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EDITORIAL

Educate and Skill Africa

SIPHAMANDLA ZONDI, TINUADE OJO & JOSEF KEUTCHEU
Editors

The African Union continues to be seized with the task to build the Africa we want as outlined in the African Agenda 2063. This agenda should lead to a stronger, more peaceful and more prosperous Africa.

It should lead to strong and effective institutions. It should produce more responsible leadership and accountable governments across the continent. It is expected that the road to 2063 must see inclusive economic growth and development marked by the participation of small and medium size enterprises and informal entrepreneurs that Africa has in abundance.

As the AU does every year, the 2024 efforts happen with emphasis on the annual theme: *Educate and Skill Africa*. This is meant to build on the outcomes of the United Nations global summit on Transforming Education of September 2022. This summit sought to address a global education crisis manifest in poor progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 4.

African Union accepts that the continent manifests this double crisis and that this was well expressed at an AU High-level side event to the Global Summit. The bulk of the challenge relates to access, completion, and quality of education, with problems facing out-of-school children and improving literacy rates.

The declaration, later refined by Specialized Technical Committee on Education, Science, and Technology stressed the need for collective efforts to address the named education challenges by strengthening continental education strategies and SDG4.

We dedicate this edition to the pursuit of education for all, quality and universally accepted education. We dedicate to the African child who has not make do with little support and hungry stomachs in order to make a better life for themselves.

We dedicate it to those children that have been denied a chance because they were too poor to enroll or were needed in household duties or there are wars and conflicts that makes access to schools difficult. There are children that are prevented by patriarchal traditions that seek to control the destiny of females.

This edition celebrates educators who go beyond the call of duty to give future generations the best knowledge they can muster often with access to teaching aids themselves. We celebrate officials who do their best to support schools and children in their learning. We recognize those who design policies and programmes that increase access and improve the quality of education accessed.

Education for all is education for fundamental transformation. It is therefore a decolonising education.

Siphamandla Zondi
Editor-in-Chief

Lived Poverty and the Fate of African Democracies

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Abstract

In comparative politics, economic development is a requisite for democracy. Democracy is deemed to fail in less developed countries as poverty has proven to be detrimental to democratic performance. This study offers a perspective on the effects of poverty on the fate of democracy in Africa using the Afrobarometer panel survey data (2002–2018). Recognising the ordered nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logistic regression model and descriptive statistics are used to examine the effect of lived poverty on the fate of African democracy. The results indicate that poverty in Africa has a mixed effect on democracy more generally. In particular, the analysis indicates that the experience of poverty, which we have termed 'lived poverty', has a negative effect on the demand and supply of democracy and on several attributes of political participation. The fact that the poor demand democracy less than the well-to-do while at the same time perceiving a limited supply of democracy, in our view, explains why more African regimes are consolidating as hybrid regimes instead of moving towards democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Democracy, Afrobarometer, Lived Poverty, Political Participation, Economic development

Introduction

> "*From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues*." Seymour Martin Lipset, 1959:75

Democratic theory, as enunciated by Lipset in the quotation above, holds that poor people make poor Democrats. Many scholars have echoed Lipset's argument over the years, including, most notably, Przeworski and Limongi (1997), who went on to contend that democracies had little chance of sustained stability and survival in societies with per capita incomes of less than $8,000 per person a year in 2005 prices. Given that the poor make up nearly 40% of the sub-Saharan population (Schoch & Lakner, 2020), several studies have postulated that Africa's democratic transitions of the 1990s faced a high likelihood of reversal (Mbaku, 2020; Norris, 2016; Bigman, 2011; Jackman, 1973). However, nearly three decades after democracy's third wave hit the African shores, the fears of full-fledged democratic reversal have not materialised. Indeed, not only has

democracy proven resilient, but, as Cheeseman (2019) notes, African democracies have grown stronger. This is notwithstanding poor and sometimes contested elections, a spattering of military coups, and several attempts to roll back constitutional rules to end the culture of personal rule, such as presidential term limits.

The continuing resilience of African democracies, as the Lipset thesis suggested otherwise, begets asking the question again as to whether poor African peoples are lesser democrats than their richer counterparts. Drawing from several rounds of Afrobarometer survey data, our findings paint a somewhat mixed picture of the relationship between poverty and democratic attitudes among African citizens that might suggest a more nuanced revision of the democracy-development theses. On the one hand, the survey data shows that poor African citizens are more likely than their richer compatriots to express support for democracy over other forms of government. However, at the same time, Africa's poor express lower levels of rejection for non-democratic forms of government such as one man, one party, and military rule. The evidence further suggests that Africans who experience extreme poverty have higher expectations than the non-poor about the quality of democracy and therefore express less satisfaction with the performance of their democracies and are less likely to rate their countries as democratic. While the higher levels of support for non-democratic forms of government among Africa's poor might point towards a higher risk of democratic regression, the fact that this group demonstrates less contentment with the quality of democracy while expressing their support for it might offset the non-democratic tendencies. The pressure for further democratic reforms in Africa is thus likely to come from the poor rather than the contented middle class. This scenario can lead to an uneasy equilibrium where the political elites are pressurised to maintain certain minimum attributes of democracy. This state of affairs might shed more light on why other studies have concluded that most African regimes are consolidating as hybrid regimes, which are neither moving towards full democracies nor regressing to authoritarianism (cf. Bratton and Mattes, 2001, 2007, Bratton, 2015).

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The rest of this section presents a review of the relevant literature on the relationship between poverty and democracy. The next section describes the data and estimation techniques employed in the study. The third section presents descriptive statistics and empirical findings. The final section concludes and highlights policy implications.

The relationship between poverty and democracy

The relationship between democracy and development has been a matter of continuous debate. Over the last half-century, numerous studies have sought to test and establish the relationship between the two. The evidence from these studies has, however, led to a rather mixed picture, where "a number of different predictions about the relationship between economic growth and democracy… are split sufficiently evenly between positive and negative correlations that no overall theoretical presumption may be claimed" (Minier, 1998:241; see also Remmer, 1995). Drawing from the modernization theories of the late 1950s and 1960s, the predominant school of thought in this debate has claimed that mass poverty poses substantial challenges to democratic survival. The poor, in other words, are considered to be poor Democrats. This proposition is best summed up by Seymour Lipset's (1963:75) seminal thesis stating that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."

Over the years, the proposition that democracies will more likely exist and survive in richer societies has been substantiated by analyses of cross-country data that have shown democracy to be more prevalent and more stable in countries that have higher per capita incomes (Diamond, 1992; Lipset, 1994; Przeworski et al., 1996; Przeworski et al., 2000; Posner, 1997; Sklar and Whitaker, 1997; Krishna, 2008). In one such study, Przeworski et al. (2000:273) have gone further

to place a monetary premium on the prospects of democracy's endurance, arguing that the probability of the survival of democracy in any country is greater when the country is richer and that prospects of survival "increase steeply and monotonically as per capita incomes get larger."

While there is very little agreement as to why higher per capita incomes should increase the prospects of democracy survival, one of the main arguments is that poor people are more preoccupied with survival and therefore have very little interest in taking part in democratic political activities. Others, meanwhile, contend that democracy is a luxury good for which poor people have less need (Przeworski et al., 1996). The poor, in other words, are more willing to trade off democracy in favour of immediate consumption. This view was first advocated by Schattschneider (1960) when he argued that poor people had less incentive to participate in electoral processes that, for the most part, advance the interests of the well-to-do. Rosenstone (1982:25) echoed this view, arguing that "when a person suffers economic adversity, his scarce resources are spent holding body and soul together, not on remote concerns like politics."

While the bulk of the literature has tended to side with the argument that poverty suppresses democratic values and behaviour among the public, there are a handful of dissenting voices. The group of dissenters includes Helliwell (1994), who advances the view that democracy has an intrinsic value that is increasingly sought after as populations become better off. We should thus expect support for democracy to rise as levels of poverty decline. This school of thought is consistent with studies that have looked at how African citizens define democracy, which have mostly concluded that a large majority of citizens on the continent attach a positive value to the meaning of democracy. Consequently, there is an expectation that democracy is a public "good" that, in some way, would make conditions "better" (Bratton & Mattes, 2001).

The argument that poverty is ill-suited to sustaining democratic politics has led many scholars to predict that the extension of the third wave of democratization to the developing world in the 1990s, particularly in Africa, was doomed to failure since many of the countries on the continent are characterized by widespread and deep-rooted poverty (Norris, 2016). Magnusson and Clark (2005:553), for example, contend that the first decade of the third wave of democracies in Africa confirms the proposition that "impoverished states do not consolidate democratic regimes easily." Thus, nearly thirty years into the democratic era, scholars remain sceptical about democratic survival in Africa. As Cheeseman (2019) notes, the contested and poor quality of elections and highly publicised campaigns to roll back key democratic institutions such as presidential term limits and military coups that are sometimes celebrated by the public mean that Africa is often depicted as a bastion of authoritarianism.

However, the majority of the studies that have informed the argument that poor people make poor democrats have tended to conclude by comparing predominantly richer industrial and largely democratic countries against the essentially authoritarian regimes of the developing world prior to the onset of the democracy third wave. The assumption underpinning these studies is that aggregate poverty at the national level is what drove the adoption of authoritarian rule, even if a number of these countries had never experienced any form of democracy in the first place. These arguments also tend to overlook the fact that the protests that ushered in democratic rule in the developing world in the early to mid-1990s were primarily driven by the very poor, who bore the brunt of the failed authoritarianism, which had been justified as offering the best prospects for democracy (Sandbrook, 1996; Joseph, 1997; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Similar lessons can also be taken from the recent protests that have precipitated the Arab Spring (Anderson, 2011). As with the democratic protests of the 1990s in Africa, the protests that precipitated the Arab Spring were led by the poor, suggesting that the existence of authoritarianism does not equate to its acceptance and approval by the poor.

Drawing from early rounds of Afrobarometer surveys, Bratton (2008:29) observes that Africa's poor people are "no more or less likely than their wealthier counterparts to hold democratic values or to prefer democracy above other political regimes." Taking advantage of the expansion of public attitude survey research that now covers more developing countries, some of this burgeoning literature has questioned the modernization arguments by adducing evidence that suggests that poor people in the developing world, including those from Africa, Latin America, and South Asia, do not value democracy any less than their richer counterparts. As Krishna (2008:9) surmises, these new studies are increasingly demonstrating that the conventional view that poor people make poor Democrats is "wrong, or at least, if ever correct, no longer true". Instead, the poor in these regions exhibit as much faith, or greater faith, in democracy as the non-poor and poor people participate in democratic activities no less, and sometimes more, than other citizens.

In his contribution to the Krishna volume, Bratton (2008) has examined how poverty interacts with various dimensions of democratic citizenship in 15 African countries. Among several findings, Bratton demonstrates that poorer Africans are less politically tolerant than their wealthier colleagues, although they are more likely to favour political equality; higher levels of lived poverty are associated with lower levels of both demand for and satisfaction with democracy. One of Bratton's more interesting findings, however, is that poverty in Africa is associated with higher levels of political participation, demonstrated by higher propensities among Africa's poor majority to vote in elections than their wealthier counterparts. Thus, rather than being absent from the political sphere, the poor on the continent are active in the democratic space.

Despite Bratton's positive findings, doubts still remain about whether the widespread and deep-rooted nature of poverty in Africa can explain several challenges with the continent's democracies over the last two decades. In the ten years between 2010 and 2020, Africa has registered nearly two dozen military coup attempts, with nearly ten succeeding in removing elected political leaders, the most recent occurring in mid-2021 in Guinea. Many of these coups d'états have been celebrated by the public, who have grown tired of elected leaders prone to manipulating elections and the rules of the game in their favour. Beyond military coups, African elections have resulted in only a handful of partisan turnovers. Lindberg (2006), for example, notes that out of 44 African elections held between 1989 and 2001, there were only nine turnovers. Thus, despite evidence suggesting Africa's majority poor are supportive of democracy and take part in elections more than the well-to-do, they are not utilising their electoral clout to vote out parties that are failing to uplift their lives.

Do these recent experiences suggest that Africa's predominantly poor majorities do not hold strong democratic values? This is the question we address once again in this paper as we seek to understand the prospects of democracy's survival on the continent.

Data and methodology

This paper draws from six rounds of Afrobarometer survey data collected between 2002 and 2018. The 2002 survey covered 16 countries and had a sample size of just over 23,000 respondents. The next set of surveys was conducted in approximately 2008, 2011, 2014, and 2017. In all the survey cycles, respondents were selected using a random, stratified, multistage, national probability sample representing adult citizens aged 18 years or older. The sample size in each country ranged from 1,200 to 2,400. While the number of surveyed countries had increased to 34 by 2017, for the sake of genuine comparison and to avoid our analyses being skewed by the addition of new survey countries over time, our analyses only focus on the 16 countries surveyed in 2002, which were all maintained through 2017. These countries are Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya,

Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It bears emphasising that Africa is a much larger continent with 54 countries. These 16 countries are, thus, less than one-third of the total number of countries on the continent. While in the analysis that follows, we generalise our reporting as representative of 'Africa,' it needs to be borne in mind that the sample choice, in terms of countries, is limited. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, it is also important to point out that the choice of countries represents most of the major regions of sub-Saharan Africa. In order to generate greater confidence in the findings, we also ran several statistical tests and analyses, for example, by estimating ordered logistic regression analyses using a merged data set that combined observations from all six surveys put together.

An ordered logit regression model is used to establish an estimated relationship between lived poverty and democracy. It uses the maximum likelihood approach to estimate the parameters. Demand for democracy (dependent variable) is composed of 5 ordered discrete choices, namely: 0 "Do not reject all three authoritarian rules (military rule, one-party rule, and dictatorship)", 1 "reject at least one authoritarian rule", 2 "reject at least two authoritarian rules", 3 "reject all three authoritarian rules", and 4 "individuals who reject all three and support democracy". The supply of democracy is composed of 3 ordered discrete choices, namely: 0 "perceives no supply of democracy", 1 "perceives supply of one, not both, and 2 "perceives full supply of democracy (extent plus satisfaction).

Ordered outcomes are modelled to arise sequentially as a latent y^* variable crosses progressive higher thresholds (Cameron & Trived, 2005). In this study y^* is unobserved measure of the demand and supply of democracy and the latent variable model is given as:

$$y_i^* = X_i'\beta + \mu_i$$

Where is a matrix of explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters and μ_i is the white noise error term. For an M ordered dependent variable model,

$$y_i = j \text{ if } \alpha_{j-1} < y_i^* < \alpha_j,\ j = 1, 2, \ldots, M$$

From the above, it can be determined that the probabilities that Y will take the value j is equal to

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(y_i = j) &= Pr\left(\alpha_{j-1} < y_i^* < \alpha_j\right) \\ &= Pr\left(\alpha_{j-1} < X_i'\beta + \mu_i < \alpha_j\right) \\ &= Pr\left(\alpha_{j-1} - X_i'\beta < \mu_i < \alpha_j - X_i'\beta\right) \\ &= F\left(\alpha_j - X_i'\beta\right) - F\left(\alpha_{j-1} - X_i'\beta\right)\end{aligned}$$

For ordered logit model, μ_i is logistically distributed and its cumulative distribution function is expressed as follows

$$F(X_i'\beta) = \frac{exp(X_i'\beta)}{1 + exp(X_i'\beta)}$$

Where *exp* is the exponential function, X is a matrix of independent variables including lived poverty, β is a vector of slope coefficients to be estimated in the model.

Measuring poverty: The Lived Poverty Index

The conceptualization of poverty presents definitional and measurement challenges, especially when comparing it across time and space (Hagenaars, 1988; Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003; Clark & Hume, 2005; Bratton, 2005). While many authors have insisted on defining *poverty* as a multidimensional concept, more needs to be done to include the various dimensions of deprivation in the practical definition and measurement of the term. This is largely due to the absence of people-centric measurements of deprivation. Perhaps the most comprehensive people-centric approach to defining poverty was the World Bank's "Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Here?" edited by Narayan et al. (2000), which captured narratives of poverty by poor people themselves from multiple countries.

How does this article contribute to the body of literature on poverty and African democracies? This study adds to the scanty literature that focuses exclusively on the role of individual resources or lived poverty other than monetary indicators (per capita income, poverty head count ratio) for explaining African political participation or democracies (see Isaksson, 2014; Mattes, Bratton, & Davids, 2002; Tambe, 2017). However, the study differs from the cited work in two ways. Firstly, the method employed in this paper is different from the ones used in other literature cited above. This study used an ordered logistic model that takes into account the natural ordering of the dependent variables, demand and supply, for democracy. In that way, the model accounts for differences in the intensity of preferences for democracy, which the other papers ignored. Failure to account for these different intensities of preferences would result in biased and inconsistent results. Secondly, the study uses the lived poverty index, which is disaggregated into four categories: no lived poverty (0), low lived poverty (0.2–1), moderate lived poverty (1.2–2.0), and high lived poverty (2.2–4.0). This will enable us to analyse differences in the demand or supply of democracy across different poverty levels. This can help us determine the threshold deprivation level above which the survival of democracy is threatened.

The increasing availability of cross-national survey data that examines the experiences of deprivation among respondents makes it possible to fully capture the multidimensional nature of poverty in ways that were not previously possible. As such, survey data serves as a very important tool to measure the experiential dynamics of poverty from the perspectives of the poor themselves instead of relying solely on experts' perceptions. Within the African context, the Afrobarometer surveys have included questions that provide objective indicators of the standard of living. Additionally, these surveys also include questions that gauge subjective measures of poverty, which focus on people's access to different resources or lack thereof. Specifically, Afrobarometer survey respondents are asked to indicate whether over the previous year they or anyone in their family had gone without (a) enough food to eat; (b) enough clean water for home use; (c) enough medicines or medical treatment; (d) enough fuel to cook their food; and (e) a cash income. A range of ordinal-level response scales is then offered with the options "never," "just once or twice," "several times," "many times," or "always".

Because the existential reports refer to income flows and other felt needs, the Afrobarometer data has made it possible to develop a hybrid *Index of Lived Poverty*. This Index starts by identifying citizens who can be considered non-poor, those who, during the year, prior to the survey, never went without food, clean water, medicine, cooking fuel or a cash income. The second category includes respondents experiencing low poverty, namely those who report occasionally going without several basic necessities. The third category is the moderately poor, individuals who report experiencing several shortages in the previous year. The fourth category is the extremely poor – those who suffer regular and persistent shortages across various basic needs.

Empirical results

Descriptive statisticss

Table 1 provides a summary of the proportions of individuals in each poverty category in the Afrobarometer surveys that form the basis of this paper:

Table 1: Classifications of African survey respondents by poverty category, 2002–2017 (16 countries. Numbers are proportions in each lived poverty category)

	Index range	Circa 2002 (n=18,880)	Circa 2005 (n=18,867)	Circa 2008 (n=18,920)	Circa 2011) (n=18,976)	Circa 2014 (n=19,005)	Circa 2017 (n=19019)
No Lived Poverty	0	12	13	13	14	19	13
Low Lived Poverty	0.2–1.0	34	33	34	34	37	41
Moderate Lived Poverty	1.2–2.0	35	33	34	34	30	32
High Lived Poverty	2.2–4.0	19	22	20	18	14	14

It is worth noting that while the proportions of the people in the non-lived poverty category have remained the same over the six Afrobarometer survey rounds, there are differences in the proportions of the remaining poverty categories over time. The proportion of people living in extreme and moderate poverty has declined by 5 and 3 percentage points, respectively, from 19% to 14% and 35% to 33% in the fifteen years between 2002 and 2017. On the other hand, the proportion of those reporting low poverty increased by 7%, the biggest change amongst all poverty categories. This implies that more Africans are graduating to the low poverty category, from up the ladder of poverty categories towards better access to basic needs.

Poverty and democratic attitudes in Africa

To gauge the effects of poverty on democratic attitudes, we first examine how poverty influences attitudinal indicators that measure demand for democracy. These look at data on support for democracy as the best system of government and those who explicitly reject authoritarian alternatives (military rule, one-party rule and strongman rule).

Poverty and demand for democracy

Demand for democracy is a scale constructed from four survey questions that measure support for democracy and the rejection of the three authoritarian alternatives. Respondents who prefer democracy and reject all three non-democratic alternatives are held to demand full democracy. The logic of the scale is that effective demand requires "more than lip service [i.e., expressed support] to democracy; it also implies that people abandon attachments to old autocratic [modes of governance]" (Bratton, 2012). This narrative is consistent with theories that state that democracy can only be consolidated when this mode of governance becomes the default. In the words of Przeworski, (1991:26), "given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the

democratic institutions when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost. Democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing, that is when all the relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions" (see also Huntington, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996).

In recent years, evidence of African citizens celebrating the ouster of constitutionally elected governments in countries such as Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe, have led to questions about the depth of commitment of African citizens towards democratic rule. Similar observations have been noted when African leaders have sought to remove constitutional provisions imposing tenure limits on individuals serving as presidents, citing widespread popular support for such adventures (Dulani, 2011, 2015). In order to test the extent to which African citizens are committed to democracy, we develop a measure of demand for democracy, which is an additive index that combines those who say they reject three forms of authoritarian rule (military rule, one man dictatorship and one-party rule) and also express a preference for democracy as the ideal form of government. Table 2 presents a breakdown of those making a full demand for democracy, that is, those rejecting each of the authoritarian alternatives and expressing support for democracy.

Table 2: Lived Poverty and Demand for Democracy, percentages (%) (16 African countries, 2002-2017)

	Reject Presidential Dictatorship		Reject One-party rule		Reject Military Rule		Prefer democracy		FULL DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY (prefer democracy and reject all 3 alternatives)	
	c2002	c2017	c2002	c2017	c2002	c2017	c2002	c2017	c2002	c2017
Non-Poor	76	84	73	77	77	76	67	72	43	48
Occasionally Poor	78	83	69	75	78	77	67	72	40	47
Poor	77	80	65	70	78	76	63	69	35	42
Extremely Poor	74	78	63	67	75	71	56	66	30	39

Question wording

1. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything? Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office? The army comes in to govern the country? (Figures are for respondents who say "strongly disapprove" or "disapprove" for each alternative.)
2. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

- Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
- Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
- Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

(Figures are for those who indicate that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.)

The descriptive results show that demand for democracy is nine percentage points among the non-poor (48%) compared to the extremely poor citizenry at 39%. The results further suggest that rejection of authoritarianism is on average lower among Africa's poor citizens compared to the non-poor. Overall, the data suggest that Africa's poor reject presidential dictatorship, one party and military rule less relative to their wealthier counterparts. Indeed, over the fifteen-yearperiod, rejection of military rule has declined among the continent's poor and extremely poor citizens. However, overall, there is a notable increase in the proportion of citizens rejecting dictatorship, one-party rule and expressing a preference for democracy.

The most notable increases are among the poor and extremely poor citizens, resulting in an overall net gain in demand for democracy across the board, with the highest jump among the extremely poor (from 30% in 2002 to 39% in 2017). This might suggest that even after some citizens have graduated from severe poverty, those left behind have gained more faith, rather than lost faith, in democracy. This is in sharp contrast to the predictions of doom that suggested that democracy in Africa would come under increasing threat from the poor. This suggests that rather than considering the poor as less supportive of democracy, it perhaps takes more time for them to warm up to the concept. Thus, rather than read the low levels of support for democracy among the poor when it was a relatively new concept, the evidence suggests that support might actually increase rather than decrease over time. In sum, while the poorer African citizens exhibit low demand for democracy than their non-poor counterparts, the evidence is still somewhat positive given that there is very little evidence to suggest that the poor are losing faith in democracy nor are they warming up to non-democratic alternatives.

Poverty and the supply of democracy

To what extent does lived poverty impact perceptions of the supply of democracy across Africa? To answer this question, we construct a second index of the perceived supply of democracy based on two survey questions: the first measures evaluations of the quality of democracy, and the second draws from expressed satisfaction with democracy in practice.

Poverty and perceptions of the extent of democracy

The first measure of the supply of democracy draws from the question that asks respondents to place their country on a continuum of democracy ranging from a full democracy to not a democracy. Figure 1 provides a summary of the proportion of citizens in the sixteen study countries who perceive their countries as full democracies or democracies with only minor problems, disaggregated by lived poverty categories:



Figure 1: Proportion of African Citizens who perceive their countries as democratic (16 countries, 2002 and 2017)

The evidence from the two surveys, which took place fifteen years apart, shows the same consistent picture concerning citizens' evaluations of the extent of democracy in their countries: the well-to-do are consistently more likely than the poorest citizens to rank their countries as full democracies or democracies with minor problems. It is worth noting that while the wealthier African citizens believe that the overall state of democracy in their countries had improved marginally by three percentage points between 2002 and 2017, at the other end of the scale, both the poor and extremely poor citizens perceived regression of democracy and registered declines in the proportion of citizens who considered their countries full democracies or democracies with minor problems.

It is often said that poor people hardly understand the meaning of democracy and can, therefore, not be expected to be well placed to assess their country's democratic credentials. Citing the main thrust of this school of thought, for example, Dalton et al. (2007:3) point out that "democracy has supposedly become a vague referent that has positive connotations, but these [poor] publics lack any real understanding of the concept". In order to address the claim that Africa's poor do not understand the meaning of democracy and are hence more likely to consider their countries as less democratic than they are, we examined in greater detail the case of Zimbabwe, whose democratic scores had progressively declined on multiple democracy indices since the turn of the Century when the late president Robert Mugabe became increasingly authoritarian and suppressed the rights of his country's citizens. Even after Mugabe's ouster in a military coup in 2017, the country's democratic credentials have plummeted. The results even, in this case, are starker: in both 2002 and 2017, large and growing majority of Zimbabwe's wealth elites rated their country to be fully democratic, while the proportion of the poorer citizens holding this view has progressively declined in the fifteen years (see Figure 2).



Figure 2: Proportion of Zimbabweans saying their country is a full democracy/democracy with minor problems by lived poverty categories, 2002–2017

The evidence from Figure 2 shows that Zimbabwe's wealth elites were almost three times as likely to say their country is a full democracy or one with minor problems in 2017 compared to those living in extreme poverty that suffer frequent and regular shortages of life's necessities. Zimbabwe's case offers, arguably, the best evidence suggesting that the wealth elites might have a tendency to unrealistically inflate their evaluations of democratic attributes compared to the poor. In this case, the low levels of poor Zimbabweans rating their country as less democratic are consistent with expert measurements of democracy. For example, in Freedom House's Freedom of the World Report for 2002 and 2017, Zimbabwe was placed in the category of "Not Free," on the back of widespread violence against the opposition, civil society organizations, independent media and attempts to stifle judicial independence (Freedom House, 2002, 2018). The Zimbabwe case shows, therefore, that being poor is not necessarily always a predictor of citizenship that will inflate perceptions about their country's democratic credentials. Indeed, what we learn from the Zimbabwe case is the exact opposite in terms of citizen understanding of democracy: the wealthy elites tend to view the democratic credentials of their country with a less critical lens, in the process, inflating their perceptions of the extent of their country's democracy.

Thus, the evidence from Figures 1and 2 should be taken to imply that the poor might apply more stringent tests in their rating of democracy than the wealthier citizens. Because the poor are less beholden to incumbent governments, they might use tougher and more objective standards to evaluate the quality of democracy compared to the non-poor.

Poverty and satisfaction with democracy

Beyond the evaluations of the extent of democracy, the Afrobarometer surveys ask respondents to indicate their levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. As with the previous evaluations of the extent of democracy demand, the evidence yet again shows that Africa's poor generally express low levels of satisfaction in the working of democracy than the non-poor (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Proportion of African citizens expressing satisfaction with democracy by Lived poverty category, 2002 & 2017 (16 countries)

Question wording: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [name of country]? Figures are the proportions of those who say they are either "fairy satisfied" or "very satisfied".

Consistent with our earlier findings, the poorest African citizens express less satisfaction with democracy compared to their wealthier counterparts. Taking together the findings on the perceived extent of democracy and satisfaction in it, it becomes clear that contrary to the school of thought that perceives Africa's poor as less democratic, they have higher standards in defining not only democracy but also their overall expectations.

This aspect is further reflected in the perception of the freeness and fairness of elections in Afrobarometer-surveyed countries. Examining the characterization of the previous elections, we find, once more, that the poorest citizens are less likely than the less-poor folk to describe the earlier elections as either "completely free and fair" or "free and fair but with minor problems" (Table 3).

Table 3: Proportion (%) of respondents describing most recent national elections as completely free and fair/free and fair with minor problems by well-being category (2005 and 2017)[1]

	Non-Poor	Occasional Poor	Poor	Extremely Poor
circa 2005 (16 countries)	73	70	65	57
circa 2017 (16 countries)	76	71	63	57

Question wording: "On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national elections, held in [election year]?" Figures are for respondents who say it was "completely free and fair" or "Free and fair, but with minor problems".

We can see yet again from the foregoing that the poor not only have higher expectations of democracy but also employ a relatively higher standard in judging the freeness and fairness of their national elections. These findings suggest that the future of democracy in Africa, particularly on the supply side, might be less threatened by the continent's poor citizens. The poor have

1 This question was not asked in all countries in 2002

higher requirements for describing their countries as full democracies. They are not as easily satisfied with the quality of democracy on offer and are equally less satisfied with the quality of elections. By contrast, higher proportions of citizens who experience no deprivation and have rather lax standards in perceiving the extent of democracy are also easily satisfied with poor quality democracy and are quick to describe elections as free and fair. These findings suggest that rather than being a democratic liability, as intimated by the early modernization literature, Africa's majority poor might be the most stringent defenders of true democracy. Because they are unsatisfied with the quality of democracy and elections on offer, this block of voters is more likely to press for more democratic and electoral reforms. Indeed, anecdotal evidence already seems to suggest this is the trajectory on the continent, as many recent protests for democratic reforms in countries such as eSwatini, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, to mention but a few examples, have originated from the disconcerted poor, particularly the unemployed youth (EIU, 2021; Ayemi, 2021; Marima, 2021; Dulani, 2009, 2011). Meanwhile, wealthy elites have remained passive or supportive of the status quo.

Model estimation results

Does poverty cause low levels of demand and perceptions of low supply of democracy?

In order to test the robustness of the relationships observed in the descriptive results presented so far between poverty and democracy demand and supply, we tested the relationships using ordered logistic regressions. Yet again, the relationships illustrated in the descriptive findings above hold and are largely statistically significant: lived poverty is not only negatively related to democratic demand and supply, but the evidence further suggests a significant causal relationship between the two, even after controlling for several other variables (Table 4).

Table 4: Ordered Logistic regression estimates on the effects of poverty on demand and supply of Democracy (Odds Ratios)

	(1) Demand for Democracy	(2) Supply of Democracy
Lived Poverty index		
No Lived Poverty	1	1
Low lived Poverty	1.056***	.825***
Moderate Lived Poverty	1.025*	.59***
High Lived Poverty	.931***	.412***
Employment Status		
Unemployed	1	1
Employed	1.157***	1.112***
Educational qualification		
None	1	1
Primary	1.292***	.965***
Secondary	1.985***	.902***
Post-secondary	2.735***	.865***
University	2.66***	.622***
Post-graduate	2.412***	.639***

	(1) Demand for Democracy	(2) Supply of Democracy
Area of Residence		
Urban	1	1
Rural	.941***	1.178***
Age	1.006***	1.001***
/cut1	.094***	.455***
/cut2	.311***	1.219***
/cut3	.79***	
/cut4	2.646***	
Observations	220654	224430
Pseudo R2	.014	.013
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1		

The logistic regression results in Table 4 underscore that demand for democracy decreases with higher poverty levels. In other words, the poor are less likely to demand democracy than the middle class or the rich, as evidenced by the reduction in the statistically significant Odds Ratios (ORs) as poverty levels increase. Concerning other variables, the results reveal that more educated individuals are more likely to demand democracy than the educationally deprived; the odds for demand for democracy increase with the level of education, with African citizens having postgraduate education registering the highest levels of demand for democracy. The results further suggest a rural-urban differential regarding the demand for democracy. Specifically, African citizens residing in rural areas are, not surprisingly, less likely to demand democracy than their urban counterparts (OR: 0.94). Citizens who are in employment are also more likely to demand democracy than unemployed individuals (OR: 1.157). The age of the individual also significantly affects the demand for democracy: the older an individual gets, the higher the demand for democracy. This might suggest an earning effect in that Africa's older citizens, who have firsthand experience of authoritarian rule, are wary of authoritarian modes of governance even if democracy comes with its challenges.

On the supply side of the regression results, the preliminary findings based on the descriptive data are also confirmed: the poor are relatively less satisfied with democracy than the non-poor. The odds of democracy satisfaction are higher for citizens that experience no poverty or low-lived poverty (1 and 0.825, respectively) and lower for the moderate and extreme poverty groups (0.59 and 0.412, respectively).

Interestingly, and in contrast to the findings on democratic demand, the regression results show that perceptions of the full supply of democracy decrease as the level of education increases. The odds of perceiving the full supply of democracy, in other words, are higher for the less educated group than the more educated group. Specifically, the odds for those who have completed no level of education and those who have completed primary level education are 1 and 0.965, respectively, while those who have attended university and post-graduate education are 0.62 and 0.63, respectively. This is contrary to the findings in the demand for democracy model. Similarly, the odds of democracy satisfaction are higher for rural residents (1.178) relative to urban residents (1). The age of the individual positively affects satisfaction with the supply of democracy. The older an individual gets, the more they perceive a higher supply of democracy.

Poverty and political behaviour

In his analysis of poverty and democracy using Round 2 survey data, Bratton (2005 and 2008) adduced evidence that showed a rather mixed picture in poverty's relationship with various forms of political engagement. To test the relationship between poverty and political behaviour, we did a re-run of the same tests that Bratton undertook in 2005 using the survey data from the 18 countries that were included in 2005 and 2017. The descriptive findings, which document the proportions of African citizens indicating having voted in the preceding national elections in their countries, are discussed below, starting with a descriptive presentation of the findings on voting behaviour by lived poverty categories (Figure 3).



Figure 3: Poverty and voting in elections (2005 and 2017, 18 countries)

Question wording: With regard to the [year] national elections, which statement is true for you? Figures are for those who say they voted in the last elections.

The findings on the relationship between poverty and voting behaviour in the 2005[2] and 2017 Afrobarometer surveys contradict the conventional theories, which state that poverty and low socio-economic status depress political participation. Yet, the evidence from the 2005 and 2017 Afrobarometer surveys suggests that, at worst, the poor are just as likely as the non-poor to vote in elections and that, at best, the poor vote more in national elections than the non-poor. We speculate that rather than depressing voter turn-out, the incidence of poverty across Africa might have a catalysing effect on voting. Despite having low regard for the nature of their country's democracies and expressing low satisfaction with the quality of democracy on offer, Africa's poor are placing faith in democracy by turning out to vote as much as, or even more than, the non-poor. That this is the case is even more surprising, considering the findings that demonstrate that the poor in Africa demand less democracy on average compared to the richer folk. Thus, poverty appears not to diminish voting behaviour.Conditional effects of lived poverty on political behaviour

In order to understand the effects of lived poverty on political behaviour, we once again ran a logistic regression analysis that controlled for the same social aspects. The evidence presented in Table 5 suggests that, contrary to established theory, the poor are more likely than the well-off to take political action by voting, participating in community meetings, and joining others to

2 The relevant question was not asked in Round 2 which was conducted about 2002. In this case, therefore, data for Round 3 of Afrobarometer Surveys which was conducted about 2005, when this question was first asked, is compared with that of Round 7 which was conducted about 2017. Since Round 3 had 18 countries, comparison is made with the same 18 countries in Round 7.

request government action. The result is not surprising, considering that the poor are less pleased with democracy and would rather take action to bring about the political changes they desire.

Regarding education, the results show that educated African citizens are more likely to participate in community meetings and request government action. This is puzzling but not surprising since the more educated are less pleased with the supply of democracy. Another important finding is the positive influence of age on political behaviour. Older citizens on the continent are more likely than the youth to vote, participate in community meetings, and request government action. Similarly, the area of residence also plays a crucial role in influencing political behaviour. Specifically, rural residents are more likely than urban residents to vote, participate in community meetings, and request government action.

Table 5: Effects of poverty on political behavior

	(1) Voted in the last election	(2) Participated in Community meeting	(3) Requested for Government action
Lived Poverty Index			
No Lived Poverty	1	1	1
Low Lived poverty	1.06***	1.75***	1.4***
Moderate Lived poverty	1.08***	2.24***	1.77***
High Lived Poverty	1.06***	2.27***	1.93***
Employment Status			
Unemployed	1	1	1
Employed	1.55***	1.22***	1.27***
Education Qualification			
None	1	1	1
Primary	1.16***	1.45***	1.15***
Secondary	.95**	1.38***	1.36***
Post-secondary	1.14***	1.55***	1.88***
University	.92***	1.32***	1.59***
Post-graduate	.96	1.58***	2.26***
Area of residence			
Urban	1	1	1
Rural	1.38***	2.14***	1.59***
Age	1.05***	1.02***	1.01***
_cons	.31***	.2***	.08***
Observations	148222	223444	96717
Pseudo R2	.08	.05	.02
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1			

Conclusion

We have offered in this paper some insights into the effects of poverty on the fate of democracy in Africa. Although more work remains to be done to make conclusive claims, our findings from six Afrobarometer survey rounds show that the experience of poverty in Africa has a mixed effect on democracy more generally. In particular, the analysis has suggested that the experience of poverty, which we have termed 'lived poverty', has a negative effect on the demand and supply of democracy and several attributes of political participation. The fact that the poor demand democracy less than the well-to-do while at the same time perceiving a limited supply of democracy, in our view, explains why more African regimes are consolidating as hybrid regimes instead of moving towards democratic consolidation. This is in part because the poor majority are not as demanding of greater democracy, even if they consider the current supply of democracy to be inadequate.

A further finding from this study has been the re-affirmation of the view that poverty in Africa positively affects the propensity to vote. This finding is in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that holds that struggles for survival would result in the poor looking at democratic participation as a luxury good. On the contrary, this finding suggests that Africa's majority poor have placed much faith in the power of the vote to uplift their lives. While the vote has in a few cases been used to vote out underperforming regimes, it is nonetheless encouraging to note that the poor are no more predisposed to vote for the ruling party than the rich. Thus, the vote remains a potent tool for the poor to remove governments that completely ignore their interests. This bodes well for the future of democracy on the continent, even if poverty does undermine other aspects of democracy.

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Effects of Ethiopia's landlocked status on ties with its neighbours

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Abstract

This study looks at Ethiopia's landlocked status and the economic, security, and political implications for the country's relations with its neighbors. Furthermore, it addresses potential threats arising from the implications as well as potential solutions. Ethiopia lost its sea outlet after 1991. As a result, it is incurring significant costs to cover port fees and other related costs. Ethiopia's economy is suffering as a result of the high cost. A literature review is used as a source of data to investigate the implications of Ethiopia's landlocked status in relation to its ties with neighboring countries. Books, journals, internet materials, and media outlets were consulted in this regard. Furthermore, a key informant interview was conducted to collect up-to-date data and information that supports the findings of the literature review. The security and political aspects are discussed in light of East Africa's security, neighboring countries' interests, and the presence of foreign powers in the region. This study underlines that Ethiopia's landlocked status has implications for its security and political affairs. Ethiopia's landlocked status is primarily due to the country's political leadership. Ethiopia can deal with the consequences of its landlocked status by establishing a stable political system and developing a compatible economic policy. In this regard, Ethiopia should learn from other countries how to overcome the negative effects of landlockedness, as there are developed landlocked countries.

Keywords: Economic, Political and Security Implications; Landlockedness; Post-1991 period; Ethiopia

Argument

The issue of sea outlet has been one of Ethiopia's main concerns throughout its long history as a critical aspect of the country's foreign policy. It was a major source of bloody wars against foreign powers such as the Ottoman Turks, Egypt, and Italy, as a result of which many Ethiopians died (Yacob, 2010). According to Yacob (2010), the post-1991 period marks the end of Ethiopia's access to the sea. One of the prime reasons is a lack of political leadership. In support of this claim, one of the ex-Generals stated that Ethiopia's post-1991 landlocked status can be traced back to the time when the insurgent Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) fought against the military regime. According to him, the group maintained a firm stance that Eritrea was a colony of Ethiopia rather than a part of Ethiopia's sovereign territory, and that it would be liberated from Ethiopia's colonization. To that end, the TPLF fully supported the Eritrean People's Liberation Forces (EPLF) in their fight for independence.

Despite the fact that Ethiopia suffers greatly from a lack of access to the Red Sea, its leaders have chosen to ignore the situation. A typical example is the response of Ethiopia's former Prime

Minister (Meles Zenawi) when asked about the impact of the country's landlocked status. He said, "Port is a commodity, and we can purchase it where it is affordable,"(Getachew, 2013; Yacob, 2010). However, as the then-Prime Minister stated, using foreign ports to gain access to the sea was not an easy task; rather, the situation has significant economic, security, and political implications for the country.

Even though Ethiopia can currently conduct its import and export trade primarily through Djibouti, with Port Sudan and Port of Mombasa as alternatives, they are too expensive, and the country has been spending a significant amount of money on port fees. For instance, in 2015 the cost incurred by Ethiopia for Port fees amounts to one-fourth of the country's annual budget of the year (Getachew, 2015) and currently, Ethiopia is spending not less than 3 billion USD annually on Port use. The high cost of port fees has an impact not only on the economy, but also on the lives of Ethiopians. If the country had been able to use its port/s, the port fees could have been used to fund the construction of hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure (Getachew, 2013; Yacob, 2010).

Landlockedness also has an impact on the country's political clout because, when Ethiopia had its own ports, there was no need to use other ports, and the country was more self-sufficient in its actions (Canon, 2017). Due to its landlocked status, Ethiopia is forced to rely on neighboring countries' ports for import and export trade. As a result, any action or decision taken by Ethiopia must not offend the coastal countries, which may use their leverage against it. No matter how important a measure or decision is to Ethiopia, the country must refrain from offending them (Rossiter, 2016). This situation jeopardizes the country's interests. Despite other obstacles to using neighboring countries' ports, port fees have been steadily increasing, and Ethiopia seemed to have no choice but to accept them due to the country's lack of bargaining power as a result of its landlocked status (Rossiter, 2016). This situation weakened Ethiopia's political leverage and kept the country under the influence of its coastal neighbors.

Ethiopia's landlocked status has an impact on its security. The crisis in neighboring countries is one of the security threats (Yacob, 2010). Ethiopia is vulnerable to security threats emanating from the sea because it has no control over the coastal areas of its neighboring countries. As a result, its security is dependent on its neighbors (Canon, 2017; Yacob, 2010). In other words, landlocked countries' security is determined by the strengths and weaknesses of their neighbors. This means that landlocked countries with poor and unstable neighbors are insecure, whereas landlocked countries with stable and strong neighbors are more secure (Ayoob, 1978).

Ethiopia is currently attempting to mitigate the effects of its landlocked status. To that end, it has already initiated talks with Djibouti, Sudan, Somaliland, Kenya, and even Eritrea, which has had a no-war and no-peace relationship with Ethiopia for the past two decades (Carmody, 2018). At the moment, diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia are improving, and Ethiopia has already begun using Eritrea's Port of Massawa (Maasho, 2018). Furthermore, talks are underway between the two countries about how Ethiopia can use the Port of Assab by paying reasonable fees (Olewe, 2018).

Therefore, this study focuses on Ethiopia's post-1991 landlocked status, as well as the economic, security, and political implications for the country's relations with its neighbors, as well as possible interventions that the country may consider to address the challenges that emerge as a consequence.

Theoretical insights

Due to a variety of factors, there are clear development differences between and among countries in today's world. One of these is being either landlocked or coastal. As a result of this disparity, some countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, are more developed, with high per capita GDP, whereas others in Africa and Asia are developing or least developed (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). The distinction between these can be analyzed theoretically. Three theories (geography theory, institutional theory, and growth theory) are discussed in this section to explain the reasons for the differences in development levels. The three theories will also be examined in relation to Ethiopia's landlocked status and its implications.

Geography theory

Geography theory explains geographical differences in growth and development between and among countries. In other words, a country's location can have a significant impact on its economic growth and development. The implications of geographical differences can be seen in terms of coastal and non-coastal (landlocked) countries (Chung, 2014). Coastal countries have easier access to the sea than landlocked countries. Because they are closer to the sea, the costs of using sea transport are lower than in landlocked countries. This means that high transportation costs have a negative impact and cause huge development disparities between and among countries, as landlocked countries incur higher costs than coastal countries (Arvis et al., 2007).

Though landlockedness affects countries' economies in various ways, the impact is magnified in the case of landlocked developing countries (Ariekot, 2016). For example, one of the challenges that landlocked developing countries face when engaging in maritime trade is their remoteness from sea routes or limited access to the sea. Besides that, coastal countries' delays and compliance with problematic import procedures raise trade costs for landlocked countries (Ariekot, 2016). As a result of their landlocked status, overall trade flow into them is significantly reduced, resulting in slow economic growth and development. Furthermore, distance from the sea raises the cost of export trade by increasing the time required to transport locally produced goods to ports (Arvis et al., 2007). In addition to their distance from the sea, landlocked countries' poor domestic and transit infrastructure, as well as their poor transportation coordination system, increase the time required to transport goods from place to place and to the sea, raising the insurance costs of import and export goods (Chung, 2014).

Furthermore, the scarcity of trade corridors is a barrier to landlocked countries' economic growth and development (Arvis et al., 2007). This means that if a country has multiple options for sea access, it will be able to choose the closest and cheapest corridor. However, if the options are limited, the landlocked country will be forced to use them regardless of how far they are, how long they take, or how expensive they are. Besides, the uncertainty of the time required to reach ports of transit states occurs as a result of border delays and a poor port system in coastal states, making it difficult to assess transportation costs (Ariekot, 2016).

Institution theory

This theory refers to the structures or institutions of a country that influence its development (Chung, 2014). Because institutions are the results of a political process, their function is determined by the nature of the political organs and the distribution of political power in a given country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). Institution theory also refers to a country's political power, which controls and decides on issues critical to the country's development (Ariekot, 2016). In other words, differences in the quality of institutions are one of the major differences

in development between and among countries (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). This implies that countries with weak or corrupt institutions will suffer economic hardship. Only the property rights of the political elites are protected in countries where institutions are corrupted, while the majority of people's individual lives cannot be changed for the better. Only the elites' investments generate economic growth under such a system, but they do not add value to the country's long-term development. Strong institutions, on the other hand, have a well-organized economic structure and better opportunities for economic growth and development than weak institutions. Furthermore, in well-organized countries, resources are distributed fairly among the people, as are development outcomes (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).

There are three types of institutional theory: economic, political, and cultural (Chung, 2014). Economic institutions are critical in determining a country's economic incentives, as well as related economic activities and outcomes (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). For example, protecting citizens' property rights is one of the most effective ways to ensure the efficient use and distribution of resources. The efficient use of resources enables a country to achieve high economic outcomes, which leads to rapid economic growth and development. Economic institutions, because of their impact, most importantly help to regulate the distribution of political power and resource allocation in a country, provided that economic institutions operate independently and without undue political interference (Jager, 2004).

Political institutions refer to the type of government, democracy versus dictatorship, and other aspects of administration. As the term implies, political institutions are directly related to political power (Toye, 2008). Political power has a direct impact on an economy's growth and development trajectories because the group with more political power can choose the set of economic institutions for themselves regardless of whether they achieve greater economic growth and development or not. In other words, people who hold political power develop a country's economic policy. This scenario is more realistic in countries where democratic institutions are in their infancy and political power is unrestricted (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Chung, 2014). Religions and beliefs are regarded as factors influencing an economy's growth and development from a cultural institutional standpoint. Some religions and beliefs, for example, may encourage people to work and save more, allowing a country to achieve higher economic growth and development (Toye, 2008).

Moreover, institution theory asserts that institutions can assist a country in overcoming the shortcomings of geography theory in the sense that geographically disadvantaged (landlocked) countries can compensate by developing strong institutions and infrastructure that enhance maritime trade and significantly reduce the cost of sea transport. Furthermore, these countries can bridge the gap by establishing a strong and stable political system capable of effectively managing economic activity and ensuring equitable distribution of resources among people (Toye, 2008).

Growth theory

This is a theory that deals with factors that are important in a country's development. There are two types of growth theories: exogenous and endogenous (Chung, 2014). According to the exogenous model, economic growth and development are determined by external factors (Engle et al., 1983). This means that the factors are unaffected by other system variables such as labor, technological changes, the availability of raw materials used in the production process, and the supply and demand for the goods produced (Jager, 2004).

As a result, economic growth within an economy is influenced by what happens outside the economy, as opposed to the internal or endogenous growth model. An economy can grow indefinitely by utilizing already available items in the system such as existing technology, the rate of technological advancement, the saving rate, and investment in education, among other things (Engle et al., 1983). In general, given the fixed nature of labor and technology, economic growth can halt at some point as ongoing production reaches a state of equilibrium due to an increase in internal demand. Once equilibrium is reached, exogenous factors come into play to either increase or decrease economic growth (Jager, 2004).

In comparison, the institutional theory is more applicable for a given country's economic growth and development than the growth theory because the outcome of the geography and growth theories will be negatively impacted unless there is an appropriate institutional setup in a given country (Ariekot, 2016). By the same logic, geographical factors are less important than institutional factors in determining growth (Ariekot, 2016; Jager, 2004). This is because, in the current global situation, there are countries with better geographical positions but are poor due to weak institutional standing, such as Somalia and Eritrea.

On the other hand, some countries, such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Andorra, and Liechtenstein, are geographically disadvantaged (landlocked) but developed due to their strong and well-organized institutional structures (Getachew, 2015; Yacob, 2010). This is because a country's geographical conditions largely determine its early stage of economic development. After industrialization and technological improvement are attained, the significance of geographical factors has decreased. Landlocked countries, for example, can use air transport to mitigate the negative effects of a lack of or limited access to the sea. Changing conditions may amplify the positive economic effects of institutional factors in some ways (Chung, 2014). As a result, in the context of current global economic realities, one could argue that institutional theory is more important than geography theory.

When we compare geography and growth theories, access to the sea is the primary source of growth for a country. However, according to growth theory, the sources of growth include factors such as innovation, capital accumulation, and technological advancement. Growth theory takes into account both exogenous and endogenous variables (Engle et al., 1983). According to the current globalization trend, the importance of technology for growth is increasing. Technology advancements may mitigate the negative effects of geographical disadvantages on growth. For example, the use of air transport has significantly reduced the geographical advantage of access to the sea because sea transport is not the only effective way of promoting international trade (Jager, 2004).

As a result, growth theory is more applicable or provides more growth options than geography theory. Nonetheless, in the case of the growth theory, the magnitude of the variables is uncertain because they are easily influenced by external forces such as government intervention and changes in the business cycle (Chung, 2014; Jager, 2004). Long-term growth forecasts must thus be adjusted when external factors change.

According to the findings from the literature review and theoretical frameworks, Ethiopia is a landlocked country with a weak economy, and the majority of its institutions that could support its economy are in their infancy.

Geographic theory is applicable to analyze the implications of Ethiopia's landlockedness in the post-1991 period because Ethiopia's geographic location placed the country in a disadvantaged position in accessing benefits from international and regional markets. In other words, geography

theory aids in seeing the various paths Ethiopia must take to mitigate the negative effects of its landlocked status (Engle et al., 1983). Furthermore, because institutions play critical roles in mitigating the negative effects of landlockedness on the country, it is appropriate to apply the concepts included in institution theory because it gives us a hint as to the type and nature of institutions that Ethiopia requires to mitigate the effects of landlockedness. On the other hand, institution theory helps in understanding how to build strong institutions to promote development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). Furthermore, because the elements incorporated in growth theory, such as endogenous and exogenous growth models, are required to bridge the gap created by the country>s landlocked status, the concepts and analyses enshrined in growth theory must be applied (Engle et al., 1983). Factors both inside and outside the economy that have a positive or negative impact on Ethiopia's economy are thus critical to overcoming the impact of landlockedness (Chung, 2014).

Research Approach

As the topic requires in-depth comprehension and a detailed description of landlockedness, a qualitative research approach and design was used in this study. This approach and design's main advantage is that it can increase our understanding of landlockedness from both a global and national perspective (Klotz & Prakash, 2008). To determine what has been done, said, and written about Ethiopia's landlocked status in the past and its effects, a thorough review of the literature was conducted. In this regard, books that have been written about the subject as well as a variety of sources, including journals, articles, internet resources, and media outlets, have been used.

Key informant interviews with experts and representatives from relevant organizations, including the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's (FDRE) Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Eastern Africa Standby Force, were also conducted in order to support the data derived from the literature review and conduct a comparative analysis of the past data with the present and updated one. Interviews were also conducted with a lecturer in political economy at Addis Ababa University.

The study used thematic coding to organize the information gathered from key informants, document reviews, and audio-visual sources. Thus, by combining the findings and discussions, the data were analyzed using thematic content analysis.

Landlockedness: Results

The authorities are to blame for Ethiopia's landlocked status after 1991. As a result of their failure to uphold Ethiopia, the nation lost its seaport (Yacob, 2010). A crucial right that is important for the nation's economic, security, and political interests was taken away from it by the leaders of the post-1991 era (Yacob, 2010; Getachew 2015). According to one of the officials interviewed, EPRDF leaders were not aware of the drawbacks associated with being landlocked at the time they allowed Eritrea to secede from Ethiopia by controlling the Ports of Massawa and Assab. The same source added that this country's disadvantage resulted from a lack of awareness of the advantages of having access to the Sea. This, however, is not a convincing defense for the claim that the EPRDF leaders were ignorant of the advantages of having a sea outlet and the drawbacks of being confined to land. This is because the top EPRDF figures at the time, like the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, had university-level education backgrounds and were able to comprehend the benefits of securing access to sea outlets.

Meles Zenawi and other prominent EPRDF leaders of the TPLF were frequently traveling to the US and Europe for political negotiations and other related missions when the TPLF was an insurgent group. Due to this exposure, it is reasonable to assume or argue that they were aware of national development and the factors contributing to it, one of which was unrestricted access to the global market through sea outlets. Additionally, Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF's leader and supreme decision-maker, was renowned for his political and economic analysis and acumen (De-Waal, 2012; Jones & Carabine, 2013). As a result, the leaders were able to comprehend the problems related to access to the sea outlets. They had the opportunity and full authority to negotiate on the matter, especially in the case of Assab during the Algiers negotiation process and the secession of Eritrea (Yacob, 2010).

Meles Zenawi's response to a question about Ethiopia's landlocked status following Eritrea's secession is one of the statements that indicate the EPRDF leaders' desire to turn Ethiopia into a landlocked nation.

> "At this time, we no longer use the ports in Massawa and Assab. If we don't use the two ports, we lose nothing. In terms of development and growth, Ethiopia experienced its quickest results ever. Due to the fact that we can use the ports of our neighbors, being landlocked does not make us poor. So, there's no need to lament Ethiopia's geographic isolation. We cannot and should not suffer from being a landlocked nation. Ethiopia was indigent before we had ports. Ports are currently unavailable, but development is being made. Therefore, development can happen without a port."

Aside from that, the EPRDF made its own political choice rather than putting the question of Eritrea's separation from Ethiopia up for public debate. The outcome of the secession process might have been very different if the Ethiopian people had been properly consulted on the matter. This implies that Ethiopia's sea outlets were lost as a result of serious mismanagement and malice on the part of its leaders in the years following 1991.

Ethiopia and Eritrea's diplomatic ties have already resumed, and it is hoped that they will grow in the future. At the moment, these ties appear promising. Eritrea is strategically more advantageous to Ethiopia than other nearby coastal states due to proximity and other factors, such as shared cultural and religious values. Of all the ports in East Africa, Assab is the one that is closest to Ethiopia. In light of this, using the Port of Assab is the best option for Ethiopia (Yacob, 2010; Getachew 2015). As a result, Ethiopia should work to realize the use of Eritrean Ports and develop their multilateral diplomatic ties. Additionally, the two nations should be able to allow their citizens to travel freely within each nation without the need for a visa or other restrictions to promote increased interaction and the development of closer ties.

Ethiopia has experienced severe economic, security, and political deficits as a result of its landlocked status since 1991. Literature on the subject and data on the extent and severity of the challenges signify that the country cannot easily overcome the issue of its landlocked status unless the related constraints are properly addressed. In order to offset the negative effects of being landlocked, Ethiopia should establish a stable political system and build institutions that enable the country to judiciously use and manage its resources effectively and efficiently.

Economic Implications

Currently, Ethiopia pays more than 3 billion USD in port fees annually, the majority of which is paid to Djibouti. Since 2000, Ethiopia has paid 1.5 billion dollars annually on average for port services, totaling 27 billion dollars (Getachew, 2013). Given that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance

Dam will cost approximately $5 billion USD to construct, the aforementioned amount could be used to construct about six Renaissance dams (Wossenu & Shimelis, 2019).

Additionally, the price of demurrage (storage) for goods at ports is so high that Ethiopia's imports have become too expensive or unaffordable. The Ethiopian Railway Corporation's success in negotiating lower demurrage costs with Djibouti suggests that Ethiopia could gain an advantage if it is able to expand the number of trade routes or ports to increase its chances of securing reasonable port fees. To this end, Ethiopia should work with the coastal states to chart means of developing the necessary infrastructure that facilitates enhanced import and export trade. It is thus of paramount importance if the country establishes regional integration with neighboring coastal states by jointly constructing railways and road networks that can facilitate trade activities.

The experiences of landlocked European countries such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Andorra, and Lichtenstein indicate that Ethiopia should update its internal road infrastructure and railways to minimize the time it takes to import and export goods (Getachew, 2015). Moreover, Ethiopia should build its capacity to export goods on which value is added and easy to transport by air so that it can minimize its dependence on sea trade (Getachew, 2013).

The poor road infrastructure facility linking Ethiopia to Djibouti is increasing the time taken to import goods to the country thereby increasing the price of goods according to one of the informants. In addition, cumbersome transit and border procedures are also main sources of delay increasing the cost of import and export goods thereby increasing the price of goods for consumers (Chung, 2014). Moreover, Ethiopian lorry drivers are not allowed to enter Djibouti for transporting goods rather they stay on Ethio-Djibouti Border when drivers from Djibouti transport goods. This also increases the cost of goods imported to Ethiopia because drivers from Djibouti make them incur extra costs. To avoid these constraints militating against import and export trade, Ethiopian authorities should conduct a series of discussions with their Djiboutian counterparts and other neighboring coastal countries.

Despite earning foreign currency from a variety of exportable goods and other sources, port fees and other costs associated with Ethiopia's landlocked status consume a significant portion of its earnings. For the past three decades, the nation has faced difficulties related to this situation. If the Ethiopian government does not come up with ways to resolve or lessen the issue, it might continue for the foreseeable future (Getachew, 2013; Yacob, 2010). Ethiopia's economic development is constantly constrained by its location as a landlocked country. This may be expressed as moving one step forward and then slipping one step backward, which in effect means that the country has and will have stagnant development.

One of the opportunities for Ethiopia to overcome the shortage of foreign currency is making use of the presence of international organizations in the country. Ethiopia receives foreign currency resulting from its being the seat of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). To sustain the economic benefit obtained from these, the country should maintain its peace and security so that it could efficiently use its economic benefit resulting thereof. If Ethiopia can manage to effectively utilize this advantage, even its neighboring countries can benefit by providing transit and port services. Hence, Ethiopia necessarily needs robust institutions that can boost its capacity to manage foreign currency obtained from international organizations and other sources to offset the negative impacts of its landlockedness.

Security Implications

Eastern Africa in general and the Horn of Africa, in particular, are among the most volatile conflict regions in the globe (Meala, 2011). Conflict remains a typical feature of the Horn of Africa, particularly in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century (Meala, 2011). The reasons for this are attributed to the following core factors (Ayoob, 1978):

1. The interaction of different cultures in the area. In other words, people with different cultures reside in the region and these cultures contradict each other resulting in conflicts. However, this argument is challenged because there are regions in different parts of the world where people with different cultures lived together peacefully for many years.
2. Countries in the Horn of Africa are not formed voluntarily or through the organic process of state creation. Rather they are formed by colonial powers that controlled the region. In other words, the boundaries of countries in the region are demarcated by the colonial powers disregarding the interests and the culture of the people residing in the area which subsequently resulted in recurrent conflict in the region. Given the current situation in Eastern Africa, this problem is presumed to continue in the future unless countries in the region make efforts to address outstanding problems.
3. Though countries in the region are officially liberated from colonization, external powers still interfere in the internal affairs of countries of the region and create a hostile environment that leads them to conflicts. This situation prevailing in the Horn of Africa is a typical example of the complications that occurred in the process of nation-building in Africa in the post-colonial period.

As Ethiopia is located in a geographic locality close to the Red Sea, which is a strategic hub for military and economic activities, the country is vulnerable to various forms of foreign threats emanating from the area. Since the country lost its sea outlets and currently does not have control over any of its neighboring coastal areas and the whole Red Sea littoral, landlockedness always remains to be a serious security concern. Any threat emanating from the Red Sea coast can easily penetrate Ethiopia's territory and inflict harm (Yacob, 2010).

Moreover, Ethiopia cannot depend on foreign powers such as the US, China, Japan, Saudi, and UAE against possible dangers from the Red Sea area since these countries are focused on protecting and promoting their national interest. Besides, prevailing rivalry particularly between the US and its allies like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, on one hand and, China, on the other hand, pose a potential threat to stability in the Horn of Africa (Mehari, 2019). For the Red Sea serves as a passage for a significant amount of oil and other goods to the world market, it is a strategic location over which the US, other Western powers, Arabs, and others have an interest. The Bab El-Mandeb Strait is the most crucial link between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, which countries in the area need to control to manipulate every activity in the area (https://www.google.com/search?q=Bablel+Mendeb&rlz).

The multidimensional competition between US and China in Africa has grown significantly, at present with the potential to usher in a new Cold War in Africa and the Red Sea area designated as a war between the two Elephants (Mehari, 2019). Hence, East African countries like Ethiopia should work together and find a way to overcome the negative influence by the US and China.

Another option, according to one informant, for Ethiopia to be in a safer position is to play a vital role to strengthen the capacity of organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Standby Force (EASF). This is because member states

agreed that any threat against one or more member states is considered a direct threat against all member states. In the case of the EASF, though the force is not currently operational as expected, member states like Ethiopia that are landlocked and vulnerable to external threats should work hard to build the capacity of the force to enable it to effectively engage in operations. Unless Ethiopia strengthens the above-mentioned organizations and looks for other means, insecurity will continue to threaten the very existence of the country. Hence, leaders of the country should intensively work and exert utmost effort to restore its right to access the sea. Moreover, they should work hard to realize the country's drive towards establishing a strong naval force that increases its capacity to defend itself against any external threats.

Political Implications

Throughout most of the 20th century, especially following its anti-colonial struggle and afterward, Ethiopia has been enjoying significant political leverage in Africa in general and Eastern Africa in particular (Rossiter, 2016). This influence was the product of a combination of factors such as its historical significance (Ethiopia is the first African country that ensured its independence against colonial ambitions), population (second largest in Africa), area (one of the largest countries in the Horn), and natural resources endowment (water, strategic location, etc.). However, following the 1993 secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, Ethiopia lost its strategic importance since it lost access to the sea. Besides, its landlockedness made Ethiopia less independent in its actions (Getachew, 2013).

Landlockedness makes a country unable to deal with problems efficiently. Ethiopia depends on the cooperation of its neighboring coastal states to undertake its import and export trade. However, Ethiopia's status in this regard prompts coastal countries to impose high tariffs that do not take into account the country's capacity to meet this in the face of its weak bargaining power to negotiate affordable rates. Moreover, Ethiopia needs to use the ports of its neighbors if it is necessary to import armaments, which implies that Ethiopia should carefully handle its relations with neighboring coastal states like Djibouti on which it heavily depends. Even if Djibouti is also benefiting from its bilateral relations with Ethiopia, it also exerts considerable influence on the latter (Getachew, 2015). If, for instance, a dispute arises between Ethiopia and Djibouti, and the latter could prevent the former not to use its ports even for a few days, Ethiopia would sustain significant economic, social, and other related damages if such a situation unfolds (Yacob, 2010). So, Ethiopian leaders are obliged to seriously think about this before they decide against the interest of Djibouti even if the latter acts against its interests.

Ethiopia is under the influence of its neighboring coastal states due to its landlockedness. Despite this, the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not yet establish a department that reviews and analyzes the political implications of the country's landlockedness in view of its relations with neighboring countries. At present, there are several foreign powers that roam around the Red Sea area. As a result, the situation calls for taking the threat seriously and taking all necessary measures to handle it. In other words, it is now time for Ethiopia to carefully conduct continuous surveillance of the area to immediately respond to any move that threatens its interests. The fact that a department that reviews and analyzes the political implications of the country's landlockedness is absent implies that the problem is not properly appreciated and dealt with by the Ethiopian government.

Nowadays, Djibouti has become a hub of military bases for different global powers. Due to this, the country is making a significant amount of money from those foreign powers. So far, Djibouti has obtained more than 90% of its foreign income from Ethiopia for using its ports. In addition, Ethiopia provides basic consumer goods and water to Djibouti. However, as Djibouti is currently

earning a significant amount of income from foreign powers, this probably decreases the country's dependence on Ethiopia to generate most of its income. This changing circumstance is most likely to increase Djibouti's influence over Ethiopia. Hence, Ethiopia should figure something out to handle the situation before it is too late.

Conclusions

The issue of sea outlets was neglected in the post-1991 period as a result of which the problem related to landlockedness remains unaddressed. Hence, the current and future generations of Ethiopia should strive to fix this problem through diplomacy, legal remedy, and any other available peaceful solution. In the post-1991 period, discussions about Ethiopia's landlockedness have been rare and discouraged. Ethiopians should not look at the issue as an attempt to open a Pandora's Box but rather raise and discuss it publicly so that all Ethiopians can understand the negative impacts of landlockedness and the benefits of access to sea outlets and strive to be part of the solution.

Despite the challenges faced and tough struggles made by their predecessors to secure Ethiopia's sea outlet, leaders of the post-1991 years did not keep the legacy but declined to preserve it. Hence, current leaders of the country should not repeat the same colossal mistake but rather should work hard to enable the country to restore its sea outlet or at least secure unrestricted or affordable access to the sea. Landlockedness left Ethiopia with no or limited access to the sea. Currently, the country depends on one or two neighboring coastal countries to get access to the sea and undertake its import and export trade. To reduce its reliance on one or two neighboring countries, Ethiopia needs to have diversified port use.

Ethiopia is incurring significant costs for port fees and related expenses. The port fee is so significant that it is adversely impacting the country's economy. To overcome this, Ethiopia should develop an economic policy that enhances job creation, entrepreneurship, and other activities that can boost its economic performance. As Ethiopia has been experiencing threats due to its landlockedness, the issue of security is critical. To avert this threat, Ethiopia needs to establish smooth diplomatic relations with the neighboring coastal countries and foreign powers in East Africa. Besides, Ethiopia should establish a naval force to protect its security against foreign threats. Moreover, the country should closely work with its neighbors to strengthen the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Standby Force (EASF) to keep its security and the security of member states.

Landlockedness by itself does not result in poverty since there are landlocked countries with developed economies. European countries such as Switzerland, Luxemburg, Andorra, and Liechtenstein are landlocked developed countries. Hence, Ethiopia should draw experiences from these countries to overcome the negative impacts of its landlockedness and bring about development.

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Chinese Funding: A Curse to Africa: A Case of Shurugwi Zimbabwe

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Abstract

The role of China in the liberation of Africa from colonial rule cannot be down played as I laid a foundation to Africa today. Most African countries were aided by China militarily and ideologically in the fight against Western colonial rule. Though some scholars would suggest that China`s contribution was as a result of the hostility that was there in the times of the cold war between the self-acclaimed democrats of the Western bloc and the Communist Eastern bloc. Philosophers like Marx Engel, Karl Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong had a major influence on the liberation of Africa. The purpose of this paper is to show how the relationship that started as sincere has become a curse for the poor and unconnected Africans. In recent years the Chinese has overtaken the Briton hood Institutes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as the major lenders of loans to African States. Kwame Nkrumah warned us of the danger of Africa being recolonised in what he termed neo colonialism where the colonisers will come as investors. Neo colonialism is no longer a theory but has become a reality as will be exposed in this article using empirical, qualitative and quantitative research methods to show how a friendship with China has benefited the elite politicians at the cost of citizens affairs. Africa is endowed with natural resources yet it has the poorest population per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The paper will show how it is easy for a Chinese to own a business in Africa compared to the native Africans using the case of Shurugwi in Zimbabwe.

Keywords: empirical, neo-colonialism, politicians, China, resources, endowed

Introduction

The Chinese` s foreign policy has seen an aggressive new way of international policy. The Chinese foreign policy is characterized by giving government loans which have undisclosed clauses. The Chinese loans do not look at issues of democracy or accountability making it a darling of autocratic regime's. From East Asian countries like Sri Lanka to Southern Africa Chinese funding has been distributed but to what end and what is the end deal. Zambia at one point has had its airport confiscated by the Chinese for failing to pay the back a loan. They have been a case where the Chinese money was directly channelled to the family of former DRC president Joseph Kabila. The Chinese have not been shy to spoil authoritarian leaders in 2020 they gifted the then Zambian president Edgar Lungu with a private jet. Chinese loans have led to mortgaging of natural resources by African governments who sort to gain on personal terms from the loans as they are no strict conditions compared to loans from the Briton Hood Institutes that have conditions, the Briton Hood loans look at things like Human Rights records which most African states don`t have a good record and they look at the state of borrower`s debt payment history while Chinese loans uses natural resources as grantees for the loans. Chinese borrowers do not follow up on how the money was used and these have become a haven for corrupt politicians.

Literature Review

Muleya D (2011) wrote about a deal that was by the Zimbabwe Mining Development and a Chinese Company, Wanbao Mining which was facilitated by Chinese bank EximBank though the deal later collapsed after it was realised that the concession of deposits of platinum there were interested in which covers 110 square kilometres of land in Selous and Northfields had already been used as collateral to acquire a USD$200 million loan. Zimbabwe has since 2009 been paying the loan in order to regain the platinum deposits. This deal shows that they are a lot of unaccountable deals that have signed on behalf of Zimbabwe that mortgages there natural resources. The sad part of these are that people that sign the deals are well informed that they are selling the future of the country to the Chinese which is opposite of many like Lobengula Mzilikazi who was cheated by the missionaries as he was illiterate. The Zimbabwe Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube in September 2022 made a shocking revelation in parliament when he claimed that Zimbabwe owed China almost USD$2,6 billion, the loans which were mainly for the mining, manufacturing , infrastructure, agriculture and health sectors (Zvinoira T 2022). The loans can clearly explain why in the agricultural sector black farmers have not been granted title deeds as the land is used as guarantee to secure loans by the ZANU PF government.

The growth of the need for food to feed China`s growing population has led to a new agricultural colony in Africa. China`s growing demand for food and its rapid shrinking arable land due to land degradation and urbanisation have made finding of agricultural land a priority for Chinese government (Horta L 2008). China has made drastic measures to get land leases from African states like Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to name a few. The Chinese bank EximBank facilitated a USD$2 billion loan to the Mozambican government to build the Mpanda Ngua mega-dam on the stretch of the Tete province, China has signed large land leases to establish Chinese run mega farms and cattle ranches allowing an initial 3000 Chinese settler farmers to farm in the Zambezi Valley (Brautigam D 2008) .

Chinese companies have been characterised by abuse of workers throughout the African continent, Nelson Holding a Chinese mining company brought before court by its sixty nine workers for failure to pay its workers from January to September 2014 (Khupe A 2014). Chinese mining companies have been marred by many accusations as reported in the 14 December 2014 Africa Confidential reported that the Zimbabwean government had privately parcelled out mining concessions to the Chinese mining companies in exchange for arms.

Chinese Mining in Shurugwi

The Chinese footprint in Zimbabwe is visible everywhere from the high politics and lower politics. The building of the Zimbabwean parliament in Mt Hampden is one foot in Zimbabwean politics by a nation who claims that they do not involve themselves in internal affairs of a sovereign. The late Zimbabwean strongman RG Mugabe in his words in a TV interview, "the Chinese don't give us free things they is always something with funding." The cost of Chinese funding has come with its curse on the Zimbabwe landscape among other things, Shurugwi a small mineral rich town in the mineral rich Great Dyke has suffered greatly, a place which used to be known as the scenic Shurugwi because of its beautiful mountains has become a scared the landscape. Shurugwi is a small mining town located in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe richly endowed in mineral wealth ranging from chrome, gold, and platinum other precious materials. Now the place is characterized by scars on the mountains as the Chinese are doing open cast mining which is cheaper but expensive on the environment. The Chinese do not observe the Environment Management Act of Zimbabwe which protects the environment; since the government is indebted to the Chinese they cannot bring them to book but watch as the environment is destroyed. A trip

in to Boterekwa a place that used to be green with life of the forest it is painful that now the place have become a site of many open cast mines and most buses coming from South Africa no longer use the road as they are scared since mining now is done near the road.

Figure 1: Boterekwa Shurugwi. Source: Own Picture

In 2006 Zimasco which was the biggest chrome mine in Zimbabwe was sold to the Chinese by the Union Carbide a British company. The company under the Union Carbide used to practice mainly inclined shaft mining which did not have much bearing on the environment but since the Chinese took over they have resorted to open cast mining, when they feel they is no longer any chrome in the area they have left large unfilled open cast mines which have become artificial dams. Many people have since lost their jobs as to the Chinese mining cuts on human labour they utilise machinery like front loaders, tippers and graders among others. The houses have become dilapidated as they do not maintain infrastructure but focus on profiteering. The mining company has also ceased to operate most of its operations which they have contracted to individuals and Chinese mining companies through the tributary system where in chrome mining the miners sell to them and gold claims are rented out for $250 a hectare on a yearly contract that is renewable as long your payments are up to date.

Figure 2: Mountain scar left by a Zimasco chrome tribute in Ironsides Shurugwi. Source: Own Picture

The government needs to look at the way the Chinese operate and EMA must be given power to protect the environment without political involvement. The environment bleeds till when

shall the land of Josiah Magamba Tongogara continue to be destroyed by the Chinese; they have not brought any developments but oppression and destruction of our environmental heritage. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans and it shall never be a Chinese colony the government should act or else Shurugwi will not be scenic.

Chinese Miners Threat to Artisanal Miners

Artisanal miners make up the largest percentage of indigenous miners in Zimbabwe, and these comprise of small scale miners. In Zimbabwe the small scale miners predominantly are found in gold and chrome mining activities. The Zimbabwe artisanal miners project is one of Africa`s most successful empowerment story of the indigenous black populace in the mining sector. In Shurugwi individual like Paradzai Hapazari, Ticha Darangwa, Chris Mahara, Chimona to name a full have gone on to successful owners of gold miners, and their success has helped in job creation among the general populace of Shurugwi. The success of these individual in the mining sector has made an imprint that cannot be erased for future generations as the young now know mining can be done with the hand of the West. In 2018 the 2nd Republic of President Mnangagwa introduced ball mills and hammer mills that have created employment as they require what is termed a baseman who operates these small mills, these small mills have benefited the artisanal miners who do not pay for the service as he owners benefit from the sands which they litchi gold from using cyanidation.

Figure 3: Paradzayi Hapazari Processing Plant (Vital Mine Ironkop Shurugwi). Source: own

The emergency of Chinese miners has become a threat to artisanal miners as the Chinese have begun to target mines with good samples. Wonderful mine which have been the heartbeat of artisanal mining has already fallen in the hands of the Chinese. The Chinese now own most of the mines in Boterekwa formerly known as Wolfsburg Mountain, the previous black owners have been forced to sell to the Chinese or loose the properties with nothing. The Boterekwa pass wants the pride of Scenic Shurugwi now suffers from land degradation as the Chinese prefer using a process called heap litching which involves cyanidation at a large scale. The process of cyanidation has polluted water bodies near there mining activities and the Environmental Management Agency have done little to control the harmful environmental damage by the Chinese who are said to be heavily connected to top government officials. People like Mr Muchenje a respected local mining tycoon was forced to sell his mine in Peak Mine Shurugwi in October 2023.

Fear of what the future holds for artisanal miners has gripped the mineral rich town of Shurugwi and in November 2023 they was an incident of fighting among artisanal miners in the few shafts that have been left for artisanal miners at Wandara mine (Wonderful Mine), they was a clash

over who gets shifts between the Chironde miners and the ZBS miners. The clash between the two groups saw the loss of life of more than five individuals, eye witnesses claim that some individuals were thrown in deep open shafts. The fight was stopped after intervention from members of the Zimbabwe defence forces. As the Chinese occupy the best mines more fights for bread crumbs among the locals will ensure.

Figure 4: Wandara cyanidation site of Chinese mining. Source: Own Picture

Figure 5: Peakmine open cast mining by the Chinese. Source: Own Picture

Accounts of Abuses by Chinese employers

An incident in 2020 where 2 mine workers were killed in a nearby city of Gweru in a mine by a Chinese national after complaining about salaries and working condition is another character of how locals have been subjected to ill-treatment by the Chinese at no discreet by the government as it is in the pockets of Chinese funding (WION Web Team 2020). In Muzarabani a Chinese businessman once boosted to villages he was evicting that they did not have title deeds to the land referring to the Communal Lands Act of 1983 which gives the government power over rural land in Zimbabwe. They has been incidents where Chinese have taken gold mines from locals claiming that the government gave them the land

The Chinese have destroyed the environment in Shurugwi by making the town a hell hole places that before were left alone to preserve the environment they have mined there, they have formed

syndicates with the locals. They do not cover the ground where they dig if deem the places unprofitable. If the Chinese are left to continue with these activities in the next 10 years towns like Shurugwi will not have anything scenically left but artificial lakes, land degradation and places like Boterekwa will crumble they will be no road to talk off.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Chinese business has increased industrial competitiveness in Africa where the mining, agricultural and manufacturing industries have been predominantly Western. China has been an all-weather friend for African countries that have faced hostility from the West though this practise has not been done at the discreet of the abuse of the rights of locals as what happened with the shooting in Gweru. Like in Morgenthau's realist theory where they are no permanent friends in the international system but it's a game of interests, the Chinese have played the game of interest very well as they are popular for working with dictatorships across Africa. The Chinese have supplied weapons in exchange for natural resources in some cases. The Chinese have become a symbol of neo colonialism among the poor Africans.

The government of Zimbabwe should learn from Zambia as they have since cancelled the Chinese debt as of August 2022. They is nothing like free lunch in international politics as they are no permanent friends in the international system but its a game of interests. When it comes to human rights the Zimbabwe government must learn from the Rwandan and Malawian governments where Chinese nationals have faced the wraith of the law after abusing locals in those countries, the Chinese should respect the rule of law in African states. The Chinese like every investors should respect the locals in African communities where they work long gone are the times of slavery Africans must be treated well in mines not be subjected to slave working conditions in their countries simply because a corrupt few are benefiting from the Chinese activities. The African Union and other regional bodies in Africa should put in place a framework that regulate the behaviour of investors within the continent in order to safeguard African nations from a second wave of colonialism in the name of funding and loans . Africa should be protected for the future generations we inherited the continent from our forefathers lets protect it for future generations.

The government of Zimbabwe should respect the constitution and allow agencies like the Environment Management Agency room to practise their mandate without political influence.

Chinese investors should be closed monitored and face the wrath of the law when it comes to abuse of workers and payment of workers in time.

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Hegemonic Party System and Federalism: The Case of the Ethiopian Federal System under the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF)

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Abstract

The paper inquires about the fixture of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) in the Ethiopian federal system, as a dependent variable. It is an interpretive-case study design that elaborates, not compare, a given case with certain theoretical and empirical guides drawn from literature, official, and public documents. The discussions have shown the malfunction of the EPRDF-dominated party system in the multi-ethnic federal constitutional setup, in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness. The hegemonic political program of EPRDF was not in line with the political pluralism meaning of the federal constitutional diversity, as it delinked the constitutional right to self-determination and federal self-rule from the types of political options and choices that dovetailed to multi-party democracy. On the structure of EPRDF, equal representation was favourable to the federal politics of diversity accommodation and minority protection. However, the exclusiveness of its structure from the so-called affiliate parties had the effects of spawning a narrow-based federal shared-rule, as EPRDF was the only channel to influence the centre. Like its Marxist-originated hegemonic program and democratic-centralism, the fusion of EPRDF and the state was the other setback to bring the constrain of power to the federal constitutional operation and to establish the neutrality of the state to deal with ethnic-driven conflict, as a major pathology to the stability of ethnic federal system. Finally, the power nucleus in the EPRDF created the dominance of TPLF at the perils of diminishing the representative legitimacy and the subordinate position of the affiliate parties to EPRDF.

Keywords: Dominant-party, centralism, state-party fusion, federalism and federal operation.

Introduction

Ethiopian has a long history of statehood predating at least the 19th century. In the first half of the 1900s, it entered into a federal and multi-party constitutional design which was quite departing from the history of centralization, no-party system and one-party system the country had. In practical realm, however, there are serious concerns. One of them is the degree to which multi-party democracy has shown progress and its interaction with the federal system. Until very recently, the entire period of the federal constitutional order had seen consistent the dominance of EPRDF. EPRDF long dominated the post-1991 Ethiopian politics in four aspects: controlling the transitional period of constitution-making, elections, government heading and political agenda-setting. Its positions in altering the preceding regime through armed rebellion enabled it to monopolize the formal apparatus of coercion left vacuum with the cease of the preceding regime.

Then, its dominance in elections and running the successive governments went unchallenged for about a quarter-century. Beginning from the Peace and Democracy Conference which had the role of an assembly mandated to draw the map of a political transition and in the elections conducted to install regional and local governments and to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly, the constitutional ratifier, EPRDF managed to turn things in its favour. That continued until the 2015 election which slightly came before the unfolding of the public uprising and the attendant shift of power within EPRDF itself. Moreover, the party also exercised agenda-setting dominance to advance those political articulations and interests aligned with its Marxist-leaning 'revolutionary-democracy' to the level of almost overarching national aspirations. Cumulatively, the political and organizational precepts and activities of EPRDF laid a one-dominant party system where the dominant party has significant level of leftist orientations. The article looks into that from the spotlights of the federal constitutional dispensation. It has four parts. The first focuses on the relevance of party system to federalism. Then, the brief outline of the Ethiopian federal design follows in the second part. In the second and third parts, the emphases are the EPRDF-dominated party system and the organizational structure and functioning of EPRDF, respectively.

Party System and Federalism

Political parties, as King (1986) reads, are one of the key institutions of the modern political system that have the elements of constitutional republicanism. Their emergences predicated on the gradual expansions of democratic ideals and forces (Kean, 1989). In federal constitutional polities, political party formations have impacts on the wider political system encompassing the processes of federal constitutional origin, operation and development. Political parties interact at least with the practice of federal system (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004). Studies have shown that party system determines the inter-play of parties and federal states. Hicken (2009, p. 4) defines that a party system is "an enduring pattern of intra-party organization and inter-party electoral competition". This definition has many intersections with the Boax's (2007) presentation that party system mirrors the number of effective parties, their organizational setups and interactions. Parties and their relative strength are the chief benchmarks to make reasonable delimitations among various party systems into the categories of multi-party, two-dominant party, one-dominant party and one-party system. The categories imply the differing of parties in their politics, institutional structures and operations, and authority. Consequently, party system has relevance to the fundamentals of federal system which are, for McGarry and O'Leary (2003, p. 2), constitutional division of power, representation and constitutional supremacy. To the legitimate designing and implementations of these fundamentals of federal system and their stable consolidations, the program, organization and working mechanisms of political parties and the nature of their competitions can be constraining or enabling.

Scharpf (1995) has asserted that federalism presupposes democracy. Derivatively, multi-party system is conducive to the federal politics of pluralism (Aaron Tesfaye, 2002 and Burgess and Gagnon, 2010, p.1-27). As Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) argued that multi-party system entrenches the rule of law and political rights and liberties, it anchors the democratic principle of power check-and-balance to provide for the federal constitutional de-monopoly of power and constitutional supremacy. The records of stable and enduring multi-ethnic and multi-national federations of such as Spain, Belgium, India, Switzerland, and Canada have proved multiparty democracy nourishes the legitimacy and stability of federal systems.

In addition to strengthening a the flexibly of a multi-ethnic federal order to address the changing demands of its constituent identity groups, multi-party competition and elections fosters the

ethos of democratic politics and representation. That advances the political capital to engage in a legitimate and stable federal constitutional negotiation. Linz (1997) put that:

> *We find a close link between multinational federalism and democracy because in the context of a democracy with its political freedoms, groups…and national minorities can articulate freely their demands and give support to a representative leadership that is difficult to ignore. Nations do not have, unless the state allows them to do so, democratic representatives, representatives elected by the members of the national community. Democracy the dominant powers, the state and those controlling it, can deny representativeness to the nationalist leadership.* (p. 21).

The experiences of fragile and failed federations have lessons reinforcing value of multi-party system to federal constitutional order. In these federations, the no-party and one-party systems of monarchism, military dictatorships, and the communist vanguard parties lacks those ideological and organizational ingredients of federal 'covenant', pluralism and dispersal of power. The deficit of multi-party democracy is the most shared features of failed and fragile federations. Relatedly, the ideological and organizational systems of one-party regimes disallow broad-based federal constitution writing and accountable federal operation, at the perils of federal constitutional imposition and practically non-accommodating institutions. Based on the comparative work of Kavalski and Zolkos (2008), the one-party system engenders a political system which is inept to enforce the federal dispersal of power and shared governance. As a qualification, the comparison between USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, on one side, and Kincaid (2010)'s 'non-liberal' and 'autocratic federations' such as Russia, Nigeria, Malaysia and Pakistan, on the other side, hints that the organs of the communist parties are by far more partisan to embrace federal constitutional pluralism. The latter, the 'non-liberal', embrace a one-dominant party system in which "…one party outdistancing all others in several consecutive elections… heads the government for a long period with the majority, or plurality, of the popular vote (Mtimkulu, n.d, p.24).

Nevertheless, compared to the one-party system of communist regimes, the compatibility of the one-dominant, or interchangeably hegemonic, party system to federalism and federal constitutional system has some subtleties. It is further complicated by the categorization of this party system into competitive and non-competitive. In the former, said Hicken (2009), the possibility of inter-party competitive elections, though with limited effects, could facilitate a modicum of multi-party representation in the federal layers of government. Besides, the dominant parties could also show broad-based politics to fend their hegemony off the political appeal of the opposition and that seems to induce dominant parties bring diverse regional, ethnic, and national interests on board. The experience of the Indian National Congress (INC), before the mid-1990s, in improving its identification with minority ethnic and religious was considered a pre-emptive response to the ascendance of competing segmental parties exclusively committing to specific ethnic groups and segmental provincial interests.

The congressional potential of competitive hegemonic parties to serve as integrative glues among politically divided groups resonates with the suggestion of Friedman (1999) that the South African National Congress (ANC) needs to have a political elasticity to transform itself from an aggregate force of liberation to a disaggregated arena of accommodation is the other case. In a multi-ethnic federal environment, the drive to show political elasticity could encourage a dominant multi-ethnic coalition party which is favourable to ethnic identity recognition accommodation. Such opportunities deemed attenuated in the context of a non-competitive one-dominant party system in which the drive to ensure a wide and flexible political space recedes with the absence of competing opposition parties. As a result, the subject of federal constitutional legitimacy and

stability in the context of the non-competitive dominant party system has much to do with the program, structure and functioning of the dominant party. These provide the parameters to deal with the EPRDF-dominant party system.

The Federal Constitutional Design of Ethiopia

Following the downfall of the military regime in 1991, the Transitional Government (July 22, 1991- August 27, 1995) recognized the right of self-determination to nations and nationalities. In constitutionalizing the Charter of the Transitional Government, the adoption of the Federal Constitution in December 1994 marked the beginning of the full-fledged federal constitutional system of Ethiopia. It is imperative to note some issues with the naming of the Ethiopian federal constitutional order. By omitting the rare description of the federal system of Ethiopia as a "tribal" (*Gossa*, in Amharic), the overall imprecision and inconsistency of labelling the federal order are better comprehendible in the terminological divide among scholars, academics and political actors into two basic splits.

The first, as a prelude to the 'multi-national' labelling of the federal system, refers to the constitutional assigning of "nations and nationalities" to the constituent identity groups in question. This is the most frequented terminology among public authorities and the leadership and regular members of the recently replaced EPRDF which had headed the government since the embankment of the federal system in 1995. Some political actors outside EPRDF and a number of academics also use a similar "multi-national" nomenclature (Fassil Nahum, 1997; Kinfe Abraham, 2001 and Merera Gudina, 2003). Therefore, the multi-national depiction of the Ethiopian federation is one of the options of the federal nomenclature.

The second split points to the wider application of the term 'ethnic' by scholars and political commentators. Considerable amounts of literature, research and non-research variants, written on the post-1991 Ethiopian politics in general and on the federal system in specific have inclined to the "multi-ethnic" labelling of the federal constitutional arrangement of Ethiopia (Aaron Tesfaye, 2002; Asnake Kefale, 2013; Assefa Fiseha, 2008; Solomon Nigussie, 2008 and Yonatan Tesfaye, 2008). The contending historical, ideological, political and anthropological interpretations over the formation and evolution of Ethiopia and its politically salient identity groups have repercussions on the varied nomenclatures of the federal constitutional dispensation of Ethiopia. Ethnic groups are the federative members of the FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). The Constitution opens with; "we the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia…", exemplary of one of its diverging points from the constitutional texts of most federal constitutional systems. The same constitution accords these identity groups 'sovereign' power; and declares itself, the FDRE Constitution, an expression of that sovereignty which involves their right to self-determination up to secession, Article 8 and 39, respectively. Within this overarching constitutional disposition, the federal character in general and the multi-ethnic federal nature of Ethiopia, specifically, are pointed out in the following three points.

Federal Structure and Division of Power

The practice of ethnic-based federal units in a multi-ethnic federal system has guided the constitutional intention of the Ethiopian federal organization. It has nine States and the federal capital of Addis Ababa (FDRE Constitution, 1994, Art. 47 and 49). Language, identity, consent and settlement pattern are the criteria for the formation of federal units (Ibid, Art. 46). When these criteria for the delimitation of the States juxtaposed with the constitutional attribution of ethnic groups, as per the Constitution NNPs (Nations, Nationalities and Peoples), there are incongruities between the territorial concentration patterns of ethnic groups and the States'

boundary. The Constitution (Art.39) defines that NNPs are groups of peoples "who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory." The possibility of forming highly compartmentalized ethnic federal units in FDRE sits uneasily with the number of ethnic groups which is not less than 80, eight times of the nine States, much more establishing a sharp among each of them based on identity, customs, psychological composition and territorial distinctions for the purpose of ethnic federal units is far removed from reality. This has led to the emergence of some incongruity between the ethno-territorial intention of the Constitution and its delineation of the States.

Following on what ground and how the States are structured in FDRE, the other important issue is to see the scope of power they have in the Constitution. The constitutional allocation of powers and functions is dualistic that it is between the Federal Government and the States. The power of the latter can be approached in terms of exclusive, concurrent and residual. Designating their own working languages, enacting a state constitution, formulating and implementing state-wide economic, social and developmental policies and plans; levying and collecting those taxes assigned to them, enacting and enforcing laws on the state civil service; and establishing the police force are the explicitly listed exclusive powers of the States (FDRE Constitution, 1994, Art. 52). Regarding revenue, taxation on the income of state employees, farmers, maritime transport services within their territory, private enterprises, land usufructuary rights and few others are the fiscal jurisdictions of the States (Ibid: Art. 97).

The concurrent powers of the States and the Federal Government are scattered across the Constitution. Article 98 says that they jointly levy and collect profit, sales, excise and personal income taxes from joint enterprises, companies and stakeholders, large-scale mining and so on. Related to that, the executive involvement of the States to administer land and natural resources based on federal law and enacting penal laws on matters that are not specifically covered by the federal penal law can be considered as elements of shared responsibilities in the Constitution ((Art. 52 (2, d) and Art. 55(5)). In addition, the States have the responsibility to meet policy frameworks set by the Federal Government ((Ibid, Art. 51(3)). Furthermore, the federal and State governments are also entrusted with the responsibility to respect and enforce the Federal Constitution itself ((Art. 52 (1)), keeping in mind the argument of whether it is an extroversion of the responsibilities of the States or not.

Finally, those powers and functions not given exclusively either to the Federal Government or the States, nor are shared by them, are reserved to the States, according to Article 51 (1) of the Constitution. However, on the decision as to which level of the government would be entitled to new tax bases the Constitution at Article 99 reads that it is to be resolved by the two-thirds majorities of the joint session of the HoF (the House of the Federation) and the HoPRs (the House of Peoples' Representatives). In general, residual jurisdictions would serve the States as a way of expanding their exclusive powers, depending on their practical capacity and political assertiveness.

To add one more point, Article 47 (4) of the Constitution declares that all States have equal rights and power. This shows a deviation from the constitutional systems of other multi-ethnic or multi-national federations such as Canada, Belgium, and India which have constructed their constitutional power asymmetrically with the intention of accommodating the interest of distinct identity groups. Nevertheless, in general, the constitutional structure of territorial federal units and the division of power in Ethiopia vest the constituent identity groups with the power to exercise federal self-rule since the States are delineated based on ethno-linguistic criteria, except the disparity among them in terms of ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity. In this way, the federal structure and power division are associated with the rights of NNPs to self-determination.

Federal Shared rule

Studying the constitutional mechanism of where and in what way ethnic groups are inclusively represented in the Ethiopian federal system is as critical as examining their self-rule. Inclusive representation means the translation of diversity recognition into institutional shared rule. It goes beyond the symbolic recognition of ethnic diversity in the official nomenclature, flag and anthems of Ethiopia (the Preamble and Ch. One of the FDRE Constitution). Dealing with the constitutional mechanism of shared rule requires of making a close investigation of federal institutions and the manner of their structure. Shared rule as the component of the constitutional rights of ethnic groups to self-determination in the Ethiopian federal system as a form of the right to 'equitable' representation in the State and the Federal governments ((Ibid, Art. 39(3)), is vital to the legitimacy of the federal system. According to Thorburn (1978), the parliamentary system of the Ethiopian orders of the governments demands an inclusive legislature for the power of the lawmakers in the parliamentary system *vis-a-vis* the executive helps to assert ethnically broad-based government.

At the federal level, the House of the Peoples' Representatives (HoPRs), the House of the Federation and the executive are important shared-rule institutions of high significance. Despite the members of the lower house, HoPRs, are the representatives of the citizenry, in general, it is worth mentioning that there are at least 20 out of 550 seats reserved for ethnic minorities ((FDRE Constitution, Art. 54 (3)). On the executive branch, the Constitution has no clear guide on the ethnic composition of the federal government except with reference to the army, "the composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia," FDRE Constitution ((Art. 87 (1)). Related to that, the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia ((Art. 9 (b)) explicitly demanded the head of the state, the prime minister, the vice-chairman and the secretary of the Council of Representatives (CoRs) shall be elected from different nationalities. However, after the second half of the 2000s, the issue of ethnic representation in the Federal Government received attention in the nomination of key office holders such as minsters and deputy ministers.

Coming to the representation of ethnic groups in the Federal Government, the Constitution is clear and loud in the composition of the second house. The Constitution (Art. 53) establishes the House of the Federation (HoF), and this goes in line with being a federation, as Assefa Feseha (2008: p. 239) put, "… second chambers reflecting the entrenched representation of the states distinguishes federations from other polities." The only exceptions, Watts (2008, p. 52) said, are Venezuela, where in 1999 the new constitution reformulated the bicameral legislature to a unicameral National Assembly, UAE, Comoros, Micronesia and St. Kitts and Nevis. In the HoF, each ethnic group has at least one representative and one additional representative for each additional one million population ((FDRE Constitution, Art. 61(2)).

Furthermore, explaining the ground as to why ethnic groups, not directly the States, are represented in the HoF; Aalen (2002: p. 8) indicates that the making of the Ethiopian Constitution was bargained among ethnic groups and their political parties. The bargaining ethnic political elites were not willing to compose the HoF by the federal units (Minutes of the Constituent Assembly, Vol. 5, 1994). This is a typical instance of the theory of rational choice in political science. In this theory, to the view of Pincion and Teson (2006), political institutions are greatly shaped by the interests of those political actors who established or are in control of them.

Federal Constitutional Supremacy

The Ethiopian Federal Constitution, while suggesting the constitutional pattern of a holding-together federal origin, has recognized the constitutions of the States and outlined what political principles and institutions need to be included in the constitutions of the States. It makes clear that the States have their own legislative councils, judiciary, and executive as well as they are to organize their administrations in line with advancing self-government, a democratic order based on the rule of law and protecting the Federal Constitution ((FDRE Constitution, Art. 50 (2) and 52 (2)). The last point and Article 51(1), which mandates the Federal Government with the power to protect and defend the constitution, are the cornerstones of the principles of constitutional supremacy. Both levels of government are established by and accountable to the FDRE Constitution. They are equally beholden to the Constitution and neither of them has no the legal power to violate, change and modify it unilaterally. To that effect, the Ethiopian constitutional adjudication and amendment processes are the twine mechanisms of constitutional safeguards to the orders of the governments and ethnic groups.

The States and the Federal Government have the right to dispute the constitutionality of each other's laws and decisions. The equal standing of the Federal and State laws at the HoF ((FDRE Constitution, Art. 62 (1)) fits into the concept of co-ordinance in which no order of the government is subordinate to the other. For Sawer (1969, 55-60), it is one of the defining features of a federal constitutional design to embolden the status of provincial laws as opposed to the unitary view of them as 'by-laws', challengeable by a court. Moreover, in times of conflicting laws, the non-existence of the federal paramountcy in the Ethiopian Constitution has also a similar repercussion on the legal status of the laws of the State by equally subjecting them and the federal laws to the same constitutional review process.

Here, the constitutional interpretation power of the HoF was one of the most intensely debated issues in the Constituent Assembly. It was justified that as it is composed of the representatives of ethnic groups in whom the sovereign power resides, the power of constitutional interpretation had to be the exclusive jurisdiction of the HoF. Granting the power of the constitutional adjudication to the HoF was considered as a mechanism for safeguarding the overriding intent of the federal system, and ethnic rights (Minutes of Constituent Assembly, 1987, p. 4-19).

The Constitution is not well versed in expressively pointing out the details of issues to be presented to the HoF seeking its constitutional interpretation. In this respect, the only stipulation is Article 84 which is on the authority of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) to decide as to the necessity of HoF's adjudication over the constitutionality of laws and other constitutional disputes presented to it. It, at Sub-article 2, reads that where any federal or state law is contested as being unconstitutional and such a dispute any court or interested party submitted to the CCI, it should consider the matter and either remand or send to the HoF for the final decision.

Later, Proclamation 250/2001((Art. 2(5)) stretched what constitutes "any Federal or State law" to subsume international agreements, executive regulations and decisions. The impact of such elastically centralized authority of the HoF on the judicial capacity of courts has remained a subject of debate. The insulation of the power of the executive from courts could engender a heavy-handed executive out of the judiciary's reach. This has much to do with the operation of the federal system. Though it can be said that the HoF shows an inclusive composition of ethnic groups, currently 76 ethnic groups (FGACO, 2015), the criticism levelled on its effective constitutional adjudication arises for its neutrality and competency.

The Hegemonic Politics of EPRDF vis-a-vis the Federal System

In a similar fashion to the ruling parties of one-dominate party systems, the ascendance of EPRDF to power was preceded by what Mtimkulu (nd, p. 23) calls "extraordinary circumstances" in which it had decisive engagements. It had the experience of championing the fierce armed struggle against the Military regime. This catalysed its dominance in the period after the Military rule in 1991. The dominance, however, was attributed not only to that historical accomplishment. EPRDF had also pursued the politics of hegemony. Most importantly, The EPRDF had programs on many policy areas of politics, economy, society, culture, military and international relations. In explaining their substances, EPRDF claimed that they were the derivatives of its ideological watermark, 'revolutionary-democracy'. As a dominant political actor since the federalizing process, understanding what it meant by 'revolutionary-democracy' helps to grasp the essence of the party's program through the lenses of the federal constitutional order; and, presuming adherence to its program, it is even meaningful in discerning what political goals were turning the wheel of the federal system and in what directions. The attributive definition of 'revolutionary-democracy' emphasizes the values of ethnic equality and consent, the rights of ethnic groups to self-determination including secession, unity in diversity, hegemonic party system and self-sufficiency (EPRDF, 2006). The last one underlines the purposes of accelerated, sustainable and fair mechanisms of poverty reduction and economic development in the domestic and foreign policies of the FDRE. Though often inconsistent and had the tendency of internal contradictions, one of the most recurring and regime-defining themes of EPRDF's revolutionary-democracy was the discursive rights of ethnic groups, what it called, similarly to the Constitution, "nations and nationalities", in the multi-dimensional interest of the society (Ibid, p. 1-10).

Consequently, the program of EPRDF maintained the constitutional federal objectives and principles of building one political and economic community, self-determination, the right to secession, and ethno-linguistic federal units. The Constitution rules that the States are to be created based on settlement pattern, language, identity and consent (FDRE Constitution, Preamble, Art.39 and 46). Moreover, on the specific institutional setups of the federal system such as the manner in which the constitutional power and responsibilities are allocated, and the establishment of an ethnically composed second chamber, HoF, which has the authority to interpret the constitution; EPRDF squarely agreed not only with text of the Constitution but also its effective implementation (Meles Zenawi Leadership Academy, 2017, p. 63-81).

Some observers of Ethiopian politics have the believe that the extensive overlapping between the program of EPRDF and the Federal Constitution on the federal system reflected its upper hand in the constitutional designing process of the early 1990s (Gebru Asrat, 2014, p. 121-123). It is a correlational explanation between a document and its writer/s. The inclusiveness and the balance of power among actors in the Council of the Representatives (CoRs), as the Constitutional Drafting Commission was accountable to it, and in the Constituent Assembly have remained one of the major grounds to seriously doubt the making legitimacy of the federal constitutional arrangement. The complete overlapping between the federal elements of the 1994 Constitution and the federal conception of EPRDF, as a post-conflict triumphant actor, is likely to depict the Constitution as a borrowed/transplanted yet experience-driven politicized constitution. The Leninist orientation of EPRDF and the close proximity of the federal characters of the Constitution itself to the former USSR and Yugoslavia may illuminate its borrowed origin (Negede Gobeze, 2004).

Focusing on the compatibility of the party program of EPRDF and the federal system, it could have been imperative to the effective operation of the latter, if the same program had not prescribed the hegemonic party system. Abbink and Hagmann, (2011, p. 558) state that, with fluctuating priorities, EPRDF believed that democracy is as vital as peace and development for national

survival. Peace was emphasized in the immediate years following the collapse of the military rule to the aftermath of the war with Eritrea. What follows was the promotion of democracy until the 2005 election. Some mentioned reasons of internal organizations, the incentives of the Western countries and the diminished appraisal of the opposition to compete effectively for the short-lived multi-party opening leading up to the election (Birhanu Nega, 2006; and EUEOM, 2005). After facing the unexpected performance of the opposition parties such as CUD and UEDF in the 2005 election, EPRDF revoked the democratic initiative and re-direct itself towards the agenda of economic growth with the developmental state model while accelerating the narrowing of the democratic space with non-competitive hegemonic party model.

The mixed nature of the party's conviction on the issue of electoral democracy had come along with the articulations of democracy in its ideology of revolutionary-democracy which has the primary objective of socio-economic transformation (Gebru Asrat, 2015). The party assumes the leading political agency "…in order to enable people to rally behind the objectives of revolutionary-democracy and to struggle for their accomplishment, EPRDF is expected to play the role of a vanguard…to lead the people in their efforts to raise their consciousness and organize themselves…", EPRDF (2006, p. 32).

In unknotting the contradiction of terms between the hegemonic program and politics of EPRDF and the multi-party structures of the Federal Constitution it engineered, the ideological calculation of EPRDF to withstand the post-Cold War global re-ordering without dropping its Marxist worldview and the factors of democratization are noted. The manner in which EPRDF articulated its contra-liberal principles and political discourse was versed with Marxism-Leninism "that has guided the TPLF since its foundation in 1975." ICG (2009, p. 6). The hegemonic projection of the party resonated with its low performance on the constitutionally recognized multi-party system. It displayed democratic apathy in the operation of every level of government "in spite of the readily reference of the EPRDF leadership to democratic jargon," said Young (1997, p. 211). Democratization also foundered with paternalistic relations of EPRDF with ethnic elites (ICG, 2009, p. 5). That severed emergence of viable opposition parties so that they negotiate the rules of the political game for democratizing the Ethiopia state. It was confounding to the opinion that the party had the objective of promoting and consolidating democracy, but the country is not yet prepared to do so. Joireman (1997, p. 401) has pointed out gaps in multi-party experience, democratic culture and institutionalization as factors for the flagging of democratization initiatives since the transitional period of the early 1990s. However, from the first regional and local election held in June 1992, EPRDF had been criticized for suppressing the opposition parties whose electoral boycotts were frequent. Continuing that, in 2014 and 2015, Polity IV (Report, 2014), Freedom House (Report, 2015) and EIU-Democracy Index (2015) gave the reports that Ethiopian belonged to the groups of states in 'closed-autocracy', 'not-free' and 'totalitarian', which is under the categories of 'flawed-democracy' and 'hybrid-regimes', in their orders. Cumulatively, following the 2015 election, the opposition had no representative in the federal lawmaker, HoPRs.

Moreover, in addition to directly suppressing opposition parties, the promotion of ethnic divisions by EPRDF was relevant to its multi-party system avoidance. Birhanu Nega (2010) argued that EPRDF, with its dictatorship, had long stayed in power in the volatile Horn of Africa for three reasons: ethnic division, economic performance, weak opposition and Western interests in the region. EPRDF spurred ethnic fragmentations and tensions to keep a united opposition at bay (Ibid), pre-empting democratization with the depletion of unity among ethnic groups to a united democratic mobilization. Democratization requires national solidarity, the destruction

of authoritarian structures, founding elections and the consolidation of democratic institutions (Hadenius, 1992, p. 112; and Rustow, 1970).

On the compatibility of EPRDF's hegemonic program with the federal system, there were observations more or less characteristic of a pluralistic federation under the centralized regime of the one-party system.

> *One-party regimes that had come to power through free elections and/or that had yielded power because of the ballot box were all but impossible to find. Far more pervasive were regimes built around an inherent skepticism toward power sharing…most shared the sentiments of Thomas Carlyle toward democracy: 'I do not believe in the collective wisdom of individual ignorance* (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999, p. Vi).

Broadly, in the milieu of EPRDF's dominance, the predicaments of the federal order to reflect the self-determination rights of ethnic groups and the legitimate exercise of the constitutional division of power were highly expected. If it had not been for the non-competitive dominance of EPRDF, multi-party competitions and elections could have democratised the structures of the federal self-rule and representation in the federal centre. The absence of multi-party competitions was less likely to force EPRDF to heed political and constitutional demands; and that undercuts the democratic validation of the ethnic federal constitutional order. Without the availability of political choices and the freedom to choose, it is possible to argue that federal operation had the serious democratic deficit of disconnecting federalism and open politics.

The hegemonic aspiration of EPRDF blocked the translation of its ethnic diversity narration into democratic political pluralism. Such federal malfunctions of the party had origin in its rejection of neo-liberalism with the conviction that individualism cannot give adequate space for group rights. However, there are counterviews which are positive as to the potentials of liberalism to accommodate diversity as the theoretical foundation of liberalism is around resisting imposition (Kymlicka, 2002). "Liberal politics comes from its explicit recognition of difference. This difference is not on the basis of some minor issues, but in fact on most substantive issues," Birhanu Nega (2010, p. 18). Hence, by compromising the contribution of the opposition politics to enhance the constitutional right of ethnic self-determination the hegemonic program of EPRDF constricted the liberty of ethnic groups so that democratic ambivalence existed in the ethnic federal operation.

The Structure and Functioning of EPRDF vis-a-vis the Federal System

The structure of EPRDF had a mixed mode of organization where the independence and the super-ordinance between the constituent parties and the overarching EPRDF existed side by side. The member parties have symmetric exclusive jurisdictions. According to the *Electoral Law Proclamation 537/2007*, the definition of a 'front' of parties informed that the component parties of EPRDF had organizational autonomy. They had the power to articulate their own objectives, to collect own revenue, to recruit members and to leave the front (EPRDF, 2006, Art. 11 and 30). Parallel to that, EPRDF had also its own structures which were accountable only at the front level and the super-ordinance ranging from policy frameworks to requiring strict adherence to ideological and procedural matters considered fundamental to the party. Revolutionary-democracy and democratic-centralism, as the major distinguishing markers of the party, were the uncompromising obligations of the member parties and parties applying to EPRDF membership ((EPRDF, 2006, II (7), Art.7(e)).

According to its *Statute* (2006), EPRDF had 11 organs. They are the Congress, Council, Executive Committee, Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretariat, Monitoring and Auditing Commission, Parliamentarian Members of EPRDF, Women League, Youth League and Lower bodies. The Congress and the Council were the highest and the second highest repositories of power, in their orders (EPRDF, 2006).

Centralism

The following Questions are crucial: What is 'centralism'? How did EPRDF apply it? And what effects did it have on the operation of the federal system? 'Centralism' refers to the degree of power concentration in the structures of a given political party. It dictates where and how decisions regarding the basic activities of the party and its internal organization are made. There are variations among parties that parties in the liberal side of the political spectrum are less centralized than those in the left side for the presumption that they embrace diverse views and discretions.

The importance of party-coherence in leftist parties relates to the systemic centralizing principles of 'party-discipline' 'democratic-centralism' and 'criticism'. Democratic centralism, according to Nanda's definition, can subsume the other two. It is the basic principle of organization in Marxist and workers' parties which emphasizes the significance of elected top party officials, the supremacy of majority decision, strong party-discipline, and criticism (Nanda, 2006, p. 147). The appointment of the top leadership through elections and the rule of criticism are considered as the democratic base for the legitimacy of centralization. Ultimately, democratic-centralism is believed to ensure the unity of force by containing the possibility of inner fragmentation with a hierarchical power matrix in which the lower organ of the leftist parties strictly enforce the decisions of the ranks usually in the executive and politburo.

Party centralism and single-party hegemony have close intimacy with the ***modus operandi*** of a de-facto one-party system, "where no matter what the formal constitution says, gives rise to a form of government in which the greatest power is concentrated in the committee of the party (and its secretary) to the detriment of all the collegial and popular organs provided for in the constitution," wrote Bobbio (1989, p.106). That goes with the notion that constitutionalism needs and results in a mixed government with non-concentrated and contending power among its parts (Sartori, 1976, p. 12).

Studies on EPRDF converge on its leftist ideological penchants. Marxism had the ideological line of TPLF, especially since the establishment of MLLT (Marxist Leninist League Tigray) in 1985 (Gebru Asrat, 2014). Democratic centralism is one of the well-known ideological markers of EPRDF. The 180 membership Council of EPRDF was formed by the Central Committees of the four component parties; and the same Council had the mandate to establish the Central Committee (72), the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson of EPRDF. The Chairpersons led both the Central and the Executive Committees (36). The latter was composed of the Executive committees of the member parties. Though structurally the Congress and the Council were powerful, the practical dominance of the Executive Committee in the party was associated with the application of democratic-centralism in order to form a centralized party structure led by the executives. Considering the interpenetration between the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the states and the self-determining agency of ethnic groups, power accumulation in the front in general and specifically in its Executive Committee produced the hegemony of the Federal Government and weakening of the federal self-rule to the level of policy executioners (Aalen, 2002).

Furthermore, the trends of centralization and re-centralization oscillated with the changing political environment (Aalen, 2002). The 2003 split in TPLF and the relevant disagreements among the member parties of EPRDF that necessitated the active intervention of the federal centre in the institutions of the States attested to the vulnerability of EPRDF's structures to crises in the structures of its member parties (Ibid, p. 103-105). Medhane and Young (2005) showed the full picture that the split within TPLF concerning the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrea war and its peace process had repercussions not only on the stability of the national organs of EPRDF organs but also on the interactions of parties constituting EPRDF.

Locating EPRDF's centralism in the discipline of federalism, the term 'grand-coalition' in the consociational theory has much to offer. It helps the question of whether the structure of the party, EPRDF, was more powerful than its component parties or not? The consociational 'grand coalition' is the shared power locus of consensus-democracy which prescribes the institutionalization of proportional power-sharing among elites accountably representing autonomous communities and the adoption of veto power (Lijphart, 2007). Considering that, it is possible to make sense of some consociational elements in the structure of EPRDF. Its composition from segmental parties representing ethnic groups having the constitutional right to self-determination is a point of similarity. Equal representation in such organs of EPRDF as the Congress, Council and Executive could be argued as potentially another aspect of the consociational 'grand-coalition'. Lijphart (2007) argues that representation is meaningful only in the context of *parity* in population sizes. So, equal representation advances the purpose of proportional representation when the relevant communities have extreme gaps in their sizes. It is imperative to protect the rights of minority groups, as an effective system of power-sharing.

Hence, equal representation in EPRDF was, in principle, protective of the relative minority ethnic groups identified with its member parties. It could have enhanced consensus-democracy in general and minority-veto in particular, if there had been a binding criterion of unanimity. When unanimous agreements were out of reach, EPRDF resorted to simple majoritarian 50^{+1} ((EPRDF, 2006, Art.7(2)). The norm of secrecy also exacerbated the problem of representativeness which might be similar to the syndrome of 'elite-power cartel', or power-hijack, referring to unaccountable power division and negotiations among elites hardly seen as legitimate representatives by the relevant constituencies.

It was stated that, like the Soviet experience of democratic-centralism, the Ethiopian regional governments were dependent on EPRDF to secure their economic and political demands, and in terms of adopting the program of the EPRDF to such extent they have become policy enforcers, let alone protecting of the federal constitutional system. As long as the principle of democratic-centralism was the chief instrument of the party, power concentration was inevitable. Abraha (2008, p. 72) claimed that "[t]he party programs stipulate that a political party can be a member of the EPRDF only if it follows democratic centralism…The party also forbids its members in legislative branches at both levels to lobby or create factions and different legislative groups." Regional governments did not effectively exercise their constitutional autonomy in the area of policy formulation.

Related to federal stability, the centralized functioning of EPRDF circumscribed the purpose of inter-governmental relations to the stability of the federal constitutional arrangement and the federation. It enforced informal and executive-dominated efforts of inter-ethnic and/or state conflict resolution. Conflict management in the monopoly of the executive offices of the government is less accountable and transparent to win durable solutions, much less in the EPRDF controlled federal orders of government. Recognizing that, the former Ministry of Pastoralists' and Federal Affairs was making a policy of intergovernmental relations that would

enable institutional and consistent collaborations among regional governments (FGACO, 2015). In addition, EPRDF's centralism had also its own marks on the stability of the federal system in terms of conflict management. Aalen (2002) made the case that the contradictory relation of EPRDF with the application of the constitutional federal dispensation induced ethnic conflicts and tensions, it though had not encountered the demand to exercise the constitutional right to secession. The conflicts would escalate, out of constitutional frustration, from asserting the federal system to outright centrifugalism, including secession.

Party-State Fusion

Party-state fusion was the other feature of the EPRDF-dominated Ethiopian party system which had ramifications on the federal constitutional order. It infers the diversion as well as the exclusive capture of the state by EPRDF. It is the ultimate negative consequence of what Bobbio (1989, p. 106) said about party system that it, as the soul of government, "influences the formal constitution to the point of changing its structure." The legislative and judiciary system become the rubber stumps of the executive where the highest power of a party usually lies and this party, using its channels, controls the bureaucracy. In Ethiopia, Asnake Kefala remarked that state-party separation gradually withered away so that the accusation on EPRDF of abusing the resources and power had truth in it. As the inseparability of party and state connotes an unchartered power system, the coupling of EPRDF's structures and their operations with the edifices of the government was accounted for in at the federal and regional levels. Even at the local community level, "the blurred borders between the state and the party are expressed by people's notion of the *Woreda* and *Kebelle* bureaucracy as party organs," Aalen (2002, p. 84). That went to the extent of, HRW (2010, p.24-25) reported, misusing humanitarian relief aids to exact spell frustration among opposition party members and supporters while sustaining its patron-client relations with its local cadres.

The high level of inseparability between the state and EPRDF was an impediment to the democratic procedure of power check-and-balance. That installed unaccountable executive pivoted with the core-power of EPRDF, notable the Executive Committee. The judiciary and the legislatures of the Federal Government were not witnessed fending the federal constitutional division of power and the federal principle of constitutional supremacy from the far-reaching hands of the executive (Turton, 2005, p. 94). That was aggravated by the difficulty in the leverages of the lawmakers and the apparatus of public administration to curb the dominance of the executive from infringing on the federal constitutional system with the procedures of constitutional review. The executives were also close to the top leadership of EPRDF. Asserting the supremacy of the Constitution (Art. 9) could be dependent on the grip of EPRDF on mechanisms and institutions entrusted to interpret and amend the Federal Constitution. In all procedures of constitutional review and amendment, whether it requires the unanimous majority votes of all the States and the separate sessions of the HoPRs and the HoF or not; three institutions: The State Councils, HoF and HoPRs are involved (Art. 10). Therefore, how EPRDF's attachment with the state affected these institutions is the crux of the matter. The possibility of effective and independent constitutional interpretation was limited due to there was no reason to believe that bodies of constitutional adjudication were uniquely unaffected by the fusion of EPRDF and the institutions of the government in the federation, at large (Aalen, 2002).

The state-party fusion was also a set back to the practice of responsive and effective ethnic conflict management. Because of their ethnic segmental bases and the capture of the government institutions by them, EPRDF's parties and the "affiliates" have faced with the challenges of ethnic and political neutrality in dealing conflicts of ethnic nature. Among ethnic conflict episodes

that occurred between 1997 and mid-2015, Bekalu Atnafu (2017) presented 20 episodes along with the relevant ethnic groups, the special spots of the conflicts, the consequences and the leading factors such as communal ethnic assertiveness and mobilizations, boundary disputes, and natural resource competitions and elite power rivalries. The incumbent ethnic parties might be ineffective to facilitate the peaceful mitigation of the conflicts for they were likely assumed partial to their co-ethnic groups. Here, the challenge was how sub-national institutions controlled by segmental ethnic parties could establish the legitimacy of neutrality to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts among ethnic groups. The experience of Gambella, in 2003 and 2008, attested to the rent-seeking behaviours of the top public officials in ossifying the regional government to prevent and stop the devastating ethnic conflicts (Meles Zenawi Leadership Academy, 2017, p. 100).

Power Balance in EPRDF and in its Relations with the "affiliate" Parties

The nature of intra- EPRDF power dynamics and the relationships of the "affiliate" parties to EPRDF is the other prism to look into the federal experience of Ethiopia. Despite the fact that EPRDF ensured the symmetrical representation of the member parties, the representative legitimacy of the parties had been debated. One of the reasons was, as indicated by many experts in such internationally recognized institutions as IDEA (2007, p. 36), the flagrant dominance of TPLF within the front. Aalen (2002, p. 88) mentioned the view of a member of TPLF Central Committee who had said that the dominance of TPLF in EPRDF was true due to the number and the political merits of its senior cadres in the structures of EPRDF, and the competence of Meles Zenawi, the then Chairman of TPLF as well as EPRDF.

The political crises that erupted between 2015 and 2018 called in the dominance of TPLF, in one way or the other. In this period, the political development of the country might hint at the proposition that the relative power of the other parties to TPLF was dependent on the extent of the public political support they had. Formerly had been perceived as "go-betweens", OPDO and ANDM became much more visible as they rallied the broad section of the society behind, not limited to their respective regions. That generated the waning of TPLF in EPRDF as well as in the Federal Government. This re-balancing of power configuration was more likely to have effects in the direction of improving the deficit of representativeness, as a broad-based and accountable form of representation (Lijphart, 2006), in the federal operation of ANDM and OPDO.

In addition, the nature of power relations between EPRDF and its "affiliate" parties: the Harrari National League (HNL), Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) and Gambella People's Democratic Front (GPDF) had impacts on the legitimacy of the federal operation. It was widely recognized that EPRDF backed the establishment and the building of these ally parties. Their exclusion from the federal power locus might convey the message of the peripherialization of ethnic groups identified with them. In explaining their relative weaknesses and subservient relationship with EPRDF, in terms of safeguarding the federal self-rule of their regional states vis-à-vis the powerful EPRDF, the question of why they did not join in to EPRDF arises, given its close relationship between them. Interviewing a top EPRDF official, Aalen (2003, p.83) found out that EPRDF, for any political party to join in, applied strict ideological criteria drawn from its revolutionary-democracy such as gender equality, a criterion that had been a barrier to the Somali and Afar "affiliate" parties to be admitted into EPRDF because of religious contexts in their regions. Based on that, it was conceivable that the "affiliates" had asked for the full membership and EPRDF measured their applications against a pre-determined set of criteria. That, combined with the sort of Ethiopian political discourse of ethnic equality

and accommodation, could be also interpreted as the subservience of the ethnic and regional constituencies of the "affiliate parties". It did not go along with the federal constitutional dispersal of powers and shared-rule.

Conclusion

The hegemonic politics, structure, and functioning mechanisms of EPRDF resulted in anomalies in the legitimacy and stability of the federal constitutional dispensation. Party-centralism, fusion with the state, internal power imbalance, side-lining of the affiliate parties, and non-competitive dominance were negating to the opinion that EPRDF was the champion of the 'question of nationalities' and ethnic federalism. They poised challenges to the genuine and stable operation of the federal constitutional order and politics (Aalen, 2002). As the constitutional division of powers has instrumental and intrinsic dimensions to the rights of ethnic groups**,** the centralized and party-dominated federal operation under EPRDF availed not to manage legitimately the increasingly polarized ethnic relations and political uprisings.

Thus, the all-around assessment of EPRDF reflected a significant mismatch with the federal system, nor did it allow alternative effective political parties in the political landscape of the federal system. Multi-party system could not thrive in nurturing the necessary political pluralism for the effective and stable consolidation of the Ethiopian federalism. Juxtaposing the essence of federal constitutional diversity with the presumption that EPRDF had the advantage of forging congressional inter-ethnic consensual federal governance, the latter becomes a mere technical arrangement to deal with the possible ethnic political fragmentation than embracing the federal value of a multi-chrome exercise of power. In filling that gap, provided the Marxist vanguard party politics of EPRDF and their own weaknesses, the opposition political parties were not able to play their role too. Following the political change ensued public protests and ethnic conflicts observed roughly between 2015 and 2018, EPRDF faced with internal and external pressures towards political opening. The query how the Prosperity Party (PP), the successor of EPRDF since 2019, has changed political space and reformed the politics of hegemony is too premature. It will be a topic for new studies addressing the changes and continuities of the Ethiopian party system.

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(**Note:** Last name does not exist in the Ethiopian nomenclature of persons)

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Africa-China Relations and the Issue of South-South Cooperation

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Abstract

Africa-China or Sino-African relations continue to grow stronger. Africa sees China as a partner in development in the context of global South-South Cooperation. As a measure of friendship, China constructed the African Union headquarters at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for free. There has been cooperation between China and African countries. Moreover, China's role in Africa during the independence struggles is well noted and its development assistance to the continent has been phenomenal over the years. As Africa and China relations continue, several bottlenecks continue to mar the relationship. This paper highlights the bottlenecks of Africa-China relations by tracing the historical ties between China and African states. It delves into Africa-China relations in terms of South-South Cooperation and China's foreign policy of non-interference in internal matters of other states. It uses 2019 data to analyze China-Africa trade, investments and revenues accruing to both partners. The paper contributes to knowledge not just in terms of bilateral and multilateral relations but in terms of infrastructure trade and investment in Sino-African relations. It concludes that there is a need for China-African relations to achieve mutual benefits.

Keywords: South-south cooperation, realism, non-interference, decolonization, Africa-China

Introduction

This study makes a meaningful contribution to the field of China-Africa relations from three lenses: historical, the contemporary and made some predictions for the future which looks bleak.

China projects itself as a leader in the developing world and aids developing nations. Even though China's economic output in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is second to the US, China still sees itself as a developing nation. In this regard, Chinese investments, both official and private, keep growing in African states as in other developing nations around the world. To give meaning to its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, China gives loans to African Union (AU) members without preconditions as they are done by the Western countries and the Bretton Woods institutions; International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This has endeared many African nations, who are seeking an alternative to the Washington consensus as a precondition to economic assistance, to China. China continues to invest heavily in infrastructural projects in Africa which Western countries and investors shy away from Africa.[1]

1 Berthelemy, J.C., (2011), China's Engagement and Aid Effectiveness in Africa, African Development Bank Group, Working Paper No. 129.

Trade relations between Africa and China keeps increasing for the past two decades. This has also increased the number of Chinese businesses on African soil and the Chinese setting their foot on African soil. The volume of goods coming from China keeps increasing whilst Chinese businesses and nationals keep coming to Africa in search of expansion and seeking new opportunities to grow. There are a lot of cultural exchanges between Africa and China as a lot of Confucius institutes keep springing up in African institutions of higher learning particularly tertiary institutions. As economic relations between Africa and China increase, experts believe that they are imbalanced and tilted in China's favour whilst at the same time depleting Africa's limited natural resources.[2] This paper looks at the history of Africa and China relations (historical lens), it looks at the South-South Cooperation between Africa and China and uses 2019 data provided by John Hopkins University on Africa-China trade, investments and revenues that accrued to Chinese engineers in Africa in 2019. It looks at the cooperation between Africa and China based on the available data is tilted heavily towards China's favour and for the prospects for Africa and China relations to look good, there must be a revision of the status quo to ensure equitable development. The data suggest inequity in relations in trade, investment and infrastructure development/revenue terms.

Theoretical Framework

The paper applies the International Relations (IR) theory of realism to Africa-China relations. According to realists, the international system functions in a "state of anarchy" where each state seeks to dominate the other.[3] To (Mearsheimer 94-5), the international arena remains a self-help system, a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other.[4] To Waltz, survival depends on a state's material capabilities and its alliances with other states.[5] As Hobbes said, due to the selfish and brutish nature of humans seeking to dominate others, there is a social contract between the state and individuals for the state to protect them.[6] The same is seen in the international arena which is seen as anarchic as espoused by Machiavelli[7]. States, just as individuals, need to align themselves with others to protect their interests. This calls for a structured international community where authority can be exercised by a hegemon. A well-structured international community can function better where the hegemon ensures cooperation and discourages conflict. This is done through the creation of political and economic alliances by states. The result of such arrangements ensures the economic and political dominance of the hegemonic leadership. China, in its quest for global dominance, has created several alliances, one of which is the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which celebrated its twentieth-anniversary last year in Senegal. The membership of the FOCAC includes all the AU members except Eswatini. In 2006, China hosted the Year of Africa to celebrate diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa. Data showed at the time that Africa-China trading had increased fourfold with China importing more raw materials particularly crude oil from Africa whilst exporting manufactured goods. China's expansion of investments and loans in Africa is maximizing its economic might and security over other states, especially Western powers and this is realism at play. Places which were in the past dubbed as either British or French spheres of influence in Africa are now hotly contested by Chinese officials and private interests. Trade volumes between China and those countries have increased astronomically whilst Chinese contractors outbid their Western

2 Mlambo, C., et al., (2016), China-Africa Relations; What Lies Beneath?, The Chinese Economy (Taylor & Francis) vol 49.

3 Dougherty, J.E., & Pfaltzgraff, Jr, R.L.,(1971), Contending Theories of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, pg 66-70.

4 Dunne, T., et al., International Relations Theories; Discipline and Diversity (3rd edition), Oxford University Press, pg 61.

5 Waltz, K.N., (1997), *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley) p103-104.

6 Hobbes, T., (1946), Leviathan, ed. and intro. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.).

7 Machiavelli, N., (1940), The Prince and The Discourses (New York: Random House [Modern Library].

counterparts for construction and other official contracts. Thus, the importance of realism in analyzing Sino-African relations in terms of trade, investments and infrastructure development.

Africa-China Relations from a Historical Perspective

A look at the literature on Africa-China relations reveals that, even though China had contact with East Africa during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) until Chairman Mao's establishment of the Asian-African Institute in July 1961 to study the history, geography, and the prevailing situation in Africa[8], much was not known about Africa by Chinese scholars and leaders. It is widely accepted by historians that the first direct contact between Africa and China was the voyages by Chinese court eunuchs and admiral Zheng He, emissary of the Ming court from 1405.[9] Africa-China relations have not received much-dedicated research until recently when China's global expansion has become a matter of concern for Western political leaders. This according to Large, might be due to several factors including decolonization, Cold War competition (China's rivalry with the Soviet Union – and Taiwan, to an extent – tending to attract more attention than its actual conduct in Africa), followed by the structural adjustment period that coincided with a more inward-focused, modernizing China."[10] Some foreign policy studies and textbooks on Chinese foreign policies even lacked portions on Chinese relations with Africa[11]. The current attention of the world towards Africa-China relations is quite comparable to the tour in 1963-4 of Zhou Enlai in Africa during the decolonization period which was short-lived due to several factors as China was seen as a lesser threat to the communist world against Western interest in Africa.[12] Africa-China relations have not received much attention in IR studies until quite recently. However, there is ample evidence of Chinese involvement in the decolonization of Africa. For instance, Chinese assistance to freedom fighters in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia, and Mozambique among others. Professor Yu[13] outlines the various stages of Chinese interaction with Africa starting from the Bandung Conference in 1955. He gives a vivid description of China's quest to receive recognition from African states which started with Egypt establishing diplomatic ties with China. Then China used Africa as a stage to battle Soviet influence before the following stage where it engaged the United States for international influence in Africa. The fourth stage is what Yu termed as China's re-entry into Africa after the proletariat revolution in China which made the Chinese retreat due to internal struggles which had caused international outrage over its internal issues.

For the last three decades, the number of Chinese in Africa has risen exponentially. Attention has been drawn to the Chinese in Africa by Howard French who details how the Chinese are building a new empire in Africa.[14] Scholars have debated and set to distinguish between official Chinese nationals sent by the state to Africa and individual Chinese who have over the past few decades moved to Africa either by state contractors or individual businesses seeking expansion in Africa.[15]

8 Anshan, L., 'African studies in China in the twentieth century: a historiographical survey', *African Studies Review* 48, 1 (2005), p. 62.

9 Li, A., (2012), A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, New York; Diaspora Africa Press.

10 Large, D., (2008), Beyond 'Dragon in The Bush': The Study of China-Africa Relations, *African Affairs*, 107/426, 45–61.

11 Kim, S.S., (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao era* (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1984); and also Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds), *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2006).

12 Brezezinski, Z., (1963), *Africa and the Communist world*, Standford University Press, Stanford, pp 142-203.

13 Yu, G.T., (1977), China's Role in Africa, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 432, Africa in Transition, pp. 96-109.

14 French, H., (2014), China's Second Continent. How a Million Chinese Are Building a New Empire in Africa.

15 Park, Y.J., Forever Foreign? Is there a future for Chinese people in Africa? Journal of Ethics and Migration Studies, Routledge (Francis & Taylor Group) page 894.

Armstrong 1997[16] argues that as many as a million Chinese has drawn attention all of a sudden, most of the Chinese in Africa were brought in the past by the Dutch East India Company to South Africa as migrant workers in the mines. Thus, China has long historical ties with Africa and China is most unlikely to leave African soil any time soon due to China's heavy investment in Africa.

Chinese Non-Interference Policy

One of the pillars of Chinese foreign policy in Africa and the world at large is that of non-interference in the internal matters of foreign states. This policy of non-interference seems embedded in Chinese relations with African states as stated in the 1955 Bandung Conference by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, 'We are against outside interference; how could we want to interfere in the internal affairs of others?'[17] Even though this policy seems to align with international law and norms, it appears to have negative and positive effects. The non-interference policy can first be seen as a preventive measure of keeping foreign states, particularly Western democratic states from criticizing China on its internal human rights record. Second, with China offering itself as a model of development to the developing world, China wants to repudiate the Washington Consensus of democracy, deregulation of markets, human rights and other neoliberal policies that serve as conditionalities for economic assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions, IMF, World Bank, and the WTO.

The policy of non-interference has, however, been criticized by scholars and international relations practitioners as keeping dictators and undemocratic regimes in power in Africa as well as abetting leaders in keeping the people poorer. This is because there are countries where institutions are not well developed to keep political leaders accountable. When leaders of such countries take loans and misuse them, the loans are kept for future generations to pay. If they even pay the loans, they use the resources of the state to offset the loans leaving the people in poverty whilst the money is unaccounted for. A case in point is Sani Abacha of Nigeria who stole and kept billions of dollars in Swiss accounts whilst Nigerians wallowed in poverty and were highly indebted to foreign lenders and institutions.

According to Daniel Large, the Chinese policy of non-interference in its foreign relations cannot stand the litmus test in Chinese dealings in Sudan. To him, China's role in developing the oil sector of Sudan which was under the United States (US) and the UN sanctions as well as its sales and manufacture of arms to the Sudanese Armed Forces gave China leverage to influence the politics in Sudan. This, he says, helped established the ruling party which used to be National Islamist Front (NIF) to National Congress Party (NCP) by enriching officials. The relations between the NCP and the Communist Party of China (CPC) ensured state-to-state collaboration of policies and projects in Sudan particularly oil production during the war and human rights abuses in Darfur. He backs his assertions with Chinese claims of being a responsible partner. "More recently, however, the Chinese government has also claimed to be a 'responsible' power that exerted 'influence' on the Sudanese government to accept a United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur and sought credit for its 'constructive' role in passing Security Council Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 that enabled this".[18] Large, further in his article, "*From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement? China's Evolving Relations with Sudan*"[19] traces China's relations with

16 Armstrong, J., (1997), The Chinese at the Cape in the Dutch East Indian Company Period, 1652-1795, Slave Route Project Conference, Robben Island, Cape Town, South Africa, October 24–26.

17 China and the Asian-African Conference (documents), 1955:25, 15.

18 Large, D., (2008), China and the Contradictions of 'Non-Interference' in Sudan, Review of African Political Economy, 35:115, 93-106.

19 Large, D.,*From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement? China's Evolving Relations with Sudan,* Non-Intererence, The Case of Sudan.

Sudan from 1959 when Sudan became the fourth African state to extend diplomatic relations to Beijing. This was after the Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Khartoum in February 2007 and told the Al Bashir government to accept the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proposal of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur. Reeling under US and UN sanctions made China exercise soft power in Sudanese affairs and that could be termed as political interference.

In many African countries, there have been occasions where Chinese nationals have committed crimes or engaged in illegal activities that, due to Chinese economic influence in Africa, were made to escape punishment. In Ghana, for example, a Chinese national who was noted for dealing in the illegal trading of rosewood and whose case aroused public interest escaped trial to the chagrin of the public. **"**Huang Yanfeng", aka Helena Huang, the Chinese woman who is standing trial for allegedly transporting a large quantity of Rosewood to Tema for export to China illegally has been deported."[20] This headline on the front page of Ghana's biggest daily newspaper brought attention to how some Chinese nationals keep operating illegally in the mining sectors and other banned operations in Ghana with impunity and whose acts go unpunished due to Chinese influence in Africa in general. Even as there are no official Chinese interventions in some of these illegal acts, the general mood is that the Chinese nationals who commit illegalities in Ghana and other African states escape punishment due to China's economic soft power.

The whole policy of non-interference has come under scrutiny among Chinese scholars and policymakers and has given China's ever-growing power in international relations. Zheng raises several debates among scholars centring on China's non-interference principle.[21] Three major debates concern whether China abandons the principle that adheres strictly to it or allows considerable flexibility in practice whilst maintaining it. Zheng concludes by saying that "Beijing will be more active and flexible on relevant issues but bearing in mind its paramount concern of state security and deep-rooted distrust of the Western powers, for the time being, a dramatic shift towards an interventionist policy remains highly unlikely." Okolo however, considers China's non-interference to have outlived its usefulness and that China needs to shift to preponderance to protect its investments in Africa and the world at large.[22] He proposes that China should use its economic and UN Security Council veto powers to ensure security in Africa whilst protecting its investments on the continent. Such a suggestion on the economic power of China may inure to the interest of China as well as to the benefits of African states in terms of maintaining peace and political stability among African states. Such a move if adopted by China will lead to a win-win.

The Issue of South-South Cooperation

South-South Cooperation (SSC) emanated from the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia on April 18-24, 1955. It was agreed during the conference to promote self-determination in line with the UN charter, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality of nations big or small according to UN principles. It was a response to the cold war between the Capitalist West and the Soviet Union, where countries belonging to the third world which geographically happen to fall on the southern part of the globe decided to collaborate to have sustainable development rather than always relying on the north. This further led to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. It is instructive to note that, almost all the advanced economies happen to fall in the northern hemisphere as shown in Figure 1.

20 The Daily Graphic, "Chinese woman in Rosewood saga deported" Date: Jul - 03 - 2019, 07:56. 20 The Daily Graphic, "Chinese woman in Rosewood saga deported" Date: Jul - 03 - 2019, 07:56.

21 Zheng, C., (2016), *China Debates the Non-Interference Principle,* The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 349–374.

22 Okolo, A.L., (2015), China's Foreign Policy Shift in Africa: From Non-Interference to Preponderance, *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity,* Rouledge (Francis & Taylor Group).

Figure 1: Advanced economies in the northern hemisphere

The quest by developing nations to place resources and ideas at each other's disposal to enhance mutual development came to be classified in International Relations (IR) studies as South-South Cooperation.

At the UN in the 1970s, attention was focused on having a framework for the members who fall on the global south to collaborate in finding solutions to their development needs. By 1974, a framework was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN called the Special Unit for Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries (TCDC) within the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which was renamed in 2004 as Special Unit for South-South Cooperation. According to Bello, this was developed as an answer to the dependency theory and the recommendations made by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America.[23] As Simplicio puts it, "while Development Cooperation (DC) has so far been largely a North-South phenomenon-with donors being Northern countries and recipients, Southern countries-there is now an opportunity to modify this global paradigm through the addition of a complementary and growing South-South DC relationship.". Simplicio observes that a lot of countries in the South have developed capabilities that are being put at the disposal of others on concessional and non-concessional terms to enhance cooperation in the south. Theodorson and Theodorson define cooperation as "social interaction in which individuals or groups engage in joint action to achieve a common goal."[24] By this definition, it is the objective of the third world countries to achieve a common goal of development. China projects itself as a leader of the developing world providing a model of development to other countries in the South and using its relations with the rest of the South as an example of South-South cooperation.

In Africa, as Asante notes, China's foreign policy towards the continent is supposedly hinged on "South-South Cooperation," underpinned by equality, common development, and a "partnership

23 Bello, W., (2004), *Deglobalization; Ideas for New World Economy*, London: Zed Books.

24 Theodorson A. & Theodorson A.S., (1969), A Modern Dictionary of Sociology. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company), pp. 78-79.

of equals."[25] He however asserts that data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shows an asymmetrical relationship where Africa exports raw materials to China in exchange for finished goods leading to a trade imbalance and rising indebtedness of Africa to China. This situation he concludes is leading to neo-colonialism akin to Africa's relationship with the North.

Using Nigeria's relations with China as an example of South-South Cooperation, Udeala notes that "The original vision was for member countries to promote trade as well as to demonstrate, through practical examples, how commercially viable projects can be implemented using the technology, experience and capital from the South".[26] He concluded that, instead of having a symmetrical relationship under South-South Cooperation different from the asymmetrical relations with the North, the trend in Nigeria's relations with China is similar to that of the global North. In his view, the ideals of SSC, through the data from trading between Nigeria and China which is heavily tilted in China's favour, are not as perceived by countries in the South who committed themselves to implement them.

SSC has, however, currently become topical in economic and developmental circles. There has been a debate about whether SSC is not being utilized by those rising powers in the global south to exploit the established development institutions of the global North whilst taking advantage of the less developed in the South. This is particularly, the case where deregulation of the production units of the world has led to the rise of China as an economic and industrial power whilst maintaining itself as a developing nation to exploit the less developed ones in the south. [27] Some commentators have likened SSC to Polanyi's quote, "Countries…which, for reasons of their own, are opposed to the status quo, would be quick to discover the weaknesses of the existing institutional order and to anticipate the creation of institutions better adapted to their interests. Such groups are pushing that which is falling and holding onto that which, under its own steam, is moving their way. It may seem as if they had originated the process of social change, while they were merely its beneficiaries, and may even be perverting the trend to make it serve their own aims."[28]

Findings

Trade issues dominate much of the literature on China-Africa relations.[29] In all the literature on Africa-China trade relations using individual African states, there are trade deficits in favour of China. A critical look at the data below for China-Africa trade, China's Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in Africa and the Annual Revenues by Chinese engineering and construction firms in Africa for the year 2019 depict that, the cooperation between the two partners is tilted heavily in favour of Chinese interests.

The following figures illustrate China-Africa relations in terms of trade, FDI and gross annual revenue.

25 Asante, R., (2018), *China and Africa: Model of South-South Cooperation?,* World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 259–279.

26 Udeala, S.O., Nigeria-China Economic Relations Under the South-South Cooperation, African Journal of International Affairs, Volume 13, Numbers 1&2, 2010, pp. 61–88.

27 Gray, K & Gills B.K., (2016), South- South Cooperation and the rise of the Global South, Third World Quarterly, Vol 37; Rising Powers and South Cooperation, Pages 557-574.

28 Polanyi, K., (1944), *The Great Transformation*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

29 Andrea Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud, and Helmut Reisen, with Michael Chen, 'China and India: What's in it for Africa?' (OECD, Paris, 2006); David Hale, 'China's economic takeoff: implications for Africa' (Discussion Paper 1/2006, Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg, 2006).



Figure 2: China-Africa Trade



Figure 3: Chinese FDI vs. US FDI to Africa, Flow



Figure 4: Gross Annual Revenue of Chinese Companies' Construction Projects in Africa[30]

The above three figures are among others offered by the China-Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins University, for this paper to analyze the economic relations between China and Africa in the context of South-South cooperation. A critical analysis of Figure 2 shows that, whilst China exports manufactured goods to Africa, it imports more of Africa's raw materials whose values keep declining whilst prices of manufactured goods keep stabilizing. This keeps the cycle of Africa's indebtedness to China perpetual as more raw materials are needed to offset loans and purchase manufactured goods from China. This results in trade deficits for Africa and in favour of China. It depicts that the quantum of trade volumes is not the same as the value of trade volumes between China and the African States.

Figure 3 shows that whilst Chinese FDIs in Africa have overtaken that of the US, they declined in 2019/2020 which can be seen as due to the COVID pandemic. However, looking at the US$192 billion in trade volumes for 2019 and the US$2.7 billion in FDI for 2019, the disparity is very huge. As China gains more from trade, its investment in Africa is comparatively small. Even as China is touted as investing heavily in Africa which other investors shy away from, the value of Chinese investments in Africa is nowhere near the value of its trade gains in Africa.

Thirdly, in Figure 4, the Annual Revenue for Chinese engineering and construction companies for 2019 totalled US$46 billion which is 26.6% of their total revenue for the year. At its highest point in 2010, the revenues from Africa accounted for 39.6% of the revenues of Chinese construction and engineering firms. As compared to just US$2.7 billion of FDIs in Africa for the same period in 2019, the three figures show a huge imbalance in economic benefits accruing to China at the expense of Africa in their relations. This situation has come under critical scrutiny.

As noted by Siitonen, "But co-operation is, as is well known, only the reverse, the positive side of the conflict, and … what in the parlance of politicians is called "co-operation", quite often is nothing but a euphemism for the new forms of power struggle or the dominance of richer and more powerful nations over poorer and weaker. Thus, the study of economic cooperation, through the facts which have been unearthed, has itself become a study of international economic

30 www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade (sourced on October 19, 2021).

power."[31] If South-South Cooperation is to be taken as achieving a common goal as Theodorson and Theodorson defined cooperation, then, Africa is taking its South-South Cooperation with China in its puerile meaning.

Future Prospects in Sino-Africa Relations

Projecting the Hobbesian principle of individuals seeking to protect their interests by aligning themselves with others on the international stage, which Machiavelli describes as anarchic, the basic requirement for cooperation should be striking a balance between competing national interests and not only seeking to dominate the other or seeking the national interests at the expense of the other. A relationship which is hinged on cooperation such as the South-South Cooperation should be seen as achieving common ends. For Africa-China relations to grow in the context of South-South Cooperation, the interest of both parties (China and Africa) should be paramount and should not be fashioned out with an exploitative effect on Africa.

Conclusion

The current posturing of Chinese nationals engaging in illegal mining businesses, illicit trade and export of banned products such as rosewood, and ivory, as well as destroying water bodies is worrying. Also, the activities of the Chinese in the environment due to illegal gold mining, all in China's search of natural resources as evidenced in Ghana in particular, and Africa in general. These acts make the future of Africa-China relations look bleak unless serious introspection from both partners takes place to review the cooperation to achieve equitable mutual benefits. The paper concludes that China-Africa relations need to be for mutual benefits and not winner-loser affairs.

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Land Question in Post-Apartheid South Africa: An Appraisal of Social Justice Theory

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Abstract

Following the end of apartheid regime in 1994, it became clear to the government that a new constitution was urgently needed in order to redistribute and restitute land. After two years of intense deliberations and consultations, a new constitution was finally adopted in 1996. The new constitution clearly spelt out the fundamental principles of land reform policy. As a result, three-legged land reform strategy was adopted. These are (i) land tenure; (ii) land restitution; and (iii) land redistribution. However, existing scholarship has shown that these land reform programmes have not really addressed the social injustices of the past. Although there has been interesting scholarship on land question in post-apartheid South Africa, most of the previous studies focus on 'economic compensation' rather than 'social justice'. In attempt to fill this gap in scholarship, this paper examines land question within the theoretical prism of social justice theory. The paper analyses the concept of social justice; then, proceeded to the discussions, applications and critiques of Kurt Lewin's three-model of social change, John Rawls' theory of social justice and Nancy Frazer's model of parity of participation to land question in post-apartheid South Africa.

Keywords: Land; Apartheid; Post-Apartheid; Post-Apartheid South Africa; Social Justice, Justice

Background and Rationale

In South Africa, land ownership is an emotionally charged issue for all South Africans (Mackenzie, 2015). During the colonial and apartheid eras, various land-related legislation and policies, at best restricted, and at worst, denied Africans access to landownership. For instance, the Natives Act of 1913 and other related legislations restricted and confined black South Africans to 7 percent of the country's total land, which was later increased to 13 percent. As argued by Adams, Cousins and Manona (1999), black South Africans were strategically denied access to 87 percent legally designated white areas, and were confined to 'a small enclave' where they were used as a reservoir of cheap labour by white commercial farmers and burgeoning mining activities at the time. This created wide socio-economic gaps between the white and black, which overlapped the colonial and apartheid epochs. Mackenzie (2015) argued that the colonial and apartheid's experience entrenched the widening poverty and inequality in South Africa. In 1994, about 16 million blacks were in the former homelands, which were created by the colonial and apartheid policies and legislation. These people had no legal landownership. Most of them engaged in subsistence farming on their small and less arable land legally designated to them, and also involved in other menial occupations to augment their incomes (Hall, 2004a). Majority of the agricultural land was owned by about 45,000 white commercial farmers (DAFF, 2012). According to Hall (2004a), close to 3 million blacks were working on the white commercial farms in 1994.

However, the election of the ANC government in 1994 heralded a new vista in the political history as well as landownership in South Africa (Mackenzie, 2015). Black South Africans were

so enthusiastic recalling the promise made by the Freedom Charter in 1955, which reads 'the land shall be shared among those who work it …" (Congress of the People, 1955). Consequently, the ANC-led government instituted some political structures, and various pieces of legislation were enacted and policies were made with the hope of addressing the historical injustice and unfairness that brought about racially skewed landownership structure and access to land. But, since 1994, the legislation and policies have been considered relatively unsuccessful, as only relatively small amount of land have been restituted or redistributed. Even those who have been restituted still remain poor because of the absence of post-restitution support. Mackenzie (2015, iii) argued that "the land ownership regime created under apartheid continues unchallenged in the post-apartheid era, as successive governments have done so little in addressing the historical inequality in land ownership and mineral rights".

Marais (2011) commented on the reasons while the post-1994 land reforms remain unsuccessful. He argued that the perceived failure of the land reform programmes is understandable within the prism of neoliberal economic ideology, which emphasizes economic liberalism. This largely informed the adoption of the willing-buyer-willing-seller approach in land redistribution programmes in South Africa. Marais argued further that successive government chose this path to engender economic development and food security through the protection of economic interests of the white commercial farmers, who occupied or owned more than half of the land that are meant for redistribution at the expense of the landless and poor black South Africans. Instead of addressing the plight of the black peasants, government opted for legislation and policies that would create a class of black bourgeoisie. Mackenzie (2015) contributed to this sentiment when he argued that 'much as apartheid had been a project of the aspirant Afrikaner bourgeoisie, post-apartheid South Africa would be a project of the aspirant black bourgeoisie'. In order to prevent any uprisings that may result from such inequities, social grants, health and educational facilities are strategically improved. This represents 'an opium' or 'soothing balm' for those South Africans that would be excluded from a class of black bourgeoisie that the government is trying to create in the country.

Although there has been interesting scholarship on land question in post-apartheid South Africa (see Marais, 2011; Mackenzie, 2015), they have not been properly situated within the social justice discourse. In other words, social justice discourse is rarely used or adopted superficially in the discourses of post-apartheid land questions and reforms. In attempt to fill this gap in scholarship, this paper examines land question from the theoretical prism of social justice theory. The paper commenced with the analysis of social justice; then, proceeded to the applications and critiques of Kurt Lewin's three-model of social change, John Rawls' theory of social justice and Nancy Frazer's model of parity of participation to land question in post-apartheid South Africa.

Social Justice: A Conceptual Analysis

Incontestably, the concept of social justice has a number of definitional problems. This is not unexpected considering the fact that it is a social science concept. Virtually all concepts in social sciences lack definitive consensus, and are intrinsically characterized by multiple definitions, which sometimes make their understanding difficult or more illuminating. Boucher and Kelly (1998), Campbell (2001) Miller (1999) and Solomon and Murphy (2000) argued that what constitutes social justice in society has been keenly contested among scholars and philosophers alike. The major points of disagreements are: (i) what constitute just and unjust or fair and unfair in society? (ii) What constitute fair and just mechanisms for sharing or allocating societal burdens and benefits? (iii) What constitute rights and liberties in a society? What constitute human dignity and respect? Classical and contemporary philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle,

Thomas Hobbes, John Lock, Hume, Jeans Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Hegel, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, among others, have attempted to give answers to the above questions albeit criticisms. In this section, attempts will be made to examine the concept of justice.

Aristotle (Aristotle ca. 322 BCE), in his Book V of the *Nicomachean* Ethics, enunciated the principle of social justice. In his view: "the matter of distribution 'according to merit' also makes this clear, since everybody agrees that what is just in distributions must accord with some kind of merit, but everybody is not talking about the same kind of merit: for democrats merits lies in being born a free person, for oligarchists in wealth or, for some of them, in noble descent, for aristocrats in excellence" (Aristotle 2002, 162 line 1131a 24-29). For Aristotle, therefore, what constitutes social justice is redistributive. Social justice found expression in fair and appropriate distribution, allocation and redistribution of society's resources. In other words, social justice is measured by the degree of fairness and appropriateness in the allocation of resources among members of the society. In his examination of Aristotle's idea of social justice, Broadie (2002, 36) argued that social justice is "the hallmark of a just apportionment is equality. In distribution, this consists in maintaining the same ratio of quantified goods or burdens to quantified merit for all recipients. In rectification, it consists in restoring the parties to the relative position (schematized as 'equality') they were in before one harmed the other". Mansbridge (2005) added that to Aristotle, social justice denotes impartiality and "treating equals as equals". Deductively, the contribution of Aristotle to our understanding of social justice could be equated to equity, proportionality or merits (see Walster, Walster and Boerscheid, 1978). However, the major drawback of the Aristotelian conception of social justice, particularly to the policy-makers is its failure to address this critical philosophical question: what constitutes appropriateness, and what mechanisms can be employed to measure or determine proportionality, equality and merit in the allocation of society's resources.

Another philosopher that contributed to our understanding of social justice was Karl Marx (1818-1883). The traces of Marx's views on social justice are implicit in his "class theory" where he traced the evolution of society from communalism to communism. In this work, Marx showed the trajectory of social justice. In communalism, social justice was very high because there were no distinctions in access and ownership of society resources. Social injustice began to surface at the stage of slavery, where humans were turned into disposable property or goods. This could be said to have marked the genesis of social struggle for justice. In later stages of social evolution, such as feudal and capitalist stages, the level of social justice took another dimension; but in reduced proportion in comparison to the slavery stage. Marx, then, reasoned that, in socialism and communism, the level social injustice would have been reduced to its barest minimum. In his "Critique of the Gotha program", Marx argued the just and fair principle that underlie social justice should be "from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs" (Miller, 1999). And this is the philosophical principle underpinning socialism. The major strength of Marxian contribution to social justice is that it spurred many social justice movements across the globe. See **Figure A** for the diagrammatical representation of the Marxian contribution to social justice discourse.



Figure A: Marxian Social Justice Circle. Source: Adapted from Marx (1973)

While Marx spurred social justice movement, social justice was "more readily embraced by" liberal and progressive thinkers (Miller, 1999, 3). In other words, social justice was taken to another dimension by utilitarian philosopher such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. More specifically, John Stuart Mill contributed significantly to the utilitarian discourse of social justice. To him, social justice is measured in terms of providing "greatest happiness to the greatest number". The Utilitarianists argued for a welfare state, which emphasizes fair and just redistribution of wealth and other resources in society in order to reduce poverty and improve the welfare of citizens. Simultaneously, the redistribution of resources should be done in such a way that it would not affect those who are wealthy or better off (Konow, 2003). Also, libertarian and egalitarian philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, Jean Jacque Rousseau, John Rawls, among other added to the discourse of social justice (Muldoon, Lisciadra, Colyvan, Martini, Sillari and Sprenger, 2013). For instance, John Rawls (1971) once said no matter how efficient and well-arranged laws and institutions are, they must be either repudiated or condemned if they are inherently unjust. Justice is the first virtue of society.

From the above conceptual analysis of social justice, it is evident that there are divergent arguments on what constitute social justice and how it can be attained in human societies. Considering these diversities of conceptions, we limit our discussion of social justice to Kurt Lewin's Three-Step Model of Social Change; John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice and Nancy Frazer's Theory of Parity of Participation. The theoretical adequacies and inadequacies of these theories will be examined in relation to land question in post-apartheid South Africa.

Land Question in Post-Apartheid South Africa: An Analysis of Social Justice

In this section, Lewian three-step model of social change, Rawlsian theory of social justice and Frazerian parity of participation are analysed in relations to land question in post-apartheid South Africa.

Lewinian Three-Step Model of Change: An Analysis of Social Justice

Kurt Lewin (1890-1947), the father of modern Social Psychology, offered psychological analysis of social justice. Lewin was particularly concerned with the methods of preventing tyrannical tendencies in human societies. Towards this end, he advanced an argument within the framework of social justice for overcoming any form of prejudicial thoughts or actions against out-groups or racial groups. He analyzed inter-group relations in Germany under Adolf Hitler. According to him, "…Nazi culture…is deeply rooted, particularly in the youth on whom the future depends. It is a culture which is centred around power as the supreme value and which denounces justice and equality… (Lewin, 1943b, 43). In addition to this, Lewin, as cited in Marrow (1969, 175) stated that: "We Jews will have to fight for ourselves and will do so strongly and with good conscience. We also know that the fight of the Jews is part of the fight of all minorities for democratic equality of rights and opportunities". Essentially, the overall interest of Lewin is how social equality and social justice can be restored, re-entrenched and maintained in *Nazi* Germany. In his critique of Kurt Lewin's contribution to social justice discourse, Burnes (2004, 986-987) concluded that the factor "underpinning Lewin's work was a strong moral and ethical belief in the importance of democratic institutions and democratic values in society. Lewin believed that only by strengthening democratic participation in all aspects of life and being able to resolve social conflicts could the scourge of despotism, authoritarianism and racism be effectively countered". This conclusion excellently resonates in the struggles of black South Africans in dismantling the vestiges of apartheid institution, which makes the restitution and redistribution of land to the victims of land dispossession a necessity in South Africa.

Although Lewin did not explicitly formulate a model of social justice in the actual sense of it, his work on three-model of social change has relevance in the sociological analysis of social justice. We will now turn our attention to the analysis of three-model of change and its relevance to the social justice discourse viz-a-viz land question in post-apartheid South Africa. In three-model of social change, Lewin (1947a) argued that a successful reform programme involved three steps. These steps are: (i) Un-freezing; (ii) Change or transition or moving; and (iii) Re-freezing. In unfreezing stage, social system "was based on a quasi-stationary equilibrium supported by a complex field of driving and restraining forces" (Burnes, 2004, 985). The existing institutional equilibrium "needs to be destabilized (unfrozen) before old" norms and values in the social system "can be discarded (unlearnt) and" new norms and values "successfully adopted. In his analysis of unfreezing, Kurt Lewin acknowledged the contribution of Gordon Allport. According to Lewin (1947a, 229), "the unfreezing of the present level may involve quite different problems in different cases. Allport…has described the 'catharsis' which seems necessary before prejudice can be removed. To break open the shell of complacency and self-righteousness it is sometimes necessary to bring about an emotional stir up". In stage two of the model, new policies, programmes, laws or pieces of legislation are made to replace the old one. In other words, new paradigms or institutional framework(s) is/are put in place. In the last stage (re-freeze), the new paradigms or institutional frameworks are entrenched and consolidated.

The relevance of this model to land question in South Africa is self-evident. For instance, unfreezing involved abrogation of the pieces of legislation that brought about injustices. In this regards, the Glen Grey Act of 1894, the Natives Land Act of 1913, the Natives Trust Act of 1936,

Group Areas Act of 1950, and other racially based or discriminatory land polices and laws must be abolished or unfrozen. Towards the end of apartheid regime, series of legislation were enacted to abrogate the existing unjust pieces of legislation. One of these pieces of legislation was the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991. The Act abrogated the Natives Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust Act of 1936. This is a typical illustration of the unfreezing stage in the Lewinian model of change for social justice. In the post-1994 era, these unfrozen discriminatory laws were replaced by the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996, Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (TLGFA), the Settlement/ Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD), among others, were put in place to correct the past social injustices on the black South Africans. This is typical of "change stage" in Lewinian model of change for social justice. Lastly, the re-freezing stage involves the implementation, consolidation, entrenchment, assessment and re-assessment of the above highlighted post-apartheid policies and laws on land reform for social justice. **See Figure B** for the diagrammatical representation of the application of Lewinian model to post-apartheid land reform in South Africa.

Apparently, Lewinian model enormously reflects the political dynamics and policy initiatives of the democratic South Africa in the post-apartheid era. According to Burnes (2004, 986-987), underpinning Lewin's work was a strong moral and ethical belief in the importance of democratic institutions and democratic values in society. Lewin believed that it is only by strengthening democratic participation in all aspects of life and being able to resolve social conflicts could the scourge of despotism, authoritarianism and racism be effectively countered. Hayek (1976, 67-97) viewed that "society ought to hold itself responsible for the particular material position of all its members, and for assuring that each received what was due to him. He argued further that "there are, no doubt, instances where the first past development of law has introduced a bias in favour or to the disadvantage of particular groups; and such provisions ought clearly to be corrected". This argument largely resonates with land reform programme in the post-apartheid South Africa. As argued by Hall (2003, 25), land reform was conceived as a positive measure to reverse the racially-skewed patterns of landownership, but also as an interaction to promote social justice and socio-economic equity".

Unfortunately, in South Africa, the institution of apartheid still remains frozen with the inclusion of property clause in the 1996 Constitution. The inclusion of property clause in South Africa further entrenched the institution of the apartheid regime. This, Yanou (2009) stressed, may further worsen the socio-economic inequalities created by colonial and Apartheid legislations and policies on land. The argument that the inclusion of property clause was vital for attracting both domestic and foreign investors was condemned. According to Khasu (1996a, 376), "this argument about investment flying out of the country because of the property clause is arrogant, racist and erroneous. At best it is balderdash". Evidently, the incorporation of property clause into constitution was a product of compromise reached by the National Party (NP) and the incoming African National Congress (ANC). This could be explained within the context of political ideology of socialist reform as put forth by Andre Gorz in his concept of "non-reformist reform". Frazer (2007) cited in Boudreaux (2010:79) referred to this as "a via media between an affirmative strategy that is politically feasible, but substantially flawed and a transformative one that is programmatically sound but politically impracticable" (Frazer, 2007 cited in Bourdreaux, 2010:79).



Figure B: Applying Three-Step Model of Kurt Lewin to Land Reform Programme for Social Justice in South Africa. Source: Adapted from Kurt Lewin (1943; 1947)

According to Terreblanche (2002), the deal made by the ANC and the apartheid government made the attainment of equality and economic justice an illusion, non-feasible and progressively unachievable. He added that the notions of equality and economic justice are an illusion for the landless majority: "South Africa's PUI (Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality) problem is mainly a remnant of segregation and apartheid but has been further intensified by the ANC (African National Congress) government's myopic policy measures to integrate South Africa is too great a hurry into neoliberal global capitalism…" (Terreblanche, 2002: 101). According to Mayenbe (2013:19):

> the property clause effectively perpetuates the system of holding of land originally acquired as the spoils of colonial conquest and held for generations yet to be born, by securing them as 'private property rights'. This then also gives the constitutional provision a distinctly neo-colonial character. It is this kind of situation that has produced the presently racially skewed structure of land ownership which is characterized by average plots of 1 300 hectares among the 38 000-odd white commercial farmers. This high level of concentration of land ownership in the hands of a small minority stands in stark juxtaposition to the fact that average plots in the former Bantustans, which is home to over six million households, are currently estimated at a mere 1.5 hectares. It is a well-known fact that most of this land is generally of poor agronomic quality, and is situated largely in poorly watered areas. The property clause also makes some provisions that appear tantalisingly to be cast in a positive light.

While the theoretical relevance of this model to South Africa land question is clearly highlighted and expressed, its shortcomings have been noted by scholars in the field of social justice. In his critique of this model, Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992, 10) argued that the model was too simplistic. Its linear conception of change is enormously inappropriate in explaining the complex processes and dynamics that produced social injustices in the first place. They maintained that the forces of social injustices and justices are multifarious and multidimensional, and they are cannot be reduced to simple, static linear equation as Lewin did. Similarly, Buchanan and Storey's (1997, 127) said "…attempts to impose an order and a linear sequence to processes that are in reality messy and untidy, and which unfold in an iterative fashion with much backtracking and omission".

Huczynski and Buchanan (2001) added that the three stage-processes provided by Lewin may not be static in their own rights; they are likely to overlap. The process of attaining social justice goes far beyond that. For instance, it involves long processes such as political struggles and coalition-building (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2001). South African experiences of social injustices spanned three centuries; and it was punctuated by series of politicking and consensus buildings. Presenting South African political experiences in simple, static linear equation amounted to reductionism, taking complex historical processes that produced social injustices as trivial. To Dawson (1994), the three-model can only explain a specific or one side reform and change. It lacks theoretical relevance to explain radical and transformational change that will bring social justice. In addition to this, Lewinian model of change downplayed the role of power and politics in human society and conflictual nature of social elements in social system (Pfeffer, 1992). More importantly the approach emphasized in Lewinian model of change was top-down rather than bottom-up (Wilson, 1992).

Rawlsian Model of Social Justice

John Rawls (1921-2002) was deeply influenced by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacque Rousseau's social contract theory. However, the major point of departure is that while these classical philosophers were emphasizing the development and *raison-d'être* of social contract, Rawls was interrogating the kind of arrangement that those who entered into contract agree to. Rawls found that the classical analysis of society was superficial for its failure to question the basis of social justice, or how fairness could be attained and maintained in a society. Rawls began his contemporary analysis of social justice discourse by raising some fundamental questions: (i) what makes a social institution, social system or society just? (ii) What justifies or rationalizes political or social policies? Rawls asserted that justice means fairness, and justice is the fundamental virtue of the social system. Based on these assertions, Rawls came up with two basic principles of social justice. These are: (i) Each member of a given society should have equal right; and there must not be any forms of differentials in access to society's resources or wealth; and (ii) Socio-economic inequalities in the social system should be such that it would be advantageous to

every member of a society. A cursory look at these principles would reveal that they underscore the underpinning assumptions of the principle and theory of egalitarianism. Viewing from this theoretical lens, the landless and the poor people in South Africa should be treated fairly, such as empowerment through land redistribution programme. In other words, efforts should be directed at bridging the widening gap in landownership between the white commercial farmers and black South Africans. However, inequality is tolerable if the benefits accrue from white commercial farmers are shared equally or extended to the landless poor South Africans. Is this feasible?

Importantly, Rawlsian analysis is somewhat related to Jeremey Bentham's assertion that what constitute 'social justice' is pursuance of greatest good for the greatest number of people. Situating land reform programme within this philosophical thought mean that the success of land reform within the theoretical prism of social justice could be measured by the extent at which land are redistributed to the greatest number of people in South Africa. This implies that majority of black South Africa who are dispossessed or who are landless or poor should be given a greater priority in land reform. However, this has not been achieved in post-apartheid South Africa. For instance, in the 1990s, there were about 45,000 large-scale commercial farms, owned by the white commercial farmers in the country (DAFF, 2012). The architects of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) boasted and promised that the policy framework would ensure that large proportion of these farms would be owned and operated efficiently by the black South Africans (Mackenzie, 2015). What could be drawn from this assertion is that LRAD only aimed at benefitting some 45, 000 individual African entrepreneurs out of the total estimated target of 19 million. "At 0.23 per cent of the estimated 19 million rural landless poor at the time, this is a tiny minority of potential beneficiaries. If 45 000 black commercial farmers were successfully absorbed into the existing large-scale agricultural sector in South Africa, the LRAD policy was largely silent on how the remaining 99.77 per cent of rural landless black South Africans were to benefit" (Mackenzie, 2015, 259-260). The pertinently fundamental question raised here is that what would be the fate of other landless people in South Africa.

The highlighted problem is noted by John Rawls. He said policy-makers or social reformers may be unconsciously carried away by their personal motive or self-interest. Consequently, this may inhibit the attaining of justness and fairness in the allocation, distribution and redistribution of resources. Bicchieri and Mercier (2013) maintained that individuals have in-built inclinations to choose policies that suit their self-interest. According to Muldoon et.al (2013, 378-379), "politicians, judges and private citizens frequently adopt positions that either advance their larger ideological goals, or their material self-interest, even if they are not consciously doing so. So, whether it is from clouded judgment or intentional sophistry, our competing interests can inhibit our ability to arrive at moral agreement in a reasoned manner". It is competing interest to impede fair policy or just social action. If policy-makers can eliminate the 'competing interests', policy or reform that would facilitate the attainment of social justice is achievable (Muldoon, et.al 2013, 379). Rawls provided a device for achieving this. This device is called 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls, 1971, 11-17). According to him, "agents under the thick veil of ignorance do not know who they are in society, whether they are a past, present or future generation, whether they are male or female, rich or poor, in the majority or in minority, or any other relevant demographies of the societies in which they live, or any other morally arbitrary facts. In fact, the agents in the Original Position could be thought as" those (policy-makers) who do not know whom their recipients are; "they want to make sure that everyone gets as good of a deal as they can". He added that "in the Original Position, the parties must not know the contingencies that set them in opposition. They must choose principles and their accompanying consequences of which they are prepared to live with, whatever generation they turn out to belong to" (Rawls, 1971, 119). In their reviews of 'veil of ignorance', Muldoon et.al (2013, 379) noted that:

> the veil of ignorance thus blocks the possibility of agents having knowledge of a particular interests that might sway them when deliberating about the basic structure of society. This is an extremely powerful idea-a framework that removes morally irrelevant considerations from our moral decision-making. It removes the possibility of our self-interest getting in the way of our reasoning. However, it is implicitly assumed in Rawls's work and elsewhere that the individuals in the Original Position, thus unburdened from self-interested bias, will then be able to agree

It is clear that since the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same argument. Therefore, we can view the agreement in the Original Position from the standpoint of one person selected at random. If anyone, after due reflection, prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached (Rawls, 1971, 120). Veil of ignorance is an imaginative mechanism for deciding or determining what should be considered as just and fair in a state of society. At the formative period of human society, no member of society have knowledge about each other's position or background such as race, gender, ethnic. In the light of this ignorance, they would be forced to agree on rules, laws, policies, regulations that are realistically just and fair. Sentiments and biases would be absolutely minimal or non-existent since they are acting on the veil of ignorance. Rawls argued that decision on the allocation of resources and formulation of policy or reform should be made and executed on the principle of "veil of ignorance". Using this device, there will be fairness in decision making or reforms since the policy-makers do not know where they will fall in the social system. Policy-makers do not have clear clues on where they are likely to belong in society because the veil has blurred their vision of their likely placement in social system. As a result of this, policy-makers may choose a programme or reform that would be beneficial to the members of the lower cadre of society, thinking that they may end up there or fall into that social category.

This model of social justice has been heavily criticized by scholars on many grounds. Scholars argued that this is a utopian assumption; it is grossly impracticable. The implication of the Rawlsian hypothesis on the conception of veil of ignorance is that moral virtue is orthogonal to societal position. This means that all members of the society should start from the same point and at the lower level. The idea is that members of the lower class are more likely to be virtuous than members of the middle and higher class. This assertion may be untrue. Sen (2009, 11-12; 56-58) criticized "veil of ignorance" on the grounds that the choice of social action or policy is indeterminate in the "Original Position". The reason he adduced to this is that social actors are incapable of making any policy choice without information or access to information about the social structure and its human elements upon which decision is to be made. In similar manner, Maclntyre (1981) and Sandel (1982) raised fundamental question: How can social actors make decisions or formulate policy without accurate and clear understanding of the situations or phenomena?

Also, Rawls did not make mention of any particular political arrangement or system that would fit his theoretical position. Thus, his analysis of social justice appeared incomplete for its lack of political framework within which social justice could be realized. He only focused on ends of social justice; not means to social justice. According to Robert Nozick, in his "Anarchy, State and Utopia" (1974), Rawlsian theory was philosophically redistributive in the sense that equal distribution of resource is not only desirable but also essential in society. Nozick also mentioned that Rawls argued that socio-economic inequalities can only be justified and rationalized if it benefits the least advantaged members in the society. Nozick pointed that society's benefits/goods are produced by some members of a society, and this people have inalienable rights to the goods or benefits they produce. In this way, extending goods or benefits produced by some

members of the society through redistribution to the disadvantaged members is grossly unjust. It is unjust because it forces some people to work for the majority of the least advantaged members. This is emblematic of the common saying: "Robbing Peter to pay Paul". It amounts to the deprivation of the "goods-producing" or "benefit-producing" members of the society. Similarly, it is detrimental to development in that it may create disincentives to hard-work and end up creating more social injustices than social justice. However, despite the above criticisms, Rawls contributed significantly to the debate on fundamentally underpinning principles of social policy and reform, which can be tapped by the South African policy-makers in designing, formulating and implementing sound land reform programmes that are capable of correcting the wrongs of the past, and facilitating the attainment of social justice. **See Figure C** for the theoretical modelling of Rawlsian veil of ignorance in land reform in South Africa.



Figure C: Modelling Rawlsian Veil of Ignorance. Source: Authors' Conception

Frazerian Parity of Participation

Nancy Frazer developed parity of participation to explain social justice. She evolved three concepts, redistribution, recognition and representation, which are fundamental to the attainment of social justice in human society. According to Frazer (2007, 27), social justice is attainable when there are "…social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. On the view of justice as participatory parity, overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interactions". To Frazer (2007), the ingredients of participatory parity are (i) assurance of independence; and (ii) availability of fair institutional context that foster equality and opportunity for all in respect of socio-economic position. Mclnerney (2003, 252) added that "…the historically constituted nature of social inequalities means that there can never be any real sense of closure…shifts in the political, economic and cultural landscape disturb existing social patterns, produce new sets of demands for recognition among dissatisfied groups and generate new questions…for social justice…" It could be deduced from the above view that social justice requires both redistribution of resources (land) and the recognition of the existence or agency of the disadvantaged groups. In the context of South Africa, redistribution of land to the landless rural poor may not bring about the sense of justice if their agency and existence are not given priority by the policy-makers. Thus, redistribution resource and recognition of their existence deserve attention and utmost consideration in policy formulation and implementation.

As Frazer noted (2007, 35), "recognition cures the pains of injustice". Walker, Lind and Thibaut (1979, 1402) argued that "the belief that the techniques used to resolve a dispute are fair and satisfying in themselves". Also, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996, 189) said "(a) process control, referring to how much people are allowed to present evidence on their behalf before the decision is made, and (b) decision control; that is, whether individuals have any say in the actual rendering of the decision". Thibaut and Walker (1975) maintained that people are more likely to have confidence in the process when they are adequately or ably represented or when their inputs are incorporated into the decision-making processes. This is what they referred to as "voice-effect". This term denotes giving opportunities to the people to voice out their views or to contribute to decision making. Giving them freedom of expression in the decision may make them to have belief in the procedural justness and fairness of the overall outcomes of the decisions (van den Bos, 2005). The foremost significance of voice effect is that it promotes trust in policy-makers and policy processes (Jost & Kay, 2010).

These important ingredients, as portrayed by Wegerif (2004:36-37), remained disappointingly elusive in land reform programme in South Africa. In his review of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in Limpopo Province, the beneficiaries of LRAD were "either business people or civil servants…many benefitted because they had the wherewithal information and contacts to obtain state land on a lease basis some year ago…they then became the lucky beneficiaries of a government decision to dispose of that through LRAD". He added that LRAD is far from endeavouring to bring poorer people into the programme, Department of Land Affair (DLA) and the Department of Agriculture (DOA) have gone out of their way to benefit those already better off and already benefiting from state land; while making access to the programme…and almost inaccessible for the very poor". Similarly, Boudreaux (2010, 17) argued that "rather than create an open process that screened claimants on the basis of past harms, beneficiaries were selected based on political and social connections". Also, women are excluded in landownership. Mackenzie (2015, 224) maintained that women should be given more recognition to own and use land for developmental purpose because they share the largest burden of poverty in communal areas as a result of the unfavourable customs which gave more power to the male. In other words, most communal areas are patriarchal and only male has legitimate rights to own and use land (Letsoalo, 2013, 6).

James (2007) maintained that land reform is tantamount to the extension of the institution of the Apartheid in South Africa (Mackenzie, 2015). They added that the rural landless were not included in the consultation processes. They argued that their only contribution to LRAD was their organization of protest outside the venue of one of the consultation meetings in December 2000 (Hall, 2010c; Wegerif, 2004), and definitely we cannot call this consultation. In response to this, DLA opined that since land-based NGOs were consulted, it implies that the landless people were ably represented. According to Mackenzie (2015, 261-262), the rural landless poor were, thus, largely excluded from the creation of the LRAD policy, reflecting a deep silence. There was a small provision made for beneficiaries who might want to use the grant to buy land for subsistence purposes, or for production within the communal areas, but this was seen as symbolic and rhetorical… However, a number of other facets of LRAD combined to exclude the vast majority of the rural landless poor from access to the new grant. **See Figure D** for the diagrammatical representation of the application of the Frazerian model of parity of participation to land reform in post-apartheid South Africa.



Figure D: Applying Frazerian Model of Parity of Participation in Land Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Source: Adapted from Frazer (2007)[1]

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has shown the relevance of the 'social justice discourse' in land question in South Africa. Essentially, the contributions of Kurt Lewin, John Rawls and Nancy Frazer to social justice discourse are critically analyzed in relation to land question and land reform in South Africa. Lessons learnt from each of the authors such as Kurt Lewin, John Rawls and Nancy Frazer were noted. From the Kurt Lewin's three-model of social change for social justice, the lesson drawn is that South African land policymakers should have showed more commitments in the dismantling of the vestiges of apartheid institutions and entrenched democratic structures in the interest of social justice. The policy implication of John Rawls' model of veil of ignorance is that the land policy-makers should demonstrate high level of integrity, knowledgeability, fairness, accountability, responsiveness and equity in decision-making processes on land. Lastly, Nancy Frazer's model of parity of participation suggested that social justice is measured in terms of extent of redistribution, recognition and representation. Thus, South African policy-makers on land reform should ensure that these elements are present.

1 The arrows directing towards the circle in the middle indicate forces for social justice; while the arrows away from the attaining social justice indicate forces against social justice. Thus, in Frazerian perspective, social justice is the movement from dispossession to repossession; non-recognition to recognition; and lack or minimal representation to fair and adequate representation in the conceptions and execution of land reform program in South Africa. So, social justice is a function of redistribution, representation and recognition.

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The Fundamental Elements of Social Contract in a Developmental State: South African Case Study

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Abstract

The Conceptual Framework that underpins this article is that of advocating for a "Developmental state" that has the capacity to deliver services at national level but also creating a platform for the private sector to make a meaningful investment through trade and investment The article moves from the premise that "Developmental state" should be one that is able to intervene in service delivery as well as to intervene in the running of the economy especially as it relates to the role of the private sector in driving national and international goals. It is the argument of these article that for a "Developmental state" to become functional its should be comprised of meritocratic bureaucracy that is able to make use of the interventionist power in the same way that the East Asian Countries has done. As such the article arises from the argument that although the ANC led government has declared South Africa a "Developmental state", such a state is still faced with numerous challenges that deter it to fulfill the requirements of a "Developmental state". The study focus will also look at the extent at which the South African state is moving towards becoming a fully-fledged "Developmental state" regardless of the challenges been experienced and encountered.

Introduction

Developmental states unlike any other states are states that has an interventionist power to address the socio-economic challenges that are facing the citizenry. These are states with long-term visions aimed at guiding service delivery interventions as well coordinating development within the state by ensuring all role-players pursue national interests that is shaped by the National Development Plan (NDP). In the pursuit of the national agenda, "Developmental state strives to ensure that clear social compact amongst all sectors that is the government, private sector, civil society and individuals. The key is whether question is whether in a South African "Developmental state" the state can coordinate the participation of these sectors in socio-economic development as the developmental state trajectory could only be realised if all these sectors could work together in form of partnerships. The main intention should be that all South Africans should have access to service delivery and other developmental opportunities that could not be mobilized outside a "Developmental state" agenda. For access to services, the state has to focus on the nationalisation of key sectors of the economy to enable access by all regardless of their social status. For that to happen, the state has to take and ownership of institutions and projects through privitisation to enable government to intervene where necessary rather than waiting for private sector to intervene. Through these interventions, the state will be able to contribute towards service delivery improvement because of growing economic development and empowerment to communities.

South Africa as has adopted a "Developmental state" agenda needs to make sure that the state is prepared institutionally and in terms of other capacities to deliver on service delivery expectations of the citisenry using selective interventions. These means that the South African government if it has to build a strong "Developmental state" it has to focus on strengthening the capacity of its public service with aim to enable it to develop, entreprete and implement policies in a manner that would result into improvement service delivery. Based on the above, the article is of the argument that South Africa although it has declared a "Developmental state" it still faces numerous challenges that could make it an effective developmental state such as lack of interventionist power, coordinated institutionalised mechanisms and that it has to focus on building social contract and embedded autonomy with all sectors of economy with the public servants been at the centre of that partnerships.

The article is written to fill the gaps of understanding the level of South African state towards building a "Developmental state". Work has been done before on what a "Developmental state" entails, whether South Africa is a Developmental state or not however, this work provide critical assessment of the capability and capacity of the South African state to intervene as a "Developmental state, to coordinate institutional development and projects across sectors as determined by the National Developmental Plan. This include key requirements that are lacking towards making South Africa a successful "Developmental state" such as building a meritocratic bureaucracy and state capacity to deliver services.

What is a Developmental State Paradigm?

The theoretical approach the researcher deploys is the "Developmental states" especially the East Asian Developmental States with reference to Japanese State. The focus is on emphasizing the institutionalist comprehension of state-society relations that is also referred to as embedded autonomy. It is also focusing on the nature of bureaucracy required to support the "Developmental state" agenda and that the state is tied together through networks that present themselves in a form of institutionalised partnerships. And external connections and links between the state, private sector and the civil society and emphasis the need for coexistence. The state should also advance core national goals. Developmental state is one that is capable to coordinate development initiatives as successful coordination requires a state with necessary tools to deal with the burden and not only focus on the protector of guaranteed rights. This is to assess whether South Africans have access to service delivery or whether their rights are limited to access to certain kind of services whilst the state is incapable to deliver some of the rights as bestowed in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. This is whether the ANC led government is capable of economic transformation and distribution of assets to the majority of South Africans an indication of state ability to intervene. The theoretical approach will be used to collect and analyses the data of which out of that a conclusion will be made if indeed South Africa is a "Developmental state".

The researcher contends that South Africa is a "Developmental state" as decided by government, but research work need to be done to draw conclusion on that. The research will also make use of analytical research wherein the researcher will seek to find supporting data that strengthen and validate the earlier views or perspectives on "Developmental state". The researcher has used literary data to validate the research study.

Factors Shaping the Developmental State

South Africa has committed itself to become a "Developmental state". This is despite the fact that the "Developmental state" is concerned more with the industrialisation of the economy with

a focus on long-term development plans that are guided by the state with a focus on private or business sector development that is hinged on the state ability to create conducive environment at international, and national, provincial and local government level. The state creates this environment by amongst others establishing institutions across all levels (Karagiannis, 2002:53). In line with the above, the key question is whether the South African economy has reached a point wherein the economy could be regarded as developmental in nature on the basis that it has been industrialised to an extent that it allows the private sector to contribute significantly in the national economy. This raises the question whether the government has the capacity to command national interest driven mainly from the National Development Plan that enables the state to have the capacity to plan and intervene in any development initiatives. According to Woo-Cummings (1999:346) "*the developmental state is an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of national economy*"). What it means is that the state has a responsibility to intervene in the economy in a way that brings a coherent vision of the national economy and that could be achieved through the social compact. To achieve the cohesive mandate the state has to intervene with an idea to direct, guide, and intervene with a specific aim to mobilise all sectors to contribute towards the promotion and attainment of the cohesive vision. In essence, the state through public institutions at all levels has a responsibility to ensure that the nation can rally behind a certain national agenda, which includes ensuring that the state can lead and provide direction for the private sector to support the identified national agenda (Bolesta, 2007:106). The South African government would through the Department of Social Development strengthen the capacities of institutions such as the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) to improve the quality of life of its citizens although some argue that it is a pursuit of a welfarist approach it is contributing in the economic development and improvement of the quality of life, especially for the poor. Perhaps it is here that the issue of the Basic Income Grant (BIG) may need to be looked at in terms of how it could be used to support the developmental state ideal of building a social contract with the ultimate end of building a strong developmental state. The key question would be whether the current institutions and programmes are geared towards building a developmental state and if not, how the state should make use of such institutions and programmes to turn the tide in such a way that every sector will be mobilised and programmes are pitched at the point of contributing towards a strong developmental state in which all sectors contribute to the social compact. The ability of the state to emerge as an economic manager of the national interest requires the state to work in partnership with other economic stakeholders and partners. It has to be noted that, in comparison to the Communist Centralised Models, the national development model of the Developmental State in democratic countries such as South Africa should be one that strengthens the private sector by creating an environment for businesses to operate without entering into any competition, and also be the one that allows civil Society to contribute in development. If need be it requires all sectors to join hands in social compact of the country. Once this happens it would lead to the growth of specific national goals such as export expansion, full employment, and security of energy supply.

It is important to understand that one of the distinguishing factors of a Developmental State in comparison to other forms of state such as the regulatory state, is that it is capable of developing detailed plans and that its focus lies in the desire for the fulfillment of national developmental goals. The issue of a developmental plan was first introduced in the early Developmental States such as Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea (Chan, 1990:59). Whilst South Africa has also developed a developmental plan what lies ahead is to galvanise every sector to contribute towards the implementation of the plan within the framework of a social compact or social contract. Whilst Presidency has mobilised business and civil society and established a framework for implementation of the plan, what is missing is to have a coordinated implementation programme

for the three sectors. This could be achieved by bringing government, business or private sector, and civil society organisations together at a platform wherein a social contract could be developed with a clear implementation plan in which all sectors could develop a mechanism for contributing towards the national vision of the state that would be the social contract. This would require an establishment of institutions that would foster rapid and sustainable economic development nationally through the work of civil society as supported by the government and the private sector and internationally as led by the government in support of the business or private sector. The logic behind all this is that for the Social Contract to work, long-term national developmental goals must be set, profitable positions in international markets strengthened, and the economic and political influences of foreign companies in their economies regulated. Without this, it would be difficult for South Africa to realise its goal of building a social contract that is not embedded within the long-term national developmental goals, creating a conducive environment for South African business or private sector to compete at the international level whilst also finding a mechanism to regulate the economic and political influences of international trade and investment. One other issue of regulating the economic and political influences of international trade and investment would be to ensure that international investors are meant to contribute towards the funding of civil society organisations in order for them to improve the quality of life for citisens. This will require that new institutions would need to be established that build coherency between the work of government, business, civil society, and investors.

According to the (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011:10-11), the developmental state propels its national agenda by intervening in two ways: directly, through nationalisation of key socio-economic sectors, by ensuring that the state has control and ownership of public institutions and projects that are perceived essential for economic growth and empowerment. The South African government should ensure that in the spirit of national solidarity, citisens should be involved in all sectors of the economy such as mining as its main responsibility lies in the industrialisation of the economy. The state should also prioritise projects that have the potential to contribute towards economic growth and empowerment of the citisenry. However, it must be understood that interventions would also mean that the state should find ways to intervene towards the sustainability of the business or private sector through the provision of easy credits, low taxes, secure and cheap supply of raw materials, guaranteed government purchases, as well as the application of trade prioritisation of national goods and assets against the foreign market. Certainly, in a developmental state such as South Africa, the government needs to be involved in the stimulation of economic activities with the idea to grow small enterprise development into big economic opportunities. The success of the Department of Small Business needs to be determined by the number of industries that have progressed into national industries that could be linked with the international market. In so doing, the government would be embarking on what is known as selective intervention by identifying businesses that have the capacity to compete at the international level. As earlier indicated, this should be driven by the institutions that are created to ensure that there is a social contract in all that is been done or implemented.

The relevance of institutions originates from an understanding that the government capability to apply selective intervention is dependent upon governmental institutions that can provide meticulous information on the nature of services required by the citisenry. Without such an understanding, the state can allocate a vast number of resources but would still not have reached the service delivery demands of its citisenry. As such, the existence of institutions is paramount in the sense that they can allocate resources based on government priorities formulated based on service delivery demands. The service delivery demands are aligned to an industrial selective intervention of the state meaning that the demands of the citisenry are linked to national and international priorities of the state (Evans, 2008:7). Surely, without competent, coherent public

institutions, it would always be difficult to realise high impact service delivery. This means that getting information from societal partners such as businesses and civil society would need to be prominent in the agenda of the state. The relationship between these key partners could be strengthened through continuous dialogue and information sharing. It has to be understood however that such, a relationship would always be frigid on the basis that the type of the network is always problematic and remains a contested terrain. This calls for the establishment of multiple institutionalised agreements to manage these relationships and to guide the national developmental agenda toward the delivery of services and economic development. The recipients of services should become active inorder to direct the nature and standard of services they require(Evans, 2008:11). At the centre of government ability to deliver services is the need to enter into institutionalised or partnership agreements with other social societal partners that would serve as a platform in which citisens would be able to make informed decisions on the nature of the intervention, they require from the state rather than state making decisions alone. The institutionalised agreements should be consolidated into the social contract.

Defining the Social Contract

The term social contract is used to describe sets of state-society relations. A Social contract is defined as the entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (i.e., the government and any other actor in power), defining their rights and obligations toward each other. Social contract create balance in state-society relations and intra-societal relations (they strengthen social cohesion). An example of the social contract is collective bargaining wherein employers, trade unions, and government representatives bargain for the rights of the workers as against the workers' benefits (Louwe et al, 2020:1-3). A Social contract in the words of (Kitthananan in Kennett, 2008: 82), (Karagiannis, 2002: 39) is an indication of planned development in the sense that it brings together multiple sectors within the society into a creative partnership. The planned development process is a powerful instrument for service delivery, long-term economic growth, and production-oriented industrial development. Here, the line of argument is that at a minimum, the process of development requires the guiding hand of the state and does not come about through the private sector alone but through a social compact that brings together multiple role-players as represented by government, civil society, and the private sector (Kitthananan in Kennett, 2008: 82), (Karagiannis, 2002: 39). If the argument about the state occupying a central role in driving economic development is supported, then it goes without doubt that, planned development a key element for building social contract that seeks to respond to societal challenges in a coordinated manner. Referring to the National Development Plan (NDP) of the South African government, it would be important for the government to realise that in order to achieve its service delivery targets, a social contract has to be forged amongst all key sectors for them to be able to contribute attainment of NDP goals. Accordingly, the government active role in the development of social contract becomes very important in the sense that it brings together all parties and partners into one national vision or solidarity goal.

However, because state capacities differ, the ability to exploit the opportunities of international economic change, rather than simply succumb to its pressures, appears much more marked in some countries than others. Since much, though by no means all, of the evidence of robust state capacity is drawn from East Asia, it is important to clear away at the outset any possible misconceptions which the debt crisis in Latin American states in the 1980s and the Thai currency crisis in 1997 may have encouraged. This is in order to demonstrate the point of institutionalised coordination.

It needs to be emphasised that, due to historical, geopolitical, institutional, and policy differences, the state capacity concept does not apply in any uniform sense to the countries of East Asia and

Latin America. The developmental state concept faced criticisms following the debt crisis of Latin American states in the 1980s, and subsequent economic stagnation in East Asian states. During this period, government interventionist approaches resulted in high inflation rates, impeding macro-economic balances, and creating inefficient and wasteful government policies (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1998:1). The developmental states were criticised mostly for their inability to deal with the debt crisis and economic downturn of Japan. The area of attention has been the state interventionist approach linked to problems of growing inflation rates, and obstructive macro-economic imbalances. There was thus little attention to plans for industrialization. In fact, countries were dragged into a narrow economic trajectory (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1998:1).

The 1997 crisis raised concerns about the effectiveness of the East Asian Miracle and the role of the state in the industrialisation process, throwing into sharp focus a key component of the developmental state model: the alliance between politics and the economy and, more precisely, the effectiveness of the partnership that existed between the state and private sector. Moreover, these economic crises were blamed on poor regulatory procedures and a lack of transparency, made possible by the institutional framework of the developmental state. It was also blamed on the absence of risk management plans (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1998:1). The economic demise raised questions about developmental states' ability to intervene in the developmental programme, including the state's ability to coordinate the development process in partnership with the private sector. The economic downturn was blamed on poor regulatory policies and the lack of institutional structural arrangements of developmental states (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1998:1).

Yet, to collapse the developmental state model into general failure is to ignore important variations between developmental states. Even at the most basic level, there are major differences between first and second generation East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC). In Thailand in the 1990s, for example, the availability of easy finance coupled with the virtual absence of investment guidelines contrasted sharply with the highly coordinated investment strategies put in place earlier by Taiwan, Korea, and Japan at a similar stage of development. Whereas the state-guided strategies of the three generated high levels of investment in strong-growth industries. Thailand's uncoordinated approach encouraged intense speculative activity, leading to a frensy of over-investment in the property sector and ultimately contributing to the currency crisis in 1997.

If these lessons remind us that no region or country is crisis-proof, they should not be taken to imply that the developmental state concept as a whole as opposed to some parts of it in the practical experiences of countries is inherently fragile. The issue turns on the quality and capacity of state institutions, to which this paper now turns to. This in turn depends on a process of institutionalising cooperation, or creative partnerships, towards selective interventions in order to effectively direct the economy.

Here the inter-connectedness between the state and the private sector guides the functioning of the private sector. The common denominator in both the "authoritarian" and "democratic" forms of the developmental state is "institutionalised public-private partnership" in the process of economic policy formulation and implementation (Onis, 1991:115).

According to some scholars, Peter Evans lists public service unity as another fundamental determinant of institutionalised cooperation (Weiss, 1998:36); (Compton, Jr, 1964:126-127). In economics, the benefits of state coordination have been noted for a range of areas, including coordinating balanced investment decisions as well as the coordination of specialist functions such as sharing of information, technological acquisitions, learning, and diffusion (Weiss,

1998: 6). A state that has strong coordination mechanisms has the potential to effectively assess investment opportunities. In essence, such a state has the potential to undertake or execute certain developmental aspects including the state's potential to coordinate small institutions in order of priority.

In respect of state-capital relations, Japan is a powerful case in point. To suggest that Japan's political and economic elites were keen to revitalise the national economy in the wake of the war is hardly novel (Beeson, 2010:4). It is possible to generalise public policy as the pursuit of economic growth. It is important to note, however, that what distinguished Japan, and what has attracted a great deal of academic interest is not simply that country's dramatic success but the specific mechanisms that underpinned it (Beeson, 2010:4). The Japanese political class pursued economic growth in an extraordinary manner in the post-Second World War era. However, it is always important to bear in mind that the Japanese success story is not a result of the state's ability to turn around things but the methods and instruments that underpinned the success story.

Part of the success story, to be sure, is the distinctive pattern of institutionalised relationships, or partnerships, between "business" and "government". The use of the word "business" in this context refers to the private sector including big conglomerates such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui and their affiliate companies that dominated the Japanese economic market. Similarly, the government in this context refers primarily to a number of key ministries in the state bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and their roles in guiding the course of Japan's post-war development project. This kind of institutionalised arrangement was seen by many as conferring specific advantages, influentially captured by Peter Evans, who has suggested that a number of East Asian states had followed Japan's lead, having derived specific benefits from a pattern of relationships he has described as "embedded autonomy" (Beeson, 2010:4). Indeed, Japan is a sterling example of how a state has used partnerships to build and promote its economy and deliver services.

Evans concludes that a number of conditions are essential if state policies are to be consistent with a transformative or developmental project and in line with growth-oriented goals. The one is that of the insulation of the state's key policy-making agencies from special interest groups and clientelistic pressures (Weiss, 1998:36). Thus, the state's policymaking institutions must be independent from the influence of interest or concerned groups which in turn enables the state to define the developmental path without interference or resistance from such organisations (Weiss, 1998:36).

The other condition is that of a competent bureaucracy committed to organisational objectives. For a state to become developmental, the public service must be comprised of capable and experienced public servants committed to the government's goals and agenda. We will proceed to discuss the two in turn.

The concept of embedded autonomy

Evans argues that states which are more effective in coordinating their developmental goals tend to be insufficiently autonomous to formulate their own national developmental goals making it difficult to achieve social contract but are also sufficiently embedded in industrial networks. Therefore, with the notion of embedded autonomy, Evans contributes an important intellectual tool to the discourse, not only for differentiating Third World capabilities but also for making sense of differential capabilities within the advanced industrial world (Evans in Weiss, 1998: 35). Similarly, the notion of autonomy is crucial for our understanding of the state bureaucracy's mode of operation in pursuing the "national interest". In essence, the term, autonomy refers

to effective, protected bureaucracies, which provide security against uncontrolled influence by particularist societal groups on state decisions (Huque and Zafarullah, 2006:207). In this line of reasoning bureaucratic independence is important in the sense that it determines whether the state would effectively be able to play a role in pursuing the national interest leading to social contract. This means that public servants need to be independent from politics so that they are able to collect, synthesis, and disseminate information from and to all societal partners without being influenced by the political positions of their superiors. The state should always guide against being insulated from society such that it starts to drift away from society and become completely isolated and detached, thus making it difficult for the state to appreciate the needs of the people so as to be able to put into place service delivery measures (Fritz and Menocal (2007:535). Thus, the state must be 'embedded' in society so that it is "connected to a concrete set of social ties that culminates into a social contract society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and recognition of goals and policies" (Fritz and Menocal, 2007:535).

In so doing, institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and recognition of goals and policies become a permanent fixture of constantly mediated relationships (Fritz and Menocal, 2007:535). The concept of embeddedness refers to the fact that the state is based on networks that link it to particular social groups with which it shares a joint project of transformation (Huque and Zafarullah, 2006:207). As a matter of fact, the concept of embedded autonomy was coined by Peter Evans in an endeavour to solve the puzzle of why some highly interventionist states are able to translate their developmental goals into practice whilst others have been less effective in economic management. Evans wanted to gain an understanding of the underlying conditions which determine whether a developmental state is strong or weak (Weiss, 1998:35). In solving this dilemma, Evans explained that there are certain attributes internal to state structure that heightens insulation or autonomy from pluralistic interests. However, he cautioned that autonomy is not sufficient if goals are not implemented successfully. For that to occur, autonomy must be 'embedded' in society: "It is an autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties which bind the state to society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation of goals and policies." Evans concluded that embedded autonomy thus draws attention to the capacity of the state to combine two seemingly contradictory aspects: "Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense immersion in the surrounding structure" (Weiss, 1998:35). Essentially, it refers to a point in which the bureaucracies or state as placed at the centre of coordination in a web comprised of strong social partners. In principle, what this means is that the state bureaucracy should work in partnership with other capable institutions for the state to become a strong developmental institution albeit the state being at the heart of that coordination. Once again, this demonstrates the importan partnerships and networks of relevant institutions which in turn define the extent to which some interventionist states are able to translate their developmental goals into practice (Weiss, 1998:35). Surely, this is a lesson that South African leaders need to embrace and understand if they want to build a strong developmental state with the capacity to intervene in the socio-economic development challenges that the country is now finding itself in. The state has to be at the centre of coordination of all developmental programmes including service delivery and infrastructure development. Failure to do so, that is if the apparatus of the state are being too distant or lacking in effective capacity, the government will be weakening the state's ability to implement policy and guide the course of development in 'appropriate' ways. Conversely, if the state is too close to societal partners, it risks being captured by self-serving interests of rent-seeking business groups (Beeson, 2010:5-6). So the state should always avoid being close to businesses as that could result in corporate capture of the state and to more detrimental effect the state capture.

One other point the South African government needs to draw lessons from East Asian bureaucracies has been that by their very nature, these states have on the whole been effective coordinators because they have used their insulation from special interest constituencies to develop more encompassing networks. Furthermore, the model for coordination as applied by East Asian states focused more on reliance on the use of incentives or negotiated power rather than coercion but rather a reliance. (Weiss, 1998:81). In economic terms, East Asian States enable state officials or bureaucracies to strategically and selectively intervene in the economy, focusing on sectors that they perceive as crucial to the future of industrial growth and transformation (Edigheji, 2010:4).

Meritocratic Bureaucracy as a Tool for Institutionalised Coordination

According to Evans, the developmental state is independent in so far as it has a balanced bureaucracy characterised by meritocracy and long-term career forecasts, which are fundamental characteristics of good public servants (Rauch and Evans, 1999:30); (Beeson, 2010:5). In the East Asian States, merit-based recruitment and promotion of officials, rather than political appointments, have tended to minimise political manipulation of the bureaucracy. Therefore, priorities in these states has been placed on attracting highly qualified individuals. There is a belief by the East Asian States that the "non-bureaucratic forms of recruitment bound such groups more tightly to the state and thus served to foster the kind of bureaucratic culture in which individuals took as their objectives the goals of their organisations" (Weiss,1998:50). What the afore-mentioned statement refers to is the fact that non-bureaucratic or political deployments do is that though necessary in some areas, it has the potential to create public servants who then behave as politicians and therefore impacting negatively the broader goal of government. In essence, the point that is been emphasised is that without competent, cohesive public bureaucracies, capability-expanding services will not be delivered. Surely, the East Asian bureaucracies have become successful in the sense that it has been comprised of the brightest and the most competitive public servants who share the same tradition and culture. Promotions and recruitment to positions of authority have depended on one's ability to showcase brilliance and expertise. This method of recruitment has minimised the abuse and exploitation of state resources by those connected to political leadership even though such approaches have been aligned with the goals of political organisations and that of the government in power (Weiss, 1998:50).

Basically, any aspiring developmental state needs to know that emphasis should be placed on efficient, well-coordinated, and well-skilled employees. Such states have the administrative, technical, and political capacity, and competency to set national goals. To this effect, it is believed that meritocratic recruitment would contribute to three objectives: the creation of unity; a high standard of performance, and professionalism (Fitz and Menocal, 2007:534). Having said the above, I would like to indicate that a state is not developmental due to it being advanced and developed; rather, it is due to a state's pursuance of a set of criteria that conform to growth and strong management (Bolesta, 2007:110). These are necessary requirements for South Africa to pursue given the downgrades and continuous reviews that threaten economic downgrade to junk status. The fundamental pillars that the South African government needs to put into place are institutionalised coordination mechanisms with the societal partners including businesses. But it is also about strengthening institutional capacities at all levels including ensuring that government pursues meritocratic recruitment.

The role of Developmental State in Service Delivery

Developmental states are the embodiment of their transformative outcomes which include, amongst others, a combination of capacities, visions, norms, and ideologies (Fritz and Menocal, 2007:534). What this means is that a state that does not have the requisite capacity would find it difficult to deliver adequate services or outcomes in a transformative manner. The point is clearly articulated by Ghani et al. (2005: 1). They assert that "a developmental state project must possess at least two essential attributes. First, the state must have the capacity to control a vast majority of its territory and possess a set of core capacities that will enable it to design and deliver policies; secondly, the project must involve some degree of reach and inclusion and have an institutional, long-term perspective that transcends any specific political figure or leader" (Bomba, 2011:28); (Fritz and Menocal, 2007:8).

Therein resides the rub. According to Ghani 'et al' (2005: 1), state capacity is an essential condition to building an effective state. Focusing on the state ability to control the areas under its jurisdiction, Leftwich (2000: 167-168) argues that states should have additional capacities that will enable them to formulate and deliver policies with a long-term perspective that is not limited to any political figure or leader. This kind of thinking was further elaborated by Leftwich when he defined the attributes of an ideal-type developmental state as one that demonstrates a "determination and ability to stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with the business sector and arrange or supervise mutually acceptable deals with foreign interests". This means that government has to work with all societal partners including the business sector in the delivery of services, and rendering of socio-economic interventions which include amongst others attracting foreign direct investment for the benefit of the citisenry in the form of employment opportunities (Leftwich, 2000: 167-168); (Fritz and Menocal, 2006:4). Moreover, the state should work with other institutions that are operating within the society such as Research Organisations and other political institutions outside the ambit of government (Southall in Buhlungu et al, 2007:19).

The Role of Social Contract

Earlier on, the focus was put on embedded autonomy which describes the circumstances in which a developmental state is anchored around institutional capacity: a state in which the Social Contract is an institutionalised national consensus managed by a competent bureaucracy responsible for "actual planning, intervening in, and guiding of the economy". However, this is not to suggest that bureaucratic elites or public servants are the only players in the process of developmental governance (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011:10-11). However, they play a much bigger role in service delivery mostly because they are responsible for actual planning, intervening, and guiding the economy only after political elites have defined broad policy parameters. Bureaucratic elites, as technicians, have to be tasked with formulating detailed policies and plans to achieve the broad developmental goals set by political elites.

Furthermore, because these bureaucrats are recruited on merit and have long-term and predictable career paths as compared to the political leaders or their political principals, they are likely to resist pressures from political leaders and sectional interest groups that could undermine long-term national developmental goals (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011:10-11). But once Political Leaders have defined the broad policy parameters, economic leaders within the private sector and public sector are required to formulate detailed policies and service delivery plans to achieve the broad developmental goals outlined by political leaders (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011:10-11). In an effort to build a developmental state, it is important that in the upcoming national elections, the Political Organisations should to field well-trained and well-skilled people as parliamentarians, members of the legislatures and Councillors, with the capacity

to intreprete broad policy parameters that are articulated at national, provincial and within their mayoral councils and be able to translate them into service delivery plans to reach to all the citizenry in their communities.

To make the afore-mentioned point clear and in relation to governance is that, the work of the political executive and bureaucracies which serves the executive office at all governance levels is informed by three overriding capacities: (1) the ability to formulate policy goals and develop strategies for implementing them independent of societal pressures; (2) the ability to change the behaviour of important internal groups in order to further their policies; and (3) the ability to restructure the internal environment in pursuit of its goals (Weiss, 1998:26). In short, it is about the ability of the bureaucracy to formulate and develop strategies for service delivery independent of pressure groups (Weiss, 1998:26). The public service has to develop mechanisms and strategies to lobby or mobilise all societal groups to the outline political vision. What makes this apparent legitimation of patriotic contribution unique to developmental states is that it is not only pragmatic, focussed on the bureaucratic management of day-to-day service delivery tasks but, on the contrary, offers an economic and institutionalised structure for a process of facilitating the practical proximity of delivery in an 'isolated', individualised society characteristic of modernity, the notion of 'mediated communities to which we referred earlier, rather a process of mediation concerned with the future socio-economic structure (Weiss, 1998:35). Perhaps this designation of role and identity is best characterised as forward planning, which is to say, the nature and workings of national development plans. These plans, ultimately, are indicative of the delivery of services to the citisenry as a long-term standard narrative of the passage from the present to the future where the future is a determinate outcome of the ever shifting borders of national and transnational economic forces (Weiss, 1998:35).

Social Contract embeddedness in Strong and Powerful Oversight Institutions

Finally, for a state to be able to address service delivery problems and challenges, it has to establish strong and capable oversight institutions. This should comprise a well-resourced and quality cohort of public servants with the capacity to monitor performance without political interference. In any developmental state economic challenges require competent and impartial referees which are to be found in strong institutions. Thus, a high-quality civil service that has the capacity to monitor performance is essential. A high-quality civil service also augments the government's ability to design and implement policies (Ibadan, 1993:11). Such an institution allows the state to formulate and implement proactive policies to improve access to services. Surely, in South Africa, the national government has established the Department of Monitoring and Evaluation to monitor and evaluate the impact of services, however, it is not clear whether the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) is playing a similar role with respect to local government or whether indeed it has the capacity to effectively render such a responsibility given the current mandate of SALGA. Perhaps, South Africa needs to establish a Monitoring and Evaluation entity that runs across all spheres of government in as far as monitoring and evaluation are concerned.

On another level, it is by now axiomatic that in order to tackle coordination problems, leaders need institutions and mechanisms to reassure competing groups that each should benefit from growth. Therefore, one other important role that South Africa could play towards the attainment of transformative outcomes is to recruit a competent and relatively honest bureaucratic cadre and insulate it from day-to-day political interference that is increasingly becoming a challenge such that it is now difficult to separate politics from administration (Ibadan, 1993:14). Moreover, there should be centralised institutions with the responsibility to tackle coordination challenges.

However, for effective coordination to take place, politicians need to develop institutions and formulate mechanisms that would enable members of society to have confidence in the neutrality of such institutions. This would instill in citisens confidence that such institutions serve their interests. The success of coordination, then, lies in the competence of the public service to perform its task; it involves the coordination of policy and developmental interventions (Ibadan, 1993:11). The process of mobilising the developmental agenda, in short, is far easier to sustain when it is legitimised by what the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci has called the "active consent" of the citisenry.

Conclusion

We can now discern the institutional elements that are vital conditions of general capabilities in formulating, transmitting, and legitimating notions of common interest in a developmental state. The role of the state in embedding developmental practices in society as a mobilising platform for the neutralisation, or accommodation, of particular interests, is a complex and carefully calibrated sequence of coordinated interventions that depend on the capacity of the developmental state to advance an economic growth and development agenda.

At a deeper level, however, the question is whether the economic movements that so significantly advanced the economies of East Asia in the past six decades are to be transubstantiated in a country like South Africa which only two decades ago ended apartheid. If the great challenge of the 21st Century developmental state is economic, even something as fundamental as institutionalised democratic gains carries the burden of empty fortresses abandoned to democracy. However, if South Africa has to deliver services and reach out to all its citisens, it has to strengthen institutional coordination mechanisms in a manner that they are embracive of all societal groups. The government also has to ensure that competent people are appointed in positions of authority to be able to translate broader policy objectives and link them with service delivery plans. Furthermore, to effectively monitor and evaluate service delivery impact, the government has to create service delivery institutions that would monitor service delivery as it happens at the national, provincial, and local government levels.

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You are too Black: Nationalistic and Ethnic Dimensions of Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa

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Abstract

This paper argues that xenophobia in South Africa is a result of intersecting historical, economic, and socio-political factors specific to the South African nationalist project embarked upon after independence. It will show how a confluence of the aforementioned factors in the country have, for the most part, contributed to an environment which is fertile for xenophobia and its expression through physical violence, especially towards other black Africans. This argument is significant because xenophobia is usually viewed from a resource scarcity perspective.

Keywords: xenophobia, nationalism, violence, Africa.

Introduction

In 2008, violent attacks on African foreign nationals in the townships of South Africa left many dead, and thousands displaced throughout the country. The most poignant image representing the manifestation of these xenophobic attacks was the image of a man wrapped around burning tyres, which captured the attention of many international media houses. This image, no doubt, put on the spotlight the unstable relationship between black South Africans and other Africans, mainly from central and West-Africa. Against this backdrop, the paper asks, why has the South African post-independence period experienced xenophobia and violent attacks associated with it? It proposes that xenophobia in South Africa is a result of intersecting historical, economic, and socio-political factors specific to the South African nationalist project embarked upon after independence.

Therefore, this paper will show how a confluence of the aforementioned factors within South Africa have, for the most part, contributed to an environment which is fertile for xenophobia and its expression through physical violence, especially towards other black Africans. The paper will begin with a brief overview of nationalism, ethnic identity and citizenship. It will then locate the phenomenon of xenophobia within this broad literature. Lastly, it will turn to the case study of South Africa, studying closely the manifestation of xenophobia in the post-apartheid era.

Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity

There is a general consensus in nationalism literature that nationalism is a recent phenomenon whose roots can be traced from the post-1789 French Revolution period, and the subsequent consolidation of the modern day state system (Hobsbawm, 1985). The author further argues that before 1884 nationalism, or precisely, the nation, meant something different—it incorporated both the local and the 'foreigner'. At its core is a "political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p.1). This means that there is a desire

for the state to be ruled by a specific people belonging to that 'nation'—however defined—in pursuance of the interests of that group.

The 'nation', or rather 'national identity' is a complex identification which changes its form in different states and also shaped by historical experience. In that sense it "involves some sense of political community, however tenuous" (Smith, 1991, p.9). This belonging to a nation, especially in Europe—whose development fostered nationalism—was intimately tied with the nascent political institutions of the modern-state era.

Hobsbawm (1990, p.18) supports this by emphasizing how in France, post-1789, there came an emphasis on the 'people' as "one and indivisible. The nation was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them as a state which was a political expression." In essence this led to the solidification of belonging to a place and a people intimately linked to state institutions, a phenomenon which had been hardly present in the era of empires where belonging to a nation did not necessarily imply a political connotation. Burbank and Cooper (2010) argue for example that in empires, different nationalities co-existed under a loosely defined political structure. And because of the weak relationship of nationalities with the institutions of the state, which ordinary people hardly experienced because of the relative autonomy of their communities, national identity did not have the political implications it has today.

Having said that, could we say that nationalism as defined above was ubiquitous? Such an assumption would be anything but accurate. Smith (1991, pp. 9 -12) suggests that there are two forms of nationalism or nation formation processes: the "Western and, or civic model" and the "non-Western ethnic conception of the nation." The first aspect of the Western model insists on a territorial aspect—a fixed (historical) land to which a people have belonged to for generations. The second aspect is that this community shares mutually binding laws aimed at fostering a functional political unit.

It is noteworthy that this distinction identified by Smith blurs in practice. In reality, different forms of nationalisms exhibit a range of combinations of these characteristics. These combinations are also influenced the historical processes that that particular nation has undergone. For example, French and German nationalism in the past differed in the measure that the former emphasized an inclusive idea of 'French-ness' based on citizenship, whereas the latter emphasized 'German-ness' from an exclusive ethnic point of view (Brubaker, 1992). This explains why people of the colonies of France could acquire French citizenship overtime, whereas such a possibility did not exist for British subjects in the colonies.

From the discussion above, we can see that defining who belongs to a nation also entails identifying those who do not belong. Arising from this then is the nationalist sentiment—the feeling of resentment produced by the non-compliance to the principle, or the emotional satisfaction aroused by its achievement (Gellner, 1983). This means that nationalism incorporates both the positive and the negative within itself. And this is important to note because negativity of nationalism has tended to be located outside itself, especially in popular discourse.

The positive side of nationalism is evoked in the popular myths that every nation creates for itself—it's supposed uniqueness and superiority, and its human and technological advancement. The negative manifests itself in the contempt that is sometimes shown towards those who are seen as not part of the nationalist project—at home and abroad. If those that do not belong share the same territorial space with the nation, the latter's discrimination may lie dormant and seldom be expressed explicitly. However, it is in periods of transition or change that nationalism intensifies. And this negative response toward the other can be seen as xenophobia.

Xenophobia, argues Hobsbawn and Kertzer (1992, p. 6), can be loosely defined as the hatred of foreigners, and involves the exclusion of "foreigners by setting up 'our own state', and being against them by excluding them from 'our' already existing state." Such an idea may take a virulent form such as the case of Germany, during Hitler's rule, purportedly concerned with the maintenance of racial purity of the Aryan race. It can also take subtle forms such as racial slurs, profiling, and other methods that may pass unnoticed under the wider political lens. In essence, xenophobia is the other face of nationalism projected towards those the nation sees as unwanted.

This is the identification of the 'other' and that discrimination can be based on ethnic terms. Ethnicity is not necessarily a politicized concept, but can be used a potent tool for fostering national and xenophobic feelings, especially if the ethnic coincides with the national (Hobsbawm and Kertzer, 1992). However, these scholars further submit that in the Third World, the national political program has tended to denounce the ethnic and tribal identities as divisive and a remnant of imperialist rule, and has favoured a national identity based on shared oppression of those indigenous to the colonies, regardless of ethnic affiliation. This has certainly been the case of many nationalist independence movements in Africa from the 1950s onwards.

It is on this rather broad—albeit shaky—base that nationalism and xenophobia has manifested themselves in South Africa. The nationalistic sentiment of 'South African-ness'—real or perceived—which has been fostered by the democratic government that rose to power in 1994 has also yielded negative results in the form of xenophobia, or more precisely, xenophobic attacks towards the 'other'. And because the 'other' is "recognizable by colour, or other physical stigmata, or by language" (Hobsbawm and Kertzer, 1992), the discrimination on them has been acute.

Nationalism, Xenophobia, and Violence in South Africa

The following sections deal with the (violent) manifestation of xenophobia in the political discourse of South Africa. The explanation presented below will hinge on multiple factors and their relevance in South African political discourse. These will include a historical dimension, economic dimension, political dimension and cultural dimension. It will argue that a synthesis of all of these processes has resulted in xenophobia towards other black Africans, and that there is no single dimension or theory that explains it fully. Lastly, it will try to account for the violent manifestation of xenophobia in the country.

Historical Dimension of Xenophobia: A Legacy of Apartheid

It would be remiss to begin an analysis of xenophobia in South Africa without looking at the history of the country, especially the so-called apartheid rule that preceded the ushering in of democracy in 1994. At the core of apartheid was separation of 'races' and a tight immigration policy that inadvertently discriminated against people of colour. And as Hopstock and Jager (2011, p.124) put it, "xenophobia was expressed through laws and policy, which led to strict controls over anyone who was seen to be different." Immigration at this time favoured the settlement of white people in South Africa as opposed to people of colour (Hopstock and Jager, 2011).

However, the ushering in of democracy in 1994, and its creation of a new South African identity incorporating previously disenfranchised black South Africans had the effect of creating a sense of nationhood among the black majority. The citizenship rights springing from this new dispensation have been jealously protected against those who are perceived as the 'other'. As this paper argues that "xenophobia is not a consequence of nationalism but…an integral part of it" (Harris, 2002, p.180), the developments in South Africa are not surprising, from a historical

perspective. Xenophobia has managed to reproduce itself, to a certain extent, within the legacy of exclusion left by the apartheid regime.

The above assertion can be observed in terms of language in popular discourse relating to immigrants in the country. Whereas the apartheid state's greatest danger to the country's stability was the '*Swart Gevaar*' (an Afrikaans term meaning 'Black Danger' coined by the white minority government to refer to black people as a danger to white people's survival)—and even more derogatory, the *kaffir*—black Africans foreigners are seen posing a similar threat to the new South Africa. And dehumanizing references towards black African foreigners abound. They are collectively referred to as "*Amakwerekwere*", an offensive onomatopoeic word that loosely refers to unintelligible idioms unknown to South Africans. There is thus an overwhelmingly negative perception towards black African foreigners. They are seen collectively as unwelcome (Nyamnjoh, 2006). Indeed, these foreigners represent the '*swart gevaar*' of the present day, as they stand for all that is considered uncivilized and backward.

The foregoing section has succinctly established above some historical influences on xenophobia in South Africa now reproducing themselves in a new era where the majority of black South Africans have been emancipated by from the shackles of the apartheid state. But why does xenophobia overwhelmingly target black Africans foreigners? The paper critically examines that question in the following sections.

Economic Dimensions of Xenophobia

This section considers xenophobia from the perspective of the theory of relative deprivation. This theory suggests that lack of certain basic goods and services is an important psychological factor in social discontent. "This arises from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to" (De la Rey, 1991, p. 41).

The ushering in of democracy in South Africa raised hope of economic opportunities for a previously disenfranchised black majority. The pro-poor policies of the African National Congress (ANC) were supposed to create a better life for all (Seekings, 2002). However, the slow trickling-down of opportunities of advancement and the continued immiseration of the majority has resulted in cracks on the walls of the "Rainbow" nation project.

The following quote from Seekings (2003, pp. 1 – 3) is insightful in highlighting the socio-economic issues in South Africa since independence:

> (There is a general) consensus that income poverty worsened in the late 1990s. Despite steady economic growth, income poverty probably rose in the late 1990s before a muted decline in the early 2000s. (Also) income inequality has probably grown, and life expectancy has declined.

Also according to official statistics, unemployment in the country has remained stubbornly high; estimated around 22.9 % in 2008 when violence against foreigners occurred (StasSA, 2009). It must note that these are often conservative estimates that usually do not include people who are in the workforce but have completely given up in finding any work in the formal economy.

These harsh conditions, coupled with the steady inflow of black immigrants (Hopstock and Jager, 2011) searching for economic opportunities in the country has influenced to a certain extent the anti-immigrant feeling directed towards foreigners. These authors argue that a conservative estimate of actual foreign population in South Africa is between 1.6 and 2 million. 3-4 per cent

of the national population, which is significantly small. Nonetheless, black African foreigners are seen as putting a strain on an already overburdened public system comprising of schools and hospitals, depriving poor locals who struggle to make ends meet (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Most of these foreigners who cannot secure employment in the formal sector usually set up operations in the informal sector in spite of the fact that they may be highly skilled and educated. And the relative success of their businesses results in rhetoric of them 'taking' locals' opportunities (Hopstock and Jager, 2011), rhetoric that the government has largely left unchecked. Thus, the resentment towards them generally grows. They are seen as unduly benefitting from the stability and economic opportunities of South Africa that rightly belong to local people. Indeed, those targeted during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks ran small businesses in poor townships in which they also resided. For example, Alexandra, one of the townships where xenophobic attacks occurred in 2008, is one of the poorest locations in Johannesburg, where foreign nationals live and ply different trades. Human Rights Watch (2009) reports that the violence which began in this township spread to all 9 provinces of the country and resulted in 62 deaths. About 40 000 foreign nationals left the country and some 50 000 were internally displaced.

Here we see relative deprivation at play. The perceived better economic position—largely untrue—of the foreigner invites indignation from the local population who see themselves as legitimately part of the nationalist project promulgated in 1994, from which they have not yet benefited. There is also a wider context of deprivation involved. Locals are exposed to the glamour of the cities to which they live close, and the media exposes them to the positive developments in the country, which they do not experience. This further increases their frustration.

There is a feedback loop between this dimension and the political and cultural dimension which is tackled below.

The Role of Politics and Media

At best, the South African government has been reactionary in attending to the problem of xenophobia in the country. One response by the government, argues Harris (2002), is that xenophobia has been "pathologised"; that is, identified as a new and unhealthy habit that is outside of South African popular discourse. However, in practice the actions of the state towards foreign Africans reinforces attitudes of suspicion towards this latter group. The state and the leadership is complicit in the prevalence of xenophobic attitudes in the country.

Neocosmos (2010, p. 77), expanding on a point made earlier in this discussion, argues that:

> the process of 'nation-building'…is not simply about the creation of 'national unity' around a common political project, it is also about demarcating that unity from others…it is a fundamentally socio-material object embedded in social relations and is experienced as such, most obviously by 'strangers'/'foreigners' who are excluded from community rights and access to resources.

In light of this, the policies of the democratic government have tilted towards a hard demarcation between foreigner and local, with its pursuit of the rainbow nation project. This is reflected in immigration legislations in the country.

While the triumph of a majority party signalled an end to white minority, the new state did not change the immigration policy it inherited from its nemesis—the apartheid state. Hence the Aliens Controls Act of 1991 (amended), became the bedrock of ANC immigration policy for

several years into independence (Hopstock and de Jager, 2011). It was under this legislation that the post-apartheid government built its 'rainbow nation' project, which, arguably, fostered hostility towards migrants, especially black Africans. Although the government enacted a new Immigration policy in 2002, hailed as progressive for its easing of skilled labour transfer, it made little mention of the problem of xenophobia in the country (Hopstock and de Jager, 2011). Instead of viewing immigration in a positive light, the ruling authorities have seen it as undesirable and therefore have framed immigration policy reform to tighten the screws on foreigners entering the country and also to enable them to jet out those who are already in the country (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

It is this narrow-based conception of citizenship and the nation which has promoted an unhealthy environment towards black migrants. And the result has been that the rainbow nation has been replaced by the onion nation whose structure of belonging is layered around an acceptable national core (Hassim et. al., 2008). Following this analogy, the black African foreigner is the peripheral layer around the core of the new South African nationalist project. Consequently, the 'other black' bears the brunt of this exclusionary immigration and citizenship conception, because of his perceived laziness, backwardness and poverty. In this new dispensation the 'foreign black' takes the place the most blacks held under the apartheid regime.

Government officials have also weighed in on the issue of foreigners in the country with unreliable and unverifiable information. For example, Neocosmos (2010, p. 85) quotes an African National Congress (ANC) ex-Director General of Home Affairs giving this outlandish remark regarding foreigners in the country:

> Approximately 90 % of foreign persons, who are in RSA (Republic of South Africa) with fraudulent documents, i.e. either citizenship or migrant documents, are involved in other crimes as well…

The same author also provides this comment by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then minister of Home Affairs (1994 – 1998):

> If we as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring in to South Africa, then we can kiss goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme.

The minister alleged that there was no xenophobic sentiment in the country, and that foreigners wanted preferential treatment. Ten years after he had said this, a study by Afrobarometer (2009) showed that 33 per cent of South Africans supported immigration laws, especially those that target black African foreigners, suggesting a cumulative increase in anti-immigrant sentiment.

Media representation of black Africans has not been flattering and has bordered on the line of irresponsible reporting. Nyamjoh (2006) argues that South African mainstream media was for a long time an ally—perhaps unwittingly—to the "service of degrading and disempowering foreign African nationals. He further points out that rifts and conflict among different groups of black people serves white media interests well, as some of the latter continue to hold fixed and essentialist positions on race and identity. Articles discussing African migrants announce themselves with hyperbole, such as the following captions from some South African media houses: "Foreign *influx*: citizens fear for their job prospects after *hordes descend* on the country from the troubled north (Sowetan, 29 July 1993, in Harris, 2002); "Xenophobia rife as Africans *flood* SA …" (Sunday Times, 28 August 1994, in Harris, 2002).

The italics in the quotes above belongs to the author in order to highlight that the choice of words such as 'floods', 'torrents', 'descend' and 'hordes', depict a chaotic situation that etches itself in the memories of people, and significantly increases negative perceptions towards the 'other'. Thus the sight of an African foreigner is to behold the "illegal, and therefore, (the) criminal" (Harris, 2002). This is in spite of statistics that reveal that so far as crime is concerned, South African citizens are more to blame than African foreign nationals.

Now it leaves us to explain why xenophobia has manifested itself in physical violence toward black Africans. Hatred or distrust for another is not synonymous with inflicting physical violence on the other. This last section considers this aspect more closely.

Xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa

Many scholars have argued that South African society is characterized by a culture of violence. "The culture of violence can be described as a situation in which social relations and interactions are governed through violent, rather than non-violent means" (Harris, 2002, p.178). This itself is a legacy of apartheid where the black majority's interaction with the state was characterized by harassment and physical violence. Thus, continues Harris (2002), even though political violence waned after independence, this culture has been transferred to criminal violence. Although these explanations give us an insight in the history of violence in South Africa, it stills fall short of the question why black Africans are disproportionately victims of physical violence.

An interesting way to understand physical violence against the foreigner, especially in the South African context, is to view violence as possessing cathartic effect for those who use it. It is perceived as a literal and figurative means of destroying what is seen as undesirable in society to restore an equilibrium in that society. This proposition is linked to how Girard (1972) explains the nature and function of violence in the civilizations and religions of the world. Among other things, Girard's theory proposes that violence in society is regulated through a ritual of prohibition that reigns in natural competition that exists among human beings which sometimes deteriorates to chaos. Failure to respect these taboos then requires a scapegoat to bear the blame of the disturbed societal equilibrium. In order to restore equilibrium, the scapegoat—a person or a group –is sacrificed. His/her death signifies a new peaceful beginning in that community's relations. And this process then tends to replicate itself overtime; a new dysfunction requires a new scapegoat.

Although xenophobic attacks have not resulted in improved conditions of ordinary South Africans—the bulk of whom are involved in these attacks—they have managed to capture the attention of the state, the latter which they see as responsible for improving their social conditions. As we have seen above, some elements in the state and media have continued to portray the black African foreigner as a social ill, which if society is rid of, the national project could get back into track. Violence can potentially be a response for cleansing the national project of these unwanted 'alien' impediments perceived—to be sure, mistakenly—as the source of all the country's trouble.

The focalization of violence towards the foreigner often shields government's colossal failure to provide for the basic needs of ordinary South Africans. That is why government officials have tended to issue ambiguous comments on the problem of xenophobia in South Africa. So long as the people search for the reasons of bad governance elsewhere, the ruling elite is somewhat shielded from the blame. Indeed, the free reign given to vigilante groups such as Operation Dudula is testimony to government's complicity to violence against the black African foreigner.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that xenophobia is the other side of the nationalist project. It has proposed a multi-pronged approach to understanding it as it manifests itself in South African post-independence politics. Also, it has argued that the South African post-independence nationalist project, though trying to dissociate itself from its apartheid predecessor, has unwittingly replicated some aspects of the colonial past in present day. Among these, is the clamp-down on black migrants and relatively easy access to the country that white people have. Because of this reproduction of unfair representation of black African foreigners, suspicion towards them has grown, as new black citizens see this group as a threat to their newly-gained privilege. Lastly, it has proposed a different way of understanding the component of physical attacks on foreigners going beyond explanations of criminality.

What is clear is that without a concerted effort by the state and other relevant stakeholders to change public discourse relating to black African immigrants, and to actively create a more proactive and inclusive immigration policy, xenophobia and the attacks associated with it may spike in recent years to come.

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Elite Governance, Development, and Public Safety in Nigeria

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Abstract

Governance defines how political actors use ethical or corrupt practices to influence mass participation in political decision-making in public affairs. This article interrogates the implications of the elite monopoly of power for development and public safety in Nigeria. We anchored the study on Pareto's circulation of elite theory. It adopts a qualitative method to collect secondary data which are content and thematically analyzed. Results indicated that the gap between the elite and the citizenry threatens the development and public safety in Nigeria. This article concludes that elitism should not only socially engage with the citizenry, but it should also reproduce egalitarian political values and actors for inclusion in Nigeria's democratic destiny. Drawing on the values of the conceptual lions (oselu) of Pareto to scare his conceptual foxes (ojelu) vices out of political domination through electoral re-socialization could neutralize elite conspiracy against the majority and boost the capacity of vulnerable Nigerians to initiate and implement development and public safety defenses. It suggests that a true fiscal federalism predicated on ethical reorientation in politics could reinvent Nigeria, and relieve her of the burden of underdevelopment and insecurity into which elite avarice has plunged the country.

Keywords: elite career path, public safety; development, oselu/ojelu, Nigeria

Introduction

Though a vague concept, different people have used the concept of the elite in diverse cultural and intellectual areas to discuss the relevance of political actors to the public good. Since concepts imply "meanings and referents which are used to describe and explain phenomena" (Wilson, 1967, p. 18-25), they transcend ordinary words. Specifically, "in the social science literature," elite is the most extensively used concept "to describe the rule of a minority over the majority of the population" (Zannoni, 1978, p. 1-30), because the elite "collectively make policies that shape the life chances of every Nigerian" (Ogbeide & Aghahowa, 2005, p. 222). However, the word governance originates from the Greek verb *huberman*, implying "to steer a ship". This reality was the logic in Plato's Republic. The French *gouverner* developed from the Latin verb *gubernare* which evolved from the Greek verb "to serve" as the origin of the English words government and governance (Plattner, 2013). Howlett & Ramesh (2014) contend that while "governing" is the occupation of governments, "'governance' is about establishing, promoting and supporting a specific type of relationship between governmental and nongovernmental actors in the governing process" (p. 318). Today, the ethos of democracy forbids ascendancy by inheritance and favors a process-driven openness marked by competition and equity in the recruitment of public office

holders. Therefore, consistent with the values of civilization, there should be a paradigm shift from 'endogenous' approaches of social reproduction where inherited privilege drives ascendancy to elite meritocratic means of production in which competition defines status achievement (Baker, 2018).

Being ubiquitous members of social groups in the social structure, the elite influence the socioeconomic and symbolic capital of the society (Khan, 2012). The political pattern in profoundly traditional societies such as Nigeria might seem very communitarian, and critically scrutinized, it 'in fact always has and still does contain elite institutions and programs' (Börjesson et al., 2016, p. 15-34). Political actors can and do access the elite class through political manipulation. Exercising power, influence, and indirect rule, the elite deploys all their resources to gain ascendancy. Once there, the holder of political power is "…in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Osuji, 2018, p. 149). However, the way the elite manage political resistance, nothing shows that they have learned anything from Nigeria's political past that concretely commits them to "a new and positive culture of leading" (Agbaje, 2014, p. 103). The capacity of the elite to represent and act as political intercessors between the ruled and their leaders to cause political anger becomes critical (Osinbajo, 2021). These political actors often graduate into rulers and then into the elite class in the system. This transformation requires explicit analysis. The danger in this political metamorphosis is that the difference between dictatorship and democracy becomes blurry. Rather than have an inclusive democracy, we have "rule by some politicians" or "polito-cracy" (Schmitter, 2021, p. 3).

Regrettably, however, all surviving democracies hinge on the non-democratic elite who are entrenched in the self-styled "guardian institutions" of the state agencies, commissions, directorates, boards, central banks, courts, administrative staff… (Schmitter, 2021, p. 3). In a country where impunity drives corrupt practices, the least resistance may draw disproportionate aggression. For example, Sambo Dasuki misapplied US$2.1 billion and N19.4 billion initially earmarked for the procurement of arms for the army to sponsor the re-election of President Jonathan through vote-buying (Nnoch, 2016). Similarly, Olisa Metuh diverted N400 million and US$2 million initially earmarked for national security to vote-buying (Yahaya, 2020). In April 2014, violence crept into education when kidnappers abducted 276 schoolgirls from a government secondary school in Chibok, a town in Borno State (Amnesty International, 2023). Violence also sneaked into and devastated the agricultural subsector when in November 2020, in Zabarmari, in Borno State, Boko Haram killed over 70 agricultural workers on the presumption that the workers reported their presence in the community to the authority (Alfa & Maclean, 2020).

Similarly, terrorism launched an attack on public transportation while some gunmen hijacked a train on March 28, 2022, in the Kateri-Rijana area of Kaduna state, killing many and abducting others (Chime, 2023). A secessionist group, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east, has become renowned for ordering people to boycott work and stay at home (Campbell, 2021). The elite have hands in all these calculated assaults on public conscience in Nigeria. Therefore, if Tijani (2013) holds insecurity to imply the inability of a nation to "…maintain law and order when the government cannot protect the lives and property of citizens (p. 181), successive governments in Nigeria have failed to secure Nigeria against underdevelopment and insecurity by tolerating corruption. The literature underscores the critical distinctions between public and elite choices (Jacobs & Page, 2005) and the gaps in public–elite political practices (Kertzer, 2020). It is doubtful if the elite function in the interest of Nigerians. The elite's seizure of public sector policies and resources weakens the productive capacities of investors in agriculture and the oil sectors of the Nigerian economy and thwarts the equitable distribution of the benefits of growth (Oxfam, 2017). Today, "…in Nigeria…the top 10 percent of the population is capturing most of

the existing growth, and the people at the bottom are without attention…" (Okonjo-Iweala, 2013) to present the richest 0.003 percent Nigerians (6,355 individuals worth $5 million and above) who have 1.4 times more wealth than 107 million other Nigerians (Oxfam, 2023).

Despite the impact of the elite on security, the scientific community knows little about the extent to which the elite are instrumental in the development and security of Nigeria. Therefore, this article aims to probe the role that the elite play in development and public safety in Nigeria. It realizes this objective by answering the following questions: (i). How do some citizens become elite in Nigeria? (ii). How do the interactions of the elite with the mass public threaten development and public safety in Nigeria? (iii). How can the elite become tools to accelerate development and stabilize public safety in Nigeria? Without addressing the elite intervention in Nigerian politics, understanding the contextual dynamics of their inherent manipulative activities in the distribution of political power and the implications of these for development and public safety may elude the scientific community. Attempting to understand how the elite use their influence to create instability in government and economic recessions (Kia & Vurasi, 2013) that wittingly or unwittingly turn "Nigeria into a fragile state" (Oluwo & Chanie, 2016, p. 1, 4-5), is the knowledge gap which this article hopes to bridge.

Circulation of the Elite Theory: A Framework

This study adopts the Circulation of the Elite Theory, propounded by Vilfredo Pareto (1848 - 1923) to clarify the conception, construction, and use of power interactions in contemporary Nigerian society as its theoretical framework. The theory holds that power is firm because the elite is organized while the non-elite are different and defenseless, the interests of the elites are integrated because of their shared social class, statuses and the clarifying criteria of power is the position of influence within the formal institution (Deric, 2011). Pareto argues that his conviction that man is unequally endowed accounts for the varieties that manifest in the superior class (the elites), and the inferior class (non-elites), into which human capacities are categorized. The elite theory emphasizes that a group of individuals that permeates the spectrum of society holds and wields an incomparable capacity to capture power, maintain it, and govern (Friedrich, 2014; Okonofua, 2013), usually at the expense of the majority. Elite theory rests on two major sets of thoughts. While power resides in the hands of a few critical individuals who direct political, economic, and military interests, the emotional distinction between the elite and the mass public is the possession of intelligence, skills, and networks with the operators of government affairs (Ekundayo, 2017). Pareto identifies two classes of the elite – the lions (*oselu*) who demonstrate some striking utilitarian political values reminiscent of applied loyalty and reformist character by superimposing societal interests on personal interests and the foxes (*ojelu*) who represent the exact reversal of the former by conspiring, being incredibly distrustful, covetous, and self-seeking such that they appropriate every imaginable advantage due to the people for their parochial interests.

Results

Formation of the Nigerian Elite

The elite is a nebulous social category having no specific parameters to isolate its members who manipulate the destiny of a country (McCartney & Zaidi, 2019). The conceptual complexity of the elite poses an issue (Thurlow & Jaworski, 2017) and predisposes it to numerous descriptive ways of analysis (Howard & Kenway, 2015). It is specifically so in the context of "…space (global versus local), time (old versus new), or field (political versus cultural)" (Hoyer, 2022, p.2). Hafner-Burton et al. (2013) define the elite as "the small number of decision-makers who occupy the top

positions in social and political structures" (p. 369). USIP (2023) conceives the elite as persons or assemblies with disproportionate political control, prosperity, or influence on policy choices or their execution. The mechanisms of elite reproduction acknowledge the hereditary norm, cooptation, and other processes that successfully transform financial, social, or cultural capital into political capital (Raciborski, 2007). If the Weberian position still holds, then the intellectuals will drive the formation of democratic institutions, such as an "aristocracy" (Michels, 2015, p. 536), which is the advanced phase of the elite group.

The unique Nigerian cultural context overlooks the exotic admission criteria for rustic grassroots political key role players in the likes of rustic late Lamidi Adedibu, the strongman of Ibadan politics. Sometimes, politicians temporarily without formal positions command prestige and authority in their area of political influence. For this reason, the resource of political power is not always institutionalized (Wesolowski, 2000). This admission loophole probably offered Adedibu the effortless celebratory entry into Nigerian elitism which was neither accessed on achieved nor ascriptive, but coercive negotiatory parameters. However, sociology acknowledges that some individuals who do not have the requisite intellectual merit sometimes become members of the elite through ascription. In this direction, some Nigerian elite have constructed an ascriptive pathway for their children into elitism. This improvised route complements its compositional criteria and destroys a specific social analysis (Kertzer, 2020). It also imports a measure of oddity into the context. Talent and effort should blend, instead of being sacrificed, to access leadership (Littler, 2013). This logic invalidates the eminence of ascription in leadership recruitment to glorify the transition from the "old elite" – whom they were by inheritance – to a "new elite" accessed by personal fitness and competence– who they become (Jahan & Hamid, 2019). Therefore, the profile of the new entrants into the elite group is anchored on acquired knowledge and intellectual capacity (Mason-Bish, 2019), most often.

Using Nigerians' assessment of politicians in the context of palliative management following subsidy withdrawal, Nigerians distrust politicians. The politicians and not the individuals living in poverty would take advantage of the palliative intervention if completely left in the hands of politicians (Nigeria Labor Congress & Trade Union Congress, 2023). Kwara state has a palliative committee including the police, traditional rulers, religious leaders, civil society organizations, security agencies, and community leaders (Ajakaye, 2023). This Kwara model can be replicated across Nigeria to make the vulnerable population access the fuel subsidy palliative provided the committee members are not members of the ruling political party. Ten bags of rice are allocated to each of the 177 wards in Ekiti (Boluwade, 2023). The inadequacy of the palliative provision itself symbolizes a kind of inbuilt corruption. Oguntoyinbo (2023) contended that some unscrupulous government officials will hijack the disbursement process to make the palliatives elude the poorest of the poor. Most disappointingly, the Rural Community Development Outreach has exposed some experienced politicians planning to hijack the palliative funds and use online media of foreign personnel to manipulate those who dare to deride the elite and their godfathers to scuttle inclusive development focus of subsidy palliative (Ezenekwe & Mohammed, 2023).

The Arewa Consultative Forum describes the federal government's palliative of N5 billion to Lagos, Oyo, Kano, and Bayelsa states as unrealistic and unscientific for treating states with differential demographic characteristics as being equal (Muhammad-Baba, 2023). Rather than disbursing the palliatives to the states in a suicidal Father Christmas manner, the government should address wage increases, focus on agriculture, and support farmers in food production (Sani, 2023). N-Power, Trader Moni, Market Moni, and the use of N500 million to feed school children during the COVID-19 lockdown are some government interventions that have failed transparency tests (Edeh, 2023). Being a large institution within which the presence of bad eggs

who might commit blunders cannot be overlooked, the government is vicariously liable (Ngelale, 2023). Given all these evident moral inadequacies of the elite, Nigerians cannot trust the elite to disburse the palliative without equity problems. This is not to say that the Nigerian elite are generically bad or good. However, the extent of fairness or unfairness that they can display in sustaining the people's interests could facilitate their informed classification. The way the elite migrate from party A to B appears to give the impression that, in reality, the distinction between the elite exists more in name than deeds and principles.

There is a need to evolve a definition that unpacks all these confounding antics of political actors without failing to resonate with the local cultural realities of Nigeria. Therefore, this article holds the elite as a predatory, exclusive group with self-assured pedigree and heuristic exposure to manipulate the asphyxiated majority, compromise their collective resources, and predispose them to perpetual multidimensional poverty. It is at this point of differentiating between the variants of the elite in the context of their altruism or lack of it that the classification of the elite makes some sense in Nigeria. Therefore, based on the role that the elite play in identifying, protecting, describing, and determining vital public concerns and settling what and who should obtain precedence vis-à-vis others (Nzube, 2018) elite classification becomes germane. This article relies on insights from Pareto's typologies of the elite to railroad the local genre of the elite into mainstream academic literature. Nigeria has many discrete ethnic nationalities. Yoruba is one of the three most concentrated ethnic nationalities from where the article has borrowed two political concepts *Oselu* and *Ojelu* for adoption.

The Paretoan foxes come closer in terms of conceptual similarity to *oselu* in the Yoruba language. Just as the Paretoan foxes seemed to overtake their competitors using superior collaborative skills and persuasion rather than the use of oppression or aggression, the *oselu* elite is committed to fairer means of attaining their goals and sharing their rewards. Conversely, the Paretoan lions were populist, just like their *ojelu* equivalent in Nigeria, which favored one-dimensional inflexible action instead of concession. They are rigidly committed to self-interest. If there is a genre of the elite that is considered morally good in the Nigerian context, it is the *oselu*; it logically follows that at its polar extreme, an implicitly morally hostile counterpart in the *ojelu* elite exists as it does in Nigeria. Even when the fact of the contending presence of the two variants in Nigeria's political ecology cannot be denied, democracy encourages the electorates to choose from the two options.

Therefore, the "prolonged struggle for dominion between two factions" within the political system (Michels, 1962, p. 102) manifest as the *oselu* (the system supporting) and *ojelu* (the system compromising) elite in Nigeria. However, both classes pursue exclusionary politics, and their differing associations with brutality result in pitiable development consequences (Ezeajughu, 2021) for the country. This theoretical interrogation can provide useful insights into the conflicting roles that the elite play to predispose Nigerians to stable development and public safety or a lack of both. The elite became so fixated with the mentality that the creator made Nigeria for them to rule eternally. "Nigeria cannot break up because the elites are united…the ordinary Nigerians…are burdened by poverty…that they cannot even organize for the break-up of the country" (Lamido 2021). Most probably out of mischief, Lamido referred to section 2(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which says that "Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state…" to back his indivisibility theory without linking it up with Chapter 11, section 13 of the same constitution which enjoins the elite, in the fundamental objectives and Directive principles of state policy, to steer national development through good governance (Uzodinma, 2017).

The description and classification of the individuals and groups that come together to constitute the elite in Nigeria is vague just as Salman (2023) finds it in Pakistan probably because of its

universal conceptual nebulousness. The elite is, more frequently, a product of predominantly affluent families having members who may have hobnobbed with the holders of elite positions or personally occupied them in earlier generations. Due to their operational idiosyncrasy, the elite have customarily been classified as occupying the zenith in social pyramids relative to simultaneous placement with other groups (Jahan & Hamid, 2019), that were probably relegated to the nadir. The stigma of incompetence that characterizes elitism in Nigeria has earned the elite members the notorious cabal identifier. In truth, individuals might spend eternity and strength denying their opportunity and exclusive status (Thurlow & Jaworski, 2017), the idea of denial that causes a redefinition of elite belongingness without elitist emotions (Krauz-Lahav & Kemp, 2020), does not change its contents and realities.

The elite group is typically made up of less than one percent of the overall Nigerian population (Odubajo & Alabi, 2014). While the elite who can be classified as *oselu* embrace shared thoughts about normative behavior (Zvobgo, 2020) undergirding development and security, the elite who typify *ojelu* capture power for their narrow interests (Kieh, 2018). Both *oselu* and *ojelu* groups negotiate and renegotiate political boundaries ostensibly to increase inclusion for electoral victory to improve society, but in reality, they attempt to access a political route out of poverty. This manifests in their reckless interparty migration at the slightest provocation. Therefore, their laying siege to public interest comes with differing levels of hostility, depending on the kind of elite. Perhaps this concern might have predisposed the Nigerian elite to incapacity for a consensus not only to improve Nigeria but also to stop itself from devastation (Osinbajo, 2020). Therefore, in the elite bargains, both camps are committed to negotiation and re-negotiation of the power-sharing formula and resource distribution between elites (Denney & Barron, 2015; Laws, 2012). While the few transparency-loving Nigerians applaud the *oselu* and condemn *ojelu*, the corruption-embracing majority across Nigeria belittle the virtues of the former and extol the vices of the latter for their parochial interests.

Mudde & Kaltwasser (2017) have helped to drive the message of the conceptual dichotomy between *oselu* and *ojelu* further home when they conjectured a stark boundary between the "two homogeneous and antagonistic camps as 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'" (p. 6). However, the way politicking is structured in Nigeria makes political settlement drive who gets what, between *oselu* and *ojelu,* and in what proportion as a result of political "godfatherism" (Isaac, 2005, p. 79-105) and its intervention in the electoral process. When societies undergo rapid transformation, they release impacts that disintegrate traditional arrangements before new associations with socially constructive functions replace them and are prepared to stand in their place. Consequently, a group of displaced persons emerges. These are persons removed from their old positions of former authority. When the normal routes to political influence are blocked to such individuals who are not conventionally qualified, anomic recruitment occurs (Apter, 1959, p 117). In 2022, Musiliu Akinsanya, aka MC Oluomo, who up to then was the Chairman of the Lagos State Parks and Garages Management dramatically became a member of the APC Presidential Campaign Council (Omisore, 2022). In a video, MC Oluomo told Igbo people who did not want to vote for the party in the Lagos governorship election should stay at home. Due to public outcry online, he recanted the threat. "We have begged them. If they don't want to vote for us, it is not a fight" (Akinsanya, 2023). Imagine if public reactions were not heavily tilted against the threat, his group might have resorted to violence or provocative acts to enable MC Oluomo and his cohorts to access political elitism in Lagos.

Elite's Interactions with Citizens that Threaten Development and Public Safety in Nigeria

This section chronicles how the elite's interactions with the public threaten development and public safety in Nigeria. Despite the "moral mediocrity" of the public and the "moral excellence" of the elite (Ortega & Gasset, 1945, p. 125), the latter is encumbered by their "political inefficacy" (Pennati, 1959, p. np) to depict Nigeria as the most classic example of the African paradox of a land of abundance with the majority living in poverty (Ezekwesili, 2013). By performance, nearly all the political office holders, since independence to date, have clandestinely conspired against the Nigerian project to covert collective patrimony to the advantage of a few (Sote, 2022). Therefore, the elite will most likely sabotage any policies or institutional transformations that might threaten their power or control over resources (USIP, 2023). As of 2022, Nigeria was the world's 15th largest oil producer and 16th largest producer of natural gas liquids (Energy Institute, 2023). Through the elite's poor governance, they allowed Nigeria to slide to the unenviable status of being the world capital of poverty, with 71 million people living in extreme poverty (Cole, 2023). Faced with this ugly reality, the elite in successive governments have intervened in the stimulation of non-oil businesses. The failure of their efforts, in this regard, has made diversification inevitable (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2021). Regrettably, however, the way the elite have mismanaged the non-oil space makes household farming which the citizens fell back on incapable of suitably lifting them out of poverty (World Bank, 2022).

The elite indulges in all forms of illegal mining activities to endanger ecological richness. Some Kokota International Airport officials in Ghana, in June 2021 intercepted 978 bars of gold, valued at about 8.2 billion naira (£14.5m). The gold allegedly belonged to Abdulaziz Abubakar Yari, the former Governor of Zamfara State (Igwe, 2021). The January 16, 2024 explosion that ravaged some parts of Ibadan was traced to some unnamed dishonest Nigerian and foreign miners (Makinde, 2024). How long it will take the government to use kinetic and non-kinetic measures to unmask the powerful Nigerians behind illegal mining and terrorist activities in Nigeria (Alake, 2023) for prosecution remains conjectural. Across the world, harvesting the organs of human beings is a crime. Ike Ekweremadu, a senior lawmaker in Nigeria and former Deputy Senate President was apprehended alongside his wife and his doctor in the UK for attempting to harvest the kidney of a young adult Nigerian male at £7,000 and a job in exchange for traveling to the UK (Mohamed, 2023). These three Nigerians have been jailed in the United Kingdom for conspiracy to ensure the travel of a man to harvest his organs in 2023 (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2023).

The sum of $2 billion was said to have been stolen from the National Security Budget under the watch of National Security Advisor, Colonel Sambo Dasuki (BBC News, 2015). Across the board, between 1960 and 2005, about $20 trillion was stolen from the treasury by public office holders, according to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Vanguard Newspaper of March 20, 2015). In 2007, the EFCC announced that it had built watertight cases against 30 state governors. However, none has been successfully convicted and sent to jail. Most telling was the N32.8 billion Police Pension Fund theft trial of John Yakubu Yusufu. Despite his admission of fraud, he walked out of court free after paying a paltry N750,000 in fines (Bellanaija, 2013). On appeal, probably due to public outcry and interest, the Court of Appeal jailed the pension thief for six years, and a fine of N22.9bn was imposed on him (The Punch of January 29, 2013). The United States FBI (2022) accused Senator Chimaroke Nnamani, the Governor of Enugu state between May 1999 and May 2007, of having looted and laundered $41.8 million. After establishing that Nnamani did not lawfully earn enough to justify the millions of dollars he possessed, he ordered the forfeiture of his assets to the US government (Acker, 2022).

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) accused Jolly Nyame, the former Governor of Taraba State, of diverting N1.64 billion in May 2007. A High Court of the Federal

Capital Territory sentenced him to 14 years in correctional service, and the court ordered him to refund the sum so diverted (Banjoko, 2023). Switzerland refunded $500m of Mr Abacha's loot, but the refund was re-looted (Ojo, 2019). Imagine Owelle Rochas Okorocha, the former Imo State Governor, was accused of money laundering. Senator Theodore Orji, who was Governor of Abia between 2007 and 2015, and Chinedum Orji Enyinnaya, his son, were accused of diverting state funds while he was governor (The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, 2021). These are a few of the instances in which the elite conspiracy served as a crafty manipulation of the system to convert the collective patrimony to the advantage of the elite (Sule, 2022).

For the State Executives to serve the ends of justice, sections 175 and 212 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) empower the president to judiciously and judicially exercise the dispensation of justice. The elite abused these statutory provisions. Governor Adekunle Ajasin of Ondo State granted pardon to his party members, who were said to have committed arson. Governor Bola Ige of Oyo State pardoned convicted Eniola Atanda. The Chief Judge of Anambra State sentenced Obi Okongwu, the then Solicitor-General of Anambra State to 21 days imprisonment. The then Governor of Anambra State, Chief Jim Nwobodo issued two instruments, one for remission and the other for pardon under the provision of the 1979 Constitution. Okongwu immediately regained his freedom (Ekwenze, 2014). A court convicted Alhaji Salisu Buhari, Speaker of the House of Representatives, for forgery, altering, and perjury and sentenced to a term. Chief Obasanjo granted him a hasty state pardon in 2000 (Kupoluyi, 2013). President Goodluck Jonathan pardoned Alamieyeseigha (Emelike, 2022). President Buhari controversially pardoned Joshua Dariye of Plateau State and Jolly Nyame of Taraba State, who were convicted and jailed for theft of public funds in 2018 even before serving half the length of their jail terms, in April 2022 (Isaac, 2023).

The elite are instrumental in budgetary injustice that provides about three percent of the Nigerian population in the National Assembly to earn more than 70 percent of the budget is sad. The reverse of this ugly practice is true in Scandinavian countries (Tor, 2022). Farouk Lawan, the former member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the House Ad-hoc Committee on Fuel Subsidy Probe was found guilty of receiving the sum of $3 million from the Chairman of Zenon Petroleum and Gas Ltd, Femi Otedola, to clear his company in the fuel subsidy probe which the House of Reps initiated on 2012 (Otaluka, 2021). Peter Nwaoboshi was a Delta State Senator who was sentenced to seven years in prison by the Lagos Division of the Court of Appeal for money laundering, he had used Golden Touch Construction Project Limited and Suiming Electrical Limited, his companies, to launder money in 2022. The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) accused the lawmaker of using 11 companies as fronts to secure for himself a N3.6 billion contract in the commission in 2021 (Uwajaren, 2021). Albert Bassey Akpan was the Senator who represented Akwa Ibom North-East Senatorial District at the National Assembly. A Federal High Court in Uyo, the state capital, convicted and sentenced him to 42 years imprisonment for money laundering (Okeke, 2021).

When infrastructure is in a state of decay, it increases the cost of production, affects competitiveness, and adds hassles to business operations (Ajibola, 2020). In recent times, stock market instability has prevented Nigeria from being a destination for foreign investors in the last quarter of the year before (Egbo, 2020). Following the investigation by the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety) of the killings in Nigeria, it reported over 100,000 unarmed and defenseless Nigerians who were directly or indirectly extrajudicially killed in the past eight years. On average, yearly deaths outside the law of 12,500, 1,050 per month, and 35 unlawful deaths per day. The report added that the security forces of Nigeria would not achieve the security of

lives and property if the Federal Government maintained its present posture (Umeagbalasi & Udegbunam, 2024).

The negligent way the elite have handled power generation for industrial and agricultural uses made most Nigerian manufacturing industries comatose because of inadequate and epileptic electric power supply to galvanize economic production (Sote, 2022). The unemployment rate among youth aged between fifteen and twenty-four years in Q2 2023 was 7.2%; in Q1 2023, it was 6.9% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2024). Strangely, kidnappers went to Emure in Ekiti and took five pupils and four staff members of Apostolic Faith Group of Schools on whom N100m ransom on Monday, January 30, 2024, was demanded. The kidnap between December 11, 2020, and March 11, 2021, three months, of about 800 school children in Katsina, Kankara, Kagara, Jengebe, and Kaduna (Lakemfa, 2021) is a national embarrassment. Furthermore, gunmen had killed two traditional rulers in Ekiti -the Onimojo of Imojo, Oba Olatunde Olusola, and the Elesun of Esun Ekiti, Oba Babatunde Ogunsakin. The attack on school pupils was the handiwork of Boko Haram which is naturally opposed to Western education (Hassan, 2024).

The literature acknowledges some adverse micro and macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidy removal for the inflation rate to increase (Mohammed, Ahmed & Adedeji, 2020). While some studies suggest that the savings from fuel subsidy removal could benefit other segments of the economy (Ogunode, Ahmed & Olugbenga, 2023), other empirical evidence indicates that fuel subsidy escalates fiscal deficit and supports the removal of fuel subsidy (Harun et al., 2018; Adagunodo, 2022). One microeconomic implication of the fuel subsidy removal is that the forces of demand and supply will determine the price of petrol, or Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) (Su et al., 2020), rather than subsidy or government intervention. It is tragic that since the fuel subsidy regime started, the domestic refineries of Nigeria have been in a bad state (Okongwu & Imoisi, 2022). Fuel subsidy in Nigeria had to go because it was economic cannibalism (Lawal & Agwu, 2022). If fuel subsidy removal is an investment in the people, the government could use its proceeds to support those living in poverty in developing countries (Couharde & Mouhoud, 2020). To the elite, the Nigerian treasury is akin to the proverbial *eja abuubutan* (the inexhaustible fish) from which they have been stealing in the hope that it will never finish. Now, the elite have resorted to foreign loans that they have also started to loot. The ignoble conduct of the elite must have prompted Obasanjo (2024) to confess that the past and present Nigerian leaders have disappointed themselves, disappointed Africa, disappointed the black race, and disappointed the world. In consequence, therefore, the frustrated boy in a viral video has suggested a mass burial for all the complicit Nigerian leaders (richdaddy75, 2017).

Converting the Elite into Positive Tools of Development and Public Safety in Nigeria

This section examines the steps the public policy can take to reverse the development and public safety disasters with which Nigeria grapples. Uzodinma (2017) identifies the constitutional mandate that the elite have to achieve in Nigeria: "...add value to the lives of the people of Nigeria... by creating employment opportunities for the people, improving on infrastructural facilities ... initiating policies that can grow the economy and enhancing the security of lives and property ... (p.15). Imagine, due to the elite's boundless wastefulness, Transparency International (TI) ranks Nigeria among the most corrupt domains in the world in its 2022 Corruption Perception Index (Punch Editorial Board, 2023). For Nigeria to make progress, we need to emphasize merit, competence, and performance to bring the best citizens in this country to do the job and hold them to account (Sanusi, 2020). In Islamabad, Imran Khan, a former Prime Minister serving a three-year jail term for fraud, has again been sentenced to another ten years in prison for revealing official secrets by a Pakistani court (The Associated Press, 2024). Similarly, in South Africa, ex-

president Jacob Zuma was sentenced to 15 months for disregarding a court order to testify at an inquiry into corruption during his tenure (Al Jazeera, 2022). There must be punishment for criminality. Nothing is normative about the theft of public funds. Therefore, Nigerians can no longer tolerate it.

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2022) reported that 33.3 percent of Nigerians are unemployed, therefore, predisposing Nigeria to a low standard of living, an increase in crime rate, low national income, and a high rate of dependency that discourages education, and leads to under-employment (Udeuhele et al., 2022). To avoid the unpleasant effects of unemployment, public policy should sustainably strengthen vocational training programs; encourage public-private partnerships beyond the customary sloganeering; invest responsibly in technology and innovation; promote entrepreneurship commitment; enhance accessible education; and establish networking platforms (Ariyo, 2023). The Federal Government lost nearly N797.8 billion to waivers and questionable concessions between 2011 and 2013. The reckless concessions that have had their toll on the economy did not have any impacts on the revenue-generating capacity of government agencies (Okonjo-Iweala, 2014). To address the inherent inequity in the Nigerian tax system so that unscrupulous foreign investors and local accomplices do not compromise the Nigerian tax system, individuals who independently struggle to survive in harsh economic circumstances should not be subject to indiscriminate taxes and levies. The collection and extortion of taxes/levies/charges by agencies of government from members of the public, without offering services that are commensurate to these numerous charges in their justification, is completely reckless and fraudulent (Gbemre, 2014).

In all parts of Nigeria, fuel price has risen intolerably while power outage has become the norm (Oxfam, 2017). Monetary and non-monetary palliatives should be instituted and equitably managed to provide short and long-term relief for vulnerable populations in the country. Products' adulteration has made an incredible proportion of Nigerians vulnerable to kidney failure. To this end, Obasanjo (2024) suggests an urgent legislative intervention to support people with kidney diseases in Nigeria as a temporary solution. To save more lives, he recommends that Nigeria should introduce pre-employment and insurance screening to bring in more individuals for early detection. The bulk of the non-oil exports of Nigeria are connected to agriculture, which contributed 19.63% to nominal GDP in the first quarter of 2023 (NBS, 2023). Many Nigerians who engage in agriculture have abandoned it because of insecurity. For agriculture to prevent food insecurity, the elite should guarantee public security. Nigeria needs to be rescued from the claws of its foreign-backed avaricious captors. (Jega, 2022). There should be no immunity for any public officeholder. Moreover, the judiciary should be holistically independent. The annual declaration of public officers' assets should be a mandatory official ritual (Faloore, 2023).

The prohibitive cost of governance in Nigeria is shameful (Soludo, 2013). As a result, public consensus on the subject favors a significant reduction in the cost of governance. Public policy should urgently upgrade the protection of schoolchildren against terrorism and create an obvious sense of security for Nigerian schoolchildren…to learn the values of counter-terrorism skills (Ayodele, 2019). By the present projection, in 25 years, Nigeria's population will be over 400 million. The fossil fuel that Nigeria relies on today as revenue may no longer be there. The public focus should be on the post-oil economy. Except the economy is realistically diversified, the source of food for 400 million people may become a spectacular issue. Nigeria needs to embark on value reorientation, otherwise, the country might become a failed state sooner than later (Falola, 2024)

Having recognized that the legacy of not having an integrated infrastructural master plan is poor public policy on infrastructure (Ayogu, 2019), policymakers should efficiently bridge that

gap. To prevent insecurity and infrastructural decay from scaring investors from Nigeria, Lemo (2021) suggested that public policy should make Nigeria recapture its rightful place that has already been taken over by Ghana, Egypt, and Kenya as more attractive destinations for foreign investors. Concerning infrastructural equipment, Ajibola (2020) reminded Nigeria that just as insecurity deters investment from hampering the future of business operations, infrastructural decay escalates the cost of production, affects competition, and erodes companies' feasibility. To redress these integrated disasters, Banjo (2021) advised that the elite in Nigeria need a paradigm shift in their attitude to nation-building to qualify as ideal role models for the younger citizens. Re-bordering the traditional placement of the elite in the social space can alter the perception of people about its objective and significance (Krauz-Lahav & Kemp, 2020). The elite project can be nonviolently reframed for wider social approval if the cooptation of meritocracy or egalitarianism is intellectualized for inclusion. This development is more so because "If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich." (Kennedy, 1961). It is in hoped that this will help Lamido's (2021) indivisibility theory to be cognizant of the norms of inclusivity and egalitarianism for sustainable national development.

Restructure, on its own, does not have the potency to address the systemic anomalies in Nigeria's system. The 'politics of turn-by-turn Nigeria' should not be discontinued because it cannot enable the escape of individuals from poverty (Olurode, 2022). The elite has weaponized religion for their selfish interests. While some people prefer to grow rice, and others to grow Sharia, then, both sides should be given the means to develop. Restructuring Nigeria will enable individuals to pursue their choices without let or hindrance (Soyinka, 2022). For Nigeria to be stable, progressive, and development-friendly, refinement of its current federal structure, and improvement or its restructuring is desirable (Adebanjo, 2022). A return of Nigeria to fiscal federalism can effectively strengthen the confederating units to address insecurity through the development of altruistic political initiatives to fix the dilapidated security and infrastructure architectures and even create new ones (Benjamin, 2013). Today, the rat race to develop efficiency to access global capital in a global economy where competitive investment advantage goes to safe environments for rewarding outcomes compels the government to pay more attention to security (Lemo, 2021). In light of this, Ajibola (2020) suggested that the government should intensify efforts, especially in the areas of insecurity and provision of electricity because they affect the cost of operation which is ultimately passed on to the consumers. The elite should speak up to the protracted security challenges that confront the country (Osinbajo, 2021). For inclusion, "Nigeria belongs to us all and no part of the country should be left in doubt about their place in this union on any basis whatsoever, ethnic, religious, language, region, culture or social standing" (Obasanjo, 2023).

Conclusion

In this article, we contend that the elite can be a positive instrument of development and public safety if their abundant resources are rightly channeled. To make this theoretical assumption resonate with the contextual realities, the article examines the formation of Nigeria's elite, the way the elite interaction threatens development and public safety in Nigeria, and suggests how the infrastructural thoughts of the elite of Nigeria could be redirected towards development and public safety. It adopts Vilfredo Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites to explain how the Nigerian project became a victim of the Nigerian elite who control the means of production, state apparatus, revenue allocation, sharing of the resources, dictate the rhythm of security, and infrastructural progress. Though the paper argues that the elite is to blame for the insecurity and infrastructural deficit in Nigeria, it suggests a paradigm shift that will enable the elite to use what Nigeria has to develop and secure the country. Furthermore, the article acknowledges

the responses of some elite members to the sanitization of the Nigerian polity against financial corruption and their abysmal failure in these contexts.

In light of available data, this article suggests that mass education should replace political egoism (*ojelu*) with altruism (*oselu*) in Nigeria for sustainable development and public safety. For security to herald infrastructural development in Nigeria, judicial independence-driven social justice is a sine qua non. Given empirical evidence in the literature, this article suggests that the cost of governance should be reduced to allow attention for other sectors; the country and its politics should be reformed to allow the inclusion of public-spirited individuals for participation; government business should be demystified such that no one runs any risk when the business of government is critically appraised; primordial interests should be precluded from the political space; recruitment into public offices should be by merit to banish nepotism from Nigeria; the national independent electoral commission should be holistically independent; terrorism negatively impacts agricultural production and complicates the rising inflation in Nigeria. Therefore, it should be crushed. The youth and women should be exposed to entrepreneurial empowerment to set the two vulnerable sub-populations free from multidimensional poverty. In response to the social demand approach, public education, health, social protection, and development should be suitably addressed. Leakages should be plugged to reduce the impact of corruption on development and public safety in Nigeria.

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Critical Review of *Medemer* from Ideological Perspectives

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Abstract

Medemer, both as a book and as an idea, is trapped between two extremes: admiration and rejection. Writers from both ends offer their thoughts, criticisms, and reviews of *Medemer*. The aim of this article is to analyze *Medemer* from an ideological perspective. Raising some political and policy questions about *Medemer*'s application is also the aim of this article. This article used a qualitative research approach and comparative and critical research methods. Secondary sources of data were used to compare *Medemer* with various political ideologies. Ideologically, *Medemer* meets the three criteria (critics of the present order, vision of the future society, and theory of change). *Medemer* is a "blended ideology" that combines concepts, principles, and ideas from liberalism, socialism, conservatism, and fascism. Furthermore, *Medemer* ideology attempted to combine concepts from opposing political ideologies and proposed it as a solution to Ethiopia's complex sociopolitical and economic problems. Despite the government's claim that *Medemer* is Ethiopia's redeemer, several political questions remain unanswered given the country's current situation. Therefore, the country's complicated sociopolitical and economic problems under the regime of the Prosperity Party challenged the applicability of *Medemer*. Is *Medemer* thus the sole (or perhaps the only) instrument, policy framework, ideology, and mechanism for resolving Ethiopia's multiple, dynamic, and complex socio-political problems? These remain a point of contention among academics and politicians.

Keywords: Blended Ideology, Ethiopia, Ideologies, *Medemer*

Introduction

Historically, Ethiopia passed through three types of political regimes based on their ideologies: imperialism, socialism, and the developmental state. The imperial government adopted the European nation-state model (Weldeyes, 2017). This regime ruled the country from the inception of so-called Modern Ethiopia until 1974. Imperialism's nation-building projects oppressed the entire community and failed to integrate multi-national identities into politics. Political discontent during the late 1960s and early 1970s because of national oppression resulted in widespread political opposition to the imperial regime, which resulted in the disposition and emergency of the military government of Derg (Horst, 2020; Aweke, 2021; Yusuf, 2019a & b).

The Derg regime attempted to adopt Russian socialist ideology until 1991 (Zimmermann-Steinhart and Bekele, 2012; Fentaw, 2011). The Derg aimed to create a totalitarian unitary socialist state and failed to integrate multi-national identity. The collision of ethno-nationalist groups brought down the socialist regime and instituted the developmental state as its ideology until 2018. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced multicultural identity as a political philosophy to resolve the national oppression thesis and problems of identity politics. But identity politics was used as an instrument for political mobilization (Gudina, 2011).

Currently, except Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), the government of Abiy dismantled EPRDF and changed it into Prosperity Party. The newly restructured party organization adopted its ideology, *Medemer*. As an idea, *Medemer* has its arguments. The main arguments of *Medemer* are its sources and the assumption that *Medemer* is the only mechanism for dealing with the country's multi-dimensional problems. According to the author, if we fail to apply *Medemer*, we will perish or rot. It further claimed that *Medemer* is a native philosophy derived from the country's history and natural law.

Paradoxically, however, as the author noted, Ethiopian history has limited historical and contemporary relevance, focusing on short-term protection and legitimacy. *Medemer* claimed, "Emperors in Ethiopian history were obsessed with resolving their immediate problems and failed to assure the country's prosperity" (p. 78). These appear to be the imperial apologist's expression. Hence, how could such a history be a source of *Medemer*? Furthermore, the author states, "Ethiopia is a developing country, and backward traditional heritage dominates the country, which is incompatible with the development of democracy" (p. 149). According to *Medemer*, the democratic norms and traditions outlined and explained are either negatively viewed or absent/poor in Ethiopia (p. 148-154). So, how could *Medemer* be derived from these conventional values? If that is the case, how does *Medemer* defend its current relevance?

The author claims that *Medemer*'s concept is the only way to pull the country back from the brink of turmoil and misery, poverty, and darkness. Nonetheless, whether *Medemer* is the right approach to handling the country's current difficulties is still contested. There is no proof that it fits the country's current multidimensional problems. As the author himself stated, various regimes tried to impose different ideologies without taking the political consciousness of the community into account (imperialism, socialism, the developmental state), and now it is *Medemer*'s turn. "If the author believes that Ethiopia should not be a laboratory where concepts are tested, I wonder why he wants to try *Medemer* Democracy on Ethiopia." Assefa (2019, no pagination) says. This forces the country into vicious circles of fragility, poverty, and chaos, which still degrades the country and makes it suffer from the devastation caused by political miscalculation and the armed conflict committed with regime change. The conflicts throughout the country and their accompanying consequences are indications of these (Human Rights Watch, 2021; International Rescue Committee, 2021; OCHA, 2021; UN, 2021; UNICEF, 2021; USAID, 2021).

Therefore, this article examined and analysed these and other *Medemer* arguments from an ideological perspective and in light of the country's current political situation. The article also attempted to pose some policy and political questions regarding the applicability of *Medemer* as a sole solution to the socio-political problems of the country.

Contending Arguments on *Medemer*

Medemer attracted numerous writers to provide their comments, criticisms, and reviews of the book based on their perspectives (Assefa, 2019; Linda, 2020; Desalegn, 2019; Mariam, 2019a, b). The above scholars and analysts provided constructive and critical reviews of the *Medemer* as a book and an idea. Scholars and elites have argued that *Medemer* is not just a book (Linda, 2020; United State Institute of Peace Panel, 2020; Mariam, 2019a & b). It is an ideology (a set of ideas), a political language, and a policy framework by which the government of the Prosperity Party rules the country. *Medemer* is a principle that governs the overall operation of government policies and functions (see United States Institute of Peace Panel, 2020).

Therefore, whether we like it or not, oppose it or support it, appraise it or depress it, select it or reject it, *Medemer* is an expression of political ideas. The argument of the author and his

government is that "*Medemer* is a philosophy, a way of life, an integrated set of ideas and thoughts applicable in every social, political, economic, and environmental setting and life" (see page 35). They call upon the universal applicability of *Medemer* (see speech made by Arega on the Panel of the United Nations Institute of Peace, 2020, Mariam, 2019a and b).

Some scholars, such as Mariam (2019a & b) and Linda (2020), consider *Medemer* as a solution to the persisting political, social, and economic problems of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the current conditions in various parts of the country show the escalation of the problems. Several international humanitarian organizations have indicated that Ethiopia is experiencing severe humanitarian crises. The conflict between the Federal government, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), as well as others that have arisen because of political tensions, has aggravated the crisis in the country (Human Right Watch, 2021; International Rescue Committee, 2021; OCHA, 2021; UN, 2021; UNICEF, 2021; USAID, 2021). So, why have the parties failed to overcome the political tension and friction with the so-called *Medemer* philosophy? Because of these circumstances, questions about the applicability of *Medemer* in the country have grown. Despite this, the government claim that *Medemer* is the only solution to every problem.

For instance, Mariam (20019a and b) provides an interpretive review of *Medemer* in two parts. He reviewed *Medemer* based on his personal reflection. He aimed to enhance the understanding of *Medemer*, particularly among English-speaking audiences. He also invited a critical review of the idea regarding its usefulness and applicability in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the reviewer admits that the review is an expository one. His review is not a conventional academic review. Therefore, this article attempts to conduct a scientific analysis of the idea in order to contribute to the academic discourse of *Medemer*.

Contrary to the above conception of *Medemer*, some scholars such as Assefa (2019) and Desalegn (2019) make a critical review and indicate that *Medemer* is not only increment but also indicates decrement and sometimes shows extinction or nullification (-2 + 2 = 0). Moreover, Desalegn (2019) provides a critical review of the applicability of *Medemer* in light of the political reality of the country. He concluded that *Medemer* is not appropriate for the current political situation of the country and recommended tolerance as an alternative solution for the country's political problems. In the words of Dinka (in providing a critical reflection on *Medemer* on a panel prepared by UNIP, 2020), considering the current situations in the country, concluded that, "*Medemer* is a hell for the ordinary citizen of Ethiopia".

The above conceptions indicate that there are controversies in both the definition and application of *Medemer* in Ethiopian political discourses. This indicates that *Medemer* is not only a book but also a political idea and political language. Individuals are approaching, using, and defining *Medemer* in different ways the author did not even conceive it. This is the nature of politics and political terminology, that no one approached and analysed political terminology with a complete dispassionate manner. For instance, Mariam (2019a) sees *Medemer* as the philosophical equivalent of open-source software such as Ubuntu, which can be used or modified as one sees fit. Moreover, Assefa (2019: no pagination) clearly shows how different individuals define *Medemer* differently and put as follows.

> Some say, Medemer means unity, togetherness, reconciliation, synergy, synthesis, consolidation, combination, or cooperation, but others say it is putting everyone in one melting pot to create homogeneous society out of heterogeneous society, unitary, elimination of identity and diversity by the means of aggregation, domination through combination or expansion, clustering, bundling, merging, or cannibalization.

Given the contradiction, *Medemer* is the motto of the Prosperity Party. For instance, one of the mottos of the Prosperity Party is that "*Medemer* is the way, prosperity is the end." It is an integral part of the Prosperity Party's political program and speeches. More directly, *Medemer* is the political language of the Prosperity Party. In politics, politicians use political language to get their audience to believe them. According to Heywood (2003), language serves as the primary communication tool in politics, whether spoken in gatherings, yelled at rallies, scrawled on posters and walls, or printed in books, pamphlets, and manifestos. Political language is primarily concerned with persuading people. It could also provide a basis that enables one to realize it, shaping their worldview and their attitude toward it. In politics, language is more than just a means of communication; it is also a means by which politicians manipulate and confuse political professionals, use it as a political weapon to express their propaganda, and place less emphasis on its precision (Heywood, 2003).

Moreover, George Orwell (1903–1951), as quoted in Jay et al. (2017:8), wrote, "political language could be used by politicians and their administration as instruments to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable." Numerous scholars, politicians, activists, artists, and some common non-professionals assume that *Medemer* is a political language of government.

Despite the contradiction, *Medemer* is the policy and political framework of the ruling party. The author, without preservation, as he is the Prime Minister of the country and a leader of the ruling party, assumes greatest responsibilities to resolve numerous complex socio-economic and politico-legal problems in the country. The author is in the right position to prepare his political, social, economic, and policy framework that he thought would be a solution to the existing problems of the country, as the author himself briefly stated on page V (paragraph 2) of the book. This does not mean that *Medemer* is a cure-all and the only instrument for the current problems of the country, free of criticism. Moreover, it is said that the government is not on the right track to resolving the country's social, political, and economic problems with the application of *Medemer*. Nevertheless, the author and his government recommended *Medemer* as a sole (perhaps the only) alternative to the country's problems. Though numerous elites, political analysts and activists, and scholars on its relevance and workability for the existing problems of the country criticize *Medemer*, the government still hopes and preaches that *Medemer* is the sole redeemer of Ethiopia from vanishing (Assefa, 2019 and Desalegn, 2019).

Therefore, the article aimed at synthesizing the ideas of *Medemer* from an ideological point of view and indicating the ideological root of *Medemer*. Moreover, the article attempted to generate some political and policy questions regarding the applicability of *Medemer* in the existing complex socio-political, and economic problems in Ethiopia's.

Methods and Materials

This article analyses *Medemer* from an ideological point of view and examines its applicability in the country's political context. This article uses a qualitative approach to make a critical analysis of *Medemer*. The *Medemer* book is a primary source of data for this article. To conduct a critical and comparative analysis, ideas that have an ideological nature from the book were selected using the purposive method. For comparison, appropriate political ideologies were selected using the purposive sampling method. The selected ideologies were used to demonstrate how *Medemer*'s arguments are rooted in the chosen ideologies. In indicating the linkage between *Medemer* and ideologies, the article applied a comparative analysis. For comparison, the four selected ideologies are liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and fascism. A critical method of data analysis was used to examine the argument of *Medemer*, posing some questions about its applicability in Ethiopia's political context.

Moreover, other secondary sources of data, such as books and articles written on ideological traditions, reviews made so far on *Medemer* by different scholars, articles, video files, and reports of *Medemer* and humanitarian institutions, were used as sources of data to substantiate and support arguments used in the analysis of data. In this article, the Amharic version of the *Medemer* book was used and translated with great care to prevent misinterpretation of the ideas presented in the book.

A brief Account of Political Ideologies

What is Political Ideology?

Everyone is a political thinker. We use political jargon in our everyday language, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The terms fascist, liberalist, conservative, feminist, and others are among the political ideologies used in our daily conversation. Even sometimes, we may commit mistakes in the interpretation and use of these terms. This is particularly so as political ideology is a highly slippery and contested political concept (Vincent, 2010; Heywood, 2019, 2003, and 2019; MacKenzie, 2003; Eatwell, 1993). French philosopher Antoine Distutt de Tracy first coined the term "ideology" in 1796. For de Tracy, it referred to a new" 'science of ideas," literally an "ideology." His aim was a scientific study of ideas (Heywood, 2021, 2019 & 2003; Vincent, 2010), whose aim is "to establish a solid and unquestionable method by which correct ideas could be scientifically identified to foster the use of reason in the governance of human affairs for the betterment of society as a whole" (MacKenzie, 2003: 3).

De Tracy hoped that objective identification of the origins of ideas would become possible and that ideology would be given the same status as biology and zoology (Vincent, 2010; Heywood, 2019; MacKenzie, 2003; Eatwell, 1993). "Despite this high expectation, the original meaning of the term has had little impact on later usage of ideology" (Heywood, 2019; 2003: 6; 2002). This means that, contrary to what de Tracy claims, negative and pejorative interpretations quickly emerged, and until the 1960s, thinkers saw ideology as a political weapon to discredit competing or rival political ideas. Nonetheless, such negative interpretations of ideology led to the term's limited use, as it excluded some political doctrines from its scope (Vincent, 2010; Heywood, 2019; 2003, 2002).

However, the modern use of ideology is substantially changed and the positive meaning of ideology evolved. For instance, Heywood (2003: 10 & 2002) states that later on "the term ideology has gained a wider currency through being refashioned according to the needs of conventional social and political analysis." This has established ideology as a neutral and objective concept, the political baggage once attached to it having been removed." An inclusive definition of "ideology" (one that applies to all political traditions) must therefore be neutral: it must reject the notion that ideologies are "good" or "bad", true or false, or liberating or oppressive. This is a feature of the modern and scientific meaning of ideology in social science. Hence, this modern meaning treats ideology as an action-oriented belief system, an interrelated set of ideas that in some way guides or inspires political action. The purposes and roles of this coherent set of political ideas are to preserve, modify, or overthrow the existing system of power (Heywood, 2019; 2003; 2002; MacKenzie, 2003; Eatwell, 1993). Heywood (2021: 8 & 2019: 74) put that "All ideologies (1) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a 'world-view', (2) provide a model of the desired future, a vision of the Good Society, and (3) outline how political change can and should be brought about." The following figure shows characteristics of political ideology.



Figure 1: The Features of Ideology. Source: Hewood (2021: 8)

Given that the definition of ideology as a coherent set of idea, it at the same time, might lack clear shape and internal consistence as they are not hermetically sealed thought. Hence, ideologies are typically fluid set of ideas that make them to overlap with one another, which leads to emergence of hybrid ideological forms. Though the definition of political ideology is still contested and controversial in political analysis (Vincent, 2010; Heywood, 2019, 2003 & 2002; MacKenzie, 2003), "ideology must possess certain set of attributes, which constitute overt and implicit empirical and normative view about human nature, the process of history and socio-political structure" (Eatwell, 1993: 7).

Therefore, in this article, the modern definition of ideology, which is more positive, is used. To support a successful completion of this article, it deemed necessary to put a brief review of some major political ideologies such as Liberalism, Conservatism, socialism and Fascism. Here, one could identify the core characterizations or values of these Ideologies. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these ideologies are blindly rejecting one another. This is because, no ideology is an entire island in its own as ideologies are sharing different values from one another. The position and importance given to different values vary from one ideology to the other. In this manner, Alexander (2014:3) and Heywood (2021: 9) cited the work of Freeden (1996) which classifies political concepts that applied in ideologies as core, adjacent and periphery, states, "The ideologies share many core, adjacent and peripheral concepts, but they arrange and order them in different ways."

Liberalism

With the dismantling of feudalism and the development of a capitalist society, liberalism emerged (Eccleshall, 2003; Heywood, 2021, 2003, and 2002). The rise of liberalism was linked to the rise of industrial capitalism in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, which spread later to other European countries and North America. Classical liberalism and social democratic liberalism are examples of liberalism (Heywood, 2021, 2003, and 2002; Walker and Rousseau, 2016; Vincent, 2010).

The basic themes of liberalism, according to Harrison and Boyd (2003: 202), are "the individual and his or her rights; an optimistic view of human nature; a belief in progress; a

commitment to freedom; limited government, the economy, and liberalism; and a commitment to internationalism." Bellamy (1993) identified three important components of liberalism: philosophical (liberty, equality, individuality, and rationality); social (tolerance and a free-market economy); and political (combining the two).

Liberalism has common elements that characterize it (Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, and 2002). "It is characterized by a powerful moral thrust that is embedded in a commitment to a distinctive set of values and beliefs, which constitute individualism, freedom, reason, justice, consent, constitutionalism, tolerance, and diversity" (ibid., 2021: 22–30, 2003: 22–31, and 2002: 43–44). Generally, liberalism envisioned the creation of a society that protected individual interests (Heywood, 2021).

Conservatism

Conservatism developed as an ideology in response to the French Revolution and the Western ideal of liberal democracy (O'Sullivan, 1993; Heywood, 2021, 20219, 2003, and 2002; Eccleshall, 2003). It arose as a reaction against the sweeping economic, social, and political changes brought by the French revolution, and the pressure rose with the growth of liberalism, socialism, and nationalism (Alexander, 2014; Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, and 2002). According to Heywood (2003: 55; 2002: 46), "Conservatism harked back to the ancient regime and stood in defence of an increasingly embattled traditional social order." Alexander (2014: 11) said that "the conservative, in general, distrusts argument because argument simplifies what should not be simplified." This is why conservatism is known for what it opposes (Heywood, 2003, 2002).

Conservatism advocates a pessimistic view of the human condition. According to conservatism, the world has an abstract structure that is beyond the limited human capacity to conceive it (Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, and 2002; O'Sullivan, 1993). O'Sullivan (1993) stated that conservatism uses political realism to develop a theory of limits and a doctrine of a quest for limits. The conservative movement is categorized into radical reformist types based on its attitude toward change (Eccleshall, 2003; Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, and 2002; O'Sullivan, 1993). O'Sullivan (1993) has identified three types of conservatism: the reactionary school, the revolutionary school, and the moderate school. Heywood (2020, 2019, 2003, and 2002) also indicated the deep division in conservative ideology and identified different forms of conservatism as authoritarian, pragmatic, libertarian, social democratic, and new right conservatism. However, all conservatism shares a common theme: the desire to conserve. Heywood (2020, 2019, 2003, and 2002) identified some elements of conservatism as tradition, human imperfection, an organic society, hierarchy, authority, and property.

Socialism

Socialism arose as a reaction against the conditions created by western industrial capitalism. It opposes a liberal market society and originally had a hostile relationship with capitalism. Socialism aims to abolish the capitalist economy and replace it with a socialist-type society characterized by common ownership. Socialism, like other ideologies, ranges from the most radical (revolutionary) to the most revisionist. The most radical form of socialism is revolutionary socialism, which is anti-capitalism and aims to revolutionize the capitalist regime. The revisionist reformist socialism sees the gradual transformation and improvement of the life of the working class and the integration of working-class people into industrial society (Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, & 2002; Vincent, 2010).

Common humanity is the core of socialism. It views a human being as a social creature. Unlike liberalism, socialism assumes that communities shape individual life. Individual behaviour is the function of social and communal factors. Therefore, socialism prefers cooperation to competition (Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, 2002). The central theme of socialism is that no man is an island. Elements of socialism are community, cooperation, fraternity, social equality, need, social class, and common ownership (ibid.).

Fascism

Given the extreme complexity and ambiguity in the explanation and definition of fascism, different scholars such as Vincent (2010), Griffin (2008), Eatwell (2013), and Wilford (2003) provide their views regarding the idea of fascism. According to Eatwell (1993), some historians and social scientists consider fascism a nihilistic form of dictatorship with extreme nationalism that lacks a set of coherent ideas and purposes. Fascism derives from the bundle of rods that show authority, strength, and unity (Harrison and Boyd, 2003; Vincent, 2010).

In Eatwell (2013), Griffin (2007) held that "fascism appealed to people suffering from a sense-making crisis, a conclusion largely deduced from intellectuals' comments about decadence and/or the isolation of the masses rather than the empirical study of public opinion." This is to say that fascism relied heavily on political myths rather than political realities. It is argued that fascism stresses the quest for national rebirth as the mobilizing myth, with the central notion of the creation of an organically united national community (Griffin, 2008). Eatwell (2013) identified three important themes of fascism: the "new man," "holistic nationalism," and "a new third-way state." Moreover, Wilford (2003: 122) stated that "while celebrating those aspects of the re-imagined past that fascist thinker considered inspiring, it also rejected other traditions and ideas that encumbered its primary mission: that of national redemption." In this manner, fascism aimed at national renewal and rebirth.

Generally, fascism argued that modern society would face moral and cultural decadence, believing in the myths of a glorious past, national regeneration, and a struggle for dominance. Hence, fascism is a kind of palingenetic ultra-nationalism (Heywood, 2021, 2019; Griffin, 2012, and 2008).

Medemer in the Eyes of Ideologies

The main issue addressed in this part is indicating the linkage between *Medemer* and different ideological traditions. Therefore, this part attempted to answer the question: is *Medemer* a new philosophy or a fusion of different political ideologies. Just by looking at the word "*Medemer*" and based on its arguments, one could identify the ideological roots of *Medemer*. Though the author argued that *Medemer* is an endogenous philosophy, various ideologies provided the root idea and explanation of *Medemer* in detail. In conservative ideology, for example, it is clear that organicism is one of the principles explaining organic society (Heywood, 2021, 2003). However, it is not possible to criticize the internal aspects of a political idea by looking at a single term or word. Therefore, to make the essence of *Medemer* clear from a variety of ideological perspectives, it is necessary to look at some of its arguments in line with ideological traditions. In this section, some *Medemer* ideas are taken and compared to various ideologies.

Medemer and Ideologies

Is *Medemer* an ideology? As per the characteristics of ideology, it is possible to see the ideological nature of *Medemer*. The figure suggests that, for an idea to be an ideology, it needs to fulfil the

three characteristics of ideology. These constitute criticism of the existing order, a vision for the future of society, and a theory of change. To be categorized as an ideology, ideas should (1) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a "world-view," (2) provide a model of the desired future, a vision of the good society, and (3) outline how political change can and should be brought about (Heywood, 2021: 8, 2019: 74, 2003, 2002; MacKenzie, 2003; Eatwell, 1993).

Is *Medemer* fulfilling these three pillars? Yes, it fulfils the three pillars. First, *Medemer* criticizes the two opposing ideologies (liberalism and socialism). It also criticizes the ideologies previously tried in Ethiopia, including the developmental state, and indicates the failures of these ideologies when taking the educational status and living standards of the Ethiopian community into account (see pages 13–34). These indicate criticisms of the existing order. Second, *Medemer* envisioned the creation of Ethiopian democracy by building free, neutral, and strong institutions, state unity, citizen dignity, and prosperity. This represents *Medemer*'s vision of a good society. Third, *Medemer*'s theory of change emphasizes evolutionary or incremental change rather than revolutionary or radical change (pages 36–43). Therefore, *Medemer* could be justified as an ideology.

In the book of *Medemer*, the author clearly states that the idea of *Medemer* has gone through various stages of development with him and become a redeemer of Ethiopia (pp. II–V). This statement is a reflection of different political ideologies, but the author seems to think that the idea is his own. It is clear and to be hoped that the author of this book realizes that many different political ideologies explain and analyse the idea of *Medemer*. To understand the idea of *Medemer*, one can look at different political ideologies. Even though the author made no citation or quotation, the concept of the *Medemer* is considered a principle in different political ideologies.

The following table tries to show the linkage of the concepts of *Medemer* in different ideologies by taking different principles or elements of some major political ideologies. Then an attempt is made to indicate how the idea of *Medemer* is blended and synthesized in these ideologies. In the table, the page number on which each principle is presented in the book is provided.

Table 1: *Medemer* in Different Political Ideologies

S. No	Ideologies	Principles	Meaning of the principle	In Medemer
	Liberalism	Freedom	Condition in which people can develop their skills and talents and fulfill their potential.	Page 10, 91-96, 103
		Reason	The ability of an individual to make wise judgments and their capacity to solve their difference	Page 12, 103
	Conservatism	Organicism	The whole is greater than the sum of its part	Page 36-41 (3.1 part)
		Tradition	The accumulated wisdom of the past	Page VII, 10 & 36-41 (3.1 part)
		Human imperfection	Human beings are limited, dependent, and security-seeking creatures	Page 36-41 (3.1 part)
		Pragmatism	action should be shaped by practical circumstances and practical goals, that is, by what works	Page 60-61

S. No	Ideologies	Principles	Meaning of the principle	In Medemer
	Socialism	Community	Human being cannot stand on its own. Human identity is defined by social interaction	Page 36-41 (3.1 part)
		Fraternity	Human beings share a common humanity. Brotherhood-based bondage	Page IV, 37, 91-96
		Cooperation		Page 108, 143
	Fascism	Nation in Crisis	Claim that the nation has entered a dangerous age of mediocrity, weakness and decline, and cultural and moral decadence	Page IV, 41, 60, 236,
		The myth of National Renewal/Rebirth	Through their timely action, fascist can save the nation from such a decline Fascism was considered as "palengenetic ultra-nationalism"	Page . II -V; 41; 236

Note: (Abiy, 2019; Fascism, 2015; Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003 & 2002; Wilford, 2003; Vincent, 2010; O'Sullivan, 1993)

The above table indicated that the idea of *Medemer* is embedded in different political ideologies. Therefore, it is questionable whether the idea of *Medemer* is the homegrown philosophy. How *Medemer* linked to the ideology of Liberalism, Conservatives, and Socialism and fascism is the major question of this article. The aim of the following sub-headings is to answer this question.

Medemer and Fascism

As stated in the book, the argument that inspired the author to recommend *Medemer* to Ethiopia is to save the country from vanishing. Page IV reads as follows: "Ethiopia is a symbol of backwardness and poverty; its land is a land of war and blood; its people are a model of migration; our unwillingness and lack of cooperation have led the country to a vicious cycle of misery and chaos." This expression is analogous with fascism's "principle of the nation in crisis," which states that the nation will enter a profound crisis and decline. The book also stated that this would push the country to the brink of disaster, that the time to save the country from failure is now, and that the only way out is to use *Medemer*'s idea. This article exemplifies the fascist myth of national renewal or rebirth, palingenetic ultra-nationalism, which aims to create a new man after decadence (Griffin, 2012; Eatwell, 1993).Moreover; *Medemer* emphasizes an imaginary view of the past historical greatness and the glorious past of Ethiopia (page 236). This is rooted in what Heywood (2004) terms «reclaiming the past,» which aims at backward-looking change reflecting dissatisfaction with the present and depends on the idealized definition of history.

Again, on page 41, in the fourth paragraph, the author stated that if we failed to use *Medemer*, we would decay and perish. Moreover, although the author did not cite the fascist ideology, the expressions make it somewhat similar to the fascist ideology. This does not mean that *Medemer* is identical to fascist ideology, but it does mean that *Medemer* has some elements of fascist ideology. The expression fulfils at least two principles of fascism (the idea of a nation in crisis, decline, or decadence, and the myth of national renewal, national rebirth, or reclaiming the past).

In general, fascism believes that the state will enter a deep social, economic, and political crisis and lose its greatness. Therefore, fascist ideology will save the state from these deep-rooted problems (Heywood, 2021, 2020, 2003; Griffin, 2012). In a similar vein, *Medemer* assumed that his idea was what would bring Ethiopia out of the cycle of misery and chaos (page IV, 3rd paragraph; page 60, 3rd paragraph). More importantly, *Medemer*, like fascism, emerges out of political instability, social crisis, and economic crisis, which is a situation that leads to the revival of fascism and the emergence of neo-fascism in Europe (Heywood, 2003). The revolution exploded throughout the

country, aided by the EPRDF's weak democracy, resulting in the breakdown of the EPRDF and the emergence of the Prosperity Party. Another important characterization of *Medemer* that is linked to the nature of fascism is the aspiration for elitism and leadership, as both call for strong elite leadership. Additionally, *Medemer* provides no room for opposition or alternative ideas. As indicated under the explanation of the stage or level of *Medemer* based on the motivation and commitment of individuals in the *Medemer* process, individuals are categorized as passers-by, gusts, and residents.

Given the incorporation of fascist components, *Medemer* is substantially different from fascist ideology in that it calls for the development and application of democratic principles. Furthermore, unlike fascism, *Medemer* provides classification based on an individual's initiative and commitment to the *Medemer* idea, and it emphasizes the potential capacity of the human being as a whole without referring to biological characteristics. Fascism, on the other hand, divides people into three categories based on race (biological characteristics): creators of culture, bearers of culture, and destroyers of culture (Heywood, 2021, and 2003). However, *Medemer* believes that every human being has the inherent capacity to determine his or her fate. Moreover, *Medemer* explores the interconnectedness and contradictions of interests, which are the expression of the ideological domains of socialism and liberalism in different literature and are primarily hostile to fascism's ideology. Compromise is another point of departure between *Medemer* and fascism. In *Medemer*'s view, compromise is one of the instruments by which *Medemer* is fulfilled (page 53), while fascism considers compromising a weakness.

Medemer and Conservatism

The author's conclusion is based on the critique of different ideologies adopted by different regimes in the country. This expression is rooted in conservatism and fascist ideology. Proof of this is the idea expressed on page VII, which states that the best solution to the country's long-standing problems is to nurture the good values that have accumulated in the country for centuries. This point is similar to tradition, a principle of conservative ideology that calls upon the superiority of the accumulated wisdom, tradition, institutions, and norms (Wilford, 2003; fascism, 2015; Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, and 2002).

Medemer contended that numerous claimants want to implement various ideologies in the country, including liberalism, social democracy, and ethnic-based nationalism, and some want to implement Leninist-Marxist ideology and the developmental state. Nevertheless, from *Medemer*'s point of view, it is impossible to apply these ideologies given the generalization that the ideologies are tailor-made in advanced countries, where the political consciousness is very different from the Ethiopian people. The major thesis of *Medemer* here is that it is impossible to implement these western ideologies because Ethiopians lack political consciousness, having been far enough from education for a long time and still lingering with their daily lives (page 34). In other words, the Ethiopian people are sufficiently removed from the country>s politics, and the country>s political culture is unrelated to the political cultures of Western countries. This expression indicates that *Medemer* considers the masses to be apathetic. Nonetheless, the author did not specify which level of political consciousness or culture *Medemer* was aiming for. This by itself represents the conservative idea of limited human nature.

Moreover, in the book, from pages 36 to 41, the author states that individuals are unable to stand alone. People cannot live alone and need cooperation and assistance to protect their sovereignty. In conservative ideology, under the elements of human imperfection and organic society, it is stated that human beings are not self-reliant. The book also states that humans

are security-seeking creatures who need help and cooperation with others to protect themselves from danger. Such an idea is also expressed in the conservative ideology under the principle of human imperfection. According to this principle of conservatism, "human beings are thought to be psychologically limited and dependent creatures." "In the view of conservatives, people fear isolation and instability" (Heywood, 2003). In this manner, *Medemer* shares the elements of conservative ideology.

Furthermore, *Medemer* provides pragmatic values (see pages 60–61). It calls for the application of pragmatic policies, programs, and ideologies that derive from the existing situation of the country. In addition, *Medemer* concluded that, as a pragmatic idea, aimed at the generation of ideas that could provide a balanced and sustainable solution for the complex and existing problems of the country. Pragmatism is one of the elements of conservatism, which states that practical circumstances and practical goals should shape action, that is, by "what works" (Heywood, 2021: 69; 2019: 86; 2002: 47). Like conservatism, *Medemer* emphasizes practical experiences with the aim of resolving the complex, realistic, and practical problems of the country. The above explanation is particularly expressed under «paternalistic conservatism» (Heywood, 2021).

Nevertheless, unlike conservatism, which is mostly apathetic toward change, *Medemer* is seeking change in the political, economic, and social spheres of the community. «Change and transformation» is a rote chant of the political elites of the government of the prosperity party.

Medemer, Socialism and Liberalism

As a principle, *Medemer* emphasizes the balance between competition and cooperation. Therefore, socialism and liberalism are commonly treated here. The author conceived that cooperation and competition as the nature of social life. This type of expression is rooted partly in socialism (cooperation), partly in liberalism (competition), and partly in conservative (human imperfection and organic society) ideologies. This section synthesizes the author's arguments in terms of both socialism and liberalism. According to *Medemer*, everything is created from a collection of small parts, which indicates the interaction of social fabrics such as family, neighbourhood, society, and countries, which have the characteristics of socialism.

In creating a balance between cooperation and competition (between liberalism and socialism), the author emphasizes how people are interacting with their surrounding environment (the idea of environmentalism) to build larger and newer systems (i.e., a synthesis triad of the dialectical approach). Therefore, *Medemer*, to achieve the goal of balancing between competition (liberalism) and cooperation (socialism), brought different principles from the ideological traditions of liberalism, socialism, conservatism, fascism, and environmentalism, at least. Moreover, the author uses system theory and the dialectical method with the aim of creating a system that is larger, newer, and different from the parts that create the whole.

More specifically, in the idea of *Medemer* (page 12), «human beings have a natural tendency to competition (liberalism) and cooperation (socialism), and conflict (fascism) and peace (conservatism) are in the hands of the individual itself,» this indicated the freedom aspect of liberalism. Moreover, in the *Medemer* perspective, the human being has the capacity to use these tendencies to build and strengthen the behaviour it wants, which is rooted in the liberal principles of reason and rationality. Like liberalism, *Medemer* has a positive view of human intellect and capacity. However, according to *Medemer*, a human being could use their intellect and capacity for both good and bad purposes. Moreover, according to *Medemer*, human beings have free choice and the capacity to determine their fate (page 103). Furthermore, *Medemer* is an idea that influences social, economic, political, and all individual and social aspects of life and style (page 35).

Similarly, the author of the *Medemer* concludes that for the effective utilization of human capacity for the fulfilment of human desire, cooperation (i.e., the *Medemer*) is required. As stated on page 108 of the book, *Medemer*, like socialism, places greater emphasis on the accumulation of capacity (cooperation of efforts). Moreover, the political speeches of the members of the Prosperity Party indicated that *Medemer* is all about creating a brotherhood. Such discourse is an integral part of socialism under the elements and principles of fraternity and community, which stress the human being's capacity as a social creature. Socialism emphasized the capacity, willingness, and ability of human beings to act collectively in pursuing common goals (Heywood, 2021, 2019, 2003, and 2002). Despite the claim of a balance between competition and cooperation, *Medemer* prefers cooperation to competition (page 143, last paragraph).

Concluding Remark

The above interpretation indicated how *Medemer* brought different elements from some major ideological traditions and questioned the applicability of *Medemer*'s ideology. Ideologically, *Medemer* comprises elements of various political ideologies. Therefore, ideologically viewed, *Medemer* could be seen as a "blended ideology": an ideology that brought diverse ideas, principles, and thought from a number of ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, conservatism, and fascism (though the author made neither a quote nor a citation in the book). Hence, it is not an exaggeration or simplification to say that *Medemer* is a blended ideology. Moreover, *Medemer* brought multiple concepts, propositions, and ideas from different theories and models (System Theory, Incremental Model, Elite Theory, and Dialectical Method), to name a few.

Based on the preceding explanation of *Medemer*, speeches by government officials and elites, and reviews of the book by various scholars, the following *Medemer* elements could be identified. The book's author indicated and presented the following ideological elements while addressing various issues. The elements derived from various ideologies combine to form a single element, and the book uses pairs of opposing elements.

- Brotherhood (a watchword of the elites of the ruling party),
- Competition & Cooperation,
- Law of nature,
- Nation in Crisis and National Renewal,
- Organic society,
- Human potential capacity, human flaws, and
- Tradition and Reform
- Pragmatism

Medemer, in general, is a synthesis of ideas that brought together and integrated concepts and thoughts from a variety of major political ideologies and other theories. The way the author links these different ideological and theoretical concepts makes *Medemer* a blended ideology. Furthermore, the author employs system theory (pages 36–41) and the incremental model (pages 41–43, part 3.2) in synthesizing the concepts derived from the aforementioned ideologies. Moreover, the author emphasizes the importance of the interaction of human beings with their surrounding environment in maintaining the balance between competition and cooperation, which is rooted in the ideology of environmentalism or ecologism. This indicates that *Medemer* uses the dialectical method to synthesize competing elements of political ideologies and political thought to create a larger and different system.

Hence, from an ideological point of view, *Medemer* has drawn its core principles from different ideologies. However, it lacks its own core principles. The reason for this is the failure of *Medemer* to integrate important ideas from the existing ingenious knowledge that was practiced in Ethiopia. Despite the claim that *Medemer* is an indigenous or homegrown philosophy, it does not integrate concepts from indigenous knowledge and practices. Therefore, *Medemer*, as an ideology, drew its core and periphery from other ideological traditions and other theories.

As a result, *Medemer* could be the best example of the conclusion that an ideology is not an island in itself. *Medemer* brought more core and periphery values from different ideological traditions than any other ideology, making it one of the ideologies that justify how ideologies share their core and periphery with other ideologies.

As an ideology, therefore, is *Medemer* the sole and only solution for the current multi-dimensional problem of the country? Unquestionably, *Medemer* could be a primary solution for economic problems and problems with the quantitative nature of the country. Political, social, and cultural (particularly the quest for identity) problems are not as straightforward as economic problems that could easily be quantified. The additive tendencies of socio-political problems of the country are problematic on their own, let alone the problems. Hence, in reality, there is no clarity regarding the question of how the idea of *Medemer* could reconcile two or more opposing complex human interests (the quest for identity in Ethiopia, for example). In the current context of the country, how can the contradiction between the quest for multi-nationalism and mono-nationalism be reconciled with the application of *Medemer*? How can *Medemer* be a solution to the country's ethnic conflict? These problems have resurfaced in the country's politics and are still unresolved (the conflicts in the country are the result of the contestation over identity).

Now it is important to raise critical questions about how *Medemer* is different from other ideologies, considering the political consciousness of Ethiopians as claimed in *Medemer*. Is *Medemer* less difficult and less complex than other ideologies? Which domestic knowledge and practices of Ethiopian people were brought into the *Medemer* idea to make *Medemer* a homegrown or domestic philosophy and make it easy for ordinary citizens? How could the political consciousness of the community (as prescribed in *Medemer*) go hand in hand with the arguments and politics of *Medemer*? Why does the government fail to entertain the current political friction and diplomatic problems with the application of *Medemer*? Let alone ordinary citizens, why is the applicability of *Medemer* debatable among the political elites of the country?

These pressing political and policy questions remained unanswered by *Medemer* and questioned its applicability in the country's socio-political and cultural conditions. For instance, there is no attempt to build a government system by using indigenous knowledge that has been practiced for a long time in numerous communities in Ethiopia. Considering the book's claim about Ethiopians' political consciousness, *Medemer* is is not a straightforward ideology, is not as easy as claimed, and is not less complex than other political ideologies. On top of this, rather than claiming that it is homegrown, indigenous knowledge is not well integrated into *Medemer*. Moreover, it is indeterminate which type of political consciousness (political culture: parochial, subject, or participatory) *Medemer* uses. Therefore, it is desirable to ask whether *Medemer* is a sole (perhaps the only) and universal instrument, policy framework, ideology, and mechanism for resolving the multiple, dynamic, and complex socio-political problems of Ethiopia. Any interested individual could conduct a further critical investigation or review of *Medemer* to answer the above political and policy questions and add value to the political and academic dialogue of the country.

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The Spiralling of Corporate Corruption and the Plummeting of Corporate Governance and Ethical Leadership in African Institutions

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Abstract

Generally, several factors around the corporate world influence different nations technologically, socially, economically, and politically. Specifically, this paper focuses on the African continent's politics concerning corporate corruption, corporate governance, and ethical leadership. This study aims to critically reflect on and evaluate the significance of curbing and combating corruption, promoting governance and ethics in Africa, and furthering and practising those principles. It employed a case study research design with a random sampling approach. Secondary data was analysed using content analysis, incorporating a critical assessment of relevant in-depth literature reviews to attain the study objective. The study results revealed that: Unethical leaders succumb to corruption, causing Africa's corruption to spiral out of control. Ethical leaders, on the other hand, resist corruption; African leaders and authorities should take steps to fight corruption through ethics and governance; African corporations have become increasingly corrupt; corporate governance and ethical leadership have declined in Africa; African politicians have uncurbed power to advance their private gains, and finally, African leaders need to change their mindsets and cultures to achieve economic growth. This study emphasises and reiterates the importance of dealing effectively with corporate corruption and advancing governance and ethics to benefit the African population and the continent. It further provides a broad and deeper understanding of corruption, ethics, and governance. The conceptual, strategic model provided by this study may be selected and used by African leaders, authorities, boards of directors, shareholders, and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), as a tool to address corruption in African organisations and institutions.

Keywords: Africa, Corporate Corruption, Corporate Governance, Ethical Leadership, Political Effects

Introduction

In many parts of the world, corporate corruption has been a constant for centuries. Yet it triggers concerns that the situation has deteriorated under post-independence African nations at the expense of corporate governance and ethical leadership on this continent. Resultantly, the legacy of African colonialism is contributing to corporate challenges and organisational stagnation (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2020). Moreover, this phenomenon disadvantages and fuels further socio-economic challenges facing marginalised Africans. According to Xue et al., (2022), corporate corruption is any immoral, illegitimate, and pre-planned misconduct committed by employees of an organisation for personal benefit who have opposite values to those of their employer. For this reason, many employers match their recruitment practices to their organisational culture to determine whether they are compatible with their current staff and future potential employees (Jiao, 2021). In response, corporate governance was established

and developed to curb malicious employees and protect the interests of investors, entrepreneurs, shareholders, organisations, and state institutions (Yusoff, Ahman & Darus, 2019).

Nonetheless, corrupt practices in the corporate world have been around for a long time. Regrettably, they persist and continue to be prevalent. These challenges stem from poor corporate governance in organisations, which are then affected by intense economic crises with adverse ramifications on their survival and sustainability (Al Amosh & Khatib, 2021; Hazaea et al., 2021). Several malpractices, including unethical leadership, corporate corruption, and poor corporate governance, led to the global financial crisis, especially in the Middle East nations (Ahmed et al., 2020). In other parts of the world, such traditions are linked and result in financial losses associated with unethical leadership and inadequate corporate governance. Volkswagen, for example, was involved in an emissions scandal because it submitted inaccurate and misleading information to protect and preserve its sustainability reputation and status for monetary gain (Kamarudin, Ariff & Ismail, 2021). As a result, the organisation forked out a staggering amount of US$63 billion because of this action (Jung & Sharon, 2019). In retrospect, the early 2000s saw significant corporate misconduct involving large companies such as WorldCom and Enron in the United States; meanwhile, scandals surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic are rife today (Sivaprasad & Mathew, 2021).

The African nations, however, are not immune and exempt from these undesirable and unethical corporate issues. It is disheartening that these misconducts and malpractices threaten foreign direct investment into the African continent (Agoba et al., 2020). Mlambo (2019) states that deceit and ethics-free corporate practices whereby public funds are being misused and mismanaged for personal gain have become rampant and uncontrollable in most African public sectors, resulting in appalling and insufficient service delivery for the poor. Among the scandals in South Africa involved nepotism, payments to ghost and deceased employees, fraudulent claims, and overpayments from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), Covid-19 relief schemes that involved public officials and local politicians, and tenders awarded inequitably, resulting in irregular expenditures (Sebake & Mudau, 2020). In Zimbabwe, misappropriation, and embezzlement of taxpayers' money by public officials and the state are impeding both the countries and its citizens' development because most projects lack the funding required to execute essential and basic needs (Chigudu, 2020). A severe financial crisis took place in the banking industry in Uganda, resulting in their bankruptcy and insolvency due to corporate misbehaviour, gross financial mismanagement, and negligence (Mathuva & Nyangu, 2021). In Ghana, Avortri and Agbanyo (2020) found that the board of directors and top management engaged in financial misconduct by misrepresenting bank financial statements to avoid being exposed to misusing bank funds and defrauding the bank.

Corporate Governance in Africa in Context

The term corporate governance encompasses the framework of regulations, customs, and procedures through which a corporation is steered and supervised (Chigudu, 2020). It was initially articulated in the 1930s by American scholars Bailey and Means (Chen, 2024), who were pioneers in analysing the dynamics between shareholders and management, as well as the organisational and managerial structures of corporations. Their groundbreaking research laid the groundwork for corporate governance standards and has since evolved into a pivotal area of inquiry within the realm of business and management. On the other hand, Professor Weian Li is widely recognised for his pioneering work in broadening the scope of corporate governance from internal to external governance (Zhou, 2021). Meanwhile, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2020) argue

that the historical path of African colonialism has significantly influenced the current corporate governance terrain, leading to organisational inertia and hindering advancement in the region.

In the context of corporate corruption, the absence of proper incentives in a corporate environment can pave the way for corruption to proliferate in corporate affairs (Al-Faryan, 2024). Thus, analysing the substantial costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control is increasingly essential, particularly in the context of frequent and recurring corruption (Wawrosz, 2022). According to Al-Faryan and Shil (2023), the lack of effective governance heightens the risk of corruption, especially in the lack of a system of accountability and transparency. Corruption is a pervasive issue deeply entrenched in many countries worldwide. Consequently, these nations encounter significant hurdles in attaining economic development, struggle to establish democratic governance, and often grapple with compromised social justice and the rule of law (Al-Faryan & Shil, 2023).

In terms of ethical leadership, its failures during the initial years of the twenty-first century have heightened awareness about the pivotal significance of ethical leadership (Amory et al., 2024). In light of this avowal, Shiundu (2024) emphasised the significance of ethical leadership, stressing the need for leaders to adhere to ethical principles, make decisions based on ethical considerations, and build robust relationships. According to this scholar, ethical leaders exhibit traits such as honesty, fairness, responsibility, concern for others, and awareness of societal implications. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the perception of ethical leadership may be shaped by various contextual elements (Shiundu, 2024).

The problem is the increasing prevalence of corporate scandals in African organisations, with the perpetrators and other involved parties facing minimal consequences. Thus, there is uncertainty and concern about the effectiveness of the strategies and tools employed by African authorities to combat and diminish this phenomenon.

The current body of scholarly work has thoroughly examined corporate governance, corruption, and ethical leadership across different contexts. However, there is a noticeable gap in the literature on these factors within the political sphere. As a result, this research study addresses this unexplored area. Accordingly, it strives to expand on the existing body of knowledge, distinguishing itself as a pioneering effort by undertaking this initiative, thereby contributing significant value to the field. Therefore, this study is unique, emphasising its high degree of novelty, and significantly enhancing its overall originality.

As a result, this study is driven and motivated by identifying the knowledge gaps related to the increase in corporate corruption and the concurrent decline of effective corporate governance and ethical leadership in Africa. It endeavours to conduct a thorough analysis, and the significance of mitigating and preventing corruption, while promoting good governance and ethical standards within the African context. It aims to examine the ramifications of combatting corruption, advancing robust governance, and upholding ethical principles.

Corporate Corruption

Corporate corruption is a misuse of official power by a corporate delegate for personal or organisational advancement (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020). This activity can take several forms, including bribery, fraud, embezzlement, and other unethical practices that undermine the honesty and equity of corporate procedures (Chigudu, 2020; Orudzheva & Sluhan, 2023). Its repercussions can adversely affect the corporation involved, and its employees, shareholders, customers, and the broader society. An environment tainted by corporate corruption erodes trust,

distorts markets, and impedes economic growth (Hoinaru et al., 2020). In markets manifested by pervasive corruption, private enterprises, and governmental bodies are susceptible to pressure to partake in illicit activities such as bribery (Orudzheva & Sluhan, 2023). According to the 2023 Global Corruption Barometer, a substantial percentage of the population in multiple countries perceives an upward trend in corruption (Brock, 2023). Thus, there seems to be a concerning pattern emerging, showing a rise in corrupt behaviours. This factor could potentially have extensive and grave consequences for the communities involved. Hence, it is essential to combat corporate corruption to promote ethical business behaviour and uphold the tenets of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, it is imperative to note that the primary emphasis of this study is on corporate corruption. This concept can be viewed from four different perspectives (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020), as outlined below:

Firstly, it can regarded as a rational action stemming from a cost or benefit analysis (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020). This perspective suggests that individuals within a corporation may engage in corrupt activities if they believe the benefits outweigh the potential costs. Secondly, corporate corruption can also be considered a cultural norm that enables or constrains illicit behaviour within companies (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020). This perspective emphasises the influence of the organisational culture on the prevalence of corrupt practices.

Another perspective views corporate corruption as an institutionalised practice that arises from cognitive, normative, and regulatory pressures (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020). This assertion suggests that corrupt behaviour can become ingrained within an organisation due to various internal and external factors. Finally, corporate corruption can be associated with managerial moral failure and decision-makers (Castro, Phillips & Ansari, 2020). This viewpoint highlights the ethical dimension of corruption and reinforces the responsibility of individuals in positions of authority within corporations.

According to this study, corruption is not a spontaneous phenomenon but rather a predetermined occurrence masterminded, driven, and inspired by the greed for money committed by immoral individuals to harm the oblivious and innocent victims in all forms of malicious damage. Corporate corruption among corporations hinders various forms of development for both the country and humanity, resulting in a poor quality of life (Hoinaru et al., 2020). Although corporate corruption is punishable in certain circumstances, companies and people engage in illicit activities and unacceptable work behaviours that have detrimental effects on shareholders and other involved stakeholders (Fauser & Utz, 2021). For instance, a study focused on corporate governance practices when analysing the failure of UT Bank in Ghana. Despite the bank's professed adherence to governance principles promoting efficiency, transparency, accountability, and integrity, these principles were consistently overlooked and violated (Appiah et al., 2023). According to this study, this negligence contributed to the bank's collapse. Additionally, the study pointed out that potential red flags were ignored and disregarded, indicating that the non-executive directors failed to carry out their responsibility to consider and behave autonomously in the bank's and depositors' best interests (Appiah et al., 2023). Moreover, this phenomenon disadvantages and fuels socio-economic challenges facing marginalised Africans.

For instance, it prevents tourism from flourishing and creating jobs for locals, harming economic growth in the African countries involved (Osinubi et al., 2021). Through irregular awarding of tenders in South Africa, political interference and participation amplified the already severe corruption in municipal business operations (Mngomezulu, 2020). Zimbabwe's political interference in state affairs negatively impacted government institutions, as corrupt undertakings by remorseless politicians increased (Chipere, 2020). Meanwhile, the Northern parts of Africa are experiencing

rising political instability and corruption that prevent them from obtaining financial assistance and stability through foreign aid (Alhassan et al., 2021).

It has become a common practice in the Kenyan private sector to recruit managers based on their ethnicity either because of linguistic convenience, cultural preference, or because they belong to a specific group endorsed by those who possess the authority to hire (Njagi, 2020). In line with this tradition, political patronage plays a role in appointing individuals in filling vacancies because of their associations with politicians (Zheng, Schram, & Doğan, 2021). Consequently, it causes imbalances in society, ballooning injustices and inequalities that are already problematic and thus attacking a sense of dignity in the population. In addition, corporate corruption hinders African citizens' ability to share and enjoy African resources so that all Africans participate in these resources, not just a few.

Corporate Governance

According to Chigudu (2020), corporate governance is administered within organisations to sustain and create a culture of sound corporate governance and organisational prosperity. Effective corporate governance relies on proper, appropriate, and sound controls to manage conflict of interests among all stakeholders in institutions and organisations worldwide to sustain themselves while improving the economy (Pham et al., 2021). In supporting these initiatives, the board of directors are tasked and entrusted to oversee and supervise management to ensure that corporate governance is advanced in business institutions to protect the interests of shareholders (Jao et al., 2019). Individuals in these roles must exercise independence to achieve their mandates effectively and efficiently with diligence and precision. In this sense, female directors are preferred and perceived as better than their male counterparts due to their independence and commitment to refraining from deficient and questionable corporate governance practices (Al Lawati, Hussainey & Sagitova, 2021). Contrary to this assertion, this study argues that organisational corporate challenges are not intrinsically associated with individual demographics, such as race, ethnicity, or gender. Instead, accountability rests with the individual's traits and moral values. Accordingly, the focus should be on eradicating corporate governance failures in the African continent.

Recently, numerous South African companies have encountered significant corporate crises, leading to detrimental effects on the organisations and society at large. One notable example is the Fidentia Group and Leisure-net (Maroun & Cerbone, 2020). These authors further postulate that the crises significantly impact society, affecting employees, customers, investors, and the wider community. The aftermath of these corporate crises may result in financial setbacks, a decline in trust within the business realm, and potential cascading effects on the South African economy and society. More recently, the Steinhoff scandal has also been a prominent example of corporate turmoil in this country (Amede & Ilaboya, 2023). According to Ahmed & Anifowose (2024), corruption has a detrimental impact on sustainable development, while corporate governance has a notable and positive effect. This study further asserts that in countries where corruption is pervasive, the positive impact of robust corporate governance on sustainable development becomes even more significant. Contrarily, Chen (2024) argues that the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which originated from the United States subprime mortgage crisis, had extensive and profound implications for economies, businesses, and investors worldwide. This scholar further asserts that the crisis can be attributed to the failure of corporate governance and unfolds in three stages: the accumulation, amplification, and outbreak of governance risks. This calamity had a significant impact that reverberated throughout the global financial system.

As such, African companies and corporations involved in anti-good corporate governance scandals and corrupt activities threaten the economy and society (Chigudu, 2020). Seemingly, an operation

involving political big shots swindling state funds and resources threatens and weakens corporate governance on African soil (Bonga, 2021). These study claims are supported and corroborated by another research study. Similarly, a research study conducted by Fagbadebo (2019) shows that corporate governance has been submerged and eroded in Africa by elegant political leaders. It is thus imperative that these organisations must adhere to corporate governance principles outlined and stipulated in all corporate governance rules and regulations. It appears that in theory, company laws are black-and-white, but in practice they are not implemented and applied as recommended.

Ethical Leadership

Shiundu (2024) highlighted the critical importance of ethical leadership, emphasising that leaders should consistently adhere to ethical principles, make well-informed decisions based on ethical considerations, and cultivate strong, trustworthy relationships rooted in ethical behaviour. This author further opines that ethical leaders demonstrate integrity, transparency, accountability, empathy, and a profound understanding of the impact of their decisions on society. Therefore, leaders must embody ethical traits and act as role models for their followers. In support of this view, a study contends that ethical leadership plays a crucial role in shaping the reflective moral attentiveness of employees within an organisational setting (Al Halbusi et al., 2024). According to the social learning theory, leaders hold significant status and power within the organisational hierarchy, making them influential sources of observation and emulation. Consequently, they can effectively serve as role models for employees, thereby impacting their moral development and decision-making processes (Al Halbusi et al., 2024)

By implementing an effective turn-around strategy, Africa can resolve its challenges and achieve its development goals through selfless, principled, moral, and ethical leaders. To earn the trust of voiceless and vulnerable communities, ethical leaders aim to demonstrate their worth by maintaining honesty and integrity (Göçen, 2021). One of the African countries was the subject of this case study. Recent research conducted by Donkor and Zhou (2020) found that Ghanaian ethical leadership confirms that servant leadership is beneficial to the intended beneficiaries because it improves the socioeconomic status of its population by providing necessities. Ngubane (2021) argued that the African public and private sectors lack ethical leaders capable of turning the tide on the escalating scandals and corporate misconduct.

A decrease in ethical leadership is evident in Nigeria, preventing development that benefits its citizens and future generations (Olatunde, Niyi & Sunday, 2020). It is also the case that Somalia's lack of ethical leadership standards is characterised and composed of non-existent morals and values that shape the nation's ability to compete among other African states in terms of its economic growth (Hassan, Zain & Ajis, 2019). Due to a decline in ethical, decent, and principled leadership in Zimbabwe, public funds were misused and disbursed through acquisitiveness and unethical practices ((Chigudu, 2020). Nevertheless, some scholars oppose this tradition and behaviour within organisations. For this reason, Nangoli et al. (2020) cautioned that ethical leaders have a conscience and integrity that contributes to their qualities such as honesty, responsibility, and accountability for organisational sustainability and ordinary people's wellbeing.

It is worth noting that ethical leadership is also eroding in the private sector (Ngubane, 2021). A case in point occurred in Uganda. In this country, a lack of efficient and monitored ethical leadership has led to several banks going under and many people's jobs being lost (Mathuva & Nyangu, 2021). Politicians' involvement in corporations has not been fruitful for Africa, as it undermined and disregarded ethics and ethical leadership values (Hoinaru et al., 2020). On the African continent, this custom contributes to the fading and diminishing of ethical leadership. It

is evident that African politicians have grown to be conscience-free; they do not adhere to, and respect corporate laws enacted by themselves to maintain African organisations. The effect is that ethical leadership on the African continent is reduced to a mere principle on paper and not in practice. As a result, businesses and state institutions are at risk due to the waning of corporate governance and ethical leadership.

Political Effects

There are various ways in which politics can affect corporations, including political patronage, political instability, political interference, and political power. Even though political patronage is disguised and pretended as trust, the appointment of candidates by politicians in Africa often encourages corruption. Hence, political patronage is also an avenue, channel, and vehicle through which political corruption and interference are promoted and implemented in organisations (Zheng et al., 2021). As a result, political interference in organisations often leads to organisational corruption and a failure of corporate governance due to poor leadership (Huang & Yuan, 2021). For this reason, Dragomir, Dumitru, and Feleagă (2021) argued that the encroachment of political influence through power has a detrimental impact on the functioning of institutions and stakeholder groups. A study in Europe revealed that politicians' involvement in companies and organisations usually results in poor assessments that cast a negative light on these institutions (van Elsas et al., 2020). There are many challenges and social problems in Africa because most poor people are exploited and neglected by politicians who forcefully participate in the operations of many organisations for their benefit (Mekoa, 2019).

Political intercession in other African states is the driving force behind scandals such as hiring politicians' friends and families; meanwhile, those without political connections pay bribes to enter the job market, even though they are less qualified than their competitors (Zheng et al., 2021). This situation highlights the pervasive impact of political connections on the job market and the challenges faced by those who rely on merit-based opportunities. However, some researchers and academicians disapprove of this tradition and condemn it. According to Nomarrwayi et al. (2020), appointing individuals to positions of power based on political connections rather than merit and qualifications has a detrimental impact on the quality of services provided to society. These appointees are highly likely to lack the capacity to effectively carry out their duties, ultimately leading to a decline in delivering quality services to the public. Similarly, Zimbabwean politicians often partake in undue interference and mismanagement of their authority when overseeing public institutions (Chipere, 2020). This conduct has resulted in a substantial deficit of funds vital for sustaining pivotal projects geared toward advancing the country and improving the provision of public services (Chipere, 2020). In another sense, politicians are strategic and cunning in their approach as they conduct their illegal business practices. Mbandlwa et al. (2020) observed that politicians often leverage their authority to cover up any evidence linking them to financial misconduct and malpractices. These academics claim that they achieve this by issuing verbal instructions to stakeholders involved, thus ensuring that their involvement remains untraceable. A triangular model of political effects on corporate corruption, corporate governance, and ethical leadership is displayed and illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Triangular Model for Political Effects on Corporate Corruption, Corporate Governance, and Ethical Leadership. (Source: Author)

Figure 1 demonstrates that due to the influence of African politics in organisations where politics have authority: corporate corruption is on the rise, as indicated by the upward arrow, while corporate governance and ethical leadership are declining, as indicated by the downward arrows. Powerful political elites' intervention in the political space has negatively impacted corporate governance in various government institutions, resulting in the slow provision of primary services to South Africans (Mngomezulu, 2020). In institutions where politics are not in charge, authorities in such institutions influence corporate corruption, corporate governance, and ethical leadership. The rationale is that authoritative individuals that have power over subordinates in organisations use their power to accomplish their missions through hierarchical seniority frequently used to intimidate junior employees (Puni & Hilton, 2020). In Africa, controlling and bullying management are tools employed to promote corruption while undermining corporate governance and ethical leadership (Katelouzou & Zumbansen, 2020). Despite this assertion, it is imperative to note that not all authorities and politicians promote corrupt activities for private gain. Al-Chaarani et al. (2022) observed that senior officials enabled good corporate governance in Lebanon to sustain and develop the banking industry, which, in turn, contributed significantly to the economy.

Notably, political corruption inhibits economic growth and corporate development; meanwhile, it has adverse psychological and emotional effects on workers vulnerable to political power abuse (Huang & Yuan, 2021). Accordingly, in democratic states, such as those found in most African nations, political parties that win elections overwhelmingly become the ruling parties. As such, the ruling party is automatically in charge of the government. This system enables politicians

to gain power as most are positioned at the top and hold the highest offices. These individuals occupy various positions such as the president, ministers, deputy ministers, governors, public protectors, mayors, and so forth. These positions authorise them to appoint shareholders who will be accountable to them for their actions.

A shareholder is a person, organisation, or institution that owns shares in a company. Shareholders are responsible for appointing the boards of directors who report and account to them. Typically, the CEO is a board member responsible and accountable for supervising top management. The Chief Operations Officers (COOs), Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), and Chief Procurement Officers (CPOs), and other executives are among the CEO's subordinates. The entire chain is controlled and managed from the top-down: right down to the employees on the ground. This authoritative power is based on seniority in any organisation as you ascend the hierarchy (Puni & Hilton, 2020). Public institutions are controlled and managed by the government, not private ones, thus politicians operate within them than private organisations.

In essence, the data presented in Figure 1 illustrates a concerning trend of increasing corporate corruption, declining corporate governance, and decreasing ethical leadership. The graphic illustration depicts a concerning trend, highlighting the urgency of conducting a thorough investigation and considering necessary measures to tackle these significant challenges.An overview of the power-play platform in organisations is displayed and shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Power Play in the Corporate Platform. (Source: Author)

Figure 2 illustrates how certain politicians exert pressure on shareholders and the board of directors by flexing their muscles to commit corporate corruption. In turn, these two groups cascade the pressure to top management as they have power over them. Management then

applies the pressure on the management team to execute the task according to the politicians' instructions and unethical demands. Ultimately, management puts pressure on employees who succumb to the pressure. They fear losing their jobs if they fail to follow the malpractices and scandals demanded and imposed upon the board of directors and shareholders by powerful politicians (Puni & Hilton, 2020). Based on this hypothesis, this study developed a definition of corporate corruption as follows: Corporate corruption is a premeditated commercial crime against human rights, human dignity and human development used as a tool to benefit a few influential individuals while disadvantaging the masses of the poor and vulnerable individuals.

Therefore, power-play dynamics in organisations demonstrate how some politicians exploit, abuse, and intimidate their subordinates to benefit unduly and misuse organisational resources due to their unethical behaviour and greed (Almeida et al., 2021). Due to this affirmation, politicians have excess power to commit corruption through intimidation and the instruction of their employees. Furthermore, politicians use this power to strategically place and deploy themselves in key positions to further their ulterior motives of corruption. While this may be the case, employees are still susceptible to corruption. Some employees are involved and partake in these activities, such as CEOs, COOs, CFOs, CPOs, executives, senior managers, middle managers, junior managers, and employees at the grassroots level for personal gain and to scam the shareholders (Xue, 2022).

The diagram above demonstrates the hierarchical organisation structure and the power relationships within. However, it is imperative to note that politicians do not belong to an organisational structure. Figure 2 portrays the political influence of politicians on shareholders, the authority of shareholders over the board of directors, and the leverage of the board of directors on the CEO. Additionally, it illustrates the CEO's power over the CFO and subsequently on Supply Chain Management (SCM), highlighting the potential political effects on management and employees.

How the Study was Conducted?

The research utilises a case study research design, which involves the random selection of institutions from diverse regions across Africa. This design was selected and regarded as the best fit for this study due to its capacity to offer comprehensive insights into the distinctive circumstances and influential factors related to corporate governance and corruption within various African institutions. The in-depth content analysis derived from these case studies was crucial in bolstering the credibility of the research findings, as they directly align with the study's objectives.

This analysis was selected as the appropriate method and conducted on this data. This technique was preferred because it allowed the researcher to sift through the articles and choose those that were relevant to the study (Kyngäs, Mikkonen & Kääriäinen, 2020). In this respect, from the vast amount of information retrieved from the search, the researcher narrowed the article pool to 60-70 in the final analysis through a thorough synthesis of data collected for this study (Pedrini & Ferri, 2019). Table 1 displays that the data sources for the final articles employed in this study were from 2019-2024. The first column shows that the inclusion and exclusion method was deployed and selected in the current study.

In other words, articles older than five years were unutilised, and those four years or less were selected and used in this paper. Further, the keywords typed and used to collect the data for this study are indicated in column two of Table1. This table displays the online search engines or databases used and selected under column 3 to access the relevant data gathered for this study.

Finally, the method employed in the current study was helpful and appropriate because it enabled the researcher to develop a conceptual model as a practical contribution to this paper. Table 1 displays the data sources and resources of this study.

Table 1: Data Sources and Study Resources

Published Articles	Keywords	Search Engines
(2019-2024)	Corporate Corruption	Scopus
Inclusion: 4 years or less	Corporate Governance	Web of Science
Exclusion: 5 years or more	Ethical Leadership	Research Gate
	Political Interference	SAGE Research Methods
	Corporate Scandals	Taylor & Francis online
	Qualitative Content Analysis	Google Scholar
	Africa	Springer Link

(Source: Author)

Table 1 above contains a detailed overview of the data sources and resources employed in the study. It also outlines the specific search engines utilised for data collection in the current research. Additionally, it presents a catalogue of the keywords employed to procure the study's data.

What did the Study Find?

Results

The following part presents the results and discussion based on the theoretical foundations of the study. Several significant findings were revealed in the current study. First, African leadership and relevant authorities should work toward reducing corporate corruption and promoting and implementing governance and ethics. This finding signifies that establishing a transparent and equitable business environment is critical to fostering the prosperity of the economy and society. Second, the research findings indicated a notable rise in corporate corruption within various African organisations and institutions. The discovery strongly suggests the existence of systemic factors that may be driving this increase, potentially exerting influence on the economic and social environment of the region. Interestingly, a prior literature review supports this finding. In this regard, Mekoa (2019) confirms that African corporations are witnessing an escalation in corruption.

Thirdly, the results indicated that corporate governance within organisations and ethical leadership in institutions are decreasing across the African continent. This trend signals the need for urgent attention and action to address the potential ramifications on business practices, organisational culture, and overall ethical standards regionally. This finding is reinforced by a recent study. In this context, Mbandlwa et al. (2020) found that corporate governance and ethical leadership are shrinking and thus pose a threat to African leadership. Fourth, it emerged from the study findings that African politicians have excessive power to advance their interests through commercial crimes. This finding indicates a significant correlation between the political influence of African leaders and their involvement in illicit activities for personal gain. Similarly, Orudzheva and Sluhan (2023) established that in economies characterised by pervasive corruption, private and public sector organisations experience substantial motivations to partake in illicit practices like bribery.

Finally, the results indicated a need for African leaders to change their corrupt culture and immoral philosophical ideologies to improve the economic status of Africans from poverty and underdevelopment. This finding suggests that to improve the economic status of Africans and reduce poverty and underdevelopment, African leaders must address the prevalent culture of corruption and adopt more ethical and moral philosophical ideologies. This measure would require a significant shift in leaders' approach to governance and policy-making, focusing on transparency, accountability, and the promotion of values to prioritise the long-term well-being of African societies. Thus, the continent can make substantial progress towards meaningful and sustainable development by employing this approach. Moreover, this result is supported and confirmed by other researchers in the same field and discipline. Specifically, African leadership is facing a crisis and is incapable of effectively practising good corporate governance and applying ethical leadership principles to benefit marginalised African communities (Chigudu, 2020; Chipere, 2020). Following is a discussion of this study.

The discussion part of this study presents the following subheadings: The Impact of Politics on Corruption, Governance, and Ethics; and the Causes, Targets, and Outcomes of Authority Abuse.

The Impact of Politics on Corruption, Governance, and Ethics

Study findings revealed that African political effects on corruption, governance, and ethics are significant. In terms of corporate corruption, African political effects contribute to and stimulate its rise. Zheng et al. (2021) confirm this finding as they found that politics are associated with escalating corruption in most African nations. The political deployment of qualified individuals to fulfil their mandates may be a successful and productive strategy in Africa. Notwithstanding, in most cases, it does more harm than justice due to unfit and inept politicians occupying high positions; meanwhile, people not aligned with politics but capable of doing the job are overlooked and not placed in those positions. In light of these arguments, it appears that corruption on the African continent is approaching normalisation. Regrettably, it plunges the poor into new depths of poverty and enriches corrupt officials.

Concerning corporate governance and ethics, African political effects contribute to their plummeting. Correspondingly, another study suggested that the dwindling corporate governance and ethical leadership can also be attributed to and associated with African politics (Huang & Yuan, 2021). In this way, African leaders and authorities seem to disregard and disobey local corporate laws. This tradition has resulted in a leadership crisis in Africa. Hence, these groups are called upon to change their culture and approach for the benefit of all Africans.

Causes, Targets, and Outcomes of Authority Abuse

Figure 3 illustrates a conceptual model to combat corporate corruption in Africa.



Figure 3: Conceptual Strategic Model to Combat Corporate Corruption. (Source: Author)

Figure 3 further displays an overview of the causes, victims, and outcomes of corporate corruption within organisations, highlighted by arrows. These causes are the sources of corporate corruption. A combination of these commercial crime practices leads to economic collapse, poor service delivery to the community, and financial drain on organisations. Ultimately, the outcomes emanating from these practices are crime, increased inequality, and poverty. There is no doubt that this is an unvirtuous cycle that needs to be broken and eliminated to solve this problem. This practice is partly due to Africa being one of the most impoverished and disadvantaged continents on the planet earth. As a result of the continent's status, Africa experiences difficulties in securing and borrowing funds from the world's financial resources (Alhassan et al., 2021). In this regard, among other issues related to corporate scandals, the debt owed by the South African state as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio overwhelmingly increased by 44.3% during 2015-2016 (Nong, 2021). Therefore, African leaders must adopt effective, ethical leadership practices and principles to address this issue (Dwiedienawati et al., 2021); and refrain from a laissez-faire leadership style (Donkor & Zhou, 2020). Thus, the current study provides recommendations that may address these African challenges. Figure 3 above illustrates that corporate corruption, poor corporate governance, and unethical leadership negatively impact the economy, community, and organisations, contributing to broader societal issues. Specifically, the consequences of corporate corruption, poor corporate governance, and unethical leadership manifest as increased inequality, higher rates of crime, and heightened levels of poverty within society. For future practices, this study proposes the recommendations displayed in Table 2.

Table 2: Recommendations for Future Practices

Motive	Action
To reduce, root out, and fight corruption.	Dilute the political power that encourages and drives corruption.
	Regardless of rank or status, perpetrators must be severely punished and prosecuted.
	Fraudulent or commercial misconduct proceeds unjustly received through corruption must be recovered from the culprits' pension funds.
	In cases where pensions are insufficient to cover the costs associated with corporate crime, attach the perpetrators' assets to cover the shortfall.
	Identify and close all channels and loopholes that facilitate commercial crime.
To promote, foster, and inculcate the culture and principles of corporate governance and ethical leadership practices.	In cases where perpetrators cannot account for the ridiculous bank balances in their bank accounts, freeze them and institute an investigation.
	Apply and enact mandatory rules to prohibit people convicted of corporate malpractices from working, even outside their countries.
	Ensure that the principles and intentions of the King IV report are promoted and obeyed.
	Promote good governance and ethics because they are crucial to honesty, integrity, accountability, and responsibility.
	Enhance governance and ethics to attract foreign direct investment to develop and improve economic viability.

(Source: Author)

Finally, future empirical studies are recommended to complement this research, as it has laid the groundwork for further investigation. Emphasising the significance of conducting upcoming empirical studies to expand upon the findings of this research is crucial. Adhering to this methodology, researchers can explore the subject matter and enhance the framework established in this study. In Table 2 above, each recommendation is accompanied and explained by the underlying motive and the suggested action by the study. This approach aims to provide a clear rationale for each recommendation and offer specific courses of action. The rationale is to aid policy-makers, corporate governance advocates, academics, and other stakeholders interested in the study to make informed decisions.

A review of the implications for the practice by relevant stakeholders suggests the following key points:

- A lack of ethical leadership among African leaders leads them to fail to preserve the interests of the poor in their countries.
- African states fail to adhere to and enforce corporate governance rules across their institutions.
- The continent will never progress and improve under corrupt and selfish leaders.
- The collapse of African organisations will exacerbate and increase the high unemployment in this nation.

- Poor African people will continue to suffer at the hands of the rich.
- It is not for the nation that individuals aspire to positions, but for personal gain and the benefit of their associates and associates.
- The current situation in Africa will prevent investors from investing in the continent because they cannot risk their capital in a corrupt environment lacking strategic and effective leadership to deal with this problem.
- Africans must be cautious and mindful about whom they elect to power and choose to lead them since those in power do not care about their well-being and socioeconomic status.
- In the 21st century, loyalty to political parties is a thing of the past, no longer relevant.

Conclusion

Study findings suggest that several African political effects inflate corruption while simultaneously deflating governance and ethics. They include political interference, political patronage; political corruption; political instability, and unrestricted political power. The study concludes that the continent would stay impoverished, increasing inequality and rising unemployment rates. These challenges stem from the African continent's spiralling, chronic, and severe corruption. A review of the literature employed in this study was beneficial to achieving and reaching its objectives. A methodological approach selected and used in this study also contributed to the attainment of results. In addition, the study addresses its research problem: it is common for African companies to indulge in corporate scandals without severing ties with the perpetrators and other parties involved. Consequently, it is controversial whether African authorities have effective strategies and tools to curb and reduce this practice and trend. The study results addressed this issue by revealing that: African leaders and all stakeholder groups in the chain are called upon to reduce corruption and increase governance and ethics within their organisations. The study also outlined recommendations to alleviate some of the challenges African organisations face due to corruption.

In partnership with other individuals with authority, these leaders are responsible for fighting corruption on behalf of all African citizens. In conclusion, accordingly, this study has achieved its objectives and provided significant contributions to theory and practice. Theoretically, this study contributes further a piece of knowledge and to a deeper understanding of corruption, governance, and ethics in African contexts. In practice, this study provides a conceptual framework that may be selected and used as a reference and guide for addressing organisational corruption on the African continent. For more insight into corruption, governance, and ethics in Africa and the world, further empirical and theoretical studies utilising a different methodology are suggested and recommended.

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BOOK REVIEW

We Can Fix Ourselves

Building a better South Africa through Black Consciousness

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

Scholarship on Black Consciousness in the so-called post-apartheid South Africa is not as prominent as its counterpart within the Congress tradition. The fundamental reason for this is the hegemony and pervasiveness of whiteness and its aversion to the Black Radical Tradition. Another reason is the "success" of the Congress tradition as epitomized by the ANC through its so-called negotiations to usher in an era that is compatible with its political vision of a non-racial constitutional new South Africa. It is in this sense that the intellectual and ideological marginalization of the Azanian tradition which Black Consciousness is a part of, is intimately linked to the "failure" of its political vision. In other words, the triumph of the democratisation paradigm, instead of the decolonisation paradigm (Ramose, 2005) is not only political but is also epistemological and ideological.

The political vision of the Azanian tradition is encapsulated in the metaphors by Sobukwe and Biko, namely the African tree and table and entails the integration of whites into an African/Black majority culture and rule in a post-conquest Azania (Dladla, 2017). In terms of this political vision which "failed" during the birth of post-apartheid South Africa, nonracialism is only possible in a post-white supremacy Azania which has transcended European colonial conquest since 1652. Herein lies the distinction between the nonracialism of the Congress tradition and that of the Azanian tradition (Dladla, 2018). The nonracialism of the Congress tradition is satisfied with the hegemony of white supremacy which is premised on the African majority being integrated into white settler colonial culture and rule. Why this political and historical backdrop? This is because the book *We Can Fix Ourselves: Building a better South Africa through Black Consciousness (2021)* by Mosibudi Mangena under review locates itself within the philosophy of Black Consciousness in discussing the fundamental problem of the so-called new democratic South Africa. This Review will be premised on the literature pertaining to the Black Consciousness Movement and African nationalist perspective as an analytical framework. Contrary to what the book under review is arguing, we posit that South Africa is an inherently "racist white settler State" therefore "black South Africans can *never* build a better South Africa" for themselves through a dose of Black Consciousness, but only "Africans can build a better Africa/Azania" first by rejecting the identity black (psychological liberation) and by destroying South Africa (physical liberation).

The book is divided into 16 chapters which are short and concise. The style of writing is clear, making the book easy to comprehend despite its many chapters. In addition to this, what facilitates the easy comprehension of the book is its simple overarching argument which is encapsulated in all the chapters. The book identifies colonial mentality as the underlying problem in the so-called new South Africa. Chapters 1 to 15 provide examples and empirical evidence to the effect that black

inferiority complex because of centuries of colonialism and oppression makes blacks who are a majority to remain in poverty and inequality. Among many other things the book foregrounds the black majority government led by the African National Congress, which has failed to uplift the black majority from poverty and inequality since it attained political power as a case in point of colonial mentality and its concomitant problem of self-hatred. The persistent disasters in the public service especially health and education are underscored as a prominent corroboration of the lack of Black Consciousness among blacks in general in South Africa and the devastating ramifications of colonial mentality among the black majority. The book provides a diagnosis and a prescription. This it does by positing that colonial mentality among blacks as a majority is a fundamental problem while the philosophy of Black Consciousness is the suggested dose to deal with this problem.

The title "we can fix ourselves" captures the ideological prescription of Black Consciousness. The argument of psychological liberation which this book advances is central to the Azanian tradition. Genealogically we can trace this argument to Lembede and his political philosophy of Africanism. Part of this philosophy is that Africans must free themselves from the domination of foreign ideologies and must rely on their ideas and themselves to attaint self-determination (Lembede, 2015). Lembede lamented the debilitating conditions of Africans during his time in the 1940's and posited that Africans should pursue mental liberation through his idea of Africanism. Lembede argued just like this book that Africanism which propagates African self-reliance and race-pride will eventuate in African liberation (Lembede, 2015). Sobukwe and Biko as prominent figures of the Azanian tradition latching on Lembede's seminal ideological contribution, continued the argument of psychological liberation as central to physical freedom.

In addition to the argument of psychological liberation the book in line with the philosophy of Black Consciousness posits that by eliminating colonial mentality blacks as a majority can take their destiny into their own hands and evade wallowing in victimhood. "A better South Africa" can be built on the foundation of the philosophy of Black Consciousness which will eventuate in the eradication of black inferiority complex and white superiority complex which characterize colonial mentality. The self-hatred of blacks reflects the inferiority complex while the arrogance of a white minority in power is indicative of a superiority complex. The book is not ahistorical to suggest that only the philosophy of Black Consciousness can cure colonial mentality as it also alludes to the material foundation of racism. The book does this by arguing that central to racism is white economic interest. In line with the spirit of black nationalism the book suggests that blacks as a majority should exercise their agency in the form of black solidarity and build their own institutions rather than blame whites for their current problems. It does this by proffering the examples of some of the icons of Black Consciousness such as Ramphele who used self-help mentality to build institutions amid apartheid to uplift black communities in which they worked as activists. The book also joins the constitutional fray. It does this by positing that Black Consciousness is compatible with the final constitution. Ironically, redolent of the Congress tradition the book argues that the final constitution is the most liberal and best in the world but to be concretised for the benefit of the black majority, a dose of Black Consciousness is needed. When the promises of the final constitution are realised through combining it with the philosophy of Black Consciousness then South Africa can be a country in which "blacks and whites live in harmony". South Africa will be an Azania in which "there are no blacks and whites but just people". A very intriguing contradiction in terms. A desire to be black and human/person, a case of South African double-consciousness perhaps on the part of Mangena? This South Africa now renamed Azania will have a human face.

The book comprises of many chapters which we will unpack in the following paragraphs to underscore its fundamental argument as alluded to above and some of its glaring contradictions. Because of the brevity of this review, we will not delve deeper into each chapter, but we will proffer an overview of

each chapter. Following this we will highlight three fundamental flaws which will entail our critical analysis of the book. We now turn to the overview of each chapter.

The book opens with a rather liberal and dull Preface by Njabulo Ndebele for someone who is associated with the Black Consciousness movement. The preface sounds more like an ideological offering from someone within the Congress tradition. Its emphasis on cosmopolitan consciousness and its compatibility with Black Consciousness is rather puzzling and exudes the miasma of the anti-black writings of Achille Mbembe for instance in *Critique of Black Reason (2013)*. While the preface laments white supremacy in South Africa and emphasizes self-transformation and black solidarity it still operates within the terms of reference of the Congress tradition and its broad South Africanism. For instance, Ndebele (2021:x) posits that "As the "black tribes" of South Africa became urban, spreading across the landscape, simultaneously forced, and attracted by economic opportunities, they evolved a cosmopolitan consciousness. On the other hand, "white" South Africans in pursuit of racial superiority, evolved an isolationist, self-obsessed mindset. This deprived them of the opportunity to play a significant role in the evolution of an inclusive cosmopolitan human environment". This could have been easily penned by a prominent Congress tradition figure like Pallo Jordan in *Letters to my Comrades (2017)*.

The Introduction by Mangena sets the tone of the entire book by underscoring the prevalence of colonial mentality and its debilitating effects on the black majority. The building of an anti-racist South Africa with a humane face is also highlighted. Mangena (2021: xiii) argues that "while acknowledging the presence of other factors, this book concerns itself with the debilitating role of colonial mentality among black majority that stymies efforts towards the showing of the *more human face"*. And this is how his notion of Black Consciousness is equated with African Humanism throughout the book. This is bizarre because the categories black and African are not ontological equivalents but have different histories. African precedes European colonial conquest, while black is an invention and reaction to white settler colonialism -its condition of possibility. Humanism is an invention of *abelungu* (Europeans) who imposed it on *Abantu* (Africans) through colonial miseducation.

Chapter 1 discusses the horror-ridden South African health care system. It makes the obvious point that the system is on the verge of collapse. It also proffers examples of the activists within Black Consciousness who made a better contribution to health than what the black majority is doing today with political power and resources. The point is that administration is bad, and that self-hatred is rampant. Therefore, Black Consciousness is needed. Chapters 2 to 4 have thematic unity. They discuss education in general. The point is that the black majority should give priority to mother-tongue education. The chapters lament the noise around decolonisation without practical implementation. Chapters 5 and 6 continue to make a point about the absence of the mother tongues of the black majority in arts and culture. They also lament the paucity of African aesthetics and ascribes this to the slave mentality of the black majority.

Chapter 7 deals with the transport system and its failures. The chapter argues that the black majority needs to aim higher in terms of the kind of transport system they deserve. It argues that corruption and inferiority complex are responsible for the failure of the transport system given what is currently available. The chapter laments the violence in the taxi industry and the dysfunctional public trains. Chapter 8 discusses perhaps the most important aspect in South Africa, namely the economy. The chapter begins by explaining the origin and reason behind townships. The chapter argues that black businesses can be developed and made to flourish in townships. It also argues that big malls destroy township small business. The chapter gives the dubious example of the black business products of Apartheid such as Mashaba and Maponya as models to be followed by blacks in the townships. The solid Black Consciousness critique of the Apartheid-driven Urban Foundation and the creation of the black elite as a buffer class as part of Botha's Total Strategy is suddenly forgotten by someone

with a long history within the Black Consciousness movement. Chapter 9 makes a historically valid point that the creation of SOE's was motivated by the so-called Afrikaner nationalism to uplift poor whites. The chapter laments the fact that democratic government of the black majority is not learning from the example of the so-called Afrikaner nationalists. Rampant corruption and colonial mentality are underscored as the reason behind the near-collapse state of many SOE's under the government of the black majority. The Zondo commission is used as recent evidence in this regard.

Chapter 10 is very interesting as it deals with a very topical issue. This is given the needless noise around expropriation with/without compensation debate and the futile amendment of section 25 of the constitution. The chapter makes a valid historical argument that land dispossession accounts for why 9 percent of white settlers own 72 percent of farmland in South Africa. The chapter also makes the valid point that all human activities be it economic or cultural depend on the land. The chapter however overemphasizes the failure of land reform thus conflating land restoration and land reform. This point is discussed extensively below when we discuss the fundamental flaws of the entire book. But at this stage we must mention the absurd chapter's critique of Zimbabwe.

Mangena with a history of liberation struggle centred on the return of the land through armed struggle ironically laments Zimbabwe's "unnecessarily chaotic and often violent land-reform programme" (Mangena 2021: 117). The same Mangena continues to make the ridiculous argument that "the violence accompanying the land redistribution was unfortunate. Force should have ended with the armed struggle. You don't have to act unlawfully when you are in power" (Mangena 2021: 117). While this is ironic coming from Mangena it is understandable due to his incorporation into government by Thabo Mbeki to disarm AZAPO and its radical politics. Chapter 11 is also topical as it deals with the issue of immigration. The chapter argues that mismanagement of immigration by government accounts for the so-called xenophobic attacks. While the chapter mentions "South African exceptionalism" it does not delve deeper into the white settler foundation of South Africa as a white man's land and the formation of consciousness in line with the origin of South Africa as a white settler colony. We discuss this point below to account for the so-called Afrophobic attacks in South Africa and the condition of possibility for the nonsensical but historically inevitable Operation Dudula. Accentuating citizenship and effective immigration laws does not get to the root of black South African consciousness and its anti-African schizophrenia born of the white foundation of South Africa and the pursuit of integration by the excluded blacks to the exclusion of other Africans.

Chapter 12 laments the high levels of crime and the inability of the black majority government to protect its own citizens. It makes a valid point by making the connection between alcoholism and violence among the black majority especially in townships. Chapter 13 laments the fact that corruption is not eradicated due to the incapacity of the criminal justice system and other associated institutions such as the Hawks. The success and failures of the cooperation between mining companies and black communities is discussed in chapter 14. The chapter provides examples of corruption between local community leaders and mining companies. It provides examples such as Royal Bafokeng Nation and Bapo ba Mogale to show the need for the black majority "harness their minerals".

Chapter 15 discusses the harrowing failures of local governance/municipalities. For instance, the shoddy RDP houses that always collapse and the fact that the black majority is satisfied with them. The chapter makes the argument that despite these failures due to incompetent and colonial mentality-ridden local officials, black voters still elect them to power. Because of this, the chapter argues that these black voters are not victims but accomplices in their own humiliation. Chapter 16 begins with a dubious quote by Barak Obama about people and change. With the quote from a figure like Obama already we have a serious problem of liberalism and its unrealistic promises. The chapter makes the argument which underlies the book, namely that if blacks rid themselves of self-hate, they will be the change that they want *ala* Obama's liberal gospel. The chapter to cap it all

celebrates the constitution by arguing among other things that through Black Consciousness blacks can translate the provisions and promises of this constitution into reality. We will discuss this point further below when we analyse the constitution.

The Conclusion of the book indulges in celebratory South Africanism by highlighting several things that all South Africans should be proud of. The conclusion concludes the book by positing the following unrealistic vision "a society where we would talk less and less about black and white, but more about just people" (Mangena 2021:207). If there is anything which underscores the underlying liberalism of Black Consciousness despite its radical pretensions and rejection of the Congress tradition, it is this quote. Mangena substantiates our point by stating that "in this way, black and white people would be able to work together as equals, as opposed to the current situation of master and servant, owner and underling or superior and inferior. With that, black and white would be able to relate together in every other sphere of life as equal citizens" (Mangena 2021: 201). This is an excellent infusion of the Freedom Charter into Black Consciousness by Mangena. There is no better way to capture the vision of "save South Africa" than this quote. This is Mangena's Black Consciousness gospel of how black and white South Africans "shall overcome". We have provided an overview of all the chapters of the book; we now turn to underscore its fundamental flaws.

The book has several fundamental flaws but for the purposes of this review we will limit ourselves to discussing only three. The first one is regarding South Africa and its history. While advocating for the "building of a better South Africa" this book does not explain the origin of South Africa. The book does not discuss European colonial conquest since 1652 in a way that locates the origin of South Africa since 1910 as an exercise in the "right of conquest" (Ramose, 2018) by white settlers. This leads to the lack of understanding of the consciousness which underlies South Africa itself. This is not surprising since methodologically this book in its enthusiasm to accentuate agency, it marginalises structure. South Africa is not just a name but a political formation which is grounded on European colonial conquest thus the racist idea of South Africa as a Whiteman's land.

At the level of foundation and constitution South Africa was never meant for Africans but only blacks with a double-consciousness who seek integration. It is based on the elimination of the title to territory of the Indigenous conquered people/Africans. According to Sobukwe title to the land was the underlying distinction between the Indigenous people and the European invaders (Hook, 2016). For Lembede before him Africans have a superior right to Africa since they are native to it, and it is wrong to put other non-Africans on an equal footing with Africans (Lembede, 2015). The initial South Africanism was white as it was premised on white nationalism of both the British and the so-called Afrikaners following the Peace Treaty of 1903 which ended the Anglo-Boer Wars and inaugurated their reconciliation to deal with the "native question" (Magubane, 1995). It is in this sense that white South Africa (n) is a redundancy while black South Africa (n) is a contradiction in terms. Thus, South Africa cannot be "bettered" for the black majority but can only be destroyed and a new political formation should replace it.

The restoration of sovereign title to territory to the Indigenous conquered people (Ramose, 2018) will be the first fundamental step to build this new political formation based on the culture and rule of the African majority thus African consciousness as opposed to black consciousness. This is central to the adoption of the name Azania by the PAC and BCM in the 1960s. It is to foreground a different political vision to that of the Congress tradition which does not problematise South Africa (Dladla, 2017). This is because central to this tradition is the pursuit of assimilation into South Africa since its birth in 1910.The African National Congress during its early stages wanted to assimilate excluded Africans into an inherently white South Africa by even appealing to the imperialist conscience of Britain. While written by an author with ties to the Azanian political tradition this book is operating within the terms of reference of the Congress tradition. Why does it fail to problematise South Africa

but rather seeks to better it? It is this lack of problematisation of South Africa as a political formation by whites and for whites based on conquest since 1652 characteristic of white historiography (Dladla, 2018) which accounts for the failure of the book to explain historically and phenomenologically the alienation from Africa by many Africans in South Africa who absurdly regard themselves as "black" South Africans. It is not surprising that the book ascribes the so-called xenophobic attacks to poor governmental administration (inefficient immigration regulation and laws) rather than to a racist white South African consciousness which excluded the so-called black South Africans since its formation in 1910 based on white nationalism.

The book calls for land reform within South Africa. It does this by alluding to the obvious failure of land reform by the anti-black ANC since its ascendence to political power in 1994. In the process of churning out statistics it elides the fundamental issue of historic justice, namely land restoration (Ramose, 2007). In doing so, it conflates land restoration with land reform. It fails to recognise the idea that land restoration is the first and necessary step for African liberation and self-determination while land reform is the second step to be decided by Africans as the rightful owners of the land once they are in possession of the land. Africans must get the land back by any means necessary (land restoration) what they do with their land afterwards is entirely up to them to decide (land reform). You cannot commence with land reform to attain land restoration. In other words, depending on your political vision, for instance premised on Africanism, you can have land restoration without land reform. Therefore, proceeding based on the battle-cry and sentiment of Africa for the Africans thus Europe for the Europeans and Asia for the Asians, Africans can restore land without sharing it with non-Africans such as Europeans and Asians/Indians. Africans can restore their land and expel these non-Africans who have no title to territory anywhere in Africa.

The second flaw is in relation to the final constitution and the philosophy of Black Consciousness. The book advances a very dubious argument that Black Consciousness is compatible with the final constitution. Dubious from the perspective of the Azanian tradition today (Modiri, 2021 and Dladla, 2021). Mangena indulges in a guarded celebratory South African constitutionalism in the following words "we are not in this mess for lack of a progressive constitutional and legal framework, but for a lack of Black Consciousness". (Mangena 2021:195). Mangena (2021: 196) further continues as follows "that is, you can have a world-renowned constitution and related laws, but unless the black people for whom it is meant are imbued with the philosophy of Black Consciousness, they will fall short". There is a very poor historical and epistemological analysis here in display by Mangena. The final constitution is based on the epistemological paradigm of the European conqueror (Ramose, 2018) and is imbricated with the doctrine of Discovery as an international law of colonialism (Miller, 2011).

Therefore, the debate on expropriation with/without compensation is futile since its epistemological point of departure is historically myopic. This useless debate proceeds on the terms of reference of a document (the constitution) based on the law and culture of the European colonial conquerors. In so doing, it gives underserved legitimacy to an anti-African legal document. The land was dispossessed from Africans since 1652 by white settlers outside of a constitutional framework (the first one was created by them in the last stages of conquest in 1853 in the so-called Cape) thus must returned the same way by Africans. Only then can Africans among themselves have a "debate" around what type of an African constitution (based on African law and culture) they want. The final constitution does not mention *ubuntu* which is the philosophy of the African majority (Dladla, 2017 and Ramose, 2018) thus exacerbating their colonial mentality and demonstrating its Eurocentric and racist origin and intention however obscured by disarming liberal pretensions of abstract equality and diversity.

It defies logic how Mangena who accentuates the need for African mother-tongues and culture of the black majority still miss this point regarding the constitution to the point of making the embarrassing *non sequitur* statement that "the recast Black Consciousness would operate within

the framework of the broad outlines of the constitution and its attendant laws" (Mangena 2021: 200). The constitution subjects the law of the African majority distorted as "customary law" to its supremacy thus manifesting the racist superiority complex of the Europeans and their Eurocentric legal tradition which was imposed through conquest since 1652. Scholars within the Azanian tradition today (Modiri, 2018 and Dladla, 2018) call for the abolition of the constitution because of its foundation in conquest and its continuation of white supremacy despite its dubious but dangerous progressive pretensions. The point is that it is through this constitution which lacks the culture, law and values of the African majority that "false integration" is attained in the so-called new South Africa with whites continuing to assimilate the African majority thus attaining their "civilizing mission" since conquest in 1652. This is rather ridiculous since the book argues about the lack of seriousness among the black majority due to colonial mentality, to advance their culture and language. Why does the author fail to see the connection between this argument and the constitution? Biko's "true integration" according to the abovementioned scholars within the Azanian tradition (with which the present writer as an Africanist disagrees vehemently) can only take place when the African majority after destroying South Africa and restoring the land, they assimilate whites on their own African terms. Thus, here is an African tree and table... (Dladla, 2017).

The last flaw which this book shares with the Azanian tradition mentioned above is the elision and aversion to the battle-cry of Lembede's uncompromising idea of Africa for the Africans in terms of Africanism. While the Azanian tradition does mention the political philosophy of Lembede, his uncompromising idea of Africa for the Africans to the exclusion of all non-Africans is not foregrounded. What is foregrounded is the African and Black integrationist argument of Sobukwe and Biko through their metaphors of the African tree and table (Dladla, 2017 and Modiri, 2018).

The difference between these scholars within Azanian tradition and this book is that what they call "liberatory nonracialism" (Dladla, 2017) which they contrast with the liberal nonracialism of the Congress tradition can only be practiced once Africans are in power not just in government which this book fails to comprehend. It is in this sense that the book marginalises Lembede's Africanism in favour of the desire for integration. This desire for integration by the Azanian tradition and this book in calling for a "better South Africa in which blacks and whites can live in harmony" can be traced to the death of Lembede and the ideological ascendency of AP Mda (Mda, 2018). This led to Mda formulating the notion of "broad nationalism" which he contrasted favourably with Lembede's exclusive African nationalism of Africa for the Africans (Mda, 2018).

This in part accounts for Sobukwe's dilution of Lembede's idea of Africa for the Africans as influenced by the Garvey movement. Sobukwe was highly influenced by Mda since his days as a student at Fort Hare and during the formation of the PAC. Unlike with Lembede for Sobukwe non-Africans can be accepted as Africans provided, they recognise Africa as their land and accept African majority rule (Gerhart, 2013). From this Sobukwe's dangerous consummation of Mda's seminal dilution of Africa for the Africans we transition to Biko's acceptance of non-Africans such as Indians and Coloureds within Black Consciousness. The book continues this historical and ideological insidious error of the Azanian tradition by using the category of black to include Africans. This is clearly a deviation from Lembede's Africanism which made it clear that non-Africans cannot be grouped together with Africans who have priority to Africa as they are native to the land (Lembede, 2015). We posit in contrast with both this book and the Azanian tradition that as Africans "we can fix ourselves" by restoring and following Lembede's Africanism and pursue a political vision of Africa/Azania premised on Africa for the Africans thus Europe for Europeans and Asia/India for the Asians/Indians. This way as Africans we can "build a better Africa/Azania through Africanism". We can start by cleansing ourselves of the ontological category of black and its Black Consciousness since their condition of possibility is the "logic of elimination" which underlies settler colonialism (Wolfe, 2006).

It is white settler colonialism in its epistemic violence and land dispossession which attempts to strip us of our African identity and culture and make us blacks and black conscious. Therefore, white consciousness is the condition of possibility for Black consciousness. Both blackness, Black Consciousness and South Africa are epiphenomena of white settler colonialism. In other words, before the "structure" of settler colonialism we were Africans in Africa/Azania. The ontological category of African tells us who we are, what our history and culture are. While as John Henrik Clarke put it "blackness tells you what you look like but not who you are as it does not connect you to land and culture". As South Africa is an inherently "racist white settler State" (Magubane, 1995) "black South Africans can *never* build a better South Africa" for themselves through a dose of Black Consciousness, but only "Africans can build a better Africa/Azania" first by rejecting the identity black (psychological liberation) and by destroying South Africa (physical liberation). Thus, as Africans we are trying to "set South Africa on fire" to build Africa/Azania by Africans and solely for Africans so that instead of a "better South Africa", Africa's cause can triumph.

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Book information

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BOOK REVIEW

Township Politics

Civic Struggles for a New South Africa

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

The book has a black and white cover, which is like a sepia-inspired filter. This beautifully captures the era in which the picture was taken and the warmth exuded by the five seemingly happy men walking down a township street. There is a clear juxtaposition between the chosen image conveying happiness and the book title, which highlights struggles.

Mayekiso divides the book into four main parts. Part 1 on a welcome to Alexandra briefly gives us insight into Mayekiso's childhood in the Eastern Cape and how he got involved in student activism. Here, he introduces key role players in his activism, including family members. In part 2: Alexandra at War, he discusses how he got involved in the activism, the tensions and social climate of Alexandra as well as the living conditions he and many others were subjected to, at the hands of the apartheid regime. He goes on to discuss how protests and movements were organised and formed, the relationship with authorities and community members and the events that led to his arrests. He does not shy away from explaining the levels at which mobilisation took place and how they had to work to get members of the community involved, across all ages, genders and social classes. In part 3: Alexandra in the Interregnum, he discusses his transition from prison back into society, the escalations of the rebellion against the apartheid government from protests to wars with the regime as well as the conflicts that arose among the civic groups among each other, and against the apartheid regime while advocating for a better standard of living for the marginalised. The last part of the book, Part 4: Towards and Beyond Liberation, underscores the contributions of women in the liberation struggle, creating sustainable development for people and advocating for a better standard of living for black people both, economically and socially.

The writer takes you down the streets of Alexandra, where you observe and interact with people. He playfully toggles between different styles of narration. Each style evokes a different emotion from the reader. Initially, the intention is to get the reader to imagine themselves in Alexandra, and therefore acts as a tour guide, showing you the surroundings, introducing us to characters and making us alert of our surroundings, as a tour guide naturally would. To aid the tour-guide-style narration, he also includes pictures in the book that make it easier to imagine the conditions. He then seamlessly transitions in a manner that's almost unnoticeable to a dairy-entry-like style of narration, where you can see and hear his thoughts in a way that almost feels invasive, but essential to understand his state of mind.

The author sets the scene in the township of Alexandra, in the 1980's-1990's, highlighting 1986 as the year that contributed the most to his growth and his position as a student leader, and later, an activist. The book offers valuable insights into the civic struggle in townships during apartheid, specifically in the township of Alexandra. It discusses the dynamics that contributed to South

Africa's transition to freedom. Mayekiso not only speaks about the efforts of South Africans but international allies and communities as well in the struggle towards freedom.

Mayekiso begins by delving into the oppressive apartheid state and their treatment of black people which include the appalling living and working conditions of people in townships, providing context for why there was an urgency needed in the people's rebellion against the apartheid government. He seamlessly weaves stories of activists and regular community members alike who all contributed to the civic movements. The more sensitive readers may be brought to tears by the killing of a 17 year old Michael Diradeng by a security guard. Mayekiso explains in detail how that incident fuelled youth groups with rage and stronger will to fight. This subsequently led to the six-day war against authorities during which, many lives were claimed.

As a detour from the established tour-guide and diary-like narrations, the author introduces a debate-like approach in which he critiques multiple scholars on their lack on information, research and bias when writing about, and reporting on the events that occurred during apartheid. Mayekiso defends the civic movements (mainly the AAC) from scholars by establishing timelines and providing in-depth clarifications behind their decisions to contribute towards making South Africa ungovernable and the methods undertaken to do so. He suggests that their writing shows privilege and a general lack of understanding of the events that took place, putting their credibility into question. The book goes on to shed light on the internal challenges faced by the different civic movements, and personal motives of people who also portrayed themselves as allies, while riding the fence for security.

The author succeeds at humanising the activists who suffered and decided to withdraw from the struggle for the sake of their families and their own safety. Where many may have called them cowards and sell-outs, he acknowledges how the traumas inflicted on activists and their families were life-changing and to some, not worth the risk. Mayekiso does not only rely on well-researched accounts of the activities that took place, he has the added advantage of being able to tell us from his experience as a youth activist. He talks about his upbringing and how different environments shaped his ideologies and political participation.

Mayekiso draws parallels between the struggles people in townships faced during apartheid and the struggles people are currently facing and highlights how socio-economic disparities(by design) have continued to negatively affect the lives of South Africans, even after the political transition. Furthermore, in a political landscape where democratic backsliding presents as a threat, Mayekiso's book stresses the importance of movements at the grass-root levels in order to shape the nation's democratic trajectory. This tactic aids the reader in understanding the nature of township struggles and why they are interconnected.

Overall, the book can be read by scholars and non-scholars alike. For scholars, the book serves as a source of information that highlights truths about the struggle that may not have previously been touched on due to a lack of interest in township politics or due to misinformation spread by the apartheid regime. For young people, the book can serve as a minefield of inspiration and insight on how young people through history came together to mobilize to fight for a better future. For everyone else, the book acknowledges the contributions made by regular citizens to push the country forward towards freedom, therefore not only educates us about our history but validates the efforts put in by all those who wanted justice. Although the author succeeds in capturing the intricate dynamics of the civic movements and amplifying the voices of those actors whose contributions have been historically overlooked, readers who are looking for a straightforward recollection of events may encounter challenges with Mayekiso's academic rigour. Nonetheless, the book has something for everyone.

For academics and non-academics alike, Mayekiso manages to explore lesser-known accounts, from his personal experience as an activist and from individuals, whose stories may have been historically overlooked by academics and overshadowed by more popular political figures. The diverse experiences and recollections make it easier to humanise the people who fought and relate to them. He mentions how both parents and children, the employed and the unemployed, the poor and the well-off were all included through yard committees and speaks of the commitment expressed through going to people's houses to teach them individually and explore the different ways community members could contribute to the fight towards freedom. This approach does not simply paint those who fought as angry radicals (even though the anger was valid), but as families, communities, and human beings fighting together for a better future where their skin colour would not determine their quality of life, fighting for political representation and justice.

Ultimately, this is a well-structured book that skilfully combines personal experiences, historical accounts and socio-political analysis that are important to understanding township dynamics and the civic movements that have shaped South Africa. Even with the tragedies in mind, this is a book about hope, community and justice. Apartheid legacies still exist, they affect every fibre of society and will take generations to undo, but Mayekiso end the book on a positive note, one with hope for a better future for all South Africans.

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BOOK REVIEW

A Life Committed

A Memoir

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

Memoirs are usually one of the best avenues to understand people's lives. They provide a first-hand account of one's life from different perspectives. One of the problems with them is that they are expectedly full of biases. It is difficult for a memoirist to criticize herself and reveal everything. Perhaps at first glance, this is what one might expect from a memoir of a person like Essop Pahad (1939-2023). However, it is a marvellous work that offers a reader with great historical accounts of events and life well lived. Pahad served as the Minister in the Presidency from 1999 until 2008 under former President Thabo Mbeki who wrote a foreword to this book, "I am happy to commend this educative tour through many decades of exciting struggles for our liberation and a better world, as contained in this autobiography" (p17). To have served Thabo Mbeki for such a long time and remained his close ally for years is a significant sign that Pahad was a distinguished politician and intellectual in his own right.

In this book, he takes the reader from the early years of his activist family which used to house political leaders in their home in the Afrikaner nationalism-dominated town of Schweizer-Raneke in the Northwest. Leaders such as J. B Marks were among the leaders the family housed. Portraits of many leaders notably Albert Luthuli and Yusuf Dadoo leaders of the African National Congress and Indian Congress occupied the walls of Pahad's home making their house making it an even safer place for housing comrades. Pahad's father was a leader in the Transvaal Indian Congress and South African Indian Congress and a close friend of Yusuf Dadoo. No doubt this wealth of politics and activism in Pahad life in and outside his home became pivotal in shaping the man and activist he became. One of the that speaks about his mentors is evidence of this statement. His mentors include O.R Tambo (1917-1993) Dr. Yusuf Dadoo (1909-1983), Ahmed Kathrada (1929-2017), Govan Mbeki (1910-2001), and Nelson Mandela (1918-2013). For having looked up to these figures, Pahad was arguably of the true sons of the congress movement led by the ANC. It is no wonder he and Mbeki became close given the man who saw and nurtured their political development.

Moreover, the book also dives into Pahad's life in exile in London where together with his brother enrolled in 1965 as a students at the University College of London. He would later graduate with a Ph.D. from the University of Sussex in 1972. His relationship with Mbeki which had been sparked when they met in Johannesburg grew even closer. It led him to meeting O.R Tambo on Mbeki's invitation where the formation of a youth and student section. The meeting culminated in the formation of the ANC Youth and Student Section (ANCYSS). During this time Pahad was already a member of the ANC and South African Communist Party having joined in the 1960s. It is clear from the book that Pahad was involved immensely in the activities of the ANCYSS against apartheid in South Africa while at the same time, he was growing as an intellectual of the movement through academic education. His dedication to education and the SACP/ANC earned him a place at the Lenin

School in Moscow in 1973. There he spent eighteen months and came back battle-ready against the oppression of the people of the world. In 1975 he was sent to represent the SACP on the World Marxist Review editorial council. Jabulani Mzala Nxumalo another intellectual do the SACP and ANC would have joined council in 1988 and Pahad if is was not for his health status revealed upon arrival. For having served on this council Pahad was a towering revolutionary intellectual whose strength and command of revolutionary theory were above board.

Perhaps one of the captivating sections of this book is the part that speaks about Pahad's role in South Africa on his return in July 1990 and as Minister in the Presidency under President Mbeki. Much of his earlier role was his involvement in the Central Committee of the SACP. As a member of the CC, Pahad reveals how Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Azziz Pahad decided to withdraw their membership of the party because they were leaders of the ANC because of fear that "the ANC would be compromised and attacked by many powerful forces in African and the world as an organization under the control of communists" (p333). Furthermore, against the sometimes distorted fact of our contemporary times, Pahad reveals that during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa together with Joe Slovo, Enver Daniels, and Chris Hani they led an SACP delegation. In political circles, Chris Hani is usually disassociated with CODESA for its "sellout" agreements reached by the ANC. insulating him from the decisions taken after all contributions were made.

As Minister in the presidency, Pahad reveals how Mbeki unleashed his leadership qualities and entrusted him with some of his important programs under his government. One such was the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, the South African Democracy Education Trust, the South Africa-Mali Timbuktu Manuscripts Trust, and later the organizing of the 2010 Fifa World Cup. The last two were essential to Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance project. Not only was he dealing with Mbeki but also dealing with Zuma who was Deputy President. And seems Pahad suggests that under Zuma these projects were no longer a priority as they were under Mbeki. Even further, Pahad argues that Zuma had remained skeptical of him because he regarded him [Pahad] as Mbeki's ally. If anything, these revelations show us that the quarrel that led to the watershed moment for the country and the ANC was more glaring than the public believed. What led to Mbeki's resignation and the sudden decline in the ANC is an old antagonistic battle we will never know its finer details.

Essentially Pahad, in this section of the book appears to be defending Mbeki's government. From HIV/AIDS stance to the decisions he took as president of the ANC. He seems to suggest that the problem for the country and the ANC began the day Mbeki was removed as president. He associates his removal with a slur of propaganda from the ANC and its alliance partners. The demise of his ally prompted his resignation as Minister in the presidency in protest. Notwithstanding these notables, this is a personal story told from a personal view of events and the life of a towering intellectual who dares not to stop fighting and intellectually engage in the battle of ideas beyond the luxuries of his high status. It is a book perfect for engaging and no doubt it will shape and enhance our understanding of the history of South Africa and its leaders.

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