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## CONTENTS

### Editorial

Africa in the Year of Geopolitics . . . . .	iii
<i>Siphamandla Zondi, Tinuade Ojo &amp; Josef Keutcheu</i>	

### Articles

The Predicament of an Ethnic Federal System: Conflict and Federal Failure . . . . .	1
<i>Yohannes Haile Getahun</i>	
The Free Movement of People in SADC: Reflecting on the Experiences, Dilemmas and Strategic Considerations . . . . .	12
<i>Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu, Toyin Cotties Adetiba, Charity Mawire</i>	
The Global Covid-19 Pandemic: The Politics of Science or the Science of Politics? . . . . .	30
<i>Chidochashe Nyere</i>	
Regard socio-historique sur les contradictions positionnelles et présentes des Burkinabè et des Sénégalaises dans la politique . . . . .	42
<i>Ndeye Astou Ndiaye</i>	
Evolution of Kenya's Foreign Policy During the Cold War: An Examination of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine During the Moi Era (1978-1990) . . . . .	69
<i>Danvas Mabeya</i>	
Femmes entrepreneures et délaissement gouvernemental face à la Covid-19 : résilience des cadets sociaux par l'innovation commerciale en ligne . . . . .	81
<i>Estelle Vérine Salla Bezanga</i>	

### Book Review

Boko Haram's Terrorist Campaign in Nigeria: Contexts, Dimensions and Emerging Trajectories . . . . .	91
<i>Sven Botha</i>	
The New Apartheid . . . . .	93
<i>Masilo Lepuru</i>	
Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China . . . . .	97
<i>Olerato Manyapelo</i>	
About the African Association of Political Science . . . . .	99



## EDITORIAL

# Africa in the Year of Geopolitics

SIPHAMANDLA ZONDI , TINUADE OJO  & JOSEF KEUTCHEU 

Editors

The year 2023 ended with the world on the precipice. The war in Gaza, a disproportionate Israeli military response to Hamas attack on a festival in Israel, is among the deadliest in decades. More than 20 000 people, mostly civilians including women and children had been killed in the Israeli bombing campaign to avenge the Hamas killing of 120 in October. Thousands have been displaced and injured. Thousands of housing units and other buildings have been destroyed. Hatred has deepened. The drums of war have grown with the US willing to stand along alongside Israel when the latter arrogantly decides to ignore international efforts to end the carnage in Gaza.

This is fast overshadowing the War in Ukraine that broke out following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, violating international law. The war in Ukraine hogged headlines from February 25, 2022, until Israel's military invasion of Gaza. This spotlight was very helpful in shaping the global public opinions about just wars, east-west rivalry, Ukraine as a victim and Russia as an aggressor. Ukraine was able to garner public sympathy, beg for support in Western capitals which has come in handy. Today, the skillful message by Ukraine now has diminished supporters. We also almost beginning to forget Ukraine and the war.

Both developments have had a bearing on South Africa at least in three ways. The first is that these wars have disrupted economic activity including in Africa. The world economy has felt the effects of this with consumer and commodity prices rising, shortage of food and so forth. Disruption of grain supplies hurt Africa. Today, the uncertainty generated by the

carnage in Gaza creates risks for Africa's export and import trade. The attacks on ships off the coast of Yemen that are part of the Gaza conflict harms the economies of Africa too.

Regarding Ukraine, Africa is divided between those siding with the West in condemning Russia and those dissuading both sides from military means towards diplomatic means. Africa has dispatched a team of 5 heads of state to make the case for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. This is yet to yield results, but it is suggestive of an Africa with agency in complex geopolitical conflicts.

On Gaza, Africa has condemned Hamas attack and Israel bombing campaign that has been disproportionate. It has been more united in this case than on Ukraine, an outcome of the historical position in favour of the struggle of Palestinians against Israeli occupation.

This edition does not consider these issues, but they have to be borne in mind as the readers read the articles in this edition. This is also a call upon readers to consider sending analyses of Africa's role in the world in future editions.

This edition would not have been possible without the contribution of authors of selected papers, peer reviewers, and the editorial team at AJPS and at the UJ Press. We thank you all.

Editor-in-Chief

Siphamandla Zondi

# The Predicament of an Ethnic Federal System

## Conflict and Federal Failure

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### Abstract

The paper inquires about the challenges of ethnic federalism vis-à-vis ethnic conflict, encompassing ethnic tensions and direct violence. The worsening of ethnic conflicts and the ceasing process of some ethnic federations, especially the dissolved communist federations, were mutually reinforcing. Empirical and theoretical discussions on ethnic federalism have shown that not less than 14 ethnic federations went defunct so the analytical framework of the article underlines that ethnic federalism is not always effective in preventing or containing ethnic conflict sustainably. Based on that, the article has reviewed literature related to the experiences of failed and fragile ethnic federations like the Soviets, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Serbia-Montenegro, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria etc. It finds that the performance of ethnic federalism to ensure a durable and legitimate ethnic federal constitutional order is dependent on several factors. The factors are categorized into mutually non-exclusive seven factors: the democratic representativeness of federal structures, ethnic political parties and elites, the realm of inclusive overarching identities crossing ethnic lines and ethnic demographic shares, ethnic federal-unit symmetry, geo-political setting, and the number of ethnic federal-units and their ethnic make-ups. The conclusion of the article states that the failure/success of a given ethnic federal polity is not limited to its constitutional outlines but also to how it takes into account its sociological, political, geographical, and economic colours. That forms the challenges of ethnic federal system to flourish as a good and feasible option to achieve a lasting just order in politically segmented multi-ethnic societies.

**Keywords:** Defunct-federation, ethnicity, ethnic conflict, federalism, secession.

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### Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

The availability, if possible, of a standard definition of the term ethnicity is not to the degree of its recurring usage. It is more understood than being defined. The interchangeability of other terms such as nation, nationality, community, tribe and cultural group to ethnicity complicates the definitional ambiguity of the latter. Nevertheless, the etymology of 'ethnicity' is a good starting point to make sense of its gradual adaptation into politics. It is the "social reproduction of basic classificatory differences and to aspects of gains and loss in social interaction," Eriksen (1991, p.264). Yonatan's (2008, p.17) view that ethnicity has the "immaculate sense of a group characterized by a common descent" tells the emphasis of ethnicity on the fine core of human identity, though too limited in scope to qualify ethnic identity with a monolithically singular identity marker. That is why there are points of similarities and differences between ethnicity and nationalism.

Ethnicity could be less politicized and self-conscious than nationalism in terms of its relation with the state. In such situations, ethnicity becomes more passive than nationalism and remains

only within the realm of social status and relations not capable enough to form its own political orientations, movements and related symbols like flags, songs and political figures. However, as Eriksen (1991, p.264-265) holds, nationalism also uses the linguistic, religious, racial or other identifying elements of a national group in asserting political and economic interests. In this way, ethnicity gives the foundation for nationalism that in the discourses of identity politics the one resonates with the other. Thus, the implied degree of politicization is important to control the conflation of ethnicity and nationalism for some context-specific analyses.

Moreover, the conception of ethnicity changes with the changes in the realities of ethnic groups. That means it is being fashioned by various factors beyond ancestry. Ethnicity is relevant to make sense of the past, present and future of ethnic groups. The belief in the common history and origin; cultural, linguistic, religious and so on; and the assumption of a common destiny in future are the attributes of ethnic groups. Anthony Smith (cited in Fowkes, 2002, p. 24) has categorized the attributes of ethnic groups into six: a collective name; a common myth of descent; a shared history; a distinctive shared culture, comprising language and/or religion and/or institutions and/or other cultural features; an association with a specific territory; and finally a sense of ethnic solidarity, in other words a recognition of each other as members of the same ethnic group. Though they are assumed to define the ontological formations of ethnic groups, there are discourses about discerning the degree to which the markers and the beliefs of an ethnic group could beget ethnicity. Ethnicity animates ethnic groups to give practical and visible manifestations of various sorts stretching from maintaining its core identity marker/s to mobilising individual members to contest with “other” relevant ethnic groups. However, the activation aspect of ethnicity is not free from objectively defined and static ethnic characteristics. Here, two widely known schools of thought, with their specific theoretical components, are at play: primordial and instrumentalist.

The primary focus of the primordial school of thought is the *unchangeable* guts of ethnic belongingness. Vaughan (2003, p.41) puts, “primordial has long been chaptered with assuming the fixed nature and explanatory of the very ethnic given.” That sees ethnic identification, in delineating lines of identity exclusiveness, as the sharpest form of social grouping. The sanctioning and regulatory role of ethnic identity for ethnicity is the result of, Govers and Vermeulen (1994, p.43-58) say, the “consciousness of difference” framed up on the objective perception of belongingness as a matter of the social cohesion dimension of ethnicity. It poses a challenge to the subjective recasting of ethnic identities to bring about socio-economic and political goals.

However, for instrumentalists, like Cohen (1974, p.4), ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon; defined in situational and contextual matters, being strategically and tactically manipulated so that the quality of ethnicity is capable of changing at individual and collective levels. The theory of social constructivism is the foundation for the instrumentalist school of thought since society reflexively responds to its reality. Except for the central point of the instrumentalists being elites (Vanderwerf, and Wan, 2009, p.8), the notion that ethnic identities are neither perennial nor objective attests to the constructivist origin of ethnic groups. Markakis (1974, p.236) states that an “ethnic group, as a political actor, is a product of the situation, history and what mobilizes its members to take collective action is the concern for future prospect, not atavistic attachment to the past.” The mere existence of ethnic groups does not necessarily mean an active form of ethnicity. It needs the phenomena of interactions among distinct ethnic groups. What is more, there is even a theoretical formulation that ethnic identity is a product of interacting responses between inner perception and outer forces at the individual and group levels (Epsteia, 1978). In this way, a conscious identification not primordialism, depicts ethnicity as a permanent yet dynamic social structure where “one shall assume that reflections among the interacting individual on what ‘our’ and ‘their’ culture takes place,” Tronvoll (2000, p.58).

Consequently, the conceptual vicissitudes of ethnicity underpin the identity assertions as well as the pursuit of socio-economic and political interests along ethnic lines. To assert ethnic identity distinctions in the public space, ethnic groups could use and promote languages and other specific identity markers separately identified with them. The markers construct the relevant ethnic groups and the necessary channel of mobilizations which are even instrumental to the elitist articulation of ethnic demands touching up on the recognition of primordial identities such as language and religion, or levelled inter-ethnic interactions.

Turning the discussion to the subject of ethnic conflicts, they are the results of ethnic-identity-driven socio-economic and political contentions and are known to emerge from villages to the state level, even to inter-state levels due to irredentism and boundary disputes. In the words of Esman (2004, p.3), “[e]thnic conflicts may occur at any level of social interaction from localities and neighbourhood to the central government.” Ethnic conflict could affect the everyday lives of individuals with lasting impacts defining the political and economic order of the state. The state disposition in the interactions of ethnic groups is the cause of most ethnic conflicts, especially when its ethnic neutrality or inclusiveness is questionable.

In politically divided multi-ethnic societies, predicating on Johan Galtung’s (1973) critical theories of conflict, ethnic conflicts have structural and direct violence forms. The latter, ethnic-driven direct conflict, has two dimensions. They refer to the horizontal inter-ethnic conflict and the vertical conflict of ethnic groups, directly or indirectly, against state institutions, policies, laws, and civilian and non-civilian authorities. Brancati (2006, p.665) presented the horizontal and vertical dimensions of ethnic conflicts along with anti-regime rebellions and inter-communal conflicts. In a more technical inventory manner, Hector (2000) unpacked anti-regime ethnic conflicts against the scale of political protest and armed-rebellion. It informs the relative intensities and depth of the conflicts which could be contained at the level of protective protests or deteriorating into offensive violence against ethnic groups or the state. The political protest subsumes ethnic-driven verbal opposition expressions, public demonstrations and symbolic rebellions while the armed-rebellion takes that in the direction of political banditry, terrorist campaigns, guerrilla activities and protracted civil war (Ibid, 146).

As a result, in addressing ethnic conflicts and the demand for ethnic diversity accommodation, multi-ethnic states have devised different responses at different times. Ethnic federalism has been hailed as a major constitutional option response to prevent or/contain the types of ethnic conflicts mentioned above. However, the interactions between ethnic federalism and ethnic relations are not always imperative, simple and straightforward. There are challenges affecting the success of a given ethnic federal system to serve as an enduring and legitimate tool to make, protect and build peace among competing and conflicting ethnic groups. The next part of the paper outlines and elaborates on these challenges.

### **The Challenges of Ethnic Federalism in Failed and Fragile Ethnic Federations**

In some multi-ethnic states such as India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Belgium and Ethiopia, ethnic federalism has been applied to resolve or prevent political conflicts among ethnic groups. It has two elements. The first is to accord constitutionally sanctioned self-rule for ethnic groups under federal territorial units or through non-territorial communal rights. The latter is known as ‘personal-federalism’ (Linz, Stepan and Yadav, 2011, p. 263). Socio-cultural rights related to culture, identity, language and history; and institutional independence to organize as self-administrative federal territorial units or communities for an ethnic group are what mean by self-rule in the context of a multi-ethnic federation (Lijphart, 2008). The second element is the constitutional entitlement of ethnic groups to access a meaningful representation in the joint ruling of a federation by the federal government.



Upper houses are the most common and standard channel for that kind of representation, without relegating the significance of ethnically inclusive federal executives, public administration and judiciary; especially if the judiciary system has the power of constitutional adjudication. As a result, contentions over diversity recognition and power balance, as the major causes of inter-ethnic or anti-regime ethnic protests and rebellions, are thought to be manageable by the federal constitutional dispersal of political power among ethnic groups and inclusive shared-rule.

However, ethnic federal system may not be a cure-all for all ethnic tensions and violence. Its capacity to prevent and manage conflicting relations among ethnic groups was far from successful in some multi-ethnic federations. The failed multi-ethnic federal experiments of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan before 1971, and Serbia and Montenegro are some of the leading historical cases (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2008). They alluded to the proposition that the primary aim of ethnic federalism to manage ethnic tensions and violence could backfire only to escalate ethnic conflicts with the consequence of federal failure. It, however, contradicts the experience of other federations which have gradually built the legitimacy and the effectiveness of their federal systems in addressing the politics of ethnic diversity recognition and accommodation. Belgium, India, Canada, Spain and Switzerland are good examples, in line with Burgess and Gagnon (2010), of matured and/or flourishing pluralistic federations.

The reasons why some ethnic federal systems are as successful as others *vis-à-vis* ethnic conflicts resonate with the major predicaments of ethnic federal systems, Watts (2008) calls these predicaments 'federal pathologies' these means those institutional, political and social structures which are not easily set with the goals of a pluralistic federal order and its continuity. It is to Newman's (2006) understanding that federal purposes are the yardsticks of federal successes, federal culture, power imbalance among federal-units and to Abate Nikodimos' (2004, p.4-49) power concentration. Specifically, ethnic conflicts threatening the continuity of an ethnic federation are directly or indirectly the functions of democratic legitimacy, federal constitutional design, inter-ethnic relations, identity politics and geopolitics. The following seven points provide the details.

### Federal Democratic Representative Legitimacy

Democracy, predicating on the conventional and procedural understanding as a consented and accountable source, exercise and purpose of power (Huntington, 1991, p. 6), has been proven an instrument for the viability of multi-ethnic federal democracies. Accountability and broad-based participation are the aspects of representativeness advanced with the democratic method of representation (Jijphart, 2008). They allow aligning the federal theoretical point of striking the balance between unity and diversity with the democratic representation of federated ethnic groups in the federal shared-rule and self-rule with positive spillovers on the stable consolidation of the multi-ethnic federal system.

While the weight of democratic representation to the legitimate and effective exercise of self-rule is obvious, its meaning to the joint federal shared-rule underlines the subtlety of difference in the representational patterns of quasi-federalism and federalism. In the former, autonomous territories, similar to Puerto Rico in the United States, may have little representation at the centre (Kymlicka, 2006, p.36). In contrast, the constitutional representation of federal-units in the common federal setups and inter-jurisdictional overlapping magnify the utility of democratic representation in a federal polity. The democratic inclusion of ethnic groups in the federal shared structures of a multi-ethnic federal system enables them to be part of decisions made at a federation scale while defending or expanding their constitutional powers and political significance, at the same time.

With the presentiment of ethnic elites not having places in the shared federal governance, could be involved in ethnic political articulations and mobilizations hostile to the intents and operation of a federal constitution. Hector (2000, p.140) underlines that “local leaders should be offered meaningful, substantial careers in the central government” to improve the representativeness of the federal government to pre-empt the possible campaigns of fragmentation by ethno-regional elites. Corollary to that, ethnic political elites assume the agency of open-ended federal constitutional negotiations and fending off federal constitutional impositions. Such engagements solicit the momentum to embrace the principle of federal constitutional supremacy as the potential source for the politico-legal loyalty and overarching identifications of ethnic groups and to induce their peaceful co-existence (Watts, 2008, p.183). The interdependency between broad-based federal constitutional commitment and federal system stability can be implied here (Tsegaye Regassa, 2008, p.3).

Other things like electoral systems and political culture remain constant, multiparty representation, therefore, has the purpose of consolidating the viability of ethnic federalism with much broad-based and democratically accountable representation. The implications of the deficit of democratic representation to the ethnic fragmentations and conflicts in defunct multi-ethnic federations of the one-party systems have lessons to draw on the implications of multiparty democratic representation to the durability of ethnic federal states. The federal constitutional systems “were often ignored in practice and were not authentically representative in USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (McGarry and O’Leary, 2003, p.14). In these ethnic federations, how the one-party system had undermined the representativeness of federal institutions was revealed in the damping of ethnic constitutional rights as subordinate to party interest. It degraded cooperation and trust among ethnic groups and “no effective judicial review existed to decide on the claims of orders of government to function more complementary in solving the existing societal reality than party line” (Ibid, p.14). The one-party system is a serious challenge to the representative legitimacy of multi-ethnic federations at the perils of inter-ethnic competitions which are deprived of their *genuine* representations through alternative political could explode to outright ethnic conflicts with the possible extent that federalism becomes appealing to none. The conquest for representativeness in the one-party-dominated federal edifices of Ethiopia is the most common criticism of the ethnic federal constitutional operation.

### Ethnic Political Parties and Elites

The nature of ethnic politics undertaken by political parties and elites is the other complicacy of ethnic federalism vis-à-vis ethnic conflicts and federal system sustainability. In a multi-ethnic federal system, the constitutional devolution of power to ethnic groups is not necessarily effective in addressing the politics of centrifugalism. It could contain ethno-nationalism up to some level as what Yugoslavia had achieved for over forty years before its demise with bloody ethnic conflicts. The point is the likelihood of ethnic federal constitutional design to provide ethnic political parties and elites with political and bureaucratic resources and self-reliance for launching inter-ethnic outbidding incompatible with federal constitutional unity and diversity. For example, for McGarry and O’Leary (2003, p.13), “giving an ethnic minority its units makes it possible for it to hold a referendum on secession, which can be useful for gaining recognition.” Accounts of that kind emphasize the mutually reinforcing divisive effects of ethnic federalism and extreme ethnic politics with the risks of federal political and constitutional crises. Brancati (2006, p.650-652) repeats that federalism could train ethnic groups or their elites to live apart with discriminatory legislations and policies inducing ethnic conflicts and secession, in times of political reforms and changes.



The self-determination-inspired constitutional decentralization made it difficult for Yugoslavia to adapt to exogenous pressures with a consolidated central administration. The drying of foreign aid from the USSR pushed its federal Government to centralize some of the fiscal autonomy of the Republics but faced with the vibrant resistance of ethnic political forces within the ruling communist party as a prelude to the culmination of the federation with terminal ethnic conflicts (Hector, 2000). It notifies that even a single party could be divided along ethnic lines so that it becomes too vacuous to hold together a multi-ethnic federation. Watts (2008, p.17-18) sees that it is difficult to establish shared-federal commitment when the federal government is exclusively controlled by ardent ethnic parties in such a way that the two regional parties of Czechoslovakia facilitated the breakup of the federation.

Nevertheless, the relationships between ethnic political parties and ethnic federal system are not always straightforward, it rather depends on the complex interactions involving the federal constitutional system of power allocation, the depth of ethnic cleavages, the nature of parties, dynamics of party competitions, party system and electoral system. As intra-ethnic political party competitions could constrain regional ethnic political aspirations from escalating into ethnic conflicts, electoral systems could encourage moderate and conciliatory parties. These parties have the potential to be the conduits of inter-ethnic integrative politics of forging ties among constitutionally self-ruling ethnic groups. Britain's, a unitary state yet with extensive federal features, the recent offer of devolution to Scotland and Wales was welcomed by voters in both lands, though more enthusiastically supported in the former (Hector, 2000, p.146). Therefore, how far an ethnic federal system ensures the self-rule of ethnic groups and how the parties play with that is one of the challenges of ethnic federalism to prescribe a viable and stable ethnic federal body politic. The recent experience of the Tigray region of conflict in the Ethiopian ethnic federal experience has shown how the power shifts among ethnic elites and parties have repercussions on the process of federal power re/centralization and the reactions of ethnic actors to this process. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) which had dominated the federal centre until the change of the incumbent party in 2019/20 challenged the federal government in terms of an authoritarian power consolidation not compatible with the federal constitutional system of self-rule and the undoing of the struggle, history and aspirations of ethnic self-determination and *ancient* autonomy (Assefa Fiseha, 2023).

### Overarching Identity and State Neutrality Vis-à-vis Ethnic Groups

To prevent ethnic constitutional self-rule from leading to parochialism and fragmentation or ethnic tension, the development of an overarching identity is appealing. Aalen (2002, p.45) proposes that "people should have loyalty to the ideas of both an overall citizenship and the narrower indigenous identity." Citizenship would prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating into open ethnic fighting by forging common points of interest that could build the middle ground across ethnic political segments. The fusion of ethnic groups to pursue goals definable by citizenship has the potential to develop an overarching political identity in a pluralistic federation.

The working capacity of an overarching political identity to shift the relations of ethnic groups from competitive to cooperative supposes an inclusive and impartial state (Ibid, p.246). Substantially speaking, if the state is partial to a certain ethnic group/s, or believes so, the other groups might have a weak self-identification with the state. The perception of state neutrality empowers the state to have effective and legitimate leverage in the process of adjudicating ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the state must promote overarching identities among federated ethnic groups and ensure that federal politics is non-discriminatory.

The former Eastern Pakistan, the current Bangladesh, separated from Pakistan due to the insignificant role of its elites and the sense of alienation from the political process. McGarry and O'Leary (2003, p.14) put, "[l]oyalty depends on the neutrality of the state regarding ethnicity *per se*. States such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Nigeria had weak or no overarching identities, to begin with, and no democratic mechanisms for developing them." The sense of citizenship is an important input for the quality of a state. The stability of a modern democracy depends not only on the justice of its institutions but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens (Kymlicka, 1995, p.285). These qualities are the social capital of citizenship. For Galstone (Ibid, p 10), social capital includes general virtues (courage, law abidingness and loyalty), social virtues (independence and open-mindedness), economic virtues, and political virtues.

### Demographic Content and Staatsvolk

According to O'Leary (2001), *Staatsvolk* refers to a dominant national or ethnic group. For a particular ethnic federation, the fostering of a democratic federal system based on the majoritarian principle has to be weighed against its demographic composition. The application of majoritarian democracy where there is no dominant ethnic group that feels secure would lead to ethnic competition and rivalry. In this rivalry, every ethnic group would engage without distinction. To curb that other mechanisms, non-majoritarian democratic systems, like consociationalism that protects the interests of all national and ethnic communities, should be put in place. They have the merit of offsetting ethnic conflicts by inducing communal autonomy and power-sharing across the basic structures of a federal system (Jijphart, 2008).

The other aspect of demography in federations is the distribution of ethnic minorities in constitutionally framed federal-units. The protection of such minorities is one of the litmus-test for the effectiveness of a multi-ethnic federal system in terms of conflict proofing and justice. As long as the federal government represents a federation as a single polity, it is also responsible for the protection of provincial minorities; the concept of the dual and direct relations of individuals to regional and federal governments serves that purpose (Elazar, 1987)

### Population and Economic Symmetry

The other factor which may contribute to the/stability of an ethnic federal political system is the symmetry between or among ethnic groups. This symmetry may be *de jure* or *de facto* asymmetry. The former refers to the variations among or between ethnic groups that are constitutionally and legally recognized or ascribed, whereas the latter emanates from the internal dynamics of the ethnic groups in a federation. *De-facto* asymmetry is a common feature of every federation since it is impossible to have ethnic groups the same in their populations, territorial size, resources including elites and economic activities (Solomon Nigussie, 2008).

The effect of asymmetry among the constituent ethnic groups of an ethnic federation on the relations of ethnic groups and the stability of the federal order is worthy of investigation. Watts (2008, p. 180) has indicated, "[a]lmost invariably, a source of extreme instability has been the situation within a federation where one region (of an ethnic group) has dominated through having a majority of the population." Examples are numerous such as Prussia within Germany, Northern Nigeria before the Civil War, East Pakistan before its secession, Russia before the breakup of the USSR in 1991, the Czech Republic within Czechoslovakia and Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro. The basic difference among the constituent ethnic groups could provoke unhealthy interaction unless some institutionalized remedy is entrenched.

### Geo-Political Dynamics

The federal solution to ethnic conflict should also be viewed with the existing geo-political scene or context. O'Leary (2001, p.20) claims. "[w]hether ethnic minority has backing from a powerful neighbouring state or its region in the border of the federation will assuredly matter, like the democratic and legal character, its mode of formation and prosperity of the federation itself."

Some geopolitical factors may call for some limitations on the autonomy of regional ethnic groups to exercise self-rule for reasons related to external threats and territorial integration (Kymlicka, 2006). This would be exemplified by the experience of the Ethiopia and Eritrea federation against the backdrop of the engagement of North African and Middle Eastern states in favour of the Eritrean insurgency. The lack of neighbour pressure against the unity of a multi-ethnic federation furnishes the ground for the proper implementation of the federal system that could satisfy the ethnic group/s for whom the power is devolved. The Indian Kashmir case concerning the claim of Pakistan and the pre-referendum arrangement in the Sudan, if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 is considered as a federal typology; are examples of how geopolitics could fan ethnic conflicts and limit the exercise of the conational powers of ethnic groups.

### Ethnic Federal-Units: Composition and Size

In the process of structuring federal-units along ethnic lines, the mutual reinforcement of various identity markers should be considered. When linguistic, religious, racial and other identity markers overlap, the cleavages among ethnic groups become too deep (Watts, 2008). The log of the former Pakistan, USSR and Yugoslavia supports this argument in a way that the severe polarization of the ethnic constituent units was the result of how they were demarcated. If they had been organized by using less divisive ethnic identities that could not underrate other shared identities among the federal-units, the relation among them would have shown loose distinctiveness. The lack of a strict overlapping between the linguistic communities of the Swiss Cantons and religious dandification has been appreciated (Ibid).

In addition to the necessity of keeping cords of identity among ethnic federal territories, Horowitz (1985) came up with the structural technique of taming ethnic conflict by the means of designing federal-units to accommodate multiple ethnic groups. By organizing multi-ethnic federal territories, it would be possible to deescalate the level and the ramifications of ethnic conflicts from a federation to a federation-unit level. Horowitz's (Ibid), requires to divide big ethnic groups not to dominate a federal-unite and, by implication, the merging of ethnic minorities under federal-units. Intra-unit conflicts could be ideological and less lethal due to the usual preoccupation of minority ethnic groups to hold the power of the multi-ethnic federal-units. Likewise, the majority might be involved in intra-ethnic contests across federal-units. Horowitz's (2002) ingenuity in the area of the electoral system also reflects the same pattern of bridging ethnic groups even employing competition rather than forming a sharp distinction between them. It is to the downplaying of ethnic conflicts by circumventing them within the component units of a federation. Horowitz (1985) observed the advantage of ascending the regional states of Nigeria from three in 1966 to 12 in 1969 and now to 36 from the vantage point of averting the reoccurrence of the daring ethnic conflicts that happened between 1966 and 1999. However, the feasibility of Horowitz's idea may be challenged under the circumstances of such deep cleavages among ethnic groups that could offset the possibility of splitting and merging them into federal-units in a legitimate manner is dubious.

The other structural element, rather than the ethnic composition of federal-units, lies in the mere number of the federal-units. The number of full-fledged constituent units and their expected interaction in federal politics defines the intensity of ethnic conflict. If a multi-ethnic federal

system establishes only two federal ethnic units, the conflict between them would be determining the continuity of the federation. The bifurcated nature of the conflict of all the two polarized ethnic federal provinces is more likely to engender a crisis in the federal system. Watts (2008, p.186) stated, “the experience of bipolar or dyadic is not encouraging” by indicating that Pakistan before 1971, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia and Montenegro before 1992 and 2006, respectively, “have provided the example of the difficulty that arises in bipolar federation... because every ‘little’ conflict, which arises between units will, threatened the endurance of the federation”. The possibility of inter-federal-unit identity groups engaging in conflict is high because the symmetries between them in economic viability and political visibility could simply provoke ethnic tensions and rivalry. The relative disadvantage of one is more likely taken as the contrivance of the other beforehand. Moreover, a conflict between the two federal-units corresponds to a federation-wide conflict. The federation-breaking conflicts between the current Pakistan and Bangladesh, the smoothness and the rapidity of the so-called *velvet divorce* between Czech and Slovakia, and the end of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro witnessed how the *impossibility* of political horse-trading in federations of two units means conflict generation and a federal state dismemberment.

## Conclusion

The rationale of ethnic federal system to bring ethnic groups together without expensing their distinct identities and interests has the implications of preventing or regluing ethnic conflict through constitutional ethnic diversity recognition and accommodation. Constitutional home rule and representations of ethnic groups are the inseparable hallmarks of ethnic federalism which are crucial to empower ethnic groups to deal with their own matters and to be part of collective decisions made at the federation scale. It allows ethnic groups to embody the foci of autonomous constitutional powers and the objects of representation in the edifices of the federal shared-rule. Cumulatively, in ethnic federal state organization, the federal self-rule and shared-rule are presumed invaluable constitutional structures to accommodate ethnic assertions and help ethnic tensions and conflicts. In that regard, however, the trajectories of ethnic federations are not uniform.

In some contexts, like the cases of Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, and, more or less, India, ethnic federalism has been touted as a successful constitutional doctrine to install a democratically functioning stable multi-ethnic federal body politic. In this case, ethnic federal constitutional dispensation has significantly contributed to the peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups which, in turn, reinforces the durability of the ethnic federal order. Contrary to that, in failed and fragile ethnic federations, ethnic federalism has failed counter-productively to address and/or exacerbate ethnic conflicts at the perils of serious political instabilities, at times leading up to state dismemberment, resulting from deadly ethnic-based communal violence, protests, armed-rebellion, terrorism etc. The federations of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Malaysia, the decade-old Ethio-Eritrea federation, the post-1995 Ethiopia, and Serbia-Montenegro are examples of failed and fragile ethnic federations. In such federations, the challenges of ethnic federal system to serve as a sustainable constitutional tool to manage ethnic conflicts are related to: the lack of democratically operating federal structures, the growing of extreme political parties hostile to the delicate balance of federal self-rule and shared-rule, fragile overarching identities across ethnic lines, issues related to the demographic proportionality of ethnic groups, number of ethnic federal-units and their ethnic compositions, de facto symmetry among ethnic federal-units, and geo-political settings involving irredentism. It leads to the view that the success of ethnic federal system in curbing or containing ethnic tensions and violence is the derivative of the political system, constitutional design, socio-economic, and geographical reality which are mostly fixed and not amenable to short-term intentional interventions. Issues of geopolitics and shared political aspirations and values are as vital as a democratic political environment. Undemocratic regimes

are less prone to generate the kind of political pluralism ethnic federalism needs to address ethnic rivalries and violence. The records of ethnic federations under various types of undemocratic rule attest to the challenges of federal constitutional diversity in the matrix of unrestrained power. Therefore, ethnic federal constitutional design alone is not for granted to bring about an effectively functioning and durable ethnic federal polity. The contextual adaption of the constitutional precepts of ethnic federal order is in point. Although the article has focused much on defunct and unstable ethnic federations and missed the lessons of mature ethnic federal systems, it has merits to apprise the contextual differences of ethnic federations across the board. Here, the systemic juxtaposition of failed, fragile, and consolidated ethnic federal states is a broad subject deserving further research which is important to deepen the growing discipline of federalism and constitutional conflict resolution in ethnically segmented societies such as Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan.

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# The Free Movement of People in SADC

## Reflecting on the Experiences, Dilemmas and Strategic Considerations

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### Abstract

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states committed under Article 5(2) (d) of the SADC Treaty to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of the obstacles to the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. The 2005 SADC Protocol on the Movement of People was celebrated as a giant step towards the realization of the regional integration objective of building SADC into a regional community that is fully integrated where citizens enjoy the freedom of movement across regional borders. Whilst substantial efforts have been invested in developing various legal and policy frameworks to open up borders for the free movement of people within SADC, thirty (30) years since the formation of SADC in April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC); the region is facing serious challenges relating to the free movement of people, migration and labour movement. In reality, SADC member states' governments have been confronted with serious feasibility challenges, complexities, risks and dilemmas as they attempt to implement commitments made towards the free movement of people in the region, with political, security, economic, strategic, and technical factors often cited as obstacles. This paper sought to critically reflect on the feasibility aspects, policy dilemmas at member state level as well as strategic considerations that stand on the way of free movement of people in SADC. The focus was on examining possibilities, capacities and prospects of SADC member states (in their collectivity and individuality) in addressing the underlying, structural and operational obstacles that are impeding the free movement of people in the region. Secondary data sources are used for analysis, and the three concepts of *free movement of people*, *migration* and *regional integration* provide conceptual lenses for analysis. Findings are key in providing perspectives on how SADC member states may need to collectively address the fundamental questions and issues that facilitate the free movement of people in the region.

**Keywords:** free movement of people, regional integration, SADC.

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## Introduction

The SADC regional integration agenda is aligned to the African regional integration agenda and imperative. The SADC policy and legal framework on the free movement of people, mainly comprising of provisions of Article 5(2) of the SADC Treaty of 1992 (Article 5); SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons of 2005, SADC Protocol on Trade of 1996, the SADC Protocol on Trade in Services of 2012, the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP, 2020–2030), the SADC Vision 2050 are all constructively aligned to the African Union legal and policy instruments that were adopted to guide member states towards facilitating the free movement of people on the continent and within their respective sub-regions. Whilst there is general policy consensus on the ideal need and desirability to allow the free movement of people in order to facilitate trade, labour circulation and investments in SADC; the empirical reality is that thirty (30) years since the formation of SADC in April 1980; the region is facing serious challenges relating to the free movement of people, migration and labour movement. SADC member states (especially those that are relatively stable economically, socially and politically) have been confronted with serious feasibility challenges, complexities, risks and dilemmas as they attempt to implement commitments made towards the free movement of people in the region, with political, security, social, economic, and strategic interests and considerations, as well as technical factors often cited as obstacles. This paper examines the efforts made by SADC in opening its borders to facilitate the free movement of people in the region. It further reflects on the empirical feasibility of allowing the free movement of people in SADC, and analyses the possible dilemmas and strategic considerations that confront SADC member states in adopting and implementing the free movement of people concept.

Organizationally, the first section is dedicated to conceptual framing, focusing mainly on the concept of 'free movement of people'. The third section presents a brief analysis of the existing policy and legal framework that governs the movement of people across borders within the region. An examination of the progress made in facilitating free movement of people and analytical discussion of the complexities and dilemmas in free movement of people is presented in the third section. The last section highlights the conclusion and recommendations of the study. This paper makes use of a miscellany of secondary data sources in the form of SADC reports, SADC member states policies and laws, books, journal articles, publications from national and international organizations, newspapers and other relevant materials.

## Conceptual Frames: The Concept of 'Free Movement of People' in Regional Integration

Generally, free movement of people as a concept denotes

The African Union (AU) Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Rights of Establishment (2018:5) defines free movement of people as follows;

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*“Free movement of persons means the right of nationals of a Member State to enter, move freely, and reside in another Member State in accordance with the laws of the host Member State and to exit the host Member State in accordance with the laws and procedures for exiting that Member State”.*

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Thus, the concept of free movement of people has generally been used in reference to mobility rights or the human right that every individual possesses to travel from one place to the other within the territory of a country, as well as the right to leave a country and return to it. Article 13 (1) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 constitutes a solid foundation of free movement rights under international law. The provision confers people with the right to freedom of movement within their state borders whilst Article 13 (2) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country” (United Nations, 1948). In a similar fashion, Article 12 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own” (see United Nations, 1966:176).

It has to be stated here, however, that the right to freedom of movement is not absolute or unfettered as countries have rights to limit the freedom of people to move into their territories. Exceptions under which the freedom of movement may be curtailed by states are provided for under the Article 12 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that restrictions on the freedom of movement may be effected “to protect national security (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others” (see (United Nations, 1966:176). In international law, therefore, there is scope and latitude in statutes, protocols and treaties for states to prohibit people from entering into their territories on the basis of national laws designed to protect their national security, public order or public health. This has oftentimes created and raised arguments of state sovereignty and territorial integrity (provided for under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter) as a political defense and justification whenever some governments are accused of restricting or controlling the entry of migrants into their territories or violating the rights of migrants, refugees or asylum seekers (Dauvergne, 2004; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). However, states have to understand that when they make commitments to allow the free movement of people and labour within the framework of regional integration, they cede part of their sovereignty – through the process of sovereignty re-configuration – for the ‘common good’ of regional development, regionalism, regionalization and globalization (Vhumbunu, 2019). Nevertheless, in reality, it is difficult to escape the temptations and tendencies of populism, public opinion pressures as well and the usual argument that ‘governments are obligated to do the best for their own citizens’ each time governments are reminded to open borders and facilitate the free movement of people.

Within the context of regional integration, the free movement of people is usually considered as one of the ‘four freedoms’ that facilitate deeper and wider integration. The ‘four freedoms’, that constitute the fundamental pillars in any linear model of economic integration as was adopted by the European Union, are *free movement of people, free movement of goods, free movement of services and free movement of capital*. It is these freedoms that are enablers of, and stepping stones towards, trade and market integration, macro-economic policy convergence, and harmonization of sectoral policies as states progress through the linear model of economic integration stages of a preferential trade area (PTA), free trade area (FTA), customs union (CU), common market (CM), economic and monetary union (EMU) and political union (PU) (see Balassa, 1994; Vhumbunu, 2019). Moreover, the free movement of people is considered a critical component of the three factors of production in economics (that is natural resources, human resources and capital).

Even within the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade regulatory architecture, the free movement of people is essential for the realization of the four modes of service supply provided by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of 1995, especially Mode Four (*presence of natural persons*) which entails the movement of labour to supply services in a foreign market. Through the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty of June 1991), the AU member states target that by the end of 2023, there should be free movement of people and effective rights of residence and establishment across Africa so as to achieve the African Economic Community by 2028. Notwithstanding the desirability of this milestone to achieve greater continental integration, the consideration of economic, social, political, security and strategic factors, benefits, merits, and demerits makes African countries and RECs to adopt different approaches in regulating the movement of people within their regions. This has slowed the attainment of free movement of people and opening of borders in most regional integration schemes including within North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Arab League (AL), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Central American Integration System (SICA) (see Sanchez-Alonzo, 2019; De Haas et al, 2019; Kaur, 2018).

There is always a heated debate in academic and policy circles with regard to the empirical socio-economic benefits of free movement of people in host states. Several empirical studies have mixed results and findings, which leaves the empirical question of whether the free movement of people benefits economies or not difficult to answer conclusively. While the benefits of free movement of people have often been argued to outweigh the real and potential benefits derived from it (see African Union, 2017:1); countries are often mindful of the reality that migrants may arrive and settle within their territories which may ultimately exert pressure on the host states' capacity to deliver social services, increase competition on scarce resources, worsen unemployment, widen inequalities and also pose threats to peace and security.

Some empirical studies have found out that countries and regions that allow for the free movement of people have often reaped vast socio-economic benefits in return through increasing the national workforce, addressing skills gaps and human capital development, labour market flexibility, taxes and other social contributions; and may bring innovative ideas and new ICT initiatives. In *Is Migration Good for the Economy?*, the OECD (2014) reports that in countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, labour migration continue to play an important role in national development. In the EU, migrant labour has been credited for addressing imbalances on the labour market, contributing taxes and other social contributions to host states, with migrants in Switzerland and Luxembourg providing a net benefit of around 2 percent of the GDP to the national fiscus (OECD, 2014:2).

However, studies by Dustmann et al (2008) have concluded that whilst migrant labour positively impact on public finances in general, it tends to decrease wages and the employment prospects for certain groups, particularly the low-skilled. With specific reference to the EU, Benton and Petrovic (2013), on the other hand, argue intra-EU mobility may have negative consequences because member states' governments have the inability to control the skill level of inflows into particular areas which increases the risk of influx of workers competing for available low-skilled jobs. This is the reality in most African RECs. For instance, even though South Africa has a Critical Skills List which guides the issuance of visas to migrant labour to address the skills gap needed to achieve the objectives of national strategic development programmes such as the National Development Plan (NDP) and Industrial Policy Action (IPAP); the government admittedly struggles to control the influx of migrants into low-skilled menial jobs. In terms of the common argument that free movement of people burden public service delivery in host states, Benton and Petrovic (2013:19)'s study on the EU has revealed that those EU migrants who have resided in the

UK long enough to be eligible for public services such as healthcare benefits are net contributors to the national fiscus and low users of public services. Perhaps, this is why the European Union (EU) countries usually experience problems in reconciling the right to free movement of people and the policy objectives of fighting poverty and social exclusion (Verschuere, 2015).

Even outside the EU in other regional integration schemes in North America, Latin America, Asia, Pacific, and the Middle East, there appears to be anti-free movement of people waves. When Donald John Trump was the President of the United States, he proposed policies such as the construction of the US–Mexico Border Wall, more border patrols and stricter deportation policies all to prevent migrants from “taking [US] jobs”, including the enactment of the *Build the Wall, Enforce the Law Act* of 2018 which amended the *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act* of 1996 (see United States Government, 2018). In ASEAN, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) calls for free movement of people have continued to exclude the movement of low or lower-skilled workers despite the fact that 87 percent of intra-ASEAN migrants are either low-skilled or unskilled workers (Olivier, 2018). This is because, whilst migrants address labour shortages and facilitate skills upgrading; the free movement of people in ASEAN is considered to exacerbate the challenges posed by migrants who are mostly undocumented, with 60 percent of intra-ASEAN migrants being informally employed (Olivier, 2018).

Within the context of African regional integration; the free movement of people (together with that of capital, goods and services) is understood to be fundamental in promoting regional integration, intra-African trade and investment, tourism facilitation, pan-Africanism, free circulation of ideas, education and research, labour mobility and increase remittances (see Vhumbunu and Rudigi, 2020; Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2021; Adepoju, 2002; Kayizzi–Mugerwa et al, 2014). With regard to remittances, for instance, Sub-Saharan African countries received US\$42 billion in remittances in 2020, although this remains lower than other regions such as South Asia (US\$147 billion), East Asia and Pacific (US\$136 billion), Latin America and the Caribbean (US\$103 billion), Middle East and North Africa (US\$56 billion), and Europe and Central Asia (US\$56 billion), for the same year (World Bank, 2021). Some African countries receive huge remittances annually whose transformational impact cannot be underestimated. In 2019, for example, Nigeria received remittances amounting to US\$23.8 billion, and Ghana received US\$3.5 billion, Kenya (US\$2.8 billion) and Senegal (US\$2.5 billion) (see Knomad, 2022).

Some benefits also accrue in other economic sectors through free movement of people. In Seychelles, the abolition of visas for African nationals is reported to have resulted in a 7 percent annual growth in tourism between 2009 and 2014 (African Development Bank, 2016). After the relaxation of its visa requirements, Rwanda also experienced a 22 percent increase in African travelers into the country in 2013, with the countries cross-border trade with Kenya and Uganda surging by 50 percent (African Development Bank, 2016). However, African countries – especially those that are relatively stable economically and politically – have tended to consistently approach the regional agenda of free movement of people with measured caution and reservations. They fear that acceding to free movement of people will be accompanied by the uncontrollable influx of citizens (especially undocumented or illegal migrants) from geographically contiguous states in search of economic opportunities and ‘welfare tourism’/‘benefit tourism’ which would compromise their national economic, social and political security whilst also pressuring their public service delivery capacities. In the end there is ‘criminalization of migrants’ and xenophobic tendencies (Atak and Simeon, 2018; Akinola and Klimowich, 2018).

The issuance of entry visas, work permits, residence permits and other relevant permits, visas and passes for free intra-African travel is a nightmare in most countries despite the implementation of the AfCFTA and the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM) initiative (see Hirsch, 2022;



Olasoji, 2022). In addition to this, one of the Agenda 2063 flagship projects is *The African Passport and Free Movement of People* whose aim is to remove restrictions for Africans to travel, work and reside across their own continent. Domestication of regional and continental commitments, however, remains a challenge. For instance, the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons has been signed by 33 member states but up to now only four countries have ratified the Protocol, that is Mali, Niger, Rwanda and Sao Tome & Principe (African Union, 2022). With intra-African migration accounting for 48 percent of the total migration of Africans (African Centre for Strategic Studies, 2022), consideration of free movement of people that advances regional integration, continental growth and development is critical as it is urgent generally in Africa, and particularly in SADC.

### **SADC Policy and Legal Framework on the Free Movement of People**

Considering that RECs are building blocks for the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC), the SADC policy and legal frameworks that have been put in place to facilitate the free movement of people are constructively aligned to African Union policy and legal frameworks. At the continental level, the AU Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty of 1991), the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPM) of 2006, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa of 2006 and Plan of Action (2018–2030), the African Union Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment of 2018, AU Agenda 2063, the African Passport Initiative, and objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) all have objectives that obligate African countries to gradually remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital and the right of residence and establishment in Member States.

The African Union Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons provides the right of entry which includes the right for African citizens to travel across the continent without visas (Article 6); the right of establishment which includes the right to set up businesses or be employed in any African country (Article 16); and the right of residence which includes the right to become a resident in any African country (*see African Union, 2018*). In consistent with the objectives of the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, SADC adopted the SADC Common Position on the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in 2017. In the SADC Common Position, SADC member states agreed that they will not sign the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons until a number of pre-conditions have been met, and these pre-conditions include the existence of peace, security and stability on the continent; macro-economic convergence and reduction of economic imbalances in Africa; and compatibility of ICT systems at ports of entry to facilitate exchange of information amongst African states (*see Department of Home Affairs of South Africa, 2017:4*).

In SADC, the following nine legal and policy instruments guide the REC and member states in implementing initiatives meant to facilitate the free movement of people in the region;

- The SADC Treaty of 1992
- The SADC Protocol on Trade of 1996
- The SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons of 2005
- The SADC Protocol on Trade in Services of 2012
- The SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour of 2014
- The SADC Common Position on the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (2017)
- SADC Labour Migration Action Plan (LMAP, 2020–2025)



- The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP, 2020–2030)
- The SADC Vision 2050

Article 5(2) (d) of the SADC Treaty of 1992 provides that SADC shall “develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the Region generally, among member states”. The SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons of 2005 (which replaced the draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons of 1996 and entered into force in 2001) has its main objective as that of developing “policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of persons of the Region generally into and within the territories of State Parties”. The Protocol, under Article 3, obligates member states to allow other SADC citizens to enter into their territories without a visa (or non-chargeable visa) for a maximum of 90 days per year for “bona fide visit” and in accordance with the laws of their respective national laws. Member states are also obligated to facilitate temporary and permanent residency, establishment and working. SADC member states also commit, through Article 7 of the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons, to harmonize their national laws, statutory rules, regulations and immigration practices that facilitate the free movement of people in the region. The conditions of entry of persons into SADC member states is governed by Article 14 (2) of the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons, and these include the possession of valid travel documents, presentation of evidence of sufficient funds to support oneself for the duration of the visit, entry through official ports of entry, and that entry is only granted to persons who are not prohibited immigrants. Relatedly, the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour of 2014 and the SADC Labour Migration Action Plan (LMAP, 2020–2025) both create a legal and policy framework for labour migration and labour mobility in SADC.

The SADC Protocol on Trade of 1996 and the SADC Protocol on Trade in Services of 2012 are key legal pillars of the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) that was achieved in August 2008. These two Protocols recognize the utility of allowing for the free movement of people, as an essential component of trade in services, in order to develop SADC economies. In particular, the SADC Protocol on Trade in Services provides general obligations for SADC member states with respect to the treatment of services and service suppliers whilst mandating them to progressively negotiate the removal of barriers to the free movement of services.

The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP, 2020–2030) acknowledges the importance of free movement of people in advancing the regional integration agenda in SADC whilst the SADC Vision 2050 recognizes that the free movement of people assists in creating an environment that fosters regional cooperation and integration. In particular, the RISDP (2020–2030) emphasizes the vitality of free movement of people in the SADC regional integration matrix under three selected pillars of SADC regional integration, namely the Industrial Development and Market Integration pillar, the Infrastructure Development pillar, and the Social and Human Capital Development pillar (see RISDP, 2020:10).

### **Free Movement of People in SADC: Tracking Empirical Progress, Complexities and Dilemmas**


It is now 30 years since SADC was formed, when the SADC Heads of State and Government agreed to transform the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) on 17 August 1992 so that the REC focuses on the integration of economic development. Whilst notable milestones have been achieved in ensuring the free movement of people within the region through the SADC Treaty of 1992, and the other above-discussed instruments, in overall the movement of people within the REC is still lagging on four fronts and indicators. Firstly, the state of free

movement of people in SADC is not consistent with the SADC visions and aspirations as reflected in the REC's legal and policy instruments. Secondly, SADC is way behind the targets set in the Abuja Treaty of June 1991 in which AU member states agreed that by the end of 2023, there should be free movement of people and effective rights of residence and establishment across Africa so as to achieve the African Economic Community by 2028. Thirdly, SADC's performance in the free movement of people dimension of regional integration is lagging behind when compared to that of other African RECs. Fourthly, there are several concerning legitimate reports of existing barriers to the free movement of people in SADC as well as continued mistreatment and discrimination of SADC citizens in other SADC countries, including xenophobic violence.

### Status of Free Movement of People in the SADC Region

A more objective assessment of free movement of people in African RECs has been attempted through the Africa Regional Integration Index (ARII)<sup>1</sup> – developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) jointly with the AU and African Development Bank (AfDB). The ARII shows that SADC member states are making slow progress in facilitating the free movement of people as shown on Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1:** The State of Free Movement of People in SADC Countries



Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)/African Union (AU)/African Development Bank (AfDB, 2022). Available at: <https://www.integrate-africa.org/>


As shown in Figure 1, half of SADC member states (50 percent), have scores below the African average score of 0.441 in terms of free movement of people. Overall, SADC member states, except Comoros, still have stringent visa regimes and have not ratified the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment of 2018. In fact, a number of SADC member states are yet to sign the Protocol, namely, Botswana, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles, Eswatini and Zambia (see African Union, 2022).

1 The Africa Regional Integration Index (ARII) is a composite index comprising 16 indicators grouped into five dimensions, namely: trade integration, productive integration, macro-economic integration, infrastructure integration and free movement of people. There are three indicators used by ARII for measuring the performance of countries in terms of the extent to which people can move in the region for tourism, social purposes, trade and business, that is, (a) the number of countries that may obtain a visa on arrival; (b) the number of countries that require a visa, and (c) the number of countries that have ratified the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of People.

In Africa, out of the 19 higher-performing countries with over 0.668 scores on the ARII Index, SADC accounts for six of them (that is Comoros, Mozambique, Madagascar, Seychelles, Malawi and Zimbabwe). Out of the 19 worst-performing countries in terms of free movement of people in Africa (with a below-average score which is less than 0.333), SADC accounts for five of them (namely Zambia, Botswana, Eswatini, South Africa and Namibia). The continued existence of stringent visa regimes and restrictions on the free movement of people cripples regional integration in SADC as it impedes intra-SADC investments, intra-SADC tourism, restrains labour mobility and disrupts trade in services.

By inter-REC comparison, SADC's performance is below several RECs with respect to free movement of people as depicted on Figure 2 below.

**Figure 2:** The State of Free Movement of People in SADC compared to other RECs



Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)/African Union (AU)/African Development Bank (AfDB, 2022). Available at: <https://www.integrate-africa.org/>

The RECs of ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD and CEN-SAD are performing better than SADC in terms of free movement of people as exhibited on Figure 2 above. These high performing African RECs are making great progress in facilitating the free movement of people within their regional configurations, despite facing implementation challenges. The EAC, for instance, introduced the East African Passport (with diplomatic, service and ordinary categories) since January 2018 as a travel document to ease intra-EAC border crossing for EAC citizens and the East African Passport has a six months' multiple entry validity and is valid for up to 10 years (East African Community, 2017). In addition, some EAC member states (namely Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda) adopted the East African Tourist Visa (EATV) which is a single-entry electronic travel permit for tourists to travel across the three countries using once document (Ngoga et al, 2021). ECOWAS also introduced the ECOWAS Passport in December 2000 to allow for visa-free movement by ECOWAS citizens (UNECA, 2022a). SADC performs better than only three RECs (that is, ECCAS, AMU and COMESA) out of the eight RECs recognized by the AU.

There has been a slow pace in the domestication of legal instruments meant to facilitate the free movement of people in SADC. Currently, the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons of 2005 is not yet in force because it has not been ratified by the requisite two-thirds of the REC's member states as prescribed under Article 36 of the Protocol. Some provisions of the

Protocol make it difficult to realize the intentions to facilitate the free movement of people. For instance, whilst member states are obligated to allow visa-free entry of SADC citizens into their country under Article 3 of the Protocol as well as a permanent residence, temporary residence and establishment; visa-free admission specified under Article 14 are too demanding and difficult to satisfy for several SADC citizens. An example of legal provisions and conditions that have resulted in the illegal entry of migrants into other SADC member states is the provision that admission of entry is conditioned upon the presentation of evidence of sufficient funds to support oneself for the duration of the visit as well as the 90-day maximum visa-free entry per year provision. Most SADC migrants, especially labour migrants who are permanently or temporarily out of their countries in search of employment and business opportunities in SADC countries that are relatively stable and economically prosperous such as South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius. The majority of these SADC migrants are impoverished to the extent that they do not have sufficient funds to present to immigration officials upon entry as evidence that they will be able to support themselves in the countries of their destination. Even those who manage to present such monetary evidence, the majority of them are unable to satisfy the visa extension requirements or application requirements for alternative visas/work permits for them to continue staying or working in the host countries. In the end, SADC migrants are forced to live in their host countries as undocumented immigrants which exposes them to the vices of migrant labour exploitation, corruption by law enforcement agencies and discrimination in accessing essential public services.

Due to the existence of strict conditions of entry and stringent visa requirements, there has been a surge in the use of illegal border crossing points in intra-SADC migration and cross-border trade. For example, at the Beitbridge Boarder Post, there are reports that several migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and cross-border traders from other SADC countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and DRC use illegal and irregular border crossing points through paid 'escorts' who even use canoes and floaters during the rainy season to carry them across the Limpopo River and then connect to Musina Town, in Limpopo Province, South Africa using well-connected commuter omnibus drivers/'cross-border drivers' (popularly known as '*Omalayitsha*') (Tshivhashe, 2020a; Ncube, 2017; Evans, 2015). In some instances, corrupt border control agents are complicit as they demand bribes to allow irregular migrants a safe passage (see Tshivhashe, 2020a; Evans, 2015). This is a two-way process, as many travellers also use the same modus operandi crossing the border from South Africa into Zimbabwe, avoiding the official exit point at Beitbridge Border Post as they would have either entered into South Africa illegally or would have overstayed in South Africa well-after the expiry of their visas, itself a serious offense that would attract an exorbitant fine and banned from entering South Africa for a specified period depending on the duration of overstay, or even face imprisonment if one cannot afford to pay the stipulated fine.<sup>2</sup> However, it has to be stated here that this is not unique to South Africa alone, all SADC countries have more or less similar provisions and rules in their Immigration laws. This has given rise to the phenomenon of migrant smuggling in SADC, together with human trafficking (see Vhumbunu, 2020). For instance, the *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons of 2020* reveals that the SADC countries of Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia reported trafficking of victims who are nationalities of other SADC countries (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, 2021:3).

2 According to the Immigration Act Number 13 of 2002, a South African visa overstay of less than 30 days attracts a ban of a period of 12 months during which one is given the status of an "undesirable person", and if a traveller overstays their visa for over 30 days, the effected ban will be for at least 5 years, and one is also given the status of an "undesirable person". In both cases, visa overstay attracts imprisonment if one is not unable to pay a fine.

Other than challenges relating to strict conditions of entry and stay imposed on travellers in some SADC countries, the emergence of anti-migrant sentiments in a number of SADC countries, also directed at other migrant SADC citizens has been an obstacle to the free movement of people in the region. In some cases, this has manifested in collective xenophobic violence. For example, as of 11 July 2022, a total of 942 incidents of xenophobic violence have been reported in South Africa since 1994, and this has resulted in the death of 642 people and displacement of 123 760 people whilst 4 849 shops have been looted during the xenophobic skirmishes (Xenowatch, 2022). Cases of systematic discrimination and stereotyping of migrants as well as xenophobic attitudes – in some instances accompanied by violence and/or conflict – directed at other SADC citizens have also been widely reported in Botswana (see Akinola, 2018; Campbell and Crush, 2015; The East African, 2014).

Several reports against intolerance, animosity, harassment, and inhuman treatment of both documented and undocumented SADC migrants at other SADC countries' ports of entry continue to be widely reported in the region. For instance, women traders continue to be subjected to harassment and violence at border crossings (see Tizora, 2021; Jacobson and Joekes, 2019; Blumberg et al, 2016). In SADC, where 70–80 percent of informal cross-border traders (ICBTs) are women, 34 percent of women ICBTs have reported sexual harassment by border officials with other cases of men reporting sexual exploitation, coercion and harassment by border agents and police (Blumberg et al, 2016:37; Tizora, 2021). Facilitating free movement of trade will even be beneficial to intra-SADC trade, as ICBT is currently contributing 30–30 percent of intra-regional trade in SADC (Tizora, 2021). However, the strict interpretation of border control laws and measures by immigration, customs and security personnel at ports of entry consequently forces travellers, cross-border traders and migrants to utilize alternative routes and other illegal means used to evade the stringent rules and measures that regulate the cross-border movement of people, which then motivates migrant smuggling. For instance, South Africa deported 351 840 migrants between 2012 and 2016, with 343 774 of these (98 percent) being nationals of SADC countries (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, 2022) whilst a total of 14 859 undocumented migrants were also deported between 1 April 2020 and 31 March 2021, with four SADC countries (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Lesotho) accounting for over 90 percent of these deportations (Chambers, 2021). In January 2022, it was reported that South Africa arrested and deported over 89 000 undocumented migrants (eNCA, 2022). In Botswana, a total of 22 000 undocumented migrants from Zimbabwe were deported in 2015, and another 29 000 were deported in 2018 (Dube, 2019).

The construction of circumvallation structures and impenetrable border walls in SADC states may not be a positive sign and signal that member states have embraced the concept of free movement of people. This re-territorialization of the region may serve to remind everyone about the pre-colonial fortresses that characterized the state formation struggles between and among kingdoms, fiefdoms and empires that preceded the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Southern Africa. Whilst this may easily be normalized as a global trend and pattern of de-globalization since a number of countries in the world such as the USA, Kenya, Tunisia, Estonia, Saudi Arabia, Hungary, and others have been reported to have announced and/or begun constructing barriers on their frontiers since 2015 (see Vallet, 2022; Gianna-Grun, 2021); the emergence of border fences in SADC may be argued to be against the letter and spirit of the SADC Protocol on Free Movement of Person and SADC Common Vision for an integrated and prosperous society. Certainly, there may be other dignified, humane and brotherly means and ways of controlling the irregular movement of people within SADC than the reinforcement and fortification of borders. The situation is worsened when borders are over-militarized, with constant deployment of troops, military patrols, drones and/or digital surveillance; especially when there responses are not a reaction to, or preventive



measures against, any serious security threats of trans-national terrorism, insurgency, conflict, pandemics, epidemics or any emergency situations. South Africa, for instance, announced the deployment of helicopters by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to patrol the Zimbabwe-South African border in Musina and boat patrols along the Limpopo River, with the Minister of the Department of Home Affairs arguing that “strict measures” will continue to be implemented “to stop people [from] entering the country illegally” as this undermined South Africa’s sovereignty (eNCA, 2021).

In 2003, Botswana started constructing a 500 metres-long and 2.4-metre-high electric fence at its border with Zimbabwe. Although the Government of Botswana insisted that the border fence was motivated by the desire to control cross-border livestock movement in light of deadly foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreaks that were affecting the country’s lucrative beef exports into the European Union market together with the “problem with Zimbabwean illegal immigrants” (News24, 2006), the then Zimbabwean Ambassador to Botswana argued that “Botswana [was] trying to create another Gaza Strip” through the barrier, and further observed that “people [would] continue to destroy the fence because it has divided families on either side of the border” (Carroll, 2003). Likewise, South Africa erected a 40 metre-long and 1.8 metres high ‘border security’ fence at its border with Zimbabwe at the cost of R7 million (around US\$2.5 million) although the border fence has now been damaged and vandalized, allowing easy crossing by irregular migrants from the region (Tshivhashe, 2020b). Border fence projects, however, also appear to be motivated by anti-migration populism and therefore become populist public relations exercises where governments must be seen to be taking action against nationalistic anti-immigrant sentiments and the unregulated influx of undocumented migrants in affected SADC countries.

### **Complexities and Dilemmas in Facilitating the Free Movement of People in SADC**

Whilst there appears to be broad consensus amongst SADC member states in their deliberations on the need for deepened and widened regional integration in the region, including the free movement of goods to facilitate intra-regional trade, investments, tourism, labour mobility and skills circulation; the empirical reality on the ground suggests otherwise. Individual member states’ positions on the free movement of people are guided by their realist intentions to protect their national economic and strategic political interests. Member states that are relatively stable and economically prosperous in SADC (such as South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and Seychelles) have often exhibited presentiment and disquietude towards wholesale and wholesome embrace of the concept of free movement of people. There are legitimate fears that allowing the free movement of people will overwhelm their domestic public service delivery capacities whilst presenting socio-economic challenges relating to competition for shrinking jobs and other economic opportunities.


The SADC Common Position on the AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons which was adopted in 2017 clarifies the complexities and dilemmas confronting most SADC member states. In the SADC Common Position, member states of SADC agreed not to ratify the AU Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Rights of Establishment. The same pre-conditions are also relevant in explaining the reasons behind the stonewalling and foot-dragging that characterize SADC member states’ negotiations on commitments relating to the free movement of people. The SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons was developed in 1996 but it went through extensive revisions and reviews before it was replaced by a more restrictive SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movements of Persons adopted in 2005 (UNECA, 2022b). The following three main issues



therefore continue to present complexities and dilemmas to member states in the regional quest for free movement of people 30 years since the formation of SADC.

(a) *Existence of economic imbalances amongst SADC countries.* There is apparently wide disparities between and among SADC member states in terms of socio-economic development which defines the pull and push factors behind intra-SADC movement of people. Economically advanced countries in SADC currently host more economic migrants from fellow SADC countries as they search for better economic opportunities, especially employment. For instance, on the latest Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>3</sup> rankings, Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana and South Africa are considered to be highly and very highly developed countries, with HDI indices of over 0.7 index score whilst other SADC countries such as Malawi, DRC and Mozambique are very underdeveloped and constitute the bottom 16 of the 189 countries ranked on the HDI Index, with less than 0.5 index scores (United Nations Development Programme, 2020). Figure 3 shows the state of disparities in SADC in terms of human development and prevalence of poverty.

**Figure 3:** State of Human Development and Poverty Rates in SADC countries as of 2020



Source: UNDP Human Development Report (2020) and World Bank (2022)

As depicted on Figure 3 above, it is Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia that have very low levels of poverty and corresponding high levels of human development in SADC. It is therefore not surprising that these are the same countries that are experiencing an influx of intra-SADC migrants, mostly in search of economic opportunities. Sustainable solutions to prevent unnecessary migration, especially low value-adding and often unwanted unskilled labour or migrants without any critical skills required by migrant-receiving countries, should emphasize more on effectively addressing the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality in all SADC countries.

Although other SADC countries ranked low in economic development are hosting substantial populations of migrants, these are in the form of refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region. The DRC, for example, hosts a total of 529 000 refugees and

<sup>3</sup> The Human Development Index (HDI) is a statistic composite index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators, which is used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Human Development Report Office to rank and measure a country's development.

asylum seekers whereas Tanzania hosts 246 000, Zambia (105 000), Angola (57 000) and Malawi (52 440) (see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). There have been arguments from migrants hosting states that the influx of migrants is burdening their public service delivery capacities and increasing competition for scarce economic opportunities. In South Africa, there have been clamours for the removal of migrants with the proliferation of anti-migrants' vigilant groups and movements such as *Operation Dudula*, *Put South Africa First*, and *All Truck Drivers Foundation (ATDF)* (see Landau and Misago, 2022). These are also piling political pressure on the South African government to seal off their national borders and strictly enforce the national migration regime. Perhaps, this may explain why South Africa opts for a 'phased approach' in implementing the regional instruments on the free movement of people (see Department of Home Affairs of South Africa, 2017:5).

(b) *Peace, security and stability challenges in SADC.* With widespread conflicts and wars in Africa as well as some SADC member states, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in SADC countries continues to increase. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, 2022) reports that between 1 January 2022 and 30 June 2022; the Southern African region experienced a total of 465 riots, 114 violence against civilians, 11 war battles and a single incident of violent explosions or remote violence. Currently, there is Ansar al-Sunna Islamist terrorist insurgency in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado since October 2017 whilst the DRC has been at war since the late 1990s whilst other SADC countries such as Zimbabwe, Eswatini and Lesotho have experienced protracted instability mainly triggered and perpetuated by contested election outcomes and democratic transitional politics. There are legitimate fears that such conflicts pose security threats to other SADC countries and conflict-induced displacements in the form of refugees and asylum seekers may worsen in the event that there is free movement of people in the region. All this can only be addressed if SADC countries commit to create conditions that are conducive for peace and stability whilst SADC member states need to adopt a new approach that seriously aim at addressing conflict and instability in the region as envisaged in the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security of 2001, the SADC RISDP of 2020-2030, the SADC Revised Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II) of 2012, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003 as well as the African Union initiative of *Silencing the Guns by 2030*.

(c) *Compatibility of ICT systems at Ports of Entry in SADC to facilitate the exchange of information.* The immigration systems in most SADC member states are not automated and interfaced to allow for digitalization of immigration system as well as exchange of information. South Africa, for instance, has an Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) and Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) which feeds into the Department of Home Affairs' Enhanced Movement Control System (EMCS). The EMCS also assists with digital database capture of information relating to fugitives or international terrorists such that they are prevented from entry at ports of entry. Although such ICT facilities are considered crucial in the *SADC Guidelines for Coordinated Border Management* as several SADC countries continue with their e-Government programmes which are also automating their respective immigration departments; most SADC countries do not have such advanced and compatible ICT systems at their ports of entry. The absence of a system comparable to the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS), EU Entry/Exit System (EES), Eurodac (for collection, transmission, and comparison of fingerprints), and use of machine-readable travel documents (MRTDs) makes it difficult to facilitate efficient screening and security checks of travellers and migrants, whilst limiting information sharing that is fundamental in free movement of people. All this may be better implemented and coordinated when the relevant immigration laws in SADC member states are harmonized.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The conclusion from the analysis is that 30 years since the formation of SADC in April 1980; the REC has been very slow in facilitating the free movement of people within the region based on the focused indicators. The status of free movement of people in SADC has not been consistent with the SADC visions and aspirations as reflected in the REC's legal and policy instruments. SADC is lagging behind in pursuit of the targets set in the Abuja Treaty of June 1991 in which AU member states agreed that by the end of 2023, there should be free movement of people and effective rights of residence and establishment across Africa. By regional comparison, SADC's performance in free movement of people dimension of regional integration is lagging most of the African RECs. There are several existing barriers to the free movement of people in SADC as well as continued mistreatment and discrimination of SADC citizens in other SADC countries, including xenophobic violence. In recommendation, SADC countries are encouraged to effectively implement its RISDP (2020–2030) and SADC Vision 2050 such that the conditions necessary for the free movement of people are achieved, namely, addressing economic disparities; ensuring peace and stability in the region; implementing pro-poor national policies that addresses the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality; and developing strategies that harness the potential of migrants into practical socio-economic opportunities. In reality, though, the recurrent convoluted and involuted challenge has been that the existence of an assortment of protocols, policies, plans, programmes and projects meant to promote the free movement of people has not been accompanied by effective implementation and compliance enforcement. Long-term plans and visions such as the SADC Vision 2050 do not have strict targets and milestones that are accompanied by regional actions and consequences for member states that fail to reach them. In the end, free movement of people and the attainment and realization of a “peaceful, inclusive, competitive, middle-income industrialized region, where all citizens enjoy sustainable economic well-being, justice and freedom” as envisaged in the SADC Vision 2050, may continue to be elusive and remain a mirage or a political phantasmagoria.

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# The Global Covid-19 Pandemic

## The Politics of Science or the Science of Politics?

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### Abstract

The politics of science, or better still, the political science of global politics is what the world is battling, concerning the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, today. Whereas scientific disciplines such as virology and epidemiology would usually take centre stage when an outbreak such as Covid-19 strikes, and now owing to the vacuum that has been created by conflicting and contradictory information from health experts on Covid-19, global health is opened up to, or left up to, political giants. Health matters of virology and epidemiology surrounding Covid-19 have, thus, been reduced to issues of *politicking*. The World Health Organisation's voice (WHO), despite its sustained campaign and provision of information on Covid-19, is drowned and almost silenced by the number of health authorities and experts that have come out to refute mainstream information and strategies on combating and managing Covid-19. As such, the politicization of Covid-19 and the coloniality of knowledge and information surrounding Covid-19 may very well be the main issue of contention than the Covid-19 itself. This paper, therefore, seeks to unmask the political dimensions that are camouflaged by the Covid-19 pandemic and expose the real issues that Covid-19 has allowed to thrive and are, as a result, sustained by the Covid-19 crisis. Using the qualitative research methodology, I set out to discuss and analyse the debates on Covid-19 as have been proffered in the public domain. Thus, the method of research is a desktop analysis of academic articles, newspaper articles, social media pieces and mainstream television pieces, among others. I offer a decolonial account on Covid-19.

**Keywords:** Covid-19; Coloniality; Afro-decolonial thought; World Health Organisation; Political Science; Scientism.

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### Introduction

The politics of science, or better still, the political science of global politics is what the world is battling, concerning the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, today. Whereas scientific disciplines such as virology and epidemiology would usually, and should, take centre stage when an outbreak such as Covid-19 strikes, and now owing to the vacuum that has been created by conflicting and contradictory information from health experts on Covid-19, global health is opened up to, or left up to, political giants. Health matters of virology and epidemiology surrounding Covid-19 have, thus, been reduced to issues of *politicking* and *poli-trickery*, I argue.

The World Health Organisation's voice (WHO), despite its sustained campaign and provision of information on Covid-19, is drowned and almost silenced by the number of health authorities and experts that have come out to refute mainstream information and strategies on combating and managing Covid-19. As such, the politicisation of Covid-19 and the coloniality of knowledge

and information surrounding Covid-19 may very well be the main issue of contention than the Covid-19 itself.

This paper, therefore, seeks to unmask the political dimensions that are camouflaged by the Covid-19 pandemic and expose more sinister issues that Covid-19 has allowed to thrive and are, as a result, sustained by the Covid-19 crisis. Using the qualitative research methodology, I set out to discuss and analyse the debates on Covid-19 as have been proffered in the public domain. Thus, a desktop analysis of academic articles, newspaper articles, social media pieces and mainstream television pieces, among others, is employed. I offer an afro-decolonial perspective on Covid-19.

### **The Politics of Science: Covid-19 According to the World Health Organisation**

The Coronavirus (henceforward Covid-19, interchangeably Covid) that broke out in Huan, China, in December of 2019 has caused untold suffering to most countries and citizens of the world. The World Health Organisation (WHO), a global institution that operates under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), declared Covid-19 a global pandemic on 11 March 2020 (Cucinotta & Vanelli, 2020: 157). The season or timing of the outbreak was set out to cause infections at cosmic proportions seeing that it broke out in December, a season that is associated with massive travel due to the festive (Christmas) holiday. In response to the declared pandemic, many countries imposed strict travel bans and lockdowns on their territories. This caused inconveniences for some travellers that were stranded out of their countries of domicile. Scientifically, Covid is caused by a virus (Mayo Clinic, 2022); as is the nature of all viruses, it is, therefore, incurable, albeit it can be managed and treated. This virus attacks the human respiratory system causing difficulties in breathing. If left untreated, it can cause acute respiratory diseases leading to choking and death (WHO, 2022; Mayo Clinic, 2022). As a result, more than 6.3 million people have lost their lives to Covid; moreover, a further half a billion people have tested positive for Covid-19 positive to date – at the time of writing (WHO, 2022). Covid-19 affects immune-compromised persons – persons who have underlying health conditions such as diabetes, HIV, and hypertension to mention a few health conditions – more than relatively healthy persons. It is easily transmittable, especially in unventilated or poorly ventilated places and spaces (Mayo Clinic, 2022; WHO, 2021).

### **Strategies to Combat Covid-19**

Several strategies have been promulgated by the WHO that are designed to combat and manage the spread of the Corona Virus. These include, the mandatory wearing of masks in public spaces, albeit some spaces and countries have since eased these, sanitising of hands and surfaces regularly, and maintaining a safe social distance – although this has raised some thorny issues around the term social distancing to indicate that it is synonymous with physical distancing that is associated with some form of apartheid, self-isolation when one presents with some Covid-19 symptoms, and in the extreme cases, enforced quarantining of people suspected to have Covid, or have come into close contact with people suffering from Covid (WHO, 2021).

At the core of these combative strategies are hygiene and cleanliness. This presents further challenges to people who are homeless, the poor who cannot afford masks, sanitisers, and at times, people who cannot afford enough space for social distancing as is ordinarily the case in slums and squatter camps.

### **Vaccine Development and Production**

The production of Covid-19 vaccines has also brought in many challenges. Not only have the challenges been with its distribution, but there were also challenges to the patenting of it, as

well as, the timeframe in developing it. According to the World Health Organization (2020), “every vaccine must go through extensive and rigorous testing to ensure it is safe before it can be introduced in a country’s vaccine programme”. The rigorous testing involves three basic phases to the development of any vaccine. Therefore, there is a standard procedure and timeframe for developing and testing for the efficacy of a vaccine.

According to the World Health Organization (2020), the established scientific phases involved in the development of a vaccine, at the clinical level, are as follows:

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**Phase 1**

The vaccine is given to a small number of volunteers to assess its safety, confirm it generates an immune response, and determine the right dosage. Generally, in this phase vaccines are tested in young, healthy adult volunteers.

**Phase 2**

The vaccine is then given to several hundred volunteers to further assess its safety and ability to generate an immune response. Participants in this phase have the same characteristics (such as age, and sex) as the people for whom the vaccine is intended. There are usually multiple trials in this phase to evaluate various age groups and different formulations of the vaccine. A group that did not get the vaccine is usually included in the phase as a comparator group to determine whether the changes in the vaccinated group are attributed to the vaccine, or have happened by chance.

**Phase 3**

The vaccine is next given to thousands of volunteers – and compared to a similar group of people who didn’t get the vaccine but received a comparator product – to determine if the vaccine is effective against the disease it is designed to protect against and to study its safety in a much larger group of people. Most of the time phase three trials are conducted across multiple countries and multiple sites within a country to assure the findings of the vaccine performance apply to many different populations.

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Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014) in corroboration of the World Health Organization’s vaccine development procedure, avers that “[t]he general stages of the development cycle of a vaccine are: Exploratory stage; Pre-clinical stage; Clinical development; Regulatory review and approval; Manufacturing and Quality control”.

The World Economic Forum (2020) concurs with this position and goes on to state that phase 1 alone, normally takes between 1 to 2 years to complete, where 10 different vaccines are developed and are checked whether, or not, they are safe. So, the safety of the vaccines is the number one criterion at this clinical stage.

Following the success(es) of phase 1, the scientific process is taken to phase 2 where 5 vaccines are screened from the initial 10 identified in phase 1. This phase of any vaccine development usually takes between 2 to 3 years, where the scientific process determines whether, or not, the vaccine activates an immune response. In other words, in phase 2, it is the response efficacy of the vaccine that is under scrutiny (World Economic Forum, 2020).

This naturally leads to phase 3, where the scientific process determines whether the vaccine does protect against the disease. This usually takes between 2 to 4 years. Phase 3 of the scientific process screens the five potential vaccines identified in phase 2; this leads to selecting the most effective of the 5 vaccines, thereby preferring only 1 vaccine (World Economic Forum, 2020).

In summarising the scientific process of developing a vaccine, the World Economic Forum (2020) underscores that “[a] vaccine usually takes more than ten years to develop and costs up to 500 million” United States dollars.

Now, Covid-19 only broke out in 2019 and by the end of the first quarter of 2020, there was already a vaccine. How could a vaccine developed in under 2 years have met all the rigorous “scientific” procedures to determine its efficacy? This suggests that the scientific processes and procedures were relaxed with the development of Covid-19 vaccines; granted that it was an emergency and therefore it merited an urgent solution. Be that as it may, the silencing of alternative voices on the development of vaccines – including propositions of alternative medicines that acted as some sort of vaccines by the World Health Organization particularly reveals double standards of the powers that be. This is what is more of the politics of science – hence political science, that was and still is, leading in the development of Covid-19 vaccines, more than the scientific processes and procedures, I argue. The Covid-19 vaccine was developed outside of the ordinary scientific vaccine-production procedures and yet we are led to believe that scientific rigour and methods must, and should, lead in understanding, preventing and managing the Covid-19 pandemic. Knowledge and information on and about Covid-19 coming out from alternative spaces – by alternative spaces, I mean outside of the World Health Organization’s scope and sphere of control – are termed conspiracy theories. However, it is some of these so-called conspiracy theories that I want to interrogate to expose the double standards of “Western” science – which is scientism.

### Covid-19 ‘Conspiracy Theories’, or are they?

There are some medical fundi who have come out to vehemently challenge the information that has been proffered by the World Health Organization on the management and treatment of Covid-19. For instance, Dr Stella Immanuel, a Cameroonian-born US citizen who practices medicine in Houston, Texas, came out on social media, Facebook and YouTube specifically, pleading with authorities to allow medical practitioners to prescribe Hydroxychloroquine (anti-malaria medication) to patients who presented with Covid-like symptoms (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2021).

Dr Stella Immanuel, who holds a Doctor of Medicine (MD) degree, argues that hydroxychloroquine cures Covid-19. In her own words, she asserts that “it [hydroxychloroquine] eradicates the symptoms; it eradicates the virus” (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2021). Dr Immanuel collected evidence from more than 400 Covid-19 patients (at the time, in 2020, when she made the sensational assertion) that she had treated Covid patients with hydroxychloroquine and they had tested negative within 7 days of treatment. She collected evidence from her patients and collated data from her practice. As such, she reiterated her assertion that “it [hydroxychloroquine] is a cure” (*ibid*). What gives credibility to Dr Stella Immanuel’s assertions is that the National Broadcasting Corporation (2021) verified that she was in good standing with the Texas Medical Board. This means that the Houston Medical Board endorsed her expertise and knowledge to practice as a medical doctor.

Thus, while Dr Immanuel made her assertions in her own right, the Texas Medical Board did not censure her. This suggests that the Houston Medical Board endorsed Dr Immanuel, and by extension, her assertions. This further says that the Texas Medical Board, through the assertions and position of Dr Immanuel, was antithetical to the prescripts of the World Health Organization. Conversely, it was reported that the Texas Medical Board was to take “corrective action” – whatever that was – on Dr Stella Immanuel following her social media assertions only in 2021, a year later after Dr Immanuel’s assertions (Rouege, 2021). I read this to mean that the Texas Medical Board must have been pressured by the World Health Organization to seem to be

doing something to discredit Dr Immanuel. In other words, she could not have been seen to be challenging the position of WHO on the Covid-19 treatment and be left alone.

Many social media users who came across Dr Immanuel's post expressed their concern over her safety, citing that she would be targeted by the authorities and that she could probably be killed (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2021). The insinuation here is that the 'authorities' that Dr Immanuel is seemingly antithetical to, would want to eliminate her. This is telling in itself, that people believed that Dr Immanuel was correct in the information she shared about the treatment of Covid-19 and that people also believed that, because of her views and assertions, her life was in danger. More importantly, why is it that the WHO threatened prosecution against medical practitioners that have treated their patients with anti-malaria medication – hydroxychloroquine – an established medication opting to scientifically develop a vaccine outside the timeframes of the established scientific process? In answering this question, one cannot but realise that the science that the World Health Organization which is undergirded by Western modernity, is the politics of science. Once science slopes to politicisation by scientists and science bodies, it assumes core characteristics of political science. I, therefore, argue that the science of politics, more than the politics of science, seems to be more in charge of the Covid-19 debacle.

Furthermore, Dr Richard Urso is part of a group of doctors who call themselves America's Frontline Doctors, a group that Dr Immanuel also belongs to. Dr Urso corroborates Dr Immanuel's assertion on the Coronavirus; he adds that "It [hydroxychloroquine] is almost vitamin-like in some sense; it's an incredibly safe drug" (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2021). What is political in the reception of these similar views shared by equally highly-qualified medical experts is that, while Dr Stella Immanuel made the same assertions as Dr Urso, the former was vilified and demonised, yet the latter became an instant social media celebrity (Mustafa, 2020). The difference is that Dr Immanuel is female, Black and of African descent. Dr Urso on the other hand is male, Caucasian and American.

Similarly, Dr Jeff Collyer (MD) advocates for the use of hydroxychloroquine as both a treatment drug and prophylaxis. He quips that after a test tube confirmation, they found that "there is a French study and there is also a Chinese study, and several anecdotal reports that this is an effective drug and, frankly, it's our only option" (Doctor Oz, 2020). When probed about who it is that he had treated, he stated that they [he and his team] were "treating those patients who ha[d] tested positive [for Covid], we are also treating their immediate family members that they are quarantining in with as well ... the second group that we are looking at is for providers who have a serious exposure" (Doctor Oz, 2020). So, hydroxychloroquine is showing promise for decreasing viral shedding and yet it continues to be slammed (DeMarche, 2020).

Dr Jane Orient (MD) similarly corroborates Dr Immanuel's assertions and reveals that more than 192 studies showed that when used early "hydroxychloroquine is safer more than most over-the-counter drugs" (Bloomberg, 2020).

A local news agency in Houston, Texas, KHOU 11, carried a story that provides some evidence that ivermectin had also proven effective in treating Covid-19. It argued that:

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Both hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin showed some promise in the petri dish. Ivermectin, which is a[n] antiparasitic drug, and hydroxychloroquine, an anti-malaria and autoimmune disease drug, appeared to prevent COVID-19 from replicating in cell cultures. But when it came to clinical trials, the results were not as good. Hydroxychloroquine showed no benefit in large trials, while ivermectin trials have been so problematic it's hard to figure out if it works or not (KHOU, 2021).

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It is of paramount importance to note that the four authorities cited in the section above, namely, Dr Stella Immanuel, Dr Jane Orient, Dr Jeff Collyer and Dr Richard Urso contended with proof that Hydroxychloroquine is efficient in suppressing Covid symptoms and cured Covid. While there could have been other contentious claims (that could be said to be conspiracy theories) made by other medical authorities, this paper's argument is focused only to, and limited to the four's pronouncements on the efficacy of Hydroxychloroquine in treating Covid.

Suffice it to note that these four medical doctors are equipped with Medicine Doctorates (PhDs) and were duly accredited in various medical boards. It is therefore on this basis that they all spoke authoritatively on Covid. Thus, it is on their scientific knowledge that I argue that dissenting voices on the treatment and management of Covid were silenced.

Despite so much evidence that points to the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin in treating Covid-19, the World Health Organization continues to discourage their use in treating Covid-19. Some popular social media sites are complicit in the censoring of information on Covid-19. For instance, Twitter took down a video that was promoted by former president of the US, Donald Trump where doctors in Washington were praising the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine in treating Covid-19 (DeMarche, 2020). This tells us that – despite the censoring – the control of knowledge and information has been challenged through the use of social media. Social media outlets have proven to be more complicated to censor and control. The Euro-North American modernity can no longer strictly censor and control information that is at variance with what it endorses, be it scientific or otherwise. Social media has allowed for the dissemination of information, knowledge production and mass communication that is free from the censor of governments and other global institutions such as WHO in this case. Albeit, this often presents challenges in countering fake news, misinformation and disinformation.

The lack of meaningful investigation into these assertions by medical personnel, and the lack of open robust platforms to debate these assertions with the WHO, reveals that the WHO could be complicit in concealing the root cause of Covid. It is this covering up of such information that is more sinister. The World Health Organisation may very well have been hoping that, by not commenting on these debates, it silences these medical pundits and its critics, particularly on how it has handled this pandemic from the beginning.

### The Politics of Covid-19 Vaccines: Pharmacology Vs Poli-pharmaco-tics

Vaccine production relating to Covid has been marred by controversies emanating from several challenges. The politicisation and instrumentalisation of the discipline of pharmacology – loosely defined as the developing and manufacturing of medicines and vaccines – is what I refer to as *poli-pharmaco-tics* in this paper.

Firstly, the patenting of Covid-19 vaccines was perceived to be more political, rather than medical or scientific. The creation of the patents was exclusionary which was problematic seeing that the pandemic was widespread. It did not only affect the Western geo-locale. So, the creation and production of knowledge that went into the patenting were exclusionary. Big pharmaceutical companies – such as but not limited to, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer – monopolised the production of Covid vaccines. This could have been explained away as owing to infrastructural capability and budgetary muscle; while this could sound sensible, it was a much more sinister agenda of denying access to knowledge creation of vaccines that this whole debacle exposed.

Seeing that it was an emergency that required urgent and immediate solutions to halt the loss of peoples' lives, the patenting bureaucracy could have been relaxed as much as *poli-pharmaco-tics*

relaxed the timeframes for passing the safety procedures of a vaccine creation. Some scientific protocols were relaxed in pursuit of scaling up the production of vaccines and speeding up the determination of the efficacy of the vaccines, yet Western *poli-pharmaco-tics* could not extend that courtesy – of relaxing some regulations and procedures on the basis that it was a global emergency – to the production of vaccines outside the monopolised patents.

Secondly, the dismissal of alternative medicines to combat Covid by the World Health Organisation exposes the intention of the patenting conundrum. Madagascar, for instance, revealed that some organically-grown plants in that country had proven to be effective in de-escalating Covid cases by treating successfully people who presented with Covid symptoms (Al Jazeera, 2020). Yet, the WHO dismissed that initiative on the basis that it was unscientific; this, further exposed the limitedness of Western scientism. When it is convenient in its view, some established scientific procedures are relaxed, and when it does not suit its narrative, it weaponises these very scientific procedures against their intended victim of control. Western scientism dismisses anything it does not know, in the process, reconfiguring its control of knowledge-production and information-dissemination. These are hallmarks of coloniality of knowledge.

Thirdly, there is a perception that countries in the Global South, particularly countries in Africa, were denied patents to producing vaccines in their local domains which meant that these vaccines were going to be much cheaper produced in the respective local domains of African countries particularly. That model of acquiring Covid vaccines from the Global North meant that it was tedious a process and exorbitant (Alexander, 2020). As a result of the closing-off of African countries from producing vaccines in their local domains, it also caused major challenges regarding the logistical handling of the acquisition, the storage of some of these vaccines that had a very short lifespan and, the consequent, disposal of expired vaccines (Kunene, 2022).

These very challenges point us to my contention that *poli-pharmaco-tics* is what is at the centre of these so-called setbacks. It is not necessarily issues of pharmacology that stalled the production and distribution of vaccines, but rather the deliberate exclusion of access of the right to health because, in the rationale of Western modernity, people in the Global South – zone of non-being – have a lesser ontological density than people in the Global North – a zone of being. Whereas it was an emergency for the West, it deemed it as not urgent for the rest of the world. This is indicative of politics – who gets what, where, how and why – rather than the pursuit of global health as the situation demanded. More importantly, the procedures of producing vaccines were set aside by the *poli-pharma-trickers*.

### **The Science of Politics: Coloniality of Knowledge and Information on Covid-19**

Covid-19 has proven that the science of politics (political-based science) seems to lead the medical fraternity in the response to the pandemic, more than the scientific rigour of studying, understanding and managing virology and epidemiology in the case of Covid-management. The control of knowledge and information by the self-select-few located in the Global North is problematic. Coloniality of knowledge “refers to the Euro-North American intellectual thought as the referral point upon which all other epistemologies and knowledges are measured against” (Nyere, 2020: 64). This has its antecedents in colonialism – the physical control of other nations by whip and cane. Arguably, colonialism has ended; however, it has been survived by coloniality. Coloniality is understood to mean the architecture of control that results from the template of thought, action and being that was set up by colonialism (Nyere, 2020: 23). This enables the once colonial masters to still control the formerly colonised peoples, places and spaces, in their physical absence from the said entities. The problem emanates from the pervasive control of others. The one who controls apportions him/herself the position of forcibly being in charge

of another. European colonialism put on a pedestal subjective European standards – that were universalized by the violence of colonialism, ways of knowing and way of life as a standard with which all other civilisations were measured and incorporated into the ‘civilised’ modern society (Nyere, 2020: 69). This has forced other civilisations outside of Europe’s consciousness to think from Europe’s locus of enunciation, resulting in the fermentation and crystallisation of Europe’s way of thinking and knowledge–production. Knowledge, and information, have to be valid, it has to be measured according to what modernity says. If knowledge and information are not met with Europe’s standard of scientism, it is dismissed as invalid and just opinion, and not factual and objective.

### Covid-19 in South Africa and Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transmissions

South Africa has been through four waves of Covid surges thus far, it is reported that SA is anticipating a surge that would usher in the fifth wave (The Citizen, 2022). The first one was experienced between June and November 2020 (Chambers, 2021). The second wave was experienced between December 2020 and February 2021. The Third wave was experienced between May and July 2021, with the fourth wave experienced between December 2021 and Feb of 2022 (South African Broadcasting Corporation, 2022). What has been particularly fascinating to observe in the case of SA is that the infections seemed to be manipulated and under-reported in October and November of 2021 – when South Africa held its local government elections, only to ‘record’ high numbers of infection in December 2021 that led to the fourth wave.

The (ANC-led) Government of South Africa tactfully downplayed reporting on the numbers of new Covid-19 transmissions during a crucial time in the country where it sought a mandate from the South African citizens in the local government elections. They did this to pass off a bluff of a narrative that transmission cases were going down in numbers and, therefore, used that as a basis to forge ahead with the elections (Deklerk, 2021). In Zimbabwe, the ruling (ZANU-PF) party continued, unabated by the police or the judicial system despite lockdown regulations that barred huge public gatherings, to hold political campaigns ahead of the March 2022 by-elections. This, it did, while denying opposition political formations to campaign as it did (Ndlovu, 2021).

This reveals that Covid restrictions and lockdowns were instrumentalised, weaponised and politicised by the political elite. If the lockdowns were truly designed to save lives and curb the spread of Covid, then they would have been applied plially in all scenarios and times. The fact that the restrictions were relaxed as, and when, it was convenient for business and politics, tells us that either Covid was just a ‘scam-demic’ as opposed to a pandemic in the first place; or, governments just sacrificed their citizens when pressed for immediate solutions. They took the easy way out. To be fair in the cases of African governments, they could have been victims of information wars from the West – meaning, they could have been misled in terms of what Covid is, and how it ought to have been managed. Or it could be that, as is the commonly held view in many African polities, governments generally do not look out for their citizens’ welfare, let alone their health. Meaning, even if governments knew about the dangers of Covid-19, they were prepared to allow their citizens to put themselves in the path of danger.

### Afro-Decolonial Thought

The Afro-decolonial thought is aligned with Pan-Africanist thought. It serves to counter the domineering Western canon of what knowledge is and what it ought to be. Western canon dismisses any other knowledge system that does not buy into its epistemic ways of inquiry. As such, Afro-decolonial thought is meant to challenge and expose the limitations and gaps in Western methods of inquiry as they chiefly negate that there are different contexts for the

application of its methods. The established scientific process in the production of Covid-19 vaccines for instance was set aside by this tradition. Signalling that within its arsenal of methods and techniques, the Euro-North American-centric tradition of science was replete with ideas. This alone gives credence to the Afro-decolonial thought as it begins its inquiry in the peripheries and margins of Euro-North American-centric thought.

Furthermore, as far as the Covid-19 pandemic is concerned, the control and censoring of information and knowledge around Covid-19, particularly knowledge that is deemed antithetical to Western scientism, only proves the reality of coloniality of knowledge. Knowledge is controlled by Western tradition. This is called coloniality of knowledge. Because the Euro-North American-centric canon is controlled by vehicles and structures in the Global North, coloniality of knowledge, therefore, privileges Euro-North American-centric perspectives that are projected as objective, scientific, universal and universally applicable. These perspectives “are main-streamed by controlling vehicles of disseminating ideas and information, such as universities, media houses, publishing houses (academic, cultural, social and otherwise)” (Nyere, 2020: 22). In this case, the vehicles of controlling knowledge and information are, among others but not limited to, the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and the various medical boards that do not question the validity of the information provided by WHO.

So, the Afro-decolonial thought asserts that all ecologies of knowledge are valid; as such, they must be scholarly interrogated to sift through pieces of information that are easily dismissed by the Euro-North American-centric science. The Afro-decolonial thought seeks to validate other forms of knowledge, hence it allows scholarship to conceive of knowledges as opposed to just a certain kind of knowledge.

### What Covid-19 is Camouflaging and Perpetuating

Covid-19 has revealed that corruption is a covertly structured pandemic on its own. The corruption cases involving Covid funds and their management have revealed that corruption deserves much more scrutiny. The corruption allegation levelled against the WHO implying that the organisation was involved in cases of bribery to silence some officials who held antithetical views to that of the establishment is the case in point (Daniel, 2020; Mathews, 2022).

Corruption within national governments involving Covid-19 funds (South African Broadcasting Corporation, 2020), the Zimbabwean Health Minister, Obadiah Moyo (Gagne-Acoulon, 2020; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2020) and the South African Health Minister, Zweli Mkhize (Heywood, 2020), cases suggest that the actual issues of Covid were minor in comparison to the rhetoric that was peddling in mass media – a tool of the West to misinform and at times disinform the global populace. Some hospital employees reported that any death that occurred during the pandemic was reported as a Covid death to balloon the number of recorded fatalities to receive financial aid from the WHO.

### Analysis of the Covid-19 Pandemic, *Plan-demic* and *Plunder-mic*

Given how the pandemic has evolved, from the time it first broke out in December 2019 in Huan, China, it is becoming clear that its management of it has flaunted many established scientific protocols regarding the production of vaccines. It is evident that the objective of the Covid-19 pandemic was a grand plan to plunder national, and in some cases, international aid, resources while hiding behind the thin veneer of the crisis. In other words, Covid-19 was a *scam-demic* and *plan-demic* – explained as a pandemic – to plunder, exhaust and frustrate efforts to detangle world economies and business from the colonial super-structure of Western modernity and capitalism.

To illustrate this thesis, in January 2020, a US scientist and Harvard Professor, Charles Lieber was arrested for his ties and connection to China over the outbreak of Covid-19. Lieber's charge was that "of concealing ties with the Wuhan Institute of Technology" and the Chinese government (Stanway, 2020). Some quipped that Professor Lieber had helped create the virus (*Diario AS*). Wittingly, the explanation that was given when news reached the public's ears, as it were, was that the arrest was based on bogus claims of Lieber's ties to China (Stanway, 2020; Evelyn, 2020).

What is telling though is the very fact that Lieber concealed his involvement with the Chinese government, and more interestingly is why he would conceal his involvement in the first place, if it was above board? To whom did Lieber conceal his involvement with the Chinese? It is obviously the US government. I argue that the theatrics of Lieber's arrest were nothing but a charade by US authorities who were pressed to appear to be doing something against Lieber after the news of his involvement with China made it to public consciousness. I further contend that Lieber's involvement with the Chinese had the blessings and authorization of the US authorities. Thus, Lieber's arrest was meant to offset public scrutiny over the US' involvement in the creation of Covid. His arrest was part of concealing the US' involvement in the pandemic. This can also be explained by underscoring how coloniality of knowledge operationalises itself.

Since the Euro-North American centric world order (system) controls and determines what knowledge is and what it is not, it remains that it (system) has asymmetrical power and control over what it determines to be scientific knowledge and what it dismisses as bogus and conspiracy theories. This system is the canon and can easily dismiss anything that stands antithetical to itself. There is no way that the US would admit to its involvement because it is convenient for it to apportion blame on Wuhan, China, however, the Western system had a hand in the so-called global pandemic.

By planning and orchestrating the *scam-demic* that Covid is, Western modernity managed to create a crisis that required global action and response that was to be coordinated and led by the Euro-North American-centric narrative, in the process galvanising and reconfiguring its grip on the world. Indeed, the West has taken centre stage and leading efforts to 'manage' the pandemic. This is what the West planned. Covid as a humanly created virus was systematically spread around the world breaking out at a time when travel was at its peak. Air travel thus was used as a vehicle to fast track the spread of the 'virus' so that it causes maximum damage, and in the process, creates the necessary panic to convince the world that it was not stage-managed. This virus-induced panic contributed to psychological assault by the West targeted at the Global South, but Africa particularly. The 'scientific' projection of the World Health Organization was that Africa was going to be hard hit by the *scam-demic* (WHO, 2022). However, since the outbreak of Covid-19, to date, Africa has had the least number of infections at any given time (World Health Organization, 2022). How scientific is this data that is provided by these powers that be?

## Conclusion

The paper has argued that the Covid-19 pandemic was a '*plan-demic*' to '*plunder-mic*' global and state resources; in the process, recalibrating the global control of politics, Western canon – which essentially is scientism, knowledge-production, information-dissemination as well as the ontological being of humans in the zone-of-non-being – Global South generally, but Africa particularly, to centre once again a Euro-North American-centric world view.



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# Regard socio-historique sur les contradictions positionnelles et présentes des Burkinabè et des Sénégalaises dans la politique

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## Résumé

La Science politique traite de l'objet « femme » depuis le milieu des années 1950 avec la variable « sexe » dans le comportement politique.<sup>1</sup> A cet effet, cet article revendique son inscription dans le champ de la sociologie politique mais aussi dans celui des études féministes en Afrique. Son objectif est de revenir, d'un point de vue socio-historique sur la possibilité d'une présence et d'une position considérables des femmes du Burkina Faso et du Sénégal tout en mettant l'accent sur les controverses existantes et qui les détournent dans un premier temps, des scènes politiques et d'y avoir, dans un second temps, une situation répondant à la légalité. Cette réflexion s'interroge dès lors sur les contradictions existantes de la présence et de la position politique des Burkinabè et des Sénégalaises ?

Assurément, le constat fait dans ces deux pays pour lesquels nous avons un discernement intuitif, fait remarquer le dynamisme historique des femmes dans la lutte pour l'acquisition de leurs droits, notamment politiques. Seulement en interne, il est aussi perceptible que des efforts nets restent à faire tant sur le plan de la présence des femmes sur la scène politique que sur le plan des postes ou places occupées au sein des partis ou encore dans les fonctions nominatives et électives.

**Mots-clés :** Présence et participation politique, femme et politique, précolonialité, Afrique et organisation sociale.

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## Abstract

Political science has been dealing with the object “woman” since the mid-1950s, along with the variable “sex” in political behavior, and this article claims to be part of the field of political sociology, but also of feminist studies in Africa. Its objective is to come back, from a historical point of view, on the possibility of a considerable presence and position of women in Burkina Faso and Senegal while emphasizing the existing controversies which divert them in a first time, from the political scenes and to have, in a second time, a situation answering the legality. This reflection wonders therefore about the existing contradictions of the presence and the political position of the Burkinabe and Senegalese women?

Certainly, the observation made in these two countries for which we have an intuitive discernment, points out the historical dynamism of women in the fight for the acquisition of their rights,

<sup>1</sup> Se référer aux travaux de l'école de Columbia avec Lazarsfeld, ceux de Nonna Mayer, Duverger, ou encore ceux de Mattei Doggan.

notably political. Only internally, it is also perceptible that clear efforts remain to be made both in terms of the presence of women on the political scene and in terms of positions or places occupied within parties or in nominative and elective functions.

**Keywords:** Political presence and participation, women and politics, pre-coloniality, Africa and organization.

« *L’Afrique a bien traité ses femmes ! Référence faite à la Charte du Mandé<sup>2</sup> et même bien avant. On n’y a jamais décapité une personne de sexe féminin pour avoir défendu ses droits* »<sup>3</sup>, déclare Dr Diop B<sup>4</sup>. En effet, cette charte évoquée, part d’un *habitus*<sup>5</sup> au sens de Norbert Elias<sup>6</sup>, qui permettait dans les sociétés africaines que les hommes et les femmes cohabitent harmonieusement, dans la différence mais sans domination aucune de part et d’autre<sup>7</sup>. En regard des « tribulations » de l’histoire du continent, à savoir le « commerce triangulaire<sup>8</sup> », la colonisation française (assimilationniste), britannique (*indirect rule*), portugaise ou encore le néocolonialisme<sup>9</sup> font que l’Afrique ainsi que ses ressources culturelles<sup>10</sup> s’en soient fortement « hybridées ». Conséquemment, au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, le domaine du politique qui doit être celui de toutes et de tous<sup>11</sup> reste l’apanage des hommes, malgré les efforts consentis par quelques pays africains en termes de représentation féminine dans les parlements<sup>12</sup> (chambre basse et /ou haute comprise).

Chemin faisant, cet article résulte d’une recherche sur la présence et la participation des africaines dans le domaine du politique<sup>13</sup> et à des postes seyants. A partir d’une comparaison entre le Burkina Faso et le Sénégal autour du concept de participation politique des femmes, une remise en question et un changement social sont visés afin que celles-ci soient plus distinguées sur la scène politique et se voient confier plus de responsabilités. Bien entendu, le risque de subjectivisme est fort ; néanmoins, un temps de réflexion a été pris afin d’examiner les conditions

- 2 AMSELLE, Jean-Loup « L’Afrique a-t-elle « inventé » les droits de l’homme ? », *Syllabus Review*, 2 (3), 2011, p. 446-463,
- 3 Si on doit la comparer à celle de l’Europe où en 1791, Olympe de Gouge rédigeait la Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne en réponse à la Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen. Ce qui lui valut la guillotine.
- 4 Entretien personnel avec B. Diop, Docteur en histoire, le 12 juin 2020 à Dakar.
- 5 Dans son ouvrage la « La civilisation des mœurs » Elias recourt à l’*habitus* pour évoquer le type de personnalité psychologique formé par le processus de civilisation des mœurs en Occident.
- 6 ELIAS, Norbert, *La civilisation des mœurs*, Ed. Pocket, Coll. Poche, 2003, p. 512.
- 7 BACHOFEN, Joharin. J., *Das Mutterrecht. Eine Untersuchung über die Gynaike- kratie der alten Welt nach ihrer religiösen und rechtlichen Natur*, Stuttgart 186 Gesammelte Werke, vol. II et III, ed. p. Karl Meuli, Basel 1948.
- 8 Le commerce triangulaire ou la traite occidentale des noirs
- 9 Le concept de néocolonialisme est utilisé ici en référence aux ouvrages de Kwamé Nkrumah et de Tshiyembe Mwayila : Le système néocolonial est encore plus néfaste que le colonialisme.
- 10 Au sens d’Amin Maalouf dans son ouvrage « *Les Identités meurtrières* » Paris, Grasset, 1998, pour qui les cultures sont dynamiques.
- 11 Phrase lâchée par une enseignante au collège, à la retraite lors d’un échange sur l’actualité politique juste avant le début de cette recherche et qui a attiré notre attention.
- 12 Avec une moyenne régionale de 23,9% de femmes au Parlement (chambre unique ou basse), l’Afrique subsaharienne se place à la 5e place du dernier classement d’ONU Femmes et l’Union interparlementaire (UIP) derrière les pays nordiques, l’Amérique et l’Europe (pays nordiques inclus et non inclus). Selon ce même rapport de 2019, Comme en 2017, le Rwanda figure à nouveau en tête du classement mondial des femmes au Parlement, avec un taux de 61,3% de députés féminines à la chambre basse. La Namibie (7e), l’Afrique du Sud (10e), le Sénégal (11e) et le Mozambique (17e) font également partie des bons élèves du continent.
- 13 Pour Max Weber, le domaine du politique c’est l’instance qui permet le vivre ensemble et la résolution des conflits d’intérêts inhérents à la vie en société. Le politique, dont la conception a évolué au cours de l’histoire, se présente dans les sociétés contemporaines sous la forme d’un ensemble de forces institutionnalisées qui interagissent un champ dit politique. WEBER (M.), *Le Savant et le Politique*, Paris, Plon, 1959. Pierre Favre, notera que « le politique concerne les fonctions de coordination des activités, de résolution des conflits, de hiérarchisation des objectifs que requiert l’existence de la société. La politique est l’activité de ceux qui assurent ou veulent assurer ces fonctions. Le politique est ainsi l’objet de la politique. » FAVRE (P.), *Comprendre le monde pour le changer*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2005.

d'une analyse pertinente respectant les règles d'éthique. De plus, en suivant la même trame que Nathalie Heinich pour qui « la règle wébérienne de « neutralité axiologique », prônant l'abstention de tout jugement de valeurs par l'enseignant ou le chercheur dans le cadre de ses fonctions, est loin de faire aujourd'hui, concrètement, l'unanimité<sup>14</sup> ». Il est ainsi question dans cette étude, d'un relativisme de la « neutralité axiologique<sup>15</sup> » de Weber. Ce sont également les conceptions d'Amartya Sen<sup>16</sup> ou de Hilary Putnam<sup>17</sup>. Quant à la littérature sociopolitique sur les femmes d'abord, et de plus en plus sur le genre en général<sup>18</sup>, elle est relativement récente et indique des inégalités profondes. Delphine Dulong reliera ce *gender gap* en politique au retard accusé par les femmes dans les domaines économique, social fruits de l'histoire de la France<sup>19</sup>. Néanmoins, elle fera noter que les Françaises connaissent des avancées quant à leurs activités lors des élections. En termes d'identité partisane, elles votent encore plus à gauche. En revanche, elles sont généralement « exclues » de l'exercice du pouvoir<sup>20</sup> avec une tendance baissière par rapport à certains pays d'Afrique<sup>21</sup>.

Mais pendant longtemps, nombreuses publications ont omis de faire ressortir « le féminin » dans le politique<sup>22</sup>. ADLER retiendra qu'« Est généralement pourvu, en Afrique noire comme dans la plupart des régions du monde, des attributs les plus caractéristiques de la masculinité. Symboliquement (et aussi, il faut bien le dire, dans la phraséologie moderne des États africains), le détenteur suprême de l'autorité est un père pour ses sujets (en principe, quel que soit le système de filiation) et, en tout cas, un homme, pleinement homme au sens que lui donne le système de valeurs qui prédomine dans la société <sup>23</sup> ». Mais quoiqu'il en soit, sans pour autant rentrer dans le débat socio-anthropologique du matriarcat, le constat est que dans les deux pays africains constituant nos terrains d'étude, les enquêtes et la documentation mènent vers une dépréciation de la femme dans le domaine politique avec l'influence de la colonisation et de la pénétration des cultures religieuses « importées »<sup>24</sup>.

En outre, les réflexions qui y ont mis l'accent se tournent quasiment toutes sur les périodes précoloniales et coloniales<sup>25</sup> s'accroissant sur la monopolisation masculine de la gestion des

14 HEINICH, Nathalie, « La sociologie à l'épreuve des valeurs », *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 121-2, pp.290, 2006.

15 WEBER, Max, *Le savant et le politique*, regroupant les textes de deux conférences de 1917 et 1919 et intitulées respectivement *Le métier et la vocation du savant* et *Le métier et la vocation d'homme politique*, Union Générale d'Éditions, 1963.

16 SEN Amartya, 1999, *Development as freedom*, Oxford et New York, Oxford University Press.

17 PUTNAM, Hilary, « The Craving for Objectivity », *New Literary History*, 15-2, p. 229-39, 1984

18 Le concept genre sous-entend que le rapport entre femmes et hommes est construit par l'ensemble du processus de socialisation. Pour reprendre Simone de Beauvoir « on ne naît pas femme, on le devient, de même on ne naît pas homme », mais on le devient par l'ensemble du processus de socialisation familiale, scolaire, professionnelle. Les rapports sociaux de sexe s'expriment à travers la division du travail. Définition de la théorie sur le genre développée par l'Unesco dans son Module 1.

19 DULONG, Delphine, « Les femmes en politique », in Antonin Cohen, Bernard Lacroix, Philippe Riutort (dir.), *Nouveau manuel de science politique, La Découvert*, coll. « Grands Repères, 2009, 789 p.,

20 Ibid., pp. 385-386

21 Au dernier classement mondial de la présence des femmes dans les parlements la France occupait la 17<sup>e</sup> place loin derrière le Rwanda 1<sup>er</sup>, la Namibie 7<sup>e</sup>, l'Afrique du Sud 10<sup>e</sup> et le Sénégal 11<sup>e</sup>

22 Quasiment toutes les études sur l'Afrique publiées dans la période coloniale, ont « masculinisé » le politique. Ce n'est que dans les années 1970, que les reines d'Afrique, les mouvements anticoloniaux de femmes et même les actes individuels ont commencé à être mis en analysés.

23 ADLER, Alfred, « Initiation, royauté et féminité en Afrique noire. En deçà ou au-delà de la différence des sexes : logique politique ou logique initiatique ? », *L'Homme* 3(183), pp. 77-115, 2007.

24 Les cultures religieuses à différencier ici aux religions elles-mêmes ; elles découleraient des cultures et civilisation arabes et gréco-romaines qui excluaient la femme des sphères de décision. Celles-ci avaient peu de droits. <https://www.worldhistory.org/trans/fr/2-927/femmes-en-grece-antique/> BONNET, Margaux. « Les femmes du monde arabe et musulman : à l'Est, du nouveau ? », *Les Cahiers de l'Orient*, vol. 109, no. 1, 2013, pp. 99-101.

25 NGOM, Saliou, *Femmes et politiques au Sénégal. Les dynamiques imbriquées d'inclusion-exclusion de l'indépendance à nos jours*, Ed., l'Harmattan, Coll., Études africaines, 2021, p.481.



affaires de la cité qui viendrait des cultures métropolitaines. C'est le cas de R. Fall<sup>26</sup>, d'O. Goerg<sup>27</sup>. Autrement, F. S. Sarr<sup>28</sup> fait ressortir la transformation des rapports de pouvoir entre les genres due à la création d'entreprise par les femmes, peu importe sa taille. Cette autonomisation selon elle, leur permet d'élargir le pouvoir sur le plan économique, au sein des couples mais aussi dans le domaine politique. H. Djibo<sup>29</sup>, dans la même trame que celle de cette réflexion, opte pour une perspective comparative entre le Sénégal et le Niger et analyse l'absence des femmes dans les espaces de pouvoir. Elle fait focus sur la division sexuelle du travail politique comme facteur de ce défaut de présence sans oublier l'institutionnalisation des mouvements féminins intégrés au sein des partis et organisations politiques comme servant à limiter les femmes dans les logiques de mobilisations et d'animations<sup>30</sup>. En 2021, S. Ngom<sup>31</sup> montre que la construction élitiste et « lettrée » du pouvoir politique renforçait la domination masculine dans la mesure où l'école était l'apanage des garçons. Or, poursuit-il d'une façon optimiste que les bouleversements sociaux et économiques de la société sénégalaise s'ouvraient à la féminisation à l'espace politique sans une remise en cause des rapports de genre. Les péroraux de nombreux études, débats et colloques sur la question des femmes africaines dans le monde politique, établissent que plusieurs obstacles d'ordre social, culturel, économique, politique, religieux et personnel rendent difficile leur accès à de hautes fonctions politiques, sans que cela ne fasse exception.

A rebours, rien ne leur enlève constitutionnellement, dans la plupart des pays d'Afrique, le droit de se présenter à des élections ou d'être nommées à des fonctions imputables. Comment se présentent les contradictions existantes de la présence et de la position politique des Burkinabé et des Sénégalaises ? L'interprétation ne peut être simplement déroulée. Elle émanerait d'un agrégat de facteurs relevé dans une littérature de plus en plus fournie par la science politique, la sociologie et l'histoire. Peu importe le domaine d'étude, la plupart des résultats et théories portant sur le statut de la femme se concluent par une sous-représentation voire une absence à moindre mesure, du champ politique<sup>32</sup>. Le pouvoir et la politique restent l'attribut des hommes. Firestone<sup>33</sup> et Descarries<sup>34</sup> poseront le problème en termes de rapport de pouvoir et d'exclusion. Irigaray<sup>35</sup> et Collin<sup>36</sup> prennent une position moins dogmatique en relevant la forte prégnance voire la prépotence masculine sur le terrain politique avec une participation des femmes sur une logique de nette différence et de place de disgrâce. Ce sera principalement, la position de l'approche

26 FALL, Rokhaya, « Femmes et pouvoir dans les sociétés nord sénégalaises », communication présentée à l'atelier *Héritages historiques et processus de démocratisation en Afrique*, Bamako, 26-29 avril, 1994, pp.69-79

27 GOERG, Odile, « Femmes africaines et politique : les colonisées au féminin en Afrique occidentale », *Clio* n° 6, 1997, Femme d'Afrique, mis en ligne le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 2005.

28 SARR, Fatou Sow, *L'entrepreneuriat féminin au Sénégal : la transformation des rapports de pouvoir*, Paris, l'Harmattan 1998

29 DJIBO Hadiza, *La participation des femmes africaines à la vie politique. Les exemples du Sénégal et du Niger*. Ed., l'Harmattan, Coll. Sociétés africaines et diaspora, 2001, p.424

30 Ibid., p. 135

31 NGOM, Saliou, *Femmes et politiques au Sénégal. Les dynamiques imbriquées d'inclusion-exclusion de l'indépendance à nos jours*.

32 C'est à relativiser puisqu'en Afrique des reines et autres femmes guerrières ou anticolonialistes ont eu à acquérir une place importante dans le domaine du politique. (À voir les études de Cheikh Anta Diop, Fatou Kiné Kamara, Ama Mazama, Amina Mama et toute la branche afrocentriste actuelle)

33 FIRESTONE, Shulamith, *La dialectique du sexe : Le dossier de la révolution féministe*. Trad. de l'Américain par Sylvia Glead. Paris : Stock, p. 306, 1970

34 DESCARRIES, Francine, *L'école rose... et les cols roses. La reproduction de la division sociale des sexes*. Montréal : Éditions coopératives, Albert Saint-Martin et Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, 128 p., 1983.

35 IRIGARAY, Luce, *Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un*. Ed. Minuit, 217 p., 1977

36 COLLIN, Françoise, « La raison polyglotte ou pour sortir de la logique des contraires ». In *La place des femmes. Les enjeux de l'identité et de l'égalité au regard des sciences sociales*, avec la coll. de Ephesia (groupe) et de la Conférence mondiale des Nations Unies sur les femmes, p. 669 – 677, La Découverte, 1995.

réflexive analysant les anicroches pour les femmes d'exercer le pouvoir<sup>37</sup>. Plus précisément, les études concernant le Burkina ou le Sénégal vont majoritairement dans le même sens et sont produites par des femmes ou parfois des hommes sensibles aux droits de ces dernières. Il y est fait remarquer que le sexe féminin est peu présent sur la scène politique et aux postes de responsabilité malgré la possibilité qu'elle en a légalement<sup>38</sup>. Plus précisément Hadjiza Djibo dans une approche historique de ce phénomène avance que dans les systèmes précoloniaux le statut politique des femmes était plus valorisé et que la mise à l'écart actuelle du politique procède de facteurs multiples comme la colonisation<sup>39</sup>. Cet article s'inscrit dans les champs de la sociologie politique et particulièrement celui de la participation avec entre autres, des résultats obtenus au cours des années sur le leadership politique des femmes en Afrique. Sa visée est de revenir, d'un point de vue historique sur la possibilité d'une position considérable des femmes du Burkina Faso et du Sénégal, tout en mettant l'accent sur les controverses existantes et qui les détournent dans un premier temps, des scènes politiques et dans un second temps, en essayant de faire ressortir les différences et les analogies existantes entre les deux pays. En effet, le constat fait au niveau des deux États, est qu'il y a un dynamisme des femmes dans la lutte pour l'acquisition de leurs droits notamment politiques. Toujours est-il qu'en interne, il est perceptible que des efforts propices restent à faire tant sur le plan de la présence des femmes que sur la scène politique et celui des positions occupées d'abord au sein des partis ou encore dans les fonctions nominatives et électives (à relativiser)<sup>40</sup>. De même, là où certaines Sénégalaises se réclament, plus commodément, féministes politiques<sup>41</sup>, les Burkinabé refusent cette posture « occidentaliste » préférant celle de « défenseurs<sup>42</sup> » des droits des femmes.

Par ailleurs, dans ce travail le choix de l'approche et de la méthode résulte de l'intérêt porté sur le concept de participation politique des femmes africaines que nous avons eu à côtoyer et principalement des Burkinabé et des Sénégalaises. L'approche retenue sera socio-historique avec une centralité de la comparaison binaire telle que définie par Dogan et Pélassy « *une comparaison de deux cas ayant un certain nombre de similarités mais divergeant sur une caractéristique précise. C'est cette divergence que l'on veut expliquer*<sup>43</sup> » entre le Burkina-Faso, un pays d'adoption et le Sénégal, la terre de naissance et de vécu quotidien. Mais dans la comparaison concernant le leadership politique (reconnaissance de la place et de la position de la femme sur la scène politique), le principal est de franchir la barrière de la comparabilité des cas. Situés géographiquement en Afrique de l'Ouest et anciennes colonies françaises, le Burkina Faso (Haute Volta jusqu'en 1983) et le Sénégal peuvent être considérés comme deux cas tout à fait comparables en termes de participation politique de leurs femmes, du fait de leur diversité de trajectoires et les quelques analogies sociologiques. En retour, leur histoire politique reste différente dans la mesure où le

37 ILBOUDO, Monique, « Démocratie, droits et libertés au Burkina Faso ». 2020 [En ligne] <http://www.lefaso.net/lsip.php?article10884>, page consultée le 16 11 2020.

38 MBOW Penda, « Hommes et Femmes entre sphères publique et privée » *Bulletin du CODESRIA*, Dakar, 1 et 2, 1999, p. 73 et DIAWARA, Mahamadou. 1996. « Mouvement associatif et transformation du champ politique ». In *Le Burkina entre révolution et démocratie 1983-1993* sous la dir. de René OTAYEK, Filiga SAWADOGO et Jean-Pierre GUINGANE, p. 229-246, Karthala.

39 DJIBO, Hadiza., *La participation des femmes africaines à la vie politique. Les exemples du Sénégal et du Niger*. Ed., l'Harmattan, Coll. Sociétés africaines et diaspora, 2001, p.424

40 Au Sénégal, il y a un non-respect de la loi sur la parité dans certaines zones, notamment dans la ville Sainte de Touba.

41 Notre réflexion est partie de ce constat dans des discussions banales avec des femmes politiques burkinabé et sénégalaises. A partir de là, nous avons démarré la lecture de thèses, d'articles, d'archives concernant le féminisme et la participation politique de ces dernières.

42 Entretien en ligne avec Madame, E. T. députée à l'Assemblée nationale burkinabé, le 12 avril 2020.

43 DOGAN Mattei, PELASSY, Dominique, *La sociologie politique comparative. Problèmes et perspectives*, Paris, Economica, 1982, 218 p.

Burkina Faso a connu sept coups d'État réussis parmi lesquels, la révolution de 1983 considérée comme un sursaut salvateur<sup>44</sup>.

Partant de la définition de J. Hamel de l'étude de cas comme étant « une approche susceptible d'englober plusieurs méthodes et techniques de recueil de données (observation directe, analyse de contenu, enquête par questionnaires et entretiens), sans pour autant comporter un protocole méthodologique strict, comme c'est le cas dans l'approche expérimentale<sup>45</sup> », il est fait notamment appel dans cette recherche au concept tant prisé par la sociologie des mouvements sociaux, de « structures des opportunités politiques<sup>46</sup> » dans une perspective diachronique et comparative. Celui-ci nous permet de mettre l'accent sur l'environnement politique auquel des mouvements de femmes évoluent et qui peut leur être avantageux ou pas. Concernant la collecte de données, deux options se sont présentées à nous : l'exploitation documentaire et des entretiens qui ont notamment permis de recueillir des trajectoires de femmes politiques et confrontant les données empiriques aux propositions théoriques. Pour la documentation, le point de départ est l'histoire précoloniale. Mais l'accent est mis sur la période de la fin du XIX<sup>e</sup> au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècles. De la sorte, différentes données secondaires ont été d'abord exploitées à savoir des ouvrages, thèses et articles sur le pouvoir politique en Afrique, les mouvements sociaux de femmes, la participation politique des femmes africaines et enfin des documents officiels et juridiques comme les codes électoraux des deux pays. La majeure partie du travail s'est déroulée durant la Covid-19, à cet effet, les sites internet nous ont permis d'avoir accès à plusieurs documents officiels. Seulement, la mise à jour de certains d'entre-eux reste problématique dans les deux pays avec une tendance baissière pour le Sénégal.

En ce qui concerne le recueil des données primaires, les entretiens semi-directs, l'observation et les focus-groups au sein de trois partis politiques et d'organisations de la société civile ont été utilisés. L'essentiel de la « participation observante »<sup>47</sup> et des focus-groups, en tout dix (10), ont eu lieu entre janvier et mars 2020 au Sénégal et en avril, alors qu'il était prévu un voyage au Burkina, le Corona virus a pris une ampleur pandémique faisant obstacle aux séries d'entretiens prévues en présentiel. Dès lors, les plateformes tels *Zoom* et *Skype* ont servi de canaux pour mener à bien vingt-trois (23) entretiens individuels dont seize (16) au Sénégal et sept (7) au Burkina. Il faut retenir que l'éloignement n'a rien changé au côté émotionnel et chaleureux des enquêtes<sup>48</sup>.

Concernant le traitement des données, le travail s'est d'abord opéré autour de la segmentation, du tri et de la reconstruction avec une interprétation ; ce qui a permis de faire une analyse des contenus<sup>49</sup> et d'avoir quatre catégories (participation politique des femmes, position au sein des partis, rapport au pouvoir, difficulté à intégrer la scène politique et à se positionner) subdivisées en plusieurs sous-catégories. Partant de là, une démarche inductive telle que proposée par Blais et Martineau<sup>50</sup> est retenue.

Les données recueillies ont permis de préciser la problématique retenue au départ. Si nous comparons les Burkinabé aux Sénégalaises quant à leur présence et leur positionnement

44 C'est l'avis de Madame E.T, députée, lors de notre entretien.

45 HAMEL, Jacques, *Défense et illustration de la méthode des études de cas en sociologie et en anthropologie : quelques notes et rappels*, Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, 1998, p.128

46 MCADAM, Doug., TARROW, Sydney., et TILLY, Charles., *Dynamics of contention*. Cambridge University Press. 387 p.

47 SOULÉ Bastien, Observation participante ou participation observante ? Usages et justifications de la notion de participation observante en sciences sociales, *Recherches qualitatives*, Vol. 27, pp. 127-140, 2007

48 COMBESSIE, Jean-Claude, *La méthode en sociologie*, Ed. La Découverte, Paris, p. 2007

49 WANLIN, Philippe « L'analyse de contenu comme méthode d'analyse qualitative d'entretiens : une comparaison entre les traitements manuels et l'utilisation de logiciels », *Recherche qualitative, Actes du colloque bilan et prospectives de la recherche qualitative*, Hors-Série, n° 3, 2007, p.246

50 BLAIS, Mireille, MARTINEAU, Stéphane « L'analyse inductive générale : description d'une démarche visant à donner un sens à des données brutes », *Recherches qualitatives*, 26, p.3, 2006.

dans le jeu politique (partis politiques et gouvernements), la variable indépendante est le lieu d'appartenance tandis que la participation politique à l'aune de la présence et du positionnement est la variable dépendante. De fait, à partir d'une analyse socio-historique partant principalement de la fin XIXe au XXIe siècle et en considération du constructivisme social comme cadre théorique hybride, comment se présentent les cas burkinabé et sénégalais en termes de positionnement et de présence des femmes dans les partis politiques et les gouvernements ? Si nous comparons les Burkinabé aux Sénégalaises quant à leur présence et leur positionnement dans le jeu politique (partis politiques et gouvernements), la variable indépendante est le lieu d'appartenance tandis que la participation politique à l'aune de la présence et du positionnement est la variable dépendante.

Le postulat principal de cet article consiste à confirmer cette citation ci-après « *la liberté politique semble être incompatible avec le pouvoir des femmes.* »<sup>51</sup> avant de mettre l'accent sur les poids social, économique et culturel des femmes burkinabé et sénégalaises qui freinent leur anthèse politique tant présentiel que positionnel. Malgré les possibilités politiques et juridiques offertes en général aux femmes africaines par le Protocole de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme du 11 juillet 2003 sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes, et en particulier à la gente féminine du Burkina notamment depuis la révolution de 1983 et celle du Sénégal spécialement avec la loi n°2010-11 du 28 mai 2010 instituant la parité dans les fonctions électives et semi-électives, cette catégorie d' « Homme<sup>52</sup> » n'arrive toujours pas à avoir une place estimable dans les domaines du politique .

A partir des variables discriminantes en rapport avec la question de l'imprégnation des femmes dans le champ politique des cas burkinabé et sénégalais, il est intéressant d'appliquer l'approche constructiviste à cette étude comparative ; ce qui en fera un cadre hybride. A ce titre, l'analyse des lois et traités internationaux promouvant la présence comme sujet et l'individualisation de la femme au même titre que l'homme devrait faciliter ce construit social. La question de la longue « domination masculine<sup>53</sup> » en politique prend sens et est souvent viscéralement acquiescée. Or, historiquement la différence de sexes humains n'a pas toujours avantagé le genre masculin dans la mesure où en Afrique et ailleurs, il est fait connaissance de sociétés matrilineaires voire matriarcales<sup>54</sup> selon les zones et sur des fondements d'une structure duelle mais pas inégalitaire. Le contact avec les négriers suivi de celui avec le colon a précipité une « désacralisation » de la femme et à une discrimination en leur défaveur, connaissant une évolution antagonique<sup>55</sup> à celle des Occidentales. Contrairement à ce qui se passait pendant des siècles dans les civilisations gréco-romaines<sup>56</sup> avec l'exclusion des femmes de toute participation à la vie de la cité du fait de leur nature procréatrice- l'Afrique « politique » a pu voir certaines de ses « avoir leur mot

51 Citation tirée des actes du colloque sur « Femmes et histoire » sous la direction de DUBY G. et PERROT M., Plon Paris La Sorbonne, 13-14 novembre 1992.

52 Homme au sens de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme, incluant les sexes féminin et masculin.

53 BOURDIEU, Pierre, La domination masculine, in : *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*. Vol. 84, septembre 1990. Masculin/féminin-2. pp. 2-31.

54 Renvois faits aux travaux de Cheikh A. DIOP, Fatou Kiné KAMARA, Moussa LAM. De même, RADCLIFFE-BROWN et FORDE, dans leur livre *Systèmes familiaux et matrimoniaux en Afrique*, nous donnent les détails suivants « *les ashanti considèrent le lien entre mère et enfant comme la clef de voûte de toutes les relations sociales.* ». Ils le considèrent comme une parenté morale absolument obligatoire. « *Une femme Ashanti ne lésine pas sur le travail ou sur les sacrifices pour le bien de ses enfants...* »

55 Si on suit les conclusions de ces chercheur (res) précédemment cités, les femmes africaines n'avaient séculièrement analysé, pas besoin de combats féministes à mener, leur construit social leur avait permis d'être dans des sociétés égalitaires ou harmonisées bien que différentielle. Inversement, les euro-indiennes avaient peut de droit et que des devoirs envers leurs sociétés, d'où le combat d'Olympe de Gouges, des suffragettes, entre autres. Au contact des négriers, des colons, de l'évangélisation, l'Afrique et l'histoire de ses femmes connurent une autre tournure. Tout devenait sujet de luttes et de revendications, y compris le leadership politique des femmes.

56 FROIDEVAUX-METTERIE, Camille, *La Révolution du féminin*, Paris, Gallimard, Coll. Bibliothèque des Science humaines, 2015, p.384

à dire dans la gestion de la cité ». Leur absence ou présence et position mitigée dont il est fait état à certains moments de la vie politique mérite à cet effet, d'être analysées dans une logique comparative. Ce faisant, il est de prime abord fait état de l'effective position « politique » des femmes voltaïque et sénégalaise ballottée par le poids de la colonisation (I). A l'image des femmes de la métropole, elles perdaient de leur possibilité d'intervenir sur le champs politique puisqu'en France, il y avait à cette période un sentiment d'incompétence légitimés par tous, des femmes en politique. C'est certainement la raison pour laquelle, elles ont été les « grandes oubliées<sup>57</sup> » pendant longtemps, des publications en histoire, en sociologie, en science politique sur la période coloniale. A partir des actions individuelles ou collectives des femmes diversement appréciées par d'abord, l'administration coloniale puis les régimes postcoloniaux et de plus en plus au niveau international, la présence politique des femmes reste encore un défi perceptible à relever (II).

### **L'effective position « politique » des femmes Voltaïque et Sénégalaise à l'épreuve du poids de la religion et de la colonisation**

Dans son ouvrage intitulé « *L'unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire : domaines du patriarcat et du matriarcat dans l'antiquité classique* », Cheikh Anta Diop précise « les sociétés africaines étaient essentiellement matriarcales. C'est l'arrivée des religions monothéistes d'une part et du colonialisme européen d'autre part qui a perturbé une organisation sociale dans laquelle la femme détenait une place centrale sinon plus importante que celle de l'homme<sup>58</sup>. » C'est en conséquence que le chercheur et ses disciples<sup>59</sup> consacrent au matriarcat la place d'acrotère de l'organisation des sociétés africaines. Ils poursuivent en mettant en exergue le fait que dans les zones où le matriarcat n'a pas été influencé par le colonisateur ou par la religion, c'est la femme qui transmet les droits politiques. Il est important de rappeler que dans la Grèce antique, c'étaient les femmes qui transmettaient aussi les droits civiques.

Le point de départ de cette partie sera l'emblématique image de la femme avec la gynécocratie de Bachofen<sup>60</sup> justifiée par les actes symboliquement politiques des figures féminines (A) en mettant toutefois, l'accent sur la colonisation comme occlusion culturelle à l'affirmation des femmes dans le politique (B).

### **La gynécocratie de Bachofen légitimée par les actes symboliquement politiques posés par des figures féminines**

L'historien Bachofen est le premier scientifique à avoir étudié manifestement, le matriarcat<sup>61</sup> notamment sur le terrain africain. Ses conclusions tournent autour de la femme comme élément phare de la société et du foyer familial. Elle recevait lors du mariage la dot, gérait les biens de la famille et transmettait plus tard, l'héritage. En était-il de même dans toutes les sociétés africaines ? La place des femmes en ce lieu a-t-elle toujours été la même partout dans toutes les provinces ? Il est à remarquer que selon les groupes ethniques et les peuples, les femmes

57 LIAUZU, Claude, *Colonisation : droit d'inventaire*, Paris, Colin, 2004, p. 198

58 DIOP, Cheikh. A. *L'Unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire : Domaines du patriarcat et du matriarcat dans l'antiquité classique*, Ed. Présence Africaine, Coll. Poche, 2e édition, p. 220, 1982.


59 C'est le cas du Professeur Aboubacry Moussa LAM, notamment dans son article *Égypte ancienne et Afrique noire chez Cheikh A. Diop ou encore des ressenties recherches Dre Fatou Kiné Camara ou avec ses ouvrages L'union matrimoniale dans la tradition des peuples noirs*, en collaboration avec Saliou Kandji, Éditions L'Harmattan, 2000 et *Pouvoir et justice dans la tradition des peuples : philosophie et pratique*, Éditions L'Harmattan, 2004.

60 BACHOFEN, Johan Jakob, *Le droit maternel : Recherche sur la gynécocratie de l'antiquité dans sa nature religieuse et juridique*, Traduit de l'Allemand par Etienne Barilier. Lausanne, Ed : L'Âge d'homme, In : *Les Cahiers du GRIF*, Hors-Sérien°2, 1996. Âmes fortes, esprits libres. pp. 198-199.

61 Le *Mutterrecht* (le droit maternel) a souvent été perçu comme un mythe devenu imposant à telle enseigne qu'il a eu de nombreuses critiques.



ont connu une évolution quelque peu différente dans le domaine du politique. Socialement, elle est tantôt considérée comme une déesse, tantôt prise comme une guérisseuse<sup>62</sup> ou encore représentée par laalebasse<sup>63</sup>. Mais quoiqu'il en soit, la centralité de la femme dans l'Afrique est une lapalissade. Quant à ses pouvoirs politiques, ils seraient à relativiser dans certains endroits. Le Burkina-Faso et le Sénégal n'ayant pas existé officiellement comme territoire juridiquement limité, les deux États se trouvaient entre les empires et royaumes du Ghana, du Mali et Wolof.



Sources African Studies Center MSU

### La place sacrée du droit maternel dans les empires du Mali et du Ghana

Radcliffe-Brown et Forde notent que « Les Ashantis considèrent le lien entre mère et enfant comme la clef de voûte de toutes les relations sociales... Ils considèrent comme une parenté morale absolument obligatoire. Une femme Ashanti ne lésine pas sur le travail ou sur les sacrifices pour le bien de ses enfants...<sup>64</sup> » À l'alternat, dans le royaume Mandingue, au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle avec l'avènement de la Charte du Mandé, le roi Soundjata rappela le grand rôle joué par les femmes à son accession au pouvoir et prononça sa fameuse phrase « N'offensez jamais les femmes, ce sont nos mères<sup>65</sup>. » C'est aussi le cas dans la presqu'île du Cap-Vert représentant essentiellement aujourd'hui, la région de Dakar, où étaient venues s'installer quatre familles migrantes dont les trajectoires seraient l'Inde puis l'Égypte en passant par le Nigéria, le Fouta entre autres lieux de traversées et de brassages. Ces familles étaient dirigées par quatre femmes : Djiguilane SAMB, Alima FALL, Diaté NDIAGUE et Sine DIOP qui sont considérées comme les fondatrices des peuples Lébous.<sup>66</sup>

Dans la plupart des ethnies de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, il y était prôné le principe d'« égalité dans la différence » comme le préconisait quelques siècles plus tard, Alain Touraine dans un autre

62 Guérisseuse ou prêtresse comme dans les sociétés « Lébous » du Cap-Vert au Sénégal au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle ; une communauté majoritairement pêcheurs venus essentiellement du Djolof.

63 Laalebasse est l'objet dont se sert la plupart des peuples africains pour recueillir le lait, l'eau, le vin de palme ou encore les céréales. Elle représente la vie. L'ethnie Diola au Sénégal l'utilise aussi symboliquement, pour la remise de la dot.

64 RADCLIFFE-BROWN, L. A.R, FORDE, Daryll, *Systèmes familiaux et matrimoniaux en Afrique*, In : *Population*, 9<sup>e</sup> année, n°2, 1954. p. 363.

65 Ce concept émane du roi mandingue Soundjata Keita qui, il y a plus de sept siècles, dans l'actuel Mali, a initié la Charte de Kurukan-Fuga (cf fin bas de l'article). Une Charte qui rend notamment hommage aux femmes qui l'avaient appuyé lorsqu'il était en guerre.

66 Entretien avec Ndiaga Samb, historien spécialiste de l'histoire Lébou, le 17 avril 2020 à Bargny dans la région de Dakar.

contexte<sup>67</sup> nous confie Abasse Ndione, écrivain sénégalais<sup>68</sup>. En effet, plusieurs exemples de sociétés comme les Fanti du groupe des Akan dans l'Empire du Ghana<sup>69</sup> ou les Diolas de la Casamance au Sénégal<sup>70</sup>, peuvent être supputées en exemple de matriarcat comme le notait Cheikh Anta Diop<sup>71</sup>. Subséquemment, il est constatable dans différentes sociétés africaines que le statut de la femme ne soit pas moindre voire marginalisé. Elle était mère, prêtresse, déesse et reine comme nous le renvoie l'image de la déesse Isis protégeant constamment son époux Osiris dans l'Égypte antique.

Au vu de ce qui a été analysé jusqu'ici, la femme africaine et particulièrement celle des Empires et Royaume du Ghana et du Mali a eu une place et une position différentes mais égales voire, frôlant le « sacré <sup>72</sup> » par rapport à celui de l'homme. De même dans les sociétés du royaume Wolof, la femme, mère faisait figure de la conseillère qui orientait les décisions du ou des « décideurs » à savoir le roi et ces hommes de main. Ainsi, un adage bien connu en langue Wolof le rappelle littéralement, en ces termes « *discute avec ton oreiller avant de prendre une quelconque décision*<sup>73</sup> », bien entendu l'oreiller représenterait la femme, celle qui partage le lit.

N'empêche, de l'Antiquité au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle même s'il y a eu à foison, des transformations sociétales avec les traites des noirs, l'évangélisation ou l'islamisation, le post-colonialisme ou encore la mondialisation, le droit maternel défendu par Bachofen, la matrilinearité de Evans- Pritchard<sup>74</sup> et le matriarcat de Cheikh Anta Diop laissent place à des sociétés patriarcales dont la violence symbolique<sup>75</sup> est légitimée même rendue naturelle, d'abord par la société ensuite par les dominées elles-mêmes : les femmes. Cette évolution n'empêcha pourtant pas, à certaines d'entre-elles de mener des combats de principe contre ce que Bourdieu définit comme un « système de dispositions durables et transposables<sup>76</sup> », *l'habitus*, qui s'installe.



Représentation de la déesse Isis protégeant son mari Osiris

67 TOURAINE, Alain., *Pourrons-nous vivre ensemble ? Égaux et différents*, Paris, Fayard, 1997.

68 Entretien avec NDIONE Abasse, le 16 juin 2020, infirmier de formation et auteur de plusieurs publications dont Ramata. Il est né et a grandi dans la communauté Lébou, où il vit toujours.

69 Les Fanti font partie du grand groupe Akan du Ghana. Beaucoup d'entre eux ont migré vers la Côte d'Ivoire et le Burkina Faso.

70 Chez les Diolas on est considéré comme membre de l'ethnie par le truchement de la mère. Du coup il est plus acceptable que la femme se marie ailleurs que ne l'est le mariage de l'homme avec une femme autre que Diola. Ses descendants ne seront pas considérés comme tel. Source : Jeune Afrique, Janvier-Février 1991 « Violence en Casamance »

71 DIOP, Cheikh. A. *L'Unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire*, Ibid.

72 La femme représentant la vie et la terre. L'homme ainsi que la femme proviennent de la terre et retournent à la terre.

73 Au même moment un adage français dit « que la nuit porte conseil ».

74 EVANS-PRITCHARD, Edward, E., "Some Notes on Zande Sex Habits" *American Anthropologist*, vol, 75, n° 1, 1973 pp.171-175

75 Voir Langage et Pouvoir symbolique, Paris Seuil, coll. « Points Essais », 2001

76 BOURDIEU, Pierre, *le Sens pratique*, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980, 500 p.

## Les prodigieux actes posés par des femmes de la Volta au Sénégal

Depuis l'Égypte antique avec Néfertiti, il est souvent fait état d'actes de vaillances posés par des femmes africaines. Mais qu'en est-il vraiment de ces femmes et de leur trajectoire. Qui étaient-elles vraiment ? Très souvent les afro-féministes mettent l'accent sur la place occupée par les femmes dans les sociétés africaines. Ainsi, sont relatées l'histoire de différentes femmes à savoir Anne Zingha<sup>77</sup>, d'Angola, Taytu Betul<sup>78</sup> d'Éthiopie, Pokou<sup>79</sup> de la Côte-d'Ivoire, Amina de Zaria<sup>80</sup> du Nigéria, Yennega<sup>81</sup> de l'actuel Burkina-Faso ou encore Ngoné Latyr Lat Sukabé Fall<sup>82</sup> ou Ndaté Yala<sup>83</sup> du Sénégal, entre autres femmes.

Ces dernières sont de plus en plus célébrées par l'Unesco<sup>84</sup>, par des artistes, gouvernants et autres organisations afin de rappeler le statut et la place conséquents de la femme dans les sociétés africaines et surtout sur le plan politique. Cela n'empêche une certaine interrogation ou remarque concernant ces héroïnes, au premier plan de luttes et de décisions changeant le cours de l'histoire. Il est à noter qu'elles sont toutes des reines, des princesses ou des descendantes de lignées nobles. Qu'en fut-il des autres femmes de classes ou de castes inférieures qui étaient *ab initio* assujetties, soit par les esclavagistes puis par les colons, soit par leurs chefs politiques, empereurs, rois ou reines ? Celles-ci passent habituellement inaperçues, d'un lieu à un autre ou au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle d'un pays colonisateur à un autre comme le souligne Odile Goerg<sup>85</sup>. Les privilèges revenaient donc, subrepticement à une catégorie de femmes de classes hautes et à moindre mesure, bourgeoises. Ce qui est nécessaire de souligner ici, c'est qu'à l'instar de Jeanne d'Arc, d'Olympe de Gouges, des suffragettes, des femmes princesses et reines d'Afrique ont pu profiter de leur rang social afin de se propulser et de mettre en avant leur qualité d'« acteur » politique et de cheffe de guerre. Seulement, les Africaines, mères, entrepreneuses<sup>86</sup>, reines ou princesses s'y sont attelées souvent, dans des contextes de traites des noires puis de colonisation dans lesquels, même les hommes subissaient la domination.

77 Anne Zingha est parvenue à éviter la colonisation de son pays. Elle fut reine et reste un exemple de femme politique en Afrique de par ses combats

78 Taytu était épouse de Menelik II et impératrice d'Éthiopie. Elle mena plusieurs combats auprès de son époux contre les Italiens qui voulaient s'emparer des territoires érythréens et éthiopiens.

79 Pokou du Royaume des Baoulé, est connue pour avoir fait déplacer son peuple vers la Côte-d'Ivoire afin de leur éviter le massacre. On raconte qu'elle a sacrifié son fils, en a fait don au fleuve Comoé pour le traverser.

80 Aminatou des Zaria devient reine à la mort de son frère. Elle fût une guerrière Haoussa et savait manier les armes comme peu d'hommes.

81 Yennega est une princesse bien entraînée et une cheffe de guerre. Après plusieurs années de pratique, elle décide de s'enfuir de son royaume, l'actuel Ghana pour s'égarer dans une forêt de l'actuel Burkina où elle fit la connaissance d'un chasseur qui lui permit de réaliser son rêve d'être mère.

82 Ngoné Latyr Lat Sukabé Fall est la fille du roi du Cayor et du Baol, (Damel-Tègne) Lat Sukabé. Pendant que son père était malade en 1699, Ngoné Latyr Fall dirigea l'armée contre les ennemis du royaume, elle vainquit l'armée des Maures ennemies qui venaient attaquer le Cayor. Elle avait alors moins de vingt ans et avait pris la décision de remplacer son père, en se déguisant comme lui. Elle serait, dit-on à l'origine de l'expression « gor baax na, jigeen baax na » (litt: les garçons sont utiles, les filles sont utiles), quand après la victoire, elle se dévoila en enlevant son foulard qui cachait son visage. Cet événement est connu sous le nom de la bataille de Ngram Ngram.

83 Ndaté Yala, du Royaume du Walo, descendante des Mbodj. Elle est connue pour avoir été une farouche combattante des Français. Sa mère Fatim Yamar Khuri est l'incitatrice du célèbre « *Talatay Ndër* », l'immolation des femmes du Walo pour ne pas se donner aux Maures.

84 La série UNESCO Femmes dans l'histoire de l'Afrique, produite par la Division des sociétés du savoir du Secteur de la communication et de l'information de l'UNESCO, a été réalisée dans le cadre de la plateforme intersectorielle Priorité Afrique, avec le soutien de la Division pour l'égalité des genres. Cette initiative a été financée par le gouvernement de la République de Bulgarie.

85 GOERG, Odile, *Op.cit*, 15p., 1997

86 Mbodj M., « The Abolition of Slavery in Senegal, 1820-1890 : Crisis or the Rise of a New Entrepreneurial Class ? », in Klein M. (ed), *Breaking the Chains*, Univ. Of Wisconsin Press, 1993, 222p., pp. 197-211

Avant ces différentes périodes, comme souligné précédemment, les femmes d'Afrique en général, vivaient de manière égalitaire avec les hommes mais dans la différence. Tout en étant sacralisée par leur place de mère, elle n'intervenait pas directement voire publiquement dans le politique. « *Elles murmuraient à l'oreille des décideurs* », nous dira la ministre Burkinabé, Madame Maminata Traoré<sup>87</sup>.

### La colonisation comme obstruction culturelle à l'affirmation des femmes dans le politique

Les résultats de la colonisation en Afrique et les reculs consécutifs des représentations sociales, juridiques et religieuses africaines et d'ailleurs, comme chez les aborigènes ont fait des familles matriarcales des objets d'étude en voie de disparition<sup>88</sup>. Nonobstant, en s'éteignant, la famille matriarcale emporte avec elle toutes les formes de gouvernance de la famille ainsi que les configurations de transmission des biens familiaux et du nom de famille, sensibles aux droits des femmes et des enfants, qui la caractérisent. Ce qui sera la résultante de la transformation essentielle des rapports homme-femme avec l'apanage d'une élite académique nécessitant ce qui deviendra un assaut avec le clin-d'œil international des femmes dans le politique : analysé comme une légitimité « légale-irrationnelle

### La transformation radicale des rapports homme-femme : l'apanage d'une élite académique.

Au vu de ce qui a été précédemment analysé, il est fait état de sociétés africaines épisodiquement matriarcales et dans lesquelles, il était relativement possible que des femmes occupent des positions de chefs, de conseillères politique ou encore de décideurs « indirects ». A l'image de ce qui se passait chez les peuples Wolofs avec les « *Penc*<sup>89</sup> » qui réservaient des places aussi bien aux hommes qu'aux femmes. Mais ces lieux deviennent de plus en plus « illégitimés » s'ouvrant à une transformation. Celle-ci se présente sous la forme d'une assimilation, transposant cultures (langue, religions, arts) et civilisation (gréco-romaine) et occasionnant une certaine hybridation de cultures.

Parallèlement, différents auteurs mettent l'accent sur la position sociale et politique que les femmes occupaient dans les sociétés africaines précoloniales qui a connu une déprédation sous l'effet d'agents exogènes, surtout la colonisation et les religions dites révélées, soit judéo-chrétienne soit arabo-islamique. De la sorte, Assié-Lumumba N'Dri Thérèse<sup>90</sup> certifie, sans équivoque que les femmes avaient une place politique bien meilleure dans les sociétés africaines d'avant la colonisation. C'est donc l'impérialisme qui les place à l'extérieur de celui-ci comme c'est le cas dans les démocraties occidentales qui oubliaient de prendre en charge la capacité des femmes à participer à la gestion de la cité.

*A contrario*, dans le continent noir, les organisations politiques précoloniales étaient conçues dans un souci d'équilibre entre les sexes sociaux et biologiques. Ainsi, il est à noter que les femmes des chefs Ashanti du Ghana ont perdu avec la colonisation, leur rôle officiel d'intérimaires en cas d'absence de leur conjoint<sup>91</sup>. N'empêche quelques femmes réussirent à apprendre à lire et à écrire ou parfois, à aller à l'école du « colon ». Ce qui les fait prendre conscience de leur droits non pas

87 Entretien avec Mme la ministre déléguée, auprès du Ministre chargé de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation, via la plateforme zoom, le 30 juin 2020 ?

88 AMADIUME, Ifi, *Male Daughters, Female Husbands. (Gender and Sex in an African Society*, Zed Press, London 1987.

89 *Penc* en wolof est cet espace symbolique où se retrouvent les membres de la communauté pour discuter, légiférer, juger ou célébrer.

90 LUMUMBA- ASSIE, N'Dri Th., *Les Africaines dans la politique : femme baoulé de Côte-d'Ivoire*. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1996, 206 p.

91 GOERG, Odile, *ibid.* p.5

initiaux<sup>92</sup> mais ceux hérités de l'hybridation de leurs cultures qui se rapprocheraient des combats de femmes occidentales à l'exemple des suffragettes<sup>93</sup> réclamant leur pleine reconnaissance citoyenne avec l'effectivité du droit de vote à partir du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Ainsi, la colonisation eut de fait, des retentissements sur le pouvoir d'action et de décision de la femme africaine en général et particulièrement des Burkinabé et Sénégalaises dont les aïeules étaient des guerrières comme toutes les reines citées plus haut ou encore les Amazones<sup>94</sup> du Dahomey, actuel Bénin, des cheffes politiques et des reines. A la place de ces catégories de femmes, la période postcoloniale produira une élite intellectuelle en groupes associatifs d'où partiront des théories et des thèmes autour du féminisme et droits des femmes. Par exemple, auprès des Burkinabé, le féminisme aura du mal à passer. Il est précédé d'une image mettant en avant des femmes « vulgaires », divorcées ou célibataires, aigries, dénudées et défiant l'ordre social et la virilité des hommes. Il est fait état d'aucune difficulté pour contenir et vilipender le féminisme afin de lui donner l'houseau. Le concept ne s'intégrera pas dans les sociétés burkinabé, semblant si dépréciatif et diabolique. Au Sénégal des mouvements féministes et féminins arrivent à se positionner malgré les réfutations de part et d'autre des communautés : religieuses, coutumières, ethniques... A rebours de ces craintes l'internationalisation des mouvements féminins et féministes se fait et les africaines y prennent part, entièrement.

### L'appel international des femmes dans le politique : une légitimité « légale-irrationnelle »

Les premières luttes postcoloniales démarrent une dizaine d'années après les indépendances, portées par des icônes féministes comme Awa Thiam<sup>95</sup> qui donne *La parole aux négresses* en 1978- Mariama Bâ<sup>96</sup> qui transcende les conséquences de la polygamie dans *Une si longue lettre*. S'ensuivra le mouvement de Marie-Angélique Savané<sup>97</sup> qui met en place le groupe féministe « Yeewu Yeewi » (« faire prendre conscience », « libérer », en wolof).

Au-delà de leurs acquis, ces femmes étaient très contestées y compris par des paires qui ne se sentaient pas concernées par les messages qu'elles semblaient véhiculer, « des femmes intellectuelles, « filles de madame<sup>98</sup> », déracinées jusqu'au bout des ongles qui veulent endoctriner leurs sœurs sans pour autant comprendre leur vécu. On ne peut avoir été choyé par la nature, vécu dans la capitale, voyagé à l'étranger, ne jamais s'être imprégnée des difficultés des femmes du monde rural et s'autoproclamer leur porte-parole. Je suis désolée, ces femmes étaient loin de faire passer nos messages. En revanche, on reconnaît leur force et endurance pour avoir défendu les droits des femmes, dans un contexte hostile. Elles ont osé<sup>99</sup> », nous dira Mme Kane qui se définit comme « féministe responsable. »

92 L'assimilation semble leur faire oublier qu'initialement, elles avaient le droit de participer au « *Penc* », représentant l'espace public où se prenait l'essentiel des décisions d'ordre social, juridique et politique.

93 LIDDINGTON, Jill, NORRIS, Jill, *Histoire des suffragettes radicales : Le combat oublié des ouvrières du nord de l'Angleterre*, Libertalia, coll. « Ceux d'en bas », 2018, 551 p.

94 Les Amazones ont formé un régiment entièrement féminin dans le Dahomey. Elles ont existé jusqu'au milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

95 Awa Thiam, anthropologue, femme politique et autrice de *Parole aux négresse* paru en 1978

96 Mariama Ba est l'une des plus célèbres auteures africaines, *Une si longue lettre*, son ouvrage phare fut traduit en plusieurs langues.

97 Marie-Angélique est une femme politique, chercheuse et initiatrice du Mouvement « Yeewu Yewi »

98 « Fille de Madame » est le terme utilisé par Madame Kane pour faire référence à l'élite intellectuelle qui portait le combat féministe qui semble-t-il serait bien loin du quotidien des femmes essentiellement rurales

99 Entretien avec Madame Kane, activiste, femme politique ayant vécu au village jusqu'à 16 ans et qui s'est très tardivement engagée dans les combats dans le monde rural avec notamment la création d'entreprises et l'adhésion à un mouvement politique.



C'est ainsi que les luttes féministes n'ont pas toujours eu échos favorables, aussi bien au Burkina, au Sénégal que dans la plupart des pays du monde. Cela n'empêche pas malgré cela, que la question des droits de la femme soit mondialisée, portée au-devant de la scène, sur la table des Nations-Unies et de ses organismes spécialisés. L'année 1976 sera internationalement dédiée à la femme après la première conférence mondiale sur le statut de la femme à Mexico qui sera suivie par celles de Copenhague en 1980, Nairobi en 1985 puis Beijing en 1995 avec une série d'évaluations quinquennales.

Sur le plan continental, à la suite de la reconnaissance du fait que les droits des femmes étaient souvent marginalisés dans le contexte des droits humains, une réunion organisée par *Women in Law and Development in Africa* (WILDAF) en mars 1995, à Lomé, a appelé à l'élaboration d'un protocole spécifique à la Charte des droits de l'homme et des peuples pour aborder les droits des femmes. L'assemblée générale de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA) a chargé la Commission africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples (CADHP) d'élaborer un tel protocole lors de sa 31<sup>e</sup> session ordinaire en juin 1995, à Addis-Abeba qui entre en vigueur avec des réserves, dans plusieurs États sur les questions concernant le mariage, le divorce, etc.

Quant à la participation politique des femmes, elle est encouragée par tous les États membres et l'article 9<sup>100</sup> dudit Protocole y est consacré avant même le droit à l'éducation et à la formation.<sup>101</sup> C'est dans ce contexte d'internationalisation de la problématique des droits de la femme et notamment de l'Africaine que les États ont manifesté la volonté de promouvoir politiquement les femmes. Pour ce qui est de nos deux terrains d'étude, le Burkina a eu sa première femme ministre en 1958, vingt années avant le Sénégal. Ce sera le début de différentes luttes pour une présence en politique des femmes, qui se heurtent à des barrières socio-culturelles, institutionnelles, politiques, économiques, matérielles ou religieuses.

Malgré les textes légalement existants, l'effectivité de la participation politique des femmes semble être irrationnelle<sup>102</sup> au vu des obstacles sociétaux qui limitent voire empêchent les activistes de mener leurs combats jusqu'au bout de leur logique. Ce sont là, les achoppements d'émergence que rencontrent les féministes qui peinent à faire passer leurs messages constamment jugés en inadéquation avec l'essence de leurs sociétés. Ces dissonances partant des traités internationaux, régionaux seraient conséquentes à des décisions prises sans au préalable prendre en compte la dimension sociale voire sociologique de la question, intrinsèquement, juridique. D'où l'importance des débats<sup>103</sup> autour de l'universalisme, de l'uniformisme, du particularisme ou encore du relativisme des droits humains<sup>104</sup>. Par exemple, avec le Protocole de Maputo<sup>105</sup> reconnaissant l'avortement comme un droit humain au moment où culturellement de nombreux États africains sacralise la grossesse et la vie d'un fœtus à moins de deux mois.

100 Article 9 : Droit de participer au processus politique et à la prise de décision

101 Article 12 : Droit à l'éducation et à la formation

102 En opposition à la domination rationnelle-légale ou légale-rationnelle reposant sur la croyance en la légitimité des règles légales adoptées et du droit de donner des directives qu'ont ceux qui exercent la domination par ces moyens.

103 MEDEVIELLE, Geneviève. « La difficile question de l'universalité des droits de l'homme », *Transversalités*, vol. 107, no. 3, 2008, pp. 69-91.

104 DIOP, Thierno, *Démocratie et Droit de l'Homme. Nouveaux pièges pour l'Afrique*, Ed. L'Harmattan, p.160, 2021.

105 Le Protocole à la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples relatif aux droits des femmes en Afrique (généralement désigné « Protocole de Maputo ») a été adopté en 2003 par l'Union africaine afin de promouvoir l'égalité des droits pour les filles et les femmes. Outre ses dispositions relatives à l'émancipation économique et politique des femmes ainsi qu'à leur santé et leur bien-être, le Protocole de Maputo est le premier traité panafricain à reconnaître expressément l'avortement comme un droit humain.

### La présence politique des femmes : un défi à relever par une volonté politique

Dans le milieu du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle alors qu'en Occident les luttes des féministes étaient de désavouer l'ordre patriarcal dominant pour la transformation de la condition des femmes et visaient l'égalité entre les sexes, les africaines avaient d'autres tourments. Assurément, elles vivaient encore dans des colonies et avaient des luttes politiques à mener au sein des partis nationalistes ou de mouvements armés en Afrique du centre, du Nord et aussi de l'ouest notamment en Haute-Volta et au Sénégal. Ces femmes se mobilisaient aux côtés des hommes pour obtenir l'indépendance. Leur participation politique se faisait en termes de manifestations, d'actions clandestines (distributions de tracts, de manifestes, émeutes...). Au lendemain des indépendances, certaines d'entre elles ressentent leur absence dans le jeu politique et particulièrement au niveau des instances de décision.

Concernant les femmes voltaïques, elles démystifiaient dès le départ l'idéologie féministe pour ensuite s'en démarquer « afin d'éviter tout déracinement après des siècles d'esclavages et de colonisation. C'était le moment de refuser toute forme de « recolonisation ». Nous voulions que nos droits soient respectés et que l'on puisse accéder au plus haut niveau d'éducation et dans les instances parlementaires et exécutives mais il n'est pas question qu'on mette sur la table l'accès à l'avortement médicalisé ou encore des problématiques purement occidentales...<sup>106</sup>» Malgré, la pluralité des résistances entre les Sénégalaises et les Burkinabé leurs combats restent permanents (A) s'éloignant de prime abord, des contradictions sociétales de la sous-représentation dans les hautes sphères de l'appareil politique et témoignant d'une mobilisation politique encore effective voire imbibée, des femmes pour les hommes (B).

### La résistance permanente et plurielle des femmes au Sénégal et au Burkina

Avant la colonisation ce qui pouvait être considéré comme l'Agora était l'arbre à palabre, l'espace public, à l'ombre duquel les communautés s'exprimaient sur la vie sociale, les problèmes du village et sur la politique notamment. Vieux, jeunes, hommes et femmes y avaient leur place selon les problématiques discutées. Plus tard avec l'administration coloniale, le politique devenait le leur et l'organisation était basée sur les réalités occidentales. Les combats tournaient en ce temps, autour de la décolonisation de manière clandestine à travers des manifestations ou par le biais d'associations étudiantes. Moins présentes que les hommes, quelques femmes ont joué leur partition dans ces contestations. C'était le cas de Lalla Fatma N'Soumer<sup>107</sup> de l'Algérie,

106 Propos de Mme G. P, activiste du Burkina, actuellement député et femme engagée dans les luttes syndicales, étudiantes, politiques, entretien sur zoom, effectué le 12 janvier 2020.

107 Femme éduquée née dans une famille de lettrés, elle rejoint la résistance kabyle à l'âge de 20 ans. Prophétesse et stratège, elle est très respectée parmi les combattants. En 1854, elle succède au chef de la résistance Chérif Boubaghla. Cette même année, elle remporte la bataille du Haut Sebaou, sa première victoire contre les Français. Capturée au combat par l'armée française en 1857, elle meurt en prison à l'âge de 33 ans.

Sarraouinia Mangou<sup>108</sup> du Niger, Kimpa Vita<sup>109</sup> du Congo, M'balia Camara<sup>110</sup> de la Guinée ou encore Aline Sitoé Diatta<sup>111</sup> du Sénégal.

Aux indépendances, la domination est ailleurs<sup>112</sup> : les hommes s'emparent du pouvoir car étant allés majoritairement à l'école et contextuellement préparés à diriger. Pour les femmes, l'heure était venue de se battre pour l'effectivité d'une rupture avec les stéréotypes de la femme africaine otage et bête de somme d'une certaine ethnologie. Elles se devaient d'avoir la chance de recevoir une éducation et une instruction, de se positionner contre les mariages forcés, etc. Les Voltaïques commencèrent progressivement à se former en groupements et mouvements afin d'acquérir des droits parmi lesquels la participation politique, l'autonomie financière avec l'entrepreneuriat et la possibilité d'aller à l'école, sans pour autant se réclamer d'un quelconque féminisme. A l'inverse les Sénégalaises de manières clairsemées, ont pu manifester la défense de leurs droits et leur féminisme à moindre mesure, avec « une extinction de la dynamique féministe au début des années 2000. »

### La détermination des femmes burkinabé pour l'indicible féminisme politique ?

Contrairement au Sénégal, le féminisme au Burkina Faso n'a pas été un mouvement issu de différentes luttes. Néanmoins, il y a eu depuis les années soixante, des femmes « féministes<sup>113</sup> » qui réfutent l'appartenance à ce mouvement et qui ont tout de même, contribué à l'amélioration de leurs conditions. Rares sont les Burkinabé qui affichent leur féminisme comme le font Alice Tiendrébéogo, Monique Ilboudo, respectivement anciennes Ministre de la Promotion de la femme et des droits humains. Concernant Tara Nacanabo, une militante pour les droits des femmes, elle précise : « je ne suis pas contre les hommes mais je veux des meilleures conditions pour les femmes ». Elle refuse d'être qualifiée de féministe, une contradiction verbale mais pas dans les actes<sup>114</sup>. D'où vient maintenant cette contestation et cette absence d'un réel féminisme burkinabé ?

*Primo*, il a fallu du temps à la gente féminine nouvellement décolonisée et acquérant le droit de vote, de se rendre compte de leur infériorité si ce n'est de leur absence, dans la sphère politique. Ainsi, les premières organisations féminines et les femmes instruites se sont rassemblées en des centaines d'associations, sans se prévaloir du statut de féministe qu'elles jugeaient exclusif. *Secundo*, comme le souligne Madame O., « se réclamer du féminisme allait créer des heurts entre

108 « Sarraouinia » signifie « reine » en langue haoussa. Elle a été chef politique et religieuse présidant depuis Lougou, la capitale aux destinées du royaume Azna, dans le sud-ouest du Niger. En 1899, elle organise la résistance contre la colonne d'exploration Voulet-Chanoine, réputée l'une des missions les plus meurtrières de la colonisation française en Afrique de l'Ouest

109 Jeune fille issue de la noblesse, Dona Beatriz tombe malade en 1704 et prétend être possédée par l'esprit de saint Antoine. En ce début de 18ème siècle, le royaume du Kongo était divisé par des guerres civiles, son ancienne capitale, São Salvador, abandonnée avec l'arrivée des Portugais au Kongo en 1482. Dona Beatriz appelle à la reconstruction du royaume et l'émancipation du peuple du Kongo face au colon portugais.

110 Militante politique au sein du RDA, le parti pro-indépendance de Sekou Touré, M'balia Camara dirige le comité local des femmes de ce parti dans la ville de Tondon, dans le Nord-est du pays. Membre très active de la contestation contre le délégué colonial local, le chef Almamy David Sylla. Après une altercation, ce dernier attaque M'balia Camara le 9 février 1955 et la blesse gravement avec son épée alors qu'elle était enceinte.

111 Originaire de la basse-Casamance, Aline Sitoé Diatta fut l'une des premières résistantes contre la domination française. Orpheline très jeune, elle a été élevée par son oncle paternel. Quand celui-ci est mort à son tour, elle est partie vivre à Ziguinchor où elle a travaillé comme docker puis à Dakar où elle trouva du travail comme domestique chez un colon. Un jour de 1941, elle entend une voix lui dire d'entrer en résistance contre les colons pour sauver le Sénégal et de retourner en Casamance sous peine de connaître un malheur. Elle choisit tout d'abord d'ignorer cette voix et devient paralysée quatre jours plus tard.

112 La domination masculine s'entend par un habitus donnant aux femmes et aux hommes un rôle prédéterminé.

113 Ce sont des femmes qui refusent tout lien avec le féminisme et qui paradoxalement, réclament les mêmes droits que les féministes d'ailleurs.

114 [information.tv5monde.com/terriennes/tara-nacanabo-feministe-malgre-elle-au-burkina-faso-50618](http://information.tv5monde.com/terriennes/tara-nacanabo-feministe-malgre-elle-au-burkina-faso-50618)

*hommes et femmes alors que pour nous autres africaines, les combats ne sont pas contre les hommes mais avec eux, pour sortir de ce système qui offre peu de chance aux jeunes et aux femmes, d'accéder également, à des fonctions politiques. Il faut néanmoins, souligner que les combats qu'ils soient féministes ou tout simplement féminins produisent des résultats. L'essentiel est qu'on reste authentiques, africaines, burkinabé<sup>115</sup>.»* C'est donc une question de construit social. Tercio, l'idéologie féministe qui reviendrait à une domination de la femme sur l'homme, selon la majeure partie des Burkinabé, les femmes y comprises<sup>116</sup>, ne peut être songée et théorisée dans ce pays où l'on défend l'idée, depuis la révolution sankariste que la première ressource du pays, c'est l'humain, à la fois la femme et l'homme. Les citoyens doivent agir pour un développement inclusif, dans le sens « Ubuntu <sup>117</sup>»

Chemin faisant, depuis les indépendances, nombreux sont les mouvements de femmes qui se créent pour plusieurs raisons. Vu sous l'angle des SOP<sup>118</sup> (structure des opportunités politiques), ce fait serait corollaire à l'accès aux décisions publiques prises sous la présidence de Sankara. La première reste cependant, l'essor de l'entreprise féminine et la seconde, la défense de leurs droits qui rejoint les conventions et traités signés et adoptés au niveau international puis en interne. En conséquence, l'État burkinabé a élaboré un dispositif institutionnel et juridique incitant la représentation des femmes. Il s'agit de la Constitution de 1991 qui met la femme sur le pied d'égalité que l'homme, et promulgue le code des personnes et de la famille. A ce niveau, la reconnaissance de l'autorité parentale est une avancée considérable. N'empêche le dernier gouvernement nommé en janvier 2021 ne compte que neuf femmes sur trente-trois ministres<sup>119</sup>.

Jusqu'à présent, les partis politiques ont encore du mal à responsabiliser les femmes, malgré l'idée du système de quotas existant depuis 2000 et renforcé par la loi n°010-2009/AN du 16 avril 2009 portant fixation de quotas aux élections législatives et municipales. Sans doute, dans le domaine de la gouvernance démocratique, cette loi constitue l'une des réformes législatives phares adoptées par l'Assemblée nationale burkinabé au cours de ces dernières années.

En effet, le processus qui a abouti aujourd'hui, à l'adoption de cette loi est le corollaire d'actions menées par les diverses entités de la société civile, en particulier par les acteurs non étatiques tels les organisations féminines qui ont mené des activités de plaidoyer et de lobbying auprès des partis politiques et de l'Assemblée nationale. Malgré les féminismes qui ne disent pas leur nom, les Burkinabé réussissent à produire des résultats assez significatifs au niveau de la représentation politique. A l'inverse, des efforts restent à faire surtout au niveau de l'Assemblée où en 2021, le pays enregistre neuf femmes pour un total de cent-vingt-sept (127) parlementaires contre 19 députés femmes soit 6,3%, à l'avant dernière législature. Cette régression est surtout due à un assouplissement du système de quotas et à un manque de volonté politique voire sociétal.

115 Entretien avec Mme O., jeune militante féministe qui avoue réfuter son féminisme pour mieux faire passer son message auprès des populations et ne pas se faire passer pour une « déracinée », le 8 février 2021 sur zoom.

116 Lors de notre recherche, nous avons banalement posé la question de savoir qu'était le féminisme et l'écrasante majorité des réponses tournait autour de la prise de pouvoir par les femmes, d'une supériorité des femmes au niveau des instances de décisions. Ainsi pour ces interviewés, il faut un réveil collectif des consciences comme cela a été le cas en 2014.

117 « Je suis ce que je suis grâce à ce que nous sommes tous », en langue Bantoue et popularisée par N. Mandela et D. Tutu pour mettre en relief, l'humanité et la fraternité

118 FILLIEULE, Olivier, et Lilian Mathieu. « Structure des opportunités politiques », Olivier Fillieule éd., *Dictionnaire des mouvements sociaux*. 2<sup>e</sup> édition mise à jour et augmentée. Presses de Sciences Po, 2020, pp. 573-580.

119 <https://www.gouvernement.gov.bf/gouvernement/membres-de-gouvernement>

## Des Sénégalaises entre féminisme politique « assumé » et défense controversée de leurs droits

« Si la femme a le droit de monter à l'échafaud, elle doit également avoir le droit de monter à la tribune » notait Olympe de Gouges pour montrer que le politique est un domaine qui semble être réservé à l'homme, à outrage. A cet effet, le lien entre pouvoir et féminité ne saurait être naturel et la question de la présence des femmes dans l'espace du politique en particulier est un défi global auquel l'humanité continue à faire face. Comme dans le reste du monde et au Burkina-Faso, le Sénégal connaît une pluralité de mouvements féminins mais aussi féministes<sup>120</sup> œuvrant pour l'avancée des droits du « deuxième sexe <sup>121</sup>» et notamment, leur ascendance politique. Seulement, il existe parfois des confusions et des contradictions entre les mouvements féministes et les mouvements féminins qui utilisent des moyens différents pour défendre leurs droits et promouvoir plus de justice sociale.

Les mouvements féminins expriment la prise de conscience qui s'agit de considérer entièrement les femmes en leur réservant une place au développement. Quant aux mouvements féministes, à l'image de « Yeewu yeewi », ils ont une posture politique, exercent un rôle d'organe stratégique, de théorisation et de réflexion philosophique afin de comprendre la nature des inégalités homme-femme et y remédier. Dès lors, à travers leurs discours, les féministes peuvent bouleverser l'ordre sociétal, rebuter, parfois heurter la morale, d'où les critiques caustiques portées à l'encontre de leurs mouvements. Et l'opinion ne s'arrête pas sur les spécificités, la pluralité des discours et les genèses des féminismes.

Au Sénégal, là où les Burkinabé, dans leur majorité, adoptent la posture de mouvements féminins, refusant de s'approprier un quelconque féminisme, certaines associations de femmes « assument pleinement leur statut sans pourtant agir en conséquence. Est-ce maintenant, un phénomène de mode pour pouvoir se vendre professionnellement ? Va savoir ! Les pionnières du mouvement agissaient avec conviction, s'engageaient dans la recherche, pour que les femmes soient nommables et éligibles naturellement à tous les postes politiques existants. De plus en plus, nous faisons face à des mouvements hétéroclites, composés de femmes qui agissent individuellement et se mettent en avant sur les réseaux sociaux sans pour autant comprendre les vrais enjeux féministes<sup>122</sup> » D'un autre côté une jeune féministe du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, nous fait observer que :

« Les premières féministes ont raté le coche avec la relève. Elles sont restées longtemps, dans leur tour d'ivoire et ont fini par s'éteindre à défaut de faire appel au renouvellement... De ce fait, de farouches féministes se défont de cette étiquette, jugée trop lourde à porter. Cette posture arrange-t-elle finalement les femmes ? Je ne pense pas. Mais en même temps, nous autres féministes assumées, avons des problèmes de cohérence dans nos idées. On reste sur la violence, le viol et on oublie trop souvent qu'il faut des femmes dans les sphères de décision, comme ministre, députée, chef d'État, élue locale pour mieux faire bouger les choses. Il faut plus que ça.<sup>123</sup>»

Outre les problèmes de discours et d'étiquette, se pose, dès lors, une difficulté majeure : un choc générationnel. Les premières générations et la jeune ont du mal à se trouver et à faire converger leurs idées et actions. En réalité, la plupart de nos entretiens au Sénégal font ressortir

120 DIOP Fatou « Bilan des politiques et perspectives sur la problématique des femmes au Sénégal : l'intérêt de l'analyse du genre ». Africa Development, Vol. XXIII, n° 3 & 4, Dakar, 1998, p.121 à 133.

121 En référence à l'essai existentialiste de Simone de Beauvoir paru en 1949 et revenant de manière philosophique, phénoménologique sur la condition des femmes due doublement à leur déresponsabilisation et au sexisme des hommes.

122 Entretien avec Mme Fall, R., féministe activiste des années 1990, réalisé le 8 août 2020

123 Entretien avec Mme Diagne A, féministe-activiste, membre de plusieurs associations nationales et internationales féministes, réalisé le 9 août 2020



un réel dynamisme des mouvements féminins comme féministes (moins représentatifs) dans la sensibilisation à la participation politique des femmes. Malgré tout, d'importants efforts restent à faire en termes de cohésion entre les mouvements, d'objectifs et de cibles.

Par ailleurs, dans le politique, il y a un certain acquiescement de la domination masculine de la part des femmes, tel l'esclave « de salon » affranchi et qui peine à sortir de la servitude. Lors d'un *focus group*,<sup>124</sup> des femmes évoluant dans des groupements économiques majoritairement se sont penchées vers une incapacité pour une femme d'être chef d'État pour des raisons sociales voire sociétales. De même, lors du vote de la loi sur la parité en 2010 à l'Assemblée nationale, d'un côté, des acteurs politiques s'y étaient opposés pour une raison principale avancée par l'homme politique est avocat Maître El Hadj Diouf : « *la parité est un danger, même pour les femmes. Parce que les femmes les plus méritantes sont absentes des listes*<sup>125</sup>. »

D'un point de vue cognitif, des femmes intellectuelles avançaient l'argument du faible niveau d'instruction des candidates susceptibles d'être inscrites sur les listes. Ce qui ferait, en sus, entrave aux compétences requises pour constituer une Assemblée nationale digne de ce nom. La loi fut finalement votée dans un climat de contestation puis promulguée le 28 mai 2010. Le Sénégal se retrouve avec pas moins de 42% de femmes députées ; ce qui représente une grande avancée, numériquement parlant. Est-ce à dire pour autant que la chambre basse ait gagné en dynamisme et en hardiesse ? La présence des femmes dans l'hémicycle change-t-elle qualitativement le fonctionnement de celui-ci ? En l'absence d'étude portant sur ce sujet, les entretiens n'ont pu en dire davantage.

### Les contradictions sociétales de la sous-représentation en politique : la femme vectrice de développement ou force mobilisatrice

D'un côté, avec l'arrivée de Soundjata Keita au pouvoir, les femmes du royaume du Mandé ont joué différents rôles dans le domaine politique, raison pour laquelle, il chercha à les protéger par tous les moyens. D'un autre côté, Dr Gueye nous rappela que « les femmes sont dans le pouvoir sans y être. L'histoire de nos royaumes montrent que les femmes sans généralement être les chefs, arrivent à mener un époux, un fils ou un neveu au pouvoir. C'est le cas de Ngoné Latyr Fall<sup>126</sup> ou encore de Yacine Boubou<sup>127</sup> dans le Cayor. Qu'on les y invite ou pas, aucune société ne réussira à se défaire du pouvoir des femmes pour évoluer. Elles doivent plus qu'influencer, être amenées à détenir le pouvoir et à diriger avec les hommes de manière naturelle.

Paradoxalement, le Sénégal d'après la colonisation, avec sa réputation de vitrine démocratique en Afrique de l'Ouest et malgré sa loi sur la parité, a mis du temps à placer le sexe féminin au centre de son jeu politique. Il a fallu attendre l'année 1963, pour avoir une députée, Madame Caroline Faye Diop qui fut nommée aussi première femme ministre en 1978 avec Madame Maimouna Kane. Pourtant, elles ont toujours été les principales actrices des campagnes électorales à travers le Sénégal du régime de Senghor à celui de Macky Sall depuis 2012. Font-elles que mobiliser pour les hommes leaders ? Que faire de leur capacité à régenter une équipe politique ?

124 Focus Group effectué avec des femmes d'un groupement d'intérêt économique, le 7 février 2020 à Dakar.

125 Propos extrait de l'intervention du député lors du vote de loi le 28 mai 2010.

126 Mère de Birima Fall et de Lat Dior Diop, tous les deux Damel du Cayor. Elle réussit à imposer son deuxième fils Lat-Dior, un Diop à la tête du pouvoir qui jusqu'ici était réservée aux Fall

127 Mère de Biram Yacine Boubou, Damel du Cayor au 17<sup>e</sup> siècle, elle fit de son fils un Damel en échange de sa vie. Elle signe un pacte avec son mari qui devait impérativement sacrifier une de ses épouses pour se maintenir au pouvoir. Elle accepta de mourir à la condition que son fils succéda à son père. Ce qui fut fait.

## La grande révolution de 1983 au Burkina avec l'émancipation pratique

Partant de la logique du cadre hybride fixé au départ avec un panaché du constructivisme social et des SOP, Sankara a-t-il tiré un enseignement du constat d'échec énoncé par Mirabeau en pleine tourmente révolutionnaire : « Tant que les femmes ne s'en mêlent pas, il n'y a pas de véritable révolution<sup>128</sup> » ? En effet, de 1958 à 1982 la Haute-Volta n'a connu que peu de ministres femmes. Leur condition dans le processus de prise de décision politique était restée très marginale jusqu'à la « Révolution démocratique et populaire » de 1983. Le capitaine Sankara a très tôt compris dans sa révolution de 1983 influencé par son penchant marxiste-léniniste. Il note d'ailleurs à ce propos « nous devons assurément au matérialisme dialectique d'avoir projeté sur les problèmes de la condition féminine la lumière la plus forte, celle qui nous permet de cerner le problème de l'exploitation de la femme à l'intérieur d'un système généralisé d'exploitation<sup>129</sup> ». Pendant quatre années, il a fait l'apologie de la femme dans la « gestion de la cité ». Loin de se fier aux textes et à la tradition postcoloniale, il a su bouleverser en mettant à exécution des convictions politiques « féministes » et révolutionnaires.

Antérieurement à cet avènement, il était rare qu'une femme prenne la parole dans les réunions publiques. Le 4 août 1983, le capitaine Sankara arrive au pouvoir par le truchement d'un coup d'État qui n'était pas inconnu dans le pays. Quelques mois plus tard, à travers un discours symbolique il rappelle « *Notre révolution intéresse tous les opprimés, tous ceux qui sont exploités dans la société actuelle. Elle intéresse par conséquent la femme, car le fondement de sa domination par l'homme se trouve dans le système d'organisation de la vie politique et économique de la société. La révolution en changeant l'ordre social qui opprime la femme, crée les conditions pour son émancipation véritable*<sup>130</sup> »

Ce discours fut traduit en actes avec d'importantes innovations sur l'émancipation des femmes et cela s'est poursuivi : interdiction du mariage forcé et du lévirat<sup>131</sup> forcé, accès des femmes à la politique...<sup>132</sup>. Pour le gouvernement Sankara cette manumission n'était guère une ardeur d'humanisme. Il était plus que temps que les sociétés prennent en compte que la « *femme portait en elle l'autre moitié du ciel*.<sup>133</sup> » Pendant les quatre années à la tête du pays des « Hommes intègres », le jeune capitaine cherche à déterminer une image positive de la femme en tant qu'agent dynamique et créatif du développement politique, économique et social et il fut aidé par une presse de propagande politique.

Plus qu'une véhémence mobilisatrice, Thomas Sankara mettait en exergue la capacité des femmes à être multitâches. Il favorisa l'ouverture de garderie populaire et de crèche en milieu rural ; ce qui permet aux mères de se former, de s'alphabétiser, de travailler dans divers milieux mais surtout d'avoir un rapport autre avec la société que celle seule de l'image de l'Africaine, mère. Au-delà de la maman et de l'épouse, le tribun politique qu'était le révolutionnaire était pour que les femmes deviennent des décideurs, des managers, des médecins, des militaires, de manière éclatante, sans népotisme ni discrimination aucun. Quelques mois avant son assassinat, le 8 mars 1987, à l'occasion de la célébration de la journée internationale de la femme, qui ne devait pas être que festive, il prononça un discours intitulé « la libération de la femme, une exigence

128 Assertion de Mirabeau, Premier président de l'Assemblée constituante, il fut surnommé la troche de Provence du fait de ses idées révolutionnaires.

129 GAKUNZI, David, op.cit. p. 223

130 GAKUNZI, David, Thomas SANKARA, « Oser inventer », la parole de SANKARA (1983-1987), New-York et Paris, Pachfinder et l'Harmattan, pp.63-66, 1991

131 Le lévirat est une pratique culturelle qui consiste à donner une veuve en héritage à une autre personne, ou à forcer une veuve ou une sœur à épouser son beau-frère ou un autre parent ([www.endvawnow.org/fr/articles/621-définition-des-autres-formes-de-mariages-forces-lepouse-heritee-le-levirat-et-le-sororat-.html](http://www.endvawnow.org/fr/articles/621-définition-des-autres-formes-de-mariages-forces-lepouse-heritee-le-levirat-et-le-sororat-.html)).

132 Gakunzi David., op.cit., p. 223

133 Discours le 8 mars 1987 du capitaine Thomas Isidore Sankara

du futur<sup>134</sup>» dans lequel, il employa 309 fois le mot femme contre 111 fois celui d'homme. A cela s'ajoutent les pronoms qui se substituent au substantif « femme (s) » tels que « elle (s) » (51 fois) et « vous » (45 fois). « Ce discours fut l'un des meilleurs si ce n'est le meilleur du capitaine<sup>135</sup> » d'après Mme V. Koné, chargée des affaires économiques.

Par conséquent, avec la volonté d'un homme, un leader, le Burkina Faso réussit pendant plus de trois années à faire évoluer le statut de la femme dans toutes les sphères, y compris celle de la politique qui lui a été pendant longtemps fermée. Le travail entrepris, permit à de nombreuses femmes de tous les milieux sociaux, de se dire que c'était possible mais aussi, de se conscientiser sur leurs droits et devoirs de participer au développement du Burkina. Des associations féminines se sont formées à flots, en cette période avec différents objectifs parmi lesquels : « le refus du statut de dominé, qui se plairait dans sa situation<sup>136</sup> » Du côté, du Sénégal, la condition restait bigarrée. En dépit des efforts consentis, le second rôle en politique est encore voué à la femme.

### La prégnance du confinement dans des fonctions d'« animation » en politique au Sénégal

Chez Senghor comme partout dans le monde, l'image des hommes actifs sur un terrain, encouragés par des jeunes femmes supporters, des *pom-pom girls*<sup>137</sup> est bien connue dans le monde du sport. Ramenée sur le champ politique, en période de campagnes électorales, de visites de leaders ou même lors de la célébration d'une journée spéciale, les femmes sont souvent habillées uniformément afin de se faire entendre et faire preuve de mobilisation<sup>138</sup>. Mais ne savent-elles faire que rassembler ? Cette représentation doit-elle perdurer aussi bien sur le plan sportif que politique ? Il est clair que la division sexuée des rôles confinant les femmes dans une tour privée, s'occupant de tâches ménagères dans l'obéissance et la résignation pendant que les hommes reçoivent une éducation, se forment et occupent essentiellement l'espace public, ne risque pas de changer drastiquement, les choses.

En revanche, au niveau mondial<sup>139</sup>, africain<sup>140</sup> et sénégalais<sup>141</sup>, il est fait état de plusieurs textes de lois, d'adoption de conventions internationales devant inverser la tendance afin que les femmes soient au premier plan en politique au même titre que les hommes. Ces actions apportent des changements qui font face à des contraintes socio-culturelles, institutionnelles et structurelles dont les partis politiques qui accueillent parfois autant d'hommes que de femmes. Or, leur faiblesse numérique au sein des organes de décisions y est plus que parlante.

Nos entretiens menés auprès des femmes membres de partis et/ou de mouvements révèlent que cette infériorité ne semble pas poser de problème aux femmes elles-mêmes. Madame Touré, membre du bureau politique d'un parti de l'opposition, nous fera noter que « *vu les horaires des réunions, le temps que requiert les travaux au sein des organes de décision des partis, il est difficile pour une femme mariée de mener une carrière politique sans avoir des soucis au sein de son ménage. Raison pour*

134 GAKUNZI, David, op.cit., pp. 221-245

135 Entretien avec Mme Koné, V. Le 8 juillet 2020 sur Zoom

136 CORCUFF, Philippe, *Les nouvelles sociologies. Entre le collectif et l'individuel*, Armand Colin, séries : « 128 », 3e Ed., 2017, 127.p

137 On les appelle aussi des meneuses de claques qui grâce à des chants, des acrobaties encourage les hommes sur le terrain sportif.

138 En référence aux SOP et au constructivisme social, le Sénégal se présente comme un terrain ouvert à la mobilisation de femmes. A l'opposé, socialement ces femmes doivent rentrer dans la cas mobilisatrice, supportrice avec un rôle second.

139 Les premières conférences mondiales sur le statut de la femme depuis Mexico en 1975, suivie de Copenhague, Nairobi et le féminisme mondial, Beijing...

140 La Convention de Maputo

141 La loi sur la parité élective et semi-élective de 2010 ;

laquelle, les femmes évitent de participer à ces travaux pour avoir une vie sociale stable<sup>142</sup>. » Elle rajoute que « culturellement, il est mal vu qu'une femme rentre tard le soir ou voyage en permanence avec des hommes, ce qui fait que beaucoup d'entre nous, restons au stade membres simples et lorsque nous avons une journée libre, nous en profitons pour participer aux activités d'animations du parti... ».

Malgré les efforts consentis à tous les niveaux, la participation politique des Sénégalaises tant en termes de présence que de position fait face à plusieurs ilés sociaux endogènes. Au vu, du niveau d'étude qui reste encore plus élevé chez les hommes, les femmes s'interdisent elles-mêmes d'occuper certains postes stratégiques au sein des partis politiques. De plus, elles préfèrent se gratifier du rôle « jigeenu çamiñam<sup>143</sup>», ce qui fait d'elles des protectrices acharnées tout en bénéficiant de certains privilèges, mais aussi et surtout s'occupant de la mobilisation et de la gestion du comportement et de l'attitude des foules pour produire l'effet que décrivait Gustave le Bon « par le fait seul que les individus sont transformés en foule ils possèdent une sorte d'âme collective qui les fait sentir, penser et agir d'une façon tout à fait différente de celle dont sentirait, penserait, agirait chacun d'eux isolément <sup>144</sup>»

De ce point de vue, tout laisse à penser que la femme sénégalaise se plairait dans son rôle d'animation au sein des partis politiques, ce qui ne lui permet pas forcément d'avoir une prestigieuse place dans le jeu politique. Elle ne va pas au pouvoir, elle porte un candidat au pouvoir, tel que l'atteste les propos de Mme Fagaye Diop, militante du Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), attirant l'attention de leur leader Me Wade sur le rôle des femmes dans le processus électoral : « Majoritaires dans la société et dans les partis politiques, notre choix sera très déterminant lors des élections de 2012 et nous, les femmes libérales derrière Modibo DIOP ne seront pas en reste et jouerons pleinement notre partition. Nous demandons ainsi, au frère secrétaire général national Me WADE d'ouvrir les yeux sur les agissements de ses collaborateurs qui ne lui disent pas la vérité sur les réalités du terrain. Nous mobilisons et portons les candidats au pouvoir<sup>145</sup>. »



Photo prise en 2012 l'organe de presse *Leral*, lors du rassemblement précité, de soutien à Monsieur M. Diop du Parti Démocratique Sénégalais de Me Abdoulaye Wade

La grande difficulté de l'analyse comparative, selon E.-W. Kelley, consiste à savoir quelle comparaison faire et pour quelle raison.<sup>146</sup> En conséquence, dans cette étude il est question d'une comparaison binaire entre les cas burkinabé et sénégalais quant aux liens existants entre la femme et le domaine du politique et les controverses qui en résultent à partir d'une analyse

142 Entretien avec Madame Touré, R., le 18 juin 2020

143 Dans les sociétés wolofs, il est souvent fait usage de ces notions pour représenter une relation que peuvent avoir un homme et une femme sa rapprochant de la fraternité avec ou sans lien de sang.

144 LE BON, Gustave, *Psychologie des foules*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, (1<sup>ère</sup>.1895) p.130

145 Madame Fagaye DIOP, est membre du PDS, elle se prononce lors du meeting de son parti pour investir candidats aux élections législatives de juillet 2012.

146 Kelley "Universal needs: An inductive framework for comparative policy analysis", in Ashford (D.-E.) (ed.), *Comparing public policies. New concepts and methods*, Beverly Hills, London, Sage Publications, 1978, p. 131.

sociohistorique. Et celle-ci nous a menée vers des chambardements intrinsèques au construit social devenant un *habitus*, de part et d'autre.

Assurément, la femme africaine n'était pas totalement absente de l'appareil politique en général. Paradoxalement, en interne et selon les peuples, il a pu subsister quelques différences. Au moment où dans certaines sociétés, les femmes étaient au pouvoir et à la tête de puissantes armées<sup>147</sup>, dans d'autres elles s'affairaient à des activités économiques<sup>148</sup>. Cependant, quoiqu'il en soit, arrivées à un certain âge leurs avis symbolisant l'expérience et l'esprit de prophétie prédominaient sur tous les autres<sup>149</sup>.

En tout état de cause, avec d'un côté, les contacts avec l'Occident par le biais de la colonisation et de la « tentative » de l'Europe de « civiliser », d'évangéliser les peuples « barbares », et d'un autre les traites Arabo-berbères<sup>150</sup> ayant occasionné l'islamisation des noirs d'Afrique, le rôle de la femme connaît un rapetissement significatif. Elle se voit désormais, débusquée de nombreux domaines dont celui du politique. Dans l'un et dans l'autre pays étudiés (Burkina-Faso et Sénégal), le chemin est encore long pour que les femmes soient communément acceptées en politique en termes de SOP et dans les meilleures positions possibles. Ainsi, le relève Mme L.C, « ...nous autres Sénégalais, baignons dans la contradiction, malgré tous les efforts pour baliser le glèbe politique aux femmes- je parie que même vous qui avez la trentaine-vos petits-enfants ne verront pas une femme présidente de la République du Sénégal<sup>151</sup>. »

Que faire donc des instruments juridiques et politiques mis en place au Burkina, au Sénégal et sur le plan international devant permettre aux femmes de faire du champ politique le leur ? Les résultats de cette étude montrent des contradictions à foison, relevées tout au long du travail de terrain. Seules quelques femmes veulent tant une présence qu'une position estimable en politique. Et peu d'entre elles osent franchir le cap. Elles craignent d'être rattrapées par les réalités sociales : heurts au sein des ménages, renvoi d'une mauvaise image, d'une femme libre voire épicurienne, etc. Au sein des partis politiques sénégalais, au, selon qu'elles aient un niveau d'instruction élevé, moyen ou déficient, elles incarnent toujours « le folklore », la massification et le spectacle. Quelques rares femmes se démarquent de cette position.

A rebours, d'autres barrières s'opposent à elles comme le flagrant phallocentrisme de leurs « frères de partis » qui ont tendance à s'offusquer de passer pour le « second d'une femme<sup>152</sup> ». Madame S. F. nous dira que d'après ses vingt années d'expérience en politique au Sénégal, « une femme doit nécessairement allier le niveau d'étude élevé, les bonnes mœurs, la reconnaissance sociale et

147 On peut en citer certaines notamment représentées en photo au Musée des civilisations noires au Sénégal :

Al Kahina, reine à la tête d'une armée Magrétine au XIVe siècle

Iyioba IDIA, reine et résistante du Bénin au XVIe siècle

Anne Zingha du Zaïre et de l'Angola, reine et résistante ayant combattu les armées portugaises au XVIe siècle

Amina De Zaria, Reine et conquérante, de l'Ouest du Soudan jusqu'en Égypte,

Ndatté Yallah Mbodj, Reine et conquérante qui s'est battu avec acharnement contre les colons et les Maures... la liste est longue.

148 BENSEDDIK, Nacéra. « *Manus lanis occupate...* ». Femmes et métiers en Afrique. In: *Antiquités africaines*, 45,2009. pp. 103-118.

149 Exemple du symbolique de la grande royale dans l'Aventure Ambigüe ou encore des prophétesses comme Kimpa Vita du Congo aux XVIIe- XVIIIe siècle. Ensuite comme le fait noter Hampathé BA « un vieillard qui meurt et une bibliothèque qui brûle ». Dans l'esprit, cette citation n'est pas exclusivement réservée aux hommes »

150 DELACAMPAGNE Christian, *Histoire de l'esclavage. De l'Antiquité à nos jours*, Paris, Le livre de poche, 2002, p. 37.

151 Entretien organisé le 8 avril 2020 sur Zoom, avec Mme L. C., actrice politique, membre du Directoire d'un parti sénégalais de gauche.

152 Expression lâchée par une militante lors d'un focus-group avec des femmes d'un parti politique sénégalais de la mouvance présidentielle actuelle, le 22 septembre 2020



*l'opulence pour pouvoir diriger un parti ou faire partie du directoire au même titre que les hommes...*<sup>153</sup> » Pour les Burkinabé, la réalité est quelque peu différente. Avec un refus d'emblée du qualificatif féministe politique, toutes celles avec qui nous sommes entretenus, semblent être déterminées à diriger au même titre que les hommes. Elles se focalisent moins sur les adversités que sur les possibilités qu'elles ont à se donner pour franchir le pas de « l'occupation assumée du terrain politique<sup>154</sup> ». Leurs obstacles se situeraient davantage vers l'*ego* masculin qui a encore du mal manifestement à se départir du mode de fonctionnement patriarcal des partis, auquel il faut ajouter l'adynamisme niveau éducatif et financier des femmes.

A partir de cette analyse socio-historique du lien entre la femme Burkinabé et Sénégalaise et le domaine du politique en termes de positionnement dans le passé et de présence actuelle, il est à remarquer une pléthore de prénotions qui se situeraient de part et d'autre des deux États. Seulement, il en ressort qu'il est plus de la volonté politique d'un homme<sup>155</sup> que des décisions juridiques démocratiques<sup>156</sup> prises souvent loin des réalités sociologiques, internes et propres à chaque État. Les logiques présentes et positionnelles Sénégalaises comme des Burkinabé, contrairement aux conclusions de nombreuses études ne découlent pas principalement des religions ou des traditions<sup>157</sup> mais plutôt principalement du statut d'anciennes colonies se référant au modèle pays colonisateur<sup>158</sup>. En termes d'axiomes théoriques, constructivistes l'hybridation due à l'imposition voire la greffe de l'appareil étatique qui va de soi avec une certaine culture politique, juridique excluait de fait, les femmes du jeu politique dans la mesure où elles n'étaient prioritaires dans le système éducatif. Concernant l'aspect historique, le Sénégal comme le Burkina Faso ont vu des femmes s'imposer, s'immiscer dans la gestion de la cité même en termes de monopole militaire au sein des royaumes comme pouvoir politique. Au-delà des reines guerrières du Cayor, du Walo, il y a eu les amazones de Béhanzin dans le Dahomey. Difficile d'affirmer ou de lier radicalement l'histoire à la participation des femmes en politiques au-delà de toute considération historique, culturelle même traditionnelle, de l'intérêt des organisations internationales tourné vers la résilience, l'empowerment, le leadership ...entre autres concepts « buzz words », la volonté politique est plus que déterminant dans l'inclusion des femmes dans le politique. En effet, après avoir relevé les efforts notés lors de la présidence de Sankara cet eux du Président Wade avec la loi sur la parité (qui n'est pas totalement appliquée), il est à relever que l'action publique traduit par une volonté politique conduit forcément à une logique transformationnelle. Ce manque de détermination se fait ressentir aussi bien au Burkina Faso qu'au Sénégal malgré la parité dans les fonctions électives et semi-électives. Par exemple lors des locales de janvier 2022 suivies des législatives la parité revenait comme un motif de non-recevabilité des listes candidats (manque de volonté des partis politiques).

Du côté des femmes, que les combats soient féminins ou féministes, l'accès à leur pouvoir peut être accompagné d'une instruction et d'une capacitation promouvant indubitablement, la méritocratie. Ce qui viendra résoudre les difficultés rencontrées avec la mise en place des quotas assouplis lors des dernières élections locales<sup>159</sup> au Burkina-Faso ou encore la parité non effective dans certaines communes au Sénégal. Parallèlement à l'engagement des femmes du Burkina et

153 Entretien avec M. S, le 9 juillet 2020 à son domicile sis à Dakar.

154 Entretien accordé par la députée L. T, qui n'a cessé de déplorer la faible présence des femmes à l'Assemblée nationale avec un taux de 14%, 18 femmes sur 127 députés, pourcentage en deçà de celui recommandé par les textes 30%.

155 Exemple de la révolution de 1983 avec un Sankara déterminé à ouvrir les voies du politique et de l'éducation aux femmes.

156 Adoption de lois, de conventions, protocoles et autres texte nationaux, internationaux et régionaux.

157 DJIBO Hadiza, *La participation des femmes africaines à la vie politique*, op.cit, p.135

158 Les Françaises n'ont eu le droit de vote qu'assez tardivement en 1944 et n'ont pu passer à l'acte que près d'un an plus tard en 1945.

159 Les dernières locales dataient de 2016

du Sénégal, il faut, *in fine*, une dynamique sociétale agréant la participation politique des femmes sans anicroche et, au-delà, une prise de conscience collective confortant le vivre-ensemble africain au sein des nations ; car en politique, homme et femme devraient se valoir.

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# Evolution of Kenya's Foreign Policy During the Cold War

## An Examination of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine During the Moi Era (1978–1990)

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### Abstract

This study critically outlines how Moi's administration in the Middle East during the Cold War shaped Kenya's foreign policy. The study examines the strategies, sources, national and personal interests, objectives, priorities, and the implementation of Kenya's foreign policy. It seeks to elucidate whether Kenya's commitment to regional peace and security served as the cornerstone for formulating and implementing its foreign policy. It posits that any inconsistencies in Kenya's foreign policy can be attributed to rational responses to emerging trends in international affairs, particularly security threats to regional and global peace and stability. The study aims to ascertain the formulation, articulation, and exercise of Kenya's recognition policy toward the Middle East (1978–1990) during Moi's era. The central question guiding this study is: What factors influenced Kenya's recognition policy toward Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine during the Cold War under Moi's administration (1978–1990)?

**Keywords:** Recognition, Foreign Policy, Ambiguity, Legitimacy, Governments.

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### The Historical Evolution of Kenya's Foreign Policy

In 1971, within the hallowed halls of parliament, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, then serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, articulated a defining moment in Kenya's foreign policy. He provided a lucid exposition of Kenya's stance regarding the military junta led by General Idi Amin in neighboring Uganda. This pronouncement laid the groundwork for Kenya's diplomatic philosophy: recognizing effective governments rather than mere regimes. Consequently, Kenya extended recognition to Idi Amin's administration as an effective government, distinct from the leadership of Milton Obote (Munene, 1997).

During the tumultuous era of the Cold War, like numerous other nations, Kenya adopted the Estrada Doctrine concerning the recognition of governments. The Estrada Doctrine posited the automatic distinction of governments under all circumstances (Jessup, 1931). This doctrine sought to establish a stringent benchmark for recognition that ostensibly disregarded political considerations and the exigencies of the state. However, this approach became increasingly untenable, particularly when confronted with situations involving competing governments. Critics contended that it blurred the distinction between the act of recognition and the maintenance of diplomatic relations.



In contrast to the Estrada Doctrine, the Tobar Doctrine, also known as the Doctrine of Legitimacy (Stansifer, 1967, pp. 251–272), advocates a diametrically opposite approach. It argues that governments that assume power through extra-constitutional means should only be recognized once their ascendancy has garnered the populace's acceptance. This principle effectively promotes non-recognition in all revolutionary scenarios yet proves challenging to reconcile with the complexities of real-world politics and considerations (as noted by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations).

### **A Concise Historical Overview of Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi**

Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, the second President of Kenya, ascended to power following the demise of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's inaugural President. Moi held the position of Kenya's Vice President when Kenyatta passed away, and constitutional provisions dictated his succession. He was born on September 2, 1924, in Kuriengwo, which was then a part of Kenya Colony situated in the Sacho region of Baringo district – now a county (McKenna, Feb 10, 2020). Moi hailed from the broader Tugen sub-group of the Kalenjin community residing in the Kenyan Rift Valley. He passed away on February 4, 2020 (East & Richard, June 3, 2014).

Moi's legacy is that of a revered statesman and astute politician who served as Kenya's second and longest-serving President, presiding from 1978 to 2002, following the passing of the nation's founding father, President Jomo Kenyatta, on August 22, 1978. Before assuming the presidency, Moi also served as Kenya's third Vice President from 1967 to 1978, succeeding Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.

A moment of considerable significance in President Moi's tenure unfolded on August 1, 1982, when a group of Air Force personnel, under the leadership of Senior Private Grade-I Hezekiah Ochuka, and with the backing of university students, embarked on an ultimately unsuccessful endeavor to orchestrate a coup d'état with the objective of ousting President Moi from his position of authority. The coup is swiftly quashed by military and police forces under the command of the then Chief of General Staff, Mohamoud Mohamed (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12). The key conspirators behind the coup, including Ochuka, were subsequently sentenced to death, marking the last known judicial executions in Kenya (Ndunda, 2016).

Moi's tenure is characterized by continuing Kenyatta's pro-Western policies, which secured substantial development aid during the Cold War era (1947–1991), elevating Kenya to one of the most prosperous African nations. However, the early 1990s witnessed challenges, including the end of the Cold War, economic stagnation due to rising oil prices, and falling agricultural commodity prices, particularly in Africa. Simultaneously, with the conclusion of the Cold War, Western powers shifted their stance towards Kenya, no longer considering it a strategic regional stronghold against communist influences from Ethiopia and Tanzania.

After maintaining a one-party political system since gaining independence in 1963, Kenya eventually began experiencing calls for political and economic reforms in the late 1990s, notably from Western nations. This pressure prompted Moi to legalize opposition parties in 1991. The pivotal moment came when Moi announced his intention to repeal Section 2(A) of the constitution, thereby permitting multipartyism, during a KANU conference held at Kasarani in December 1991. Despite intense debate and opposition from numerous delegates, the motion passed unanimously (Throup & Hornsby, 1998).

In subsequent years, Moi ran for re-election, winning in 1992 amidst electoral fraud and civil unrest allegations. A similar situation unfolded in the 1997 elections, where numerous Kenyans,

primarily of Kikuyu ethnicity, died. Nevertheless, the people elected Moi to a fifth term as President. However, constitutional limitations prevented him from contesting the 2002 presidential elections. Although some of his supporters floated the idea of amending the constitution to allow a third term, Moi chose to retire, endorsing Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya's inaugural President, as his successor (Lacey, 2002). KANU subsequently splintered, with dissidents joining the National Rainbow Coalition, leading to Mwai Kibaki's presidential election with a two-to-one majority over Kenyatta. His inauguration ceremony in December 2002 attracted one of the largest crowds Nairobi had ever seen, though the crowd exhibited open hostility toward Moi (Lacey, 2002).

Following his departure from office in December 2002, Moi was primarily marginalized by the political establishment, although he retained popularity among the masses. On July 25, 2007, President Kibaki appointed Moi as a special peace envoy to Sudan, citing his "vast experience and knowledge of African affairs" and his standing as an elder statesman, which brought him back into the limelight. In this role, Moi contributed to peace efforts in southern Sudan, where an agreement signed in early 2005 was being implemented (Hull, Reuters. 2007).

In August 2017, Moi was diagnosed with dementia (Kahawatungu. August 29, 2017). In October 2019, he was hospitalized in critical condition at The Nairobi Hospital due to complications arising from pleural effusion (Mphaso, October 29, 2019). Moi passed away at The Nairobi Hospital on February 4, 2020, at 95, although his son, Raymond Moi, disputed this age, claiming his father was at least 105 years old (Standard Digital, February 10, 2020). A state funeral was held at Nyayo Stadium on February 11, 2020, followed by his burial at his Karabak home in Nakuru County on February 12, 2020 (BBC News. February 11, 2020). The funeral proceedings included full military honors, featuring a 19-gun salute and a missing man formation flyby (Moi sent off with a 19-gun salute video, February 2020). They laid him to rest beside his former wife, Lena Bomett (BBC News. February 11, 2020).

### **Rationale and Objectives of the Research**

Limited scholarly attention has been devoted to Kenya's foreign policy during President Moi's tenure, particularly about countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine. During Moi's leadership, foreign policy discourse often found its place in his public addresses, leaving behind a need for more comprehensive documentation. During his reign, this absence of well-defined foreign policy directives has led some scholars to question whether Kenya maintained a coherent foreign policy stance. This research aims to elucidate how Kenya engaged with foreign governments from 1978 to 1990, coinciding with President Moi's presidency. It is a timeframe marked by significant global political shifts, particularly within Africa.

### **The United States**

As early as 1793, U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson articulated a quintessential American perspective on foreign policy, emphasizing the right of every nation to self-governance and the freedom to choose its form of government. This foundational principle allowed nations to conduct their international affairs through channels of their choosing, whether it be a monarchy, a convention, an assembly, a committee, or a president. Diplomatic relations with other nations were not mere compliments but tools to facilitate practical conveniences.

The United States initially stipulated in its recognition policy that a foreign government had to demonstrate a commitment to its international obligations to gain recognition. In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson introduced a novel criterion when dealing with Latin American governments. He insists that a government must have been established through constitutional processes

respecting people's will. He used the withholding of diplomatic recognition as a diplomatic lever against governments that failed to meet these standards, an approach notably applied during the sixteen-year non-recognition of the Soviet Union (Jentleson & Paterson, 1997, pp. 466-467).

### Research Scope

This research delves into President Moi's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine during the Cold War era (1978-1990). Kenya's stance on recognizing foreign governments during Moi's tenure must be clarified and more precise. The enigmatic nature of its policy formulation and articulation, coupled with the key personalities involved, has raised doubts regarding the existence of a coherent recognition policy. This study unravels the intricacies of Kenya's recognition policy during President Moi's term, focusing on specific case studies involving Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine. The central inquiry driving this research is: What factors influenced Kenya's recognition policy towards these nations during the Cold War under President Moi's leadership (1978-1990)?

### Significance of the Study

This study holds significant relevance for scholars and the general public, providing insight into the evolution and articulation of Kenya's recognition policy concerning Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine in the Middle East during the Moi era. Kenya's strategic location has established it as a consequential player in international affairs. The research findings are valuable for scholars investigating Kenya's recognition policy over time. Furthermore, this study sheds light on a pivotal yet intricate facet of Kenya's foreign and recognition policy. By examining trends and articulation in Kenya's recognition policy towards the specified countries, scholars and students can draw upon this research as a foundational resource to discern consistencies, discontinuities, and continuities in Kenya's foreign policy across subsequent administrations following Moi's presidency.

### Conceptual Framework

Recognition is fundamental in international law, influencing the allocation of international rights and obligations to emerging states or governments. It pertains to the responsibilities and privileges of engaging with the international community. The concept of recognition serves as the cornerstone of a state or government's legal identity and involves various subjects of international law. Recognition, in and of itself, is a weighty and intricate matter that can sometimes be susceptible to misuse by various governments (Taylor, 1994, p. 25).

A more profound issue arises concerning states that need more representation within the United Nations Organization as they confront the possibility of non-recognition by significant powers and influential international actors. This predicament stems from the substantial influence these major powers wield, allowing them to determine who enters the organization through their veto power. Thus, "recognition" can be defined as the act of acknowledging the existence of a new entity within the international system and granting it an independent status in the existing international order, complete with the rights and duties outlined in international legal documents (Satyavrata, 1964, p. 45). Top of Form

When a state as an international actor endures, it recognizes a new government. However, a revolution or popular uprising ousts the ruling government, transferring state power to a new entity or rebels (Malcolm, 1997, p. 306). In such situations, the challenge lies in the fact that non-recognition of the government can also imply non-recognition of the state itself, as the

government typically represents it. Therefore, recognized states can achieve the recognition of a new entity (state) through formal declarations, the establishment of legal relations, issuing formal statements, or by the conduct of the concerned state. In essence, the principles of international law adhere to the recognition process (Satyavrata, 1964, p. 45).

Once an international actor (state) secures international acceptance, it becomes challenging to change its status from recognition to non-recognition due to governmental changes or overthrow. The state remains an international legal entity unaffected by changes in government. Recognizing a government, therefore, implies recognition of the state, but not the other way around (Talmon, 1988, p. 309). The complexity arises because the international community cannot readily assume recognition of new governments, whether they assert themselves constitutionally or unconstitutionally in areas previously governed by legitimate authorities. International recognition has significant implications, including the ability to enter into treaties, seek membership in international organizations such as the United Nations, and exercise voting rights within these organizations (Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933) (Dixon & McCorquodale, 1991, p. 127).

### Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) witnessed an evolution in Kenya's recognition policy, shaped by changing global circumstances. Upon gaining independence, Kenya joined the OAU, aligning itself with the OAU charter's call for member countries to contribute to a fund supporting nations striving for independence through liberation struggles. Initially, the focus of recognition lay with states successfully achieving independence from colonial powers. These states were eligible for OAU membership, allowing them to join the United Nations and gain international recognition (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12),

However, the initial optimism surrounding newly independent African nations was short-lived, as many countries fell into coups and military rule. This posed a challenge for both the OAU and regional governments. In response, the OAU developed strategies to address this emerging trend, creating a conflict management department to tackle the rise of states governed by extra-constitutional means. The proliferation of such regimes overwhelmed the OAU, leading to contentious debates about recognizing such regimes, with concerns that doing so might set a precedent for other states to follow suit. Many countries, including Kenya, chose to limit their recognition to states rather than governments. Nevertheless, this selective approach had its drawbacks. Firstly, unrecognized states faced isolation from the international community. Secondly, non-recognizing states risked missing out on bilateral trade opportunities with these states, which often possessed valuable resources. Finally, decisions on recognition were heavily influenced by considerations of national interest (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12).

Amidst this uncertain backdrop, Daniel Arap Moi assumed leadership in Kenya. Kenya adhered to a policy of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, enabling it to maintain relations with military regimes, including the controversial rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. In 1981, Moi took over as the chairman of the OAU. During his tenure, he grappled with conflicts in various African regions, including Chad, Western Sahara, apartheid-era South Africa, Namibia, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique. Ironically, while Moi worked to resolve conflicts across Africa, internal turmoil erupted in Kenya in 1982 when the Kenya Air Force staged an unsuccessful coup (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12), placing Moi in a challenging position as a peacemaker.

### Literature Review: The Evolution of Moi's Foreign Policy (1978-1990)

Following the passing of Kenya's founding father and first President, Jomo Kenyatta, on August 22, 1978, Daniel Arap Moi assumed the role of the second President of the Republic of Kenya. While endeavoring to uphold the principles of the Nyayo philosophy, which his predecessor had championed, Moi exhibited a nuanced approach to Kenya's foreign policy, adapting it to the changing domestic and international landscapes (Mabeya, 2002).

One notable feature of Kenya's foreign policy continuity during the 1980s was its steadfast alliance with socialist Ethiopia, as long as the Somalia threat persisted, providing no compelling reasons for withdrawal from this pact. In contrast to the meticulous and cautious foreign policy-making process under Kenyatta's administration, with final approval resting primarily within the confines of the State House, Moi introduced a distinctive approach. Moi's personal diplomacy and direct involvement in foreign policy management sometimes led to the sidelining of relevant institutions in foreign policy-making (Mabeya, 2002).

Additionally, Kenya's foreign policy was significantly influenced and constrained by its economic performance and internal opposition to the Moi regime. As regional dynamics shifted, particularly with resolving conflicts in Ethiopia, Kenya recognized the necessity of mediating internal conflicts in neighboring regions, such as Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to maintain regional stability (Mabeya, 2002).

### Moi as the Principal Architect of Kenya's Foreign Policy

Musambayi (1995) contends that Moi cherished international summits and actively articulated foreign policy statements during political rallies, a departed from his predecessor, President Kenyatta, who delegated foreign policy matters to subordinates. Over time, Moi's leadership resulted in a centralization of foreign policy within the Office of the President at Harambee House, effectively personalizing the nation's foreign policy. The late Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Robert Ouko, acknowledged this transformation by attributing the authorship of Kenya's foreign policy to President Moi (Chelagat, 1991).

However, the concentration of foreign policy authority in one individual or a select group led to shortcomings in Kenya's foreign policy, often prioritizing principles over the best interests of Kenyan citizens. A striking example was Kenya's abrupt shift in foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo.

### The Fifth Kenyan President: William Samoei Ruto

There are parallels between Moi's foreign policy approach and that of Kenya's fifth President, William Ruto. Like Moi, Ruto has opted for a similar mode of foreign policy communication, using social media platforms, particularly Twitter, to make foreign policy pronouncements. Ruto assumed the presidency after a contested national election on August 9, 2022.

An example of this shift in foreign policy communication occurred when Ruto tweeted on September 14, 2022, indicating that Kenya would no longer recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a territory in Western Sahara ruled by the Polisario Front, exiled in Algeria. Morocco has contested this territory since 1975 despite the SADR and Morocco being African Union members (The East African. September 16, 2022). Kenya's Foreign Ministry later clarified that the country would maintain diplomatic relations with the SADR, retracting Ruto's earlier tweet and expressing support for the SADR's right to self-determination, aligning with the positions of the United Nations and the African Union. Kenya's historical support for the SADR,



including establishing its embassy in Nairobi in 2014, further complicates this matter (Anadolu Agency, September 20, 2022).

### **Kenya's Role in the Cold War Era (1978-1990)**

The Cold War era (1978-1990) significantly influenced Kenya's recognition and non-recognition practices in its foreign policy. Superpower rivalries, geographical considerations, and strategic dynamics shaped Kenya's approach to recognizing governments. The Estrada Doctrine (Jessup, 1931), which generally accepted governments as they emerged, gained prominence in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, allowing greater flexibility in recognition practices.

Moi's ascension to the presidency in 1978 prompted efforts to solidify his domestic and international standing. Frequent international trips were part of this strategy, aiming to secure financial assistance amid economic challenges following a downturn in the coffee industry. His 1980 visit to West Germany aimed at strengthening bilateral relations, coinciding with heightened superpower interest in the Indian Ocean region (Weekly Review, January 11, 1980. p. 6).

### **Kenya's Role in Global Affairs: Afghanistan and South Africa**

At the United Nations in the 1980's, Kenya voted against the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at the general assembly. This led to most African countries boycotting the Olympic games that year, which were held in the Soviet Union. Kenya led the pullout as one of the leading Olympic African country (Weekly Review, January 18 1980. p. 14). After the United Nations meeting in 1981, Moi met with the U.S President Reagan and assured him of Kenya's support for the withdrawal of South African forces out of Angola (Moi was the chairman of the Organization of African Unity by then) (Weekly Review, September 18 1981. pp. 14-16). It was also Moi's stand as the OAU chairman that South African troops be withdrawn from Namibia and that South Africa needed to be isolated from the international community. Moi was however keen in recognizing Israel as a State and its government as a precondition for peace in the Middle East though he also recognized the Palestinian homeland. This policy was made clear when he addressed an Arab League as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (Weekly Review, November 27 1981. pp. 19-20).

### **Kenya's Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War**

"The Iran-Iraq war, which lasted nearly ten years, also had some side effects on Kenya. As the war continued into the late 1980s, Kenya found itself in the middle of an arms scandal involving Iran. Ten counterfeit end-user certificates, bearing Kenya government letterheads and forged signatures of the former chief secretary, Mr. Simeon Nyachae, and former chief of general staff, General Jackson Mulinge, were discovered when the arms were intended to pass through Egypt, destined for Kenya but actually bound for Iran. Egypt, at the time, did not allow arms destined for Iran to pass through the Suez Canal. Iraq was displeased with Kenya over the entire affair. President Moi attempted to mend relations with Baghdad during an official visit to Baghdad in 1987 (Weekly Review, April 3, 1987, p. 5)."

### **The Israel-Palestine Conflict**

In 1988, President Moi made an official trip to Egypt. He held talks with the President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. Moi's stand on the Middle East conflict was clear when he said, "Kenya's position was identical to that of Egypt on the Palestinian issue, and both countries see that there can be

no peace in the region without the Palestinian people having the right to self-determination” (Weekly Review, April 8, 1988, p. 29).

However, unexpectedly, to the Arab League’s surprise, Kenya resumed diplomatic relations with Israel and reopened its Kenyan mission after closure of up to fifteen years. It was a boost to Israel’s diplomatic cycles when it needed Africa’s support most, though to the dismay of the Arabic countries. To Palestine, this was a blow when it was pushing ahead with its plan of seeking international recognition. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was expecting support from Arabic countries that had already recognized the PLO government in exile. However, Kenya argued that it resumed a relationship with Israel because the PLO had formally recognized the existence of the Jewish State and had acceded to the United Nations charter as the Middle East question, which acknowledged the right of the existence of Israel as a State and advocated the creation of a Palestinian State as an independent State. Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at the time, the late Dr. Robert Ouko, said, “Kenya believed that Israel would seize the opportunity to recognize and negotiate with the PLO directly under the auspices of the United Nations” (Weekly Review, January 6, 1989, p. 5).

But the Tunis-based Arab League voiced its disappointment against the Kenyan government’s move. The league expected the Kenyan government to recognize the Palestinian State, which had won the support of most UN member States, rather than amending relations with Israel. On the other hand, Kenya had done its part by supporting the PLO at the UN forums and giving the PLO movement full diplomatic status in Nairobi. On his part, Moi said, “Kenya had moved towards that direction due to the PLO’s recognition of the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 that gave recognition to the existence of the State of Israel and similar status to Palestine. Kenya and 29 other African States had closed their diplomatic missions to Israel following the Yom Kippur war in 1973, in which Israel attacked and occupied Arab land, thus calling for international condemnation as the aggressor” (Weekly Review, January 6, 1989, p. 5). Moi’s foreign policy at this time can be said to be pursuing the principle of strategic ambiguity; that is, a government deliberately remains vague on a policy to help it gain from both sides. This was meant for Kenya to remain neutral in regional conflicts instead of pursuing regional peace in avoiding confrontations from the two countries.

### **Moi’s Foreign Policy: Strategic Ambiguity**

Embracing Strategic Ambiguity Strategic ambiguity defined Moi’s foreign policy during this era. Kenya sought to uphold neutrality in regional conflicts as a means to protect its interests, allowing it to leverage advantages from all parties involved in different matters and foster regional peace, all while steering clear of confrontations.

### **Methodology**

This study of Moi’s foreign policy from 1978 to 1990 primarily utilizes secondary sources, with supplementary inclusion of select personal statements from willing individuals. We obtained research materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reputable newspapers such as The Daily Nation. The analysis in this study employs both descriptive and analytical approaches, examining a wide range of sources, including magazines, newspapers, books, journals, seminar papers, and research papers, with a particular emphasis on case studies.

## Limitations

Despite efforts to maintain objectivity, the study acknowledges potential bias in arguments and criticisms. Additionally, time constraints limited the depth of analysis. Some institutions and individuals approached for insights into critical government issues, especially about President Moi, were reluctant to provide information.

This literature review offers a comprehensive overview of Moi's foreign policy evolution, his role as the principal architect, and Kenya's stance on crucial international issues during the late 20th century.

## Analysis of this Study: Recognition Policy Rationale

The study under examination sheds light on Kenya's historical recognition policy regarding other states. This policy has undergone several shifts and transformations, with significant implications for the nation's foreign relations.

Historically, much like many other nations, Kenya adhered to a policy of recognizing other states primarily during President Moi's leadership. The rationale behind this approach was to minimize potential conflicts arising from recognizing specific governments. This strategic move allowed Kenya to overtly extend recognition to governments it might otherwise have refrained from acknowledging (Galloway, cited in p. 142).

During the early stages of its foreign policy development, Kenya needed a clear and identifiable tradition or established pattern of interests. However, the research conducted by John Howell in 1968 discerned two distinct strands within Kenya's international relations. The first strand was conservative, primarily guiding Kenya's objectives in the Middle East—this conservative stance aimed to maintain the regional status quo, fostering and enhancing Kenya's regional role.

Conversely, Kenya's international relations had a radical dimension. The country actively embraced non-alignment in international affairs, establishing it as a foundational principle to assert its autonomy and sovereignty as a newly independent state. It's noteworthy that, during this period, Kenya maintained covert relations with the South African regime.

Importantly, Kenya's commitment to the principle of non-alignment also meant a dedication to self-determination. This commitment inherently obliged states to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations, highlighting the significance of respecting the territorial integrity of other states. These principles resonate with the charters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) (Olatunda, 1985, p. 87).

This analysis offers valuable insight into Kenya's historical recognition policy, unveiling a nuanced approach influenced by both conservative and radical elements within its foreign policy. Furthermore, it emphasizes the nation's dedication to international principles such as non-alignment, self-determination, and the respect for the territorial integrity of other states, as enshrined in international charters.

## Conclusion: Implications of Kenya's Recognition Policy under Moi's Leadership

This study meticulously examined Kenya's recognition policy during President Moi's regime in the context of international law. It delved into government legitimacy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine. The rationale for recognition intricately linked specific circumstances, national interests, and the geopolitical context of the Cold War era. The study also elucidated

the transition in recognition policy from recognizing entire states to acknowledging specific governments and explained the reasons for this shift.

In the midst of evolving diplomatic landscapes, this study emphasizes that Kenya must adapt to dynamic regional and international policy realities while avoiding isolation. It underscores the necessity of involving various stakeholders, including the public, parliament, and intellectuals, in formulating a well-defined foreign policy. Furthermore, the study advocates for higher learning institutions to play a pivotal role in educating and fostering rigorous debate and critical examination of foreign policy, drawing comparisons with international counterparts. This inclusive approach aims to reinvigorate Kenya's foreign affairs ministry and ensure that foreign policy aligns with the national interest.

This study has revealed a history of inconsistency and ambiguity in Kenya's foreign policy regarding the recognition of governments over time. It highlights the need for a more collaborative and transparent approach to foreign policy formulation to safeguard the nation's interests and maintain its standing in the global arena.

## Recommendations

Kenya's recognition policy has evolved since independence in response to changing global dynamics. To ensure a vibrant and effective contemporary foreign policy, all relevant stakeholders must actively participate in its formulation. This includes the public providing input, the legislature engaging in discussions, and intellectuals contributing their expertise.

Higher education institutions should play a pivotal role in fostering foreign policy knowledge and discourse, enabling comprehensive analysis and debate of Kenya's foreign policy in comparison to other nations. This comprehensive approach will infuse fresh vitality into the foreign affairs ministry, dispelling doubts about whether Kenya had a well-defined foreign policy during President Moi's era.

In conclusion, involving the public and parliament in foreign policy discussions prior to implementation serves the nation's best interests, safeguarding its national concerns and ensuring a more consistent and coherent foreign policy.

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# Femmes entrepreneures et délaissement gouvernemental face à la Covid-19

## résilience des cadets sociaux par l'innovation commerciale en ligne

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### Résumé

L'une des transformations sociales majeures portées par la Covid-19 au Cameroun avec l'outil internet est le développement des activités commerciales d'e-shop. Au centre de cette mouvance se situent les femmes dont les profils socioéconomiques montrent qu'elles sont en situation de vulnérabilité financière. Les domaines d'intervention commerciales de ces femmes vont de l'industrie de l'habillement à l'industrie agro-alimentaire, en passant par la cosmétique, la restauration ou les produits naturels de santé. Si leurs motivations s'inscrivent dans une dynamique de développement personnel qui est liée à leurs parcours, la plupart de ces femmes font des plateformes numériques des espaces de rentabilité économique pour une sortie de leur état de précarité. S'appuyant sur un réseau de fournisseurs grossistes basé en Chine, en Turquie ou dans les grands centres commerciaux des villes de Yaoundé et de Douala, les vendeuses participent à la dématérialisation des espaces de vente pour leur numérisation. Cela s'explique par des nombreux avantages qu'offre le phénomène : le paiement du loyer qui se substitue en paiement de forfait internet pour les diverses transactions. Cette forme d'accumulation utilitariste du capital numérique renseigne non seulement sur la transformation socio-économique du Cameroun par des cadets sociaux mais aussi sur le sens des rapports entre ces vendeuses en ligne, leur clientèle et leurs fournisseurs et la structure patriarcale du système social.

Le présent travail a pour objectif de comprendre au-delà d'un environnement précaire, la capacité des femmes entrepreneures dans le secteur d'économie non structurée, à surmonter les changements induits par la Covid-19. Pour ce faire, la démarche analytique est structuraliste, elle s'appuie à la fois sur un réseau de relations symboliques qui rendrait possible l'analyse politique de, la position des femmes au Cameroun, la situation de crise et leur autonomisation.

**Mots-clés :** Femmes entrepreneures, gouvernement, résilience, cadets sociaux.

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Le 17 mars 2020, sur instructions du Président de la République, les mesures de restrictions ont été prises par le Premier ministre Chef du gouvernement, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du Plan de riposte contre le coronavirus. Par ailleurs le confinement et ses conséquences ont mis à jour les liens entre la pandémie et les inégalités sociales (Liotard, 2020). Au Cameroun, les travailleurs salariés femmes sont estimés à 16% en 2019. Les mesures gouvernementales ont créé de nouvelles inégalités dues à leur inadéquation (Ondoua Biwolé, 2021) avec le vécu des femmes entrepreneures dans l'informel. La situation de confinement a produit des effets variables sur des

secteurs d'activité animés par ces femmes. En effet, cette informalité exacerbe les effets immédiats de la pandémie de Covid-19 sur la perte d'emploi, la diminution des revenus et les difficultés des individus à subvenir à leurs besoins essentiels. En ce sens que la mesure où l'imposition du confinement vient renforcer leur état de précarité économique. Cette décision gouvernementale impose aux femmes entrepreneures en situation de vulnérabilité économique de se réajuster et trouver des mesures alternatives pour subvenir à leurs besoins économiques les plus essentiels le temps du confinement et même après. Autrement, plusieurs femmes entrepreneures, vont se replier vers l'outil internet pour résister à l'incertitude du nouvel environnement. Si l'application de ces mesures tend à réduire considérablement ou relativement les interactions entre les individus, l'enfermement va accentuer la situation économique non reluisante des femmes. D'abord, il s'agit pour elles, d'une réception des mesures de confinement qui impliquent un isolement de l'environnement où se déroulent leurs activités commerciales ensuite réduire de manière significative voire cesser toutes les interactions rapprochées avec la clientèle. D'autre part, les mesures de distanciation sociale ont pour corollaire immédiat, l'éloignement de la clientèle, leur principale source de gain. Face à cette situation, les femmes engagées dans ces interactions commerciales, se retrouvent alors dans la même précarité voire aggravée qui les a rendues actives dans ce secteur. Une façon de réagir à l'insécurité, au malaise et à l'indignation causés par les dures conséquences de la crise est de tenter de comprendre les diverses représentations dont elles en font (Avdela, 2015); comment les mesures gouvernementales modifient leur mode de pensée, selon les positions qu'elles occupent dans le champ économique. Elles se replient vers les plateformes numériques pour optimiser la vente de leurs produits au détriment d'un encadrement institutionnel. Ainsi, le phénomène des boutiques en ligne connaîtra un nouvel essor depuis la crise sanitaire, en marge d'une régulation étatique.

De ces constats, les plateformes numériques se présentent aux femmes comme des espaces alternatifs de résistance à la crise. Elles leur permettent d'innover en termes de production d'un réseau complexe de relations organisé ou non et inscrit dans une dynamique de sortie de la dépendance financière. En outre, les plateformes numériques de s'inscrire dans un temps long à une dynamique de sécurisation au travers des transactions numériques dans un contexte qui aggrave les inégalités structurelles entre les hommes et les femmes (Pigeyre, 2022). Les usages qu'elles font de ces plateformes sont pluriels. Par elles, les femmes adoptent des stratégies et actions qui tiennent compte du contexte (Meyer-Waarden et Trinquecoste, 2020). Les répercussions de la crise les amènent les femmes entrepreneures dans le secteur de la vente à adopter des mécanismes numériques pour éviter la défaillance et s'adapter plus ou moins d'agilité à la situation (Dianoux, Siadou-Martin, 2020). Le choix d'une conversion des espaces de vente physiques en espace de vente numériques est un moyen pour elles de réduire considérablement leurs charges financières et de fidéliser la clientèle à distance. Parallèlement, les plateformes numériques en l'occurrence Facebook, Instagram et Whatsapp dont les plus utilisées par les vendeuses en ligne se présentent sous forme de dispositifs d'apprentissage, d'innovation et de création de nouvelles idées de vente (Perrot, 2018). En ce sens que les espaces numériques de vente permettent de disposer d'un identifiant numérique de se connecter et d'effectuer des démarches administratives et financières en ligne. En retour, ces interactions numériques rendent plus complexe le processus de décision politique en matière de prélèvement fiscal sur les produits vendus en ligne. Les plateformes sont ainsi devenues des entreprises familières pour ces femmes ; qui luttent contre la précarité salariale (Baratier, cité par Nakara, 2020, pp.160-177) en entreprise par des opportunités d'être elles-mêmes leurs patrons. Cette précarité s'est traduite par une baisse continue des femmes salariées du fait des inégalités de genre préexistantes accentuées en situation de crise. L'innovation commerciale entamée par celles-ci par le biais des plateformes numériques dévoile ainsi des mécanismes féminins de résilience financière dans un champ économique contrôlé par les hommes (Bourdieu, 1997).

Les travaux portant sur l'étude de la résilience oscillent entre deux pôles de positions théoriques. Un premier pôle s'inscrit dans les temporalités de la résilience. Il insiste sur une analyse des trajectoires (Buccheit et Al, 2011). Cela revient à accorder une importance à l'histoire personnelle de ces femmes. Il peut s'agir d'une histoire longue (Quensière et al, 2018) ou privilégier une histoire récente (Archambaud, Gonrard-Delcroix, 2018). Ce pôle retrace l'histoire personnelle de l'individu avant et après le choc de la crise qui amène les personnes résilientes à affronter les perturbations au sein de leur environnement (Rosolofu, et Droy, 2018). Il permet d'enregistrer des situations qui se produisent économiques dans les ménages des femmes en temps opportun pouvant légitimer une attitude résiliente. Cette approche consacre une large place à l'histoire et la capacité de résister aux perturbations de l'environnement. Par contre, elle réduit les parcours des femmes dans une reconstitution de son histoire et sa capacité à s'adapter aux contraintes nouvelles imposées par leur environnement (Hervé, Rivière, 2014). Le deuxième pôle se situe à l'opposé du premier. Il s'intéresse aux trajectoires de résilience par l'autonomisation des femmes (Patton Salinas, Fusulier, 2011). Il soutient que la situation de précarité des femmes dans la production des richesses soit liée à un manque de ressources mais aussi d'un problème de capacité, c'est-à-dire d'une capacité à convertir les ressources en des fonctionnements effectifs qui permettent de mener une vie digne librement choisie (Sen, 2003). Ce pôle axé sur une dimension économique de la résilience qui privilégie la finalité de l'action d'autonomisation des femmes au détriment des conditions dans lesquelles elle se produit. Il a la faiblesse de ne pas établir clairement la structuration des rapports de force et d'influence au sein des relations d'interdépendances dans l'espace social. Cette littérature se focalise sur l'existence d'un fait déclencheur qui conduit à un état de résilience. Pourtant une entrée la féminisation de la résilience, permet d'interroger les stratégies d'autonomisation par les cadets sociaux (Bayart, 2018) qui prend en compte tous les niveaux d'intervention des inégalités dans le système social. Elle met aussi en visibilité les potentiels de transformation de la société par des femmes. Les femmes en tant que cadets sociaux restent bien souvent cantonnées dans des positions subalternes. La retraduction dans le champ politique et économique de la problématique de la résilience remet à l'ordre du jour les discussions sur l'autonomisation financière des femmes dans un contexte d'incertitude où les cadets sociaux sont subordonnés à la domination de leurs aînés sociaux.

Cette étude entend combler l'analyse de la résilience financière renvoie par la prise en compte de rapports de subordination sociale organisés sur de rapports de séniorité permettant la reproduction du système politique (Bayart, 2018). Dans cette perspective d'analyse verticale du champ politique, les interactions de résilience (développement des boutiques par les femmes entrepreneures dans le secteur informel) seraient davantage éprouvantes avec un gouvernement qui peine à les accompagner. Pourtant, il est un promoteur des mesures de déstructuration même si elles visaient la crise. Le gouvernement par effet indirect, a accentué la précarisation des femmes qui en retour ne se laissent pas dominées en restant dans cette condition de marginalisation. À contre coup, la dimension horizontale du champ politique montre les e-boutiques subissent aussi la concurrence des boutiques réelles puisque leur adoption suppose un travail sur la culture commerciale et donc de consommation (les individus peinent à adopter modèle commerciale pour plusieurs raisons : la distance, la confiance, etc.).

Sortie de ce débat sur les dynamiques de résilience financière des femmes, l'objectif de la présente recherche est de saisir, comment les femmes affrontent leurs situations financières par la création des points de vente virtuels. En d'autres termes, il est question d'analyser comment elles acquièrent un capital d'autonomisation par l'usage stratégique des plateformes numériques.

## I. Les femmes entrepreneures face au désintéressement de l'État en situation de crise

La réflexion nous amène à éclairer les logiques du manque de suivi des femmes entrepreneures au sommet de l'État et ses conséquences. La comparaison des propriétés sociales des femmes de notre échantillon selon le critère selon l'approche sociohistorique, offre 02 ensembles de résultats. D'un côté, le contexte de mise en œuvre des programmes d'ajustements structurels et leurs effets sur la reproduction d'un schéma culturel dominant par l'administration coloniale (Saussey, 2013). D'un autre côté, la reproduction des inégalités sociales de sexe dans la sphère privée.

### I.1 Contexte sociopolitique de production des inégalités

L'État rompt progressivement son intervention dans les secteurs liés à l'économie locale depuis la fin de la guerre froide qui consacre la mondialisation libérale, les politiques d'ajustement structurel et culturel (Nyemb-Wisman, 2011). Une tendance qui renforce davantage la marginalisation des femmes entrepreneures (Amougou, 2021). En effet, leur position de subalterne dans le champ économique pendant les moments de crise est aussi le fait de leur insertion dans un système d'hierarchisation sociale à la domination patriarcal (Bayart, 1985) qui, redoutant la constitution d'un secteur privé « non contrôlé », accorde la priorité aux entreprises publiques (Nkolo Asse, 2015). Cette volonté s'est traduite par la privatisation des entreprises publiques et parapubliques dans les années 2000. De plus, sur plus 8000 créations d'entreprises comptabilisées au courant du 1<sup>er</sup> semestre 2017, plus 1800 ont à leur tête des femmes (Amougou, 2021). Dans ce contexte, l'État retire son pouvoir souverain de protecteur, d'employeur, de développeur (Nyemb-Wisman, 2011) au profit d'un essor du secteur informel, où les femmes font partie intégrante des catégories qui excellent dans ce domaine.

L'engagement dans les activités « de débrouillardise » tel le gardiennage des enfants, la vente à la sauvette, la photocopie de rue, le ménage comble les offres de demande d'emplois raréfiées par l'adoption des mesures d'ajustement. De même, le gel du recrutement dans la fonction publique, à la faveur du programme d'ajustement structurel, a laissé sans emploi des milliers de diplômés. Deux décennies plus tard, les résultats de la mise en œuvre des politiques d'ajustement structurel dans un contexte de subordination de l'économie à la bureaucratie, vont renforcer la précarisation sociale (Amougou, 2021). L'expression du durcissement des conditions de vie, constitue entre autres, une rupture dans la représentation des femmes en Afrique comme au Cameroun en mettant en cause l'image des femmes associées à la tradition et en mettant en lumière leur rôle productif (Saussey, 2013). Celle-ci implique une modification des rapports sociaux de sexe en plaçant les femmes au cœur des stratégies de survie des ménages. L'enquête menée ne permet pas de conclure à l'existence d'une discrimination contre les femmes sur le marché du travail. Néanmoins, une série de transformations a en effet affecté pendant ce moment l'entrepreneuriat féminin. Dans la mesure où les compétences dont disposent les femmes pour mettre en marche leurs entreprises sont comparativement à celles des hommes (Assoumou Menye, Guetsop Sateu, 2017), médiocres. Néanmoins, la circulation des capitaux monétaires et marchands, elles ont acquis un poids important dans les stratégies familiales et professionnelles (Sadio Ba Gning, 2013). Un environnement qui conditionne fortement leurs trajectoires (Nkolo Asse, 2015) économiques dont l'impact est visible autant dans la sphère privée.

### I.2 Les implications dans la sphère privée

L'intériorisation des normes sociales pèse sur la dynamique du pouvoir au sein des ménages en situation de crise. La dimension genrée de la conjoncture d'incertitude et d'insécurité prend des formes différentes suivant leur localisation et selon les groupes sociaux et culturels (Avdela, 2015). En effet, l'analyse des déterminants de l'accès à une activité économique au Cameroun



révèle l'existence de 05 facteurs explicatifs, à savoir le milieu de résidence et le niveau de vie du ménage, l'âge, le niveau d'instruction et le statut matrimonial de l'individu quel que soit le sexe (Fopa Diesse, 2011). Durant la crise, la précarité est plus marquante chez les femmes n'ayant pas un emploi fixe ou une activité génératrice de revenus. Cela signifie que malgré l'existence d'une crise économique profonde, il y'a une différenciation de perceptions et de représentations entre les sexes. Les femmes, catégorie fragilisée, paient le plus lourd tribut. Au-delà de l'insuffisance de revenus, de ressources, qu'elle engendre, la crise économique crée un manque en termes de capacités, c'est-à-dire « en termes de libertés substantielles qui permettent à un individu de mener le genre de vie qu'il a raison de souhaiter » (Sen, 1999). Cette dimension de la crise permet d'articuler la question de la crise autour de la prise en charge des cadets sociaux notamment les droits des femmes et leurs capacités relevant des différentes dimensions de la vie (Ngo Nyemb-Wisman, 2011).

Dans cette conjoncture de survie et d'exclusion des femmes dans le marché du travail, le secteur informel assure aux femmes un nouvel environnement d'inclusion. C'est en cela que, les réseaux sociaux se positionnent comme un espace d'ouverture du marché et d'expression libre pour les femmes. L'internet commercial (Beuscart, et al, 2019) est perçu comme opportunité d'améliorer les conditions de sorties des femmes de l'incertitude financière tant à l'échelle familial que macro.

## II. Construction d'un capital d'autonomisation par l'innovation commerciale

La construction d'un capital d'autonomisation s'opère à travers le renouvellement d'un usage marchand de l'outil internet pendant la crise. En effet, les transactions commerciales par les plateformes numériques exacerbent depuis le début de la pandémie Covid-19. Il s'agit pour les femmes en situation d'incertitude financière de se familiariser aux méthodes qu'offrent les réseaux sociaux pour les activités commerciales. Ensuite de transformer cet acquis en capital économique.

### III.1. L'utilisation des plateformes numériques comme opportunité d'autonomisation financière

Conscientes de leur position dans la société, les femmes entrepreneures vont se projeter pendant à la crise en tant qu'agents rationnels qui vont agir dans un espace où le volume du capital qu'elles disposent va déterminer leur niveau de contrôle du jeu économique. La maîtrise de l'outil internet en tant que manière incorporée est une condition nécessaire à l'analyse des divergences de trajectoires (Arnaud, 2015) des vendeuses en ligne en temps de crise. Cette posture renseigne sur les usages des plateformes numériques dans la production économique à domicile (Leamer, Storper, 2005) et elles participent de ce fait à aider les femmes à surmonter les chocs financiers de la crise.

Les plateformes numériques sont utilisées indifféremment pour décrire des formes très variées de systèmes techniques et d'acteurs économiques, depuis les médias sociaux jusqu'aux systèmes d'exploitation, en passant par les magasins d'applications et les places de marchés (Beuscart, Flichy, 2018). Il est intéressant de voir comment cet outil transforme les femmes en acteurs clés d'une économie informelle en ce sens qu'il désigne alors, de façon très large, le lieu de la mise en relation technique entre une multitude hétérogène. Cette notion s'est progressivement colorée de teintes plus inquiètes et critiques, à mesure que l'attention s'est portée sur le pouvoir de ces acteurs, notamment sur leur capacité à structurer l'activité des personnes, à transformer, des marchés du travail en en contournant les régulations, à opérer des formes massives de collectes de données sur les activités qu'elles organisent. De fait, l'éclosion des nouveaux médias sociaux au cours de la crise va raviver bien que tardivement le secteur du commerce en ligne dans notre contexte.

## Conversion des boutiques matérielles en boutiques virtuelles

La crise sanitaire participe largement à la dématérialisation des espaces de ventes en espaces de vente numérique à travers les réseaux sociaux. Il s'agit d'un retour aux activités de vente par le biais d'internet en adoptant une démarche par laquelle elles développent leurs « marchés » (Debenedetti, Gombault, 2014). C'est un choix stratégique de vente et de promotion des produits pour pallier aux perturbations économiques liées à la crise. Bien que ce choix soit fondé sur la période d'incertitude, sa réception par la femme se heurte à la concurrence persistante du champ économique. Elles voient en cette dématérialisation des visées financières plus rentables comme le traduisent les propos de cette vendeuse en ligne :

« L'intérêt pour le e-commerce est qu'on gagne en temps, on gagne en énergie mais également on capitalise d'une manière ou d'une autre la dépense relative à l'achat de connexion internet ».

Cette perception de l'activité par notre enquêtée traduit un comportement intéressé qui minorise les coûts et optimise les gains dans les diverses transactions effectuées. Mais au-delà il faut analyser ici la structuration de cette lutte pour le gain. C'est de savoir les motivations qui conduisent à faire le choix de ce mode de commerce. Elles sont liées aux déterminants sociaux et économiques des goûts (Bourdieu, 1979a). Ce qui se rapporte à cette raison avancée par la vendeuse susmentionnée :

« Je mise sur le fait d'être toujours bien vêtue, pour quelqu'un qui m'a rencontrée deux ou trois fois, lorsque je présente mes vêtements il est beaucoup plus facile pour lui qu'il veuille prendre au moins parce qu'il m'a déjà vue avec quelque chose de semblable et il a été convaincu. ».

La démarche de séduction de clientèle n'est toutefois pas nouvelle dans le sillage du marketing. Des années plus tôt, deux parmi les vendeuses de notre échantillon occupaient déjà des postes de téléconseillère dans un centre d'appel de la ville de Yaoundé. Elles y ont appris les métiers au marketing numérique.

## II.2 De classification socio-biographique des profils de vendeuses en ligne à la légitimation de leur statut

Sans prétention analytique et encore moins interprétative, il s'agit d'une brève description des parcours singuliers de cinq figures vendeuses en ligne à partir des récits narratifs recueillis sur le terrain. L'objectif est de présenter quelques traces objectives et subjectives permettant de fixer un regard global sur les parcours biographiés. Des éléments objectifs présents nous conduisent à proposer un échantillon de vendeuse aux compétences acquises et spontanées.

Profils des vendeuses	Laure	Laurence	Laure 2	Yvonne	Christelle
Age	35	39	36	32	32
Statut matrimonial	Marié	Célibataire vivant en concubinage	Célibataire Vivant en concubinage	Mariée	Célibataire
Rang au sein de la famille	4 <sup>ème</sup> enfant d'une fratrie 5 enfants	5 <sup>ème</sup> enfant d'une De 7 enfants	Pas de réponse	3 <sup>ème</sup> d'une fratrie de 6 enfants	Pas de réponse
Nombre d'enfants	1	1	2	5	0

Profils des vendeuses	Laure	Laurence	Laure 2	Yvonne	Christelle
Années d'expérience dans la vente en ligne	12ans (Téléconseillère pendant 10ans et 2ans de vente en ligne via les réseaux sociaux)	4ans	5ans	2ans	10ans (Téléconseillère pendant)
Les raisons d'agir	Faillite de son entreprise de téléconseil pendant la Covid	Sans emploi depuis la fin de sa formation en santé vétérinaire	Covid 19	En attente d'intégration à la fonction publique après sa formation d'administrateur de poste et télécommunications, Covid 19	Covid-19

Tableau récapitulatif des profils

### De téléconseillère à vendeuse en ligne. Fabrication d'une expérience en vente dans un centre d'appel

L'idée est de mettre en avant les différentes positions occupées par les vendeuses dans le champ social et de ses consommations et pratiques d'autre part (Moingeon, 1993). Le passage dans un centre d'appel en tant que téléconseillères constituent pour ces jeunes femmes un cadre de socialisation aux métiers de vendeuses en ligne. Entre 2010 et 2016, elle nous raconte comment s'est déroulé son apprentissage dans les centres d'appel de Vipp Interstis à LMT en passant par Orange Cameroun :

« A l'entrée on te fait une formation entre deux à trois à trois semaines en fonction de ton adaptation. Tu suis une formation sur les techniques de persuasion, la relation client, capacité à rester patient face à l'inconnu. J'ai beaucoup appris dans la vente en ligne surtout comment gérer un client ».

L'expérience de la télévente au travers de divers centre d'appel se constitue *in fine* en capital culturel chez ces jeunes femmes. Au fil des années l'intériorisation de l'habitus commercial devient convertible en capital culturel et économique et procure à ces femmes une légitimité dans le secteur de la vente en ligne.

En outre, cet héritage féminin des modes de production est un vecteur de la reproduction de la hiérarchie sociale (Jourdain, Naulin, 2011). En ce sens que, l'héritage économique ici, fait l'objet des stratégies visant au maintien et à l'amélioration de la position sociale des femmes investies dans e-commerce. En plein engagement dans cet emploi transitoire dans les centres d'appel, elles sont animées par l'idée d'une autonomisation financière. A l'observation, nous découvrons que la plupart de ces jeunes femmes commencent à exercer de la vente en ligne dans les sites des centres d'appel puis créent des comptes personnels sur les plateformes numériques Facebook, Whatsapp, Snapchat et Instagram pour des fins de visibilité accrue. Il se forme entre elles, un réseau de vente qui les socialise assez rapidement à cet environnement du commerce. Elles se spécialisent davantage dans le secteur de la cosmétique, de l'habillement et de l'agroalimentaire. Dans la plupart des cas, confie Gertrude, le télétravail cause des troubles de santé notamment des problèmes d'audition et des maladies liées aux nerfs.

La légitimation de la qualité des produits mis en vente est largement tributaire de la publicité qui les précède comme le témoigne Laurence :

« La publicité des produits mis en vente sur les plateformes numériques offre des opportunités de vente, quel que soit le budget ».

Elle est organisée autour d'une stratégie de visibilité qui varie en fonction des profils des vendeuses et de la clientèle ciblée. Pour l'une d'elles, la tactique s'articule d'un rôle de mannequin incarnée par elle :

« Je suis mon propre mannequin, je consomme mes propres produits et généralement je les vends sur moi et je maximise sur la régularité de mes statuts car je me dis que tout le monde ne les regarde pas au même alors il faut poster encore et encore ».

En filigrane il y'a une volonté de fidéliser la clientèle dans un marché où la compétition semble légitime. Pour le cas de Laurence, elle met en visibilité les photos des modèles dont elle publie les vêtements sur son statut WhatsApp en activant le partage du statut par tous ses contacts. Il s'agit en fait des actions de marketing destinées à la séduction d'une clientèle imaginaire (Dacheux, 2001) par ajustement de l'offre à la demande. Cette démarche qui se veut persuasive, réduit la communication des entreprises numériques à une dimension instrumentale.

## Conclusion

Si la résilience des femmes, en particulier celle par l'économie numérique, est indéniable, elle ne s'accompagne pas d'une transformation radicale ou même d'une « ouverture » de la composition patriarcale du système social. Les effets de la féminisation de la résilience financière ne perturbent ni ne remettent en cause les modes de production et de reproduction des élites économiques. L'impression générale qui se dégage est plutôt celle d'une « reproduction dans la révolution » (Dulong, 2003 :431), comme l'illustre la division sexuelle du travail et l'occupation par les femmes des positions sociales les plus secondaires ou dominées, de même que les métiers relevant d'une économie numérique non structurée se rattachant aux domaines considérés comme féminins (vente des vêtements en ligne, restaurants en ligne, la cosmétique, vente en ligne des produits agroalimentaire, etc.).

Les résultats de l'enquête auprès de 05 femmes entrepreneures dans le commerce en ligne, invitent montrent que les programmes institutionnels en direction de la prise en charge de la crise, privilégient les secteurs d'activités encadrées. En revanche, le e-commerce constitue un des secteurs les moins régulés qui nécessite à notre sens une prise en compte non négligeable. Alors que le phénomène des e-boutique est fortement associé aux problèmes relatifs à la régulation, à la fiscalité des plateformes usuelles et aspects sociaux (Perrot, 2018). Les femmes entrepreneures dans ce secteur font face aux contraintes structurelles d'entraves au développement qui pèse sur l'État.

La comparaison de la pandémie Covid-19 et les politiques d'ajustement structurel, puis ses effets sur le processus d'autonomisation de la femme, montrent ainsi le rôle particulièrement décisif de la structure patriarcal du champ politique hérité de la colonisation.

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
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# Boko Haram's Terrorist Campaign in Nigeria

## Contexts, Dimensions and Emerging Trajectories

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Boko Haram has fast become one of the world's most notorious terrorist groups. The longevity of Boko Haram, coupled with its dynamic nature, necessitates that scholars keep abreast with a vast and intersectional array of developments. As a result, much ink has been spilt providing analysis and insight into the group's motives, activities, internal politics, tactics, and future trajectories. Boko Haram's ever-green endurance both in Nigeria and the wider West African region paves the way for a scholarly momentum which Oriola, Onuoha and Oyewole's edited collection aligns with. The book has 12 chapters which are split across five thematic areas, namely: gender, the media, displacement, non-state actors, human rights, and non-state actors. It is beyond the scope of this review to place each chapter under the microscope. Instead, the reviewer will highlight some of the most important contributions the book makes to the academic discourse on Boko

Haram. Chapter three (by Oyewole and Onuoha) provides the reader with a comprehensive account of the Dapachi Kidnapping of 2018; this contribution is significant as much scholarship as focused on the Chibok Kidnappings of 2014. Oyewole and Onuoha unpack why the Dapachi Kidnappings took place, placing an emphasis on the need for Boko Haram to portray itself as a resilient origination so as to appear appealing to prospective members, to raise funds (by means of hostage negotiations), and rewarding hardworking foot soldiers with 'wives' and sex slaves. Furthermore, context is given to Dapachi's geographical and political vulnerability vis-à-vis Boko Haram's terrorist campaign.

Chapter four (by Oshodi) highlights how journalists and media outlets have come under fire by Boko Haram. Emphasis is placed on how journalists have become 'easy prey' for misrepresenting Boko Haram's narratives and/or activities, which resulted in the issuing of threats or the attacking of media outlets. Chapter seven (by Tar and Ayegba) highlights the resilience of internally displaced persons (IDPs) displaced as a result of Boko Haram's armed assaults. Tar and Ayegba's contribution shows that IDPs resort to skipping meals, selling of their own critical assets (such as homes, cattle or land), wage labour, and networking (which involved forming connections with host communities that allowed IDPs to escape the harsh conditions of the IPD camps). This illustration of resilience was followed by suggestions on how to build the capacity of IDPs which included social support and wealth creation initiatives.

Chapter eight (by Adeakin, Gray and Madu) questions the overall consequences of humanitarian assistance provided by non-governmental organisations. Their chapter finds that while humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs is a crucial lifeline for victims of Boko Haram campaign of terror, this assistance is, all too often, given out to recipients whose allegiance is unverifiable.

As a result, humanitarian assistance may, unintentionally, end up in the hands of Boko Haram. Omotuyi and Okwechine (chapter eleven) investigate how the Leahy Law of the United States of America (USA) was being implemented. The Leahy Law was passed in 1997 to prohibit the use of counter-terrorism assistance (particularly military assistance) to facilitate human rights abuses. They find that the application of the Leahy Law under former President Obama within the context of Nigeria was misguided as the law was leveraged not to protect and promote human rights but to prevent Nigeria from gaining access to counter-terrorism assistance due to Boko Haram informants possibly operating within the Nigerian military. The final chapter of this edited volume provides a bird's-eye view of how the international community provided assistance to Nigeria in fighting Boko Haram.

Boko Haram's complex nature facilitates this book's broad thematic scope, which is its greatest strength. Additionally, Oriola, Onuoha and Oyewole's edited collection is a quick and easy read, which makes it the ideal resource for seasoned and novice Boko Haram watchers alike. Both of these readerships will find context or inspiration, respectively, as they seek to either commence their research into Boko Haram or advance their contributions to the literature. The 'easy to read' style and presentation of Oriola, Onuoha and Oyewole's edited collection means that the work is accessible to students, scholars, policymakers, non-state actors or the layperson wishing to understand more about the Boko Haram conflict and its complexities outside of the media cycle. With these laudable strengths in mind, it is worth noting that the book does not give a detailed account of Boko Haram's roots. Given the combined expertise of the various contributors, a forecast of Boko Haram's future would have been another welcome addition to this book.

The above paves the way for further research opportunities. Chief among these is the death of Abubakar Shekau in 2021. Boko Haram watchers will need to monitor and interpret what the post-Shekau era means for (counter-)terrorism in Nigeria and West Africa as a whole.

### Book information

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# The New Apartheid

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“How indeed would a living understanding come to those, *who have fled knowledge of the source?*” (Ayi Kwei Armah in *Two Thousand Seasons*, 1973, p xvi. My italics).

## Apartheid & Delusion: 2 Myths by Sizwe in South African Politics.

The fundamental distinction between a Civil Rights movement such as the African National Congress and a liberation movement like Poqo lies in the status of white settlers and Apartheid. The mythologisation of Apartheid by promoting it to the main problem in liberation politics and history in conqueror South Africa (Ramosé 2018) is the persistent intellectual obsession of the Congress Tradition. A trenchant contestation and rejection of Apartheid as the fundamental antagonism in the history of the struggle for national liberation is the defining trait of a liberation

movement and liberation intellectual production. Due to the triumph of the Civil Rights movement of the ANC in 1994 the Congress Tradition as an ideological and intellectual paradigm has attained a hegemonic status with the help of white liberals (Mafeje 1998). At the very origin of the Congress Tradition is the embrace and propagation of the Freedom Cheater (Pheko 2012). This is why the Congress Tradition is premised on Charterism (Raboroko 1960). Adopted in reaction to the dominance of the so-called Afrikaner nationalism in 1955, the Kliptown Charter (Sobukwe 1958) is the core of Charterism which centralises Apartheid as the main problem. Liberal non-racialism (Soske 2017 & Dladla 2018) as an antidote to the rabid and clumsy racism of the Apartheid regime is encapsulated in the Congress of the People’s annoying fixation with the naïve fantasy of South Africa belonging to all who live in it, both black and white... Mpofo-Walsh is an organic product and “bright” example of the triumph of Tutu’s curse of blacks and whites belonging together in South Africa, literally. While the Congress of the People was preoccupied with the old Apartheid, Sizwe and his fellow Charterist intellectuals are obsessing about the new Apartheid in “post-Apartheid” South Africa. Having written a book entitled *Democracy & Delusion: 10 Myths* (2019), in which he debunks what he considers to be myths about the so-called post-Apartheid South Africa, Sizwe is back again only this time he is reinventing two myths. This first myth is about the centrality of Apartheid as *the* problem in liberation politics and history while the second one is about the ANC being a liberation movement. This is how Sizwe (2021: 178) reinvents the first Charterist myth “Defining a central social problem takes generations. In hindsight, the struggle against formal apartheid appears coherent and premediated. *But identifying apartheid as the problem took eternities of debate, struggle and reflection*” (our italics). Within the Africanist Tradition as the opposite of the Charterist tradition of Sizwe, Peter Raboroko has debunked Sizwe’s two myths in a piece called *The Africanist Case* (1960). The Africanist tradition which was later called the Azanian Tradition broke away from the Civil Rights logic of the ANC in 1959 due to the Charterists’ betrayal of the fundamental question of historic justice, namely to whom does the land belong? Anton Lembede and Robert Sobukwe later emphasised the idea that Europeans are alien conquerors who dispossessed the Indigenous people of their land. And this land dispossession took place since 1652 and not in 1948, making the horrible date of 1652 fundamentally important in the Africanist and Azanian Traditions. This implies that the fundamental problem is not Apartheid be it old or new but conquest in the form of land dispossession since 1652 in wars of colonisation (Ramosé 2007). In the book under review, entitled *The New Apartheid* (2021),

Sizwe promotes the delusion and first myth of Apartheid as *the* problem and the second myth of the ANC as a liberation movement. This is how Sizwe (2021: 23) reinforces his second Charterist myth “Furthermore, when the liberation movement was nationalised, it assumed apartheid’s debts. These debts further constrained ANC policy choices and limited fundamental reform”. According to Sizwe, his book *The New Apartheid* posits that Apartheid did not die, it was privatised. The book investigates the afterlife of Apartheid which was made new by being privatised through the market logic of neoliberalism. The power of the State was diminished by the dominance of private actors. It is in this sense that Sizwe’s fellow Charterist intellectual comrade, namely Tembeka Ngcukaitobi argues in the blurb of this book that it “explodes the myth that apartheid is a thing of the past”. From an Africanist Tradition’s position this “explosion” is pointless since apartheid was never the problem but a mere regime invented by Dutch settlers who under the delusion of indigeneity called themselves the Afrikaners. These delusional architects of the regime of apartheid merely reconfigured white settler colonialism which commenced with conquest in the form of land dispossession and intellectual warfare (Carruthers 1999) in wars of colonisation (Ramose 2006). It is only Charterist intellectuals like Sizwe and Tembeka and their ideological victims who see the need to “explode” the myth of apartheid being a thing of the past. White settler colonialism and white supremacy in South African politics preceded apartheid and transcended it in the so-called post-apartheid South Africa. Apartheid as a political regime of Dutch settlers was just a clumsy manifestation of white supremacy. This regime is not *the* problem but white supremacy is *the* main antagonism. White supremacy does not need apartheid. This is why white supremacy has outlived the regime of apartheid under liberal constitutional democracy in the current so-called new South Africa. White liberals (Mafeje 1998) like Hellen Zille and Merle Lipton (2007) know very well that apartheid as a clumsy political regime was too costly for white supremacy and this why they had to intervene ideologically in 1994 to secure the afterlife of white supremacy under liberal constitutional democracy. So why obsess about just a regime of white supremacy and not white supremacy itself? In promoting the two myths of apartheid as *the* problem and the ANC as a liberation movement Sizwe indulges in Charterist delusions throughout the book. The book is divided into five sections, namely Space, Law, Wealth, Technology and Punishment. For someone who obsesses about apartheid, the section on Space is a well-presented summation of the racist production of social space by the apartheid regime. The section on Law is by far the most rewarding portion of this myth-making book. Sizwe’s criticism of the two schools of constitutionalism, namely the triumphalist which is embraced by his fellow Charterist intellectual Tembeka (2018) and the abolitionist as “forged” by Ndumiso Dladla (2018) and Joel Modiri (2018) was indicative of his commendable yet shallow comprehension of legal philosophy. His critical point about the two schools’ naïve belief in the power of law was quite interesting. Sizwe’s legal and constitutional scepticism and its critique of the legalism of the constitutional abolitionists and triumphalists is by far the only important thing about the entire book. This is how Sizwe (2021:68) states it “Both constitutional triumphalist and constitutional abolitionist overestimate law’s potential for transformative change. This belief in legal centrality is not uncommon among lawyers”. It was interesting to see a Charterist intellectual mythmaker like Sizwe engage with the Azanian Tradition honestly by citing the scholars and in the process debunking the myth of legalism in these constitutional schools. Given the ideological flipflopping of Tshepo Madlingozi we cannot classify him under the Azanian Tradition, but we can credit him as an influence on Sizwe’s first myth of apartheid as *the* problem. Sizwe is clearly familiar with the scholarship of Madlingozi especially his article on *Social justice in a time of Neo-apartheid constitutionalism* as he cites it. The transition from neo- to new is not a long journey to apartheid mythmaking. Another interesting section is the one on Wealth. This is the section which foregrounds the privatisation of apartheid. It delves into the rise of market logic within apartheid and how it affected the governance of the ANC in “post-apartheid era” in terms of policy and debts. While in the section on Law Sizwe demonstrated a shallow but commendable grasp of legal philosophy, the section on Wealth is a manifestation of his shallow comprehension of the history of economic



thought. His discussion of neoliberalism is not impressive. It does not show a solid grasp of the literature on the origin of neoliberalism. Merely quoting Von Hayek is not sufficient. Ludwig Von Mises, Mont Pellerin society, Austrian school of economics, German historical school and the Chicago school of economics and its second-hand dealers in ideas literature should have been given a brief exposition. The sections on Technology and Punishment are important but unremarkable. Ironically the Conclusion is very significant. It is here that Charterist mythmaking reaches “explosive” heights. The Conclusion is certainly Sizwe’s brightest moment of Charterism. The conceptualisation of the 1994 Civil Rights project of the ANC as the first republic is however a less sophisticated way of expressing the mythmaking of the Congress Tradition. Eddy Maloka (2022) as a fellow traveller in the Charterist journey of mythmaking in South African politics has called for a Second Republic in an awkwardly passionate fashion. Exhibiting the naïve and embarrassing integrationist double-consciousness of the ANC since its founding moment by “civilised natives” confused by Cape liberal indoctrination, both Sizwe and Maloka refuse to trace (white) South African republicanism to the 1852 moment as a racist invention of the Dutch settlers who called it *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* or the South African Republic. Their dishonest Charterist republicanism simply refuses to acknowledge the two republics of 1852 and 1961 which preceded their myth of the 1994 first republic. Tired of radical pretensions of his shallow grasp of legal philosophy, Sizwe “Concludes” by celebrating the constitution. As a typical Black liberal, Sizwe shamelessly flirts with Karl Klare’s transformative constitutionalism. This is how Sizwe (2021:163) confesses his proud flirtations “my argument, then, is not that the constitution should be entirely abolished but that it should be substantially transformed. I admit, and indeed celebrate, the constitution’s achievements and advances. I believe in constitutional democracy. And I do not take for granted the constitution’s role in extending the franchise and inaugurating the rule of law”. His Charterist fellow traveller Tembeka accompanied him in this mythmaking journey of the Congress Tradition by stating that (2021:226) “our forefathers were in struggle so that we could have access to the law...They were fighting for the law. We cannot abandon the law”. Thus, we have here in display both radical and moderate black liberalism in jurisprudence in the form of the Azanian Tradition and the Congress Tradition. In conclusion Sizwe wrote his first book to debunk 10 myths only to write another one under review to reinvent 2 myths of Charterism, namely *the* (delusion) problem of apartheid and the ANC as a liberation movement.

*Remember this; against all that destruction some remained among us unforgettable of origins...*” (Armah 1973, p xv. My italics).

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
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# Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China

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The rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the severity of the 2008 global financial crisis have sparked a new round of debate about the long-term viability of transatlantic norms, ideas, and institutions that have dominated global governance since its commencement. Many of the bodies and organizations that contribute towards global governance were formed between 1945 and 1980, and have been dominated by Western actors and an agenda centered on the West. To support the main argument of the author there are various chapters in the book *Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China* that focus on The Evolution of Brics and the international system, Russia and BRICS, China and BRICS and Russia and China in BRICS: Convergences and Divergences. The strength of this book is that it is based on empirical evidence and it address pertinent questions on BRICS, contemporary

international relations and monetary institutions. Most importantly, the book sheds light on the future of BRICS and the international financial system by providing a clear overview of BRICS and Unipolar and Bipolar world order systems.

The book helps understand global economic transformation and economic developments in the BRICS countries in the post-globalization period. The author laments on the international system trends which came after the end of the Cold War between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and America in which the USA emerged as dominating player in international politics. Furthermore, the author argues that monetary institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, G-8 and G-20 are West dominated. I agree with the author that monetary institutions are West dominated this is because African countries are forever indebted to the West due to this monetary institution and this holds the development of African countries. Moreover, the author argues that Russia and China had certain interest in BRICS as the two countries believed that BRICS would be different from the Group of Eight and Group of 77.

The G-8 and G-77 groups gave Russia and China the opportunity to enhance their foreign policy interest when it comes to international politics. The author makes an argument that the structure of international system has been changing in multiple dimensions since the beginning of the twenty-first century and that the modern world is extremely interconnected.

The core of this book is that it seeks to emphasize the role of Russia and China in BRICS international affairs. In addition, the book proves that BRICS has necessary resources to become the center of global politics and international relations. Furthermore, the author debates that the main objectives of international institutions are to aid sustainable development in BRICS member states. Moreover, the author argues that BRICS is taking positions in various international issues on sustainable development and economic growth (page 44-47). The author believes that BRICS brings stability in global order and regional politics.

The author draws some of his arguments on international systems from the neo-realist prominent scholar, Kenneth Waltz, who argues that bipolarity was more stable than the multipolar system. On

page 53-57, the author acknowledges the COVID-19 pandemic which affected the world's economy. I agree with the author that COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns did not only affect BRICS countries economy, but it affected many other countries. During Covid-19 many countries were forced to lockdown their economy to monitor and manage the spread of the virus. The lockdown period forced countries to have little economic activities. Furthermore, a table on global financial crisis is drawn to show annual percentage change from the year 2007 to 2010. With the use of the IMF 2011 reports the author outlines how rising power countries have become stable in terms of economic growth. On page 58, the author states that multipolarity is considered as interpolar in the age of independence. Moreover, the author laments the fact that multipolarity became prevalent during Primakov's tenure as Foreign Ministry in 1996-1998. It was during Putin's presidency in 1991 that multipolarity became legitimate and received financial support from financial institutions.

The authors says that with the current world order is unbalanced and needs reformation. Therefore, multipolarity should be a new global political trend. However, Stanley (2023) states that Multilateralism is on the decline as consensus-based processes have proven unsuitable for negotiating among an ever broad and diverse membership. For instance, the United States' decision to obstruct the nomination of new members to the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body has jeopardized the organization's capacity to settle disputes, which is one of its primary functions. The shift from formal institutions to unilateral action and informal multilateralism indicates the emergence of a world that is multipolar. Furthermore, the author explains that multipolarity became popular in Russia around 1993 after the Soviet Union event and that the US-centric unipolar world should be replaced with a multipolar world order.

After reading the book *Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China*, one can conclude that Srinivas is in favour of multipolarism. Therefore, the book is recommended for IR scholars, or anyone interested in IR politics. Furthermore, the book provides further understanding of the cause of international conflicts on rising power states fuelled by dominant powers which are not following the international rules on wars.

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# About the African Association of Political Science



The African Association of Political Science was launched in Dar es Salam in 1974 as the continental parent body of political scientists in Africa, and as a platform to interrogate the state of the politics, governance, economy and development of African states. Before its collapse, AAPS promoted the systematic study and application of African Political Science scholarships. The Association also interrogated the viability of knowledge conjectured about/for Africa. AAPS became a formidable composition of established and emerging African Political Science scholars, Political Science students, scholars from related disciplines and the corporate membership of foreign scholars and institutions.

AAPS' biennial conferences and annual workshops were platforms for exchange of notes, discussion of on-going research, formation of new research networks, the launch of major publications, and exchanges with research funders and publishing houses. These platforms helped in the formation of schools of thought such as the Dar es Salaam, Ibadan, Cairo and Harare (SAPES Trust) schools in the 1980s through to the 2000s. These helped induct scholars emerging with the arrival of a new South Africa to the broader archive and legacy of African political thought in the 1990s, a crucial moment for the extension of AAPS' reach. The association was central in strengthening the pan-African social science fraternity as one of the biggest and most organized associations participating in the CODESRIA network.

In June 2021, AAPS was revitalised in an international conference and its journal was also rejuvenated. Alongside this, several national associations also re-emerged. AAPS counts on you to support by registering via its website - <https://aapsrising.org/> - and partnering with it on matters of shared interests. Look out for next conferences and colloquia.

## Notice

AAPS together with South African Association of Political Studies and the Institute for Pan-African Thought & Conversation at University of Johannesburg at holding a colloquium on Southern African Development Community @ 30: Pasts, Present and Future. Papers are welcome that look at regional and national issues in SADC or comparable experiences, which must be no more than 6 000 words long and using APA referencing and citation style by 31 July. Send to [Africanpolitics2019@gmail.com](mailto:Africanpolitics2019@gmail.com) with Colloquium as title.