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Editorial

The Brazilian Presidency of BRICS in 2025

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Editors

Brazil chairs the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in 2025 after taking up the mettle of presiding over the G20 in 2024. This is an amazing show of diplomatic and technical strength on the part of Brazil. Brazil chose - *Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance* - as the theme. Five sub-themes chosen are shown below:

1. **Facilitating Trade and Investment:** Promoting economic integration through the development of efficient payment systems.
2. **Regulating Artificial Intelligence:** Encouraging inclusive and responsible AI governance for development purposes.
3. **Addressing Climate Change:** Enhancing financing mechanisms to support global efforts, in coordination with the COP30 climate summit.
4. **Public Health Collaboration:** Strengthening cooperation projects among member countries, focusing on improving public health systems.
5. **Institutional Development:** Bolstering the internal frameworks of BRICS to ensure effective governance and decision-making.

Source: Government of Brazil

The presidency of Brazil represents a significant opportunity for the country to shape the agenda of one of the world's most influential multilateral groups. The bloc has expanded and looks set to expand even more, thus expanding its power currency but also complicating its internal dynamics. As a member since the bloc's formalization, Brazil's leadership and priorities during its presidency reflect its aspirations for global governance, economic cooperation, and geopolitical influence. Brazil's presidency of BRICS typically operates within a rotating system that allows each member state to chair the organization and set the agenda for the year. This rotational presidency is an opportunity to advance issues critical to the host country while maintaining the collective interests of the group. For Brazil, its presidency often emphasizes multilateralism, sustainable development, and addressing inequality.

Brazil's approach is grounded in its historical advocacy for South-South cooperation and its role as a voice for the Global South in global forums. During its last tenure, the priorities typically included: **Promoting Sustainable Development:** Brazil emphasizes policies related to the environment, clean energy, and sustainable economic growth, aligning with its vast natural resources and biodiversity. **Strengthening economic partnerships:** Enhancing trade and investment flows between BRICS members while reducing reliance on the US dollar in international trade. **Advancing multilateralism:** Reinforcing global governance reforms, especially in institutions like the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank. **Addressing global inequalities:** Brazil champions equitable access to vaccines, technology, and education as part of its presidency.

Key challenges anticipated include

- **Internal BRICS Dynamics:** Diverging interests among member states, especially between China and India or Russia and the West, pose a challenge to consensus-building.
- **Global Pressures:** Brazil's presidency occurs amidst heightened global polarization, with mounting US-China tensions and ongoing conflicts such as the war in Ukraine.
- **Domestic Political Constraints:** The effectiveness of Brazil's presidency is influenced by its domestic political stability and leadership priorities.

Impacts and Legacy

Brazil's presidency provides an opportunity to enhance its diplomatic profile and strengthen its economic and strategic ties with member states. Success in achieving its agenda would reinforce Brazil's position as a leader among developing nations and bolster BRICS' credibility as a counterweight to Western-dominated global institutions. Conversely, failure to address internal divisions or produce tangible outcomes could weaken the bloc's unity and global influence. Brazil is ultimately expected to place firmly on the agenda the questions of development including the implementation of the SDGs, advancing the fight against poverty as it did in the G20 and innovative climate financing.

This edition is dedicated to the efforts to lead BRICS to greater heights in 2025.

We thank the authors, reviewers and fellow editors for the sterling work on this edition

Siphamandla Zondi

Editor-in-Chief

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BRICS Expansion and Future Prospects: Implications and Policy Consideration for Pakistan

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Abstract

The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) bloc, representing a coalition of major developing nations, has recently expanded by admitting six new members—Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—effective from January 1, 2024. This expansion transforms the bloc into BRICS Plus (+), reflecting the rising multipolarity in global politics and economics. This paper examines the implications of BRICS Plus for Pakistan, assessing potential economic, geopolitical, and security benefits while addressing challenges such as Indian opposition and Western pressure. The study concludes with policy recommendations for Pakistan to leverage this opportunity by enhancing trade, investment, and diplomatic relations within BRICS.

Keywords: BRICS Plus, Pakistan, global governance, economic integration, multipolarity, trade relation

Introduction

An alliance of developing nations i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa is known as BRICS. A British economist Jim O'Neill coined the acronym BRIC (O'Neill, 2001). Annual summits, have been held since 2009, by BRICS countries to discuss and collaborate multiple issues including economic development, political cooperation, global governance. The formal institution of BRICS, the NDB was established in 2014 during the sixth BRICS Summit (Evaghorou, 2016). Bangladesh, Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Uruguay were admitted as members of the NDB in 2021 (Khan, 2023). A capital of US\$ 100 billion was initially authorized by NDB. The BRICS nation has diverse economies and geopolitical interests but enhancing their influence on global affairs, to address the economic challenge, and development promotion and cooperation among members are their common goal.

The 15th BRICS summit was able to achieve an across-the-board consensus on one major agenda points (among the others) of the summit; an agreement on the expansion of BRICS into a broader platform by inviting new member state. Six new countries including Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran (IRI), Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE have joined BRICS and adopted the new form of BRICS Plus (+), and their membership will be effective from January 01, 2024 (Reuters, 2023). More than 40 countries and regions showed interest in joining BRICS and 22 of them formally applied to join BRICS (Hassan, 2023). After the inclusion of 6 new members into the group, it no longer remains BRICS but has adopted the new form of BRICS Plus (+).

The expansion of BRICS nations contributes to the emergence of a multipolar world, where various power centers exist, challenging the unipolar dominance of Western nations (Ghalib, 2023). There is a consensus among the BRICS nation to bring reform in the United Nation Security Council to increase the representation of developing countries in the Council's memberships.

The aim of the present study is to analyze the implications of BRICS expansion for Pakistan, focusing on economic, geopolitical, and security dimensions, and offering policy recommendations. The objectives of this paper are:

1. Examine the opportunities and challenges for Pakistan in joining BRICS Plus.
2. Analyze the economic implications of BRICS expansion for Pakistan.
3. Assess the geopolitical and security impact of BRICS for Pakistan.
4. Propose policy recommendations to maximize Pakistan's benefits from BRICS membership.

Literature Review

BRICS was initially hypothesized by Jim O'Neill (2001) as a grouping of emerging markets that could notably reshape the global economic order. Its members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—came together to challenge Western supremacy, particularly in global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Scholars debate that BRICS represents an alternative to the neoliberal global order by promoting South-South cooperation and institutional reforms (Hansen & Sergunin, 2015). The shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order forms the basis of the theoretical understanding of BRICS' role. Power transition theory (PTT) is often applied to analyze how BRICS and similar groupings emerge as challengers to established powers. According to Lim (2014), rising powers, disappointed with the status quo, tend to forge new alliances and institutions to maximize their economic benefits and reform the global order. BRICS, therefore, positions itself as a coalition of emerging economies that advocate for inclusive global governance and challenge the existing global financial hierarchy.

Recent literature on BRICS expansion highlights the group's shift towards a broader framework by acknowledging new members, transforming into BRICS Plus. This expansion is viewed as part of the broader strategy to strengthen its geopolitical influence and economic relevance. Analysts explore that BRICS Plus aims to counterbalance the influence of Western alliances and enhance the voice of developing countries in global affairs (Krugman, 1991; Ghalib, 2023). The new members—Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—bring not only economic reserves but also geopolitical leverage, potentially making BRICS a more formidable player on the global stage.

Moreover, the literature indicates that BRICS expansion enhances its authenticity and relevance in global governance, aligning with calls for UN reforms to increase the representation of developing countries (Mandrup & Smith, 2015). This diversification also indicates the bloc's strategic intent to strengthen economic cooperation and reduce dependency on Western-led financial institutions (Lagutina & Vasilieva, 2012). The economic potential of BRICS is widely credited, with studies highlighting its collective contribution to global growth and trade. Brawley (2007) suggests that while BRICS countries have distinct economic models, they share common goals of raising growth and reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar in trade. The admission of resource-rich countries into BRICS Plus further strengthens this agenda, creating openings for energy and trade alliances among member states.

However, some scholars express skepticism about whether BRICS can maintain long-term economic consistency due to the structural differences among its members (Mathur & Dasgupta, 2013). Countries like Brazil and South Africa face challenges related to infrastructure and inequality, while China and Russia pursue different geopolitical strategies. The expansion to BRICS Plus introduces new complications, as the bloc must navigate diverse political interests to maintain cohesion.

BRICS is not only an economic coalition but also a geopolitical body that influences regional and global power dynamics. Studies suggest that the bloc's expansion is driven by its wish to create a multipolar world order where power is distributed among multiple centers rather than concentrated in the West (Organski, 1958). Scholars claim that the inclusion of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia adds a new dimension to BRICS' geopolitical influence, enabling the group to engage in regional issues such as energy security and conflict solution (Sergunin & Gao, 2018).

Pakistan's potential membership in BRICS Plus is particularly relevant in this context. Analysts note that China's support for Pakistan within BRICS could strengthen Pakistan's strategic position in South Asia, counterbalancing India's influence. However, BRICS typically refrains from intervening in bilateral conflicts, requiring Pakistan to leverage diplomatic avenues rather than relying solely on BRICS to mediate regional disputes (Glosny, 2010). While the expansion of BRICS offers significant opportunities, the literature highlights several challenges. Political scientists warn that internal divisions among BRICS members—such as border disputes between India and China—could hinder the group's ability to function cohesively (Mandrup & Smith, 2015). Moreover, the addition of new members with divergent political systems introduces further complexities in decision-making processes.

The future of BRICS also depends on its ability to translate economic growth into sustainable development and political power. Scholars argue that BRICS must address internal inequalities and invest in new technologies to remain competitive with the G7 economies (Brawley, 2007). Additionally, the bloc's success will hinge on its ability to build inclusive institutions and foster meaningful cooperation among its diverse members.

Theoretical Framework and Methods

This research draws on the theory of multipolarity in global governance, which posits that international relations are increasingly shaped by multiple power centers. BRICS expansion signifies a shift from unipolar dominance to a multipolar world, where developing nations like Pakistan can play a significant role. The research also applies economic integration theory, which suggests that inclusion in international economic blocs like BRICS could drive economic growth through trade, investment, and cooperation.

This study uses a qualitative research approach, relying on secondary data sources such as existing literature, reports, and expert analyses. The research follows a thematic review of BRICS expansion, focusing on economic, geopolitical, and security implications for Pakistan. Data is collected from credible sources including BRICS reports, IMF databases, and policy papers to understand the impact of BRICS Plus on Pakistan.

BRICS expansion and future prospects

The expansion of BRICS nations contributes to the emergence of a multipolar world, where various power centers exist, challenging the unipolar dominance of Western nations (Chalib, 2023). The perception of BRICS as a potential challenge to Western hegemony is because of several factors. The BRICS countries hold a share of 32 % of the world GDP in term of purchasing power parity (PPP) compared to 30 % held by G7 countries in 2023 (Statista, 2023). Bloomberg reported while quoting IMF data, that by 2028, BRICS countries will contribute close to 40% of global economic growth (Bloomberg, 2023). It is predicted that the economy of BRICS countries will continue to grow at a faster rate than the average growth rate for the entire world (Saddam, 2023). BRICS represents almost half of world's population i.e., 55.75% (IMF, 2023). The BRICS nations are challenging the dominance of IMF and world bank by increasing their influence in global governance and forums

(Ghalib, 2023). The collaboration of BRICS countries on various fronts economic development, security, and culture exchange can enhance their collective power contribute to a more balanced global order (Ghalib, 2023). The shifting of global economic power balance could lead to BRICS play an even more decisive role in the formation of international norms and regulations. BRICS countries have varied geopolitical interests, often conflicting, like border disputes and differing foreign policy objectives, requiring careful management. The BRICS nations have distinct economic systems, making unified policy formulation challenging. Aligning diverse economies like China's and South Africa's needs negotiation and compromise.

United Nation Security Reforms

A joint statement has been issued by the BRICS countries during the 15th summit; "We support a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more democratic, representative, effective and efficient, and to increase the representation of developing countries in the Council's memberships so that it can adequately respond to prevailing global challenges and support the legitimate aspirations of emerging and developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America including Brazil, India and South Africa, to play a greater role in international affairs, in particular in the United Nations, including its Security Council" (Onultalia, 2023). UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said that most UN countries recognize the need for reforming the Security Council. "Africa is underrepresented in the global financial architecture, just as it lacks a permanent seat on the Security Council. The world has changed. Global governance must change with it. We need reforms to make global frameworks truly universal and representative of today's world".

Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan is a potential candidate for join the BRICS plus, recently China and Russia expressed their wishes and hinted that Pakistan may join the block in future (Ghalib, 2023). Joining BRICS will surely have positive implications for Pakistani considering its geopolitical position, economic needs, and diplomatic relationships.

Economic Implications

The analysis of BRICS expansion into BRICS Plus reveals several economic opportunities for Pakistan, primarily in the areas of trade, investment, and energy cooperation. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two of the world's largest oil producers, presents Pakistan with a chance to secure more favorable energy deals. This could help alleviate Pakistan's ongoing energy crisis, which is a significant hurdle to economic growth.

In addition, the potential for increased trade with BRICS members, especially China and Russia, provides an avenue for Pakistan to diversify its exports. The geographic proximity to China, in particular, allows Pakistan to strengthen its participation in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is already a vital economic partnership. However, Pakistan's current economic instability and lack of export diversification pose a challenge to fully capitalizing on BRICS membership.

Key Findings:

- BRICS Plus membership would enable Pakistan to secure energy resources from oil-rich member countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

- Pakistan's exports could reach new markets within BRICS, but the country must improve the quality and competitiveness of its products.
- Strengthened ties with China through BRICS Plus could lead to deeper integration within CPEC, but economic reforms are necessary to take full advantage.

Geopolitical and Diplomatic Implications

Geopolitically, joining BRICS Plus offers Pakistan a platform to elevate its diplomatic influence on the global stage. China and Russia's backing for Pakistan could enhance its standing within the organization, particularly in balancing its complex relationship with India. Although BRICS does not typically engage in bilateral disputes, Pakistan could use its position within the bloc to counterbalance Indian influence.

The inclusion of Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, presents Pakistan with additional diplomatic leverage. These countries have traditionally maintained close ties with Pakistan, which could enhance regional cooperation on issues like counter-terrorism and regional stability. Iran's inclusion adds another layer of complexity, as Pakistan would need to carefully manage its relationship with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, given their geopolitical rivalry.

Key Findings:

- Pakistan's strategic partnership with China could be further strengthened, positioning Pakistan as a key player in BRICS Plus discussions.
- India's opposition to Pakistan's inclusion in BRICS remains a significant geopolitical challenge, requiring a strong diplomatic strategy to overcome.
- The addition of Middle Eastern countries offers Pakistan a broader diplomatic platform to engage in regional and Islamic world affairs.

Security and Regional Stability Implications

From a security perspective, BRICS Plus could offer Pakistan opportunities to collaborate on counter-terrorism and regional stability initiatives. Both China and Russia have vested interests in combating terrorism, particularly in the context of South Asia and Central Asia. Pakistan, being a frontline state in the fight against terrorism, could benefit from intelligence-sharing agreements and security cooperation within BRICS Plus.

However, Pakistan's internal security challenges, including insurgency and terrorism, must be addressed to fully participate in BRICS security initiatives. Furthermore, BRICS does not typically interfere in regional disputes, so the potential for BRICS to facilitate dialogue between Pakistan and India is limited. Nonetheless, Pakistan can leverage its membership in BRICS Plus to highlight its role in regional security and counter-terrorism efforts.

Key Findings:

- BRICS Plus could facilitate greater cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts, benefiting Pakistan's security apparatus.
- Internal security challenges in Pakistan could limit its ability to fully engage in BRICS security initiatives.
- The bloc's non-interference in bilateral disputes means that Pakistan cannot rely on BRICS to mediate tensions with India, but it can use its membership to strengthen its diplomatic position.

Challenges in Joining BRICS Plus

Despite the opportunities that BRICS Plus presents, Pakistan faces several challenges that must be addressed to fully benefit from membership. Indian opposition is perhaps the most significant hurdle, as India may attempt to block Pakistan's entry into the bloc. Additionally, Pakistan's internal political instability, coupled with economic stagnation and security concerns, could hamper its ability to engage effectively with BRICS Plus.

Pakistan must also navigate Western opposition to BRICS, as the bloc is seen as a counterbalance to Western-dominated institutions like the IMF and World Bank. This could strain Pakistan's relationships with its Western allies, especially the United States, which views BRICS as a potential challenger to the global economic order.

Key Findings:

- Indian opposition remains the primary challenge for Pakistan in joining BRICS Plus.
- Pakistan's economic and political instability may hinder its ability to engage effectively within the bloc.
- Western pressure on Pakistan could increase if it aligns too closely with BRICS, especially given the bloc's opposition to Western-dominated financial institutions.

The findings from this study indicate that BRICS expansion into BRICS Plus presents significant opportunities for Pakistan in terms of economic growth, energy security, and diplomatic engagement. However, the challenges, particularly related to India's opposition and Pakistan's internal instability, must be carefully managed through strategic diplomacy and economic reform.

Pakistan's successful entry into BRICS Plus depends largely on its ability to leverage its relationships with key BRICS members, particularly China and Russia, and to balance its relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Pakistan must focus on improving its domestic political stability and economic resilience to fully capitalize on the opportunities BRICS Plus offers.

While BRICS Plus provides Pakistan with a platform to expand its geopolitical and economic influence, the country's internal challenges—economic, political, and security—must be addressed to take full advantage of these opportunities. Effective diplomacy, economic reforms, and strategic partnerships will be critical for Pakistan to successfully navigate its path to BRICS membership.

Conclusion

The expansion of BRICS presents significant opportunities for Pakistan, particularly in terms of trade, investment, and security cooperation. However, the challenges posed by India's opposition and Western pressure must be navigated carefully. Pakistan's policymakers should develop a strategic approach that strengthens its diplomatic ties with key BRICS members, enhances its economic resilience, and promotes regional stability. By actively engaging with BRICS Plus, Pakistan could enhance its global standing and contribute to a multipolar world order.

Pakistan's policy makers would need to navigate these with a strategic vision that leverages the country's strengths and addresses its vulnerabilities in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

Recommendations

1. Pakistan should continue to make its case as an eligible candidate for BRICS membership. despite Indian expected opposition by utilizing its good relationship with China and friendly nations.

2. To counter India's Pakistan will have to conduct an aggressive diplomatic campaign to lobby all BRICS' member to vote in favor of Pakistan and convince India to let Pakistan in for the larger interest of the BRICS plus.
3. It is crucial for Pakistan to balance geopolitical interests, especially regarding the India-Pakistan dynamic.
4. Pakistan will have increase its agriculture and food production output plus quality that will substantially contribute to the collective output of the organization.
5. Pakistan should focus on strengthening economic diplomacy with BRICS Plus members, leveraging its relations with China and other friendly nations.
6. Pakistan will have to strengthen its national currency as it will aid in smoothly dealing in national currencies with other members for commercial purposes.
7. The overall export portfolio also needs to be expanded extensively and move towards product specialization in order to compete with bigger economies within the group and avoid becoming commercially redundant.
8. Policy consistency will have to be ensured at every level; this will boost confidence of other BRICS members on Pakistan as a potential candidate for BRICS
9. Pakistan should immediately apply for NDB membership even before it formally applies for BRICS full membership. This will complement and strengthen Pakistan's full membership case into BRICS.
10. Enhancing security cooperation, promoting cultural exchanges, and preparing for potential full membership in BRICS Plus should also be key components of Pakistan's strategy.
11. Pakistan should put its diplomatic efforts for UN reforms by stressing inclusive global governance. This approach will enable Pakistan to maximize the benefits of this evolving geopolitical landscape.

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An Analysis of South Africa's Foreign Policy Priorities on Africa: The Domestic-Foreign Policy Nexus, 2018-2022

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ABSTRACT

This research paper explores the nexus between South Africa's domestic and foreign policies between 2018 and 2022, using a neoclassical realist framework, and with a focus on South Africa's foreign policy priorities on Africa. It measures the state's performance against its pronounced foreign policy priorities towards the continent. This paper aims to examine whether the citizens of South Africa are an asset or a liability to the state's stated foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, it examines how South Africa can improve its foreign policy such that the domestic developments in the state may positively impact the African continent. The paper uses qualitative research, with data analysis of case studies. The findings indicate that South Africa does not have a coherent foreign policy, which in turn negatively affects the African continent, and that South Africa is a long way from achieving a pan-Africanist foreign policy. The paper concludes by contemplating the importance of educating South African policymakers and citizens in strengthening and implementing the DIRCO's mission and objectives.

Introduction

Background of the study

One of the most debated issues is whether South Africa has a coherent foreign policy or not. South Africa's foreign policy has been viewed as inconsistent. The divisive leadership of the former President, Jacob Zuma, and the failures of the ANC to ensure transparency and good governance have contributed to the challenges of South Africa's foreign policy. According to analysts, South Africa's foreign policy is ineligible to be classified as impressive and coherent (Lipton, 2009). The ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy are still ongoing in the present day under the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa.

Apartheid contributed to people living in fixed categories. This meant that people were grouped according to where they were and how they physically looked. This segregation led to Africans being isolated from one another and each state living on its own. Every African state developed its foreign policy based on the interests that the states had. It is believed that to understand South Africa's foreign policy, the political transition after apartheid should be well explained and understood (Habib, 2009). It is crucial to understand what influenced South Africa's ideas, interests, and institutions during the political evolution post-apartheid.

This research paper seeks to examine how South Africa's foreign policy the African continent and whether domestic developments help or hinder the advancement of the aims of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). This paper studies the White Paper on South African foreign policy and what the DIRCO aims to do. It examines Zuma's and Ramaphosa's foreign policies. The paper studies the xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa between 2018 and 2022, the reclaiming of buildings in Johannesburg under the mayorship of Herman Mashaba,

and the cancellation of the Zimbabwe Special Permit by the South African government. This paper further examines whether or not South Africa can have a pan-Africanist foreign policy.

The research argues that despite its international recognition and connections, South Africa is still has a flawed foreign policy. The paper uses domestic events as a starting point for what South Africa has to work on within its borders before it achieves its goal of building shared prosperity for Africa and its people. It may be argued that South Africa has played a vital role in bringing peace and security to Africa and affirming African development; however, there is instability within its borders. It is for this reason that South Africa has to prioritize its citizens before expanding its priorities to Africa.

Case Studies

Introduction

This paper will discuss literature that talks about the South Africa's foreign policy, its national interest, South Africa's position in Africa and in the world. It further discusses literature on administrations by Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Additionally, this paper discusses the literature on Herman Mashaba's mayoralty in the city of Johannesburg, xenophobic attacks in South Africa, the function of Operation Dudula and the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit in South Africa.

White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy

Looking at South Africa's history of liberation, its changing international engagement is centralized around two doctrines, namely the Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa views itself as an integral part of Africa. This is because it understands its national interest as being connected to Africa's stability, unity and prosperity. South Africa and Department of International Relations and Cooperation's (DIRCO) aim for the next decades is that South Africa's international relations must shape and strengthen the national identity, cultivate national pride and patriotism (DIRCO, 2011). It should address the injustices of the past, including those of gender and race. It aims to bring social cohesion and stability by bringing the divisions in the society (DIRCO, 2011). It also aims to grow the economy for the development and upliftment of its people (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa aims to promote its national interest and achieve a better life for its people and the continent.

South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country that embraces the concept of Ubuntu as a way of defining who South Africans are and how they relate to others (DIRCO, 2011). Ubuntu is a philosophy concept that means humanity. It is reflected in the idea that when one affirms their humanity, they also affirm the humanity of others. The philosophy of Ubuntu translates into an international relations approach that respects all nations, peoples and cultures (DIRCO, 2011). It recognizes that it is in the states' national interest to promote and support the positive developments of others. According to DIRCO, South Africa supports collaboration of states, cooperation and building partnerships over conflict. South Africa's recognition on interconnectedness and interdependency together with the infusion of Ubuntu into the South African identity has shaped the foreign policy of the state (DIRCO, 2011).

In a world that is interdependent and changing fast, it is essential for South Africa to regularly make an evaluation of its foreign policy and to ensure that its national interests are maximized. Foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies and as such South Africa ensures that these inform its foreign policy (DIRCO, 2011).

South Africa's foreign policy is currently based on the primacy of the African continent and the Southern African Development Community, commitment to South-South cooperation, the importance of multilateralism, consolidating relations with the North, and the strengthening of bilateral social, political, and economic relations, while remaining faithful to the constitutional principles that have guided South Africa since 1994 (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa is dedicated to pursuing an aggressive and targeted foreign policy. As the principal advisor on matters pertaining to South Africa's foreign policy, DIRCO's role is to coordinate how South Africa conducts its international relations (DIRCO, 2011). In order to improve South Africa's international cooperation and the execution of its development and humanitarian assistance programs, DIRCO established the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) (DIRCO, 2011).

DIRCO (2011:9) claims that the alignment, coordination, and management of South Africa's international relations and related activities, monitoring of global developments, including the provision of early warnings to political principals, formulation of foreign policy options, protection of South Africa's sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic diplomacy, and public diplomacy, are all ways that its international mission is carried out and mandated.

South Africa's position in the world

South Africa aims to be an influential and successful member of the international community by 2025. It aims to do this by establishing a globally competitive economy that addresses unemployment, inequalities and poverty in South Africa and it also aims to contribute to the development of the African continent (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa gets opportunities from how fast the gap between developed and developing countries is closing and the establishment of the balance of power in the international system (DIRCO, 2011). South African companies have been leading in using technology to develop market conditions and the development of new business models (DIRCO, 2011). This has allowed South Africa to be able to explore markets in sectors such as mobile communications and financial services (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa should continue to explore opportunities to overtake other strategies to open up market sectors (DIRCO, 2011).

The change in the balance of power in the global system together with the increase in the closing capability gap between developing and developed states creates opportunities for South Africa (DIRCO, 2011). States now have an unprecedented opportunity to maximize their influence by taking the lead on specific issues as well as within the region, due to the convergence of trends (DIRCO, 2011). This influence comes from taking the lead on policy, creating institutions, and developing solutions (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa's influence in international fora has increased because of its participation in this position on the African continent (DIRCO, 2011). The next strategic challenge is for South Africa to take advantage of this chance to lead the way in establishing a new world order (DIRCO, 2011).

As some important developing state move closer to becoming developed, the unity of the states of the South may weaken (DIRCO, 2011). Based on their capacities and integration into global governance frameworks, this group of developing states already distinguishes itself from the rest of the developing world (DIRCO, 2011). The capacity and influence gap between major states and the rest of the developing world, particularly the LDCs, has expanded as a result (DIRCO, 2011). This could have an effect on the South's unity and the promotion of the agenda of the developing states in international fora (DIRCO, 2011). In this situation, South Africa should continue to promote the interests and solidarity of the South. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that solid bilateral ties strengthen South Africa's influence and international positions within multilateral organizations and groupings (DIRCO, 2011).

South Africa's position in Africa

The fight for a better life in South Africa is linked to its efforts to create a better Africa in a better world. Its fate is entwined with that of the Southern African region (DIRCO, 2011). The basis for Africa's socioeconomic development and political unification, as well as crucial to our own prosperity and security (DIRCO, 2011), is regional and continental integration. Africa is therefore the focal point of South Africa's foreign policy. In order to respond to and resolve crises, strengthen regional integration, and most importantly, increase intra-African trade and support sustainable development and opportunities in Africa, South Africa must continue to support regional and continental processes (DIRCO, 2011).

According to DIRCO (2011), South Africa's role in the African Union (AU) and its structures is to step up its involvement so that the AU can carry out its mandate to promote social and economic advancement as well as unity on the African continent. In addition to warning them about how Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributes to the delay of African unity and solidarity, South Africa intends to continue supporting the AU's function as the main body for coordinating continental positions (DIRCO, 2011). In the meantime, through its planned bilateral activities and other international fora, South Africa will keep advancing common African positions (DIRCO, 2011).

Development must take place in an environment of peace, stability, and security (DIRCO, 2011). Future conflicts will be more frequently threatening due to rising demographic pressures, energy, food, and water scarcities, as well as increased global competition for access to natural resources (DIRCO, 2011). Socio-cultural, racial, and religious barriers might make these problems worse (DIRCO, 2011). The best way to address these issues is through regional political and economic cooperation as well as through tackling colonial legacies and neo-colonial influences (DIRCO, 2011).

As a result, South Africa will continue taking the lead in efforts to prevent conflicts, maintain peace, build peace, and aid in post-conflict recovery (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa will keep collaborating with the AU to prevent unlawful governmental changes (DIRCO, 2011). It will also keep supporting AU and the United Nations (UN) measures to resolve unresolved self-determination and decolonization problems on the African continent (DIRCO, 2011). The values of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states are upheld by South Africa (DIRCO, 2011).

Insofar as the continent is able to rationalize and streamline the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as pillars of African integration, future economic success and unity on the African continent will be realized (DIRCO, 2011). Agriculture, energy, and water are just a few examples of the complementary industries that continue to exist and will support regional integration and industrial growth (DIRCO, 2011). Regions will become subject to outside interests if there is a failure to maximize the advantages of these complementarities (DIRCO, 2011). Therefore, South Africa would prioritize taking on a constructive leadership role to hasten and deepen regional integration (DIRCO, 2011).

South Africa will continue to support Southern African Development Community's (SADC) regional economic program, which calls for sectoral cooperation, market integration, and policy coordination and convergence through the SADC Free Trade Area (DIRCO, 2011). SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East Africa Community (EAC) integration would strengthen Africa's political union and economy (DIRCO, 2011). Relationships between South Africa and the various African states continue to be crucial to its approach to foreign policy (DIRCO, 2011). It will continue to strengthen bilateral cooperation with African states through ongoing partnerships for development, including the promotion of trade and investment, the establishment of joint projects for the development of infrastructure, and the provision of technical assistance for

institutional and policy development (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa will also make an effort to better coordinate its bilateral and multilateral engagements in the region (DIRCO, 2011).

South Africa's national interest

The protracted years of the liberation struggle had a significant influence on the principles that motivate and direct South Africa as a state (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa, which has benefitted from several acts of unselfish solidarity in the past, is adamant that what it wants for its people should also be what it wants for all of the world's population (DIRCO, 2011). Thus, its national interest might be described as being centred on its people, including encouraging their welfare, growth, and uplift; safeguarding the environment for future generations; and maintaining the prosperity of the state, its region, and continent (DIRCO, 2011). In pursuing its national interest, South Africa is motivated by a desire for a more just, humane, and equitable world order that promotes more security, peace, dialogue, and economic justice (DIRCO, 2011).

The principles that motivated the development of a free trade and democratic South Africa have stood the test of time and struggle, making the durable (DIRCO, 2011). Documents like the Freedom Charter, which emphasizes non-racism, non-discrimination, liberty and peace, democratic organs of self-government, and equality as essential to achieving the common goal of a "South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, black and white," firmly rooted equality, democracy, and human rights (DIRCO, 2011). These principles, which were ingrained in the founding clauses of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, served as an inspiration to countless people over the years of the struggle (DIRCO, 2011). One of the most progressive constitutions in the world, it affirms the aspirations of South Africa society to live in freedom, equality, and human dignity (DIRCO, 2011).

In South Africa's development and social goals strategy, foreign policy plays a significant role because it is an extension of national policy and interests (DIRCO, 2011). Encapsulating and conceptualizing a South African foreign policy that enables the state to be a decent global citizen is the goal of improving South Africa and helping to make Africa better and safer in a better world (DIRCO, 2011). The state works to create an environment where it may realize its national socioeconomic agenda as well as its political and security goals as it interacts with its region, continent, and the global community (DIRCO, 2011).

Jacob Zuma's foreign policy

In 2010, President Jacob Zuma's administration was recognized as being far less ambitious as compared to past administrations (Vines, 2010). However, due to regional challenges like Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Swaziland that still require attention, South Africa is not in a position where it can stop engaging with other states (Vines, 2010). Lessons from prior engagement, including South African peacekeeping efforts in states like the DRC and Burundi, as well as South African mediation efforts in states like Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, and the Comoros, were meant to guide the Zuma administration's future strategy in terms of both substance and style (Solomon, 2010). Although South Africa's performance in accepting international obligations 10 years before the Zuma administration has been inconsistent, there was scope for past experience to influence the Zuma engagement (Calland, 2013).

The priorities of the Republic's international engagement are defined by a set of concentric circles that make up South Africa's foreign policy (Landsberg, 2014). The Zuma government has attempted to learn from that of its predecessor, the Mbeki government (1999-2008), by emphasizing crucial foreign interactions and concerns, with the theory being advanced that these various layers reinforce one another (Landsberg, 2014). According to stated policy, the Republic's international

strategies were centred on pursuing national interests, which came to be seen as the new glue that held it all together (Mabera, 2017). However, four years into Zuma's administration, the concept of the "national interest" was still underdeveloped and needed expansion and to be put into practice (Hendricks and Majozi, 2021). The South African government still could not spell out in detail what the national interest constituted or how it would be pursued (Landsberg, 2010).

South Africa squandered its reputation as a proponent of human rights that was built by the Mandela administration. There has been a noticeable deterioration in South Africa's international engagement on African affairs, starting with Pretoria's abandonment of crisis management in Burundi in 2015 and ending with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's unexpected resignation as head of the African Union Commission (AUC) in 2017 (Strategic Comments, 2017). Due to its protection of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who was wanted for genocide and war crimes, as well as its threat to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2016, South Africa's moral reputation has suffered greatly (Strategic Comments, 2017). South African diplomats gave sluggish performances at the annual meetings of the G20 and the association of the five top developing national economies- Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) - despite the fact that it continues to be the only African member of both groups (Asuelime, 2018).

These developments were the result of Zuma's two crippling periods in government, during which he neglected domestic and international growth while abusing his position to enrich his family and African National Congress (ANC) allies (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). There have been multiple attempts to remove Zuma through party institutions because of divisions within the ANC leadership between revolutionary stalwarts outraged by the former president's nepotism and favouritism and self-serving Zuma acolytes (Yende and Yende, 2022). The stage has been set for South Africa's exclusion from continental and international affairs through his unscrupulous personalization of foreign policy, systematic mismanagement of the government, and rising xenophobia within South African society (Hamill, 2019).

Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy

Cyril Ramaphosa became the president of South Africa in February 2018, he was expected to break from Zuma on critical areas of domestic and foreign policy. Ramaphosa promised to pursue long-overdue economic reforms. He was a harsh critic of Zuma and his allies for allowing corruption to permeate the government despite the fact that both entered office as leaders of the ANC, the party that has dominated South Africa's politics since Nelson Mandela became the first post-apartheid president in 1994 (Strategic Comments, 2021). Even though Ramaphosa carried out his campaign against corruption, which frequently caused strife within his own large political party, the economy of South Africa is now in a worse state than it has ever been (Strategic Comments, 2021). The government has been compelled to prioritize domestic rather than international matters due to the severity of the economic crisis. Ramaphosa had the opportunity to modify (but not completely change) South Africa's foreign policy strategy because the state assumed leadership positions in two multilateral for the first time in 2019 (Hendricks and Majozi, 2021). Compared to Zuma, Ramaphosa's handling of these issues has shown to be more professional and practical, and less anti-Western in nature (Bond, 2023).

South Africa was elected to a two-year term as one of the ten rotating members of the United Nations Security Council (beginning in January 2019 and ending in December 2020), and Ramaphosa himself served as chairperson of the AU for one year (from February 2020 to February 2021) (Nick Pay and Postolski, 2022). These events marked the state's most significant foreign policy decisions since 2018. In these roles, the president worked with the DIRCO and his foreign ministry to develop and synchronize the various themes of Pretoria's foreign policy agenda, such as its long-standing

commitment to using multilateral approaches to solve regional and global issues (Strategic Comments, 2021). Just as the state assumed its seat on the Security Council, Ramaphosa had to deal with three concerning domestic occurrences that would all have an impact on foreign policy (Graham, 2022).

The first was the economic crisis, which resulted in South Africa's debt being downgraded to sub-investment or junk status by two of the three major credit-rating agencies: Standard & Poor's and Fitch (Mutize and Nkhalamba, 2021). South Africa had slow growth of 0.8% in 2018, extremely high unemployment of 27% and numerous structural inefficiencies (Strategic Comments, 2021). The second occurrence is when the ANC began to experience major factional strife, which threatened to bring the party to a standstill. According to Ramaphosa and his allies, the old guard connected to Zuma and the networks of state capture and favouritism that had developed around him were pledged to be punished if necessary (Fredericks and de Jager, 2022). The battle for ANC supremacy would later have an impact on policy discussions across the board. Ramaphosa's position today is not unassailable because he was only narrowly elected party leader in December 2017 (Levy *et al*, 2021). Even some of the highest posts in the party leadership were held by some of his political rivals, including the former ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule, a close ally of Zuma who was detained and accused of corruption in November 2020 (von Holdt, 2023).

The COVID-19 pandemic, which has spread more broadly in South Africa than any other state in the African continent, at least according to official figures, was the third development (Strategic Comments, 2021). Early in 2020, the pandemic quickly rose to the top of the political agenda, pushing all states into crisis management mode, escalating the already dire economic situation, and sabotaging much of Ramaphosa's peace and security agenda for his term as the AU chairperson (Strategic Comments, 2021).

Herman Mashaba's mayoralty

Herman Mashaba, a prominent businessman from South Africa, was elected mayor of Johannesburg in August 2016 and led a slender DA-led coalition (Beaumont, 2020). At the time of the 2016 local government elections, no opposition party was in power in any of South Africa's metropolitan municipalities outside of the Western Cape, where the Democratic Alliance (DA) controlled both the city and the province of Cape Town (Beaumont, 2020). However, the ruling ANC was beset by scandals as allegations of corruption and state capture involving Zuma, senior ANC officials, and the infamous Gupta family emerged in the first half of 2016 (Beaumont, 2020). The DA acknowledged the significance of picking the best candidate to run for mayor in Johannesburg (Beaumont, 2020). To deliver that vital municipality, it was going to take someone extraordinary (Beaumont, 2020). Herman Mashaba was the name that stuck out among the many that had been mentioned. Although he was not a politician, Mashaba had established a name for himself through his business successes (Beaumont, 2020).

Herman Mashaba claimed to embark on a mission to purge corruption from Africa's wealthiest metropolis, with undocumented immigrants and allegedly fraudulent agreements by ruling party leaders of South Africa as his main targets (Tech Central, 23/03/17). Mashaba stated in an interview that the government ought to seal South Africa's border due to the "massive" influx of unauthorized immigrants (Tech Central, 23/03/17). Additionally, he stated that he was ready to pursue private prosecutions if the national police authorities continue to fail to indict corrupt officials, as he claimed they have (Tech Central, 23/03/17). Mashaba stated that his plan for the downtown area of Johannesburg is to clear out residents of "hijacked" structures, hire private contractors to refurbish them, and then rent the spaces to residents making at least R4000 per month (Times Live, 04/10/17).

According to municipal figures from 2013, about 400 000 of Johannesburg's 5 million residents reside in the city's inner areas (Times Live, 04/10/17). The vicinity of infrequent employment possibilities, educational institutions, medical centres, and cheaper transportation entice people to the area (Times Live, 04/10/17). The local government's efforts to revive the city centre and entice private companies to return to help reduce a housing backlog of roughly 300 000 units are being undermined by the flood of unauthorized immigrants, according to Mashaba (Times Live, 04/10/17). Organizations that Mashaba characterizes as "so-called human rights groups" have expressed concern about the "shock and awe" campaign he is preparing to evict thousands of unauthorized occupants from buildings in Johannesburg's CBD (Times Live, 04/10/17).

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa between 2018 and 2022

When Zuma resigned in February 2018, Ramaphosa was elected to a five-year term as the president of South Africa. There was the lowest voter turnout in election history because of rising inequality, high unemployment, and corruption (Human Rights Watch, 2019). In March 2019, xenophobic violence against African foreigners and their businesses was fuelled, among other things, by economic insecurity (Cinini and Mkhize, 2021). As a result, hundreds of foreigners in Durban sought refuge at police stations and other locations as their homes, trucks, and other belongings were looted or destroyed (Ngcamu and Mantzaris, 2021). According to research by the Road Freight Association, which represents suppliers of road freight services, more than 200 people, largely foreign truck drivers have died in South Africa since March 2018 (Mlepo, 2022). The South African government unveiled a National Action Plan to tackle racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance on the 25th of March, the same day the attacks started (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

In South Africa, xenophobic abuse and violence against foreigners of African and Asian descent is common and occasionally fatal. The government has not done much to make sure that attacks by members of the public, police, and government employees are investigated or that those involved are held accountable, despite the approval of a government action plan to combat xenophobia in March 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Foreigners have been the objects of widespread protests and shutdown marked by mob violence, looting, and torching of their businesses (Niyitunga, 2023). They are used as scapegoat and blamed for economic instability, criminality and government failures to provide services (Urban and Townsend, 2022). Law enforcement personnel have treated foreign nationals unfairly and violently (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Businesses owned by foreign nationals have been the focus of raids to combat counterfeit goods. Police have carried out raids during which they have fired rubber bullets into crowds of people before searching and looting foreigners' stores (Vigneswaran, 2020). In neighbourhoods with high concentration of foreigners, the police have conducted invasive documentation raids in collaboration with the Department of Home Affairs (Vigneswaran, 2020).

The outbreak of xenophobic attacks has led to a strain in South Africa's diplomatic relations with other African states, notably Nigeria (Ibrahim, Dele and Ukeaja, 2019). Following the attacks, approximately 600 Nigerians living in South Africa were sent back home (Ibrahim *et al*, 2019). The South African government temporarily closed its embassy in Abuja, Nigeria in response to reprisal attacks in that state (Ogunnoiki, 2019). On the other hand, due to the xenophobic atrocities committed against their people in South Africa, Malawi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo did not attend the World Economic Forum on Africa, which was held in Cape Town in September 2019 (Oxford Analytica, 2019).

Operation Dudula

Operation Dudula is the most recent group to target African immigrants by exploiting the fact that South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. A division of the Put South Africans First Movement, which popularized and revived anti-immigrant activities on social media before finding expression outside, gave rise to Operation Dudula (Al Jazeera, 08/04/22). Nhlanhla “Lux” Dlamini who was born Nhlanhla Paballo Mohlauli, is the leader of the new movement. It was established in Soweto a few months after the July 2021 riots, which broke out when former president Zuma was given a jail sentence for contempt of court. It has been dubbed by some as “xenophobic and dangerous” (Al Jazeera, 08/04/22).

Operation Dudula went after alleged drug dealers and companies that reportedly hired illegal foreign workers so they could pay them less than what was required by law (Al Jazeera, 08/04/22). Intense conflicts between locals and other African nationals are frequent in Soweto, a historic Black township that was at the heart of the anti-apartheid resistance and was the home of legendary figures Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu (Al Jazeera, 08/04/22).

An Equal Education researcher and an attorney with the Equal Education Law Centre have emphasized the importance of recognizing the false narrative used to make foreigners the scapegoat for government failures and incite xenophobic sentiments in the wake of a reported campaign by the anti-foreigner group to expel migrant learners from Diepsloot schools (Daily Maverick, 10/02/23).

While grassroots democracy has the potential to liberate, it may also be used as a weapon against the weak (Open Democracy, 17/02/23). Elvis Nyathi, who was stoned and burned to death in 2022 after a mob of approximately 30 people demanded identification documents (IDs) and money he did not have, appears to have experienced this (Open Democracy, 17/02/23). Nyathi was a Zimbabwean gardener who resided in Diepsloot. Evidence revealed that Nyathi was not the only target of the group who is accused of killing him (Open Democracy, 17/02/23). They had been visiting shacks and requesting money and documents. Operation Dudula, a vigilante anti-immigrant movement, established this tactic. With its racist rhetoric against illegal foreigners, whom Dudula blamed for increased crime and unemployment, Dudula had become well-known outside of Diepsloot (Open Democracy, 17/02/23). The group asserted that because the government was doing nothing to stop the influx of illegal foreigners, thus the people had to take action.

Zimbabwean Exemption Permits in South Africa

Labour migration from nations like Zimbabwe and others, to South Africa has been a typical aspect of migration in the Southern African region since the 19th century (Moyo, 2018). But in the years following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, two stages of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa can be distinguished (Moyo, 2018). Many white skilled and semi-skilled employees fled to South Africa in the early 1980s because they were unsure of their position in the newly established Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2018). Significant migrant flows have recently arisen as a result of the country’s deteriorating economic and political condition (Moyo, 2018). Both people with documentation and people without it have migrated from Zimbabwe to South Africa (Moyo, 2018).

Through a special amnesty program known as the Dispensation Zimbabwe Program (DZP), the South African government legalized undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in 2010 (Nyakabawu, 2021). The licenses issued under the program’s purview were valid from 2010 to December 2014. The Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP), which was established from 2015 to December 2017, replaced the DZP (Nyakabawu, 2021). The Zimbabwe Exemption Permit (ZEP), which was implemented from 2018 to December 2021, replaced the ZSP (Nyakabawu, 2021).

The South African government reached an agreement to terminate the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit (ZEP) with the aim to reserve jobs for domestic citizens (News24, 27/01/23). According to a report released by the University of Johannesburg's Centre for Sociological Research and Practice (CSRP), the proposed termination of the ZEPs is forcing a significant number of people to become undocumented and fostering pockets of corruption (Daily Maverick, 08/08/23). The CSRP report stated that some ZEP holders were at a relatively high risk of going undocumented since other types of visas are difficult to get, and most ZEP holders will not qualify for visas which allow them to work in South Africa because work visas are based on critical skills (Daily Maverick, 08/08/23). Due to a unique permission, ZEP holders may launch an appeal and apply for the visa while still in South Africa (Daily Maverick, 21/06/23). According to the Immigration Act, an employer cannot legally hire someone without a valid work visa if a decision has not been reached by the end of the year (Daily Maverick, 21/06/23). The ZEP holders are also unable to continue working legally in South Africa without a visa (Daily Maverick, 21/06/23).

It has been determined that the Minister of Home Affairs' decision to end the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit program is illegal, unconstitutional, and illegitimate (GroundUp, 28/06/23). The Pretoria High Court's full bench of three judges has ordered the minister to evaluate the situation following a fair process that complies with the applicable laws (GroundUp, 28/06/23). ZEP holders are shielded from arrest and deportation while that process is ongoing, and the permits will stay valid for an additional two months, that is, until the end of June 2024 (GroundUp, 28/06/23).

Conclusion

Based on an examination of events that occurred between 2018 and 2022, this research paper examined two key issues: whether domestic citizens are an advantage or a liability for South Africa, and whether the state can implement a pan-Africanist foreign policy. This paper concludes that local citizens are a burden to the state and that South Africa has not yet developed a pan-Africanist foreign policy after a thorough analysis. Because the state's decision-makers did not implement the aims and goals they had established for the state, South Africa had a flawed foreign policy and, consequently, a poor diplomacy. As a means of achieving state objectives, diplomacy is described as the art of negotiating and interaction with individuals and state. This means that South Africa does not have good interactions with other states.

A number of critical factors surface when examining South Africa's foreign policy. For instance, the flaws of the DIRCO, followed by Zuma administration from 2009 to 2018, then Ramaphosa's administration and the events that shaped the current foreign policy in South Africa. This research illustrated that although South Africa became a member of BRICS under the Zuma administration, majority of the groundwork was done by Mbeki and the Zuma administration failed to leave a memorable mark on foreign policy. South Africa has failed to maintain influence and relevance on the international scene due to shifting global power dynamics and the appearance of new players.

This paper also examined that there are still ongoing ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy under the leadership of President Ramaphosa. Even though Ramaphosa carried out his campaign against corruption which caused conflict within the ANC, the economy of South Africa is now in a worse state than it has ever been before. The government has been compelled to prioritize domestic rather than international matters due to the severity of the economic crisis. South Africa still faces inconsistencies despite the fact that Ramaphosa handles issues professionally and practically and in a less anti-Western nature. This shows that South African leadership contributes to the inconsistent and flawed foreign policy.

The goals of South Africa's foreign policy include, but are not limited to, establishing unity, fostering inclusive economic growth, and promoting shared prosperity for Africa and its people. This demonstrates that South Africa places a greater emphasis on the international scene than the domestic one. Protecting South Africa's territorial integrity and sovereignty is one of the state's foreign policy goals. This goal has not been achieved because South Africa continues to give priority to foreign nationals in order to foster positive relations with other states. Unauthorized immigration from outside is still a problem in South Africa. Foreigners continue to enter South Africa illegally despite licences like the ZEP, and the government continues to shield them. The ZEP program's termination has been ruled to be unlawful, illegal, and illegitimate, but immigrants continue to flout the law. This research extends the idea that domestic citizens and events can influence foreign policy, in line with a number of experts who contend that South Africa's foreign policy is inconsistent and flawed.

This paper showed that South Africa's foreign policy seeks to advance its national interest, safeguard its independence, and uphold the rule of law. Additionally, it sought to improve its citizens' wellbeing, security, and prosperity as well as make Africa and the globe a better place. The reason South Africa is still far from achieving this is that its actions do not align with its foreign policy goals, and it has used the constitution to justify its actions rather than to govern the state. Due to internal problems, it will be challenging for South Africa to maintain positive relations with other African states. When South Africa cannot resolve the issues within its own borders, it cannot unite African states. As long as South Africa's leaders and citizens cannot be united, a pan-Africanist foreign policy cannot be implemented. Prioritizing the needs of its people should come before promoting unity and prosperity in Africa and around the world. When making decisions that affect the state, South African policymakers should look to the state's foreign policy goals and mission as a reference guide to build a more secure and stable state. They should never lose sight of the reasons they were elected and the promises they make to the public. The constitution should always be used to govern the state, not just when it is advantageous to them.

According to neoclassical realism theory, both domestic and international factors affect the state's foreign policy. This paper analysed the South African context. Neoclassical realism predicts that the domestic problems that faced the Zuma administration, such as corruption scandals and economic instability, resulted in a more home-grown approach to foreign policy. Internal pressure and criticism forced Zuma's administration to focus on domestic issues, potentially taking resources and attention away from international affairs. South Africa's foreign policy has been revised as a result of the Ramaphosa transition. According to neoclassical realism, a leader's dedication to solving domestic issues can have a positive effect on the state's international engagement. Ramaphosa's initiatives to fight corruption and spur economic expansion may lead to a more active foreign policy. Neoclassical realism, which incorporates Herman Mashaba's mayoralty, suggests that his leadership and policies have influenced Johannesburg's foreign policy approach, emphasizing economic and urban diplomacy and addressing local issues through international engagement.

According to neoclassical realism, domestic problems like xenophobia have an impact on foreign policy. As a result of xenophobic incidents, South Africa's relations with its neighbours and international standing suffers, thus forcing the government to re-evaluate its diplomatic strategy. An appropriate balance between domestic and international pressures is reflected in the government's response to movements like Operation Dudula. Neoclassical realism suggests that the government may seek to preserve internal stability while managing its reputation and relationships with external partners. Immigration permits for Zimbabweans are a complicated matter. Neoclassical realism contends that South Africa's strategy might be affected by the need to strike a balance between domestic issues like economic and security concerns and its international standing and relations

with Zimbabwe. According to neoclassical realism, DIRCO's function is crucial in converting domestic demands and difficulties into foreign policy decisions. Based on the domestic political climate and global interests of the nation, the department plays a critical role in determining South Africa's international response.

In conclusion, neoclassical realism holds that domestic political dynamics, leadership changes, and public pressure have an impact on South Africa's foreign policy and response to global developments. The government's efforts to balance internal and external imperatives will have an impact on how it stands internationally. The discussed case studies and results highlight the adaptability and relevance of neoclassical realism to actual circumstances. They emphasize that a state's foreign policy is heavily influenced by domestic political dynamics, changes in leadership, economic factors, and public opinion in addition to external pressures. Neoclassical realism is still helpful in understanding the complex interactions between domestic and foreign factors that influence foreign policy.

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South Africa and International Law: South Africa's Multilateral Response to the Russia-Ukraine War

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Abstract

This study aims to review South Africa's multilateral response to the Russia-Ukraine war concerning the discourse of international law and South Africa's national interests. The response was met with significant backlash. However, it elucidates several imperatives, notably, the power politics of international law, South Africa's advocacy of multilateralism, and its obligation to the BRICS bloc. This research adopts a qualitative research approach and uses the theory of Realism. Recent 2023 developments in South Africa concerning International law and the Russia-Ukraine war have sparked huge debates across international relations and academia. Topics of war crime, alliance, BRICS summit, and international law have continued dominating the mist surrounding these events and their impact. Arguably, in international relations, post-economic crisis tends to compel states to adopt a realist attitude towards their foreign policy to see through their national interests. However, due to the geopolitical and global economic crisis, protectionism in the international space has become contemporaneous, where every country enforces Realism in their foreign policy using their sovereign capacity and influence in the international space. However, such creates a beggar-thy-neighbour effect on their counterparts. South Africa finds itself being affected by these foreign protectionist policies. When the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant of arrest to South Africa against the President of Russia, this was followed by debates on notions of law and litigation; however, at the center of these debates is the South African dilemma between international law and economic cooperation with the BRICS bloc. The arguments following the dilemma have alluded to South Africa hosting a successful BRICS summit, and the execution of the warrant as South Africa remains a signatory of the Rome statute. In assessing the justification of this warrant was the relevance of international law to South Africa.

Keywords: International law, South Africa, Realism, Multilateralism, and ICC

Introduction

This research aims to thematically review South Africa's multilateral and balanced approach to simultaneously achieving its international obligation through international law and protecting its national interests. The study uses the Russia-Ukraine war to demonstrate how states will always be propelled to see through their national interest at all times. South Africa seeks a way out of this multifaceted problem while maintaining good relations with its trade partners and allies. The country is challenged to review its national interests and foreign policy against the principle of international law. To assess whether the signatory to institutions or courts of international law makes the country more resilient or more susceptible to future geopolitics as South Africa is building its operational resilience after the geopolitical risks caused by the Russia-Ukraine war.

The Russia-Ukraine war is exhibiting far-reaching effects on the global community. Through this war, developed and emerging states find themselves scrambling for means to circumvent the geopolitical

impact of the war and its blanket effect globally. The war continues to exhibit contemporaneous effects of a realist foreign policy, which has now compelled many other states like South Africa to function similarly within the political international system. The synchronized impact of the war pertains to the compromised position South Africa finds itself in, resulting in the reconfiguration of its foreign policy. This means that, as powerful countries continue to employ a realistic approach to their foreign policy, such as Russia and the United States, one instigated the war against Ukraine, the United States continues to use numerous instruments and their position to coerce smaller states through sanctions and the element of international law.

Consequently, the approach by the superpower exacerbates geopolitics and infringes on states already affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. The power struggles emanated from the latter power struggle in a hostile environment. South Africa finds itself through the cracks as more powerful countries fulfill their interests. These can be attributed to the mode of survival of many superpowers. The USA's recent uproar towards South Africa signals this realism mode of survival in the international community. This embroiled South Africa in several dilemmas and probed its global alliance, trade partnerships, foreign policy, BRICS membership, and obligation to the principle of international law through the ICC.

Literature Review

International law is divided into two main categories: conflict of laws or private international laws, which focuses on cases within specific legal systems analyzing the application of foreign law, and public international law, generally termed international law, which focuses on state relations from every angle "from war to satellites" and is responsible for regulating international institutions' engagements or work (Shaw, 2008:1-2). The Writing Center (2019:2) states that public international law or international law can be defined as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another." Slomanson (2011:2) states that "international law plays a critical role in fostering stability and order in international relations and in providing a framework for cooperation among States in addressing common challenges, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security." According to Shaw (2008:3-4), international law has no legislature, meaning it operates without standard rules, laws, or regulations, and "There is no unified system of sanctions in international law in the sense that there is in municipal law, but there are circumstances in which the use of force is regarded as justified and legal." However, international law is made up of four primary sources: international conventions or treaties, customary international law, general principles of law, and judicial decisions and qualified publicists (The Writing Center, 2019:3). Additionally, international law is established by international agreements developing rules that bind signatories, and customary law. States operate independently, signing treaties and participating in actions that may or may not be viewed as legally binding. Therefore, international law comprises a set of rules "from which States pick and choose" (Shaw, 2008:5).

Law generally reflects its society, primarily focusing on its environment's conditions, cultural traditions, and social, economic, or political values. Therefore, international law is also framed, reflecting the environment in which it operates. The central reflection is the "basic state-oriented character of world politics" (Shaw, 2008:43). Similarly, Slomanson (2011:3) states that law is an expression of the political system of a particular society. Therefore, national law expresses a national political system in a national culture. Thus, international law represents a specific culture and its political system. International law is responsible for governing independent States relations and is made up of a set of rules which, at certain times, are incorporated into their co-dependent relations (Slomanson, 2011:4). Historically, international law only governed the relations of States; however,

now it has extended to govern non-state actors such individuals, international organizations, and corporations (Slomanson, 2011:8). This was also highlighted by Shaw (2008:43) that international law has expanded to include individuals, groups and private or public international organizations.

According to the Writing Center (2019:4), there is a connection between international law and national law, which is understood using two main approaches. The first is the monist approach, whereby international law cannot be separated from national law. It bridges into it automatically, and dualism, whereby the states ensure that international law is separated from its national law. Slomanson (2011:17) pointed out the same perspective that there is an interaction between the application of international law and national law, which can be clarified using two perspectives: the monist perspective, whereby international law is automatically inherited by national law, and the rejection of its principles is unacceptable, and dualism which rejects the views of monist and believes that international law and national should be applied as two different legal systems. In the South African context, Tladi (2016:310-312) highlights the following using the Al Bashir saga: The South African Constitution is highly regarded as the most internationally law-friendly constitution in the world. The duty of S.A. to arrest Al Bashir under international and South African law has been questioned. Conclusions are drawn "highlight the importance of a proper approach to the interpretation and identification of International law by South African Courts."

The foreign policy priorities and objectives of South Africa, according to the Department of International Relations and Cooperations (DIRCO), are centralized around the human rights perspectives. This principle is derived from the constitution of South Africa. The maxim prominently speaks to redress from the past injustices of the apartheid regime (DIRCO, 2024). Regarding wars and conflict, the country's foreign policy notes that South Africa strives to enhance international peace and security, support sustainable development and adherence to and strengthen international law, and promote democracy. South Africa's foreign policy further advocates for a multilateral approach toward resolving global challenges and supports the call for the United Nations reform, including the UN Security Council (DIRCO, 2024).

South Africa's response to the Russia-Ukraine war raised much criticism and a divide among analysts. Orderson (2024) argues that foreign policy practice is complex, and the Russia-Ukraine war revealed how states tend to apply a zigzag approach towards the matter of international relations since the facultative and complex nature of international relations at times makes it challenging for states to be consistent. Orderson (2024) states that "South Africa has no principled approach towards these global conflicts," wrote Greg Mills and Ray Hartley, analysts at Johannesburg-based think-tank the Brenthurst Foundation, in a recent op-ed in the local paper the Daily Maverick. "It professes to want to mediate, but it picks and chooses when and which of its principles apply. It is a matter of time before another indiscretion undermines the spin doctoring." (Orderson, 2024). Contrary to this view, Zwelethu Jolobe, an associate professor of politics at the University of Cape Town, agrees with the seemingly two-policy approach, saying the country is "trying to promote an alternative world order" due to its enduring belief in a "multipolar society." "South Africa knows the world is a complex place ... and for us to have world peace, multilateral diplomacy is the best way to have international relations, which is at the core of its foreign policy doctrine"(Orderson, 2024). The two contrasting views on this matter flag the complex practice of aligning a country's foreign policy and its international obligation since international law and power politics are intricate to the practice and can be challenging for states to fathom.

Theoretical Literature

The theoretical framework guides the research by providing a theory that strengthens the writer's ideas regarding how they understand and plan to research their topic (Grant and Osanloo, 2014:13).

The theory is significant as it clarifies the importance of the study. Therefore, the realism theory informs this study. Realism is a school of thought that clarifies international relations concerning power (Falode, 2009:2). In addition, Realism is a school of thought that highlights the competitive and conflictual side of international relations (Antunes and Camisã, 2018:1). "The exercise of power by States towards each other is sometimes called 'realpolitik' or 'power politics'" (Falode, 2009:3). About the study, the current competition between the U.S., China, and Russia to gain more influence and power on the global system is a practical illustration of power politics. In this case, SA is caught between its international obligation to abide by international law as "instructed" by the US through the ICC to arrest President Putin or protecting its national interests by ensuring that its response to the Russia-Ukraine war does not impact its interests. Therefore, SA is a pawn in the game of power politics, whereby the U.S. and China are currently the two most powerful nations in the world, and they want to enhance their power and influence further, especially in Africa.

Realism suggests that the global system is anarchical as the States conduct relations without any global government. Therefore, to understand international relations, it is essential to focus on the power distribution among states (Falode, 2009:3). The global system has no government; therefore, states are anarchy. Thus, each State performs and makes decisions that will Favor its interests and enhance its power. SA's response to choosing a multilateral and balanced approach to the Russia-Ukraine war was calculative as it did not give in to the arrest warrant and chose a neutral stance, clearly illustrating its protection for its national interests and using its foreign policy to avoid neglecting international law. Whereas, all along, the U.S. is playing global government by instructing S.A. through the ICC to arrest President Putin; this is all for its interests and power masked as its obligation and respect for international law.

In addition, power is a significant concept realists use to explain international relations, and the uneven distribution of power in international relations clearly illustrates power politics. According to Falode (2009:3), "realists believe that power determines which country prevails; they hold that politics is aimed at increasing power, keeping power, or demonstrating power." Realists believe that power is significant over morality as "politics is directed towards keeping, increasing and demonstrating power" (Antunes and Camisã, 2018:2). The belief is that policies that place morality or are based on idealism lead to weakness and domination of a State by a competitor. The current decision taken by ICC under international law influenced by the U.S. shows that politics is directed at keeping, increasing, and demonstrating power. The U.S. seeks to keep, improve, and demonstrate its power, especially towards its competitors, China and Russia, neglecting its moral obligation to respect and promote international law. It seeks to prove its influence and control over the ICC through international law. Therefore, the US used SA to fulfill its indirect pursuit of keeping, increasing, and demonstrating power. This case was the demonstration of its power. Unfortunately, SA's international obligation to abide by international law was tested. Therefore, SA's choice of a balanced and multilateral approach to protect its national interests was seen as threatening the US' pursuit of power. According to Antunes and Camisã (2018:1), there are four assumptions surrounding the realism theory; these are as follows:

- The nation-state is the leading actor in international relations, meaning other actors are available, such as organizations and individuals; however, their power is limited.
- The State is a unitary actor; regardless of internal and domestic politics, it will focus on maximizing its national interests using one voice.
- Decision-makers are rational thinkers; therefore, they make decisions and manage relations in a manner that enables them to survive in a competitive environment.

- States are anarchical; therefore, no one is in charge globally. The States rely on themselves. There is no legislature indicating how States are expected to conduct themselves. Hence, SA's decision to respond to the Russia-Ukraine war in a balanced and multilateral approach was independent and based on its foreign policy and national interests.

Falode (2009:10) states that most realists are linked to political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who believed that there is no order in the absence of a government, individuals pursue their self-interests and that humans by nature have the desire to dominate and be more potent than others. Realism believes that foreign policy is established through reasonable calculation about the State's interests (Scott, 1994:12). Politics is a power struggle; therefore, it is wise for States to frame their foreign policy around the 'Darwinian country-eat-country world' whereby power is significant for national survival (Falode, 2009:24). Antunes and Camisã (2018:1) posit that leaders main concern is to ensure national security, therefore, to achieve this, the leader needs to be able to handle both external and internal threats by being a lion and fox. These are significant for conducting foreign policy, as the lion signifies power, and the fox signifies deception. The U.S. identifies China and Russia as more tremendous threats to their power and national security; therefore, it pursues its national interest to dominate the global system. Hence, the US acted as a fox and lion, trying to use its power to manipulate SA's response to the Russia-Ukraine war. Acting as a fox trying to promote international law, but all along, it was a lion in pursuit of power. However, as the realist believes that foreign policy is established through calculation about the state's interests, this was proven true through SA's use of its foreign policy to formulate its calculative response to the Russia-Ukraine war.

Scott (1994:1) states, "Realism dismisses international law as being virtually irrelevant to matters of high politics." Realism links international law to power, suggesting that it is an instrument used by the most powerful State (Scott, 1994:2). Realism believes that international law is insignificant and fails to understand why States obey it. International law is an instrument powerful States use to dominate and gain greater power. It is also a conceptual disguise for the State's political policy whose interests were shaped by the control of the status quo (Scott, 1994:7). Therefore, as suggested by Realism, international law is an instrument used by the most powerful State in this case the U.S. to dominate, gain more power and pursue its interests. International law is the main factor of comparable power positions in international politics. Realism believes that States obey international law when it aligns with their power interests. The relationship between international law and power precisely clarifies State behavior. Therefore, as Scott (1994:12) stated, "Power is not a consideration distinct from international law. It appears that the idea of international law is an important form of power in international politics". The U.S. is not promoting the application of international law for the interests of the global system; however, it seeks to eliminate Russia from the power competition by destroying its relationship with S.A. The U.S. promotes the arrest of Putin by the S.A. regardless of the critical consequences that the S.A. will face in the future. Eliminating Russia means it will only compete with China, decreasing its pressure. Therefore, international law, in this case, Favors U.S. interests, proving, as stated by realists, that it is an instrument used by the most potent State to pursue its selfish interests and increase its power.

Critics believe that the realism idea that power is the most significant instrument that states seek in the international systems needs to be reevaluated as States at times seek security and economic development over power (Falode, 2009:23). However, the critics neglect the idea that it is easy to have security and economic development when one has power. Realism focuses on States being the main actors in international relations, which neglects the role played by organizations and other actors as well as global issues that are unrelated to State survival (Antunes and Camisã, 2018:2). However, international organizations and other actors are easily manipulated by the powerful states, i.e., the US using the ICC for its power pursuit masked as its promotion of international law.

Additionally, Realism can lead to the creation of the violent and aggressive world that it describes as it assumes the uncooperative human nature and the anarchical system, which encourages leaders to act in a manner framed around suspicion, power, and force.

Methodology

Research methodology is used to solve a research problem systematically (Mishra and Alok, 2017:1). It provides a breakdown of the different techniques that will be used to achieve the aim and objectives of the study. The study "SA and International Law: SA's Multilateral Response to the Russia-Ukraine War" aims to thematically review SA's multilateral and balanced approach to simultaneously achieving its international obligation through international law and protecting its national interests. The topic of international law and SA may have been studied. However, the context and focus of the study are new and exciting. The study is significant as it provides an in-depth understanding of SA and its international obligation to abide by international law while maintaining its national interests in the current ever-changing global economy, power politics, increased focus on geopolitics, BRICS, lavish attention on the arrest warrant issued by the ICC against President Putin, and the current domestic elections situation in SA which may have an impact on its foreign policy. Therefore, the study provides an in-depth understanding of the importance of a state's foreign policy, i.e., SA, international law, and its work. There is no global government, but through this study, there will be a clear indication and understanding of which State has power and control over international law. The study employs a qualitative research method based on an explanatory research approach. The qualitative research method provides a deeper understanding of a situation by collecting reliable information to provide a description and understanding of human actions under situations (Jackson, Drummond, and Camara, 2007:22). Therefore, the study plans to gather enough reliable information to describe and provide an understanding of SA's decision to use a multilateral and balanced approach to respond to the Russia-Ukraine war even though it may have had an impact on its bilateral relations, i.e., US-SA relations.

The study is primarily framed around the explanatory research approach as it tries to understand the relationship between international law and S.A. Explanatory research explores reasons for something occurring using limited information, enhances the understanding of a particular topic, and seeks to provide a complete understanding of the relationship between variables (George and Merkus, 2021). The study relies on secondary sources to gather reliable and relevant information. Secondary sources include research studies and academic literature pertinent to analyzing the relationship between international law and S.A. Travis (2016) states that secondary research takes place when the writer reviews existing literature about the topic of the study. These will include journal articles, books, newspaper articles, and speeches about international law, Realism and international law, South Africa, and international law.

The study will also employ a document analysis method to review and analyze documents on S.A. and international law, especially concerning its response to the Russia-Ukraine war and the arrest warrant issued against Putin. According to Bowen (2009:27), document analysis is essential for revising and analyzing printed or electronic documents. These methods and approaches are significant and relevant in gathering efficient, appropriate, and significant information for this study.

Implications of South Africa's non-alignment stance

The height of the Russia-Ukraine war has pronounced major global shifts in economic configuration. Evidence recorded in recent months on the geopolitical fallout of the war, specifically to South Africa, has reflected the need for strengthening the sovereign capacity of the country's priorities,

the legislative transformation of international law, and the constant revision of South Africa's foreign policy.

As the war broke out in Russia, the United Nations (U.N.) and the rest of the world were compelled to employ peaceful resolution mechanisms to ensure the de-escalation of war and subdue the heightened food insecurity caused by the war (White and Holtz, 2022). The U.N. was composing a comprehensive resolution based on the charter of the United Nations by passing votes aimed at condoning Russia's invasion, which was sponsored by 96 States and passed with 141 voting in favor and five against and 35 absentees (Weiss, 2022). Nonetheless, these resolute efforts did not circumvent or reverse the impact on individual states or de-escalate the war.

The current climate in the international arena reflects the contemporaneous effect of geopolitical imbalances internationally, with its impact reaching the South African grounds. The authors argue the latter for the following findings. Firstly, South Africa is compelled to take a stance at the U.N. Security Council. This pertains to how the country was criticized for its non-alignment (Eligon, 2023). Secondly, the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court was ambushed with heightened criticism, mainly directed toward international law and its legal quality (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). Lastly, the accusation of South Africa providing weapons to Russia during the time of war in December 2022 was a clear indication of an uproar from America towards South Africa and most certainly invited uncertainty over South Africa's stance on war crimes and lowered confidence across economic markets (Van Niekerk, 2023). Concurrently, South Africa was bewildered to act in the country's interests and maintain global bilateral and trade relations while circumventing a declaration of war with Russia by not executing the warrant of arrest.

Borger (2023) notes that at the height of South Africa being challenged to oblige to the Rome Statute, the presidency expressed displeasure by labeling the ICC and international law as having double standards, especially towards African states. This came as no surprise as the whole discourse of international law has been criticized mainly for its legal quantity (Armstrong, Farrell, and Lambert, 2012). Theorists like John Austin and Morgenthau have expressed skepticism over the weak and sluggish enforcement while questioning the power and hegemonic dynamics intricated within the discourse (Armstrong et al., 2012).

When two bulls fight, the grass suffers

The war established a series of security dilemmas worldwide; we can resonate the current climate in the international community to ideals of realism where states conduct themselves in a manner that foresees their national interests using their sovereign capacity and influence on the global stage (Williams and McGuinnis, 1992). This blanket effect caused by the war on every state instigated a hostile climate on the international ground, which obligated states to exhibit their national interest simultaneously in the global arena, establishing a synchronized pattern of realism worldwide and leading to a collision of national interests in the international arena/field.

These are the peculiarities in which South Africa found itself, constrained between the interests of the USA and Russia, with limited self-determination to define South Africa's interests at the time. Herein, the sovereign capacity and influence of these two superpowers outweighed the interests and priorities of South Africa. The latter can be explained by states' typical behavior and conduct when faced with a security dilemma or an economic crisis (Montgomery, 2006). Consequently, such behavior helps establish a hostile international order with a beggar-thy-neighbor effect on weaker states. South Africa was affected by the synchronized effect or pattern of realism, which reverberates to the African proverb that reads that *when two bulls fight, the grass suffers*, which means that the weak get hurt in conflicts between the powerful (Simpson and Speake, 2008).

Operational resilience after a global crisis

The current anarchist international space continues to compel South Africa to strengthen its political and sovereign capacity to trade on equal footing with its state counterparts. This can thwart sanction-driven bilateral relations and partnerships underscored by conditionalized trade agreements and menacing alliances. This research urges South Africa to review its relevance to the Rome Statute. The country must assess if being part of the ICC helps build its operational resilience and strengthens sovereignty, peace and security, and immunity against geopolitical shocks and global rivalries.

The ICC makes South Africa more susceptible to geopolitical risks as it can be modeled as a political tool by states powerful enough to impose sanctions. Armstrong et al. (2012) posit that the element of self-help and the lack of an obligatory character of international law aids it to be used only by the powerful states against emerging ones. Thus, South Africa should seek a window of self-determination not only in response to the current international adversities of the Rome Statute but also in reasserting its position in the whole economic and international arena. The appropriate action should ponder the nexus between operational resilience, a realist attitude towards global cooperation, and foreign policy. As a way of ensuring tenacity against future adversities, we are introduced to the idea of geopolitical resilience, which is enclosed on six elements, namely, reputational, organizational, financial, technology, operational, and governance model; these elements should be revised continuously for states to ensure resilience beyond the current international climate (Grant, Haider, and Mieszala, 2022).

Conclusion

This study has revealed the complex nature of international politics and the growing prominence of multilateralism. These co-existing complexities were highlighted by South Africa's response to the Russia-Ukraine war. This approach has been termed a multilateral one that considers South Africa's international obligation but prioritizes the country's national interest through a realist approach. This study proposes that the country should examine and distinguish between state bilateral and multilateral relations that help accelerate the country's economic and international cooperative development. While also sourcing out memberships that invite inquisitions and risks to the country's development. South Africa reserves the right to shape its political and economic order under the auspice of sovereignty by the Montevideo Convention (Shaw, 2008). South Africa should aggressively use attractive national instruments to pursue and see through its national interests and the country's rise. It is overt that the war has aggressively pushed for a reconfigured world order that has clearly distinguished priorities and disparities of the global North and South, which further calls for the states to clearly define their development objectives and implementation plans under the aegis of building capable states that can strictly eliminate the vulnerability of future global shocks and geopolitical risks.

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Exhibiting Archaeology: A Qualitative Study on Museums and Public Education

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Abstract

The museum has played a vital role in educating the public about their past through the use of its exhibits. Museums through their programs provide archaeological public education. Museums' role in protecting cultural heritage cannot be underrated. In this study, data was collected using observation and structured interviews from the public who visited the museum on various occasions. Also, key informant interviews were another key method of obtaining data that was used on museum staff. The research findings indicate that archaeological exhibits are essential in communicating information about the discipline of archaeology. Secondly, museum programs convey information about archaeology to the public. Lastly, museums act as a purveyor of cultural heritage information and as a custodian and protector of heritage. In conclusion, museums have a role in ensuring that exhibitions are well displayed to communicate information about archaeology. The stakeholders in archaeology have a role in partnering with museums in developing programs that are of value to the public. Public education programs should be developed to suit the different segments of the public from the school going children to senior citizens in the country. Museums should be well nurtured by the public and the government in order to protect our cultural heritage.

Keywords: Exhibit, Museum programs, Public education, Legislation.

Introduction

Museum is an establishment whose main function involves the preservation (conservation) of a collection of pieces which are of cultural, historical, artistic or scientific significance. A museum has been the main purveyor of archaeological public education. Museums display scientific, historical, cultural and artistic treasures through their exhibits that are essential in shaping our society. Exhibits communicate more about our communities, nation, past cultures. In the absence of this, such noble stories would have faded away. This enables us to understand and appreciate our history creating a sense of pride and patriotism as we appreciate the achievements of the peoples of the past. One of the main ways through which museums convey these messages is through exhibits. Therefore, the museums need to deliver exhibitions through a network of avenues as well as by use of new and emerging technologies like the internet other than relying on the traditional modes of display. This will broaden the catchment area so as to reach the target groups.

A lot of museum scholars have argued that exhibitions are basic services that are performed in the museums. Museum exhibitions are a channel of public communication that provides the education experience that generates the sense of the self-interest and their environment by making the visitors be aware, interested, and value many things about themselves and the world. The museums

as cultural institutions collect, document and preserve artefacts as cultural assets and also display and interpret them to the public through exhibitions to the public (see also Dawson, 2006).

In the recent past, many museums embraced ways such as audio-visual shows, multimedia programs, simulation and other experiences making the museum exhibitions more of entertainment. This interactive experience in turn stimulates desire of visitors towards their environment, feeling a sense of excitement and enthusiasm. Such transformative experiences that stem from the authenticity of the exhibits lead to effective learning only if the museum visitors are having fun. This makes museum exhibits a primary method of education. Exhibitions need to educate the visitor about their subject matter. Museum exhibitions are educational and their educational value is important for their success. According to Lord (2001), museum exhibitions are meant to change certain aspects of the visitors' interests, attitudes or values as effectively as possible. Dawson (2006) also stressed that museum exhibitions as a medium of communication has brought about to a sort of arise, to popularize the visitor experience with thoughtful and complex types of touch screen interactives with other new ways of relaying museum subjects.

This paper addresses the importance of archaeological museum exhibits in public education. The study was conducted at the Nairobi National Museum in Kenya which is the largest museum in the country. Primary data was collected using observation and structured interviews from the public who visited the museum on various occasions. Also, key informant interviews were another key method of obtaining data that was used on museum staff. Based on the collected and analyzed data, the results and discussions in the next subsection are presented.

Museums and Educational Purpose: a Discussion

This section is presented into two themes; Museums for educational purposes and Protection of the Museums as follows.

Museums for educational purposes

The study found that museums remain the focal point of disseminating archaeological knowledge to the public. Through the members of the public, it was revealed that understandable information can be obtained by visiting museums. The findings also depict that education in a museum also gives a wide methodology that individuals can use to gain an understanding and appreciation of a collection. Through one of the key informants (Museum staff) posited;

Museums allow individuals to search for collections with the intention of view, teach or be entertained. They are establishments that acquire, preserve, exhibit, conserve and disseminate relics and specimens that form part of the legacy that belongs to the society. Most of them keep these items for display through exhibits which could be permanent or temporary ones in public museums (KII 02).

The findings imply that museums provide learning opportunities by providing visitors with unique opportunities to explore various concepts of social sciences. This makes a museum a service provider of knowledge to the public or the general society. It does this through; Thus, it can be stated that museum objects as belonging to the cultural and natural historical heritage of a country. Museum collections entail a group of artefacts that holds the history of a people and are preserved by museum curators who make them accessible to the public viewing.

In another interview with members of the public, one informant noted that museums are unique in the sense that they provide real stuff that reflects past livelihood. He posited;

...The exhibits are in form of physical objects that are displayed in trays as specimens while others can be watched via the internet. However if one wants the real thing, visiting a museum is the best option. In museums, we (visitors) get opportunities to get closer to museum exhibits, see them, touch them and this harnesses the process of learning (KII 05).

The findings show that in Kenya, just as it is the case in other countries, museums have varying aims ranging from serving as research centers to serving the public. Museums exhibitions provide the means of conveying information about archaeology to the students and the general public even those outside the profession. This is done in order to promote stewardship and make archaeology relevant to society. These findings align with Greenhill's work that in terms of education, visiting a museum can bring what is taught in schools to life by observing exhibits (Greenhill 2007, 200). Thus, learning directly from objects provides firsthand information and experience to the learners. Museum visits can make learning enthusiastic among children, thereby the chance of success for those children that face difficulties in learning in school environment. This makes a museum a service provider of knowledge to the public or the general society It does this through; Thus, it can be stated that museum objects as belonging to the cultural and natural historical heritage of a country.

In a different related study by Hopper –Greenhill (2005), the vital functions of museums are detailed. The authors opine that museums are institutions that are in place with the intention of helping out the public most importantly in their education. Therefore, they are unique educational institutions complementing the traditional school and college system and belonging to the sphere of informal learning. They expand the process of the formal education and provide various possibilities of learning, entertaining and debating. Museums present material culture to be viewed. By the use of objects of the past to generate knowledge they enlighten the minds of the public. Museums collect objects, display them and illustrates information on these objects therefore produce interpretation for visitors.

Hooper-Greenhill further argues that visitors deploy their own interpretive strategies to make sense of the objects. Teaching with objects enhances the school curriculum as these materials engage students who do not respond to written materials. These objects facilitate students to relate with their environment, their culture as well as other cultures. Besides, using of objects reinforces the connection between sensory perceptions and learners' subjects, thus developing new levels of interest. This creates students with higher levels of visual literacy. Museum objects when used for teaching purposes can help students understand the topics presented as well as offering leadership skills amongst their peers. Objects are a powerful tool that helps students develops a high level of reasoning (Hooper-Greenhill, 2005: 276). Besides, the presence of movable objects taken into classrooms means that the experience obtained by learning-changes becomes existential. This encourages students to develop their own questions about the objects they explore.

The current study also revealed that museum exhibits are designed to inspire, teach and delight visitors. The exhibits thereby enable the making of archaeology understandable to be engaged in the interpretational process of reading of the past by the distinct parties of the experts and the laymen. They are used as platforms for communication. One key museum staff as a key informant reported, "Museums can be used as venues to promote the continuing education of people at every age". The sentiments are in tandem with existing literature that details how individual visitors at the museum have freedom around the museum (Falk and Dierking 2000). As the public pay visit to the museum, they have a chance to speak with others while groups are able to have different experiences than their routine learning experience

The study showed that museums are centres of research findings dissemination. One of the museum staff posted;

Archaeologists get opportunities to present papers at archaeological conferences. Proper archaeological resource management is always at the centre of public archaeology. This is a branch of archaeology which mainly focuses on the discovery, location, survey, appraisal, survey and documentation of different sites and artefacts in an effort to help in their conservation and protection and aid in management, visual representation, and utilization via mitigation measures (KII 01).

The findings imply that public lecturers, seminars and outreach programs in museums are powerful tools through which archaeological knowledge can be disseminated to the public. It offers a platform where professionals and nonprofessionals interact. Public outreach programs in archaeology are essential as they enhance interpretation of archaeology and its essence to the public it serves (Chiarulli, 2016: 551). Museum programs are developed by the education department of the museum. Hence, it is expected that the museum educator should be acquainted with the shifts in the education system of the country so as to harmonize his/her programs with the school curriculum. The programs engage visitors in learning experiences in providing essential information related to museums. If there are no educational programs, children and other visitors will not have such great opportunity to meet the collections of the museum and, therefore, to get acquainted with the history.

The success of the programs may vary depending on several elements such as the willingness of schoolteachers which in turn is complemented with preparations made by the teachers within class prior the visit to the museum. Furthermore, the attitudes and practices of museum educators or teaching staff and the geographical setting of the schools are instrumental to the effectiveness of the activities. In this case they are asserting that for a program to be effective there should be a compatibility between teachers and museum educators.

The potential of the museum educational programs is one of the targets and it is not to make specialists in particular field but to assist and direct the visitors to use the gained information in another perspective (Ceróne and Mz-Recaman, 1994). If the archaeologists were unable to clearly bring their research into perspective of the modern world, the modern world will continue to develop in such a way that will be able to do without the services of the archaeologists. So if archaeology, its methods and results are to be an important part of the discussion throughout this country, then the people undertaking this work have to consider what makes this science important (Fritz and Plog, 1970: 406).

The current study revealed that museums host educational programs that are very crucial in the exhibitions and the curators play a very important role in this process. The curators are regarded as the most appropriate individuals to provide recommendations to the educational department concerning the choice of programs and their appropriateness. However, their input into the programs is crucial because the curators are responsible for carrying out the right kind of research to favor the museums targeted users before the planning and execution of an exhibition. One of the key informants (museum staff) posited;

The curators are very much involved in the actual formulation of the education programs. This category of workers select, arrange, preserve and facilitate the viewing/ accessing of artistic and cultural artefacts. They are responsible for managing a set of displays in a museum. They also consult with the Educational Department regarding program themes and objects to be incorporated to the program, texts for presentation and question, new concepts, and ideas in program development and redevelopment (KII 04).

In general the curators seemed to have trust in what the Educational Department was doing. Both of them mentioned that curators are the experts of the exhibitions but they are more involved in making educational programs about it and their collection is a bit limited but very valuable. This is why the cooperation between curators and the Educational Department necessary to stimulate the creation of highly interesting and effective, children's educational programs.

Formerly, duties of museum officers were confined only to procuring, preserving, studying and exhibiting various forms of art artifacts, archeological relics, ethnological pieces, scientific and technological instruments, etc. Today's museum staff have a much broader functions for the visitors of the museum in the world that is considered to be developed (Prahbas, 1997). Besides just regarding the objects and admiring, enjoying them, people learn from them in museums and pass them over to the generations that follow. Museum archaeologists are critical because they are the centre of appreciation of archaeology and archaeological resources. Consequently, the functions of museum educators are quite simple since they are the ones that work directly with the public. They are the people that children and other visitors first interact with in their initial visit and are the people that children and other museum visitors listen and emulate during the educational activities.

Teachers are employed in a museum to ensure they provide information to the audience that is in the museum. Some of their duties entails developing and presenting tours and children and adult programs, training teachers, constructing classroom and continuing education materials, community education and volunteers. Not only do educators directly engage with members of the public, but they also consult other employees of the museum to determine the kind of exhibitions and programs to develop to make the exhibits more public- friendly. For this reason, it is crucial that these people are educated on the different educational programs that may be offered in a museum. It is evident that the main roles of the museum archaeologist are curation of artefacts and dissemination of archaeological information to the public.

Students and the general public gain a lot of information from the lectures and tutorials given by the museum staff on the archaeological past. They also interact with the museum staff as they address question to them on what they observed in the museum in relation to what they had learnt in schools. The education project at the museum encourages the teachers to bring children to the museum as this will strengthen and broaden their knowledge of the past. In Kenya, the museum remains the single most centers of archaeological heritage studies. It attracts those interested in learning about the past and most visitors are school children.

Protection of the Museums

The second theme of this article is based on the need to protect the museums regarding the importance to educational purposes. The study found that it is essential to include the protection of the archaeological heritage in the list of one's moral duties towards oneself and others, not only for a museum. It is also a collective public responsibility. This finding is in congruence with existing literature that the remains of the past are unique and irreplaceable and therefore need to be protected for future generations (Carman, 2002: 99). The study, through one of the key informants, found that in the recent past, population pressure, increase in industrialization and economic demands have continuously threatened the survival of archaeological resources in many countries especially in Africa. The informant posited;

Without any doubt, African's archaeology heritage is on the decline. This has been in the disguise of development projects, theft or probably looting. Some local communities at times cut down trees to get stones for constructions while others graze their cattle on the sites and still others make foot paths and bridle ways on what they

consider as waste products from the heritage sites. In many a case, these communities are completely unaware of the destruction their activities have on archaeological sites and artifacts, monuments and other cultural icons around them (KII 07).

The findings imply that as a result of awareness in communities, the museums remain important assets that would of immense benefit to the country's socioeconomic and civilization advancement has been negated (Kyule, 2016). This context led to the formation of Archaeological heritage management (AHM) which is used to give protection, proper care and preservation of the backwards. This entailed development of measures to counter the destruction of archaeological resources through enactments of legislations and policies in national and international arenas. This obligation has to be recognized by respective legislation and provision of sufficient funds for the legislative activities and the support of legislative measures needed for the successful management and protection of heritage assets.

Carman (2002) appears to support the above contention on protecting the past. He posits that there is no such thing as 'private archaeology', positing that no single person can behave in a manner that becomes detrimental to the public's right to access ancient relics. In addition, Mc Gimsey (1972) further argues that such a view entails the notion that "archaeology is the public's right" and the need to have control over the private in order to protect the archaeological heritage from the public. While there is a difference from one country to the other in legislation for the protection of archaeological heritage; to ensure the public and private nature of archaeology, modern states introduce an official mechanism for the control. This system as reflected by laws and regulations, classifies, categorizes and groups of archaeological sites and objects commonly to define their status or treatment for protection. In this respect, the state administration is good for archaeology as a form of the public authority that constrains the private. The goal of archaeological heritage management should be the long-term preservation of all artifacts and historical structures and sites in their original context. The identification, registration and documentation of all record and artifact collections should also be included in this initiative. (www.international.icomos.org).

The study further reports that without the active participation of the public in archaeology, there cannot be public support for the subject. Similarly, without public support, there cannot be legislation to provide funding and means for the recovery and protection of a states or nations archaeological resource. This is in tandem with existing literature that mention that without such appreciation, there can be no protection of sites or of information contained in sites; there can be no well-written, enforceable antiquities legislation and no effective willing cooperation of those who control use of lands (McGimsey, 1972).

The findings on protection of the museums corroborate the existing literature where Kenya is believed to be among the few countries in Africa, which spearheads protective policy and legislation for heritage management. The first step taken by the country to preserve ancient monuments was through a passing of the Ancient Monuments Preservation Ordinance No. 17 of 1927. This law was soon succeeded by the Preservation of Objects of Archaeological and Paleontological Interest Ordinance, 1934. This was the only legal instrument for preservation of the nation's archaeological and paleontological resources until 1983 when it was repealed and enacted into the Kenyan Statute Books as the Mining (preservation of Archaeological and paleontological resources) Act Chapter 215 of laws of Kenya (ICOMOS, 1990).

The Kenyan Parliament also enacted the National Museums Act, Cap 216 that was aimed at controlling, managing, and developing National Museums. The Act defines the roles and responsibilities of the NMK and puts the task of studying the culture of the nation and interpreting it to the public into the

NMK's hands. It also re-affirms the country's desire and commitment to identifying, safeguarding and promoting the conservation of Natural and Cultural Heritage in Kenya, inclusive of pre-historic & historic periods, paleo-anthropological assets, archaeological sites and properties. A land and building, or any part thereof, whether or not containing structure of place of historical, archaeological or architectural interest, anything contained therein and every artifact and historical, archaeological or architectural structure in the physical possession of the NMK; (Republic of Kenya 2006).

The constitution of Kenya also has cap 216 that notes that no person should destroy, excavate or alter any archaeological site without an exploitation/excavation permit from the cabinet secretary. The ministry of education, science and technology through the Kenya National Council for Science and technology first grants a research license, section 27 on the other hand accords the cabinet secretary in charge of the NMK discretion in granting exploration-excavation permits on public and private lands (Republic of Kenya, 2006). Thus, the two documents are crucial to any form of field study an archaeologist wishes to conduct. The research license does not entitle a researcher to access land to explore/excavate, and more so, the cabinet secretary will not allow a researcher to proceed with explorations/excavations. This reduces risks of destruction of cultural and archaeological sites.

Notably, in the late 1997 the NMK put into practice the research and excavation permit by law to ensure individual research projects takes responsibility of the requirements of the conservation of the material excavated. The same by-law further demands that any researcher especially those undertaking cross border research projects, must be accompanied by NMK staff each time they are conducting field work research. The main purpose of this is to give the staff of NMK practical experience in field work training and in addition, to oversee, for NMK, the compliance by the researchers with the conditions of research permits. Most of the time, this staff consists of technicians with low academic achievements and therefore, generically restricted from understanding the modalities of the research they are supposed to oversee. These circumstances allow the odious researchers to either ignore or not fully adhere to any guidelines that may be hampering their project's interests in the field, as well as not record and in some cases spirit out of the country notable artifacts (Republic of Kenya, 2006).

Conclusion

It came out clear that museum exhibits are crucial in passing information about archaeology discovered through education process to people outside of the profession. When the audience uses their vision through observation, this creates a relationship between the observer and the object stimulating a process of learning. Visitors also gain experience by engaging with objects stimulating future learning experience that can build inside and outside the museum. Museum displays with their contents on hold carry information about the past especially if they are well set to capture target groups. Exhibitions is one of the fascinating ways that many visitors find as an avenue of communication used by museums about the past since they get chances to touch, hold the exhibits with the direction of museum staff arousing their learning process. Exhibitions that are well arranged accompanied by information on every exhibit attracted many visitors as they were exposed to real stuff facilitating the process of learning.

Museums have a duty in ensuring that that exhibits are well displayed in order to communicate information about what they offer. Exhibits are among the major avenues that museums use to pass information about archaeology to people within and outside the profession. The art of seeing enables the visitors connect with the object resonating him or her to develop attachment with the object. These exhibits need to be displayed with information pertaining to them in simple and clear language that is understandable by all.

Programs run by museums are also very important in communicating information about archaeology to the public. These includes seminars, videos, talks among others that are geared towards letting the public know what the museum offers. Museum educators in Education Department are responsible for developing museum programs and activities. These staff have historical, cultural, and artistic education background to understand who their audiences are and tailor make these programs to suit all target groups. Curators are the people appropriate of doing research to meet the needs of the museums. They collaborate with museum Education Department in coming up with themes of programs, selection of objects to be used, texts for presentation as well as coming up with new concepts and ideas. The cooperation between curators and Education Department is vital for the development of interactive and stimulating activities to ensure creation of programs that are exciting to children and the public. In some instances, curators appear in introductory movies explaining historical concepts and show objects in exhibitions facilitating the process of learning.

Museum programs are essential in conveying information about archaeology to the public. Visitors felt motivated by listening to talks, seminars and presentations from museum staff as this offered an interactive platform for learning. In the context of education, it emerged that a museum is an institution that offers education experience across a wide range of variables museum programs being among them. These programs are categorized to those meant for school going children, college and university students and the general public. This ensured that all visitors in museums are able to obtain information about the materials showcased in museums in a language that is suitable for their levels. The programs that were meant for school going children entailed demonstrations and videos in ways that communicates to the age bracket in a more luring and appealing to them. The same case to adult visitors to the museum programs were more in form of seminars and talks in a more inclusivity ways that involved interactions with museum objects and staff.

Museum has a crucial role in the protection of cultural heritage of a people by providing access to important artifact/ exhibits that are used in the reconstruction of national identity and promotion of national culture. It has a central role in the protection of knowledge through creating a setting that allows people to learn experience and pass information. Nevertheless, it is evident that heritage conservation is everyone's business including the private sector. Organisations such as the travel and hospitality industries profit from heritage through tourist attractions and other heritage related business but they are not seen as significant players in conservation endeavours. This is a situation that apparently applies to most African countries including Kenya where apparently the private sector has not done anything or, at best, very little to support heritage conservation. Museums come up with legislation mechanisms and policies for the protection of both cultural and natural heritage. In these policies it stipulates the penalties and fines subjected to those who destroy heritage either intentionally or accidentally. The hefty penalties are likely to scare the general public against destruction of their heritage. The legislation mechanism put to safeguard cultural heritage in Kenya are weak while some are outdated. Some of the penalties for violators of these legislations are very lenient and many destroy heritage since they can be able to afford the penalties. Most African legislation tend to favour the concept of monument protection neglecting other heritage like built environment, landscape heritage, underwater heritage among others. This process tends to make conservation of heritage that does not fall under the category of monument.

Recommendations

There is no doubt that museum exhibits are avenues of education to students and the public visiting museums. Exhibitions are contexts in which people become engaged with one another and 'talk' with products and artifacts. The interaction should be practiced at least in a controlled environment, for instance, by inviting the touch in certain artifacts including in a special exhibit or in a handling

tray. It also can offer samples of handling the materials which the object was produced from. Some of the recommendations may include the following; There is need to have children museums. If children are young and restricted by the fact that they have very little or in fact no information to work from, they can turn to children museum that is meant for students of their age. It is at this young age when the children are in their most formative age that museums should not lack in the intended contribution to education. Museums should display their exhibits accompanied by well described and clearly written information to suit any target groups visiting. Display of exhibits should be made colorful by use of warm colors and appealing to the eyes of visitors in order to attract attention and facilitate the process of learning. Museums should align themselves to meet the demands of its target groups.

Museum education department should aim at coming up with programs that are in line with school curriculum. They should do so in consultative joint committees of teachers and museum educationists. The museum educationists should offer lectures that are illustrated by use of slides, films, demonstrations and guided tours. Museums should have well-arranged special tours according to the needs of the visiting groups. The programs should for instance be aligned to the school syllabus and visits well planned ahead so that children can relate what is taught in class and what is on the ground. The museum educationist is expected to talk and act like a teacher so that children can feel the correlation of class studies and museum studies. Museum programs should be frequently revised to suit the changes of school curricula so that to be efficient in providing information to its audience. Additionally, collaboration between archaeologists and community should be encouraged in order to illuminate paths towards greater dissemination of information to the public. This can facilitate the process of learning through experience.

Museums have a duty of protecting cultural heritage since it's a reflection of a peoples' ways of life. Heritage is very important to national identity and is also the foundation upon which the culture of a people is developed. Cultural heritage once destroyed is not renewable and therefore there is need to protect it for future generations. Museums have come up with legislation mechanisms and policies for the protection of cultural heritage. These laws help define what is deserving of protection and enables museums develop the right mechanisms based on their particular features and needs. In these legislations, the laid laws stipulate what it takes to those who destroy heritage. These laws should be very crucial in sensitizing the public on the dos and do not's when interacting with heritage both tangible and intangible. Without legal protection, heritage will be eroded resulting in cultural and natural loss. Heritage is about what is handed down from one generation to the next; it's much linked to the present needs of the people and therefore needs to be preserved.

Protection of cultural heritage can be successful if all stakeholders are involved in formulating policies and protective legislation mechanisms. All communities have the right to conserve and develop their heritage and should be accorded unrestricted opportunities to do so. In instances where the legal framework is weak, there is need to review or completely have a change over in some of the legislations to suit the prevailing circumstances. This includes increasing penalties to hefty figures and those who fail to pay the fines to be jailed for long terms. This would scare people from destroying their heritage. Legislation relating to cultural heritage preservation needs to have local ownership as when communities feel there are part of these policies, they will find the essence of protecting their heritage.

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Declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Ethical clearance by the University of Nairobi (NUMBER)

Availability of data and materials

The datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Are Sino-Africa Relations Mutually Beneficial for Africa?: The Case of South Africa and Zambia

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Abstract

Throughout the years, China has managed to acquire enormous political and economic growth. Through these efforts China gained global recognition from then world superpowers (Britain, France, and United States of America), and was introduced to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member in 1971. In order to maintain this position in the international arena, China focused on strengthening her rapidly developing economy by entering the African diaspora where she would acquire much needed raw minerals and varying sources of energy to sustain and further bolster her developing but competitive economy. These relations resulted in strengthened political and economic relations between China and African countries. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether Sino-Africa relations are mutually beneficial, and not lopsided in favor of Chinese interests. To determine this, the paper will be assigned with four task; (1) analyzing diplomatic and economic interactions between China and African nations (vice versa); (2) addressing the common perceptions and misconceptions associated with China's activities in Africa; (3) to determine whether indeed Sino-Africa relationships are based on mutual gains or if they are lopsided and in favor of China's interests; (4) to determine whether or not these relations and interactions have a promising future.

Keywords: Africa, South Africa, Zambia, China, Diplomacy, Economic Cooperation

Introduction

Fifty-two out of the Fifty-four diverse Africa countries still maintain relations with their former colonial masters (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany and Portugal), who still exert political and economic influence over their former colonies, through their varied resource extraction multinational cooperations and debt exacerbating international financial institutions (IFIs). As newly independent states, each with its own respective style of governance and varied levels of development, they have gone on to establish diplomatic and economic relations with other countries. One of these countries is China, which has managed to infiltrate the African diaspora, and challenge former colonial masters and Russia (the USSR) to solidify its contemporary position in Africa, as one of Africa's leading diplomatic and economic partners. China's position, influence, and interactions with independent and contemporary Africa, has brewed mixed reactions as it either compliments, clashes, or competes, with the legacies and interests of the former colonial masters and other actors (the USSR). However, Sino-Africa diplomatic and political engagements have provided the continent's economies, societies, and environment, with both negative impacts and positive outcomes. The latter serves as the basis for this chapter, which is to evaluate the economic interactions between Sino-South Africa and Zambia and examine the impact of these engagements.

Skepticism about Chinese activities in Africa

It is noteworthy, that this chapter provides a section to discuss and evaluate Africa's reception of Chinese activities, by highlighting and making a distinction towards what's constitutes as a

perception or reality. Alden (2005: 158) and Sautman and Hairong (2009) concur that addressing the common perceptions and misconceptions by Africans towards Chinese activities, is mostly influenced by the Western propaganda discourse, which to some extent of skepticism and pessimism China had continuously been portrayed as neocolonial or neo-imperial. Lumumba-Kasongo (2011: 236) repudiates this western perspective and argues that if this western portrayal of China were true, then China would have established a monopolistic ruling class rooted in Chinese language and culture, and imposed governing programs developed according to the Chinese model. Zondi from (Prah & Gumede, 2018: 24) also notes that these western perceptions did not arise because China's unforeseen and subtle growth leading to its Asian hegemony status but because China is rising in a manner that brings ambiguity to the western hegemony. Therefore, most of the writings from the west regard China's role in Africa as a rise of a colonial empire intent on plundering Africa's resources for its own national interests and placing Africa under its global wing as it plans (Prah & Gumede, 2018: 31)

Furthermore, Lumumba-Kasongo (2011: 258-263) stresses that it would only be possible through the ignorance, willingness, and collaboration with African political forces, which will enable China to become neo-colonialist or imperialist power in Africa. In support of the latter, Sautman and Hairong (2009) provide a survey report conduct across various African countries, aimed at determining whether the existing African perspectives about China are indeed western influenced and reflect western narratives. The findings from this survey discovered that, western propaganda has frequently exaggerated the negativity of African perceptions about the Chinese (Sautman and Hairong, 2009: 728-736). Although Sautman and Hairong provide a valuable body of research to a large shortage of research surveys on Sino-Africa relations, it has limitations due to its methodology, sample selection, and results, because the surveys were not conducted within South African or Zambian communities where locals reside and work alongside the Chinese. If the surveys by Sautman and Hairong were comprehensive enough and did not exclude these types of social settings and communities, the outcome of the results would have been very different, and through this point one of the major negative impacts of Sino-Africa economic activities has been introduced.


Application of Mercantilism

The Mercantilist perspective can be utilized to study and explain trade patterns between two countries. As mentioned above (chapter 2) Mercantilists believe that wealth is equal to power (vice versa) and that markets should be protected at all costs. Furthermore, they are also of the belief that the role of the state should be an active one which will help it in steering a mixed economy and promoting capital accumulation and national industries (Guzzini, 1994: 5-7). However, a neo-mercantilist lens will be utilized for this chapter, which is rooted in the application of economic nationalism, which is pre-dominantly utilized by global powers. Secondly, it believes in the relationship of openness, foreign capital, and accessing foreign markets, which is also attributed by the governments active role (Holslag, 2007: 136).


In terms of state-to-state economic relations, neo-mercantilism believes that these can never be equal, and will mostly turn out to be lopsided. Furthermore, it also notes that states need to capitalize on their comparative advantage within international markets, by seeking dominant strategic sectors within international markets, which will contribute positively towards a state's wealth and power (Ziegler and Menon, 2014: 17-29). Lastly, neo-mercantilism just as classical mercantilism, also approves of trade deficits only if it is through raw minerals and natural resources, because in return they will expand the states manufacturing sector. However, they also advocate for investments (Holslag, 2007: 137-139).

Mercantilism in Sino-South Africa economic relationship

Trade relations between South Africa and China can be traced back to the 1990s. Before formal diplomatic ties in 1991 the two countries engaged in a two-way trade ranging at only \$14 million, which increased to almost \$1 billion within six years (Shelton, 2001: 110-117). By 2002 two-way trade had increased to almost \$1.5 billion (Shelton, 2001: 110-117). Raw minerals are the dominating regular South African exports to China. Whereas China usually exports to South Africa manufactured products such as textiles, clothes, household appliances and materials, communication and network devices, machinery parts, transmission equipment, and plastic products. Zondi (Prah & Gumede, 2018: 18) notes that for China to remain as a dominant economic superpower during its supposed peaceful emergence it cannot afford to do without relations with African countries such as South Africa, which possess most of the natural resources it needs, and as consumer of its goods.




Graph 1: South African exports to China 1998-2015




Graph 2: Chinese exports to South Africa 1998-2015

Graph 1 and 2, depict the exports from South Africa to China and vice versa from 1998 to 2015. Graph 1's data points out that there was a continuous increase in exports to China from 1998 till 2011 when exports reached over \$12 billion, and thereafter there was a decline to \$10.5 billion in 2012. A subsequent increase followed in 2013 when exports reached \$12 billion, but again exports would decline in 2014 and 2015, reaching at \$8.8 and 7.4 billion respectively. Graph 2's data on exports from China to South Africa depicts that as of 1998 exports remained at \$1 billion until 2001, and

they slightly increased in 2002. However, exponential growth in exports to South Africa only took place in 2003 till 2008, when exports increased from \$2 billion in 2003 and up to \$7.5-8 billion in 2008. The first decline in exports would take place in 2009, when exports decreased to \$6.5-7 billion. Another period of exponential growth took place from 2010 until 2013, when exports increased from between \$10.5-11 billion up to \$17-17.5 billion. These two graphs have proven to be in support of the abovementioned that two-way trade between the two countries increased post-1998, with the establishment of formal diplomatic relation.



Graph 3: South African exports to China 2016-2022



Graph 4: Chinese exports to South Africa 2016-2022

Graph 3 and 4, depict the exports from South Africa to China and vice versa from 2016 up to 2022. The data from graph 3 points out that in 2016 and 2017, South African exports increased from \$7 billion in 2016 to \$8.8 billion in 2017. However, this growth slightly dropped to \$8.7 billion in 2018, but exponential growth was experienced from 2019 until 2021 when exports increased from \$9.7 billion in 2019 to \$13.7 billion in 2021, and would decline in 2022 to \$11.8 billion.

Whereas according to the data depicted in graph 4 Chinese exports to South Africa as depicted in graph 4, points out that Chinese exports had a constant growth from 2016 until 2019, increasing from \$12.8 billion to \$16.9 billion. However, they experienced a decline to just over \$15 billion in 2020, but would increase again in 2021 and 2022 reaching up to \$21 billion and \$24 billion in both respective years.

As espoused by the Mercantilist perspective, that states usually prefer to export products which they have in abundance (comparative advantage) (Appleyard, 2010: 18-21, 39-40; Markusen, 2005: 3-5). Which in the case of South African exports, the country mostly exports raw unprocessed minerals and commodities (gold, diamonds, iron, copper, and manganese ores, etc.) therefore signifying that its comparative advantage lies in natural resources. Whereas for China, its comparative advantage lies in its abundance of skilled labour, manufactured products, and lower tariffs (Shelton, 2004: 59-67). However, thorough analysis through a Mercantilist lens, South Africa's comparative advantage is flawed and lacks longevity, in that the South African export strategy has failed to place value on South African exports, and these raw minerals being exported will eventually run out. This is proven by the data provided in graph 3 and 4 on exports between the two countries from 2016 to 2022, China has profitted way more than South Africa on exports with the average difference between China to South Africa exports and vice versa, amounting to \$40.64 billion.

FDI between China and South Africa

South Africa's political and social climate are the major causes for its poor investment conditions. According to Liberalist FDI conditionalities countries with a higher degree of political and social stability tend to exhibit positive economic growth which attracts FDI. Furthermore, for liberals attracting FDI depends on the liberalization of its trade policies (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003: 529-533). Social factors such as high crime rates, unemployment, and low education together with the abovementioned conditionalities are part of the reasons why South Africa has a low FDI average. However, despite these factors China and South Africa still continue to invest in each other. This has been visible with Chinese investments in South Africa's mining sector, with investments exceeding \$90 million in mining deals such as the Limpopo Province Development Corporation which established ASA Minerals, based on chrome mining (Shelton, 2001: 118-119; 122-125).


South Africa mining sector is responsible for the continuation of Chinese FDI's as China's industrialization period has created a great demand for natural resources. However, South African companies have capitalized on China's rapidly growing economy and global prominence, and entered into China. South African companies who have invested in China are SAB-Miller brewers who have managed to expand themselves throughout China through joint partnerships with local brewers across China (Anon, 2006). Sasol also managed to secure two investments, the Sasol Polymer located nearby Shanghai, and joint venture with the Chinese government to build \$6 billion coal to fuel plants (Anon, 2006).

Mercantilism in Sino-Zambia economic relationship


Unlike with South Africa, economic relations between China and Zambia did not begin on a high after Zambia's independence, and as abovementioned that interactions between Zambia and China unfolded in three periodical stages. During the first stage economic interactions had not been established, and it was only during the second stage in the 1990s, which were ignited by the Chinese *going-out* policy that was implemented in 1990 (Mwanawina, 2008:1). The implementation of this policy, saw the gradual surge in economic engagements between China and Zambia. In the third stage, Mubita (2013: 3-6) notes that economic engagements propelled during this period as both

focused on sustainable economic development, as Zambia believed that the success of the latter would also help achieve the first MDG goal (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger).

Mubita (2013) and Qiang (2007: 7-16) note that another important contributor to the economic relationship between China and Zambia was the formation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. In the context of Sino-Zambia economic relations FOCAC has been the cornerstone for China's increased development of its interests in Zambia (Mwanawina, 2018: 2).




Graph 5: Zambian exports to China 1998-2015




Graph 6: Chinese exports to Zambia 1998-2015

Graph 5 and 6, depict the exports from China to Zambia and vice versa from 1998 to 2015. The data portrayed in graph 5 points out that exports from Zambia to China in 1998 until 2002 were very low, amounting to less than \$100 million. However, from 2003 until 2006 exports increased from over \$50 million in 2003 to \$250 million in 2006. Exports in 2007 would decrease to \$200 million, but 2008 until 2013 exponential growth in exports increased from \$260 million in 2008 to \$2025 million in 2013, but 2014 and 2015 exports decreased to \$1750 million and \$900 million respectively.

Whereas data from graph 6 points out that exports from China to Zambia in 1998 were also low amounting to only \$30 million, and further decreased to below \$30 million in 1999. In 2000 and 2001 respectively, exports gradually increased from just over \$45 million to over \$50 million, and in 2002 and 2003 respectively exports decreased and ranged between US\$40 million and \$45 million. A four-year (2004-2008) period of exponential growth increased exports from over \$60 million to over \$200 million, but decreased in 2009 to below \$200 million. Another four-year (2010-2014) period of exponential growth increased exports from +/- \$250 million to over US\$600 million, but decreased again in 2015 to below \$600 million.



Graph 7: Zambian export to China 2016-2021




Graph 8: Chinese export to Zambia 2016-2022

Data from graph 7, depicts the exports from Zambia to China from 2016 until 2021, and that in graph 8 depicts exports from China to Zambia from 2016 until 2022. Exports from Zambia as portrayed in the data from graph 7 shows that from 2016 until 2018 exports remained below 1400 million and only went above 1400 million in 2019 and 2020, and by 2021 they had increased to over 1800 million.

Whereas, China to Zambia exports between 2016 and 2019 increased from 490 million to 950 million, and decreased in 2020 to below 700 million but would increase again in 2021 and 2022, amounting to over 750 million in 2021 and 950 million in 2022.

Chinese financial assistance to Zambia

China has been Zambia's financial ally going back as far as the 1960s. However, even though Chinese aid does not come with any extreme conditionalities, China is very strategic in its aid offerings. Mwanawina (2008: 18-19) concurs that the majority of Chinese aid is directed into strategic sectors such as economic and technical cooperations, and a lesser amount is made available through grants (either cash or materials). According to Mwanawina (2008) by 2006 Zambia's loans from China amounted to US\$409.4 million and grants amounted to US\$5.4 million, which has also been attributed by the increased Chinese Economic and Technical Assistance, and from these loans and grants owed, Zambia had only managed to repay US\$197,8 million to China, leaving its debt owed to US\$217 million. Rupp (2008: 65-76) concurs that these forms of Chinese aid and investment programs are not so different than those offered by the West, in that Chinese investments in particular are attached with Foreign Development Assistance (FDA).



Graph 9: Zambia's debt to China in US\$

Above graph 10, is a layout of sectors which responsible for Zambia's debt to China. However, despite these debt figures China continues to engage economically with Zambia as its integral country to its demanding industrial country, as espoused by Zondi (Prah & Gumede, 2018: 18). Mwanawina (2008: 20-21) notes that the continuation of economic engagement between Zambia and China is beneficial to the latter, as it refuses to scrap the debt owed by Zambia, and instead reschedules it debt, reduction of interest rates. Furthermore, based on the nature and structure of the economic relationship shared by the two countries, in the longterm it stands to be in favour of China.

FDI between China and Zambia

Unlike South Africa, Zambia has a relatively higher degree of political and social stability, and its mining sector is one of the sectors where the majority of FDI's are directed and located. Zambia posses a widescale copper mining sector, and it has become infested with Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) and private investments. Mwanawina (2008: 8-9) notes that the mining sector experienced a investment boom in 2007, due to Chinese companies investing up to US\$900 million.

Other sectors which have been responsible for attracting FDI's for Zambia are manufacturing, construction, communications and transport, and health (Mwanawina, 2008: 9-14).

Sino-Africa engagements: conclusions

It cannot be denied that Chinese diplomatic and economic engagements with both South Africa and Zambia have resulted in both positive and negative outcomes. The positive gains which have resulted from these relationships can be witnessed from the infrastructural developments in the transport sector (ports and railways) and financial assistance through various loans aid. China has also produced positive outcomes in agricultural and rural development (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2009: 686). Longstanding diplomatic relations with China have benefited South Africa and Zambia, in that they are usually protected from the powers of the western countries, and it also provides them with international bargaining power. These relations may not be entirely negative, but China is the one who continues to benefit more from these relations, which makes these relations to be lopsided. Lumumba-Kasongo (2011: 238-259) notes that for this to change African states need to work on creating new and advance ways and policies which will produce mutual beneficiation during these engagements. However, the possibility of this happening is dependent on the leaders of the respective countries.

The negative factor about Chinese engagements is that unlike the conditionalities attached to western aid, China has utilized a different approach to secure its global prominence and survival, by offering huge loans which will be difficult for developing countries to repay in time, as a way of ensuring that it continues to have access to natural resources of these countries which simultaneously exploits their economic growth. Alden (2005: 148) concurs that China's Africa policy is not necessarily about improving south-south cooperation and mutual beneficiation deals but is strategically meant to further secure its economic and security interests in both countries.

However, moving forward this can be gradually corrected by ensuring that political leaders are also held accountable for irresponsibly agreeing to compromising deals. Secondly, they need to implement policies and deal that will allow for mutual beneficiation on more infrastructure deals, which will then ensure that African workers are protected. Political leaders need to urgently amend and strengthen their foreign policies or produce a separate policy on China which will act as a directive when engaging and negotiating with China to ensure that Africa states actually acquire more beneficial deals.

In conclusion this essay has managed to briefly discuss both the diplomatic and economic relationship between China and the subject nations. This was done by offering detailed backgrounds on each of the relations separately, and how the relations have developed. It has also provided the finding from these relations and provided solutions for the way forward.

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The Influence of South Africa's Democratic Principles on its Cybersecurity Framework and Cyber Threat Response: A Qualitative Inquiry

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Abstract

This study explores the intricate relationship between South Africa's democratic political system, its commitment to human and private rights, and the development of its cybersecurity framework, strategy, and response to cyber threats. Given the country's robust constitutional commitment to human rights, this research explores how these democratic principles are integrated into and influence cybersecurity policies and practices. Through a comprehensive analysis of legislative documents, policy frameworks, this study identifies the extent to which democratic values and human rights considerations shape South Africa's approach to cybersecurity.

The findings reveal that South Africa's cybersecurity strategy is deeply influenced by its democratic ethos, with a strong emphasis on protecting individual rights while ensuring national security. The study highlights how laws such as the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) and the Cybercrimes Act balance the need for security with the protection of privacy and freedom of expression. Furthermore, it explores the multi-stakeholder approach adopted by South Africa, emphasizing public participation, transparency, and accountability in developing and implementing cybersecurity measures. This research also explores the challenges and tensions that arise from striving to protect human rights within the cybersecurity domain, such as ensuring privacy and freedom of information in the face of increasing cyber threats. The study provides insights into how South Africa navigates these challenges, including the mechanisms put in place to ensure oversight and accountability in the surveillance and data collection practices by state security agencies.

Keywords: cybersecurity framework, cyber threat response, democratic principles, influence, South Africa

An overview of the Cybersecurity landscape in South Africa

A cybersecurity framework refers to a structured approach to securing digital environments, protecting sensitive data, and mitigating cyber threats. It aligns with democratic principles by ensuring the privacy of individuals, promoting transparency in data governance, and safeguarding digital rights critical to freedom and equality (Nasir et al., 2024). South African democratic principles include transparency, accountability, equality, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice (Thipanyane, 2015). Important to note is that South Africa's cyberlaws are coordinated by different government agencies, creating windows of opportunities for inconsistencies, fragmentation, and misalignment, thus, weakening initiatives for an effective national cybersecurity strategy (Chigada, 2023). Mahlobo (2015) also acknowledges that different government agencies have overlapping mandates resulting in information asymmetries and poor coordination. Pokwana

and Kyobe (2016) posit that civil society, public and private sector institutions are not well-versed with cybercrimes, let alone understanding and interpretation of legislation. Thus, firms and individuals fail to comply with cyber legislation. With reference to the prevailing circumstances, this study also analyses the gaps in the country's cyberlaws and ascertain if the substantive laws criminalise and successfully prosecute cybercrimes. Furthermore, the researcher states that to successfully investigate and prosecute cybercriminals, the legal fraternity, cyberlaws and well-equipped and trained well-trained law enforcement agencies should be pooled together and work harmoniously.

Methodology

For the purposes of data collection researchers made use of academic journals, government reports, policy documents, official statements, and other relevant literature to gather data. The researchers conducted a thorough literature review to identify existing studies, reports, articles, and other publications relevant to South Africa's political system, human rights protections, cybersecurity framework, strategy, and cyber threat response. This review helped them understand the current state of knowledge in the field and identify gaps or areas requiring further investigation.

Once the data were collected, the researchers screened and selected relevant sources based on predetermined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Researchers focused on sources that provided in-depth insights into the influence of South Africa's democratic political system and human rights protections on its cybersecurity landscape. We prioritised recent and authoritative sources to ensure the relevance and accuracy of the information.

After compiling a comprehensive dataset, the researchers analysed the gathered information using thematic analysis as illustrated by Braun and Clarke (2006) to identify patterns, trends, relevant to our research questions. This analysis accrued several themes as presented in the findings section.

Finally, the researchers interpreted the findings of their data analysis and synthesised the results to draw conclusions about the influence of South Africa's democratic political system and human rights protections on the development of its cybersecurity framework, strategy, and cyber threat response. The implications of our findings and any limitations of the study were discussed, as well as offered recommendations for policymakers or future research directions.

Development of Cyberspace and Cybersecurity in South Africa

By the nature of its political system, South Africa is a democratic state. There is no uniform definition of democracy among scholars, however, it is a political system where the people have the right to govern themselves, civil society can hold their elected representative accountable for actions or inactions, governmental authority is limited by civil rights, and freedoms and equality of all are guaranteed (Sodaro, 2004: 31 & Attenberger, 2020: 14).

Since the end of apartheid and beginning of democratic dispensation in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has been in government in South Africa. However, it has been losing its attractiveness to the electorate for reasons not unconnected with internal rifts, and its failures on service delivery (Sutherland, 2017: 84). On one hand, there is an independent and powerful Constitutional Court that holds everyone accountable (Roux, 2016). On the other hand, there is the Parliament that has often struggled to scrutinise complex legislation, and exercises only limited oversight of budgets, ministers and policies (Hawker, 2003; 2007). The latter fits broadly within the framework of weak institutional endowments (North, 1990), explaining the limits to the ability of governments to create mechanisms and structures to deal with complex issues. Sutherland (2017) adds that if government is to persuade firms and individuals to adopt measures to improve their cybersecurity,

then it needs to ensure its own activities are highly secure or, initially, not embarrassingly insecure, and to acknowledge the limitations of its influence, in order to maximise its credibility. He notes that after 1994, the governance of the intelligence community and of the wider security sector was never going to be easy, given the histories of the State and of the ANC, neither of which had shown much regard for accountability or transparency in intelligence and security matters.

Important to note is that South Africa has had a “shortage of ICT skills for many years despite high levels of unemployment and the presence of many colleges and universities” (Sutherland, 2017: 96). One cause is the lack of a national ICT planning process that could engage with industry, educational institutions, and providers of continuing professional development (CPD). For instance, 86% of South Africans regularly use online banking services (Kshetri, 2019), a proportion higher than many countries in the Middle East and Turkey.

Cyber threats and cybercrimes in South Africa

Cyber threats and actual crimes are global concerns of the contemporary period. Though such security apprehensions are common to all regions, the exact nature of the threat types and motivations vary from one region to the other (Brown & Rudis, 2017). By cybercrime, we mean those offences highlighted by the 2017 Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill. They are: unlawful securing of access; unlawful acquiring of data; unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tool; unlawful interference of data or computer programme; unlawful acquisition, possession, provision, receipt or use of password access codes or similar data and devices; cyber fraud; cyber forgery and uttering; cyber extortion; theft of incorporeal.

Depending on the impact, perpetrators, target and gravity on victims, cyber-incidents get unequal attention in the public space. For instance, cases of nation-state cyber-espionage, which are closely linked to advanced persistent threats (APTs), will receive significant attention (Van Niekerk, 2017: 114) compared to attacks on private organisations that will as well come under scrutiny for having insecure sites, and toxic to customers. Ransomware is another attack that elicits as much as national and global interest. Notably, the number of ransomware payloads proportionally increased internationally from 18% of detections in January 2016 to 66% in November 2016 (Van Niekerk, 2017: 114). There were 3,700 ransomware attack victims who collectively lost \$49.2 million and 800,000 malware attacks where victims collectively lost \$45.6 million. Compared with phishing, that is more than 70 times fewer victims (Mabuza, 2022).

Similarly, phishing is another very common threat. According to Surfshark’s study, phishing has continued to be the most common cybercrime for the third year (2019-2021) in a row (Mabuza, 2022). In 2020, there were 241,343 phishing victims, while 2021 recorded 323,972. Other security concerns and at the level of a national emergency are: insider threats, either malicious or accidental, resulting in security incidents; attacks by hacktivists who are politically or ideologically motivated; and attacks by individual hackers who are trying to learn or show off, such as the “script kiddies” who make use of existing tools (Andress & Winterfield, 2014).

South Africa has had its fair share of cyber-incidents with heavy toll on the economy too. The country has the familiar odd record of being one of the most often attacked countries in Africa. This is partly due to its demography, continental economic strength, and attendant burgeoning exposure to the cyberspace. Analysts have projected that 10–15% internet penetration as the threshold level the generation of significant hacking activities (Kshetri, 2013). As of January 2022, there were 41.19 million active internet users in South Africa (Galal, 2023). According to the Statista.com, it was also found that 28 million internet users in the country used social media, which was around 46 per cent of the total population.

In the last decade, South Africans experienced several extensive scamming attacks, of which the most prominent is the herding of personal information using South Africa Revenue Service (SARS), and the fraudulent World Cup offers supposedly from South African Airlines (Grobler & Vuuren, 2013). Their findings revealed that many people have already succumbed to these fraudulent emails that gather their personal information. South African banks are also experiencing an increase in banking fraud that directly poses a threat to individuals that may lose their savings. A 2013 report by Norton found that South Africa had the third highest number of cyber-attacks in the world. It was found that majority of these attacks were conducted by non-South African hackers, who wished to gain access to faster internet and more advanced software. Cybersecurity is an issue for both the public and private sectors (Griffiths, 2017).

The estimated costs of cyber-attacks are as diverse as the nature of the crimes. Estimates in 2011 put the financial loss from cyber-attacks at ZAR 3.7 billion in direct losses and ZAR6.5 billion in indirect costs (Norton South Africa, 2012). In 2014, South Africa was estimated to have lost between ZAR5.8 billion (Sutherland, 2017: 84) and ZAR50 billion to cyber-incidents (Van Niekerk, 2017: 115). Over half a billion online personal records were lost or accessed illegally in South Africa during 2015 (*SABC News*, 2017). The South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) estimated that South Africa loses \$157 million annually to cyberattacks (Kshetri, 2019). The threat will become more widespread going forward as the number of South African Internet users increase, aided by the African continent's increasing undersea capacity (Song, 2017).

In 2015, one in 10 businesses reported a cyberattack in South Africa (Jonker, 2015). Such incidences were expected to rise significantly from 2018, when reporting was made mandatory, triggering much greater attention to prevention and security, especially because firms can then be held legally liable (*ibid*). As at 2022, Surfshark, a cybersecurity company in its research ranked South Africa among the top 10 countries found to have experienced the most cybercrime in 2021 (Mabuza, 2022). South Africa had 52 victims per 1-million internet users, to earn a sixth place in the global ranking that also has countries like United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Austria and Greece in the top five. The Chief Executive Officer of Surfshark, Vytautas Kaziukonis, said as more of our lives become digital, the chances of falling victim to online crimes grow every year. Since 2001, the online crime victim count increased 17 times, and financial losses grew more than 400 times, from \$2,000 to \$788,000 losses per hour (Mabuza, 2022). In total, cybercrime claimed at least 6,502,323 victims and \$26,116bn in losses over the 21-year period (*ibid*).

Indeed, there is uncertainty and crisis of confidence in the capability of the South African Police Service (SAPS) to efficiently handle matters of technology and cybercrimes. There are dangers in the lobbying and salesmanship from those making cybersecurity systems, who may overstate the risks and the effectiveness of their products, in order to increase their profits. Equally, the intelligence services may seek greater budgets to buy such systems, an extension of the military-industrial complex described by Eisenhower (Brito & Watkins, 2011).

More specifically, a 2017 analysis of cyber-incidents (through the media lenses) in South Africa critically examined the state of affairs via some 54 incidents that were considered (Van Niekerk, 2017). The study categorised those identified cases according to: (i) impact type, (ii) perpetrator type, and (iii) victim type. The study found that the most common impact type is data exposure and the most prevalent perpetrator type is hackers, which had also exhibited a recent increase in activity (*ibid*: 113). The study established the trend of high number of incidents of data exposure caused by error, a trend running contrary to the drive to improve cybersecurity in South Africa. "It was also found that of the incidents considered, 54 per cent targeted state-owned or political entities as victims (Van Niekerk, 2017: 113-4). The main findings across the theme areas of impact type, penetration type and victim type are illustrated thus.

(i) Impact type

The 54 incidents were examined across six types of impacts of cyber-attacks. They are: exposure of data or records; disruption or denial of service through encroachment; financial motive that succeeded or otherwise in stealing money; defacement of webpages; data corruption and modifications, and system penetration through illegal access to network or system only.




Figure 1: Graphic illustration on impact type findings by the number of sample size. Source: Van Niekerk, 2017: 117.

Data exposure has been common across private and public organisations, and the study confirmed 22 cases of such attacks coming from within and outside South Africa as at 2017. Van Niekerk captured Advanced Persistent Threat (APTs) infections, where in one of the incidents, an organisation in South Africa fell victim to the APT1 espionage group attributed to Chinese hackers in 2010 (2017: 117). About two years later, “the Red October cyber-espionage campaign (attributed to Russian hackers) was detected, after having possibly operating for five years undetected, with various targets in a number of countries affected, including infecting a diplomatic organisation in South Africa” (Ibid: 118).

In the web of data exposures are targets like the embassies and foreign missions, the hacking of South African Police Service database that released approximately 16,000 details of whistleblowers and victims, hacking of fast-food outlets, accidental data exposure by Vodacom mobile operator, and the invoicing portal of the City of Johannesburg. Not left out is the portal of Cell C mobile operator in 2014, Altech Autopage, the hacking of the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) e-Toll website, the job portal of V-Report in 2016, the compromise of state’s Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) as part of #OpAfrica’s grand data exposure that affected 2500 websites, hacking of the state-owned arms procurement agency Armscor’s invoicing portal, Cinema chain like Ster Kinetor, the eThekweni Municipality (Durban) e-services portal, and the e-billing portal of mobile operator MTN, also in 2016 (Ibid). “The Chinese-linked group known as APT10 were involved in the Cloud Hopper espionage campaign in late 2016, or which there were South African victims (Ibid, 119).

Financial motive is just as rife as data exposure, though with lesser proportion as shown above. There are several familiar cases in that respect. In 2003, Absa bank was hacked, and it lost nearly ZAR500, 000 (Thiel, 2004). “Hackers targeted three South African banks in 2006, managing to transfer cash from bank accounts into prepaid accounts held with mobile operators (Van Niekerk,

2017: 119). In July 2009, a criminal gang stole about ZAR7 million from bank accounts that were compromised by phishing and SIM cards duplication for the interception of online banking one-time PIN codes (OTPs). Hackers also compromised Land Bank's IT security in December 2010. The hackers initially stole ZAR8 million that were later recovered by the bank (Potgieter, 2011). It was the turn of PayGate, a credit card payment provider, in August 2012. Hundreds of thousands of credit card details were compromised across four major banks, with an undisclosed loss of fortune (Arde, 2012). The National Department of Water Affairs lost ZAR2.84 million in 2011 when its passwords were compromised. The South African Post Office's financial institution, Postbank, also lost ZAR42 million to hacker in January 2012 (Patrick, 2015). A year later, over ZAR15 million was lost by the Department of Minerals and Energy after login credentials were stolen by criminals using a keystroke logging device (ibid.). In 2014, insider threats among employees made a botched attempt to hack the payroll system of Eskom – the state-owned electricity company. Almost at that period, the Gautrain Management Agency's bank account nearly lost ZAR800 million to a hack. The Road Traffic Management Corporation was not that lucky in 2015 as it lost ZAR8.5 million to a series of illegal transfer by hackers (Mkhwanazi, 2015).

In denial of services, a case of reference is that of South African petrochemical company's supervisory, control and data acquisition system that was infected by the PE Sality virus in 2009 (Pretorius, 2016). The attack denied operator's visibility of operations for eight hours until the infected servers were recovered. "In 2013, the website of the national ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), was made inaccessible due to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack by Anonymous Africa (different from Anonymous #OpAfrica) (Van Niekerk, 2017: 120). From 2013 to 2015, the *Independent Online* news website, mobile operator MTN and affiliated service providers all suffered a service outage due to DDoS attacks that were targeted and access disrupted. "Anonymous Africa returned in 2016 by targeting the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), whose website was unavailable due to the DDoS attack, with the hackers stating that the attack was in protest against corruption and the recent censoring of protests" (Van Niekerk, 2017: 120). Also targeted in 2016 were the websites of the Economic Freedom Fighters political party, news channel ANN7, *The New Age* newspaper, and computing company, Sahara, "in protest against perceived corruption by their owners and the South African government" (Van Zyl, 2016).

Almost all major institutions – education, health, telecoms, politic and so on – have had encounters with hackers' *defacement* of websites. In 2003, University of Stellenbosch, Natal University, Rhodes University and the University of the Witwatersrand, and University of Cape Town all fell victim of the illegal acts (Van Niekerk, 2017: 120-1). The following year, a total of 45 company websites in Cape Town and Stellenbosch were attacked by Spykids. In January 2005, hackers from Morocco, known as Team Evil, defaced approximately 260 South African websites, replacing the legitimate websites with anti-U.S. messages (Mbongwa & Makua, 2005). In 2008, both the Democratic Alliance political party and the ANC Youth League websites were compromised. While the Democratic Alliance website was offline for a week, the ANC was defaced with a fake message announcing that the youth president has stepped down (Van Niekerk, 2017: 121). From Moroccan hackers came the defacement of three government websites in 2012. The Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences website was defaced by a Bangladeshi hacker in 2013, who posted a message notifying the website owner to secure the website (*ITWeb*, 2013). Approximately 20 websites, including Sasol, were defaced by a Moroccan hacktivist in 2014, again protesting the South African position on Western Sahara (Ackroyd, 2014).

Notably, the trio of data exposure, denial of service and financial impacts have been the most consistent, with spikes between 2013 and 2016 (Van Niekerk, 2017: 122). As self-evident in Figure 2 below, the financial-crime motivation remained constant, whereas the data exposure and denial

of service motivations, often indicators of hacktivism and protest – i.e., they commonly used to discredit or exact revenge – appear to be on the rise in the South African context.

Finally, it is interesting to note that after reaching a total of 11 instances in 2013, there were declines in 2014 (7 instances) and 2015 (2 instances), before a spike to 12 instances in 2016, the largest number recorded for any of the years studied – an apparent indication that cybersecurity measure are still not being effectively applied in South Africa, and/or that attempts at perpetration are becoming increasing complex and skilful (Van Niekerk, 2017: 122).




Figure 2: Graphic illustration on trend in impact type. Source: Van Niekerk, 2017.

Perpetrator type

Perpetrators that were uncovered cut across different groups like: hacktivists, individual hacker, insiders, accidental/misconfiguration by non-malicious insiders, malware, and nation-state. Figure 3 below shows the spread of perpetrator types. Threats of hacktivist proved to be the most dominant of the seven types highlighted, and closely followed by threats of criminals, accidental cases, and individual hackers.




Figure 3: Graphic illustration on perpetrator type. Source: Van Niekerk, 2017: 122.

Figure 4 below shows that the threat of individual hackers has since 1994 always been part of South Africa, though in marginal proportion. Along came the threats of hacktivists, criminal and nation-state. However, these various threats have since 2011 been consolidating to swell the threat levels, “indicating a growing protest and revenge dimension in South Africa’s cybersecurity risk profile” (Van Niekerk, 2017: 123).




Figure 4: Graphic illustration on perpetrator type trend. Source: Van Niekerk, 2017.

Victim type

In the distribution of the victims, findings by Van Niekerk showed that more than half of the incidents were aimed at State institution and political parties compared to other entities.




Figure 5: Graphic illustration on victim type. Source: Van Niekerk, 2017.

Figure 6 below expresses the trend in victim type showing that state/political institutions have always been the target of interest in the 1990s, and significantly diminished in the 2000s. The last decade, however, saw a massive spike in cases of cybersecurity threats targeted against state/political institutions and other entities.




Figure 6: Graphic illustration on victim type trend. Source: Van Niekerk, 2017.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the leading perpetrators of cyber-attacks are hacktivists, and criminals. "The top two cyber-attack impacts are data exposure and financial theft. The top two perpetration-impact combinations are criminals resulting in financial impact, and accidental/misconfiguration resulting in data exposure" (Van Niekerk, 2017: 126). Besides the growing patronage in internet connectivity vis-a-vis cyber threats globally, heightened political tension and negative perceptions on financial mismanagement of the commonwealth in South Africa have spiked attention of protesting hacktivist and criminals alike on State-owned/political party institutions more than on other entities (Ibid).

Cybersecurity policy framework and strategy in South Africa

Certainly, in the face of the cyberspace volatility and threats, the cybersecurity and control mechanism are *prima facie* ineffective. Based on history, South Africa has a common law on right of privacy that dates back to the 1950s, as seen in the *O'Keeffe v Argus Printing* (1954) case (Sutherland, 2017: 94). However, the foundational acts really took effect from legislation, through the following: (1) Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECT) of 2002; (2) The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) 2002; (3) The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Bill (2009); (4) National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) 2015, and (5) Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill.

Like other countries, modern South Africa has adopted a variety of approaches to e-government at national, provincial, and municipal levels, purportedly all under the Department of Public Service and Administration, though most recently from DTPS (2017b). Beginning in 1997, there was a slow process of consultation and adoption, aimed at increasing productivity and efficiency for government and improving convenience for citizens. Implementation often failed to achieve the planned goals, due to the limited capacity and the lack of willingness of ministers and officials to engage with the challenges. Little attention was given to cybersecurity, despite risks to human rights from the misuse of the large volumes of personal data held by government, or its theft by cybercriminals.

Suffice to add that the Constitution of 1996 protects privacy in Section 14. It states that everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have— (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed. Additionally, section 10 created the right to human dignity that must also be respected and protected.

The Constitutional Court has concentrated on forced legislative disclosure of information, providing general guidelines for data protection (SALRC, 2005): Was the information obtained in an intrusive manner? Was the information about intimate aspects of the subject's personal life? Was it provided for one purpose but used for another? Was it disseminated to the press or general public from whom the subject "could reasonably expect such information would be withheld"?

The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 2002 sets out principles for information protection and created offences of unauthorised access to, interception of and interference with data. However, it appears to have had little practical effect.

The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act

The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Bill (2009) broadly matches the European Union legislation (EU, 1995; 2016), with a view to attracting outsourcing and call centre business, since data cannot be transferred from the EU except to countries with comparable data protection provisions. This reflects efforts over a number of years to attract back office processing and call centre activities to major urban centres (Deloitte, 2015 & Sutherland, 2017).

This South African Act (enforced from 1 July 2020) allows for personal data transferal across borders, provided that the country where this data is to be processed follows regulations/ laws, equivalent to those stated in the POPIA. It was based on the European Data Protection Directive (EU DPD) as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) principles. This act was also inspired by the data privacy models from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The POPIA safeguards both juristic and natural persons as data subjects and pertains to both manual and electronic processing of personal information (Baloyi & Kotzé, 2018). This makes international data flow much safer in terms of privacy.

There are eight data privacy principles enlisted in the POPIA, which are derived from the five Fair Information Practices (FIPs). The FIPs are transparency, use limitation, access and correction, data quality and security (Cate, 2006). The eight POPIA principles (section 8 - 25) are accountability, processing limitation, purpose specification, further processing limitation, information quality, openness, security safeguards and data subject participation. If data is to be transferred to a country without such rules and regulations, an agreement can be reached between the parties, with the consent of the individual being mandatory.

According to Sutherland, a central question concerning data protection emerges from section 6(1) (c) of POPI Act. This section excludes processing by or on behalf of a public body involving national security, defence or public safety (2017: 95). This gives the intelligence services an entirely free hand in the processing of data, except that they must comply with Section 198 of the Constitution that, *inter alia*, enforces human rights. "While those rights can be limited by statute, it is only insofar as is compatible with a democratic society. The subsequent section 6(1)(d) of POPI additionally exempts processing for Cabinet, an obscure provision, since it is in addition to national security purposes, without any indication of what processing the Cabinet might require. Eventually cases must be brought before the Constitutional Court to test the limits of the state to violate the right to privacy" (Sutherland, 2017: 95).

The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF)

Acknowledging the lack of coordination within government and the insufficiency of existing legal measures needed to counter and prosecute, the NCPF emerged in 2015 with the aim to: facilitate the establishment of relevant structures in support of cybersecurity; ensure the reduction of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities; foster cooperation and coordination between government and private sector; promote and strengthen international cooperation; build capacity and promoting a culture of cybersecurity; and promote compliance with appropriate technical and operational cybersecurity standards (Sutherland, 2017: 91). Implementation of the NCPF requires extensive coordination across government (see Table 1 below), which was unwieldy for effective implementation.

Table 1: Departments directly engaged in cybersecurity

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Department</i>	<i>Legislation or policy</i>	<i>Agencies and centres</i>
Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster Cybersecurity Response Committee	State Security	National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA) Protection of State Information Bill	State Security Agency (SSA) SSA Cybersecurity Centre Electronic Communications Security Computer Security Incident Response Team (ECS-CSIRT, n.d.)
	Justice and Constitutional Development	Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill	National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) South African Police Service (SAPS)
	Defence	Cyber Warfare Strategy	Cyberwarfare Command Centre HQ COMSEC Ltd
	Telecommunications and Postal Services	Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act Cryptography Regulations (RSA, 2006) e-government Strategy and Roadmap (DTPS, 2017d)	National Cybersecurity Advisory Council (NCAC) National Cybersecurity Hub Cyber Inspectorate
Economic Sectors, Employment and Infrastructure Development Cluster	Trade and Industry	Companies Act	-
	Public Service and Administration	Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAI) Governance of Corporate IT Framework (DPSA, 2012) e-government strategy*	State Information Technology Agency (SITA)
Governance and Administration	Public Service and Administration	-	-
	Justice and Constitutional Development	-	-

Source: Sutherland 2017: 88

In 2015, work started on Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill. As at 2017, the draft was still being scrutinised (Sutherland, 2017: 91). The Bill will formally create the Cyber Response Committee to coordinate work across government. The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill was released in 2015 but has yet to be approved as a law by President Cyril Ramaphosa.

Thus far, South Africa's national security has been shaped by several policies, with four key principles pertaining to national security. These four principles are: (a) National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans as a nation and as individuals, to live in peace and harmony and to be free from fear and want, and to seek a better life; (b) the resolve of South Africans to live in peace and harmony prevents any South African citizens from engaging in armed conflict, nationally and internationally, with exceptions provided in the constitution and national legislature; (c) national security must be pursued in compliance with the national and international law; (d) national security is subject to the authority of the Parliament and the national executive. One of the key inclusions in South Africa's take on national security is human security, which was conceptualised in 1994. The 1996 White paper on Defence further stated that South African national security has been broadened to incorporate not only military and police issues, but also political, economic, social, and environmental matters.

This use of human security, as a means of ensuring national security has been widely criticised due to the broad definition of 'human security' and has been accused to being a means to enforce regime security. This encouraged the theory that the South African government have been prioritising the security of and stability of their rule over the country as opposed to taking cybercrime and security seriously. The South African 2015 Defence Review placed emphasis on the threat of cybercrime and its effects on national security. Cyber-attacks were classified into four categories: (a) cyber espionage, which involves gaining access to information without the permission of the data handler/ data subject, usually for commercial purposes (phishing); (b) malware, to commit identity

theft, fraud, and extortion; (c) cyber warfare, which is an attempt by a state to direct offensive cyber operations to another stage or organisation/ company; (d) cyber terrorists, which are actions taken in cyberspace intended to harm a state, organisation or civilians (Griffiths, 2017).

Critique

Like many other laws and policies, the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework was partly the result of diffusion, drawing on sources such as the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the U.S., which are more advanced users of technology and have faster-moving policy formulation (Gilardi, 2010 & Sutherland, 2017). According to Sutherland, "The South African government used some foreign experiences and texts, raising questions about the effectiveness of its adaptation to the legal and political systems and cultures, and the degree to which it has designed something it had the administrative and technological skills to deliver," (2017: 87).

Internationally, South Africa has supported a series of resolutions of the UN General Assembly (2010) concerning CSIRTs, protection of CNIs, and more generally, the work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2017). It has also supported the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-Terrorism (IMPACT), created by a UN official, but now seemingly defunct. At the 2017 ITU World Telecommunications Development Conference, attempts to amend Resolution 45 (Rev. 2014) on cybersecurity failed, due to wildly differing aims amongst countries. South Africa signed the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001), but never ratified it. It has also signed, but not ratified, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (AU, 2014); indeed so few countries have ratified it that it is unlikely to come into force.

As a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), South Africa is subject to periodic review, though it was 14 years late in submitting its most recent report (Sutherland, 2017: 92). Amongst many suggestions to South Africa from the UN Human Rights Committee (2016):

The Committee is concerned about the relatively low threshold for conducting surveillance in the State party and the relatively weak safeguards, oversight and remedies against unlawful interference with the right to privacy contained in the 2002 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act. It is also concerned about the wide scope of the data retention regime under the Act. The Committee is further concerned at reports of unlawful surveillance practices, including mass interception of communications carried out by the National Communications Centre, and at delays in fully operationalising the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013, due in particular to delays in the establishment of an information regulator (arts. 17 and 21).

From the foregoing, the democratic South Africa has been consistent in its passive defence approach to issues of cybersecurity policies, and framework. It leverages on safeguarding local infrastructures and deterrence policies against criminals. However, the fallout to the liberal approach is the bureaucratic bottleneck made manifest in the process of plausible compliance with fundamental rights, democratic values, and carrying along of all relevance political institutions. In the circumstance, not much of success has been recorded in deterring cybercriminals and enhancing national security. The framework and cybersecurity strategy are still unfolding despite phenomenally high threat rate. Because, a lot of citizens, organisation, and several government institutions are falling prey to shrewd cyber criminals as more of the population embrace digital resource, and its opportunities. These dangers, combined with a large portion of the South African population that has not had regular or sustained exposure to technology and broadband internet access, expose local communities to cyber threats (Grober & van Vuuren *et al*, 2014).

Conclusion

South Africa's experience with cyber threats mirrors global trends but is influenced by its specific socio-economic and technological landscape. As the most economically vibrant country in Africa, it has both high internet penetration and significant exposure to cyber threats. The frequent attacks, such as the notable scams involving the South African Revenue Service and fake World Cup offers, emphasize the prevalence and impact of cybercrimes in the country.

Most cyber-attacks in South Africa have been attributed to foreign hackers, exploiting the country's relatively advanced internet infrastructure for malicious purposes. This situation not only affects individuals through scams and banking fraud but also poses broader security challenges for both public and private sectors. Cyber threats and crimes continue to evolve, driven by changes in technology, shifts in hacker tactics, and the varying levels of cybersecurity awareness and preparedness across different regions. While some incidents capture public and media attention due to their scale or novelty, others, like phishing, persist as consistent threats. The situation in South Africa exemplifies the complex interplay of local and international factors influencing cyber security. It underscores the need for robust, adaptable cybersecurity strategies that can address both the current threats and anticipate emerging challenges.

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About BRICS

Policy brief

The BRICS Summit in 2022: Continuity of Change?

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2022 marks the real begin of the post-Covid era with the pandemic having subsided significantly and the ramifications of the past two years becoming ever more gruesome. It also marks a period where to Covid and the global financial crisis before it is added the war in Ukraine among challenges deepening age-old problems of global poverty, socio-economic inequality, the global divide between the north and the south, the rendering ineffective of the UN by this divide and geopolitical contestations, and others. The BRICS are looked upon to contribute to arresting these problems and accelerate the reforms towards an inclusive world development. The BRICS, aware of this, has tended to be big on dreams and plans, but short of what has been done so far to get to the targets. The BRICS still does not have a mutual accountability mechanism by which they could hold each other to account for the implementation of decisions made. This piece seeks to show that the BRICS is born in change, and they embody this, but it is long on plans and visions, no report back on what has been achieved.

What is in the history?

The BRICS was established as a mechanism for cooperation at the meeting of foreign ministers from Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006. South Africa joined in 2009 when the BRIC became BRICS, when it upgraded into a summit level. In 2022, BRICS leaders gathered at the 14th summit in Beijing, China, on 23-24 June 2022 to make decisions under the theme: 'Foster High-Quality BRICS Partnership, Usher in a New Era for Global Development'.

2022 Summit

As with all summits, this summit was a culmination of a series of meetings from which recommendations are escalated to heads of states to make final determination on. About 26 meetings were part of this build up. Many of these are by senior government officials in various sectors of public policy, including national security, health, education, agriculture, industry, investment, space, science and technology. There is a lot of negotiation and horse trading. Some of these meetings are consultative in nature, involving state agencies that are semi-autonomous like central banks, competition authorities, audit institutions, development banks and so forth. Some involve non-state actors like business associations, experts, political parties, trade unions and NGOs that seek to feed into the chain of decision-making. It is a long and protracted process of making the BRICS agenda often running into months ahead of each summit.

BRICS on values and principles

The summit theme in 2022 is meant to discipline all this hive of activity towards a coherent set of decisions at the summit. In this case, the theme straddled the need to strengthen partnerships with the BRICS, which was the theme in India in 2021, with the intention of the BRICS to participate in fashioning the new post-Covid and post-financial crisis global development agenda. The first theme is out realization that without internal cohesion BRICS may not be able to deliver on their promises. The second is in recognition of opportunities that come with the universal sense that something needs to change in global affairs.

As usual, the BRICS reaffirmed its principles, values and objectives because these define who they are together in a changing work. These include the values of mutual respect and understanding, equality, solidarity, openness, inclusiveness, and consensus. The principles lifted up this time include “mutual trust, deepened intra-BRICS mutually beneficial cooperation, and closer people-to-people exchanges”. The shared objectives emphasised are to improve “BRICS solidarity and cooperation based on our common interests and key priorities, and to further strengthen our strategic partnership”.

Seven strategic priorities were emphasised, most of them as a build up from decisions of the past four years. First among this as usual is to strengthen and reform global governance. It is standing position of the BRICS to reaffirm their strong commitment to global governance and multilateralism first and then indicate the need to reform it in order to make it more inclusive, representative, participatory, responsive, effective, transparent, democratic, objective, action-oriented, solution-oriented and credible. It is hope shared with the developing world that these reforms would make the achievement of global development more feasible.

BRICS Priorities

The second being ‘Working in Solidarity to Combat COVID-19’ is advancing solidarity and multilateral cooperation witnessed during the height of the pandemic. The idea is that there should be no reversals, but consolidation. They want World Health Organisation-guided international cooperation on prevention and treatment strengthened. This support of the WHO is critical at the time when there is attack on the body from right wing.

On ‘Safeguarding Peace and Security’, as usual they commit to the principle of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations, in a manner that suggests non-approval of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They actually discussed the war in Ukraine and decided to respect national positions as already vocalised in the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. Of course, the positions of four BRICS not involved in the war emphasised peace, calling for an end to war, and recommended negotiations to give effect to this call. The call for peace through negotiated settlements is reiterated in reference to other conflict situations also. BRICS leaders also committed to disarmament, peaceful use of outer space, and peaceful ICT-environment. International cooperation in response to all security issues is stressed.

On ‘Promoting Economic Recovery’, the BRICS had an extensive list of decisions and commitments as usual. These include the continued implementation of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025; the BRICS Digital Economy Partnership Framework, the BRICS Initiative on Trade and Investment for Sustainable Development, the BRICS Initiative on Enhancing Cooperation on Supply Chains, the BRICS Framework for Consumer Protection in E-commerce, and the BRICS Framework for Cooperation on Trade in Services. They stressed infrastructure development as a catalyst for economic recovery. BRICS leaders committed their countries to work together to strengthen the

Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) mechanism as a contribution to strengthening the global financial safety net. They want the new Agreement Between the Governments of BRICS Countries on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters enforced.

'Expediting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development' has become an apex priority for BRICS since 2016. They think global partnership as envisaged in SDG 17 is crucial to this end, so developed countries have to honour their pledge to contribute (finances, capacity and technologies) to SDGs implementation in poor countries. They called for stronger and demonstrable commitment to a shared climate change agenda by improving implementation of the Paris Agreement and the adherence to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. They think breakthrough in big data and artificial intelligence hold promise for the development agenda and therefore BRICS countries have set up platforms to enhance cooperation in digital technologies.

With regard to 'Deepening People-to-People Exchanges', what is new is the adoption of an Action Plan for the Implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on cooperation in the Field of Culture (2022-2026). The BRICS want to improve digitalization in the fields of culture, heritage and arts in the hope that this will enhance mutual learning and appreciation. Educational exchanges are to be expanded. The intention is to also strengthen third-track diplomacy in the form of forums for universities, think tanks, youth, political parties and civil society formation.

It has become ever more urgent for the BRICS to look at how it is organised and institutionalised. In this regard, under institutional development, the BRICS countries committed to a structured process to discuss possible expansion of BRICS. It will continue to expand its cooperation with other emerging and developing countries as part of its BRICS Plus Cooperation strategy.

In all this, there are opportunities to grow intra-BRICS research collaboration to better understand what the BRICS are doing, how its actions might impact other processes by which the global agenda after Covid is being shaped and what might lead to meaningful benefits for the peoples of BRICS? The BRICS has not failed to inspire with its commitments and declarations of intents. All of them are in keeping with the latest thinking in the developing world. They all are commitments that if they were to be achieved would change much of the world for better. But the BRICS continues to report on intentions and not on what has been done, or what impacts have been realised. This is BRICS' next challenge, the proof that it can do what it envisions.

We, therefore, recommend that the BRICS should set up a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, a statistical platform to collect data on actions made, and mutual accountability mechanism. The Institute for Global African Affairs is developing a project to study ways in which this accountability in BRICS and related countries (BRICS Plus) may be enhanced.