African Journal of Political Science
Revue Africaine de Science Politique

The AJPS is published by the African Association of Political Sciences (AAPS),
with the aim of providing a platform for African issues or perspectives on politics
and society in Africa. It is published twice a year – in April and September, and
targeted at the social science community, policy-makers and university students.

AAPS
African Association of Political Science

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BOOK REVIEW

EDITORIAL

A Static Dynamic in African Politics

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Editors

Political developments in Africa continue to manifest that disjuncture between progress and stalemate. There continues to be a co-existence between change and stasis in many areas of African society. This is a sort of static dynamism where great hope inspired such developments as citizens electing new governments in countries like Malawi and Zambia, only to encounter deliberating despair marked by the destruction of Somalia by a ravaging terror-linked and externally driven conflict in the form of drones and bombings, the stubborn growth of terror in Mozambique, terror in the Sahel deepening. The incidence of political corruption put into the spotlight by the South African commissioning probing the so-called state capture, and the extradition of a former Mozambican finance minister for trial in the U.S. adds the gloom that threatens to dim hopes.

The heavy impact of Covid-19 on social systems, communities, politics and on the economy in Africa threatens to stagnate further the growth Africa needs to catch with those ahead of it, but the long-standing challenges like misgovernance, loss of state capacity to deliver public goods, diminishing national leadership and weakened social compacts bedevil efforts to help Africa recover from the Covid impacts quickly. An exposition in technological innovation that has seen Africa play a key role in e-payment systems, marked by a huge update of cellphones and social media space by Africans, is a development that is pregnant with possibilities that could translate to more flourishing small businesses, more industrialisation, greater participation by Africans in global value chains, greater public participation in governance and deeper regional integration. But this is hampered by problems with basic infrastructure such as energy, overwhelmed data networks.

As papers in this edition show, African governance and politics are marked by transitions whose direction is not simply from negative to positive. But there are points of progress and points of reversal of progress simultaneously. As these papers show, institutions matter in this game of progress. They cement trends we want and prevent those we do not wish to. As these papers also show, citizen agency is critical for African progress, whether as leaders or as mere participants in public life, citizens can introduce the dynamism society needs. Thirdly, Africa's friends and enemies alike have a crucial role in the direction the continent takes since they can stimulate, consciously or inadvertently, a reaction by Africa that could catalyse the Africa we want.

In "Development as an Intellectual Process: The Role and Significance of African Intellectuals in Rethinking African Politics", Ngaka Sehlare Makgetlaneng argues that in rethinking African politics, viewing development on the continent as an intellectual exercise cannot be excluded from the process with developing resources at the centre of this process. This exercise aims to ensure a better life for the citizens of the continent within the context of distribution and consumption. Makgetlaneng argues that leadership plays a vital role and asset in ensuring the continent's citizens are placed first on the list of priorities.

In his article, Thabiso Muswede argues that digital media has impacted political campaigns in Africa. Consequently, this impact has resulted in disintermediated political communication on the continent. Furthermore, due to the rapid escalation of digital media, there has been a shift in political communication processes as it has drastically moved away from traditional ways of communication to platforms linked to digital citizenship.

The paper written by Christopher Beilings focuses on the novel Emergency Continued which is the sequel of Richard Rive's novel, Emergency. The novel is set in 1980s South Africa at the height of the Apartheid state. Employing uncertain subjectivity as the theme, the paper zooms into the Coloured subject. Beilings note that issues such as oppression and colonialism have scared the Coloured

subject's sense of self, belonging, and political agency. Additionally, these and other issues of this period has spilt over into the post-apartheid period as many of the experiences and complexities that the Coloured subjects face continues to be wrestled with today.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States, the world has increasingly paid attention to terrorism. In an attempt to diminish terrorist activity, many countries on the African continent have turned to insurgency groups. This paper aims to provide an overview of the increasing terrorist activities as it relates to Africa.

Aswathi A. Nair argues that according to the West, Human Rights and advocacy of Democracy are two fundamental principles entrenched in rights. By these principles, countries are appraised on democratisation based on how well their citizens are treated in their natural rights and safeguarding against human rights violations. However, in many countries in Africa and Asia, the degree of democratisation has been controversial. In this context, Nair addresses the influence of globalisation of these and other principles and values in the post-colonial period of African states, particularly Zimbabwe.

Using the Boko Haram and Niger Delta as case studies, this paper aims to examine the legacies of violence in the context of politics and socio-economics. Furthermore, the paper investigates the interplay between transitional justice and the values of the rule of law as it relates to political tensions. Finally, the recommendations include how transitional justice and the power of law values contribute to peace and recovery in a post-conflict period for offences in politics and socio-economics that come from violence and conflict.

Seife T.K. argues that Democracy and political stability are dependent on how politicians in Africa respond to politics concerning ethnicity and language. However, the challenge is reuniting economic growth and well-being

with entitlement politics. This article aims to investigate the increasing rise of ethnic politics on the continent in the context of six African states. Furthermore, the paper attempts to illustrate a comprehensive perspective on formulating debates to comprehend political parties and elites.

In this article, Nyere's objective is threefold; firstly, examining the reasons why the 2011 uprising in Libya took place. Secondly, Nyere analyzes how the government of Libya responded to the rebellion. Finally, there is a focus on how the international community responded to this protest, mainly how this response was led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In this paper, Gottschalk reminds the reader that it has been 129 years since "Pan-Africanism" was coined. In the diaspora, initiatives such as these culminated in an elaborate permanent, continental, state-centric institutionalisation, starting six decades ago with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The OAU later became what we now refer to as the African Union (A.U.). However, Gottschalk notes that Pan-Africanism will continue to be fragile unless it gains extensive support, as opposed to what it is now, a phenomenon usually employed by a limited group such as intellectuals and certain members of the ruling elites.

Development as an Intellectual Process

The Role and Significance of African Intellectuals in Rethinking African Politics

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Abstract

This article contributes to rethinking African politics by viewing the continent's development as an intellectual process in which resources are created for the satisfaction of human needs. Central to this process is the primacy of production of resources over their distribution and consumption. Therefore, development as an intellectual process in which society's resources are created to ensure a better life for its citizens is a central task. The best, most effective and progressive way to do justice to this task is to put the people at the centre of development in advocacy, debate and policy. The dominant and yet incorrect view that Africa's economic sectors such as mining and agriculture are drivers of its economy and development should be replaced with the indispensable role of its human capital under the leadership of intellectuals in its economy and development. This role should be recognised in theory and practice. The point is that economic sectors derive their importance to economy and development from human beings using their knowledge, skills and determination in deploying their resources to achieve tactical and strategic objectives. Therefore, African intellectuals, creators of leaders and institutions and organisations, producers and disseminators of knowledge, producers and providers of evidence and forces dominating the possession and utilisation of human capital without whose organic input no organisation or social force can achieve and sustain its strategic objectives, are indispensable to a rethinking of African politics of development they must lead. Their weapons in this role are their leadership of and role in institutions and organisations and individual knowledge and talents as proud continental assets through the mediation of parties under their leadership in deploying Africa's natural resources, mainly mineral and agricultural resources, in putting the continent and its people first in terms of development.

The political, economic, and ideological justification for rethinking African politics

In rethinking African politics, African scholars should seriously and critically consider Claude Ake's position that, with few exceptions, it is a fallacy to analyse development in Africa in terms of a failure to achieve it. The point is that "the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place" of the decisive majority of African political leaders. On their agenda has been their struggle to prolong their stay in power. With the "struggle for power" being "so absorbing … everything else, including development, was marginalised" (Ake, 1996, p. 5). In three decades of political independence, the rule of the majority of African leaders has been "notable for oppression, corruption, social disorganisation, the demise of the development project, and growing poverty". Their leadership has been serving to reinforce the view of Africa as the continent enmeshed in "a vicious circle of negativity and diminishing self-esteem" (Ake, 1996, p. 141). The status quo has remained. The decisive majority of African leaders have increasingly made Africa and its people more vulnerable to external actors and powers. This is what they have inherited from their predecessors from the 1960s and to Africa of multiparty elections, which have not led to new power relations. This status quo in African politics and development is characterised by:

(a) the dominance in the national economy of foreign ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange; (b) the consequent foreign exploitation of indigenous resources; (c) various forms of socio-cultural and political dependence which sustains these ownership and exploitative relations; (d) the external orientations of the national economy; (e) the confinement of national participation in the international division of labour to primary production for export and the importation of manufactured goods; (f) confidence in the beneficial nature of external conditions; (g) high hope of benefits from foreign relations; and (h) appeals to the humanitarian sentiments of the advanced [capitalist] countries, as the primary means of international influence [and national development.]. (Nnoli, 1971, p. 7)

The consequence of their confidence that external forces, not African people, are primary actors in the strategic area of African development is that "political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to development" (Ake, 1996, p. 1). To be honest and sincere in rethinking African politics of development is to admit that one being for truth cannot seriously expect the majority of African leaders to ''legitimately exercise power and authority over the control and management of the country's affairs in the interest of the people and accordance with the principles of justice, equity, accountability and transparency" (Moyo, 1997, p. 65).

These are some of the challenges constituting problems that have earned Africa and its people a status as objects of compassion and contempt, and marginalisation globally. Central to this status is the issue of feeling pity for Africa for its future and how its countries trade with other countries outside itself, receive aid and debt relief and govern themselves by individuals and organisations throughout the world. Oxfam articulated this view of Africa and its people by some individuals and organisations across the globe in its Make Trade Fair Campaign in 2002 when it maintained that the "future of Africa, more than that of any other continent, hinges on the collective global action" and that "how Africa trades, receives aid and debt relief and governs itself is not the responsibility of Africans alone; these issues are the responsibility of decision-makers and global citizens everywhere" in the world (Oxfam, 2002, p. 22).

Rethinking African politics is also to confront and defeat the hegemony of the populist thesis that we Africans are all in the same boat in the world by raising and answering the strategic question as to who are enemies and allies of the masses of the African people among Africans. By blunting the edges of the struggle against Africans who are enemies of Africa and its people and institutions and organisations supporting it, this thesis serves the status quo. This task is

to advance a politics of the truth; to avoid easy compromises; to address the immediate and long-term needs of the mass of the population and of those who suffer the most severe forms of oppression; to search for the common ground of that oppression; to resist ideological claims that 'we are all in the same boat' in this society; to reject what [C. Wright] Mills called the 'crackpot realism' that makes the status quo into a kind of inescapable second nature and closes off the future; to fight market fetishism. In short, to avoid making what Raymond Williams called 'long-term adjustments to short-term problems.   (Foster, 1990, p. 286)

Rethinking African politics as the primary ask of African organic thinkers

African intellectuals are the dominant social forces in the production of knowledge vital to the development of Africa and its people. They are leaders in the production of knowledge the continent requires to concretely understand its problems and the opportunities it is enjoying in its struggle for sustainable development. The task of the production of knowledge is not purely an academic task. It is a task specified by practice in organising and utilising knowledge for developmental purposes as

problems are confronted either for their solution or maintenance. By producing knowledge vital to the continent's development, intellectuals enjoy enormous opportunities to provide the continent with the understanding that knowledge is power when organised to achieve strategic objectives. Only African intellectuals play an indispensable role in representing all the African people, not only members of their ethnicity, language, gender, religion, clan, and other related socio-historical affiliations in the strategic area of development. They execute this task through presentations of their papers at conferences, symposiums, seminars, workshops and other forums, their books, journal articles, monographs, policy briefs, interviews, and lecturing at the learning institutions. They dominate the possession and utilisation of human capital, speaking on behalf of those their works structurally represent. Their structural commitment to speak on behalf of particular social forces through their careers is central in their indispensable role that no social force or organisation can achieve and sustain its strategic objectives without organic input of intellectuals.

Rethinking African politics is first and foremost to reconsider the role and significance of Africa's organic thinkers in African politics from their perspective as producers and disseminators of knowledge and as creators of leaders, experts, and institutions and organisations. Intellectuals have "enormous power" through "research and creative thinking" to "change the world". They can achieve this objective by "sharing their ideas and knowledge" not only with their peers but also, of grave import, with "the broader public". Education, "a critical tool for grappling with the major challenges facing the world", is their asset in "reaching out" to the public (Heleta, 2020, p. 27). The central role of knowledge in development is such that development is knowledge. Knowledge-based development is through the effective use of knowledge in ensuring sustainable socio-economic security.

In rethinking African politics as thinkers and actors, African intellectuals should produce and disseminate knowledge tangibly on what it means to be true Pan-Africanists. This theoretical and political task is to protect the role and significance of Pan-Africanism primarily from Africans who have made it more of a political, economic, and ideological fashion and transformed it into a state-centric theoretical weapon, especially by declaring that South Africa and Nigeria are leaders of the Pan-African cause of Africa's structural transformation and development. Central to Pan-Africanism, contrary to this state-centric perspective, are the African people as social agents of the transformation and development of Africa and its people and Africa as the basis of the independence of the African people of the world. It has never been that it should be led by countries and their heads of state and government. This position should be defended. True Pan-Africanists operationalise Pan-Africanism in their countries through active participation in the resolution of problems faced by their people. True Pan-Africanists are those who put Pan-Africanism into practice in the service of the African people by wielding the knife of theoretical and practical criticism of the socio-political and economic problems and their structures. To be a true Pan-Africanist should be like what Mikhail Gorbachev maintains should be critical factors characterising true Marxists, which

> means not being afraid of what is new, reject obedience to any dogma, thinking independently, submitting one's thoughts and plans of action to the test of morality and, through political step, help the working people realise their hopes and aspirations and live up to their abilities. (Gorbachev, 1990, p. 17)

It "means, first of all, to be consistently democratic and … put universal human values above everything else" and be "able to identify with the vital interests of the people and understand the importance of the international and global issues that define mankind's common destiny" (Gorbachev, 1990, p. 17). Detesting lies should be characterised by "rigorous respect for the truth" and resent "anyone who makes one-sided judgments and pretends to have absolute knowledge about what is going to happen and what should be done" (Gorbachev, 1990, p. 17). It is through

substantiating these principles in practice in their countries that African intellectuals working in alliance with other national forces who are for socio-political and economic justice that will end the political, ideological and organisational hegemony of the decisive majority of the African Union heads of state and government have established over the African people. The transformation of the African Union from being "a concentrated microcosm of Africa and its ills" into an organisational expression of the democratic will of the African people whose operations represent their socio-political and economic needs and interests is through the fundamental restructuring of African societies in their interest. The point is that:

> The danger is of an organisation being cut off from its membership. The beautiful, or glorious, new headquarters of the AU – built by the Chinese and complete with the golden statue of Nkrumah – is an example of isolation. The headquarters is not just a vast conference chamber and offices. It is an entire complex, a luxury hotel for African presidents arriving in Addis Ababa for summits. From the airport to the headquarters and back again, one need never step outside a limousine or the walled compound of the AU; one need not speak to any ordinary Ethiopian, and one need not learn anything of an average person's problems. If complaints of the privileged positions of Eurocrats are one of the factors leading the EU into crisis, the Afrocrats – from presidents to staff members – lead lives that are unrelated to Africa as a whole. (Chan, 2016, p. 44)

It is common practice in theoretical and political forums and circles to hear some Africans declaring that they are revolutionaries, socialists and communists. As legitimate and appropriate this declaration maybe, as a person concerned with the task of substantiating one's political, economic and ideological position on development and democracy issues, processes and developments in practice not in theory, of what relevance is this declaration to the state of Africa's development and misfortunes confronted by the decisive majority of its people and the benefits enjoyed by its decisive minority? What will be the response of Africans who like to make this declaration publicly if some of those daily facing misfortunes ask them the question, you are revolutionaries, socialists and communists, so what? The point is that:

> It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a Communist in general. You must be able at each particular moment to find the specific link in the chain, which you must grasp with all your might to hold the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the following link; the order of the links, their form, how they are linked together, the way they differ from each other in the historical chain of events, is not as simple and not as meaningless as those in an ordinary chain made by a smith. (Lenin, 1984, p. 595-96)

The most reasonable way to advance the struggle for the equality of the material conditions and rights of the African people is to know how best and most effective to seize and exploit any potential or actual situation to change the course of events. This is what is required of any organic thinker and actor in providing leadership and guidance in any decisive moment when the people, in response to issues, processes and developments relating to the status quo of their misfortunes, act decisively without being led by them through political formations in their efforts to end the material conditions of their suffering. The point is that:

> Every question "runs in a vicious circle" because political life as a whole is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole art of politics lies in finding and taking as firm a grip as we can on the link that is least likely to be struck from our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that most of all guarantees its possessor the possession of the whole chain. (Lenin, 1977, p.502)

What is needed in successfully effecting the restructuring of African societies is not only their concrete understanding of the key issue being to change them for the better but also the readiness, quickness and energy with which one as a theoretician and practitioner should take the unexpected chances offered to do what is the best for them and their people.

Rethinking problems faced by Zimbabwe and Nigeria by African intellectuals

African intellectuals should critically rethink the profound unprecedented problems faced by Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Are their problems only national and internal to them? Are they also regional and continental? This theoretical task is directly related to their rethinking of African politics.

History does not repeat itself. It does not deal with whatever might have happened in the sense that what happened has happened and what has not happened has not happened. This reality does not prevent us from questioning what should have happened if particular developments did not occur. Rethinking the politics of Zimbabwe and Nigeria within this framework, it is permissible to maintain that the fact remains that if Zimbabwe and Nigeria did not face problems they continue encountering, Southern Africa, West Africa and Africa should have been different, particularly in terms of their development. Causes and consequences of problems of Zimbabwe and Nigeria are developments that impact their relationship with Southern Africa, West Africa and Africa. Their relationship with their respective regions and the continent should have been different if they did not face their problems. African countries such as South Africa should have been structurally compelled to relate to Zimbabwe and Nigeria, their respective regions and continents differently. The rest of the world should have been structurally compelled to deal with Southern Africa, West Africa and Africa differently. The contribution of Zimbabwe and Nigeria towards the regional and continental integration and transformation should also have been different. Given this reality, problems faced by Zimbabwe and Nigeria are a setback in the regional and continental integration and change and, broadly, in African affairs. They are Africa's problems, not only Zimbabwe and Nigeria.

The role and significance of African intellectuals in transforming extraction, trading, and public service content of the African economy

The economy of African countries is extraction, trading and public service in content. It is an extractive economy characterised by extracting its strategic raw materials by transnational corporations. It is a trading economy exporting its mineral resources to countries outside the continent in natural form and importing finished products. Trade is concentrated between them and these countries. While primary products they export to these countries are relatively cheap, manufactured products they import are rather expensive. These primary products are converted into finished products and imported back to them, buying them at a relatively high price. The consequence is that the terms of trade between them and these countries are in favour of their main trade partners. In the process, African countries export in raw forms as their primary products, but these countries and their people first and themselves and their people last in terms of development. This reality supports the position articulated by Nahas Angula: "Today the wealth of nations is built on knowledge and less on raw materials" (2011, p. 7).

The economy of African countries is public service in content in that the majority of their citizens work for the public sector. Foreign companies dominate the private sector of almost all of them. Their national companies are directly interlinked with foreign companies to which they are subordinated as junior partners. Given that their economy is extractive, trading and public service in nature, while the transformation of their economy in terms of the means of production, distribution and exchange is critical, its transformation from a resource-based economy into a knowledge-based

economy is of long-term strategic importance for the utilisation of its natural resources for the popular national sustainable development.

South Africa is Africa's qualitatively largest and strongest diversified economy. Its capital accumulation process is characterised by mining, manufacturing and agricultural economic sectors with a long-standing and well-entrenched external expansion regionally and continentally since the 1960s. Some of its mining companies have been operating in the centre of capitalism and other countries outside Africa before the 1960s. It has relative international strength and large African continental and Southern African regional strength. Despite these factors characterising its national economy, it is fundamentally or in essence not different from problems faced by other African countries in the utilisation of their natural resources for their developmental needs and demands. Its unemployment, poverty and inequality problems are linked in part to the systematic bulk exploitation of its natural resources. Its sustainable development depends on resolving this problem in the link between unemployment, poverty and inequality levels and the exploitation of its natural resources. This is one of the critical problems it confronts in its national development plan. Jean-Marie Jullienne articulates this reality tangibly when he maintains that:

> It is … becoming abundantly clear that the future depends on our ability to establish joint ventures in processing our resources. For example, South African iron ore is converted into pig iron billets and further processed into rods, bars and sheets. This same process should be applied to diamonds, coal, chrome, manganese, gold and platinum. South Africa produces 75% of the world's platinum but fewer than 15% of the world's catalytic converters.
>
> A simple product like granite is being shipped in bulk to Italy before being offloaded onto trucks taking it to factories in Carrara and Verona to be cut and polished by Italian labour before being shipped again to the rest of the world.
>
> This is absurd when seen in the light of a world held to ransom by oil cartels, yet nothing of the sort exists regarding mineral resources. If established here, we could ensure that local labour is not taken advantage of and paid in a currency subject to devaluation. Foreign companies reporting profits in foreign currencies are always keen to devalue the Rand, thereby reducing labour costs and maximising profits in their currencies.
>
> It is interesting to note that as soon as South African democracy was born, several large mining houses moved their holding companies offshore. The concept of a devalued Rand based on our inability to compete in specific industries associated with developing nations, such as textiles, ignores the industries in which we have the most significant advantages, those based on the country's natural resources.
>
> Countries trade on their strengths, so focusing on a resource in abundance can make us strong and competitive, provided with beneficiation. Therefore, it is very encouraging to see that at the last ANC National General Council meeting, a resolution was taken to increase the beneficiation of our products from 10% to 50% by 2030. This is the sensible road to prosperity, job creation and a solid and equal partnership with growing powers like India and China, whose appetite for our natural resources is unquenchable in the foreseeable future. (Jullienne, 2011, p. 13)

He continues:

> A small island nation like Japan, with the world's third-largest economy despite an almost total lack of natural resources, imports everything it needs and utilises its strengths to produce end products.
>
> Imagine the joint ventures South Africa could embark on with countries like Japan. As a nation, we must take stock of what we have been blessed with in natural resources and set out how best to utilise these to maximise the benefit for the people of South Africa.

This must be a dispassionate decision based on realistic assessments of South African realities. We can only succeed if we place our nation as the primary beneficiary of the system and not be concerned with the international conglomerates' need to show profits in international currencies. (Jullienne, 2011, p. 13)

The essence of the problem faced by South Africa in the exploitation of its natural resources raised by Jullienne was articulated by Ben Turok in speaking during hearings on the industrial policy action plan before the National Assembly Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee in November 2012. Pointing out that the continued "separation" of the roles of the mining sector from those of the manufacturing sector of the South African economy has resulted in the de-industrialisation of the country, he told Members of Parliament that the beneficiation strategy document, A Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa, published in June 2011 by the Department of Mineral Resources is "seriously inadequate" in solving this structural problem. Central to its serious inadequacy is the fact that it does not produce a vision on how South Africa should use its mineral resources even in cases where it "enjoys a monopoly" to "maximum benefit" of the economy (Turok, 2012, p. 1). He concluded that the country is faced with "a curious anomaly" in that it exports its resources in raw form to be "beneficiated and fabricated elsewhere and the final product is imported back … with most of the value-added abroad". According to him, "the result" of the fact that even inputs into its mining sector such as machinery are largely imported" is "de-industrialisation" of the country (Turok, 2012, p. 1).

As a result of the relationship of disarticulation or incoherence or lack of forwarding and backward linkages in production between the mining and manufacturing sectors of its economy, South Africa, like other African countries, exports its mineral resources to its main trade partners in raw form in relatively low prices. They are converted externally into finished products and imported back to where they are bought at a relatively high price compared to their export. It contributes to creating and providing employment and wealth opportunities and reducing poverty and inequalities in countries where raw materials are converted into finished products. Briefly, it contributes primarily towards their development and secondly to its national development.

The solution to the problems faced by South Africa and its African Union partners in the utilisation of their natural resources for their development needs and demands is the structural and fundamental need for them to have an articulated or coherent economy with sectoral complementarity and reciprocity of exchanges between their mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors of their economy. This task requires investment into research and development to have requisite technological, information, management, marketing and transportation techniques or advanced science-based production methods. The point is that the production process of their economy needs these methods for its operation to put them and their people first, especially in terms of development. This task requires them to be determined to acquire the capacity to leverage and adopt or adapt technology to their existing technology. The point is that some African countries have technology appropriate to their particular conditions and situations, which is relatively cheaper in their development efforts. Instead of using it, they use expensive technology from external countries that is not relevant to their conditions and situations. The consequence is that they are not successful in their development efforts.

For African countries to be successful in their development efforts, their development theoreticians and practitioners should take seriously the proposed solution provided by Nahas Angula, former Prime Minister and Minister of Science and Technology of Namibia, to the problem faced by Namibia in the utilisation of its natural resources for its development needs and demands. He maintains that technological readiness, business sophistication and innovation are critical missing links in Namibia's economy for its development growth and potential to materialise as the reality (Angula,

2011, p. 7). His position is that Namibia has technologies to convert its raw products into manufactured products. However, what is "missing" to execute his development task is "a system of leveraging and adopting or adapting existing technologies". Therefore, to solve this "lack of technological readiness", it has to acquire the capacity to "leverage and adapt existing technologies". This means investing in research and development to have the requisite quality scientific research institutions producing "a human resource capable of knowledge production and diffusion" (Angula, 2011, p. 7).

Angula's proposed solution is supported by Joseph Ramos and Osvaldo Sunkel in answering the question critical and required in achieving development as the intellectual process of the creation of resources for the satisfaction of human needs. Their answer is that:

> It is not demand and markets that are critical. The heart of development lies in the supply side: quality, flexibility, the efficient combination and utilisation of productive resources, the adoption of technological developments, an innovative spirit, creativity, the capacity for organisation and social discipline, personal and public austerity, an emphasis on savings, and the development of skills to compete internationally. In short, independent efforts are undertaken from within to achieve self-sustained development. (Ramos & Sunkel, 1993, pp. 8-9)

The struggle for 'self-sustained development' is achieved through primarily satisfying popular internal needs and interests. What Olayinka Akanle is saying about the people of Nigeria applies to citizens of all other African countries. In his words:

> The government's industrialisation policy must be necessitated by national expediency against the quest to satisfy globalisation. The industrialisation that leans heavily on global dictates is bound to expose Nigerians to danger. This does not imply that the nation must not align with global realities. The point is that local needs and local content must be central in terms of thoughts, social capital, workforce, and technology. (Akanle, 2011, p. 13)

Central to Akanle's point is the progressive inward industrial development process that provides people with foodstuffs, water, housing, health care, energy, security, transportation and employment opportunities. As a result, their material conditions and rights are constantly improved for the better.

African countries should transform their economies through industrialisation and beneficiation to fulfil the requirements of putting their people first. They should move away from a natural resource-based economy to a knowledge-based economy whose key component is a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities or knowledge-intensive activities than on natural resources. The role of their intellectuals who are experts committed to realising their sustainable development through their natural resources is indispensable in this task.

Their mineral, sands and agricultural endowments are enormous and attractive for investment. They are catalysts of their development. Their experts in various fields should best and most effectively use their knowledge and skills as proud national and continental assets through the mediation of the governing parties in working together with the general public, the private sector and civil society to advance and achieve the development satisfying needs and interests of the people. Without this human endeavour under the leadership of intellectuals, African countries will not achieve their development objectives.

The popular and yet incorrect view that Africa's economic sectors such as mining and agriculture are drivers of its economy and development should be replaced with the indispensable role of its

human capital under the leadership of intellectuals. The point is that economic sectors derive their importance to economy and development from human beings using their knowledge, skills and determination in deploying their resources to achieve tactical and strategic objectives. Therefore, African intellectuals, creators of leaders, experts, and institutions and organisations, producers and disseminators of knowledge and social forces dominating the possession and utilisation of human capital without whose organic input no organisation or social power can achieve and sustain its strategic objectives, are indispensable to rethinking of African politics of development they must lead theoretically and practically. Their weapons in this role are their leadership of and role in institutions and organisations and individual knowledge, skills and experience as proud continental assets through the mediation of political parties under their leadership in deploying Africa's natural resources, mainly mineral and agricultural resources in putting the continent and its people first in the area of development.

It is not only Africa's mining sector which, through its resources vital to the operations of high-technology industries, particularly in aeronautics, nuclear energy, and national defence of advanced capitalist countries and some dependent capitalist countries, that is of strategic importance to their further development. Its agricultural sector is also of strategic importance to their further development. The strategic importance of their agricultural industry for their long-term food and energy security has made the land a more attractive asset to be bought or acquired by the state, agribusiness, energy corporations and other financial forces. This socio-historical development and the role of African nationals, particularly state actors serving as intermediaries or partners in facilitating foreign investors' access to, acquisition of, or control over land (Cotula, 2013, p. 54) have led to a global situation in which to "a very considerable extent … any discussion of the landrace is a discussion of Africa" (Klare, 2012, p. 196). In the same vein, the discussion of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should also be the discussion of its governance and security problems and the looting of its wealth – mostly mineral resources by the alliance of the transnational corporations and Africans. These corporations and Africans have vested interests in the governance and security problems of the country (Zizek, 2015, pp. 22-23).

The best and most effective way to invest in the security of African countries is to satisfy the needs and interests of their people. Through the execution of this task, they can successfully determine and control their programmes of action and limitations in foreign policy. To achieve this objective, they should have a concrete understanding of the strategic perspective that foreign policy starts at home. Its success is made possible by its operation based on the people being its first line of defence. Their understanding of this perspective should be implemented through the unquestionable service to the majority of their people.

This perspective points not only to the African people in general but also to the African working class, a social force central to the operation of the social fabric of African countries placed at the heart of their socio-economic life in the most fundamental ways, as the first line of achievement and defence of a structural change of African societies. They are indispensable to the successful resolution of the national question of African countries. Without them as an alternative historical bloc structurally opposed to the continental status quo, only a change in signboards, a rearrangement at the top of African societies will continue being an essential characteristic of African politics and development.

Without African organic intellectuals using their knowledge, skills and experience as proud, treasured national assets through the mediation of the political parties under their leadership committed to the development, extraction, trading, and public service content of the economy of African countries cannot be transformed. Through these political formations as collective intellectuals, their members can be turned into experts and specialists and assume and exercise leadership roles in critical areas of their societies.

It is through the role of intellectuals in the production of knowledge and creation of leaders, experts, specialists or skilled individuals as indispensable in the society's progress that development as an intellectual process of production or creation of resources for development can best be understood, highly appreciated and treasured especially in the urgent need to transform African countries from natural resource-based societies into knowledge-based social formations.

The political parties led by Africans with unassailable leadership qualities constituting a radical rupture with the continental status quo on governance, democracy and development issues, processes and developments are required for this task. Some of these qualities are:

> Practical and flexible organisation; ability to generate resources for its operations; a viable alternative program for overall reconstruction and rehabilitation; an effective foreign policy; legitimate and visionary leadership; a solid internal and public education program to challenge the established world view; a transparently democratic and accountable structure; and in-depth knowledge of existing political (even theoretical) debates, blueprints, developments in other nations, and of the local political economy. Such a movement must cultivate and retain the support of alternative constituencies; its politics must be seen as different from the discredited past; the leadership must be principled, consistent in its philosophy, and above board morally. Finally, the administration and movement must distinguish between rhetoric and practical politics and must consistently strive to stay and operate above primordial and opportunistic considerations. (Ihonvbere, 1997, p. 127)

Conclusion and Recommendations

Political changes in most African countries from the 1960s to today have been developments assuring external actors of the future security of their strategic interests and safe fields for their investments. Their future was determined by how colonial rule was ended. In the global political economy language of racism, these countries are viewed as fields of action embarked upon by the alliance of the external political and financial rulers for their interests and the national exigencies of their countries. Within this political economy linguistic framework, Africans are regarded as not their own or with no movement of their own, but extensions of other people. In terms of rivalry, ambition and contest among external powers competing over its wealth, Africa, like Asia, is "an elegant table laid out for a banquet". With sharpened weapons picking at what they want for their internal exigencies, they are fighting over the banquet to be secure at the head of the table (Hawksley, 2018, pp. 13-14).

African intellectuals should recognise the strategic importance of mobilising for political, economic and ideological hegemony in theory and practice and provide a transformative theoretical and practical alternative to the governing political parties. Their approach and training must reflect the link between knowledge and power. The masses of the African people should view themselves as historical subjects with emphasis not only to restructure their societies but also, most importantly, as the foundation against subversion of structures of their power. Accordingly, they should avoid being in danger of being reduced to the practice of exerting pressure upon their national heads of state and government and regional economic communities and countries for policy changes and victories which will not be sufficient for them to achieve new political power relations.

They should revive the political culture popular during the struggle against the colonial rule of the African people that they are their liberators and do not need anyone else to liberate themselves. An integral part of this process is that if limitations and weaknesses characterise them, it is their task to reduce and eliminate them. They should travel the journey together with the African people in

general and the African working class in particular with whom linguistically, culturally, and other life aspects such as race, ethnicity, clan, and intangible cultural heritage are interlinked.

African intellectuals should ensure that they are increasingly active actors and leaders in the operational fields of African politics. Without political parties under their leadership, they cannot best and most effectively organise for their societies' socio-political, economic and ideological restructuring. They cannot move their theory and analysis to practice through mobilisation and concrete action to achieve this restructuring.

Mobilisation for political, economic and ideological hegemony and provision for comprehensive and transformative theoretical and practical alternatives to the governing political parties are critical as prerequisites for the erosion and defeat of the political domination of those who talk Africa but walk the dominant axes of global socio-economic order. The restructuring of African societies will not happen while power remains with people who speak Africa but look to those who lead global injustice to solve their problems. They should use their deft analytical skills studying "the rich and the powerful" or global political and financial rulers and their organic intellectuals, recognising that as their "tactics become more subtle and their public pronouncements more guarded, the need for better spade-work becomes crucial" and that "the best" they "can do is to give" the masses of the people including the poor "a clearer idea of how their oppressors are working now and can be expected to work in the future" (George, 2010: 82). Briefly, they should put their ability to argue and develop positions at the service of eroding and defeating the political rule of those who are inimical to Africa's popular development.

African intellectuals should use their resources, speaking truth to power or being in control, irreversibly committed to integrity, justice, self-discipline, hard work, resourcefulness, efficiency, responsibility, credibility, transparency, and accountability in the continent's service and its people.

The role and significance of African intellectuals in rethinking African politics of revolutionary change are aptly articulated by Haidar Abdel-Shafi when he maintains that:

> The critical issue is transforming our society. All else is inconsequential … We must decide to use all our strength and resources to develop our collective leadership and the democratic institutions that will achieve our goals and guide us in the future. The important thing is for us to take care of our internal situation, organise our society, and correct those negative aspects from which it has been suffering for generations, which is the main reason for our losses against our foes. (Abdel-Shafi, 1997, p.15)

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Re-thinking Pan-Africanism and African Integration

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Abstract

It is 129 years since an African-American journalist in Chicago coined the word "Pan-Africanism". Pan-Africanism began as a gift of the diaspora to the African continent. These civil society initiatives in the diaspora culminated in an elaborate permanent, continental, state-centric institutionalisation, starting six decades ago with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Its current dispensation is the African Union, and sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community. Diplomacy, peace-making, and economic integration have been prominent dimensions of Pan-African endeavours. As well as the continuing growth of African diasporas in countries ranging from the USA to China, we need to note the precarious position of growing intra-African diasporas in other African countries. Pan-Africanism will remain fragile until it can grow mass support, as opposed to being usually limited to intellectuals and some members of the ruling elites. African integration has not yet achieved the extraordinary supra-national aspirations enunciated in its treaties. Taken literally, they would require such significant concessions of national sovereignty as to amount to a post-Westphalian dispensation. But dense, overlapping networks of inter-governmental organisations, and continental NGOs, continue to proliferate and have substantial successes to date. These range from multi-lateral peace-enforcement expeditionary forces, to free trade areas and the start of common markets. Diplomatic alliances mark the essence of most sub-regional organisations and explain why they continue to thrive, notwithstanding the "spaghetti bowl" incomprehension of some economists and law scholars about their entanglement. We can confidently predict the continued growth of inter-governmental organising, sub-regional and continental NGOs, and Pan-African corporate expansion of an order of magnitude above what currently exists.

Keywords: Pan-Africanism, African Integration, African Union, African Continental Free Trade Area, supra-nationalism

Introduction

The methodology of this article is an eclectic blend including constructivism and Pan-Africanism. Its central argument and theme are that the African Union (AU) and its affiliates compare well with other inter-governmental organisations such as, for example, the Organization of American States, and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. But because some of the AU *acquis* and treaties would require supra-national powers to be enforced, which it lacks, the AU tends to be more severely criticised than its peer organisations.

Pan-Africanism is the political driver, and globalization is the economic driver, behind African integration. Today, the continent overshadows its diaspora in Pan-Africanism's organisational dimension. Alongside inter-governmental organisations are African corporations broadening their business operations into other countries on the continent, plus international business associations, professional associations, and NGOs. With six decades of African integration and twelve decades of Pan-Africanism, this is an appropriate moment to both take stock of achievements and re-think persistent and troubling problems.

Re-thinking Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism, aiming at the unity of all Africans and persons of African descent, began with civil society initiatives in the diaspora for six decades; then became a state-centric narrative for six decades of institution-building. Latterly, the African Union's inter-governmental structures broadened to include 20 diaspora NGOs in one institution, the Economic, Social & Cultural Council, but this project flagged after 2012. (Maloka, 2019, pp. 227, 233). The literature conventionally writes of five Pan-African congresses. In fact, the "First" Pan-African Congress was at least the third, and there have been at least fourteen such civil society conferences to date.

Box 1: Pan-African Congresses

1893:	Congress on Africa. Chicago; name "Pan-Africanism" coined.
1900:	Pan-African Congress. London.
1919:	"First" Pan-African Congress. Paris.
1921:	"Second" Pan-African Congress. London, Paris & Brussels.
1920s:	"African for the Africans"– zenith years for UNIA branches in Africa.
1923:	"Third" Pan-African Congress. London & Lisbon.
1927:	"Fourth" Pan-African Congress. New York.
1945:	"Fifth" Pan-African Congress. Manchester.
1958:	First All-Africa People's Conference. Accra.
1960:	Second All-Africa People's Conference. Tunis.
1961:	Third All-Africa People's Conference. Cairo.
1974:	"Sixth" Pan-African Congress. Dar-es-Salaam.
1994:	"Seventh" Pan-African Congress. Kampala.
2004:	AU inaugurates permanent Economic, Social, & Cultural Council, including 20 diaspora NGOs; diaspora contingent dormant after 2012.
2014:	"Eighth" Pan-African Congress. Johannesburg.
2015:	"Eighth" Pan-African Congress. Accra.

Sources: Gottschalk. 2012, 12. http://www.ituc-africa.org/8TH-PAN-AFRICAN-CONGRESS-CALLS-FOR.html

There are various strands within Pan-Africanism. Garveyism was a Pan-Negroism, excluding Africans of Arab, Indian, and European ancestry, and its Universal Negro Improvement Association had active branches in port towns on the west coast of Africa during the 1920s. More recently, the "Eighth" Pan-African Congress in Johannesburg in 2014 expressed its opposition to Arabicization in the northern part of the continent. The majority strand in Pan-Africanism may be conceptualized as continentalism plus the diaspora. From the 1893 Congress on Africa, one or more delegates came from Egypt and other Arabic-speaking countries in Africa. Currently, the African diaspora remittances comprise a major source of foreign exchange to numerous African countries from Nigeria to Morocco, and often exceed grants of foreign aid. Necessity is the mother of invention, and more African governments can be expected in the future to issue bonds directed at their diaspora, as Morocco has done, or to legislate permanent residence visas for descendants of their mother country, as India has implemented.

Africa's diaspora is conventionally conceptualized as the diaspora in both Americas and the Caribbean; plus, those in Europe and, rarely written about, the diasporas in south-west Asia. For example, Indians of African descent have won a court ruling in one Indian state entitling them to "reservations" (i.e. affirmative action). Less analysed are what we may term Africa's internal

diasporas. South Africa hosts an estimated two million foreign Africans, mostly in Gauteng Province, where foreign workers have a history going back fourteen decades. Since May 2008, episodic xenophobic *pogroms* have seen mobs attack some of them, steal their possessions, and loot *spaza* shops owned by foreign Africans. These attacks provoked retaliatory attacks in Nigeria against South African businesses over there. (Bateman, 2017). These internal diasporas also participate in political protests. The Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa, for example, held a protest outside the head office of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) against the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray. (Mohamed, 2020). In the Ivory Coast, supporters of *Ivorité* have attacked native-born Ivorians whose parents immigrated from countries to the north (Wheeldon, 2015). In the DRC, *Congolité* brought the same ethnic mobilization (Onah, 2011). Supporters of *Congolité* attack native-born Congolese who are the great-great-grandchildren of immigrants from Rwanda and Burundi, whom they sometimes term Bamyamulenge.

These riots and *pogroms* indicate that in too many African countries support for Pan-Africanism is limited to an elite of intellectuals, political leaders, and governmental officials in foreign affairs departments, but lacks depth of support amongst the majority. Remedying this will require more than political education campaigns: when South African unemployment is at 42% (Head, 2020) some politicians and internet activists will inflame claims that foreigners "steal jobs" from South Africans; with variants of this in other countries. The latest example is that the National Truck Foundation and the All Truck Drivers' Foundation demand that South African freight companies stop employing foreign truck drivers. Scores of trucks have been petrol-bombed (Hosken, 2020).

The Brexit vote, and Trump voters amongst US workers whose factory jobs had relocated to Mexico or China, add to the international examples which serve as warnings to African political elites to not become complacent, but to renew popular mobilisation and create support for Pan-Africanism during every five-year election cycle.

Re-thinking African Integration

The OAU was founded, like the earlier UNO, Organization of American States, and Arab League, on an unequivocal principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member state (OAU Charter, 1963, Article 8).

Starting with the African Commission of Human and People's Rights in 1980, new institutions and their procedures introduced – theoretically - supranational mandates and jurisdiction. This evolution might have been possible due to an industry of ghost-writers, as the OAU, AU, the sub-regional organisations, and their organs' secretariats all hired NGOs to draft documents (Tieku, 2016, p. 14). In some cases, these were European NGOs that were hired by donors (AU Audit, 2008, p. 85). Some of these NGO intellectuals, Pan-Africanists or Pan-Europeanists, were evident enthusiasts of the capabilities of supra-nationalist institutions and protocols. But their political principals, the heads of state and government, pushed back against this, considering their personal and political interests to require the defence of undiluted and undiminished national sovereignty. During the 1980s-2010s, the OAU and AU assemblies of sovereigns voted to pass many key treaties without reading them, or even their executive summaries (Tieku, 2016, pp. 8, 14, 34-37). When they realised the consequences, such as regional or continental court rulings annulling government actions, many of these states, ranging from Benin to Zimbabwe, angrily withdrew from such treaties or even revised the protocol to diminish or rescind the jurisdiction of a regional court (Kode, 2021). In particular, the right of an individual citizen or company to appeal from the highest court of the land to a supra-national court beyond the country's borders triggered pushbacks from authoritarian rulers.

The first attempt to circumvent or limit article 8 of the OAU Charter came in 1980 with the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, (often called the Banjul Charter) unanimously signed in 1981, but which only came into force in 1986. This established an African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights. (https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49) This Charter provided the restricted right that all persons had the right to express their political and other opinions "within the law", (Article 9) - but did not venture to state how much the law itself might restrict such political and religious opinions. Article 47 permits any member state to object to violations of human rights in any other state, the first continental pushback against Article 8 of the OAU Charter, then twenty-three years old. The Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights could make a report to the Secretary-General of the OAU (Article 49) and make recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Article 53). There is no evidence that any state ever made such objections against another state, still less that this resulted in the lifting of censorship of a newspaper or other media, nor in the release of political prisoners. That point conceded, it nonetheless was a first step in laying down a continental law, which on paper overrides Article 8 on national sovereignty.

An African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights was later set up alongside the Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. This protocol was signed in 1998, but only came into effect in 2014, due to so many governments being reluctant to ratify. This was notwithstanding that the protocol merely stated that states who wanted to could entitle NGOs and individuals to lay complaints before the Court. (Articles 5(3) and 34(b)). The protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, signed in 2008, has never entered into force, due to so many states refusing to ratify it: Article 30 of the Annex proposes to broaden those entitled to submit cases to the Court to African NGOs accredited to the AU.

This is the appropriate place to mention the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, signed in 2007 and coming into effect in 2012. Its articles 2(3) and 3 (4) commit the signatories to free and fair elections, with Article 17 specifying that this includes access to state-controlled media. Articles 2(2) and 10 both commit to the supremacy of the constitution above other laws. The relevant point here is that the only way to implement such a treaty, in reality, would be through intervention in the domestic affairs of the country and regime concerned.

The Treaty of Abuja (1991) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) both sought, to an unprecedented extent, to import lock, stock, and barrel the norms, institutions, and procedures of the European Union into the African continent. These constituted a mix of inter-governmental and supra-nationalist institutions and procedures.

The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, hereafter called the Abuja Treaty, has clauses that mark an evolution from the OAU Charter stipulation of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state that are, on paper, striking. The article on principles of an African Economic Community includes that famous EU terminology "harmonisation of policies" (Article 3 (c)), and the recognition, promotion, and protection of human and people's rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. (Article 3 (g)). Clearly, the only mode of protecting human rights from authoritarian rulers is interference in a repressive state's domestic affairs. Article 4(2)(g) stipulates establishing a common external tariff; and sub-clause (h) the establishment of a common market, which requires the partial ceding of authority over economic policies, and abandonment of protectionism by national states and sub-regional entities.

The Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) has articles stipulating the political *integration* (not just cooperation) of Africa (Article 3 (c)); to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance (Article 3 (g)); and the right to intervene in genocide, crimes against humanity, and other grave circumstances. (Article 4 (h)). In fact, the AU has not in its two

decades ever invoked this right. Should it do so in the future, it would be a significant step towards evolving a post-Westphalian continental regime.

The Abuja Treaty requires the founding of the Pan-African Parliament in the last phase ending in 2034: it was in fact inaugurated in 2004, through indirect elections from national parliaments. The PAP has sought during its first two decades to establish its role in oversight of peace-keeping; in monitoring national elections; and in discussion on the AU budget. The PAP has recently set up a Civil Society Forum.

The potential of the PAP to democratise the AU lies in it being the only AU entity, alongside ECOSOCC, whose members do not constitute governmental officials. Further, its protocol explicitly requires a minimum of one out of five MPs in every national delegation to come from an opposition party in that parliament. Also, one out of each five must be a woman, a first for any such regional parliament. Several factors have so far prevented the PAP from fulfilling its potential. First, many of the national parliaments seconding it MPs are rubber-stamp parliaments, and their delegation will be in the same mould. Second, the PAP has yet to acquire that crucial parliamentary power of veto over the AU budget, which the European Parliament (EP), for example, has won. Third, and most importantly of all, there is no effective link between the African person in the street and the PAP: it is regularly criticised in the media for being more concerned with members' privileges than with the plight of the continent's majority.

There can be no substitute for the PAP, like the EP, evolving to direct elections. Here, it would be wise to avoid the mistake of the EP, where separate elections for the EP result in such low percentage polls as to detract from its legitimacy. The PAP would best in the future have a PAP voting paper added to the national parliamentary voting paper in general elections. Almost all who vote for their own parliament would simultaneously vote for their choice of MP for the PAP, resulting in a respectable percentage poll. Such PAP MPs would then remain on standby until called up for the new session of the PAP. In 2005, AU members signed the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact whose Article 4(d) states:

> "As part of the vision of building a strong and united Africa, State Parties undertake to establish an African army at the final stage of the political and economic integration of the continent."

"At the final stage" is diplomatic coding for only after the terms of office of all heads of states and governments present has expired. Also, the Pact wording does not specify whether establishing "an African army" means the integration of national armies, or simply a NATO-style deployment of some army units, in addition to armies remaining on national military duties.

In 2014, the AU adopted the African Integrated Maritime Strategic Plan for 2050. Its objectives include establishing a "Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa" (point 21) which will "engender collective efforts" (AU Maritime Strategic Plan, 2014, para. 29) and proposes that a "CEMZA, be[come] a common African maritime space without barriers" AU Maritime Strategic Plan, 2014, para. 30). One implication is that African navies will jointly patrol it, regardless of national maritime borders. This is the context in which Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma referred to the "pooling of sovereignty", and "the collective exercise of sovereignty". Point 31 of the strategy proposes "a naval component within the African Standby Force" (AU Maritime Strategic Plan, 2014, para. 31). An analyst cannot but notice that the strategy proposes that such potentially supra-national features will only come into effect thirty-six years in the future. This too is diplomatic coding that it will be only after the end of terms of office of all heads of state signing the treaty.

Pan-African Prestige and Institutions

Two dimensions indicate how the prestige of Africa, and of being African, rose since independence. During the nineteenth century, Khedive Ismail "ardently desired detaching Egypt from Africa and reattaching it to Europe" (Russell, 2004, p. 231). A century later, President Nasser made Egypt a founding member of the OAU and its African Liberation Committee in 1963. In 2019-2020, President al-Sisi served a term as AU Chair, and launched an annual African Investment Forum, hosted in Egypt. (Al-Youm, 2019).

Malvern van Wyk Smith (2009) noted that the Ethiopian imperial family historically emphasised its extra-African Solomonic ancestry, rather than an attachment to Africa. Even when he wrote this, his imputation was already anachronistic by over four decades. Starting with Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopian foreign policy re-oriented itself to Pan-Africanism, hosting the headquarters of the OAU and subsequently the AU, its Peace and Security Council, and other organs. During 1960-62, the Madagascar Government insisted on describing itself as Malagasy, not African, insisting that this name be included in organizations it joined. But from 1963 Madagascar has accepted membership in the OAU and AU without repeating such cultural distancing from being described as "African".

In 2006 the USA became the first government to have an ambassador present credentials to represent it to the AU, followed by over fifty other states. In 2009 the AU accredited a permanent representative to the USA. No state-accredited ambassadors to the OAU. This reflects the order of magnitude higher global standing and operations of the AU.

Formally speaking, the institutions listed in Figure 1 are a blend of AU organs, specialized technical agencies, quangos, and continental and sub-regional affiliates. It is more analytic to arrange them by function, which is how this table is organised. This visualizes what Alvarez highlights with surprise:

> "The treaty provisions establishing these African institutions anticipate international organisations charged with discharging the kinds of plenary executive, legislative, and even judicial powers once associated exclusively with national governments" (Alvarez 2005, p. 116).

The most successful of the regional economic communities are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded in 1975, and the East African Community (EAC), revived in 2000. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose antecedent was founded in 1980, has been less successful at norms diffusion but is very much operational. (Khadgiagala, 2018). The worst failure is the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), founded in 1989. Even entities established to work around its failure, such as the North African Regional Capability (NARC), and its North African Standby Brigade, themselves fail to be operational. (Gottschalk, 2020). The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), founded in 1983, can at best be characterised as intermittent and partial in its functioning. ECOWAS and the EAC are also the least vulnerable to donor dependency, mostly funding themselves by a community levy on imports from third-party countries.

The Treaty to establish an African Economic Community entered into force in 1994 and schedules a forty-year programme to integrate Africa. The latest stage of this to enter into force (in 2019) is the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Pan-Africanists should note that free trade areas and common markets have provoked political controversies and backlash on at least three continents: North America, Europe, and Africa. Though US Republican President Ronald Reagan proposed the North American Free Trade Agreement, Republican President Donald Trump demanded that NAFTA (ratified in 1994) be terminated and replaced by the USMCA treaty in 2020. The new treaty raised the Rules of Origin for autos to 75% local content. There were protests from US auto and other workers over the earlier NAFTA when their jobs migrated southwards.

Figure 1: African Union Family: Operational Entities

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
African Centre of Disease Control (ACDC)
African Electro–technical Standardization Commission (AFSEC)
African Observatory on Science, Technology & Innovation (AOSTI)
African Regional Organization for Standardization (ARSO)
African Science, Research & Innovation Council (ASRIC)
African Space Agency (AfSA)
Inter–African Phyto–Sanitary Council
Inter–African Bureau for Animal Resources
Inter–African Bureau for Soils (BIS)
Pan–African Tsetse & Trypanosomiasis Eradication Campaign
Pan–African Veterinary Vaccine Centre

ECOSOCC
includes
- 24 NGOs;
- 20 diaspora NGOs.
Business & professional associations;
Civil Society

PEACE & SECURITY
Africa Forum of former Heads of State
African Centre for Studies & Research on Terrorism
African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)
African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum
African Standby Force
Association of African Ombudsmen & Mediators
Continental Early Warning System
Committee of Intelligence & Security Services of Africa
Military Staff Committee
Pan–African Network of the Wise
Peace & Security Council
Panel of the Wise
Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Security, & Safety

JUDICIAL
African Committee of Experts on the Welfare & Rights of the Child
African Commission on Human Rights & Peoples' Rights
AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Board
African Court of Justice & Human Rights
African Prosecutors' Association
CEMAC Court of Justice
Coalition for an Effective African Court of Human & People's Rights
COMESA Court of Justice Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa
EAC Court of Justice
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice
Extraordinary African Chambers
SADC Tribunal
SADC Lawyers Association
UEMOA Court of Justice

EXECUTIVE CORE
AU COMMISSION*
ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE & GOVERNMENT*
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL*
Permanent Representatives Committee
Specialized Technical Committees
International Law Commission
Advisory Board on Corruption

CULTURAL
African Academy of Languages
AU Youth Volunteer Corps
Afro–Arab Institute for Cultural & Strategic Studies
CELHTO
Economic, Social & Cultural Council
Pan–African News Agency
Pan–African University
Pan–African Women's Organization
Supreme Council for Sport in Africa

LEGISLATIVE / DELIBERATIVE
African Parliamentary Union
Association of African Electoral Authorities
East African Legislative Assembly
ECOWAS Parliament
Pan–African Parliament
SADC–Parliamentary Forum
United Cities and Local Governments of Africa

ECONOMIC
African Civil Aviation Commission
African Commission on Nuclear Energy
African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat
African Development Bank
African Energy Commission
African Export–Import Bank
African Institute for Remittances
African Minerals Development Centre
African Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
African Peer Review Mechanism
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization
African Regional Standardization Organization
African Risk Capacity Agency
African Tax Administration Forum
AU Development Agency – NEPAD
African Union Housing Finance
African Union Institute for Statistics
Association of African Central Banks
Association of African Development Financial Institutions
Association of Power Utilities of Africa
Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale
Banque Sahelo–Saharienne pour l'investissement et le Commerce
Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Central (CEMAC)
Common Monetary Area
Comité Maghrébin de l'électricité (COMELEC)
Common Market of East & Southern Africa (COMESA)
East African Community (EAC)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle
Pan–African Infrastructure Development Fund
Pan–African Intellectual Property Organization (PAIPO)
Pan–African Postal Union
Pan–African Telecommunications Union
Regional African Satellite Communications Organization
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Southern African Customs Union
Southern African Power Pool
Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA)
Union of African Railways
West African Power Pool

* The only OAU Organs in 1963

The United Kingdom (UK) voted by a 67.23% majority to join the European Community in 1975. Forty-one years later, by 2016, only 48.11% voted to remain. The winning Brexit campaigners highlighted the issue of the net funds transferred to the EU, and argued that the European Commission, and European Court of Human Rights, undermined the UK's sovereign control. These international analogies warn Pan-Africanists of sombre pitfalls. A perception of loss of sovereignty alienated many British voters, and would need robust future political campaigns to be persuasively justified head-on. A net loss of budget will require the political class to make strong justifications and benefits for voters to persuade them to continue their support. The British political elite of both parties became complacent, and failed to win over their voters afresh, for Pan-European solidarity, during every five-year electoral term.

Pan-African attempts to rise from an inter-governmental to a supra-national level sometimes meet with regime resistance. Treaties constituting sub-regional courts, such as the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ), the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), and the now-extinct Southern African Development Community Tribunal (SADC-T), include the consequence of national governments submitting to the jurisdiction of a court beyond their borders. This implies what we may conceptualise as polycentric sovereignty. In the case of the SADC-T, the Zimbabwe regime led lobbying to narrow the tribunal's jurisdiction, to prohibit it from accepting lawsuits brought by individuals or companies against governments (Nathan, 2013a).

Some South African media commentators were critical of this diminution of the SADC-T, and also critical of the South African Government's decision to not arrest the visiting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for whom there was a warrant of arrest issued by the International Criminal Court. The same commentators failed to criticise UK Prime Minister David Cameron when he said that it was inconceivable that the UK would submit to the European Court of Human Rights jurisdiction, and he would take strong action if it attempted to judge a case concerning the UK (Guardian, 2015). His successors repeatedly cited as a major justification for Brexit the need for the UK to refuse to be under the ECHR's jurisdiction.

The US Government had always refused to join the treaty creating the International Criminal Court. When an ICC prosecutor started investigating alleged war crimes committed by US troops in Afghanistan, the US Secretary for State, Mike Pompeo, announced sanctions against all ICC personnel involved (BBC, 2020). When Los Angeles authorities arrested a former Mexican defence minister (lower-ranking than a head of state) on drug smuggling charges, the US prosecutors declined to prosecute, explicitly citing foreign policy considerations as the reason (France24, 2020). Again, no South African commentator criticised these decisions. Clearly, some South African commentators and media judge the South African Government's actions, and those of other African states, by a higher standard than the bar they use to judge the UK and US governments. Perhaps the colonial cringe is to blame.

There have been protracted problems with Africa's inter-governmental organisations. Heads of Government have been reluctant to cede meaningful powers to the SADC and other regional communities (Nathan, 2013b). The OAU bureaucratic problems which the "strictly confidential" Adu Report spelled out in 1972 (Wolfers, 89) remained all too stark when spelled out at greater length over three decades later in the AU's audit of 2008 (AU Audit, 2008, pp. 44, 47-49, 52, 59). Much of the member governments' resistance to implementing REC and continental protocols and treaties is an inevitable consequence of the heads of government not even reading the treaties, nor even their executive summaries, before voting on them (Tieku, 2016, pp. 8, 14, 34-37).

On paper, the Constitutive Act of the AU (2000), in article 4 (d) commits its member states to "a common defence policy". But peacemaking has led to the establishment of some foreign military

bases in Africa. In April 2016, the AU's Peace & Security Council called on member states to be "circumspect" when "entering into agreements" that would lead to the establishment of foreign military bases in their countries (Atta-Asamoah, 2019). There are at least 27 known US military outposts across Africa. At least eleven states from outside Africa have a military presence. Numerically, the largest are 7 550 French military personnel, and 6 000 US military personnel at 27 outposts (Turse, 2020). Russia's presence was limited to only mercenaries, but what are currently termed defence contractors or consultants obviously require passports and official toleration, as in line with the foreign policy of their home state, for combat work abroad. In the colonial epoch, foreign military bases underpinned imperial rule in Africa. Even in the post-colonial half-century, scores of French military bases and interventions saw the overthrow of some Francophone rulers. Today, foreign military bases are in Africa as negotiated, to pay rental with the host governments, but the potential to undermine national and continental sovereignty always remains.

Quangos, Corporate, and Civil Society Sectors

Too often, literature on Pan-Africanism and African integration have the narrowest possible focus, limited to intergovernmental organisations. This omits the increasing importance of the corporate sector, with African companies founding branches in several countries, and also the quasi-nongovernmental organisations, the QUANGOs. A few representative selected examples are listed below. Power utilities, both public and private, have interconnectors. The *Comité Maghrebin de l'Electricité* (Comelec) runs a 2 700 km power line linking up the national grids of all countries from Morocco to Egypt. The West African Power Pool (ECOWAPP) and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) have similar interconnectors: SAPP links nine national energy grids. These confer in the Forum of the African Regional Energy Pools. At the individual corporate level, they are also members of the Association of Power Utilities of Africa (APUA).

It would be a major research project in itself to compile an inventory of all the continental and sub-regional NGOs, professional, and business associations. They range the alphabet from the African Airlines Association, and the African Union of Architects, through to the African Medical Association and Pan-African Lawyers' Union, to the African Association of Zoos and Aquaria. Since this is a scholarly publication, it is appropriate to single out the African Association of Political Science (AAPS), and CODESRIA, the Council for Development of Social Research in Africa, as examples of Pan-African NGOs. Lastly, with so many "partly free" and "unfree" countries on our continent, the African Network of Centres for Investigative Reporting also deserves to be singled out for the courageous exposes of its members' national regimes' repression and kleptocracy.

Many of the largest African companies naturally branch out to run business operations across a region or our continent. Rival lists of the top African banks compiled by African Business (2020b) and The Africa Report (2020) show much congruence, with many of the banks with the largest assets operating in more than one country. Similarly, the African companies with the highest market capitalisation (African Business, 2020a) often operate in more than one country.

The African Security Exchanges Association (ASEA), founded in 1993, has 27 stock exchanges as members. Its African Exchanges Linkage Project enables brokers in seven stock exchanges to place orders in each other's exchange; this will be incrementally extended to the other stock exchanges. This will help deepen Africa's capital market and start their integration.

The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, launched in 2019 by the African Export and Import Bank (Afreximbank), avoids use of the dollar and other third party currency costs in transactions between African countries, and will so save an estimated $5 billion per year in seigniorage (Wass, 2019). This is one more incremental step towards Pan-African ways of doing trade, prior to the

ultimate merging of currencies. Since the EU took half a century to negotiate the launch of its single currency, the Euro, and even today only half its member states have adopted it, it will be prudent to assume it will take the AU an even lengthier time-frame. Confirming this is that the Anglophone and Francophone states of west Africa have repeatedly postponed over two decades their attempt to launch the ECOWAS Eco, which will merge their currencies. The East African Community has also had a decade of efforts without success to launch a single currency, even though this will be in essence reviving the colonial precedent of the East African Shilling of a century ago.

Some Obstacles to Economic Integration

Implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) faces immense and diverse challenges. Country after country reports the same experience as Nigeria:

> "The prospect of sending a truck full of cargo across the country is daunting. Not only does the terrible state of the ports and roads make the logistics costs eye-watering, but the driver will also have to have wads of naira to pay off the inevitable bribes" (Olurounbi et al., 2020, p. 55).

In two provinces alone of the Democratic Republic of Congo, North and South Kivu, there are 798 roadblocks demanding tolls at gunpoint. (Schouten et al., 2017). Many other African countries have roadblocks manned by rival police or militia which each act like the feudal robber barons who ran chains across the Rhine and Danube rivers, to exact tolls from barges.

The Treaty for an African Economic Community (hereafter called the Abuja Treaty), which came into effect in 1994, posits the AfCFTA as merely one stage before a scheduled upgrade into a continental customs union (scheduled for 2023), followed by a continental common market (scheduled for 2028). But to upgrade the AfCFTA into a continental customs union, one of the biggest obstacles to negotiating will be that already Morocco (in 2000), Egypt (in 2004), and Tunisia (in 2008) all signed free trade association agreements with the EU. Egypt has since 1997 also been a member of the Arab League Free Trade Area. Unless a future African customs union sets at 0% import duties from the EU, its mere establishment would require those three states to withdraw from, or at least to substantially re-negotiate their FTAs with the EU. Mangeni and Juma wisely caution us that:

> "Free Trade Agreements with some third-party countries is resulting in adverse implications for the [African] integration programme. This trend is observed in many other AU states and is likely to come back to haunt the continent's integration process" (Mangeni, Juma, 2018, p. 104).

Conclusions

To realize the aspirations of the Constitutive Act (2000), such as clause 3 (c) to "accelerate the political integration of Africa"; clause 4(h) "the right of the Union to intervene in a member state … in respect of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity"; and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (2007), would require a post-Westphalian epoch of supra-national, continental sovereignty. Alongside national sovereignty it would need a new concept of continental sovereignty, to operationalize the ambitious aims of an *acquis communautaire,* a veritable sandwich of sub-regional and continental treaties, protocols, and praxis. In 1960 Kwame Nkrumah had the Ghanaian constitution revised to include a new clause:

"In the confident expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a Union of African states & territories, the people now confer on Parliament the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana." (Part I, Article 2).

That never happened: in 1966 an army *coup* overthrew Nkrumah; and later the clause was removed from the constitution. After that, Pan-Africanists did not again dare to repeat the phrase "surrender of sovereignty". Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, when chair of the AU Commission, used the more diplomatic terms "the pooling of sovereignty" and the "collective exercise of sovereignty" (Business Day, 2013). The closest that any states have come to that is the submission of Nigeria, Niger, and Kenya to respectively judgments of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the East African Court of Justice. To submit to a court ruling from beyond your border does amount to the start of a polycentric sovereignty.

This article argued that the continental and sub-regional institutions and praxis of African integration compare reasonably well with, for example, attempts at integration in South and Central America, the Caribbean, and South-East Asia. They are surpassed only by the European Union, which has two orders of magnitude more international civil servants, and three orders of magnitude more budget than the AU and its sub-regional affiliates. But because some of the AU's treaties and *acquis* would necessitate major supra-national powers to be enforced, while the AU remains an inter-governmental organisation, it is often judged more stringently than its peers.

Each major continental treaty or protocol typically takes a decade to be implemented; in some cases, two decades. Just to take one example, the 2018 treaty for a Single African Air Transport Market is basically the unimplemented reiteration of the unimplemented 1999 Yamoussoukro Declaration that all African countries should offer open skies to each other's airlines. But over the six decades of the history of the OAU-AU, the cumulative treaties and institution-building add up to substantial achievements and will be markedly more substantial by the completion of the AU's 2063 Agenda. In the *longue durée* of international relations, Pan-Africanism and African integration have irrevocably founded and asserted their presence.

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The Debate Between Conventional Ideology and Ethnic Politics in Africa

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Abstract

Ethnic politics will continue to be a more significant challenge in the twenty-first century for many African countries. Many scholars believe that creating ethnic-based political ideologies in the mainstream will make it more difficult for the masses to have representation. Ethnic politics could be an appealing tool for leaders seeking to preserve power through appeals to emotion and manipulation of resources, with no added value or rational debate. Political stability and democratic ideas are contingent on how African politicians respond to ethnic and language-based politics in the future. The challenge is finding a way to reconcile economic growth and well-being with entitlement politics. This article examines the rise of ethnic politics in Africa through the lens of six African countries. The article's question is how political, ideological polarisation can be avoided in Africa, and a win-win strategy to that end is being explored. The article also attempts to convey a comprehensive perspective on shaping political debates to understand the foundations of political elites and parties.

Overview

For a variety of reasons, ethnic identity-based politics is the most politicised way of pursuing political office in the African context. Instead of merit-based attraction, the incentives are based on similar ethnic and linguistic resonance. In most cases, raising funds and voting to secure positions as elected officials in various positions is far easier in ethnic-oriented campaigns than in ideologically linked campaigns. The African political and economic situation is characterised by an unusually high level of anarchy (known as state and ethnic anarchy), which aids in the maintenance of power and the exercise of political and economic manipulation. Deconstructing the concept is the first step in identifying and resolving long-term problems in ethnically and linguistically diverse societies such as Africa. An identity is defined by beliefs and practices that can be changed or rebuilt, whereas ethnic identity comes after other identities, such as being male, female, transgender, and so on (Fearon, and Laitin, 2000:846; Fearon, 1999:17). Ethnic identities are created or reconstructed; the aim is to serve political elites. Ethnic identity is the recognition that one belongs to a specific group of people with whom one shares cultural values, beliefs, and, in many cases, a similar racial background. Ethnic identity and national identity occasionally overlap. The continentality of one's identity may also be presented as a rivalry with other national, ethnic, and racial identities, such as African, European, American, Latino, and so on. However, for conscious Africans or Pan Africanists who use this as a claim, African and Africanism identities are synonymous.

Africa is a multi-ethnic melting pot with a rich cultural heritage. Multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism have a considerable advantage in widening knowledge in the philosophical setting if adequately utilised. Only a few African countries are extraordinarily ethnically homogeneous; most African countries have a significant ethnic and linguistic diversity. The postcolonial African state has been subjected to all forms of governance, including semi-feudalism, capitalism, socialism, military dictatorship, civilian autocracy, monarchy, and ethnically led regimes. Neuberger (2000, p. 294) almost all African states are multi-ethnic and have borders that cross ethnic groups; understanding the relationship between state and ethnic groups is critical for analysing African states' internal

and external politics. Given the article debate on ethnic political arrangements versus ideological philosophy, it has a more significant impact on discussing these two themes. Using ethnicity as a political system or tool has the potential to cause many controversies, particularly in the current context of Africa society. The notion of ethnic politics is an instrument used by the political elite to manipulate and grip governmental or other power structures. It is also a means of acquiring resources such as wealth and social status by scratching the thin skin of tribal personality rather than serving the people's interests. Shani (2000, p. 269) contends that shared ethnic identity crystallises as a social, economic, and political context and serves as a tool for political mobilisation with limited divergence.

According to the consensus, no African ethnic group has established a system for tracing biological arguments as differences resulting from assimilation, intermarriage, and lineage being linked for generations. Instead, the myth of common ancestry, which may or may not have kinship ties, shapes ethnic worldview. This presents an intriguing challenge: rather than implementing a state-centred approach, postcolonial African states failed to build stable and robust state structures due to deeply polarised ethnic relationships and opposing viewpoints (Smith, 2013, p. 448). Ethnic groups also believe that they are descended from a common ancestor and have a sense of shared history, which varies depending on whether the shared history is based on actual or recently imagined identity. Many ethnic identities in Africa are not distinguishable except for minor cultural and traditional differences and experiences. Most ethnic politics is fuelled by elites seeking to maintain power and privilege.

In contrast, ethnic polarisation does not exist among ordinary Africans. Ethnic identity evokes a myth or imagined community with all the political power necessary to legitimise a political community based on mutuality and mutual benefit (Assefa, 1996, p. 35; Anderson, 2006). Ethnicity emergence is mainly understood and linked to language and colonialism's massive assimilation project before and after European colonisation. Subjective factors based on objective characteristics and markers, such as language, culture, religion, customs, folklore, and traditional political and social institutions, describe ethnic diversity. Language is what we use to communicate, and language does not exist on the one hand, and thought does not exist on the other (Berlin, 2013).

It is critical to recognise that not every ethnic formation threaten destabilisation; specifically, the debate is about the politicisation of ethno nationalism in the aftermath of postcolonial Africa's state/nation-building. Chandra (2006, p. 398) explains that ethnic identity concepts are far beyond ethnic parties'', involving ethnic riots, voting, resource mobilisation, trading, religious worship, and representation. Identity politics has emerged as a distinct political practice that is not based on class movements or ideological activity but instead mobilises a specific ethnic, religious, and racial group to form exclusive political alliances. In comparative political science, ethnicity is thought to play an essential role in governance anarchy, democratic stability, institutional design, economic growth, and individual well-being (Chandra, 2006, p. 398). Liberals, communitarians, and republicans have no use for identity politics because its studies issues that are beyond the realm of liberal, communitarian, and republican thought. Bernstein (2005, p. 48) illustrated that neo-Marxist distinguished identity politics from class politics and categorised it as a new social movement; postmodern/poststructuralists view identity politics as political activism rather than cultural activism. Individuals are more critical in a liberal democracy than collective identities, resulting in democracy rather than economic survival. The broader debate is, what are the primary reasons why identity politics in Africa are primarily associated with ethnic identity, and why has ethnic politics become a problem? I believe there is no single answer to such a broad question; however, studying why and how ethnic politics emerge case by case will provide a comprehensive picture of ethnic politics arrangements in various African countries.

Ethnic Politics in Africa

Ethnic identity formations extend beyond demarcated colonial territories and are inextricably linked to language, culture, and geographical settlement. The emergence of ethnic identity through political parties was a novel phenomenon in postcolonial Africa. Ghana became the first African country to gain independence from colonial rule on March 6, 1957. The country faced enormous challenges in political party formation and accommodating all interest groups; there was no other preceding experience in Africa to emulate. According to Boafo-Arthur (1993, p. 228), Nkrumah sowed the seeds of political chaos and destruction in those early days through political parties based on ethnic, religious, and regional formations. Most postcolonial African leaders have sought better party formation strategies to conduct legislative business in a civilised manner while considering the unequal nature of ethnic and religious demography. One of these was the ban of religious and ethnic-based parties on the ground reality of African countries and the historical journey to prevent undesirable conflict. Among these was Ghana's first ethnic, religious, and regional party prohibition, enacted in the 1960s by President Kwame Nkrumah (Basedau et al., 2007, p. 630). The argument was that ethnic and religious political parties pose a threat to national and regional security by competing for government power and national resources. The hostile nature of ethnic politics divides citizens into "us" and "them," or "these are ours, and the rest are others". The negative consequences of ethnic politics are numerous, with those who do not hold power being treated as second-class citizens and severely jeopardised human rights. Given these facts, Namibia was the first African country to implement voter and political party regulations that prohibited party membership based on sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed, or social or economic status (Basedau et al., 2007, p. 628).

The postcolonial state witnessed various forms of ethnic and religious violence ranging from Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. The facts on the ground in Africa provide further evidence of the decline of ideologically based political formation, and the distraction is visible in the majority of African countries. Similarly, from 1967 to 1970, Nigeria's civil war featured ethno-regional and religious clashes between three dominant ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbos (Abubakar, 2001, p. 31). The ethnic dimensions' conflict that raged in Darfur between the 'Janjaweed' Arab origins and African tribes, the Rwandan genocide fought between the Hutus and Tutsis in 1994 was significant aftermath. Furthermore, forty-year tribal and secessionist conflicts within Ethiopia and Eritrea have resulted in ethnically oriented parties wreaking havoc in Africa's Horn of Africa. According to Hagmann and Hoehne (2009, p. 50), Somalia has been the most prolonged failed state without a proper solution and the epitome of civil war that has triggered instability between clans and sub-clans since 1991. Somalia's destabilisation has impacted not only Somalis but also neighbouring countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

With this understanding, the rise of ethnic identity-centred party formation must be critically examined and the consequences. One of the main points of contention revolves around the structure and agency of ethnic politics in representation and how the execution is accomplished. The perplexity of ethnic politics in a heterogeneous society poses numerous challenges, including making just, fair, and legitimate decisions. According to Fain (1980, p. 111), "a representative is simply someone who is authorised to act as a representative" based solely on acts of representation. Unlike ideological formations, 'representation in realism' necessitates the submission and consent of every ethnic member with proper legitimacy, which can illustrate in various scenarios.

First and foremost, human rights issues are the central argument for non-participatory actors unwilling to compromise any decision made without their collective consent. As a result, justice is a core element, representing ethnic identity, which belongs to each member with 'equal

responsibility.' The other scenario is a legal issue concerning how each member can be defined and bound by bylaws. The final scene focuses on the rights of other ethnic members within the territory and governance model, as well as culture, tradition, and language.

Ideology is a system of conduct that includes representing concepts, ideas, or imaginary relationships with humanity's conditions of existence (Hall, 1985, p. 103). Ideologies operate in clusters, socio-political systems, and belief systems through discursive chains. Individual representation is not given supremacy in ideologically centred representations that are inversely based on bylaws, rules, and regulations. With the same concept, but conduct allows the majority or simple majority to decide on their behalf; because of the issues that matter for the supremacy of idea and notion, not individual beings. Political ideology manifests deep desires for actual existence, identity, and political socialisation (Smith et al., 2011, p. 10).

Furthermore, the ideology of the alluded people can be seen as art, educational philosophies, humour, religion, and occupation. The interconnectedness of politics, economics, and ideologies necessitates examining structure and agency (Hay and Wincott, 1998, p. 953). The reverse discrimination of ethnic politics in heterogeneous Africa necessitates in-depth analysis to improve the political context and intergroup relations. People must adopt the mind-set of game players to gain freedom; it is assumed that while people seek to liberate themselves, the universe should be subdued in the same manner (Berlin, 2013). Similarly, an imaginary representation requires a framework to examine legitimacy and agency. The article includes a conceptualisation of political identity and ethnic politics in postcolonial Africa and case studies from various countries. They are, furthermore, engaging in contemporary Africa's best governance and democratic value systems. Finally, I examine Pan African ideals concerning ethnic and ideological party politics, as well as citizenship.

Conventional Ideology as A Comparative Argumentative Instrument

The term "ideology" will be demonstrated to have both a distinct meaning and a distinct historical standing, with the concept's history serving as a guide to the actual interaction of "real" and "ideal" aspects whose dialectic is obliquely intended in the concept's formulation (Lichtheim, 1965). It's all too common for ideology to be an extra-terrestrial implant, manufactured by dreamers of dreams, otherworldly philosophers, or machinators with dictatorial goals. Political thought in its broadest sense currently demonstrates six threads: the painstaking construction of argument; the normative prescription of standards of public behaviour; the imaginative production of insight; the genealogical investigation of provenance and change; the deconstructive unpacking of paradigms; and the morphological analysis of concepts and conceptual clusters (Freeden, 2004).

Adherents of political theorists' ideologies find themselves hammered by prevailing academic interests and substantive motivations and by 'dominant techniques' hidden from many of their practitioners. Ideology as a tool of 'totalitarian seduction,' an alien encircling system of ideas centred on a 'single truth,' and a self-justification drive, primarily representative prescriptive ideologies and their opposing epistemologies (Freeden, 2004). To be an ideology, it must have the ability to influence one's thinking, the ability to guide one's decision-making, and the ability to lead one to action. When ideology is analysed from an epistemological standpoint, it becomes clear that its antecedents exist in political party contexts and the corporate world, which requires more analysis and elaboration. As diverse formulations and conceptions of ideology emerge, the theory of ideology evolves into distinct knowledge systems; today, ideology serves not only political motives but also a different field of studies and practice.

Identity Politics in a Few African Countries: A Situation Analysis

The increasing prominence of ethnic politics in Africa is a general level of political and ideological clout among intellectuals, blue-collar workers, and the bourgeoisie. The ethnic-based political system will continue to be the simplest method of mobilising support to hold public office. This is an intangible but powerful message because it is easy to scratch the soft layer of human kinship, language similarity, and "us vs them" mentality. Additionally, some promoted a false narrative of oppressed and oppressors, while others promoted Eurocentrism and nationalism. Stalinist perspectives constitute a significant factor in the flourishing of ethnic politics. Berman's (1998, p. 310) argument is that ethnic identity in precolonial Africa was constructed not as a static primordial character but as a distinct tribe uniting for political sovereignty, economic assimilation, and ethno cultural construction. In such a situation, there is a limited possibility of one tribe or ethnic group being dominant without controlling the entire mode of production of the nation. Communities in precolonial Africa were fighting for political and economic territory and trying to stay alive during periods of famine and disease. In other words, it is conceivable to deduce that these demonstrate that even when ethnic dominance had been established, the control of central power was interrupted in the 18th century by colonial rulers.

Colonialism has done tremendous damage to African society in two separate ways. On the one hand, it stifled continued wealth accumulation and ownership among Africans; on the other hand, it sowed rivalry and division within ethnic and tribal communities. Africans are presently embroiled in some of the most prominent ethnic conflicts the world has ever seen, resulting from their people's legacy of colonialism. Today partly Africans are harnessing the rivalry and the rift that was created by colonial powers. Green (2010, p. 3) says that even though many African states have been embroiled in ethnic violence and conflict at various times, postcolonial efforts to fashion supra-ethnic national identities have failed. Colonialism has had a more significant negative influence in some countries than in others. While colonialism used indigenous and colonial languages to divide Africans, it was also responsible for ethnic animosity.

Divisiveness within Cameroon's Sovereignty Over the Colonial Language Ideology

Three colonial powers colonised Cameroon due to its unique historical circumstances: The French, the Germans, and the British. As authorised by the League of Nations, Britain and France ruled their respective portions of Cameroon for the entire period from 1919 to 1945 (Ngoh, 1979, p. 6). Additionally, explain that following World War II, France administered her portion as a trusteeship territory of the United Nations Organization until 1960, when it achieved independence; Britain administered her portion as a trusteeship territory of the United Nations until 1961 gained independence. Cameroonians are embroiled in a protracted conflict over the European language division between French Cameroon and British Cameroon, which is embarrassing and humiliating for Africans. It serves as a reminder of colonial rule and slavery.

Thus, language ideology addresses the characteristics of thoughts, ideas, beliefs, and assumptions that govern the lives of individuals or groups and are frequently established to provide structure or meaning to the world (Nana, 2016, p. 169). The "legacies of colonial language" can be both sources of division and sources of unity. It's perplexing to contemplate how its victims exploit a language created by a colonial power to sow discord among those who share the same colonial language ideology. Regardless of colonial language is a tool of subjugation but having your countrymen who have been with you through generations follow you to fight and worship you in a colonial language is nothing short of insane. Colonialism divided not only spoken and codified languages but also African and European languages of indigenous populations (Zeleza, 2006, p. 22).

Along with examining identity politics and institutionalised power, it is necessary to investigate the role of language groups such as Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, etc. Prior to colonisation, Cameroon had a diverse range of languages; however, throughout and after colonisation, English and French have remained the country's official languages (Nana, 2016, p. 180). Furthermore, he stated that the ongoing conflict resulted from missionaries' continued use of indigenous languages and the French administration's promotion of French at the expense of indigenous languages. Similarly, mother tongue education has been phased out in West Cameroon in favour of English as the primary medium of instruction in schools.

Somalia's Nightmare of Clan-based Politics

A variety of factors contributed to Somalia's state-building project coming to a halt for an extended period. A discourse is known as a colonial experiment when it attempts to explain or interpret the same topic simultaneously, in which theoretical and empirical underpinnings emerge concurrently. Somalia exemplifies the brutal fragmentation and poisonous impact of colonialism. The Somali people are genetically homogeneous, but colonial demarcations such as French Somalia, British Somalia, and Italian Somalia have fragmented them.

Somalia-Ethiopia, and similarly Somalia-Kenya, absorbed a sizable proportion of Somalians into their populations in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively. The nearby Somali region of Ethiopia and Somalia make interesting empirical cases of statehood for countries and regions that are not nations (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009, p. 46). The issues are not about whether greater Somalia should exist or not; instead, Somalis living under one flag are incapable of coexisting peacefully and harmoniously as a nation. Somalians have experienced various turbulence since gaining independence in early 1960 and nearly cohabiting for nearly twenty years until early 1980. The reasons are numerous and delving into the realities may necessitate an assessment of a number of factors. Still, the most obvious is geopolitics, and several domestic and foreign political actors can be mentioned.

Somalia has long been regarded as a case study in state failure. Since 1991, it has been mired in political and military instability, which an ongoing humanitarian crisis has exacerbated. In addition, the country has seen multiple governance models, both formal and informal, emerge in the country, which have not received international attention or been accepted by scholars studying state failure (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009, p. 48). Injustice and distrust between Somali clan structures and colonial divisions were the causes and numerous flaws of Somalia's conflicts. Others attribute Somalia's insecurity to the country inherited "nomadic culture," clan structure, and incompetence of political leaders; clan dominance has resulted in corruption and maladministration, impeding Somalia's emergence as a stable and functioning state (Hagmann, 2005, p. 512). Somalia has been without an operational central government for more than three decades in its brief history of state formation. The conflict is layered like an onion, with clans, sub-clans, and sub-sub-clans, making it difficult to pin down the root cause. It is fuelled partly by insecurity, a lack of state protection, and a breakdown of law and order, and the clan's superiority and identities cause it. As a result, Somali society suffers from the devastation brought about by three decades of war and subsequent instability.

Ethnic politics and political tribalism are causes of violence in Kenya

In contrast to other African countries, Kenya is one of the few African countries to maintain an unbroken peaceful reputation after independence. Colonialism in Kenya was distinct in that European settlers displaced indigenous African peoples to settle on the land solely for economic exploitation. Kenya's natural resources are diverse, encompassing agriculture, small industry, tourism, and mining. There are vast areas filled with verdant greenery and scenic landscapes, abundant wildlife in the interior, and a long seascape bordering the Indian Ocean. Since Kenya gained independence in

1963, ethnic tensions have polarised the country's political landscape; however, Kenya is considered a stable country compared to other East and Horn of Africa nations. Ethnicity can be defined as a combination of objective characteristics, such as language fluency, and subjective features, such as an individual's sense of identity and awareness (Goldsworthy, 1982, p. 107). The long-term impact of "political liberalisation" on Kenyan politics has exacerbated "political tribalism." Still, this phenomenon has also allowed moral ethnicity debates to come to the forefront of politics (Orvis, 2001, p. 8). According to this viewpoint, ethnicity has played an important role in Kenya's political processes since the colonial era; however, this role is regarded as minor compared to other African countries. In contrast to the rest of the sub-region, postcolonial Kenya demonstrated ideological consistency, which aided the country's economic development.

Because many Kenyans have lived through colonialism and dictatorship, they have a shared understanding of conflict with post-colonial nations (Roberts, 2009, p. 4). Liberalisation has facilitated the public display of political tribalism, such as corruption and all its negative consequences. Kenyans identify with and have a strong affinity for their tribe in various ways (Roberts, 2009, p. 8). Ethnicity has a double-edged effect on political liberalisation, at least in Kenya's tightly constrained "virtual democracy." This is partially due to the colonisers' and independent governments' relations with landowners throughout centuries. A greater emphasis on the local demonstrates how liberalisation has facilitated the discussion of moral ethnicity, a concept that can help with citizen empowerment (Orvis, 200, p. 12). This means that Kenyans believe that executive branch officials always win and that those in power will go to any length to prevent others from getting something position. Despite the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the 2007 elections, land disputes between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities remained a source of contention (Roberts, 2009, p. 6).

Furthermore, it was argued that executive power abuse, specifically in employment and land distribution, was the primary root cause of both manifestations of structural violence. Unfortunately, Kenya has a history of tribalism; due to the country's unique colonial experience, Kenyan ethnic groups have developed a strong sense of difference (Goldsworthy, 1982, p. 107). Kenya's tribalism and ethnic violence must be addressed; political, non-state actors, academic, and religious leaders must examine the concept of political ideology critically.

The Ethnic Divide and Power Dynamics in Nigeria: North and South

Two types of ideas define nationalism. The first is that nationalism claims that nations have supplanted traditional identities such as ethnicity; nationalism also claims that nationality and sovereignty are rooted in ethnicity (Calhoun, 1993, p. 221). As strange as it may appear, dual identities are visible in the case of ethnicity and nationalism in Nigeria. The ethnic composition of the Nigerian federation governance model contributes to two trends: supporting ethnic solidarity and aggravating tribal rivalry. According to Mamdani (2005, p. 13), the federal government is defined in two ways: first, it is an arrangement of ethnic home, its indigenous authority, and its State within the Nigerian federation; and second, with each new State, the number of Nigerians classified as nonindigenous grows. The Eurocentric federal arrangement has the cumulative effect of exacerbating the contradiction between economic and political processes.

During the nationalist struggle for independence and subsequent constitutional development (the 1920s–1960s), Nigeria's three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast, ruled their respective regions through ethnic/regional political parties (Abubakar, 2001, p. 33). Aside from its diverse ethnic makeup, Nigeria is religiously diverse; nearly half of the population practises some form of Islam, while the remainder follows Christianity and indigenous religions. The post-independence era was defined by regionalism and the "ethnic trap," with ethno-regional and religious identities playing a significant role in

shaping political contention (Abubakar, 2001, p. 35). One defining characteristic of contemporary Nigerian politics is the active exclusion of various marginalised groups from the political arena. When one considers the threats to Nigeria's democracy, the country faces significant challenges related to ethnicity, religious fanaticism, corruption, identity politics, and the country's practice of prebendalism (Mbalisi, 2017, p. 72). It is worth noting that Nigeria, like many other countries, has a volatile social environment, making it difficult to create conditions conducive to peaceful coexistence free of fear, tension, or violence.

Späti, (2016, p. 3) despite widespread use, the concept of identity remains challenging to conceptualise, making it difficult to define; therefore the term itself is somewhat ambiguous, making discussion of identity and identification difficult. The identities politics in Nigeria and across Africa can be divided into three historical eras, the first being the colonial era, the second the colonial era, and the third postcolonial era (Alumona and Azom, 2018, p. 292). The inherent characteristics of the African population and culture and the legacy of colonialism, socioeconomic inequality, and the absence of an indigenous governance model have all contributed to the vitality of identity politics in Africa. Nigeria's social and security structures have suffered due to identity politics, poor governance, and leadership focused on personal gain. They are the two deadly cankerworms that have devoured the Nigerian psyche, particularly the upper and lower classes, but also the wealthy and impoverished (Mbalisi, 2017, p. 78). As can be seen, Nigeria has never been associated with any ideological camp because its capitalist economy has remained unchanged since independence.

Ethnic identity also plays a role in African electoral contests. Continuing with Nigeria as an example, the First Republic's elections were marred by ethnic politics, with electorates voting almost exclusively for members of their ethnic groups (Alumona and Azom, 2018, p. 295). In Nigeria, it appears that there is an unwritten law that states that power is perpetually shifted between the South and North majority ethnic groups, with each group claiming their share. As previously mentioned, the 2015 presidential election was like past elections because the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group preferred a Muslim and a northerner over a Christian and a southerner, while the incumbent president at the time, Goodluck Jonathan, won a landslide in the South (Alumona and Azom, 2018, p. 295). The difficulty inherent in such an arrangement ensures that other minorities are never heard and remain outside the realm of politics, while also preventing society's crème de la crème from serving the nation on the front lines.

Ethiopian Ethno-Linguistic Federalism Sets a Dangerous Example for African Governance

Ethiopians assert that they are the Horn of Africa's most ancient, civilised, and centrally governed nation, with a history spanning over three thousand years. It can be verified in the holy book of Christians: The Bible. It is also substantiated in the central religious text of Islam: The Quran. Ethiopia is an ancient country home to three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Regardless, the long-established central government, Africans' philosophical centre, and tenacious resistance to colonial power could not avoid being supplanted by pre-modern ethnic centrist political turmoil. In Ethiopia, ideology has also contributed to the maintenance and intensification of the perception that ethnic animosity and superiority manifested by one group toward another is at the root of the country's problems, particularly in the previous two decades (Assefa, 1996, p. 40). There had been some ideological inconsistency in Ethiopia for the previous sixty years. Ethiopia has been through different ideological systems, including a semi-feudal monarchy, a military regime with socialist leanings, a developmental state, and an undefinable liberal democracy. Economic depression is partly to blame for ideological instability, which is similar to what happened in Sudan and Somalia.

Europeans never colonised Ethiopia, inspiring many Africans in their homeland and diaspora (Abbink, 2011, p. 599). On the other hand, the defeated Europeans do not take defeat lightly and have

systematically divided Ethiopians through multiple narratives. The narratives were meticulously crafted to exacerbate political instability and sabotage the country's economic development. (Seife, 2020, p. 13). Among these are the narrative and portrayal created by colonisers and amplified by unpatriotic Ethiopians portraying Emperor Menelik as an enemy of most Ethiopian people. Particularly among adherents and leaders of narrow ethnic political ideologies. Certain political advocates attempted to resurrect outdated colonial narratives of oppressor and oppressed within Ethiopia's political system, created by the ruling elite. The divisions in Ethiopian society have a significant impact on the country's political shambles and economic stagnation. The intellectual residue of colonialism remains a pivotal hindrance to nation-building; colonial stories are still alive and well among African political leaders, characterised by similar mind-sets (Kebede, 2003, p. 4). There are numerous manifestations; however, in the case of Ethiopia, the colonialist agenda has been carried out by secessionist and ethnic political advocates who came to power in early 1990. Ethnic federalism could have been viewed as a feasible option due to it being a hybrid ruling ideology combining elements of Leninism, democracy, and ethnicity (Abbink, 2011, p. 602).

The second component of the revolutionary student movement's programme in the 1960s and 1970s was to resolve the "nationalities" issue by mobilising anti-feudalist, anti-capitalist popular revolutions (Abbink, 2011, p. 559). Stalinist concepts of nation and nationality benefited ruling elites, despite remaining incompatible with local reality in various circumstances. The false narrative of superiority and imposition is erroneous. Ethiopia was the only country that achieved supremacy without a command of the means of production. In recent Ethiopian history, no tribe has exercised complete control without relying on any of the other tribes. Ethiopians face numerous restrictions on their livelihoods under the ethnic-based regime, including ethnic federalism, which has never been practised in Africa except for Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. And because of ethnic federalism, the world witnessed the artificial assembly of distraction and breakaway states within a socialist framework.

People were concerned about how Ethiopian ethnic groups would be accommodated within the new state structure established in 1991. Still, everyone is uncertain about how they will implement tribalism (Abbink, 2011, p. 599). Despite the setbacks and complications, the administration retained control of the system until 2018, when it was eventually discarded. The challenges with various tribal settings and attempts to undermine collective human understanding of the nation; indeed, tribalism's primary goal is division by introducing indigenous and non-indigenous settlers and indigenous people. In most African countries, shocking occurrences result from the poisonous legacy of postcolonial anarchy and primordial tribal arrangements, resulting from which hatred for one another has become the norm. Political actors consistently favour their own ethnic "category" or "group," and they do so in a variety of ways: through continuous competition for scarce goods (for example, through contracting, licencing, and awarding development grants), and because everyone involved believes they belong to an ethnic group (Goldsworthy, 1982, p. 108). In politics, ' ethnicity or 'tribalist behaviour' refers to people acting in specific ways due to their belief in or presumption of this personal identity. In terms of justice, democracy, and self-determination, and due to the contemporary content, many scholars warn against equating ethnicity with tribalism (Kebede, 2003, p. 12). In my opinion, ethnic identity is far more malleable than many people believe, and as such, our priority should be to strengthen our capacity to shape and mould our conceptions of ethnic identity and tribalism.

The Rise of Ethnic Inclinations, as well as the Contrast of Race Relationships

South Africa is unlike any other African country in a variety of ways. Among them are a sizable number of people of European descents, who constitute the generation of European settlers.

Additionally, there are Asians, most notably Indians, Malays, and Chinese; in this regard, no African country has comparable demography. Nonetheless, except for Algeria, Europe has a small number of European settlers. With the emergence of the Apartheid regime, the race relationship in South Africa created a massive political vacuum. It became a focal point of gravity in Africa and throughout the world. According to Clark and Worger (2016, p. 4-5), apartheid was a system of institutionalised racial segregation that lasted from 1948 to the early 1990s in South Africa and Southwest Africa. Additionally, explain that racial discrimination, even if it received constitutional protection in 1948, has existed since the Dutch colonisers arrived in 1652. Apartheid has come to be synonymous with racial segregation, but the term originates in Afrikaans, a derivative of the Dutch language.

Racial segregation was abolished in 1994, establishing a new political regime and an inclusive constitutional framework. South Africans paid a high price for freedom with their lives and endured an immense amount of suffering that humans can rarely bear. Even if South Africans primarily fought the long struggle for freedom, it encompasses anti-Apartheid movements across Africa and the world. Though equal citizenship was declared in the new political systems but never synchronized in ordinary citizens' daily lives to date. The expected positive results were obstructed due to enormous historical economic discrepancy among African origin citizens and European descent South African counterparts. The inheritance of apartheid may endure for a long time; the employment hierarchy, land, and business ownership cannot be changed with law enforcement in a democratic country like South African. South Africa has been well known for its racial hierarchical wage structure. At the same time, European South Africans get the highest pay, followed by Asians, mixed-race, and at the lowest ladder Africans (Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks, 2002, p. 448). Such an unjust system has created invisible discomfort among the citizens for a long time and is still alive.

Corrective measures were not as effective as anticipated in closing the gap; in fact, they widened the divide between rich and poor across racial groups. Similarly, political orientation is influenced by one's race and social class. The political, social transformation policies in post-apartheid South Africa profoundly not shaped or made a significant challenge in unifying citizens to think based on merit than race or economic status. According to Schulz-Herzenberg (2019, pp. 10-14), the argument race and economic situation still significantly affect voter political loyalties. Accordingly, the African National Congress (ANC) still enjoys the African South African majority vote despite its declination. The Democratic Alliance (DA) has significant supports of European South Africans and the newly emerged Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) enormous potential appeal to African workers, the poor, and marginalized vote.

The ANC is Africa's oldest political party, and its 1955 Freedom Charter expressed its opposition to tribalism in favour of inclusivity and tolerance. Apart from having a Pan-African perspective and a more excellent vision for South Africa and Africa as a whole. Ethnic favouritism manifested in different ways; among this, the ANC 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in December 2007 was the sign of tribal tendency. Unlike ANC tradition, the ethnic dimension was much more significant than expected; Zuma was the strongest supporter among KwaZulu Natal delegates, and people with Zulu or Ndebele origin was high (Southall, 2009:320). Also, the rejection of Senzeni Zokwana 2016 local election for the Tshwane mayor election by the local communities is a sign of growing ethnic elements. According to Baloyi (2018, p. 3) assessment, the tensions between Tsongas and Vendas over the Vuwani-Malamulele municipality were a tribal tendency. He also alluded that the most significant challenge in South African politics is a tribal division between the majority Xhosas and Zulus and within minorities at the municipality level. South Africa must invest in transformational projects that advance equality and success that promotes equality and success beyond tribal lines.

Pan-Africanist Ideals and an Antagonistic Relationship with Identity Politics

Pan-Africanism, in my perspective, is a passion and devotion to the African continent and its people; and a collective interest in Africa unification, prosperity, and equality as influenced by political, economic, and sociocultural activities. To understand humanity as a large part of the African population and to have the depth to support the African unity and prosperity agenda, one must have an ideological foundation attached to Pan Africanism. The premise of this argument is that it is impossible for Pan-Africanists to adopt ethnic or tribalist ideas. On the other hand, certain African leaders are Pan Africanists in the morning, nationalists in the afternoon, tribalist in the evening, and chauvinists at night. Consider that we are all, first and foremost, human beings who live in fifty-five constituency "countries" divided by colonisers (Seife, 2020, p. 4).

Additionally, he emphasised the singular significance of our ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identities. However, when we use it as a political tool, we diminish our inherent worth as human beings. It is critical to discuss Pan-Africanist ideals and their diametrically opposed relationship to identity politics in order to demystify and gain a more comprehensive understanding of ideology. Following the colonial power over the continent, inter-tribal rivalry for political power, public offices, and public wealth became prevalent. Politicians are compelled to fan the flames of tribalism and religious divisions by appealing to their constituents' prejudices or engaging in ideological battles with their opponents out of political expediency.

African states have strived to manage identity politics since their inception as independent polities. Apart from Europe's scramble for Africa between 1884 and 1885, colonial powers imposed "their particular artificial criteria to create states in Africa" (Keller, 2014, p. 3). This is yet another exemplification of how African countries were colonised on the assumption that they would remain economically and politically dependent on the colonial powers in perpetuity. The tendency was to discuss agency in an institutional vacuum, focusing on how it was harnessed to colonial both bemoaned "tribe" and "tribalism" as colonial inventions while accepting "race" and "racism" as accurate in a positivist sense; according to some, ethnicity was cultural, and the race was biological (Mamdani, 2005, p. 3). In contrast to the colonial administration's and colonial anthropology's concept of tribalisation, which was undermined by local circuits of exchange, movement, and interaction, countervailing elite paradigms, politics, and projections of Pan-Africanism emerged to undermine tribalisation (Zeleza, 2006, p. 18). The ideology, institutions, and the people are inextricably linked, a phenomenon is known as Pan-Africanism, which is similar but distinct from Pan-Arabism and Pan-Europeanism. The problem is that there is some evidence of a return to traditional tribal attitudes in postcolonial Africa, and we, furious and sick at heart, believe that race feeling in its most virulent form is triumphant (Kebede, 2003, p. 12). The solution, however, remains the same: educating Africans about the larger picture of unity in diversity.

Pan-Africanism's diverse and uniquely intertwined sociocultural frameworks of African people were critical during their emancipation from colonial powers. They will continue to be critical contributors to Africa's unification process. Notably, ensuring citizens' comprehension of the larger objectives, participation, and awareness regarding the collective endeavour of unity based on Pan-Africanism ideals. Pan-Africanism is a more potent tool. Social scientists have repeatedly stated that the only way out of ethnicity or tribalism is to avoid thinking in retrograde terms and instead pursue modernity (Berman, 1998, p. 306). Additionally, Pan-Africanism represents the coming together of African people on an ideological basis, as the primary value system of African people is a diverse one. Pan-Africanism remains the only ideological option for uniting Africans for collective goods and advocating for equality and economic emancipation from dependency on international fora.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that linkages and dissociations exist in political ideology and identity politics, scholars who study 'political thought' or 'political theory' find it difficult to create a clear demarcation line between the two fields. An ideology is considered a set of beliefs that originates with an individual or a group for various non-epistemic reasons. More specifically, it refers to the ideals of the foundation. The article's purpose is elucidation is to achieve a precise understanding of ideology, political ideology, political identity, and ethnic politics. Some arguments are logically sound, while others are based on epistemological assertions.

In comparison to identity politics, which is a political method in which members of a specific gender, religion, race, social background, social class, or other identifying element form political agendas around these identities. On the other hand, ethnic representation necessitates that all members of the group wholeheartedly support the ethnic or tribal structure. In Africa, ethnic identity politics is the most politicised route to public office. In most African elections, which are skewed toward one ethnic group or another, the perceived ethnicity of the candidates also influences voting decisions. As opposed to merit, incentives are based on comparable ethnic and linguistic resonance rather than on individual performance. In Africa, ethnic identity formation extends beyond colonial boundaries and is inextricably linked to language, culture, and geographical settlement. That is, ethnic settlement in Africa is not limited to the current definition of the border along which one ethnic group resides. Certain ethnic groups may be found in four or five countries, and if ethnic politics become the norm, the negative and positive consequences extend across borders.

Ethnic politics is gaining popularity among the general public in Africa, owing to the ideological clout of elite politicians and cultural leaders who see it as a less complicated path to take than ideological confrontation. However, even if ethnic politics gains acceptance, the political space becomes more vulnerable to various interest groups due to a lack of adequate conditions for legitimate ideological contestation. Political decisions made by states frequently lay the groundwork for ethnic mobilisation. Ethnic conflicts often erupt in multi-ethnic, underdeveloped societies when the state's behaviour is perceived to be dominated by a specific group or community within it, when communities fear marginalisation, or when grievances go unresolved. Hence, society's struggles with diversity, with certain ethnic groups attempting to destroy all understanding of the country as a whole; indeed, ethnicism's primary claim is the desire to form social groups and nations by establishing divisions between "us" and "them."

Similarly, colonial language-based politics in certain African countries have exacerbated the threat to peace and stability. Aside from the rise of ethnic inclinations and the contrast in race relations, certain African countries face challenges, even if the scale of grievance is limited. The article proposes that Pan Africanism emerges as a political ideology for many African populations to understand humanity. Furthermore, to have the depth required to support the African unity and prosperity agenda, one must be ideologically committed to Pan Africanism and be able to transcend narrow nationalism as well as parochial ethnic, tribal, and language settings.

Acknowledgements

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- Being, Belonging and Becoming in Africa: A Postcolonial Rethinking
- The Rise and Fall of Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF): Postcolonial Rethinking of Ethnic and Language Based Federalism in Africa

Impact of Digital Media on Political Campaigns

Towards Disintermediated Political Communication in Africa

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Abstract

This article explores the impact of digital media on political campaigns towards disintermediated political communication in Africa. It highlights that, due to the proliferation of digital media, political communication processes have drastically shifted away from traditional formats to more adaptable and personalised platforms linked to digital citizenship. It further discusses the characterisation of African political campaigns and their impact on democratisation. Application of the Adaptive structuration and Media richness theories is employed to explicate the role of information technologies in facilitating societal change. The article argues that disintermediation in political campaigns results from unfettered access to alternative means of information with the potential to diminish the power of the "voice"; stimulate new forms of political consciousness; cultivate optimisation of political engagement and yield truism through verification of political information both pre and post-elections. It concludes that digital media have radically changed how the electorate participates in African politics, meanwhile cascading its ability to empower citizens to redefine their sense of political space in a disintermediated environment.

Keywords: Digital media, political campaigns, disintermediation, politics, Africa

Introduction

The concept of digital media is a 21st-century phrase used to define all forms of digital communication related to the internet as it describes the interplay between technology, text, images, and sound in the context of information production and consumption (Lindgren, 2017). It is associated with the information revolution where new (digital) media have given impetus to the evolving multi-media environment leading to numerous changes in the way society interacts. Internet-based publishing and citizen journalism, largely made possible by the proliferation of digital (social) media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have permeated all facets of life including politics (Karekwaivanane & Msonza, 2021). This interplay has yielded a plethora of widely distributed digital products and a growing share of user-generated content attributable to members of the public, irrespective of geographic space or professional skill (Rodny-Gumede, 2017). Apparently, the new trend has yielded new ways of information dissemination and consumption among all age groups, and this includes the sphere of political communication. This is particularly interesting, especially since research on the use of new media applications has revealed that a significant number of people already spend more time on digital platforms each week than on any other media platform (Lindgren, 2017). As such, people all over the world are now largely exposed to numerous digitally-inclined interactive technologies that come with ample opportunities to participate in the political space as planetary citizens.

Subsequently, as digital media technologies continue to become an integral part of people's daily lives, political communicators also get compelled to adapt to the drastic changes associated with the technological revolution and politics. Orature or rhetoric, which dominated the world of African politics for centuries, now occurs in a multi-media environment dominated by digital technologies with virtual reality sites (Ott, 2017). This has dramatically altered the way in which politicians relate to potential voters and constituencies in the political space, particularly in Africa where the realities of the digital divide remain starkly evident (Pick & Sarkar, 2015). Contrary to the traditional context when politicians depended on the power of their oral persuasive skills for political expediency to convince the electorate during elections, today's politicking occurs in a media flux. Some decades ago, the success of political campaigns in many parts of the world including Africa lay in the astute application of word-of-mouth rhetoric to influence supporters or lure them (Baines & O' Shaughnessy, 2014). Hence, the effectiveness of electoral campaigns largely relied on propaganda for electioneering supported by the public media, especially public service broadcasting.

As such, media practitioners including journalists and editors would fulfill the agenda-setting role as agents of and mouthpieces of politicians and political parties in their respective countries (Nyarota, 2018). This yielded a scenario where news production teams or journalists with knowledge about the public's behaviour, would become purveyors of public opinion formation, agenda-setting, and evaluation (McNair, 2011; Muswede, 2019). Hence, political punditry was popularised through craftily tailored opinion pieces, columns, satiric cartoons, editorials, and talk show programmes targeted at gullible audiences. Overall, this means that conventional news media have over time forecasted, interpreted, and even prescribed to the public what political content and ideological views they should uphold (Muswede & Lubinga, 2018). To this end, the article explores the impact of digital media on political campaigns towards disintermediation of political communication in Africa.

Characterisation of Political Campaigns in Africa

Emphasis on the "One Party State Model" of government

Fanon (1963) observed that some of the earliest campaigns by political leaders after assuming power have been associated with the dangers of adopting the "one-party state" approach as a system of governance. In the context of "pitfalls of national consciousness", he emphasised the value of multi-party politics as a true reflection of democracy as opposed to the centralised system of governance. In agreement with this view, Koenane and Mangena (2017) noted that in most African states, regardless of how the government is structured, a minority group always holds real power. This is due to the dearth of active citizenship where political campaigns reduce citizens' participation to mere casting ballots during elections without a clear understanding of the subsequent outcomes (Dieltiens, 2005). Studies on the post-colonial governments in Africa have noted how the military often becomes part of an institutional transfer of western paradigms of governance along with models of political administration (Naidoo, 2006). This has been common in West Africa, particularly in Nigeria and recently in Mali where military commanders usurp power to get recognition as legitimate leaders of government. Despite promises to hold elections in due course, this trend has become the agency for political grand-standing and guarantee for self-aggrandisement. This often leads to democratic principles being overrun by the politics of patronage such as was the case in Zimbabwe, where the military over time had taken the 'king maker' role by campaigning and sustaining the ruling party in power (Nyarota, 2018).

Political intolerance and excessive use of force

After assuming state power, most African leaders have resorted to perpetual power through political campaigns that have demonstrated their pre-occupation with incumbency resulting in a suffocated political space. This trajectory unfolds at the expense of strengthening institutions of governance such as electoral and judicial reforms (Zinyama, 2011). In some countries, this has led to contestations that have degenerated to levels of anarchy as exemplified by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Zairean 1996/7 strife (French, 2004), and recent conflicts playing out in South Sudan, Somalia, and the Tigray region of Ethiopia. This has led to civic outrages in the form of agitated civil protests and violent political altercations during and after elections as was the case in Uganda in 2020. Apparently, these actions have been met with lethal responses through police brutality often leading to disenfranchisement (Nyarota, 2018). In Zimbabwe, the government of then-President Mugabe's response to the untenable socio-economic situation yielded politico-security skirmishes between opposition parties and civil society under similar circumstances. This occurred in the context of a number of restrictive laws including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA, 2001) which made it difficult for a multi-party political environment to prevail until the transition in 2018.

Infringement on freedom of speech, opinion, and human rights

Some scholars have observed that there has been an increasing trend, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa for governments to impose draconian laws that suppress freedom of speech and access to information (Koenane & Mangena, 2017), especially towards elections. In numerous instances, the news media have carried disheartening news where ordinary citizens have been brutalised or denied the right to register their discontent against misrule through peaceful demonstrations (Nyarota, 2018). Instead of the political campaigns being used to entrench human rights and achievement of broader interests of the citizens, civic society has had to pressure politicians to be responsive towards the will of the people. This is contrary to Heywood's (2007) view that political systems should be punctuated by the free and continuous participation of society in the decision-making processes of government. However, most African states do not seize the opportunity to view the media (particularly public service broadcasting) as nation-building platforms. Instead, they have used them as tools of political expediency and propagators of divisive ideological enclaves associated with tribalism and vengeance (Muswede & Lubinga, 2018). Subsequently, the media have largely failed to play the nuanced mediation role in which the citizens need to make informed decisions about electoral processes and the state of political affairs in their respective countries. An example of this kind of intervention was the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA, 2001) in Zimbabwe which the government of the time used to deal with political activists and 'unpatriotic' journalists (Nyarota, 2018).

Digital Media Utilities and Communicative Benefits

This section discusses how digital media allow users to express their opinions, beliefs, share thoughts and participate in interactive conversations with prospects for unique ways of civic political engagement. It attests to the fact that, while digital and traditional media differ extensively, this disjuncture is evident with respect to communications flow and audience penetration (Hutchins & Rowe, 2012), as determinants of the medium's appeal.

The blurring of production and consumption of information

Unlike traditional, digital media engagements have increasingly become amenable to the ordinary person both in terms of production and consumption where most users with no expertise can thrive on their volition and actual construction to optimally function online (Lindgren, 2017).

As such, content production and consumption are not seen as rigidly separated anymore, rather the lines between them are blurred as users can create personal blogs and podcasts, record their daily activities as they wish, and post videos on YouTube. Judging by the popularity and level of buzz these platforms have created among users, it can be argued that the blur between media production and consumption has widely been embraced (Wood, 2012). Subsequently, this has made digital media platforms more popular, particularly among citizens who view them as a way of self-expression to make their opinions count and to share their views with other users or communicators (Lindgren, 2017).

Propensity to alter conceptions of space

Prior to the invention of computers and the internet, space was understood as an abstract and astronomical concept including within political contexts, and the space was viewed as a distinct phenomenon from the people, objects, and events that happened within it (Wood, 2012). However, of late digital media have successfully bridged this space and time among users, thereby enabling them to have instant communication through text chats, voice chats, and video calling et cetera, which defy the geographic distance between correspondents (Chen, Mao, & Qiu, 2018). Beyond overcoming the traditional challenge of geographic distance, digital media have been commended for facilitating instant communication and users' aptitude to alter the conception of space. In political contexts, this would entail the ability to access information or participate in platforms that traditionally would have been impossible to partake in due to physical distance and time constraints.

Low cost and a high degree of user-friendliness

One of the benefits of digital media applications, particularly social media networks is their public availability on web browser-enabled devices such as a smartphone or a personal computer at a relatively low cost (White et al., 2011). Applications such as WhatsApp enable users to interactively communicate at nearly zero cost particularly during promotions, thereby affording users ample time to converse without fear of immediate depletion of airtime or data. Most importantly, nearly all social media platforms rely on highly user-friendly interfaces which require minimal technical skills for optimal use (Elefant & Black, 2012). This is a good gesture for ordinary users who may be semi-literate or relatively illiterate because they do not have to provide requisite educational or professional qualifications to partake in any form of personal or collective interaction with other users.

Enablers of community-based communication

In the context of interactive communication, digital media technologies do enable ordinary persons to construct their own meanings based on their personal experiences, something that allows formation of digital communities. This affords communities the latitude to share matters of common interest, such as political issues or a favourite television programme on the cards (Clow & Baack, 2012). Thus, through digital media technologies, community members can gather virtually and discuss topics of interest, share ideas and express both personal and collective views on matters of common interest. This has the potential to facilitate community colloquia which enables users to meet both professional and lay people to share divergent or similar views via these virtual links (Chen, Mao, & Qiu, 2018). Such connections enable users to explore areas of common interest by meeting content mediators who may contribute towards their personal and collective knowledge of political issues. For example, digital citizens can create a group where they share common or personal experiences which can later be aired on mainstream media platforms where they may end up receiving public attention.

Facilitation of links for connectedness

Most kinds of digital media, especially social media networks thrive on connectedness, making use of links to other sites, resources, and people as multipliers. For most cases, these forms enable users to converse with other participants such as friends, family, parents, and potential clients in a relatively safe and convenient online environment (Lindgren, 2017). For these reasons, most people spend time on social media for different purposes including chatting, updating profiles, getting along with old friends, and meeting new ones during online sessions (Grey & Silver-Pacuilla, 2011). Contrary to traditional forms of media, digital media platforms have a personal rather than public focus, which makes it possible for users to derive personal gratification even in sole transactions (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). It is this ubiquitous nature that sets digital media above traditional forms of media whose packaging processes stem from a heterogeneous and often consultative scope of practice rather than a personal appeal.

Theoretical Proposition on New Media Communication

Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST)

DeSanctis and Poole (1994) promulgated this theory as a modification of Giddens' (1984) Structuration Theory following studies on the role of information technology to enable the understanding of organisational or societal change. The theory proposes that advanced information technologies such as social networking sites do not only facilitate multiparty participation in society but also ensure the exchange of information about activities within organisations through information management. Furthermore, the theory promulgates that a bi-directional exchange between society as a system and technology as a structure often develops in which societies adopt information technologies to enhance human interaction and public communication. Subsequently, it argues that technologies are and represent the medium, but are also the outcome of social actions with societies facilitating the circulation of the information. Through a structuration process, systems and structures exist in a relationship where they produce and reproduce each other. The AST emphasises the importance of how the technologies are used, with the users acting as agenda-setters for the kind of information they receive and how they respond to it (Rains & Bonito, 2017).

The relevance of AST in studying digital media relates to its ability to facilitate an effective analysis of how new information and communication technologies are used in society as well as how they permeate existing functions. For example, an analysis of conversations on Twitter reflects the theory's functional link involving the transfer of information from one group in society to another (Rains & Bonito, 2017). This may be inclusive of interactions among individual politicians or a group of politicians with their existing or potential electorates and between electorates. Notably, these bi-directional interactions usually evolve meanwhile shifting back and forth between the users through the medium, from the system (society) to structure (technology) and vice versa. In the context of the tenets of the Adaptive Structural Theory, as the medium evolves, it impacts society with the inherent potential to inspire change (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). As such, digital (social) media should be seen as social interaction technologies that have virtuously permeated the post-modern world, eventually playing a major role in influencing various fields of society including politics.

Media richness theory

The media richness theory is an ingenious philosophy of organisational communication which makes predictions about behaviour and outcomes in connection with various communication contexts. Even though the theory was developed well before the emergence of the internet and the widespread use of electronic communication technologies available today, the scope of media richness theory's

predictions is relevant to digital media (Kock, 2010). The theory proposes that different media have different degrees of media richness and leanness in their effort to transmit information. Media richness is defined as the capacity of information exchange within a time interval (Zelkowitz, 2010), thus the difference between media richness and leanness is the amount of information a medium could convey to change the receiver's understanding of the message within a time interval. The proposition is premised within the social presence theory as it espouses that the increased richness of the media is linked to the increased social presence of users (Zelkowitz, 2010). For example, when users of social media are both online, communication becomes easy as each individual makes an effort to make sure that the information received by the other user is understood. If not understood, one user is able to ask the other user to rephrase or explain themselves right away. This communication is instant, thereby allowing the participants to respond to one another immediately.

Media richness theory argues that the media differ in their level of richness and this is determined by four criteria, which are natural language, the capacity of the medium to carry multiple cues, degree of personal focus, and the speed of feedback (Cheng, 2008). This infers that the richest medium would have to offer not just one but all four aspects. Subsequently, this would allow users to communicate in any language which they feel comfortable with, and be presented with multiple cues with which to express themselves whenever the need arises. The medium would also allow users to personalise the medium while also affording them the opportunity to discuss personal issues within their comfort zones and enjoy speedy feedback. For these reasons, some scholars have attributed the selection of a particular technology by users to the richness of the medium or the objective characteristics of the medium (Joosten, 2012), an aspect that makes digital media important in communication.

The theory further makes two predictions that argue that, for effective communication to occur, media users often choose the richest possible media available to them. Secondly, when the choice of media is constrained (e.g. only when the medium is available), media users resort to the use of a lean communication platform. Thus, both social presence and media richness theories uphold the view that the perceived sense of the social presence of a medium is proportional to the medium's richness. Hence, rich media with a wide communication capacity also have a high level of social presence (Zelkowitz, 2010). Overall, this basically means that the richer the media platform, the more social presence it will provide to the users who then interact on the basis of its qualities.

Digital Media Political Campaigns: Towards Disintermediated Political Communication in Africa

This section discusses how digital media impacts political campaigns in an environment where media users engage with simple technologies such as smartphones and tablets to access political information during campaigns. For many people, including those in rural Africa, this is possible without the need to acquire special training as would be the case with other professional gadgets or software.

Diminishing the power of voice with digital optics

With the advent and proliferation of digital media technologies, particularly social media networks, the traditional political thought processes involved in political campaigns for leadership in society have been dramatically transformed. The ever-increasing penetration levels of media technology in people's daily lives has yielded a situation where the political sphere is compelled to adapt to the *modus operandi* associated with the digital technological revolution (Dingli & Seychell, 2015), as opposed to the power of the voice. Twitter in particular has enabled a disintermediation process in politics by replacing the power of voice from conventional media to digitally-inclined politics. Where news media and journalists have traditionally been powerful intermediaries in communicating politics and exerting political influence, politicians now use digital platforms such as Twitter to

lure potential voters and engage civic society on political issues. In conjunction with other digital platforms, they use it to directly state their opinions to the electorate, at times using it as a campaign platform, where they covertly attempt to set good examples to their followers through personal tweeting behaviour (Kruikemeier, 2014).

Adaptation and stimulation of political consciousness

Some scholars have noted digital (social) media's perceived instrumental role in projecting negative rhetoric in the political arena (Lee & Quealy, 2018), particularly in developed countries such as the United States of America. They claim that traditional propaganda techniques such as *loaded words* which enabled the use of concepts with strong negative connotations and antics like *name-calling* have been adapted to digital platforms. Specifically, Das Sarma (2016) remarked on how Twitter has augmented propaganda techniques by bolstering their personal nature to facilitate political grandstanding and posturing in contemporary politics.

Despite this notion, this tendency has disintermediated political rhetoric due to digital media's ability to stir political consciousness among the citizenry. This is confirmed by Crockett (2016) who analysed 2,500 tweets posted by former President Donald Trump over a period of 8 months during his campaign for the USA presidency. The study noted that, despite being mostly negative, Trump's use of rhetoric in his Twitter handle gave his campaign an edge over other political rivals in the presidential race (Das Sarma, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that, while digital media platforms may be adaptable to traditional techniques of political campaigns (White, King., & Tsang, 2011), this happens in a digitally savvy media environment populated by planetary citizens.

Unfettered access to uncensored political information

Digital media technologies, particularly social media networks have changed the way political information is accessed and how potential voters interact with it as opposed to content subjected to strict editorial control and gatekeeping (Kruikemeier, 2014). This is particularly applicable in places where citizens remain highly fragmented and large segments are cut off from the mainstream media (Rodny-Gumede, 2017). In some parts of Africa, poor signal distribution, costly DStv subscriptions and the multiplicity of languages or dialects that compete for airspace have compounded editorial and programme scheduling practices (Pick & Sarkar, 2015). Moreover, it has been difficult to meet the informational needs of the broad scope of audiences in such places due to age group preferences, cultural and linguistic dictates. This situation has left some parts of society feeling marginalised, thereby providing fertile ground for political opportunism and grandstanding when politicians make ambitious promises to desperate communities. In view of these limitations, digital media's easily accessible formats, have become alternative sources of uncensored political information (Hobbs & Roberts, 2018). Subsequently, the electorate can switch sources to suit their informational needs on favourite online news tags and independent political analysts. To a large extent, such growing access to a variety of media platforms offers added opportunities to voters to get alternative political information with which to inform their decision-making processes.

Prospects for truism and information verification

Digital tools provide citizens with platforms for possible information verification as means of counteracting propaganda tactics. As digital media technologies continue to become an integral part of people's daily lives, mainstream media, including public service broadcasting have been compelled to adapt to the drastic changes associated with the limitless opportunities available on these platforms (Hobbs & Roberts, 2018). With their inherent ability to facilitate multi-path, multi-directional dialogue between individuals (person to person/person to group), influencers, and

companies (Powell et al., 2011), digital media have changed the conceptualisation of information as a homogeneous exercise with similar tastes and needs (Rodny-Gumede, 2017). This has deconstructed the passive and gullible consumption of political information as the *gospel truth* which could not be questioned, particularly from the popular liberators. Before the proliferation of digital media, political rhetoric was largely churned out through state broadcasting entities (Muswede & Lubinga, 2018). Conversely, the digital platforms have empowered citizens with tools of information verification, thereby broking the erstwhile state-interventionist tendencies associated with state broadcasters' cajoling as purveyors of truth. This helps to curb the hegemonic control of state broadcasters which often succumb to ideological pressure (Mendel, 2011), a situation that often leads to the hypnotisation of the vulnerable populace into political oblivion. Thus, the social presence of digital media broadens the political space towards the promotion of pluralistic ideas that empower citizens to make informed choices about who should lead them.

Optimisation of citizen participation and political engagement

Both the adaptive structuration and social presence theories discussed above do infer that, due to their interactivity features, digital media platforms have the ability to influence and enhance active citizen participation. In the recent past, they have been used to promote civic activism, voter education, and mobilisation based on their user-benefit features which encourage open dialogue (Karekwaivanane & Msonza, 2021). Their interactive nature has transformed media users from being mere consumers of content to active participants with the ability to co-produce content in the form of citizen journalism (Saridou et al., 2018). For this reason, they have become the foremost tools for dissemination of breaking new accounts, with the possibility to stimulate political dialogue into new perspectives. As a platform for citizen engagement, they are not time-bound (Sang-Hee, Kyung-Ho, & Do-Hyun, 2011), a feature that enables users to write or post anything information they wish to 'trend' or popularise. In the context of political engagement, this speaks to daily interactions based on self-expression and sharing of information on platforms from which they can get immediate feedback from other activists, politicians, or potential voters. This is enhanced through the multiple apps and feedback regimes that operate without diminishing the number of users partaking in the conversation. This is dissimilar to mainstream media where preferred guests usually dominate the content and only a handful of participants get an opportunity to contribute to the political debate.

Conclusion

This article notes that, in today's digital media landscape, information dissemination and consumption patterns have drastically shifted away from traditional formats to more adaptable and personalised platforms linked to digital power or mobile culture (Lindgren, 2017), as gateways to digitally inclined politics. As a result, access to political information, participation, and opinion formulation operate in a radically transformed political context wherein the electorate has become elusive participants in the electoral process. As such, the erstwhile tendency of intermediated political campaigns that thrived on propaganda, orature, and state censorship, to serve the interest of the elite has been extensively disintermediated by digitalisation. This is because contemporary politics now occurs in the buoyancy of unfettered access to alternative political information with the potential to diminish the power of the "voice"; stimulating new forms of political consciousness; cultivating optimisation of political engagement and yielding prospects for truism through verification of political information both pre and post-elections. In the end, the article concludes that digital media have radically changed how the electorate participates in African politics, meanwhile cascading its ability to empower citizens to redefine their sense of political space in a disintermediated environment.

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Unmasking the Diversionary Global Imperial Designs in the Invasion of Libya in 2011, ten years on, and counting

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Abstract

In this article, I analyse the machinations of Western modernity that were manifested in the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Libya. The principal objective of the paper is three-pronged. Firstly, I critically observe the reasons for the uprisings in Libya. Secondly, I critically analyse the Libyan government's response to the protests. Lastly, I focus on the responses of the NATO-led so-called international community. The article employs a decolonial lens of analysis to address this three-in-one objective, on the basis that the current discussions on Libya's political impasse are deficient in addressing fundamental matters of intersections between regional, and global designs that fuelled the 2011 uprisings in Libya. I seek to answer why, fundamentally, was Libya targeted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), if saving lives as it purported was not achieved, and the intervention only exacerbated the conflict and increased the death toll as a result? The qualitative methodology is used and the paper uses secondary sources that are available in the public domain. The findings are that the Libyan invasion was a targeted and selective application of the legal norm of the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P), quasi-insulated from legal reproach by being sanctioned by the United Nations (UN). As such, the UN was used as a vehicle for the powerful located in the Global North to punish a member of the weak Global South. Therefore, the Libyan invasion by NATO forces further entrenched the colonial global power structural configuration of the Euro-North American-centric world.

The Libyan Leg of the Arab Spring Uprisings

The 20th of October 2021, marked exactly ten years after the demise of President Muammar al Gaddafi of Libya, in the Arab Spring protests that enveloped North Africa and parts of the Arabic world in 2011 (Beaumont & Stephen, 2011). The Arab Spring protests in Libya started on the 15th of February 2011 with the protests in Benghazi. As evinced by the British Broadcasting Corporation (2013b), "Libya's uprising began in February 2011 after security forces in the eastern city of Benghazi opened fire on a protest". Libya's crisis today can be traced as far back as the Lockerbie crisis of Scotland (1987), however, the Arab Spring uprisings were the political context that gave rise to the Libyan invasion. The contention is that this reportage from the BBC is misleading as I will argue that the opening of fire was just propaganda against Gaddafi by Western mass media. Ghosh (2011:16) concurs with Campbell (2013:67) that the local version of the Arab Spring uprisings in Libya started on the 15th of February 2011.

As a result of the uprisings, about 1000 people died in the Libyan protests compared to about 3500 people who died in similar protests in Syria, before the so-called United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-led NATO intervention in Libya. Of course, the toll in Syria has since soared as that conflict continues unabated. Rettig reveals that "before the NATO mission to protect rebels began in mid-March, reports suggested that Gaddafi's forces had already killed over a thousand people". The

irony is that, as a result of the intervention of the UNSC-led NATO in Libya, about 30000 people died (Campbell, 2013:30; Al Jazeera News Agency, 2016; Khan, 2016; Rettig, 2011). This then raises the question, why fundamentally was Libya targeted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), if saving lives as it purported was not achieved and the intervention only exacerbated the conflict as a result? This is therefore the question that this article seeks to answer while highlighting the implications of Libya's invasion in Africa.

It is established that the Libyan regime under the command of President Gaddafi, was a challenge to the Western bloc that housed NATO (Nazemroaya, 2012:127; Prashad, 2011:6-7). It was only a matter of time before the West's cunning regime-change agenda would be implemented (Zoubir, 2002, p. 33). The contention is that while NATO, in the name of the international community, intervened militarily in Libya's Arab Spring protests, it did not intervene in the same manner in other countries that witnessed the Arab Spring protests too in their domains, if NATO intervened at all. In other words, NATO variably responded to the Libyan leg of the Arab Spring protests, in comparison to Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Bahrain, for example. The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia resisted the Arab Spring protests by unleashing state-security forces to quell the rebellion (Al Jazeera News Agency, 2015; Cordall, 2018; The Firstpost, 2012; Graham-Harrison, 2018). The Mubarak regime in Egypt, invariably from Tunisia, suppressed the citizens' protests and used state-sponsored force to liquidate the protests (Elliot, 2011, p. 22; Gosh, 2011, p. 16; Rettig, 2011; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011b; Al Jazeera News Agency, 2016b).

Similarly, the Al Bashir regime in Sudan identically crushed citizens' protests by unbridling state-security forces on protesters (Rosen, 2012, p. 57; Abdelaziz, 2011; Medani, 2013, p. 37). Furthermore, indistinguishably from Sudan's response, the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime in Yemen equally responded with violence to its local version of the Arab Spring protests (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2013a; Gosh, 2011, p. 16; The Cornell University Library, [n.d.]; Bakri & Goodman, 2011). Invariantly from Yemen, the Isa al-Khalifa regime's response was that of violent resistance to the peaceful protests of the local Arab Spring protests (Gosh, 2011, p. 16; McEvers, 2012; Rettig 2011). Other governments, including the international community and NATO particularly, did not intervene, nor interfere in the domestic affairs of these named sovereign states. Put differently, the Libyan regime responded pliably to all other governments that were affected by the Arab Spring protests. However, the Libyan government's response was to illicit a variably response from NATO, in the name of the so-called international community.

What is of significance and posited here is that "at the first sign of protests in Libya, the UN, through the tripartite alliance of Britain, France and America, expeditiously convened and passed UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973 that made it possible for the trio-led 'international community' to interfere and invade Libya" (Nyere, 2020, p. 104). The response, which was more of a reaction, from NATO to the Libyan crisis of 2011 stands out as divergent from how the international community had responded to similar protests in the respective countries affected. In the Libyan case, the set precedent - that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states - was to have an exception. This suggests some form of targeting or some custom-made and selective application of responses or processes.

Suffice it to note that Gosh in his analysis of the Libyan crisis of 2011, characterised Gaddafi as a despot who was a tyrant and dictator; unsurprisingly, this characterisation is underwritten by Western media and neoliberal scholarship (Time, 2011, p. 16; Taylor, 2017). As such, this tyrant and dictator had to be dislodged and silenced. Western-centric mass media and scholarship "pathologise[d], bastardise[d] and demonise[d] and therefore, legitimatise[d] the elimination of Gaddafi" (Nyere, 2020, p. 124). Western media operationalised the elimination of Gaddafi by othering him. Campbell (2013, p. 67) mentions that "Western intelligence services that had cooperated with Gaddafi were

now stroking propaganda against him and mobilising the media to argue that there was an imminent massacre of civilians in Benghazi". The tainting of Gaddafi through negative characterisation by Western mass media inadvertently placed itself as the standard and canon, with which everything else is judged, therefore, it controls (mis)information (in the case of Libya) and knowledge (Barovick, Romero, Sanburn, Suddath, Tharoor, & Webley, 2011). "Britain's (British Broadcasting Corporation) France's (France 24) and the US' (Cable News Network)" were the vehicle of the West that was used in the propaganda against the Gaddafi regime in 2011 (Nyere, 2020, p. 124).

The Decolonial Framework

Decolonial thought is advanced here in combat of a Euro-North American-centric narrative and tradition of thought that dominated the Libyan narrative of 2011, and still does to this day. Decoloniality is both an epistemological movement and a political movement of resisting colonial and imperial domination of the formerly colonised (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015, p. 485). Decoloniality is, therefore, meant to dismantle and expose the fault lines of that Eurocentric modernity and disrupt the asymmetrical power relation of the resultant world system (Maldonado-Torres, 2011). It is posited here that the domineering narrative of what transpired in Libya in 2011 is largely European, which is a misnomer given that Libya is in Africa. I argue that it is a Western-style of democracy that was perceived as ideal for Libya (Nyere, 2020), hence there was an agenda to democratise and liberalise Libya (Campbell, 2013, p. 69). Gaddafi was anti-imperial and anti-colonial; it only makes sense to analyse him from his own positionality and locality. As such, a decolonial analysis is meant to evince and affirm the ideals that Gaddafi stood for, and the ideals that he was prepared to ultimately defend with his very life.

The Causes of the Libyan Leg of the Arab Spring Uprisings

Following from the Tunisian leg of Arab Spring uprisings of the 17th of December 2010, that were sparked by the self-setting alight of a street trader, Mohamed Bouazizi, the Egyptian leg of the Arab Spring uprisings was to take off on the 25th of January 2011 (Hess, 2013, p. 254; Plaetzer, 2014, p. 258; Al Jazeera News Agency, 2016). Libya, in the semblance of the Arab Spring protests of the time, was to follow suit starting from the 17th of February 2011 (Hweio, 2012, p. 112). I note that there is an almost one-month gap between the escalation of the protests from one country to the other, in the North African region particularly.

The protests in Libya were coordinated and they began simultaneously in different cities but were intense in the Eastern parts of Libya, where Gaddafi originated from. Corruption by government officials was cited to be the major cause of the Arab Spring protests in Libya (Abdessadok, 2017; Serafimov, 2012). Hweio (2012, p. 112), adds that this alone meant that Libya genuinely needed political reforms internally if it was to realise a democratic society. Of course, other authors pointed out Gaddafi's dictatorial tendencies as the primitive rationale that sparked the Libyan dissent (Middle East Monitor, 2017; Gosh, 2011, p. 16; Lynch, 2011, p. 69). Yet, others cited that the Libyan state had abused its citizens' human rights for long as the state systematically excluded minorities from enjoying the natural resources of Libya (Serafimov, 2012; Reuters, 2011; Bouckaert, 2011). Therefore, it can be concluded that there was a myriad of reasons and causes of the Libyan version of the Arab Spring protests, which then suggests that there may very well have been protracted issues that the Libyan government ought to have addressed, but did not, or was still in the process of addressing.

The Response of Libyan Government to its Local Leg of the Arab Spring Uprisings

The responses from NATO and the so-called international community left a lot to be desired. Unverified online messages, including Facebook messages, were used as authoritative sources to determine that Gaddafi had issued threats to his countrymen and women, and that that was the basis to intervene in Libya. As evinced by Gosh (2011, p. 16), quoting Gaddafi who had issued a communication that he would not "succumb to revolutionary rap songs, Facebook pages, and nonviolent demonstrations". This was interpreted to mean that Gaddafi was to kill his people to protect his interests, whatever those were! Of course, this is deficient and was meant to sanitize the NATO invasion of Libya. Admittedly, Gaddafi's regime engaged state-security forces in responding to the internal uprisings in Libya, as he ought to have done anyway, but that move was really in preparation for eventualities that ordinarily occur in such scenarios. While, Hweio (2011, p. 112) argues that the Gaddafi regime unleashed violence to the initially peaceful protests in Libya, that observation negates the fact that some Western powers, together with some Arab countries, sponsored rebels in Libya with artillery and weaponry to destabilise Libya (Nazemroaya, 2012, pp. 127-128; Campbell, 2012, p. 59). The sponsoring of arms and weapons was to give credence to the Western false narrative that there was war in Libya, thereby consolidating the West's *Casus Bello* on Libya. In other words, seeing that the claims that Libya was at war with itself were not going to stand, Western powers had to stage a war by planting the so-called Libyan rebels and providing them with weaponry to convince the world that there was need for military intervention in Libya, yet NATO intended to militarily invade Libya for its own ends (Gazzini, 2011, pp. 2-3).

The Murdering of a Sitting President, Muammar al Gaddafi

President Muammar Gaddafi was killed by remotely piloted missiles while fleeing Sirte, his home area, by US forces (Gazzini, 2012, p. 3). Gaddafi's convoy was fleeing from a battle between his forces and Western-sponsored 'rebels' when it was assaulted by missiles "from a US Air Force base in Nevada that compelled the [Gaddafi] loyalist convoy of 75 vehicles to disperse" (Gazzini, 2012, p. 3). While still trying to contain the battle, Gaddafi's convoy was further subjected to heavy artillery at the instruction of NATO that commandeered a French jet to discharge "two 500-pound bombs" that charred "a dozen vehicles and killing at least 25 loyalists" (Gazzini, 2012, p. 3). The uncorroborated assumptions that emerged were that this second airstrike by the French at the instruction of NATO, may have caused Gaddafi's vulnerability; as a result, he sought refuge at a proximate makeshift shelter. It is at the makeshift shelter that Gaddafi was discovered by Libyan 'rebels' who shot and killed him (Gazzini, 2012, p. 3). There is no doubt therefore that NATO, the US, Britain, France, and Qatar participated in the killing of a sitting African Head of State and Government of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, with no consequence, which suggests a regime-change agenda from the very top echelons of the so-called international community. Gazzini (2012, p. 3), Campbell (2012, p. 125), and Hweio (2012, p. 112) attest to the idea that these foreign forces, Britain, France and the US, were responsible for arming 'rebels' in the Libyan debacle.

The contradictory explanations that were offered by the then Libyan interim Premier, Mahmoud Jibril, attests to the obvious foul play around the killing of Gaddafi. Jibril's first explanation stated that Gaddafi had died in an ambulance enroute to a medical facility to receive medical treatment for the wounds he had sustained in the fire exchange. However, that explanation was rebutted by the ambulance driver who put it on record that, in his own words, "I did not try to revive [Gaddafi] because he was already dead"; this, the driver stated when he attended the scene (Gazzini, 2012, p. 2).

Hweio (2012, p. 112) quips that it was the foreign-armed and backed opposition fighters that were to "quickly form the Transitional National Council (TNC)" which had to steer the reformed and democratic Libya. Suffice it to note that Nicolas Sarkozy, the then French president "met the

fledging NTC leaders at the Elysee Palace on March 10 [2011] and surprised everybody (including the opposition themselves) by granting them official recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people" (Gazzini, 2012, p. 4). The granting of official recognition to a warring party is tantamount to coloniality of power, it was not Libyans who recognised the TNC officially, but a European country, France. It demonstrated that, in Libya, the regime-change agenda was foreign to Libya; it belonged to France and it was not the conation of Libyans necessarily. In other words, the TNC was a veneer of a European regime-change agenda in Libya.

What is telling in the Libyan debacle is that three days after the killing of Gaddafi, the TNC announced that it was going to pave the way for Libyans to hold democratic elections within eight months (Hweio, 2012, p. 113); this has not materialised to date because it was never the end goal for European countries to let democracy flourish in that African country. Instead, the chaos that Libya is in today, was Europe's desired end goal. With chaos, there is no regulation and control of what transpires in Libya. Now Europeans are plundering Libya's resources without being held to account, as they would have under Gaddafi. Libya, as an African country that belongs to the zone of non-being in the conception of Europe (Maldonado-Torres, 2002, pp. 286-7; Ramose, 2001, p. 2), could not have succeeded as it did under Gaddafi; it had to be altered to fit a European characterisation of Africa, that of being diseased, war-torn, chaotic, uncivilised and therefore requiring a European saviour and messiah.

Analysis of the Libyan Leg of the Arab Spring Uprisings

So far we have established that the singling out of the Libyan regime's reaction to the Arab Spring protests in its domain spells the West's long-brewing regime-change agenda. It was as if the West was just waiting for an opportune time to operationalise it. In other words, the West had been standing guard waiting for an opportunity that would justify the reason to declare war on Libya. So, the Arab Spring protests became the *Casus Bello*. Naturally, Gaddafi had to defend his territory. However, his un-reflected statements contributed to his downfall. Gaddafi responded by assuring his nation that he was prepared to "fighting to the end" in defence of Libyan territory (Gosh, 2011, p. 18). I argue that while these sentiments were justified, they were un-reflected as they gave the West an opportunity to misconstrue what Gaddafi meant, and they did just that. Admittedly, Gaddafi's sentiments seemed to have threatened some quarters of the Libyan population, but they were more a basis for the West to use mass-media to communicate what favoured their regime-change agenda. The West interpreted what Gaddafi said to mean that the Libyans were in imminent danger whereas "Gaddafi was justifiably speaking against Western imperialism in Africa" (Tanoukhi & Mazrui, 2011, p. 151 cited in, Nyere, 2020, p. 127).

Gaddafi's resistance to Western imperialism and neo-colonialism is significant for Africa because it asserts Africa's position in the world. Whereas Gaddafi self-identified primarily as a Berber, Mazrui (in Tanoukhi & Mazrui, 2011, p. 15) reveals the other side of Gaddafi that he was "the first major leader of an Arab African country who regarded himself as an African first and an Arab second". This revelation by Mazrui is an affirmation that Gaddafi saw himself as rooted in Africa; Africa was his primary identity in terms of geo-locale. Therefore, it is correct for Professor Mazrui to highlight a Gaddafi who prided himself as African and "his African constituency as more-sincere and carrying greater promise for fulfilment than his solidarity with the Arabs" (Quoted in, Tanoukhi & Mazrui 2011, p. 151). More importantly, Gaddafi pronounced on his African heritage in July 2011, 3 months before his demise, at the African Union Opening, when he asserted that:

> The European experiment is of no use to us ... the area known, as North Africa should be Africanised. Either it will be an anomaly, and will therefore have no future. As an inhabitant of North Africa, I have always

rejected the Barcelona agreement, which regards North Africa as part of the Middle East, with a vocation to integrate with Europe. This is a conspiracy against the integrity of Africa. They have said to me the Barcelona agreement and cooperation with the European Union will be to Libya's advantage. They want to draw us in and make use of us, through the Barcelona agreement, to dismember the African continent, stealing North Africa to make it join with the European Union. This is unacceptable. In any case, look at what has already become of the Barcelona agreement. It is in a comatose condition and could well disappear (*sic*) (Quoted in, Campbell, 2013, p. 19).

Gaddafi correctly asserted his locus of enunciation, i.e., a position that one thinks from. Suffice to note that this position that one thinks from is grounded in space and time; furthermore, it is geographical. One thinks from a particular place. In light of that, Gaddafi was thinking from the geo-locale of Africa, thereby countering the implied argument embedded and disguised in Western epistemologies that purport themselves as objective and a point of reference where all other knowledge is judged and assessed.

Furthermore, in light of the history of conquest and colonialism in Africa, Gaddafi had every right to think in the context of Africa and defend the African position in the face of European imperialism. Africa's interests were what Gaddafi was defending primarily in resisting the NATO invasion of Libya in 2011. Gaddafi's resistance to the monolithic and gigantic NATO-led European assault on Libya was antithetical to the US National Security Council (NSC) document number 68, which explicitly stated that the US was prepared to suspend universal human rights ascribed to all of humanity if those human rights stood in the way of its interests (Chomsky, 1986: 11). In other words, the US, Britain, and France, through NATO, ignored the human rights of Libyans, and by extension Africans' when they assaulted, not only the territorial integrity of Libya which is not only guaranteed by the doctrine of state sovereignty, but by international law. The NATO assault on Libya, and Africa trivialised the doctrine of state sovereignty as well as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as protection was not provided for the so-called vulnerable people of Libya.

More importantly, Western powers through the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995) crafted the Barcelona Agreement that sought to co-opt four African countries into the European political and economic territory (Kukushev, 2010). The four countries that Europe hoped to co-opt were Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; suffice it to note that these countries are Libya's immediate and regional neighbours. Gaddafi had resisted the Barcelona Agreement, and that stood at variance with the European agenda (Huliaras, 2001, p. 11; Zoubir, 2002, p. 35). Gaddafi's position therefore challenged the West's agenda in the Barcelona Agreement, and equally, disturbed the regime-change agenda of the US, Britain and France for Libya. Gaddafi's resistance to Western mechanisations in the Barcelona Agreement reflected his positionality, and that he instead, identified with the African agenda. He defended the integrity of the African Union, which was threatened by the Barcelona Agreement. Unsurprisingly, Western reportage and epistemologies deliberately omit and muffle such dynamics in its analyses of the Arab Spring protests especially as it relates to Libya.

Gaddafi's assertion and insistence that he was African, entrenched his positionality. Thus, by his assertion of his African positionality, Gaddafi alluded to the issue of instrumentalisation of Treaties, Agreements, and international legal outfits, such as R2P, International Humanitarian Law, by imperial powers for their power pursuits. Gaddafi was exposing how western-centered coloniality operates in reconfiguring its power matrices. The Barcelona Agreement was, meant to partition the North African region and join it with the Arabic world to unify the Arabic region with Europe (Kukushev, 2010). In other words, the Barcelona Agreement sought to Europeanise North Africa, via the Arab world. Gaddafi was not one to fall for this ploy. Even more, reason western modernity and coloniality loathed Gaddafi; he could see through the mask and charade they put up.

The response by the international community to Libya's case of its local version of the Arab Spring protests demonstrates an asymmetrical, targeted, vilifying, and selective response. Rosen (2012, p. 57) described the National Congress Party's regime in Sudan as the worst repressive regime of the countries that were affected by the Arab Spring protests (Rosen, 2012, p. 57). Yet, there was no international intervention in Sudan. This shows that the invasion of Libya was a *prima facea* of a long-standing regime change agenda of the West. The West, in its collective, awaited a convenient *Casus Bello* to launch the attack. There is clear uniformity in the responses of the *international community* in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Bahrain. The common thread is that there is non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. There is a sudden variance in the response when it comes to Libya because Libya stood antithetical to Western domination and Western control on power matrices and levers that perpetuate coloniality and modernity.

On 20 February 2011, Gaddafi's son, Saiph al-Islam, cautioned of the impending danger that would accompany his father's forceful departure from office, elimination, or demise (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011a). He "warned that the country would regress into tribal wars and turn into a place where 'everyone wants to become a sheik or an emir'" (Gosh, 2011, p. 19). Al-Islam's warnings were, dismissed and branded as a case of sour grapes and did not receive much attention and airplay. In the typical form of Eurocentric modernity, it was instead the views such as those held by Abdelnabi Yasin, a Libyan citizen, and writer who was in self-imposed exiled in Athens, Greece, at the time, that dismissed al-Salam's forewarnings rebutted al-Islam's view and argued instead that, "we are not the medieval society that Saif described" (Quoted in, Gosh 2011, p. 19). Hweio (2012, pp. 112-113) validates Saif al-Islam's caution to Libya and the world as, "Gaddafi's regime ended when Gaddafi was captured in his tribal homeland of Sirte and killed by the opposition fighters on October 20, 2011". Saif al-Islam was right in that without Gaddafi, Libya was to descend into tribal wars and conflicts. The chaos and vacuum of leadership to date (2022) bears testimony to it.

Professor of political science, Fathi Baja, was part of the protestors who denounced Gaddafi's rule and was active in the Benghazi region. He now forms part of the Committee that leads Benghazi. He argues that the revolution was about the "creation of a modern Libya, freedom, and democracy based on a pluralistic society, based on human rights, participation of all parts of Libya in creating their government and their institutions" (Gosh, 2011, p. 19). The chaos that was to, later visit Libya, from the first day that the US, French, British and Qatari armies (Gazzini 2012, p. 3; Campbell, 2012, p. 100) engaged in combat with Gaddafi's forces in 2011 is felt today still. To this date (2022), there is not a credible national government in Libya that is recognised by all Libyans, let alone the so-called international community. The chaos that manifests today was foretold by Saif al-Islam; needless to note that his warnings were negated and dismissed as "dire prophecies [that] are typical of failing regimes" (Gosh, 2011, p. 19).

The US, Britain, and France had scores to settle with Gaddafi's Libya following the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (Bowen, 2006, p. 17; Huliaras, 2002p. 11; Zoubir, 2002, p. 34), the downing of *Union de Transports Aériens* (UTA) Flight 772 over the Niger desert (Davies, 2013; Huliaras, 2002, p. 12; Zoubir, 2002, p. 34), and the bombing of the *La Belle* disco in Berlin (Hweio, 2012, p. 112; Zoubir, 2002, p. 33), Germany among other incidences. The perceived close ties between Tripoli and Moscow - a nemesis of the US - precipitated the animosity towards Libya by the US and its allies. Libya's advancement in proposing a gold-backed single-African currency was set to compete with the US dollar (Gwaambuka, 2016; Koenig, 2017). Libya advanced the development of a communication satellite via the Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation (RASCOM) which was set to compete with global mass media corporations (Pougala, 2012, p. 170; RASCOM, n.d.). These developments were challenging the very praxis upon which the current world order rests. As Gaddafi could not be trusted by this Western-centric world system, there was no telling on

how he would use the resources at his disposal to challenge - with reasonable success - the current asymmetrical, biased, hierarchised, patriarchised, and racialised world order.

So, to put a stop to that, the West used the theatrics and optics of a humanitarian crisis in Libya premised on unfounded mass-media overdrive that pushed a narrative that discredited Gaddafi (Gosh, 2011: 16; Campbell, 2013: 67). In the process, arresting all of Gaddafi's efforts reduced Gaddafi's success to ground zero.

Implications of the invasion of Libya and the killing of Gaddafi for Africa

The NATO assault on Libya's Gaddafi was, and still is, tantamount to assaulting all of Africa and the African agenda for developing itself. NATO and its allies molested the territorial integrity of Africa by invading one of Africa's sovereign states. This exposes the attitude and disdain with which NATO and its allies relate to what it 'others'. The superiority that the West thinks it is over other civilisations was further consolidated in the invasion of Libya. African states, at best, issued statements condemning the invasion but did nothing else beyond that rhetoric. Africa could have unionised and imposed sanctions and trade embargos with the NATO-member countries to indicate and register its displeasure, not only in word but deed. Militarily, Africa could not have taken up arms and fought NATO. But economically, Africa could have dented the West's insatiable thirst for oil, gold, platinum, cobalt, and all the other minerals that it so depends on. If Africa does not unite in purpose, it will continue to be trampled upon by the West, especially Britain, France, and the US, and more recently, China.

The killing of Gaddafi signalled to African Heads of State and Governments that they too can be killed without consequence. The West, in that regard, successfully bullied and silenced African Heads of States. By implication, since Heads of State are representative of the general populace, the assault on Libya was an assault on all Africans. The failure of the AU to canvas for the imposition of trade embargos and some sort of sanction on the West on the invasion of Libya, exposes the organisation, AU, and curtails what it represents, the resistance of Western imperialism particularly. Africa cannot afford to continue with business as usual, especially with respect to NATO and its allies. The natural resources and commodities that Africa has should be bargaining power and basis of engagement on Africa's terms, and not be dictated to by other countries regardless of their military might.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrated that the Arab Spring uprisings were hijacked by the West's agenda. It revealed that various governments that had the Arab Spring protests directed at them, resisted the protests and used violence to quell the demonstrations. Notably, NATO and its allies that purport to be the international community did not intervene in those countries. The non-interference stance by NATO and its allies in the Arab Spring-ridden countries consolidates the view that Libya was selectively targeted for the purpose of effecting regime change. The particular application of R2P, via the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, confirms the arbitrariness of the UN, and that casts doubt on the genuineness of a set of international norms that R2P, International Law and International Humanitarian Law are.

More importantly, the assassination of Gaddafi was made possible because the US, Britain, and France interfered in the domestic affairs of Libya. The Arab Spring demonstrations in Libya were hijacked by the US, the UK, and France to effect regime change as Gaddafi had proven to be a force to be reckoned with by the Euro-North American-centric world. Gaddafi's crime was that he had tinkered with the power structure of the current world order and that move was meant to unshackle Africa from its ascribed position of subservience to the West. In the conception of the West, that it

cannot co-exist without domineering other civilisations, Gaddafi had to be stopped, and if it meant killing him in the process, so it was! The asymmetrical power structural configuration that favours the Global North and the Western bloc particularly was simply reconfigured and remains intact.

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Building an African Counter-Terrorism Architecture

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Abstract

Following September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the world trade centre in the United States of America, the phenomenon of terrorism has attracted increasing global attention. Coupled with this is the observable trend in the proliferation of terrorist groups in many parts of the world. To tackle these issues, nation-states, sub-regional, regional and continental bodies face the daunting task of evolving effective strategies for checkmating or containing the phenomenon. Indeed, many African countries have come to be faced with the problem of how to curtail the activities of terrorist groups, most of who operate on an established external link with notable and wealthy global insurgency groups. The overarching effects of these threats have become unprecedented and worrisome in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the search for practical solutions has been a challenge to scholars, state functionaries, and even attack victims. The paper provides an overview of the apparent vulnerability of the continent to increasing terrorist-related activities and the weak capacities of African countries' leaders to respond to the unwholesome trend. Hence the call for developing a continental-counter terrorism strategy for the African continent.

Introduction

Terrorism is a threat to global peace and security. Many Nation-states across the globe are embroiled in the cessp ool of terrorism. While the terrorists may differ in their ideology and strategy of operations, their goals usually remain the same- to; instill fear in the hearts of the populace, kill innocent citizens, destroy state assets and symbols of authority, and alter existing socio-political, economic, or cultural values. However, differences in geography, culture, techno-scientific advancement make the articulation or adoption of a single counter-terrorism mechanism facile. This is due to differences in policy interpretations.

Lacquer likened terrorism to the workings of a multinational corporation. He postulated that an operation would be planned in western Germany by Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan with weapons supplied by an Algerian Diplomat, and financed with Libyan money (Lacquer,2000). It may be added that the casualties of this attack may certainly have diverse nationalities. Today the phenomenon of international terrorism has grown to become a giant monster associated with the constant loss of life, destruction, and unimaginable damage worldwide. The increase in lethality and the unprecedented dangers posed by terrorists become an evident threat to global security, peace, and development. Many African countries are today ravaged by homegrown terrorism with international connections. Some of these include; Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, Lords Resistance, Tuaregs, etc. As a result, African countries have adopted diverse anti-terrorism models with little results. The African Union (AU), AU counter-terrorism framework seems to be only effective on paper. Analysts argue that the African continent needs a unified counter-

terrorism strategy that is homegrown, taking into account the history, culture, and dynamics of existing terrorist groups in the continent (Makinda,2009; Tarek and Joanne,2016; Ramdeen, 2017). A situation where current strategies are anchored, wholly on foreign expert advice and western counter-terrorism models, makes the entire anti-terror pursuit an effort in futility. This paper is thus an attempt to rethink existing paroxysms of counter-terrorism in Africa and make a case for the development and adoption of a concretized Africa model. Besides, the paper provides insights into building sustainable regional counter-terrorism in Africa.

These views are shared by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who insists that by its very nature, terrorism constitutes an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes upon which the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), etc have an indispensable role to play in providing the legal and organizational framework upon which the campaign against terrorism can unfold. Today, the need to combat and contain the spread of terrorism has attracted the activities of the academic community. Schematically, the paper is divided into six parts; the introduction, section two examines some conceptual issues, Section three is the theoretical framework, section four interrogates and illuminates the contours of current debates on counter-terrorism (Soft Power versus Hard power, de-radicalization). And the fifth section explains further the central theme of the paper.

Conceptual issues

In this paper, terrorism, counter-terrorism is properly situated within the vortex of this essay. Terrorism lacks a generally accepted definition. It means many things to different people. This is because one man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter. Contrary to Seteolu's view that terrorism is a recent phenomenon, it is rather, historically, an age long term, which had been used many centuries ago to denote acts of violence or aggression against a constituted authority (Seteolu,2004). The term terrorism is derived from the Latin word "terrere", meaning terror, used to describe the systematic state of fear by an organized group of people in a state. Terrorism, to Schultz and Sloan, refers to the threat or use of extra forms of political violence in varying degrees with the aim of accomplishing certain political goals (Schultz and Sloan, 2009).

Seteolu avers that terrorism is the "resort to violence or terror for political ends by unauthorized non-governmental groups in pursuit of specific goals (Seteolu, 2004). It is a form of political violence that challenges the legitimacy and authority of the state" stressing the view of Jackson on what terrorism is (Jackson, 2008). Seteolu further identified four key characteristics of terrorism to include:

> A deliberate and planned strategy of political violence in pursuit of targeted goals (2) a form of political communication used in sending symbolic messages to targeted persons who may not necessarily be the victims of terror or violence but rather the audience(3) action with the intent of causing fear, harassing and intimidating society in pursuit of targeted goals (4) activities targeted primarily but not solely at civilians targets may include the military, police, institutions, and structures.

Lalude argues that terrorism is particularly a phenomenon of harmful extraordinary, extreme and unsettling violence usually caused by certain economic, socio-economic, cultural, and political injustices manifest in perceived depreciation, poverty, lack, illiteracy, unemployment, denials, among others (Lalude, 2011). The United Nations Security Council defines terrorism as

> criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or group of persons

or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

In addition, the United States of America Federal Criminal Code conceives terrorism as

Activities that involve violent...or life-threatening acts...that violate the criminal laws of the United States or any State and... appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. To influence the government's policy by intimidation or coercion or ... to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping and... occurs primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Terrorism in this paper is therefore seen as a deliberate, strategically articulated, planned violent acts targeted at civilians and government security personnel and institutions, through the use of bombs, chemical or biological weapons, machetes and guns, assassinations, kidnapping intended to coerce both government and civilian population and alter existing order. Terrorist groups influence government policies violently, especially with their activities. In recent times religion and politics are becoming the driving force for terrorism in Africa.

Current Debates on Counter-Terrorism

The term counter-terrorism lacks an acceptable definition and policy. This is because scholars and policymakers across disciplines and national frontiers have diverse understandings and approaches to counter-terrorism. What is more, every conflict involving terrorism has its unique characteristics. However, an attempt is made to situate the meaning of counter-terrorism within the vortex of this paper. Counter-terrorism refers to collectively articulated processes, strategies, and mechanisms toward preventing and eliminating the emergence, growth, development, and outbreaks of terrorist acts in a given society.

Counter-terrorism operations are subject to change according to the nature of the terrorism threat. Indeed, International terrorism, particularly Al-Qaeda terrorism, remains persistent and adaptive. However, terrorism is a tactic that cannot be entirely eradicated. Nevertheless, steps can be taken to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat organizations that use terrorism. As such, policy prescriptions in addressing threats coming from 'corrigible' groups like Hamas and Hezbollah will be different regarding the political context. The current threat in the environment and the conduct by the government in counter-terrorism operations will be additional.

Counter-terrorism is defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual as "Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism. Besides, Crenshaw (2010) sees counter-terrorism as the totality of all deliberately planned measures taken by the government and Non-governmental organizations, including civilians, to prevent, protect, and deter terrorism in a given geopolitical locale. The essence of counter-terrorism strategies is to ensure that conditions that lead to terrorism in human society are adequately immune from terrorism through institutional or legislative frameworks. Besides, counter-terrorism also includes a wide range of clear-cut measures such as the use of the military and the creation of viable social, political, economic, and cultural conditions germane for mutual peace and unity among people.

Counter-terrorism strategies connote all the measures and articulated policies designed to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Existing research tends to structure debates around two approaches namely the war model and the criminal justice mode (Wikinson, 2006). The war model tends to frame the struggle against terrorism in

military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing a counter-terrorism strategy. On the other hand, the criminal justice model champions the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in western democracies. Doing so puts restrictions on the government and thereby risks reducing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. However, as Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001) have argued both models rarely function according to academic theory during an actual counter-terrorism campaign. While democracies tend to champion democratic ideals and the preservation of civil liberties, their attempts to combat terrorism forcefully have continually tested the boundaries of the criminal justice model.

It is becoming increasingly clear that a new framework is needed in order to develop and measure successful counter-terrorism strategies considering the evolution of counter-terrorism, it could be more useful to view counter-terrorism in terms of "hard and soft power" (Schmid et al., 2009). This requires restricting the debate around a direct and indirect approach to counter-terrorism. The direct approach would be an enemy–centric doctrine consisting of primary offensive, hard power tactics such as predator and Reaper drone strikes, Special Forces operations, increased policing, and intelligence operations. These are useful tools if the goal is to isolate and destroy groups like Al-Qaeda.

The indirect soft power approach would consist of population-centric methods and would contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive. The direct approach to counter-terrorism is straight forward but it raises serious questions regarding the ethical and legal use of force –on top of the issue of collection of intelligence and the protection of civil liberties within a democratic society. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if soft power alternatives such as democracy promote economic development and counter-radicalization effectively address the ill-defined "root causes" of terrorism. For example, Jervis (2005) argues that poverty and economic inequality are the root cause of terrorism. Therefore, even though aid is given to weak states such as Afghanistan Pakistan, and Yemen it will be difficult to determine their effectiveness in countering Al-Qaeda's terrorism.

Providing development and increasing capacity building is questionable from a counter-terrorism perspective since a causal link between weak states and terrorism cannot be proven. Aid increases the standard of living, level of education, and general quality of life in some countries. It is difficult to argue that locals would turn to terrorism or political violence without it. Furthermore, such root theories would have to address the fact that home-grown terrorists radicalize and carry out attacks in democratic countries and weak and failing nations. While poverty and economic inequality are prevalent throughout the world, terrorism is not (Boyle, 2008). Finally, there is the issue of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization in counter-terrorism. Some argue that both are viewed as a complex process consisting of a variety of interdependent push and pull factors and triggering events that drive people into and out of terrorism (Horgan, 2009).

Social networks and group dynamics explain how individuals take up radicalization (Sageman, 2004). Theories of radicalization face difficulties in explaining individuals in terrorism. The reason is terrorist comes from a wide variety of backgrounds and there exists no single individual terrorist profile (Horgan, 2005). Vidino (2009) argues that any attempt to dismantle terrorist networks is similar to playing a game of whack-a-mole. Counter radicalization theories also have trouble measuring success from a counter-terrorism perspective because such programs essentially amount to increase community engagement that requires community leaders to target and mentor individuals who are presumably susceptible to terrorism recruitment.

Yet, it is difficult to prove that they would have turned to terrorism in the first place and more importantly, that they will not engage in terrorism afterward. Soft power can facilitate an exit

for individuals from terrorist groups, arguing that government counter-terrorism programs should offer terrorists a pathway out of terrorism by facilitating disengagement and rehabilitation (Horgan, 2005). In Lebanon, soft approaches such as political engagement and increased capacity building might influence bringing about Hezbollah's disarmament and its full integration into the Lebanese political system. Yet the fact remains that Hezbollah already chose to join the political process in Lebanon many years ago and has yet to decommission its military (Norton, 2007). However, attempts to weaken and isolate Hamas have proved questionable from a challenging power perspective. Hamas showed in 2006 that it could use democracy to its benefit without having to moderate its political aims.

On the other hand, the FMLN in Central America decommissioned its militia and joined a democratic system in early 1990; it is now one of the largest political parties in El Salvador. The records are mixed on whether democracy can offer groups a pathway out of terrorism. However, it is believed that soft power measures could offer specific individuals and groups some sort of pathway out of terrorism.

Theoretical Framework

The paper adopts the collective security theory. The collective security theory is based on the assumption that war and international conflict are rooted in the insecurity and uncertainty of power politics (Koskenniemi, 2004). Collective Security suggests that states as long as they pledge themselves to defend one another, have the capacity either to deter aggression in the first place or to punish the transgressor if international order has been breached. Successful collective security depends on three conditions. First, the states must be roughly equal, or there must be no preponderant power. Second, all states must be willing to bear the cost and responsibility of defending one another. Third, an international body must have the moral authority and military capacity to take effective action (Tuck, 2001). Collective security is the security arrangement in which all states cooperate to provide security for all by all actions against any states within the groups that might challenge the existing order by using force (Tuck, 2001).

Sovereign nations eager to maintain the status quo willingly cooperate accepting a degree of vulnerability and in some cases of minor countries, also accede to the interests of the chief contributing nations organizing the collective security. Collective Security is achieved by setting up an international cooperative organization under the auspices of international law and this gives rise to a form of international collective governance albeit limited in scope and effectiveness (Murphy, 1994). The collective security organization becomes an arena for diplomacy balance of power and exercise of soft power. Unless legitimized by the collective security organization, the use of hard power by states is considered illegitimate, reprehensible, and needing remediation of some kind (Tuck, 2001).

From the above explanations by the eminent scholars, collective security can then be seen as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign States whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack. According to Norman and Howard asserts "a collective security system, to be effective, must be strong enough to cope with aggression from any power or combination of powers, and it must be invoked if and as aggression occurs (Norman and Howard, 2007). The principle of collective security involves a willingness to apply sanctions as and when necessary and even to go to war. Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and fight an aggressor if necessary. It must be open to those states which are willing to accept its obligations in good faith.

Over the years there have been various calls for the formation of an African High Command, a Pan–African Defence (PADF), and an ECOWAS defense pact that would provide for the collective defense

and the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of African states (official journal of ECOWAS 1981). This demand for African collective security has been summed up as African collective security. The collective 'regional' safety is the military aspect of the pan-Africanist concept which implies, a voluntary association of states in which the countries involved pledge themselves to use their military power against any other member state that commits any acts of aggression within the region.

The African concept of collective security, just like that of the UN which makes provisions for regional security organizations is based on the need for states to, 'provide a conflict management method that can be utilized in a relatively peaceful environment through systematically standardized procedures for dealing with unacceptable international behavior (Amistutz, 1982). Hence, in the pan-African context, security is seen in the light of the defense of Africa's independence and solidarity with emphasis on the notion that:

> Africa's security is the national security of all African countries since any threat to African security represents direct or indirect to African security represents a direct or indirect threat to all Africans. (As such), Pan-Africanism shapes the strategic and foreign policies of African states. As a security doctrine and movement, it provides African states with a common focus and a common forum in security development matters and foreign policy (Nkrumah, 1961).

The concept of Collective Security was propounded by scholars, philosophers, and policymakers such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson who applied interests in security broadly to avoid grouping powers into opposing camps and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out. Collective Security literature and definitions of collective security are copious and still growing (Baylis, 2005). This assumes that regional security threats exist. It is in the interest of regional organisations to maintain order and stability in their regions. African leaders have established appropriate institutionalised organs within the AU for resolving and managing perennial conflicts in the region such as border clashes, ethnic/tribal differences, and political power rivalries. The AU's attempt at conflict resolution and crisis management is underscored by its principles embodied in the AU charter.

Building a Continental Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The African Perspective

One of the most striking features of how terrorism and counter-terrorism have evolved in sub-Saharan Africa during the last five years has been the resilience of terrorist groups to increasing large-scale national and international responses. There has also been substantial bilateral and multilateral support for counter-terrorism efforts in sub-Saharan Africa by the USA's wider international community (Situpart, 2013). Yet despite this, several of sub-Saharan Africa's most prominent terrorist groups have thrived, with Boko Haram resurgent even after a large scale assault on the group by Nigerian Security forces succeeded in killing its leaders and around 800 Boko Haram members in 2009 (Agbiboa,2013) and with the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi illustrating only too well that Al-Shabaab still can strike beyond the borders of Somalia. This points to another striking characteristic of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the continent. This is its international nature and arguably its ongoing internationalization of which there are multiple dimensions.

We have seen the incorporation of initially national or sub-national terrorist groups into regional and even global networks of terrorists and insurgents. This is apparent convergence of collective action frames and strategic goals. For example, Al Shabaab announced its integration into the Al-Qaeda network in 2008. Although however, Boko Haram does not appear to have become organizationally

joined Al Qaeda, its leadership has reached out to other jihadist groups both in Africa and beyond its splinter group, Ansaru, cooperates with and comprises at least in part of militants trained by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Roggio, 2013).

There are good reasons to be cautious about how the homogenizing tendencies of macro-scale analyses of global terrorism and global responses might shape our understanding of terrorism in sub-Sahara Africa. As with any broadly conceived movement across the various jihadist terrorist groups, competing interests, ideas, strategic priorities, and tactical tastes can be teased out with detailed empirical analysis. For example, there are forms of association and collaboration between groups such as AQIM. Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and the Islamic Movement for the Azawad. These groups have articulated different strategies priorities and have adopted different tactics (Dowd and Raleigh, 2013). Terrorist actions and counter-terrorism responses. Attempts to counter terrorism effectively reduce the risk of terrorist violence and political violence. The leadership of Africa should be proactive. This will assist the people living in these parts of sub-Saharan Africa who have been affected by the diffusion of this wave of terrorist activity.

Given the above security challenges posed by terrorism, there is the need for African nations to intensify efforts to contain the threats. The defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognised this need, which was transformed into the AU in Durban 2002. It was borne out of the grasp that terrorism threatens national and regional security and violates international law, including the charters of the UN and OAU, constitutive Act of the AU, as well as the Protocols Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. Based on this recognition of the potential dangers posed by the phenomenon, the Former Chairman of the AU Commission, Alpha OumarKonare declared that the AU strongly condemns all acts and forms of terrorism in Africa and wherever they may occur.

Explicitly, member countries of the AU resolved to adopt a collective approach in combating the common peril and later adopted joint counter-terrorism instruments and decisions, some of which have been ratified by the necessary majority. One such instrument is the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted in Algiers, Algeria in 1999. In the quest to implement this resolution, the Algiers-based African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 as an institution to boost the Union's capacity in Counterterrorism. However, the inadequacies linked with the implementation of the Algiers Convention have led to the search for complementary strategies to boost the war against terrorism in Africa. In line with this, the following prescriptions are proffered (ACSRT, 2004).

Strategic Measures for Capacity Building in Counter-Terrorism in Africa

The challenge of combating terrorism in Africa demands combined and rigorous efforts across national boundaries. The most important is the nature of contemporary terrorism itself, which does not respect international boundaries or the concept of sovereignty. Terrorist groups can and do operate in several countries simultaneously. Boko Haram, for example, has split in northern Cameroon and north-eastern Nigeria and recruits from both countries (Zenn, 2014).

Groups have also become adept at taking advantage of national borders to evade justice. The Lord's Resistance Army, which regularly shuttles between several Central and East African states, making it nearly impossible for authorities to track it down; or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which established operations in northern Mali when the Malian state effectively collapsed in 2012−2013, giving it a safe haven from which to target neighboring countries. Terrorist organizations have become formidable and more robust than many weak states on the continent. The measures proffered here will require practical legislative, political, institutional, and collaborative endeavors by member

nations of the AU. A breakdown of these measures would include Establishment and Implementation of Relevant International Documents, Organizing Seminars, Conferences and Training Workshops, Effective Cooperation and Collaboration, Building Comprehensive and Efficient Domestic Capacity, Efficient and Effective Intelligence Network**,** Governance**.**

Establishment and Implementation of Relevant International Documents

The rising complexity and cross-border implications of terrorism demand collective efforts by states in the continent to combat the phenomenon. The OAU convention on the prevention and combating of Terrorism (Algiers Convention) was adopted by African heads of state in July 1999 and came into force in December 2002, 30 states had ratified it. This was the first African instrument on preventing and combating terrorism which provided an African definition of terrorism; Article 1(3). The definition contained in the convention enabled African parties to create criminal offenses in national law on the basis of a shared, internationally negotiated, and accepted definition. The Algier convention is consistent with and complementary to the international legal regime and to the Arab convention; Article 1(3). Endorsement of continental instruments remains essential. Law and fidelity are part of the more comprehensive strategy to overcome terrorism in the long term. Approval of instruments illustrates unity in combating terrorism and provides countries with an internationally agreed basis for drafting national laws and for cooperation as part of national strategies (ACSRT, 2004).

Endorsement is important for its own sake but is not the actual objective of counter-terrorism support or response. The principal objective of the global counter-terrorism community of which Africa is a part is to ensure a seamless global web of national-level counter-terrorism prevention, response and cooperation measures grounded in the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, the endorsement was pursued at the expense of real dialogue to ascertain and respond to countries and sub-regions' perceived counter-terrorism needs in meeting this objective. These needs might not involve endorsement. Research-driven policy and legal reform are needed on a country-to-country and sub-regional basis to ensure appropriate proactive and tailored counter-terrorism measures in Africa.

Ewi and Du Plessis (2014) explained that the importance of the convention for counter-terrorism in Africa cannot be overstated ...the convention put in place a solid and fundamental criminal justice framework for the fight against terrorism in Africa. It codified counter-terrorism norms and consolidated common standards. Another institution that could play a vital role is the proposed African Court of justice and Human Rights, which would have the power to prosecute individuals and potentially states contravening the Algiers convention and Protocol (ACJHR, 2004).

Organizing Seminars, Conferences and Training Workshops

This is needed to sensitize the populace, particularly the various stakeholders from the security sector within Africa on the challenges of terrorism. In addition, it will provide an opportunity for capacity building among actors and a platform to appraise their various anti-terror strategies and work out appropriate policy prescriptions for practical actions. Accordingly, the Nigerian Army and African Command of special operations organized a four-day workshop to share lessons learned from counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations from 13 January to 16 January 2014 (Nigerian Army, 2014).

More seminar discourse should focus on preattack, the attack, and post-attack. Sharing framework and best practices, counter-terrorism financing, and deradicalisation programs. There must be constant and realistic joint military training and exercises among sister African nations. The

militaries should introduce some form of flexibility in their various military operations. These should include non-conventional strategies of urban guerrilla warfare, sensitivity to public (domestic and international) opinion, and human rights issues such as handling civilians in line with international humanitarian laws (IHL).

Effective Cooperation and Collaboration

Central Banks and Ministries of finance of all member states should develop financial reforms to scrutinise foreign business interests and a systematic means of tracking international money transactions. In addition, joint border patrols between neighboring countries within the continent should be institutionalized while extradition treaties should exist among AU members to ensure the repatriation of cross-border criminals.

There is also a need for collaboration between such international agencies as the UN Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC), AU, European Union, Paris based Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Eastern and Southern Africa Money laundering Group (ESAAMLG) has also been key for countries in Eastern and Southern Africa in complying with international standards against terrorist financing and money laundering. In addition, technical assistance could be sought from development partners like the IBRD, IMF, and Egmont Group, especially regarding combating money laundering by suspected terrorists within the African continent.

Building Comprehensive and Efficient Domestic Capacity

It is expected that each of these countries ought to have established legislations to regulate and counter-terrorism based on the UN and AU resolutions that criminalize terrorism and acts of terrorism. For instance, resolutions 1368 and 1377 call for information and intelligence sharing among states to tighten immigration procedures to fight terrorism. But, unfortunately, most of the countries in their various sub-region find it challenging to put in place legal structures for countering terrorism.

However, despite the challenges they are confronted with, the critical countries have tried to enact and evolve legislative measures to combat and prevent terrorism. Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Mali, and Mauritania are these vital and threatened countries. They are battling with terrorist activities in their various polities. As noted earlier, 9/11 provided the basis for a concerted global war on terrorism. Several resolutions passed by the UN Security Council called for legislation to combat terrorism. Others like Kenya and South Africa, facing the growth of Islamic terrorist groups, have struggled to balance the need for new security legislation with the preservation of newly gained civil rights and in Kenya's case to avoid the worst repercussions from the recent developments in Somalia through active diplomacy. Ethiopia and the previous government of Mauritania have used the terrorist threat to solidify policies of suppression and anti-democratic practices while solidifying US support for their anti-terrorist policies.

The country report on terrorism initiated by the UN Security Council in ensuring member states report periodically to the body on their counter-terrorism efforts has been met by an apathetic response from most African countries (UNSC, 2020). Notwithstanding the above, an overview of counter-terrorism measures in critical African nations is vital. African nations should improve their capacities in anti-terrorism legislation drafting and training law enforcement and criminal justice officials in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism.

Efficient and Effective Intelligence Network

There is the need to enhance the intelligence-gathering network in the war against terrorism, this will require the development of a counter-terror intelligence center that will have the mandate of gathering efficient and effective intelligence information on terrorism, trade-in narcotics, and money laundering. This will be complemented through the regional exchange of intelligence on the activities of suspected terrorists and their allies. Ghana established such a center at a national level in October 2001 in response to the terror attacks on the USA in September 2001 (Kafe, 2013).

Nigeria's armed forces have always cooperated swiftly with demands for the investigation of terrorist threats and the sharing of information and intelligence in respect to counter-terrorism. The Nigerian military has a counter-terrorism unit at the Armed Forces and Staff College in Jaji Kaduna which is specially equipped to train officers and men in counter-terrorism tactics and strategies. Senegal also has a regional counter-terrorism intelligence center using its security and intelligence services with support from the United States. The role of the committee of intelligence and Security services of Africa (CISSA) was formed in 2004 whose mandate is to provide AU and its member services with timely and insightful intelligence which would assist in making informed decisions among member states. In 2019 CISSA established a database to track terrorist fighters across the African continent aimed at monitoring their movements and proactively disrupting their activities.

Governance

Governance provides the background with which the war on terror is pursued. Without governance and the rules, norms, and institutions that strengthen it, the war on terror would be unintelligible. However, some strategy through which the war on terror is pursued has the potential to undermine certain forms of governance. At the same time, the best way to weaken terrorism is to augment governance and the values, norms, rules, and institutions on which it is based. It occurs at various levels of social activity, from the village to the state and the global system.

The Commission on Global Governance has claimed that governance is a continuing process through which conflicting and diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). From this angle, governance would describe the structures, rules, and institutions that African people have recognized to manage their political, cultural, economic, and social affairs. Governance has been used to refer to formal and informal sets of arrangements.

As governance is based on values, norms, rules, and institutions, which are dynamic, it can be assumed that governance is dynamic. For this basis, Rosenau (1998) has observed that governance 'is in a continuous process of evolution, a becoming that fluctuates between order and disorder as conditions change and emergent properties consolidate and solidify'. In this sense, governance is historically contingent. In practice, governance reflects the preference of hegemonic actors. To the extent that the wellbeing of hegemonic forces shapes governance, the latter does not perfectly reflect the diversity of interests in a particular situation. It must be recognised that what metamorphosed into terrorist attacks is acrimony and bitterness emanating from the actions and inactions of the political leadership of nations. It is argued that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. To this effect, conduct in public office must be oriented to ensure good governance, justice, and equity.

Conclusion

The fight against the growing menace of terrorism requires a broad range of policy responses to address the underlying conditions conducive to its spread. Although the counter-terrorism strategies proposed may not provide a complete answer to the problems of terrorism in Africa, it nonetheless establishes a proactive framework for dealing with the threat of terrorism and thus requires effective implementation. First, there is the need to define terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement that will assist international operations. Having a definition of this kind must depend on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states) and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars   (between an organisation and a state). The description of terrorism will be the basic sand operational tool for expanding the international community's ability to combat terrorism. It assists legislation and specific punishments against those involved in or supporting terrorism and will permit the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them.

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Investigating the Legacies of Violence and Conflict in Transitional Justice and Peace

The Values of Law in Politics

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Abstract

Violations of law, human rights abuse, and socio-economic and political grievances are legacies of violence and conflict-affected politics. In recent times, the aggravation of violence and conflict has hindered political development and instigated socio-economic grievances. Transitional justice and peace deal with human rights abuses, violation of rights, violence, and other grievances in societies in transition. One of the main focuses of transitional justice discourse is to engage human rights law for political stability, accountability, and peace in changes, as developed in the strict law practice. This research is descriptive and relies on secondary data. Thus, transitional justice and the rule of law are considered a framework for analysis in violence and conflict-affected politics as intertwined to promote post-violence and conflict or socio-economic and political stability. Therefore, various political actors have engaged in promoting the rule of law and the promotion of peace through security sector reform. With the focus on transitional justice, various processes have been considered through the promotion of rule of law, security, and accountability in the Niger Delta and the northeast of Nigeria that have been ravaged by insurgency, terrorism, violence, and conflict, and these processes have been supported and developed by an increasing number of actors at the national and international levels. Therefore, this paper investigates the socio-economic and political legacies of violence and conflict in transitional justice and peace and examines the interaction of transitional justice and the values of the rule of law in dealing with political tensions as shown in the cases of Boko Haram and Niger Delta. This paper recommends that transitional justice and the rule of law contribute to peace and post-conflict recovery for socio-economic and political grievances resulting from violence and conflict.

Introduction

The focus of transitional justice specifically relates to situational contexts where the rule of law has been blatantly raped, where conflict has left a demeaning legacy, or human rights have been systematically violated. Transitional justice has, therefore, extended its influence beyond the acknowledgment and examination of the past by focusing on the victims of the rule of law and human rights violations. Recently, transitional justice's compass has examined how legacies of violence, conflict, and human rights violations are addressed and how this 'affects short-term peace processes and longer-term state-building and development processes' (World Bank Report, 2011). Why this current study relates and links transitional justice with restructuring and examination of the rule

of law, socio-political and economic matters, state accountability, and the use of human rights to rebuild relations between the state and society, the World Bank Report in 2011 did not make many attempts to reconstruct these relations. However, several advocates of transitional justice against human rights violations, abuse of the rule of law, and misappropriation of human rights have made moves for 'judicial accountability for human rights crimes as a matter of legal and moral principle and because they assume that impunity is more destabilising over the long term (Pilar, 2012).

The primary explanation for this is to consider victims of various violations and other parts of an affected population by demanding accountability and justice for acts of iniquity and atrocity. Beyond transitional justice advocates and human rights activists who have consistently called for peace, security, and justice, various developments in international law and jurisprudence which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the emergence of a transnational network of human rights activists have not only evolved to support the demands for peace and justice in international politics but it has also prepared better grounds for peace, security, and justice across levels. Recognition of the need to investigate the legacies of violence and blatant human rights violations have motivated political factors to shape the plausibility of transitional justice and in practice, domestic and international human rights activists have been politically astute in their efforts to materialise the adoption of transitional justice as an opportunity to renew and obtain justice.

To achieve these objectives, international bodies like the United Nations (UN) made an enormous agitation for transitional justice through its Secretary-General. They presented a guideline which reads: Guidance Note on the United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice. One of its principles, especially principle nine calls on the United Nations for the need to "strive to ensure transitional justice processes and mechanisms take account of the root causes of conflict and repressive rule and address violations of all rights, including economic, social and cultural rights" (United Nations Report on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014). This principle is in total agreement with the position of this paper that recognition and firm establishment of transitional justice would deal substantially with the legacies of atrocity, violence, and conflict inflected through abuse of the rule of law and violation of human including economic, social, and cultural rights. The Guidance Note of the United Nations further presses that a situation or an approach like this is indispensable for peace and justice to prevail, as values of law in our political practices. Therefore, the Guidance Note emphasises that 'transitional justice must have the ambition to assist the transformation of oppressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will procure an equitable future. It must reach to, but also beyond, the crimes and abuses committed during the conflict that led to the transition, and it must address the human rights violations that predated the conflict and caused or contributed to it' (Arbour, 2007, p. 59).

The emphasis is that transitional justice is a way of dealing with the failure of the past on economic, social, and cultural rights and abuse of the rule of law and violations of these rights which have led to violence and conflict and reassurance of peace and justice. And since the actions or omissions by States and non-state actors during the violations of human rights and economic, social, and cultural rights often lead to violence and conflict, transitional processes can be used as a transformational tool to release societies from widespread legacies of violations of economic, social and cultural rights which are the root causes of violence and conflict. For this purpose, the paper aims at examining transitional justice and the rule of law as the framework through which the promotion of economic, social, cultural rights, security, and accountability can be achieved, as it would be demonstrated through various processes of transitional justice in Niger Delta and northeast of Nigeria where insurgency, terrorism, violence, and conflict are always on the increase. Therefore, this paper investigates the socio-economic and political legacies of violence and conflict in transitional justice

and peace and examines the interaction of transitional justice and the values of the rule of law in obscuring political tensions.

The Concept of Transitional Justice

Implications of past violence and conflict on humans and economic prosperity have pronounced the widespread use of transitional justice as a global concept through which various past atrocities and legacies of violations are checked and addressed. The emergence of the term was prevalent in the early 1990s. According to Buckley-Zistel et al. (2010), the term has since come to be "an ever-expanding range of mechanisms and institutions, including tribunals, truth commissions, memorial projects, reparations and the like to redress past wrongs, vindicate the dignity of victims and provide justice in times of transition". Transitional justice can, therefore, be defined, as the "effort to respond to the needs of societies emerging from conflict or political violence" (Robins, 2012, p. 21). Also, transitional justice is seen as "the range of processes and mechanisms that are utilised to enable war-affected or post-authoritarian societies to make a transition to a more democratic and peaceful dispensation" (Selim and Murithi, 2011, p. 59).

These definitions have shown that transitional justice has set measures and parameters as designs for implementing actions to redress the legacies of abundant human rights abuses and violations of the rule of law during violence and conflict in authoritarian regimes. The development of these measures is set to provide enduring norms against human rights violations. The specific violations of transitional justice dealt with were civil and political abuses and economic and social violations. With this, the contexts associated with the operation of transitional justice have expanded to cover conflict and post-conflict contexts. It extends to countries that are currently experiencing conflict and those that have not even gone through a significant economic and political transition (Jon, 2004). Such conceptions are not necessarily based on the idea that civil and political rights are intrinsically more important than economic, social, and cultural rights; instead, "this view sees transitional justice as being meant to address one part of the problem with the hope that it can contribute to solving the whole" (Ruti, 2003, p. 71). Transitional justice initially developed as a particular way of both addressing serious human rights violations and facilitating transitions to democracy; responding to claims for justice for the violation of economic and social rights was not part of this understanding of how best to effect such a transition. More so, as viewed by Olsen et al. (2010, p. 11), transitional justice is 'the array of processes designed to address past human rights violations following periods of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict'. The concept of transitional justice is meritoriously given an all-encompassing definition that attempts to include different transitional settings and a situation or context where the violators of human, political, economic, and social rights are not limited to state actors or are not seen as the only provider of justice. Still, all facets of the social setting were involved.

Rule of Law and Transitional Justice

The rule of law is an indispensable legal framework for the stability of any organisation. Its presence in any establishment ensures there is a situation in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, hold on to the principle of accountability, lawfulness, and responsibility for the promulgation, enforcement, and independent adjudication which are consistent with human rights norms and standards and economic, social and political rights. Since the rule of law deals with adherence to the principles of law to ensure peace and justice, transitional justice examines the processes and mechanisms that ensure a legacy of large-scale past abuses, human rights violations, accountability, justice, and social, political, and economic rights are achieved for reconciliation. Mihr and Sriram (2015) have raised the argument regarding the tenets of human rights and the

rule of law concerning transitional justice and the prevention against violence and conflict, such as (a) the State obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence, and to punish those found guilty; (b) the right to know the truth about past abuses and the fate of disappeared persons; (c) the right to reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law; and (d) the State obligation to prevent, through different measures, the reoccurrence of such atrocities in the future (Kathryn & Hun, 2013). These tenets are cardinal to achieving transitional justice's purpose(s) with formidable principles of rule of law in practice.

While an argument can be deduced concerning the collaboration between the rule of law and transitional justice, Kathryn and Hun (2013) have concretised the values of law to the operation of transitional justice such that both are almost considered inseparable entities for the accomplishment of peace and justice in conflict and post-conflict contexts. A similar point was raised in the 2011 Report on "The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies," by Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General, who summarised his argument as thus: "though linkages between transitional justice processes and institutional capacity-building" such as rule of law have to be "strengthened...greater commitments to integrate" these approaches should be enforced to ensure more commitment on justice and the need to move forward. Adherence to principles of rule of law approach to ensure transitional justice brings about accountability and careful respect for certain fundamental human and procedural rights, which can even be outside of formal legal proceedings, in truth-seeking, or in assuring peace and justice. The proposition this attempts to affirm is that the rule of law always plays an essential role in ensuring that the demand for peace and justice is achieved in the transitional justice process. This process is also an approach to generate a critical opportunity to rebuild public institutions and confidence in the rule of law. What this means is that any failure to seize this opportunity, and reinforce the rule of law to sow seeds of peace and justice through the procedurally balanced transitional justice process, the popular legacies of violence and conflict such as human rights abuse and social, political, and economic rights violations would prevail.

Critical examples or lesson of where a rule of law approach to transitional justice processes have been adopted could be revealed in the pronouncements of the International Criminal Court (ICC), especially in 2012, where Thomas Lubanga from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was found guilty of human rights crimes, Charles Taylor, from Liberia and their ex-President, was found guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Strict implementation of rule of law has also evolved other mechanisms for achieving transitional justice in a wide range of post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, and this has, therefore, ensured social, political, and economic stabilities in countries where this has been adopted, such as Spain. In fact, in countries with a legacy of violence, oppression, or impunity for human rights abuses, there is now an almost automatic expectation that issues of redress, justice, and accountability will feature in the ensuing governance transition (Theidon, 2007).

Legacies of Rule of Law and Human Rights Violation in Transitional Justice

Legacies of violence and systemic violation of human rights is an unavoidable policy issue in the conflict, post-conflict, and other transition settings, which has led to the question of disagreement about the merits and perils of the various transitional justice choices (Pilar, 2012). To counter the perilous legacies of blatant violations of fundamental human and procedural rights, advocates of transitional justice, human and economic rights, and organisations have moved for adherence to rule of law and judicial accountability for human rights crimes as a matter of legal and moral

principle. With this unavoidable move, the era of impunity for violence and conflict against human rights would be dealt with.

Rule of law in transitional justice signals human rights violators and perpetrators that impunity would be critically dealt with and not tolerated, and this would result in deterrence for any future recourse to violence and other human rights violations. Transitional justice processes, in this case, make violence or conflict and post-conflict non-issue and reassure citizens that the government is committed to accountability, justice, rule of law, with the potential to improve public trust. Mihr and Sriram (2015) have, therefore, averred that transitional justice and the rule of law are unavoidably expected, especially in conflict-affected societies, as a measure against the legacies of violence and conflict and to help to promote post-conflict or post-agreement stability. This is achieved with the help of several actors who not only engaged in rule of law promotion and the promotion of security sector reform but also the eradication of conflict and post-conflict disorder. To ensure this, for, over the past two decades, various transitional justice processes have emerged to promote accountability, rule of law, and security for human rights and conflict-affected states, and this is developed at the local, national, regional, and international levels to ensure that the influence of these processes cut across.

However, several challenges were encountered in the transitional justice effort to identify and clarify its goals and design processes and projects that would deal with the atrocity of the past or legacies of human rights violations. The goal of transitional justice can be varyingly or simultaneously identified as peace, reconciliation and social cohesion, retribution, punishment, restitution, reparation, truth-telling, vindication, validation, deterrence, prevention, reform, and development (Mihr and Sriram, 2015). This approach takes as its starting point the idea that prevention is prioritised among all the possible goals for transitional justice, positing that the principal goal for transitional justice interventions should be non-recurrence, to guarantee never again. And this approach also assumes that the most effective prevention strategy is a well-developed rule of law, defined broadly to encompass not just effective and efficient justice sector institutions, but also guarantees of basic human rights such as due process, fairness, and equality, and indices of good governance such as transparency and accountability of governmental institutions. There are other ways, as Mihr and Sriram put, in which transitional justice processes can present challenges to early rule of law in ensuring that atrocious legacies are eliminated.

As the first challenge to peace-building, transitional justice processes might further destabilise severely damaged justice sectors in the short term, making it more difficult to promote longer-term rule of law in several ways. They can provoke responses from perpetrators or elements of the old regime, which could destabilise a fragile peace in nascent democracies, as they might question its legitimacy or actively seek to undermine the authority of public institutions. As the second challenge, the attempt by national courts to prosecute perpetrators of human rights violations and rule of law abuses can put excessive pressure on judicial systems, which may be severely damaged after conflict. An instance of this can be seen in the processes to the accused of genocide in Rwanda, and due to the pressure on the judicial system, the national judicial system was destroyed totally. With these challenges, relating transitional justice with rule of law promotion is essential to dare the atrocity of violence named above because these principles, transitional justice, and rule of law promotion, are often adopted to face over-pressured judicial systems and conflict-affected societies. Thus, to reassure no reoccurrence of the conflict, Louis (2007, p. 34) has said that support must be given to judicial, legislative, and police reform, reform of the closely related security and corrections sectors, and the support of transitional justice and criminal prosecutions, truth-telling mechanisms such as truth commissions, vetting, and reparations.

Interaction of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Transitional Justice

Beyond the interplay of rule of law and human rights with transitional justice processes, the interaction of cultural, social, and economic rights must be safeguarded against past legacies of violence and post-conflict contexts. As such, transitional justice has taken an additional dimension in building the assumption for social, economic, and political changes which are significant during negotiations for power and establishment of rights in a State. While human rights law has strongly influenced transitional justice, the recent focus of transitional justice on violations of civil and political rights has similarly affected important developments in economic, social, and cultural rights. On the obvious, according to Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014, transitional justice mechanisms may lack economic and human resources and moral and political capital (United Nations Report on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014). Transitional justice processes relate substantially to social, political, and economic rights and this is particularly essential with the consideration of transitional justice to address violations of these rights. Although these rights may be included in 'transitional justice processes, even a successful transitional justice experience will not secure the enjoyment of these rights by everyone.

Nevertheless, transitional justice can contribute to the fight against impunity for violations of economic, social and cultural rights, and their prevention, by laying the foundations for forward-looking reforms and agendas' (United Nations Report on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014). In the preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, it is averred that economic, social, and cultural rights are part of universal human rights. As a legal framework, it is stated that all rights are "universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated" (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action). They are more like other rights such as civil and political rights, which aim at protecting human dignity by ensuring both negative and positive obligations for States. As such, since economic, social, and cultural rights establish the similar minimum conditions required for the exercise of rights to live in standard life, the dignity of human life, freedom from trepidation, and enjoyment of life, it must be covered by transitional justice processes because it affects fundamental human rights.

The necessity for the establishment of these rights in transitional processes can be said to be built on the foundation that economic, social and cultural rights are enshrined in various international instruments, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (arts. 22–27) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These international laws, the Declaration and the Covenant have firmly provided for rights such as:

> work, just and favourable conditions of work; form and join trade unions; protection of the family, maternity and childhood; social security; an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing; health; education; take part in cultural life; benefit from scientific progress, and protection of the moral and material interest of authors of scientific, artistic or literary works. The property right is mentioned in the Declaration and regional human rights treaties and has been interpreted, for example, as protecting housing, indigenous peoples' ancestral territories, indemnities for unfair dismissal, and the right to social security (United Nations Report on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014).

Beyond the above, the Declaration and the Covenant, many other binding universal human rights instruments such as the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination, have provided for the promotion and protection of economic, social, and cultural rights.

Similarly, the interaction of economic, social, and cultural rights under transitional justice can also be linked to many regional treaties which also promote and protect economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the 1961 European Social Charter (revised 1996); the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador); the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; and the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. The relevance of these regional treaties cannot be underestimated in transitional justice processes as a measure to ensure peace, security, and justice are sustained in conflict or during post-conflict situations. More so, we have other legal frameworks that focus primarily on civil and political rights, which have been read or interpreted to include protecting aspects of economic, social, and cultural rights such as the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its first Protocol of 1952, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (United Nations Report on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014).

Other important treaties incorporate state obligations relevant to economic, social, and cultural rights and help to link these rights to transitional justice. For example, the report of United Nations on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has declared that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide stipulates that 'genocide can be committed by deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part—for example, by deliberately depriving the group of the minimum standards of living, such as food.' On this note, it can be surmised that international refugee law also protects the economic, social, and cultural rights of refugees within the stipulation of transitional justice processes. As reported in United Nations Report on Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in 2014, for instance, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees contains provisions on such rights as the right to work, the right of association, and the right to education under transitional justice processes. The conclusion to reach here is that transitional justice processes have extended beyond human rights violations and abuses of rule of law to economic, social, and cultural rights.

Discussion of Transitional Justice Processes in Peace-building

Since transitional justice is defined by Robins (2012) as an effort to respond to the needs of societies emerging from conflict or political violence, Maria (2017) has, therefore, under critical discussion, considered transitional justice as mechanisms and practices which are directed to 'redress past wrongs, institutionalise the rule of law and construct new legal and normative frameworks in post-conflict contexts or in societies that have suffered occupation, dictatorship or other suppressive situations, to prevent violence and war from happening again.' Even though the United Nations has, in 2014, referred to transitional justice measures as a set of judicial and non-judicial instruments and mechanisms as trials, truth commissions, lustration, memorials, reparations. Based on the arguments on human rights violations and economic, social, and cultural rights under transitional justice processes, there is a need to then see the overall focus of transitional justice as part of peace-building processes. Thus, a holistic perspective about the working of transitional justice as peace-building practices is an attempt to provide links between the past and reconstructing for the future, to ensure an enabling and more sustainable peace, security, and justice in the society, as against the violation of rule of law, human rights, and economic, social and cultural right. From this perspective, transitional justice projects and outcomes have important implications for political, civil, and economic relations in post-conflict societies (Maria, 2017).

To ascertain peace-building through transitional justice, most advocates of this attempt to promote justice and accountability with strict adherence to principles of rule of law and fundamental procedural rights. Various justice systems such as normative, retributive justice which build peace and justice are developed by postulating that "those who do wrong ought to be punished" (Aukerman, 2002, p. 40-41) and others have further argued for the ability of punishment to deter future abuses (Huyse, 2001). Beyond prosecutions focusing on violators and perpetrators of abuses of rights, transitional justice mechanisms that have been advocated for peace-building are truth commissions or reparations and which are 'a victim-centred approach allowing victims a public voice, as potentially cathartic or healing' (Hayner, 2001, p. 28). "They may also argue that accountability processes of some sort are essential for longer-term peacemaking and peace-building" (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004). Impunity for certain key perpetrators of these rights will undermine people's belief in the rule of law and the possibility of building a culture of respect for the rule of law (Huyse, 2001, p. 325).

Lutz (2006, p. 330) has averred that peacebuilders and negotiators have also relied on amnesties to secure a peace agreement. Under here, the primary concern of peace-builder is that transitional justice mechanisms may ensure peace, security, and justice and the endurance of a peace agreement and efficacy of peace-building measures. As peacebuilding is not only a multifaceted process but also a way to confront violence and conflict, transitional justice also addresses various goals which are potentially helpful to confronting conflict and post-conflict challenges. Thus, it would be easy to say transitional justice and peacebuilding activities play a more complementary, where possible, to ensure the legacies of violence and conflict are dealt with. Both sets of activities are dynamic and context-specific. In this case, 'several peace operations have been mandated to address transitional justice as well as activities in rule of law, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR).' A typical example of this is international territorial administrations, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)--all of these had responsibility for judiciaries, police, and prison services (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004).

In Nigeria, for instance, as peace-building evolves to deal with restoration of security, peace, and rule of law and other activities to ensure careful respect for human prosperity, transitional justice processes also include a range of institutions and activities which engage in post-conflict issues and reassure citizens that the government is committed to accountability, justice, rule of law, with the potential to improve public trust, even peace-building. From the point and for the attainment of peace restoration, certain local mechanisms that would ensure rule of law, peace, and security in Nigeria, especially in the northeast, such as oath-taking, dialogue, and consultation, obligation to forgive, and so on, have been considered (Hassan and Tyvoll, 2018, p. 20). For reassurance of peace and conflict, the suggestion is that these local or indigenous justice systems in northeastern Nigeria that feature some form of oath-taking, consultation, and dialogue are integral to conflict resolution and this would not only help in tackling Boko Haram insurgency but it would also assist the operation of rule of law that requires consultation and dialogue in the transitional justice system. For instance, oaths may be restrictive by preventing a penitent criminal from repeating an act even though a criminal act had previously been committed, or can be adjudicative by determining which of two parties is in the right, that is where the government or the Boko Haram members. Since these members appear to venerate the Qur'an, the restrictiveness of oaths is to make them swear upon the Qur'an to reach a compromise.

While this is encouraged for peace and security to be attained and it no doubt seems to support rule of law through its restorative means, consultation and dialogues with insurgent members should be done with participants who are encouraged to subdue emotional responses and unrealistic

expectations to prevent the generation of new resentment or grievances. If this is achieved through a policy-making decision to ensure reconciliation or justice, it would enable victims, perpetrators, and community leaders to make arrangements that will best benefit the future and guarantee security and peace. As recognised by the United Nations Secretary-General, rule of law can be adapted to support these local mechanisms such that the purpose of peace-building activities is to prevent the recurrence of conflict through the provision of technical assistance to transform national structures and strengthen new democratic institutions are guaranteed. These mechanisms are sensitive and community-specific approach to reconciliation and justice, would create an assurance for potentially thousands of hardened Boko Haram members to denounce their dastardly acts for complete eradication programmes, and this method would provide a comprehensive approach to transitional justice measures supported by judicial and otherwise processes to redress human rights abuses and repair social cohesion following armed conflict. The ultimate need for this is, to provide accountability for crimes committed during the insurgency and simultaneously empower local communities to lay the groundwork for an enduring peace against the legacies of insecurity, violence, and conflict.

From the above case of using local mechanisms as support, it is no news that transitional justice is associated with internal political changes within a state to attend to conflicting or wrong acts and this means that a wide range of mechanisms which may include both judicial and non-judicial approaches supported by the rule of law, involving both local and international actors at different levels to seek reparations, institutional reforms, vetting, etc., can be considered. As such, consideration for regional mechanisms such as oath-taking, consultation, and dialogue, obligation to forgive, and so on, together with the judicial process, would make transitional justice stress two broad ideas: retributive and restorative justice, where retributive justice supports how to judicially bring the perpetrators to account for their human rights violations and the restorative justice focuses the victims of violations and address their emotional, economic and social needs through dialogue, reconciliation, forgiveness and compensation (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2017). This position is not outlandish, the similar step was taken in South Africa where this transitional justice method was adopted to deal with the post-apartheid era, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up, and patterned in a court-like manner. The hearing session was broadcast live to promote national consciousness. Despite a few errors committed in the process, the method helped to eradicate a certain level of conflict and political violence by laying a formidable foundation for peace and tranquillity in South Africa (Zwanbin, 2017, p. 78).

In the case of the Niger Delta, where armed conflict between militias and government forces in the region has lasted for more than two decades, a different number of instruments such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) mechanisms have become a key component of national and international efforts in the facilitation of transition from war and insecurity to peace and security. This usually involves a multi-staged transition process that ranges from the political settlement, peace agreements, disarming and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, processes of reconstruction and economic recovery, the restoration of institutions of democratic governance and justice, and processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding (CEPD Monograph Series, Ikelegbe & Onokerhoraye, 2016). This approach is radical enough that it enforced transitional justice and it became successful immediately because it forced ceasefire and had planned programmes to rehabilitate and reintegrate militias into the civil society.

However, there is a doubt that DDR has achieved what it is set out to because it can be argued that DDR programmes are somewhat narrowly conceived, bureaucratic, and detached from the political transition for reconstruction strategies. Even though the concerns of policymakers are to make DDR programmes effective to end the protracted conflict and establish peace in the long term. (Okonofu,

2016). Specific challenges can be outlined to have affected the effective operation of DDR in ensuring transitional justice in the Niger Delta. With the failure of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission of 1999 which was expected to foster reconciliation and prevent future violations of human rights, one of the significant challenges associated with attempts to establish transitional justice in Nigeria is the failure of 'some perpetrators of gross human rights violations to appear and testify before the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission. There were no consequences for the perpetrators who refused to appear, and no decisive effort was made to ensure that such persons accounted for their actions' (Umukoro, 2018, p. 98). Since some former military leaders were among those who failed to appear before the human rights investigation tribunals, this adversely affected the transitional justice methods of truth-telling and reconciliation.

Indeed, the failure to continue the enforcement of the 1999 Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission had a disastrous effect on the success of transitional justice in Nigeria and reconciliation could not be ensured because the commission's recommendations were not implemented. The most important recommendation of the commission regarding transitional justice is that all victims of human rights violations in Nigeria during the period of a military rule should be compensated. Additionally, it recommended that perpetrators of human rights violations should be punished. The transitional justice focus of the commission would have had milestones on DDR in Niger Delta if the government had complied with the recommendations and taken appropriate actions to hold violators accountable and compensate the victims (Umukoro, 2018, p. 99).

Like it has been recommended for northeastern, sustainable peace can be ensured in the Niger Delta through the establishment of local mechanisms such as platforms, forums, and organised consultative meetings, dialogue, and obligation to forgive as instruments for reconciling diverse groups, sectors, and interests and these methods should be combined with judicial and international organisation intervention. The establishment of effective government-sponsored structures such as dialogue, negotiations, and the reconstruction of broken relationships together with a non-judicial local mechanism within and between communities and ethnic groups or between communities and the oil companies and oil-servicing companies would ensure efficient and effective transitional justice and application of rule of law. Since transitional justice is a requirement for sustainable peace after periods of gross human rights violations and violent conflict, efforts should be made to put transitional justice mechanisms in place to punish perpetrators of human rights violations and provide redress for victims through these local mechanisms. Additionally, the federal government should embark on activities to adopt local instruments and develop the infrastructure of the Niger Delta, and the actions to adopt by the government should be both judicial and non-judicial and include local mechanisms and international body intervention.

Conclusion

Transitional justice has been considered through rule of law, human rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights to examine the complex issues emerging from conflict, armed violence, authoritarian rule, and post-conflict which are at stake in societies. As such, transitional justice and peace are considered a field of scholarship that deals with human rights abuses, violation of rights, violence and conflict-affected politics, and other grievances in societies in transition. One of the main focuses of transitional justice discourse is to engage human rights law for political stability, accountability, and peace in transitions, as developed in the strict practice of law. Transitional justice and rule of law are often considered in violence and conflict-affected politics as intertwined with one another to promote post-violence and conflict or socio-economic and political stability. More so, this paper has radically shown that transitional justice processes have also addressed economic, social, and cultural rights issues, in addition to rule of law and human rights, as an essential part of the main

causes of violence and repression or human rights violations and abuses of rule of law occurring during the conflict. Thus, the paper has also averred that peace-building is ascertainable through transitional justice, and most advocates of this have attempted to promote justice and accountability with strict adherence to principles of rule of law and fundamental procedural rights.

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Emergency Continued

The Problematic of a Liminal Subjectivity

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the themes expounded in Richard Rive's novel, Emergency Continued. The novel is set in the heat of the State of Emergency sanctioned by the Apartheid state in the 1980s in response to the uprisings in Black and Coloured townships. Andrew Dreyer, a teacher and writer, is the protagonist of the story and is at odds with his sense of self, his belonging, his personal and social history, and his political agency. Using the theme of an uncertain subjectivity, this piece discusses the uneasy problem that befalls the Coloured subject. There is a great deal that needs to be unpacked regarding Rive's hint at an uneasy, traumatic and personalised past that his characters are at odds to face. These characters do, however, recognise that a historical reckoning is nonetheless necessary if any semblance of being is to be achieved. Colonialism and oppression have scared and corrupted the Coloured subject's sense of self, belonging and political agency. This discussion has relevance to the Coloured subject in a post-apartheid context as many of the complexities, histories and experiences that these individuals face are yet to be grappled with today. From a broader stance, this discussion is linked to theories of Afro-pessimism and the negated ontology beset upon Black bodies. The Coloured subject is however unique in that there is an implicit post-humanist aspect to being mixed race--the supposed product of colonial interaction. What is to be made of the unique experience of Coloured subjectivity? Can a sense of being be achieved through the seemingly impossible odyssey of historical reckoning?

Introduction

Richard Rive was one of the most ardent writers in South Africa's literary history. I say this not only because of the raw expression, emotion and detail that he uses in his work but also because these very works exposed the everyday pain and suffering that went unreported throughout the censorship of the Apartheid regime. Rive's works were subject to a banning order by the Apartheid regime. This was the unfortunate fate of his seminal novel *Emergency*, which encompasses the first set of states of emergency that were pronounced over particular communities embroiled in mass dissent after the Sharpeville Massacre. *Emergency Continued*, the focal point of this paper, constitutes the sequel to this dramatic, semi-biographic depiction of the events that occurred during this time. The story centres around Andrew Dreyer, the same protagonist from the prequel. As Dreyer struggles between fact and fiction, there is a clear loss which he seeks to rectify.

Admittedly, I would like to have seen more literary reviews of this novel, but this is not the point of this paper. I must stress that it is not my desire to reproduce some type of summative appraisal nor a critical review of this literary work. Rather, it is my objective to excavate and borrow some of the core themes in this work to claim a broader inquiry about a group of people that are not often mentioned in academic discourse. I am concerned here with the case of Coloured people in South Africa; a social group that constitutes a history of mixed heritage, distinctive culture and communal subjectivity constantly at odds in an intergenerational, historical and political sense. Herein, I am not trying to

make any claims or arguments without the use of hard evidence. Rather, I attempt to open the floor to questions around the essence, or lack thereof, regarding Colouredness[1]. Given what we know about the history of Coloured communities and the development of the unique subjectivities therein, what are we to make of contemporary claims to Coloured identity? Given Afro-pessimist notions of non-being and social death of Black subjects, how ought we to contemplate Colouredness? Though Rive's novel centres around the political activism of a Coloured community within the Western Cape, this is not the most important component that this paper borrows. Rive himself had a less than comfortable position on Colouredness as a racial classification; this is evident in his semi-biographical characters. Rather, it is the tropes of history, memory, subjectivity and intergenerational dichotomy that form the main tools of analysis for the questions that this paper raises.

Apartheid's Racial Ideology as Social Death

Rive starts the first act of *Emergency Continued* with a letter from Dreyer to Abe in which he details the current events of his life, his family and the sombre political climate. Sombre indeed it was, as Dreyer risks life and limb searching for his son amidst the running battles between protestors and police. The first section of the novel reads as a parable of a concerned father who is out of touch with the political ambitions of his son, Bradley. In a way, Dreyer sees himself in his son. Bradley represents a certain nostalgia in Dreyer's life: a longing for purpose. He took on an oppressive regime, the freedom from which would mean something far bigger than himself. In this euphoric sense of meaning that he felt in his youthful activist days, he felt as though he had a place, not just in the struggle but in the world. Within the temporal setting of the novel, Dreyer is a middle-aged deputy principal who lives in a wealthy neighbourhood. Despite his lush and comfortable disposition, he felt that he was far out of his political prime. For obvious reasons, he was out of touch with his son, a radical student activist. What makes this situation worse is that Dreyer finds himself further roped into the Education Board's policy of subduing dissident pupils. This further entrenches the protagonist in a precarious and ironic subjective state. It is important to contemplate this break in Self that Dreyer experiences. In doing so, I draw upon the theory of social death in order to analyse this rupture. Simultaneously, it is also imperative to apply this analysis to the case of Colouredness.

In order to address this, I turn to Zoë Wicomb's discussion on Colouredness and shame, and how the relationship between the two cannot be divorced from the natal alienation of Coloured people. Wicomb, in this instance, is quite critical of the rise of Coloured nationalism that had taken root in the first few years of South Africa's democracy. The origin, in the case of Coloured Nationalism, is that of miscegenation, and more importantly the hidden shame that follows it. Wicomb (1998, p. 92) is concerned with this creation of racial ideology; that is, the construction of shame that surrounds those who have no cultural and traditional 'purity':

Miscegenation, the origins of which lie within a discourse of 'race', concupiscence, and degeneracy, continues to be bound up with shame, a pervasive shame exploited in apartheid's strategy of the naming of a Coloured race and recurring in the current attempts by coloureds to establish brownness as a pure category, which is to say a denial of shame.

The dilemma of this surge in Coloured nationalism is thus rooted in shame. The fictive haven of purity or homogeneity is constructed by racial ideology and avowed by Coloured people as a means to supplant the shame of concupiscence. In order to underpin this false sense of belonging in the

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1   Throughout this paper, I refer to Colouredness as the identity, subjectivity and positionality of Coloured people, particularly in a South African context. In southern Africa, mixed race individuals are commonly regarded as 'Coloured'. This is a social group constituted by diverse ethnic backgrounds, cultures, religions and languages. For further reading, see Adhikari (2013), Erasmus (2001) and Hoffmeester (2018).

racial strata of Apartheid, it was necessary to create a myth of origin. In my analysis, District Six[2] ought to be viewed as the site, not of origin, but loss. The forced removals at District Six and other sites are symbolic of the severance of natality for Coloured people (Trotter, 2013).

Focusing once more on the life of Dreyer in Rive's novel, he finds himself at a point in his life where he no longer finds resonance within himself. He had inadvertently disavowed himself from his youthful past in District Six. This, thus, portrays a geographical separation that had contributed to Dreyer's social death. It severed his sense of connectedness to his community, old friends and his previous devotions and agendas. That being said, there was not only a geographic separation that had led to Dreyer's loss of Self but also a metaphysical one. This is embodied in Dreyer's relationship with Ruth, a white woman from Vereeniging[3] with whom he had fallen deeply in love. The relationship was ultimately not meant to be as Ruth's father had torn them asunder, viewing Dreyer as racially impure and inferior for his daughter. Dreyer never quite heals from this metaphysical separation, as evident in his letters to Abe. He is doomed to perpetual separation from Ruth due to his perceived inferiority, and this he can never fully come to terms with. It is these elements of geographic and metaphysical separations that are also evident in my broader analysis of Colouredness. Coloured people were the victims of forced removal, often from geographic sites of rich heterogeneous identity and culture. While on the other hand, there is the fictive, metaphysical notion of racial homogeneity that is beset upon the Coloured community. These elements of separation are what may establish the foundation for an analysis of social death and loss of social heterogeneity in Coloured communities.

The formalisation of race is an important marker in South Africa's colonial history. Herein, race was rationalised not solely through biology, but as a socio-legal framework (Posel, 2001). Posel (2001) touches on the fact that while the imposition of race was not exclusive to Apartheid, there was a striking vagueness in defining race pre-1948. This pre-Apartheid heterogeneity is palpable in Posel's (2001, p. 95) insinuation:

> […] the cases of people who looked Coloured but lived in native locations, spoke a native language, had paid lobola; or adversely, people who looked native but had married Coloured women, lived in Coloured areas, spoke Afrikaans, and were devout Christians

Furthermore, the rupture of this heterogeneity is expressed in Rive's novel, when Dreyer laments his natal alienation as he exclaims, 'I was bastardised by colonialism in such a manner that I have one foot in Europe and the other foot on this continent' (Rive, 1990, p. 97). He further links this rupture to the formalisation of race:

> Segregation was entrenched even deeper as part of the constitution. We fought to regain the past. We were yesterday's children who looked back even further (Rive, 1990, p. 100)

In the last sentence, he longs for a meaningful past of heterogeneity[4], instead of one that homogenises and 'bastardises' him. It is exhibited here that even in the face of vague racialism, prior to Apartheid, there still existed heterogeneity of culture, language and community. It must then be acknowledged that the formalisation of race, through rationalisation, gave way to the false ideal of homogeneity, or what Posel (2001) refers to as 'race as common sense'.

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2   Prior to forced removals in 1966, District Six was a highly diverse neighbourhood in the city of Cape Town. It was known for having a colourful, vibrant history with residents of various backgrounds and economic means.

3   Vereeniging is a city in the south of present-day Gauteng province.

4   He expresses that this heterogeneity had a presence prior to Apartheid. His political activism was constituted by a fight to regain this sense of heterogeneity.

I thus establish that the formal implementation of racial classification was detrimental to the heterogeneity of Coloured people prior to Apartheid. The racial vagueness of heterogeneity was no doubt problematic for Apartheid and its racial ideology. It was this heterogeneity that, as per Wicomb, was contrived into miscegenistic shame[5]– thus prompting homogenous Colouredness as a red herring to mask that shame. Thus, in contemplating Colouredness, one must be mindful of the interconnectedness between social death, racial ideology and heterogeneity. These are intertwined in the same manner that Rive convolutes the source of Dreyer's subjective loss. Rive often hints at Dreyer's youthful past in District Six, which cross-references the reader's attention to '*Buckingham Palace', District Six*[6]. It is this reference that points towards that essence of Self embedded in social heterogeneity and hitherto lost in the infernos of social death. This heterogeneous sense of identity was done away with physically through the forced removals and subsequent destruction of grey areas[7]; as well as mentally through the imposition of racial ideology and the false episteme of homogenous Colouredness. Rive makes this sense of loss and nostalgia candid within Dreyer's character, although it is a difficult trauma to reckon with. It is throughout the passage of this novel that one starts to witness the development of Dreyer's character through a reckoning with his past. It is this reckoning that gives way to a newfound sense of Self. One that we can compare, in phenomenological terms, to that of a new Humanism.

A New Humanism?

Emergency Continued is ultimately a story of personal reconciliation. It comprises the restoration of one's Self and one's subjective value that had been lost through the traverses of life. Dreyer is a character that overcomes this loss of Self. Everyone inevitably experiences this loss at some point in their lives through the dehumanising mechanism of modernity and capitalism that continually disfigures the human psyche and reality. Of course, it is not advertently capitalism nor modernity that is detrimental to Dreyer, but the very passage of time, of routine and ultimately institutionalisation that had altered his reality. His sense of Self had been disfigured by the events of the everyday that had slowly but inevitably led him on a path that was antithetic to his former Self. As a result, it is clear that themes of memory, personal reckoning and kinship are presented as aspects that slowly rehabilitate the beleaguered protagonist. Dreyer realises that as he searches for his son, he has a burning desire to simultaneously and symbolically find himself through re-piecing memories and old friendships.

Whether or not Rive was hinting at the humanism implicit in non-racialism, as he had done in '*Buckingham Palace', District Six,* one can certainly note the symbolisms of human agency that are required to overcome the alienation of social death. It is this instance that I'd like to highlight in Rive's novel. Almost through a Cartesian moment of rationalisation, one is able to re-navigate the locality of Self. This is what must also be analogised with the social death of Coloured people. If it is the case that humanity had been lost through the processes of Apartheid, forced removals and racial ideology, then could it follow that we ought to undo these processes by way of agency and reason? Perhaps this is what Rive was hinting at through Dreyer's revelation, reconciliation and

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5   This disfigurement of heterogeneous Colouredness is reminiscent of Mbembe's (2001) discussion of the manipulated distortion of the postcolonial African subject

6   One of Rive's novels wherein he illuminates expressions of culture and ideologies of non-racialism that sprawled the boulevards of District Six

7   This refers to urban locations constituted by a racially diverse demographic (i.e. District Six & Sophiatown). Under the Apartheid-era Group Areas Act, these residential areas were demolished, and its inhabitants forcibly removed to reserve whites-only residences.

repatriation of Self. Through looking at the authorship of Sylvia Wynter[8] and Zimitri Erasmus[9], I explore the rationale and intentions that a reinvention of humanism might have in remedying the rupture of subjectivity.

What could a Wynterian renegotiation of Humanity mean for the Coloured subject? Now aware of the society of race in the first instance, and the coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom in the second, what lies next for the Coloured subject in a setting of non-racialism? Does this provide the impetus for the Coloured subject to reinvent their sense of Self and Being? These are some budding questions that must be directed towards the issue of formulating a new humanism. Wynter provides us with the epistemological foreground with which to critique the way we have hitherto viewed race and Otherness. What needs to be ascertained is the path towards formulating new images of Being, outside of the paradigm of 'Man'. Essentially, the invention of a 'nonhomogeneous' Humanity within redefined parameters of race or Colouredness. If impetus is placed upon the march towards human-ness and heteronomy, then perhaps it is Colouredness that constitutes the vehicle of this trek. Thanks to Erasmus, we may focus upon the ways in which Colouredness is reconfigured in order to undo social death and embark on the journey towards finding the meaning of Self and Other. This is not dissimilar to the message that Rive seemingly displays in his novel.

Within the setting of *Emergency Continued,* non-racialism is somewhat of a forgone element of the story. Although it has a notable presence, race is not a major catalyst of Dreyer's story. One can, however, deduce the tensions and signifiers that one would otherwise recognise in our racialised world. These signifiers resemble the assemblages of race. For instance: geography, the type of language used and the portrayal of certain characters. Perhaps, like Erasmus, Rive's point is attempting to illuminate the inevitability of racial norms while at the same time validating the non-essence of race itself. Nonetheless, this novel portrays the story of a middle-aged teacher who was able to undo the estrangement that had befallen him. Like the Overrepresentation of Man (Wynter, 2003), institutionalism had stripped Dreyer of all semblance of being and replaced it with a foreign dogma that had alienated him from his own essence. This, like the history of colonised peoples, is the height of tragedy in terms of subjectivity and the order of things. This, however, only becomes clear to Dreyer when his son leaves home without notice. Perhaps this serves as a symbolism for the reckoning of the coloniality of power as Wynter poses. It is through this reckoning, and the search that it ignites, that Dreyer can reconcile an alternative yet binding meaning with which to constitute his life. This, in my opinion, is what links Dreyer's outcome to the proposal on race by Erasmus. Subsequent to reconstituting past friendships and re-entering political activism, he reaches a point at which he could offset the perplexities of his social death. Even though he finds his son and himself (in a symbolic sense), the world still carried on as it always had. He had not stopped the brutality of the Apartheid regime nor had he nullified the fugitive status of his son, but he had achieved the reconstitution of his subjectivity[10]. Much like the inevitability of racialist structures which Erasmus speaks of, Dreyer had established a new humanism as an alternate to the structures which still ravage him. If this alternate humanism is possible for Dreyer, as I have corroborated with discussions from Wynter and Erasmus, then perhaps there lies a horizon on which Colouredness is reconstituted with its lost sense of heterogeneity. What we haven't yet uncovered, however, is the antagonisms of racialism.

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8   Wynter (2003, 274) argues that the Black colonised subject, now aware of their position within a Eurocentric order of knowledge truth and power, must embark on a reinvention of Self, a production of Humanity that is 'nonhomogeneous' and non-analogous to Western modernity.

9   Along the line of Wynter's 'nonhomogeneous' human, Erasmus (2017) argues that in perceiving race 'otherwisely', we ought to understand its totalising mechanics; however, in so doing, we must repurpose and renegotiate what race means in terms of identifying the Self and Other.

10   Though only to a nominal extent as I shall discuss.

Racial Antagonism and the Coloured Question

There are some notable tracts of racialism that are discussed in Rive's novel. Although alluded to in passing, these are nonetheless important instances in the book that cannot be overlooked. We can agree that humanism—the ultimate awakening from Kantian self-imposed darkness—is indeed an inspiring story. However, one cannot overlook those imposing structures which latch onto one's very existence. This important yet nominal element of the novel is rooted in the racial relations of subornation that are apparent throughout the novel. Here, I refer specifically to Dreyer's forbidden relationship with Ruth, his first true love. As the reader learns towards the middle of the book, the two were caught and charged with the Immorality Act[11]. Dreyer was subsequently bailed out of prison by Ruth's father, but he had to suffer a worse punishment- the genesis of his own alienation. What's important, however, is to note the antagonisms that are at the root of this alienation. The Immorality Act and Ruth's father are two elements in the story that highlights this antagonism. It is not so much the case that Dreyer's racial inferiority is the main culprit in this instance, although this is what Dreyer laments. On the contrary, it is the negation of Dreyer's Colouredness which must be addressed. As I will discuss, it is Dreyer's Colouredness that capacitates the whiteness, and thus the perceived superiority of Ruth and her father. I bring this antagonism up, not to link with the genesis of Dreyer's social death, but to highlight the improbability of offsetting it. Analogous to Colouredness, there is no setting in which a reconstitution race will offset its negation. In other words, I argue that the superiority of whiteness is predatory on the incapacitation of Colouredness. This incapacity is what limits a socially dead Colouredness from usurping new humanity.

I argue that Colouredness, even in a post-apartheid sense, is problematic for the mere fact that it is negated by whiteness. As I have discussed in the case of Dreyer, it's not only problematic that Colouredness had lost its natal essence, but also the fact that whiteness bases its own essence upon this lack of essence. Wilderson (2008) describes whiteness as the positional form which predicates itself upon the non-position Blackness[12]. This is analogous to Colouredness, as the image of the Human Other, which breathes essence and form into the ontology of whiteness. Whiteness, as we have seen in Wynter's position, is simultaneously afforded the ultimate position of Humanity as based upon this negation. It is this negation that I am particularly interested in interrogating further. If it is this negation, and thus antagonism, that is the underpinning of modernity and all her symbolisms of Humanism, then does this not present an ethical dilemma for modernity and Humanism in itself?[13]

This reading of Wilderson thus provides a point at which to contemplate the negation of Colouredness. If it is the case, as supposed earlier, that the loss of heterogenous identity among Coloured people had led to their social death, then one must also consider that civil society does not admit those without subjective capacity. Coloured people are relegated to the gates of civil society. How is it that one comes to such a supposition? In homogenising Colouredness, Apartheid policy also produced the negated form on which Colouredness was to be socio-legally interpreted:

'coloured person' means a person who is not a white person nor a native (Population Registration Act 1950)

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11 Apartheid legislation (amended in 1950) which legally incriminated sexual relations between whites and other races.

12 Here Wilderson speaks to elements of social death through invoking 'thanatology'- this is what opposingly gives life to civil society. Wilderson (2008, 62) goes on further to illuminate how this lack or void in Blackness provides the very capacity for Humanity in whiteness

13 Its arguable that Humanism is not an appropriate vehicle in which either to articulate the suffering of Black bodies nor to transume it into the plane of civility. Blackness is a result of social death and the suffering of 'accumulation and fungibility' (Hartman, 1997), not by way of contingency, but rather the 'matrix that positions the subject'. Wilderson (2008, 75) articulates the inadequacy of Humanist theory in so far as it does not account for the dilemma of slavery as a 'matrix'

Here we see that Coloureds are defined negatively as those who are neither white nor Black. What's more, is that this same negative aspect is used to positively define and affirm whiteness:

> 'white person' means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a Coloured person (Population Registration Act, 1950)

This thus provides the impetus to make use of Wilderson's arguments on racial antagonization. Though not identical to the case of African Americans, Coloureds have been homogenised for the sake of racial ideology and sanctioned to social death for their perceived lack of cultural identity. As Wicomb (1998) recounts, Colouredness is used as the façade in which to mask shame; in disavowing their history, they attempt to charter new tropes of identity and belonging among an imagined community. This is what one notes in the case of Dreyer, where he imagines his ideal life with Ruth, though masked it with his pretentious relationship with Mabel and the birth of their children. He attempts to establish an alternative Self vicariously through Bradley, and it is subsequently through his search for Bradley that he is able to finally attain that alternative Self. In a way, Dreyer is thus reunited with the same sense of Self that he had lost after Ruth. How, then did he manage to overturn the incapacitation of his social death? I argue that he didn't, owing to the fact that the damnation of social death is a binding one.

Regarding Colouredness, there are indeed markers of imagined subjectivity, such as a liminal sense of self or community. There may even be a consciousness of diverging and overlapping interests among Coloured communities, though I don't believe this could ultimately resist the matrix of racial antagonism. Those without subjective capacity says Wilderson (2008, p. 50), may have the same sense of interests or agendas as the socially living, but their positionality may never be analogised:

> ...whereas Masters may share the same fantasies as Slaves, and Slaves can speak as though they have the same interests as Masters, their respective grammars of suffering are irreconcilable.

One sees that the reimagining of Colouredness and its disavowal of Apartheid homogeneity may still prove inadequate for a supposed new Humanism. The very antagonism within civil society, between the socially living and the incapacitated, poses an irreconcilable problem for any attempts to reverse social death. If the incapacitated Black were to transume a humanism of some form, then it would inevitably result in the implosion of the Eurocentric civil society- although, perhaps this is what Erasmus was insinuating. However, I agree with Wilderson's position in claiming that the ethical dilemma of Humanism is insurmountable.

Going back to my analysis on Dreyer, he didn't manage to undo his situational damnation. Apartheid and its socio-legal devices had still rendered him a non-being, despite his liminal sense of reconciliation. In the same way, it is these antagonistic devices that suspend Coloured people in its social matrix of positionality- in other words, they remain socially dead in perpetuity. Dreyer's story of overcoming subjective adversity does, however, illuminate an interesting point. There may be a crevice of simulated transcendence. Even though Dreyer is still suspended within the atrocities of Apartheid, his son's uncertain future and his pretentious marriage, he is still able to muster some liminal though non-effectual meaning in his life. Essentialist though one may view humanism, perhaps it is also true that Wilderson inadvertently wanders in the same direction. It is my position that Wilderson places too much emphasis on the racial antagonisms within civil society, so much so that he describes Blackness as the overdetermination of 'incapacity'. This incapacity doesn't necessarily disqualify existence, albeit in a merely sentient form within the margins of civil society,

modernity and humanity. Even Wilderson nominally admits this. Perhaps then it is these liminal spaces that need to be illuminated in our study of Colouredness. Here, again, I reinvoke the essence of Erasmus' supposition of renegotiating meaning within the confines of marginality[14].

Navigating Subjective Meaning in Liminality

A mysterious though an important part of the novel is Dreyer's interaction with a vagrant named Paai on Macassar Beach[15]. Dreyer holds a conversation with Paai and learns that he lived among the Port Jackson trees and subsisted on the marine life that he had caught on the beach. Dreyer is intrigued by the elderly beach-dweller, though baffled as to why someone would choose to live on the margins of society as Paai had. The vagrant had no interest in the happenings of civil society. Like Dreyer, he was denied access to modernity, but simultaneously has no interest in it. Dreyer comes to the conclusion that Paai is nothing more than content and certainly less happy than a schoolteacher. He finds some commonality with Paai in that they were both running from something. In my analysis, Paai is more of a pragmatic figure than Dreyer. Between the two, Paai doesn't buy into the fictive telos of transuming his damnation. Contemplating Paai's situation, Dreyer asks himself:

Can the whole world always escape to some miserable existence under Port Jackson trees, sheltered from the north-western? There would always be north-westers. Sooner or later one must leave the flimsy shelter of Port Jacksons and stand four-square facing the north-wester. (Rive, 1990, p. 135)

I argue that Paai is indeed facing a metaphysical north-wester[16]. He is aware of the alienation and damnation that befalls him. Though, instead of attempting the futility of transcending his situation, he makes the most of it. On the beach, he is aware of his social exodus but chooses contentment in a world where he can nominally do as he pleases. In some way, this is a subversion of the exclusivity of modernity. Similarly, I don't argue for the transcendence of Colouredness from its hitherto damnation. There is no transcendence; there is no humanist telos. Nonetheless, there is a liminal semblance of agency within the margins of civil society.

In contemplating this vexing liminality[17] concerning Colouredness, one is reminded of the problem which Albert Camus attempts to surmount in *The Myth of Sisyphus*[18]. Referring to the mythical figure of Sisyphus, Camus (2005, p. 117) argues that this 'is the hour of consciousness. At each of those moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks towards the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his fate. He is stronger than his rock'. It is here, that Sisyphus had charted typography of subjective meaning and found some semblance of articulation in an otherwise meaningless life. What then are we to make of Camus' Sisyphisian analogy for absurdism and the problem of Colouredness? If we are to assume that there is no meaningful end to Colouredness, then we can compare the precarious positionality of Colouredness to that of absurdism. A Coloured person, expressing themselves as such in a liminal space, is already in a position to subvert those structures which offer no social meaning or articulation. Coloureds, in their social definition, is negated in their essence. But within

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14   Though I agree with this marginal level of subjective agency, I don't expound it in a teleological sense. I refer to this 'renegotiation' as a purely liminal one, and not something that is capable of ever superseding the coloniality of Humanity.

15   This beach stretches along the small town of Macassar in the Western Cape, which has historically been home to a predominantly fishing and boat making community.

16   This refers to the strong winds or storms which emanate from a northwest direction.

17   I espouse this in an anthropological sense, as in the moment of suspension in one's subjectivity. For the socially dead, this is a perpetual suspension within the margins of civil society. Though socially dead, there is still a marginal, sentient existence within these margins. For more on liminality, see Turner (1969).

18   In order to solidify his point, Camus makes use of the Greek allegory on Sisyphus. Herein, Sisyphus is doomed to meaninglessly carry a boulder up a hill, only for it to fall back to the bottom once he reaches the top. This menial damnation is repeated in perpetuity.

the margins of this same society, we may find a subjective essence to Colouredness that is perceived and negotiated in a nominal way. Understood in this way, Coloureds, like Sisyphus and Paai, are damned to eternal suspense; never Black nor white but always the Human Other. It is for this reason that we must move towards perceiving Colouredness not as a teleological ambition, either towards humanism or racialism, but as a state of subversion to the void that non-racialism[19] poses.

To drive this point further, one could explore this element of liminality in *Emergency Continued.* Dreyer's character is one that portrays a relentless soul. He is adamant about undoing his own experience of Absurdity. This is very admirable, though futile for reasons I have already discussed. His reconciled sense of self is one that does not fully address the catalysts which induced his alienation in the first place. Thus, it is antithetical for this alternative humanism to exist simultaneously to the elements which superimpose and negate it. In my reading of this novel, the climax is not constituted by the moment where Dreyer is finally at peace with himself and his past. On the contrary, the pinnacle moment in this story is at the point where Dreyer is most perplexed–this is his 'hour of consciousness'. This is the moment of clarity, not because he finds the answers he is looking for; rather it is clear that there is no answer at all. It is between fictive answers and the reality of unknowing that one finds liminality of the non-effectual agency[20]. For Dreyer, his moment of liminality is the non-effectual agency he has in his writing. Conveying to Abe his longing for Ruth, Dreyer says, "In fiction, we could meet again, but in real life, this is unfortunately highly improbable" (Rive, 1990, p. 37). Here he alludes to the ability to imagine his ideal life in writing while acknowledging its improbability. This is hard to accept for Dreyer, but he embraces this liminality, nonetheless. As he writes his autobiography, he is unable to apply an ideal telos for he cannot foresee his own future. He has no choice but to encounter his turbulent life of self-alienation:

> How can one really exercise the sublime detachment of the novelist if one is directly involved in the situation one is writing about? I cannot plan what happens next since I myself must wait to find out what is going to happen next. I cannot predict what my characters will do or say and thus have no control over the direction they will take. So much for the writer's omniscience and detachment. All I am able to do right now is wait, observe, transcribe and garnish here and there. This might prove a futile exercise. I can but try. (Rive, 1990, p. 36)

It is this suspense in Dreyer's writing, and ultimately his life, which is inescapable in my examination. This does not, however, deem this liminality in a negative sense. On the contrary, it must be seen as the locus for the subversion of those elements which have imposed this liminality in the first instance. Liminality provides the moment in which the Self can be reimagined, reconceived and renegotiated–but only in a subjective way. In other words, nothing will change Dreyer's situation except to imagine it differently in a fictional novel. In the case of Colouredness, nothing will undo its social death; but that doesn't exempt imaginings of community, Being and Self. These imaginings are non-effectual, but they occur nonetheless. This liminal, non-effectual agency is not enough to offset the racial antagonisms embedded in Apartheid's legacy, but it does offer the socially dead some nominal meaning and articulation.

We may never know what Rive's thoughts on post-Apartheid South Africa and contemporary Colouredness may have been today. I am, however, of the belief that *Emergency Continued* would not have been his final semi-biographical novel which portrays the life of Andrew Dreyer. Perhaps a

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19   I refer to the void in non-racialism for the fact that it doesn't address racial antagonism. By denying race in a discursive sense, it removes the platforms by which social death and racial antagonism may be articulated.

20   By this, I refer to the liminal ability one has to create subjective meaning and articulation within the margins of the objective world. However, this liminal ability is purely subjective and incapable of effecting change upon the objective world.

non-racial South Africa would have posed another bout of introspection and search of Self for Dreyer or perhaps Bradley. My final point here is that a real, binding Self is unattainable for the socially dead. Colouredness is a still-born state of being that would prove any humanist telos futile. At best, Colouredness must seek its 'hour of consciousness' and make the most of its perpetual liminality.

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Delineating the Western Orders of Rights and Reason in Post-Colonial Africa

An Appraisal of the Zimbabwean Variant Under and After Mugabe

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Abstract

Adherence to the fundamental tenets of Human Rights and advocacy of Democracy are the two traditionally entwined Western expressions of rights and reason that any state must comply with to be treated as an egalitarian state. The degree of democratization in any state is to be gauged by its ability to give its citizens an acceptable form of governance and a slew of natural rights and legal safeguards against human rights abuses, from which the idea of justice is to flow. Many of the African and Asian countries, that became sovereign states through the 1980s and 1990s and consequently came to be hailed as formal democracies have only had a very perfunctory degree of democratization. In such circumstances, human rights, without the existence of a real democratic structure to uphold and sustain it, does not effectively translate into a charter of rights but would merely be retained as a set of flexible norms. It is in this context that the proposed paper intends to address the impact of globalization of the principles and values associated with the concepts of democracy and human rights in post-colonial African states. It also aspires to inquire into the need for an element of universality in the dialogues on human rights and democratization, so that they do not get reduced to mere synonyms for Westernization. Further, the reality and ambivalence surrounding the consolidation of democratic virtues along with the observance of human rights are best reflected in the exemplification of how the Sub-Saharan African country of Zimbabwe operated its "democracy"; both under its longest-serving President Robert Mugabe and post his unceremonious ouster following the coup *d'etat* on 14 November 2017. It would be interesting to study the political economy of transition in a country like Zimbabwe that, during and after its leading figure Mugabe, continues to pledge allegiance to a nationalist, post-colonial, and populist anomaly of being principally antithetical to imperialism in all its forms while also being an anathema to the precepts of democracy, justice and human rights in practice.

Keywords: Democratization, Human Rights, Globalization, Universality, Justice.

Introduction

The identification of an ideal state most often rests both on the notions of political freedom, frequently summarized as democracy, and on the guarantee of civil liberties and human rights to all its citizens on a day-to-day basis and in activities relating to their political participation. Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980 has presented itself as a classical example of how the stability of political institutions and the sustainability of economic reforms are organically linked to the multiple parameters of political freedom. The swearing-in of the first post-independence government committed to radical social transformation of society, under the leadership of a liberation leader like Robert Mugabe, was expected to pave the way towards a new democratic revolution in Zimbabwe. The standardized democratic ethos was to eventually give birth to well-founded political institutions

in the country. However, the semi-democracy state that Zimbabwe descended in to, in due course of time post-independence, not just made its political institutions fragile but it also soon became an arena for fierce political conflicts; the adverse spillover effect of which was rampant human rights violations on the downtrodden (Gwenhamo, Fedderke & Kadt, 2012).

The political transition of Zimbabwe was, and to this date continues to be, marred by intense polarization and surging violence. However, interestingly neither the polarization of the Zimbabwean electorate was an imminent repercussion of the democratization process nor was the mobilization of the electorate carried out along the lines of pre-existing ethnic chasms. Rather, the two prominent political parties in Zimbabwe, namely the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) politicized their respective constituencies and boosted their mobilizing faculties through combative maneuvering that essentially divided the electorate into two antagonistic factions, fiercely opposed to arbitrations with the rival camp. The exclusionary tactics employed by the political parties in "democratizing" countries like Zimbabwe not just spawned rampant disintegration, displacement, and state violence but also became the focal point of the political craft that Zimbabwe eventually adapted for itself. Such a scheme of political craft, built-in resistances and rebellions, further enables one to understand the intertwined relationship between spiraling electoral contests (in other words democratization) and state-sponsored violence (read as human rights violations) in post-colonial states like Zimbabwe (LeBas, 2006).

In Zimbabwe's political transition from a heavily militarized liberation movement, rooted in the ideals of socialism and left-wing nationalism, to a democratic government that eventually conformed to the neo-liberal designs, what shot through the most was how the politics of command emerged as the chief precursor to the centralization of control. Even with the acceptance of neo-liberal policies like Essential Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in the early 90s, the opponents of the Zimbabwean government, under Robert Mugabe, continued to be attacked as agents of the West, foot-soldiers of the imperialists, and thereby anti-Zimbabwean. Furthermore, the anti-colonial /imperial rhetoric and the cautiously popularized patriotic history of the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe served as the legitimizing factors for crushing democratic dissents in the country (Ranger, 2005).

Mugabe's regime under his ZANU-PF sought to position itself as the sole savior of the post-colonial nation of Zimbabwe. In fact, the process of democratization of the Zimbabwean society was largely equated with absolute compliance to Mugabe's call for national unity and complete subservience to the historical discourses of nationalism appropriated by his ZANU-PF (Hammett, 2011). However, conditions of political instability and perceived vulnerabilities soon forced the ruling elites to sacrifice liberation and democracy for the sake of retaining and tightening control over the nation-state. The resultant slump in the development of the democratic institutions, thereby, became a smokescreen for the exclusivist and authoritarian policies of the Mugabe government (Tomaselli, 2009).

The replacement of Mugabe with his erstwhile crony, Emmerson Mnangagwa did not in any way signal the end of the constellation of political ideas, political behavior, rhetoric, actions, policies, or even political controversies that formed the bulwark of Mugabe's notion of governance and political life. The regime change, if any, only solidified the possibility of an inevitable perpetuation of Mugabe-ism by the new government in Zimbabwe, centered on personality cults and reinforcement of one's own constituent territories around ethnic indicators strategem. The replacement of Mugabe by Mnangagwa, in fact, was less to take charge of and counter the wave of despair and distrust that had crippled Zimbabwe for long and was more of an effort to preserve the sanctity and respectability of the glorious Zimbabwean liberation struggle and its stalwarts. In fact, even to this day, the Mugabean legacy of sustaining the authority of the "supreme leader" works as the fundamental

institutional code in the country, that in turn both systematizes and legitimizes the use of any kind of power in Zimbabwe to curb dissensions and resistances (Parsons, 1963).

While Robert Mugabe was an ardent critic of the neo-imperialist imposition of ideas and cultural norms on his countrymen and argued for a separation of human rights discourses from the West-sponsored notions of democracy and democratization, the reality remains that Zimbabwe under and after Mugabe has successively diluted the integrity and probity of human rights as a set of natural rights that are universal in nature. Such dilution of the universality of human rights further paved the way for a shrinking of democratic spaces in Zimbabwe, as democracy ceased to be the principal legitimizing touchstone in Zimbabwean politics. However, along with recognizing the lack of democratic ethos and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe, it is also equally important to not turn a blind eye to the cultural imperialism foisted on post-colonial societies like those of Zimbabwe by the new and old colonial masters. Correspondingly important is to be vigilant against the misrepresentation of the interrelation between democracy and human rights, mostly by the West, so that the ambiguities surrounding the democratic credentials of states like Zimbabwe do not serve as an alibi for them to not formally recognize the internationalism of human rights laws.

The Crisis of Democratization and the End of Human Rights Discourse in Zimbabwe

The liberal notion of the idea of democracy encompasses a variety of characteristic features ranging from regard for the rule of law, a vibrant civil society, transparent and inclusive elections, a guarantee of constitutional and political liberties to citizens, and respect and recognition of human rights. Although the evolution and stability of political, social, and economic institutions in a state are fundamental to the development and deepening of democratic ethos, it can also be stated that these two conditions are closely associated with each other; just as how institutions establish democracy, democracy too promotes institutions. The important thing to note here is that no country begins its democratization process on a clean canvas as any effort towards the rebuilding of a nation-state on democratic principles must acknowledge that certain components of the erstwhile society, like its institutions, would remain as they are and hence, the process of rebuilding must be receptive to the existence of such still surviving institutions (Eve, 2009).

The West has always assumed the mantle of being the pioneer of democracy and has particularly positioned itself as the benefactor of democracy in African countries. The Western idea of a New World Order is for them the only democratic framework that can secure peace and development in the entire world. The West also sets the benchmark for democratization in almost all the erstwhile colonies, and this includes framing of a constitution, the introduction of a multi-party state, fair and free elections, forging of dynamic civil society groups, and most importantly a blind allegiance to capitalism. Any country fulfilling the above-mentioned criteria would then be hailed a democracy. However, what the West conveniently forgets is the fundamental oversight in superimposing their ideas of democracy on these erstwhile colonies, specifically those in Africa, that have completely antithetical lived experiences.

Hence, while African countries can take inspiration from the West in their democratic transitions, it would also be highly unworkable and counterproductive for these former colonies to blindly mimic the Western models of governance and economic growth in their transition phases (Udogu, 1997). For instance, the concept of free and fair elections is one of the bulwarks of the Western notion of liberal democracy. While it is true that transparent elections are critical to the sustenance of democracy in any country and is also the foundation on which all the other facets of democracy would derive, it must also be known that the outward bogey of periodical elections cannot serve as the sole determinant of the survival of democratic ethos and culture in a country (Abbink & Hesseling, 2000).

Further, while African countries have had much less experience of contemporary democracy due to colonisation for centuries, it also remains a fact that African societies have always placed greater emphasis on community living and have given precedence to community rights over the rights of individuals. Zimbabwe, like many other African countries, began its democratization process in the early 90s and wished to move forward through a socialist setup under the aegis of democracy. Yet in the words of Fomunyoh (2005), democracy for African countries, like Zimbabwe, largely remained "*a mixed bag of accomplishments, challenges and largely unmet aspirations*". As democracy most often takes the flavour of the society it emanates from, Zimbabwe too had its own unique democratization process. This process, however, neither checked the political competition between the ruling elites at the national level nor did it expand the social basis for productive political interactions. It must also nevertheless be pointed out that many a time African leader, like Mugabe or his successor Mnangagwa, are elected not just to political power but are also elected into challenging circumstances such as acute economic debts and bankruptcy, natural calamities like famines and epidemics, and man-made catastrophes like ethnic cleansing. Hence, it becomes the responsibility of the colonizers, with claims of democratic credentials, to assist these newly independent countries in their capacity-building enterprises (Campbell & Carroll, 2005).

In the specific instance of Zimbabwe, the West talks about how the country would only proceed towards real democracy with the abolition of the one-party state of ZANU-PF that wields definitive control and authority over a wide range of institutions, economic sectors, and resources. In fact, the rise of Robert Mugabe's successor Mnangagwa, to Presidency, is nothing short of an extension of the fundamentals of Mugabe-ism as the latter too is equally guilty of ethnic cleansing, electoral malpractices, widespread corruption, and brutal suppression of people's rights, much like his political godfather. However, what the West overlooks is the deep-seated antagonism that they fostered amongst the native black communities in countries like Zimbabwe, during their colonial rule, for the White settler minorities. The era of European imperialism in Zimbabwe, just as it did in several other African countries, pushed the native black population into an epoch of social marginalization. While the Europeans took pride in them being a glorious nation-state, Africans remained the mere "uncivilized tribes" and hence, lesser mortals.

Consequently, post-independence, Zimbabwe, and many of its counterparts were primarily preoccupied with correcting the historic mistakes of the Whites that had by then become laws of the land in these former colonies. Thus, if South Africa was engaged in quashing the legal sanction accorded to apartheid, Mugabe in Zimbabwe sought to give back the blacks their traditional landholdings which were taken away from them over the course of the occupation. Mugabe also took it upon himself to accord entry to the blacks to those sectors like agriculture, finance, and industry, from where they were barred through white mandated laws and provisions. Under such circumstances, the West could not have anticipated the newly elected black majority government in Zimbabwe to treat both whites and blacks as equals for the greater good of the nation, regardless of their race and class positions (Eve, 2009).

Also, while it is true that Zimbabwe has to be provided with a level-playing field for establishing a political framework governed by rule of law and respect for human rights, it must be noted that Zimbabweans must be able to solve their own dilemmas as that is indispensable to drive the country towards a healthy state of democratic governance. The new president Mnangagwa in fact managed to instil the confidence of being a "practical businessman committed to prioritizing agriculture to revive the moribund economy" (The New Age, 2017) amongst the white settler farmers by emphasizing the need to adequately compensate the evicted white farmers, along with sustainable economic recovery, in his inaugural address to the nation in 2017 (The New Age, 2017).

It is a fact that the advent of the 90s brought with it a liberal democratic critique of human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Along with discussions on the electoral malpractices, an accusation that still holds weight in the case of Zimbabwe, this new wave of political liberalization was also quite vocal about the human rights abuses perpetuated by the Mugabe regime in the guise of exerting absolute control over its citizenry. There was a massive plea from the civil society groups to re-evaluate the legacies of the liberation struggle and to place more attention on the movements for civic and human rights that were gaining traction in the post-colonial state. While the land reform movements of the ruling party were largely appreciated as efforts towards reparation of the colonial legacy, the authoritarian nationalist politics of the Mugabe regime, that many a time ended up facilitating massacres posed, and continues to pose through the current regime, both theoretical and political hitches towards the influx of an alternative politics in Zimbabwe (McCandless, 2005).

Operation *Murambatsvina* of June 2005 was perhaps the most brutal episode of a systemic far-flung attack on a poor, defenceless population that took the form of an epidemic of organized violence and torture in Zimbabwe. Operation *Murambatsvina* marked a defining moment in the political economy of conflict in Zimbabwe as it represented the best prototype of Mugabe's idea of decimating political opposition and establishing a *de facto* one-party state. The nation-wide unsparing onslaught on the residential settings, the trading markets, and stalls in the informal sector bore testimony to the fact that even after two decades of political liberation the ruling ZANU-PF, which had perched itself at the heart of the liberation movement, had not made any significant transformation to a civilian, democratic party that was in effect receptive to the needs of the new millennium. In fact, the resistance of a section of the population against the cleanout operation could not match up to the repressive paraphernalia of the state, that had by then accrued an abysmal track record of human rights violations and excelled in the absurdities of breach of rule of law, implementation of draconian legislation and curbing of voices of dissent (The ZHRNF Report, 2005).

When the role of the state as the central force of development and transformation went uncontested both within the socialist ZANU-PF and the early left-intelligentsia, in the first decade after independence, the abuses of state power remained unquestioned. All concerns surrounding human rights excesses and shrinking of democratic spaces, which once constituted the bulwark of the Zimbabwean national movement, were systematically wiped out from the selective history of nationalism popularized by the ruling ZANU-PF. However, what is most disturbing is the manner in which the Mugabe regime found a refuge for its human rights violations, necessitated by a coercive nationalist politics, under the broad umbrella of an anti-imperialist, Pan-African clique. Mugabe and his cronies were successful in employing the complexities of racial inequalities as the perfect justification for the 'war against the historical wrongs' while attempting to cover up the very structures that furthered inequality in post-independence Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2006).

In short, it can be stated that while the successive ZANU-PF governments led by Mugabe and now by Mnangagwa have been pandering to the pretext of an anti-imperialist ideological offensive internationally, back home they oversaw a very precise and autocratic class project. Further, it is a fact that the language of anti-imperialism did help the ZANU-PF leaders in accumulating a collective idea of a nation; a nationalist pattern of the politics of globalization that worked towards camouflaging resource accumulation by the political elites and employed mass mobilizations to obfuscate the critiques of authoritarian politics. The nationalist bogey of Mugabe was no doubt one of the repressive varieties, that revived in the face of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 thereby leading to the end of international solidarity of socialists. Hence as clearly stated by Raftopoulos (2006), "notwithstanding the impressive achievements of the anti-globalization movement, the broadness of the diverse agendas of the nationalist projects of the likes of Mugabe could also accommodate the authoritarian anti-imperialism of the Zimbabwe regime". The real challenge for

the post-colonial African states like Zimbabwe is, therefore, to evolve an anti-imperialist critique and praxis that is both democratic in spirit and anti-capitalist in its principles; one that would ensure more space for democratic political participation while also confronting the remnants of the New Imperialist Order (Raftopoulos, 2006).

The Tragedy of Globalization of Human Rights without Democracy in Zimbabwe

It is now common knowledge that the globalisation of the ideas of democracy and human rights has been met with several criticisms from all around the world, wherein the most notable has been the one linking the process of globalization to the neo-imperialist hegemony over the cultural practices, religious traditions and ways of living of the erstwhile colonized by the former colonial masters. As the power differential here is clearly tilted in favour of the latter, as per Langlois (2003), it is imperative that a non-separation of human rights and democracy would culminate eventually into a clash of civilizations, which would essentially be a by-product of cultural imperialism. In fact, it could be assumed that the globalization process, instead of diminishing the cultural differentiation between the West and the rest, would indeed bolster them, thereby activating culturally conservative pandemonium in less developed countries. Such anarchist uproars, far from institutionalizing the global discourse around human rights, would instead very well obscure the process of the evolvement of a global culture of respecting and recognizing the principles of human rights (Langlois, 2003). In the words of Monshipouri and Welch (2001), "one way to promote an international human rights regime is to separate respect for human rights from the Western-centric notion of democratization and treat such respect as the international norm".

Enumerating on the need to disassociate the Western notions of human rights and democratization from each other, Nathan (1997), also explains that such segregation can combat the advent of reactive nationalism in erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa. He further goes on to take the specific case of the United States of America and says, "the United States should separate human rights from democratization, focus on abuses that are illegal under international law and pre-empt the charge of cultural imperialism by framing the issues as one of compliance with international norms...it is important to separate human rights from democratization and treat it as the international idea that it is, not as a code word for Westernization" (Nathan, 1997).

Before getting into the specificities of Zimbabwe, it is important to understand that although the concepts of human rights and democracy are globally revered as the inalienable attributes of any civilized nation and their application all around the globe as pragmatic political projects, the truth remains that the statuses accorded to both these notions differ significantly; both in terms of the political and ideological functions they are to fulfil and also in terms of the institutions that bolster and shape the significance of human rights and democracy as objectives and action schemes. In comparison to democracy, human rights have a more powerful institutional standing in the international arena. This is specifically because of how the United Nations (UN) has engineered the progression of the human rights discourse as one of the cardinal principles of the statement of norms by which human beings are expected to co-exist with one another. While human rights are bestowed with international recognition, the fact remains that this recognition does not take into account the dynamics of power and politics at play and mistakes the value and implication of such a recognition to mean more than what it effectively does. Hence, it would be preposterous to think of its relevance and intensity to be identical to its prima facie claims and it would certainly be a misstep to take this international recognition at face value (Langlois, 2003).

Another important subject of concern is how international human rights laws are blindly applied to states all over the world. In other words, having a democratic setup is not a pre-condition to endorse and even be a signatory to the various conventions and instrumentalities of the UN, concerned

with human rights. The fact that a regime does not need to be a democratic one but could just be superficially seen as being committed to pursuing the human rights norms is quite alarming. The actual reasons for both democratic and non-democratic states for getting tangled with a particular UN treaty on human rights could be quite removed from the honest and prioritized interest in a particular issue of human rights at hand. Mostly, it is the pressure of international legitimacy, along with access and respect in international platforms that push world leaders and country heads to publicly recognize the need for institutionalization of human rights laws in their respective states.

Coming to Zimbabwe, it can be stated that this kind of a perfunctory commitment to certain human rights standards has been for long the basis of UN aid programmes in the country, which in turn bears testimony to how international cooperation is heavily determined by pledging allegiance to the human rights conventions. Even states like Zimbabwe that do not have a West-approved democratic domestic government thus become eligible for international assistance, provided they come under the purview of international human rights law. Hence, it is crucial to understand the real politics behind the propagation and mindless adoption of such human rights covenants and protocols (Langlois, 2003). In fact, it is the West that played a crucial role in overthrowing Mugabe in November 2017 by instigating his own party men to orchestrate a coup, as the former was proving too incommodious for the Western interests.

Apodaca and Stohl (1999), in fact, argue that international aid is integrally linked to the adoption of human rights-respecting postures. Taking the specific example of the United States as one of the leading donor countries providing aid and assistance to the less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, they argue that a state's human rights record is paramount to the United States when it comes to providing it with economic, if not military, aid. This is quite decisive when the self-proclaimed oldest democracy in the world has its own skeletons in the closet. That apart, the pre-condition of observance of human rights laws for delivery of aid in erstwhile colonies like Zimbabwe provide ample opportunities for the donor countries to justify the global recession in the amount of cooperation and services imparted to their domestic and international precincts over what is deemed as inappropriate and unjust by the donors who are by default the overseers of the right and the wrong. Therefore, the fact remains that the position and prominence accorded to the concept of human rights and its actual worthiness in a country are two different aspects and are hence to be treated as two separate political concepts.

As the political realities of human rights practices and their linkage to legitimacy are concepts that are very different from those that emanate from a democratic framework, it can be stated that the combination of the legitimacy and the political/economic impetus aspects of the human rights scheme provides the international community, in the words of Langlois (2003), "the wherewithal to demand that the state regimes change the way they govern without necessarily demanding that they change their governance regimes". Thus, the imperial masters devised a plan to acculturate the non-democratic states by pulling them out of the human rights abuse abyss without bothering to check on the progress of their domestic democratization performance before facilitating any form of colonizer-colonized collaborations (Langlois, 2003).

While it is argued by some that democracy is not an immediate pre-condition for the expansion of human rights in less developed countries like Zimbabwe and that the complex process of democratization might actually defer the institutionalization of human rights norms in many states, the fact remains that the complete disconnection of democracy from human rights mostly ends up in the latter being reduced from a set of rights to a mere set of norms or covenants. As the concepts of both democracy and human rights are Western-sponsored concepts, the foundation of the two remains the same and the latter, if not operating under the auspices of democracy, would be no better than some basic standards of human behaviour or in worst cases charity (Langlois, 2003).

In the case of Zimbabwe, till the supposedly harmonized elections of 2013, Mugabe's ZANU-PF wove all of its electoral agendas around fighting the neo-imperialists, wherein, in the words of Ncube (2013), "the right to 'external self-determination' (against extant power relations in the global system) was prioritized over the right to 'internal self-determination' (referring to political and civic rights of citizens, including that of choosing one's own government)". It is a fact that Mugabe, in the name of countering Western hegemony, perpetuated and justified state-sponsored human rights violations in the country. The repression programmes were however most often a cover-up for the corruption and financial misappropriation charges against the Mugabe government.

However, the opposition forces in Zimbabwe, understandably backed by the West, always sought to prioritise the abuse of civil and political rights, which was indeed a reality, over the measures taken by the Mugabe regime to ensure social and economic justice through land reform programmes. While the latter was ridiculed as the politicization of the land question, the stated prominence for the deepening of political and civil rights became a potent weapon in the hands of the opposition to achieve their aim of bringing about a change of regime in the country. Interestingly, it was not just the opposition forces who were in an iniquitous alliance with the Western imperialists to bring down Mugabe, but there were the petty-bourgeois classes too (Ncube, 2013).

With the intent to thwart the socio-economic and cultural progression of Zimbabwe, the petty bourgeoisie too used and abused the human rights discourse. The white settler farmers who shared a common goal with the opposition, of ousting Mugabe and his ZANU-PF from political power, employed the human rights rhetoric to halt the forceful acquisition of their lands by the ZANU-PF government as part of the latter's land redistribution projects. Similarly, some of the black bourgeoisie too effectively employed the Western conception of human rights to promote self-aggrandizement (Ncube, 2013). It is in this context that scholars like Raftopoulos (2010) have talked about the need to raise consciousness about the uncritical usage of the human rights discourse in subaltern countries, mostly by playing into the hands of the West, as that could herald a new wave of neo-imperialism. What is to be in motion in Zimbabwe, even with the *coup d'etat* that dislodged Mugabe from power only to then make one of his former associates the new President, is the continuous struggle for social democracy which must include both rights-based claims to national self-determination as well as political and civil rights (Zhangaza, 2013).

Conclusion

While it is indeed necessary to promote and protect the basic human rights of citizens occupying any nation-state, the fact remains that in many of the relatively newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, where the process of democratization is still an ongoing event, the West-sponsored rights discourse has reduced the practice of democracy to evolving progressive legislation and paving the way for formal democratic processes. The lived experiences of African countries like Zimbabwe, rich in their incomparable traditional beliefs and practices, have vouched for the ineffectiveness of the Western idea of human rights to apply itself into lending support to the collective rights of the predominantly underprivileged communities inhabiting such regions or redressing their social grievances. Hence, the West, rather than super-imposing their ideas of liberal democracy and human rights on subaltern states, must understand the historical and cultural specificities of each of these regions so as to be able to create a space for both effectual democratization and respect for human rights. It is indeed a fact that human rights most often end up being the discretion of the sovereign under benevolent authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the doctrine of human rights cannot be the quintessential indicator of a truly democratic state. Zimbabwe, under Mugabe, became an increasingly unpopular regime over the years, from 1980 to 2017, as the people of Zimbabwe saw through the bogus claims of a permanent nationalist revolution against Western

imperialism. However, one cannot also take away from Mugabe the distinction for heralding an era of black sovereignty over the white settler communities in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe of today under Mnangagwa, while taking pride in its revolutionary history and liberation movement, must also prepare itself to work towards a political framework founded on the principles of inclusiveness, social security, communal harmony, tolerance, and plurality to take forward its commitment to the socialist discourse of development and the undeterred quintessence of African resistance to all forms of imperialist manifestations.

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Examining the Prospects of Consociational Power-Sharing as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in South Sudan

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ABSTRACT

South Sudan has not escaped the world's attention even after the signing of the infamous Revitalized Peace Agreement in September 2018 that, for the 12ᵗʰ time, brought the two antagonists –Kiir and Dr. Machar, to the negotiation table since the conflict began in 2013. Even with the aura of a shaky peace, the main question is whether the new Agreement will stand the test of time, going on the history of the failed implementation of peace agreements. This paper recognises the essential nature of the prevailing peace and questions whether consociational democracy can be propped up during this period of relative stability. Discussions are hinged on the consociationalism theory that contains a broad array of principles, including power-sharing, requisite for consociational democracy. It argues that although South Sudan's context could favour consociational democracy, several barriers characterising Sudan's social and political spheres should be alleviated. We elucidate on the obstacles and suggest in broad strokes the need for solid independent institutions and vibrant civil society, amongst others. We also recognise that overreliance on individuals in resolving the conflict is detrimental to the young nation. Hence, there is a need for a citizen-centred approach that entrenches consociational principles in South Sudan's political sphere.

Key Words: South Sudan, Sustainable Peace, Consociationalism power-sharing

Introduction

The past decades have witnessed an exponential increase in violent conflicts in a contest over central governments in divided societies worldwide, especially in postindependence Africa and Latin America (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005, p. 797; Coatsworth & Williamson, 2007, p. 919). In particular, these conflicts, in which groups organised themselves around a shared identity, have become more rampant in Africa (Deng, 1996, pp. 46-50; Colier, 2000; Osinubi & Osinubi, 2006). Their brutal nature fronts severe local and regional threats to human security, local development, and the ability of the state to provide essential services to its citizens (Raleigh, 2010). Bringing the conflicts to an amicable end has proved difficult for mediators and other policymakers due to various complexities entrenched in such disputes and countries where they have occurred. As a result, the mediators have often settled on power-sharing as a strategy to resolve the conflicts.

Indeed, power-sharing and eventual decentralisation of states' institutions have become popular strategies in mitigating the effects of conflicts since the centralisation of government has proved to have insidious effects in countries divided along the ethnic and religious lines due to the propensity

of political leaders to personalise power for self-aggrandisement purposes. In ordinary times the corollary is often utter mendacity, impunity, and corruption, and in extraordinary times dictatorship and conflicts ensue (Brancati, 2006, pp. 653-8; Brown, 2008). Power-sharing is a principle of a political theory known as consociationalism, which has three more principles – minority veto, autonomy, and proportionality. According to Horowitz (2014), consociationalism power-sharing as a peace strategy has been experimented with in many countries (Horowitz, 2014, p. 2). Its accommodative nature brings the conflicting interests of antagonistic groups under consideration by increasing shared institutions to foster peace. Countries like Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Northern Ireland fall into the list of countries that have successfully implemented consociationalism to accommodate the different cleavages in their societies (Flynn & Russel, 2005).

The underlying argument favouring consociationalism is that it can guarantee minority rights by providing them with veto powers entrenched in the constitutions if implemented wisely. This approach also addresses a fundamental problem, taking it all brand of politics prevalent in divided societies like those in Africa. This strategy works by facilitating the establishment of institutions that promote inclusion such that fears of repression and marginalisation are moderated (Lijphart, 1977). However, there are also dissenting opinions on consociationalism power-sharing (Berg, (2007; Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen, 2006). Horowitz (2014, pp. 7-12) opines that consociationalism power-sharing can only be successfully adopted in situations where the majority group is temporarily fragile after periods of prolonged violence and are ready to compromise for peace as they seek peace new strategies. Spear (2002) echoes his criticism of the ability of the approach to provide long term solutions to conflicts. He argues that the system only offers a short term panacea while disregarding serious underlying grievances, which have the potential of sparking new disputes.

Even with such criticisms, consociationalism power-sharing has registered many successes in different cases. This paper seeks to examine whether the approach can be helpful in the South Sudan crisis. Noteworthy, South Sudan has had several power-sharing agreements, all of which have not only been founded on shaky grounds but also have avoided fundamental aspects of consociationalism. South Sudan has been ravaged by both civil war and protracted conflict, and the country is in dire need of sustainable peace after a mass failure of previous peace agreements (Alier, 1990). Power-sharing is an essential aspect of peacebuilding as it allows for the cessation of hostilities but only temporarily. Therefore, it is essential for stakeholders and actors to further broaden the efforts by implementing other concepts associated with consociation. It is on this ground that this paper investigates whether consociational power-sharing can be part of the ongoing peace efforts in South Sudan? And if so, under which conditions can make the strategy work? The paper argues that the context in South Sudan is favourable for adopting consociationalism but cautions that such a framework should be accompanied by the elimination of what it terms 'complexities' to pave the way for consociational democracy to thrive.

South Sudan's Context

South Sudan has not escaped the attention of commentators and policymakers, even as the country is currently experiencing an aura of tremulous peace, thanks to the revitalised peace agreement signed in September of 2018. However, the country is still haunted by the previous conflicts that have left a dark cloud on the political and social spheres of the government. After attaining independence from Sudan through the popular referendum of 2011, South Sudan soon plunged into another turbulent period of conflict in 2013 (Johnson, 2014; Pinaud, 2014; Nyadera, 2018, p. 60). Until September 2018, when the competition came to a halt due to the revitalised peace agreement, the country was characterised by simmering ethnic tensions and violence, which earned South Sudan a place in the list of 10 most fragile states in 2018.

Countries	R.. ⚥												
Yemen	1st	113.5	10.0	10.0	9.6	9.7	8.1	7.3	9.8	9.8	9.9	9.7	9.6	10.0
Somalia	2nd	112.3	9.6	10.0	8.9	8.8	9.4	9.2	9.0	9.4	9.3	10.0	9.4	9.2
South Sudan	3rd	112.2	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.8	8.9	6.5	10.0	9.8	9.3	9.7	10.0	9.4
Syria	4th	111.5	9.8	9.9	10.0	8.8	7.5	8.4	9.9	9.4	10.0	7.9	10.0	10.0
Congo, D.R.	5th	110.2	8.8	9.8	10.0	8.3	8.6	7.0	9.4	9.2	9.6	9.8	10.0	9.7
Central African Republic	6th	108.9	8.6	9.4	8.3	8.7	9.9	7.1	9.1	10.0	9.5	9.1	10.0	9.2
Chad	7th	108.5	9.5	9.8	8.2	9.0	9.0	8.5	9.6	9.1	8.8	9.5	9.5	8.0
Sudan	8th	108.0	8.4	9.7	10.0	8.1	7.7	8.3	9.8	8.6	9.4	9.4	9.6	8.9
Afghanistan	9th	105.0	10.0	8.6	7.8	8.6	7.5	7.8	9.0	9.8	7.9	9.3	9.6	9.1
Zimbabwe	10th	99.5	8.8	10.0	6.7	8.1	7.9	7.3	9.4	8.6	8.2	9.0	8.2	7.3

Source: Fragile States Index, 2019

Even though the general quiescence has slightly shifted the debate from the strategies to mitigate the conflict to a question as to whether the relatively peaceful atmosphere would stand the test of time (Mednick, 2019) there are still manifest fears that conflicts could erupt again, and this explains its inclusion in the list of most fragile countries in the world. Conflicts have the propensity to damage any country's crucial social, political and economic fabrics (Madut & Hutchinson, 1999; Young et al., 2016, p. 198). In the case of South Sudan, the conflict had serious ramifications that damaged the country's social, political and economic contours rendering the country almost socially, politically, and economically amorphous (Okiech, 2016, pp. 8–9). Socially the conflict eroded the needed social trust between the state and the citizens and between the citizens themselves. This situation has widened the rift between ethnic groups leading to simmering ethnic tensions that often result in violence (Radon & Logan, 2014, p. 150).

Politically, the government has lost legitimacy and going to the divisions in the ruling party; the government has the support of a fraction of the South Sudanese, putting the country on a dangerous trajectory. Moreover, its monopoly over legitimate violence has also been eroded by the availability of organised groups both within and outside the government, which possess arms and other arsenals for perpetrating violence (Okiech, 2016, p. 11). The net effect of this ferocious environment is manifested in the human cost the country has accrued over the last years. It is estimated that about 400,000 people have lost their lives, and another over 2 million people have been displaced, placing the country in a dire humanitarian and development crisis (Mercy Corps, 2018).

On the economic front, the conflict had insidious on the sources of livelihood of the South Sudanese. The decrease in agricultural activities coupled with the prolonged droughts weakened the farmers and the pastoralists, leading to the loss of their livelihoods. Moreover, the country was in a state of paralysis in which the government, economically weakened by the conflict, was unable to provide essential services to its citizens (Okiech, 2016). As a result, the revenues from oil became few and far between, and the earned income was redirected to the purchase of arms and self-aggrandisement by the political elite. The corollary was the loss of lives due to hunger and starvation and plummeting of the country's currency, which lost 90% of its value (World Bank, 2018).

The conflict has left South Sudan weak, fractured, and the verge of becoming a failed state. The increase in actors involved in the competition makes the conflict even more difficult to solve due to changing demands and interests (Nyadera, 2018, p. 60). The country's social, political, and economic position further worsens the whole scenario. It could be a recipe for another prolonged violence if the revitalised peace agreement collapses, as has been the case with previous peace agreements. As it stands now, a renewed peace agreement, although not well received by the international community, provides a window for bringing together all the parties involved in the conflict for serious dialogue.

Previous Peace Agreements and Power-Sharing Deals in South Sudan

Several peace agreements anchored on consociationalism power-sharing have been crafted, negotiated, executed, and terminated to build and consolidate long-lasting peace (De Waal, 2014). The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA)-which is broad, recognised-and the High-Level Revitalization Peace forum orchestrated by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), stands as the main Agreement that has gained traction in the recent past (Onditi et al., 2018). Others like the Agreement on the Conflict Resolution in South Sudan (ARCSS), signed in 2015, and the most recent Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, signed in September of 2018. However, the latter has received lukewarm acknowledgement by the United States, the European Union and a section of South Sudanese who regarded it as an endeavour by Uganda and Sudan to further their interests to the detriment of South Sudan (United States Institute of Peace, 2018).

However, the CPA is still a widely recognised document and one that aimed at conclusively ending both the civil war and the conflict. Signed in Naivasha on January 9 2005, the CPA ushered in a new political dispensation and an avenue for political independence for the South Sudanese, which came to fruition through a referendum in 2011 (Shaka, 2011). Subsequently, South Sudan gained recognition as a new state and was admitted to the community of nations as the 193rd Member (Onditi et al., 2018, p. 43).

Within its proposals, the CPA had several significant aspects in fostering peace and stability. The first one was the proposal for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration that required parties to the CPA to institute a National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDC) with the primary mandate disarming civilians (African Development Bank, 2016). Unfortunately, even though the commission was formed, its activities never materialised due to the ever-present simmering tensions and suspicions engulfed the country and the political elite. The result, which hampered the peace process, was that more arms remained in the hands of civilians, further diminishing the state's legitimacy as a bearer of legitimate violence (Ruey, 2017; Munive, 2013; Phayal, 2015).

Another aspect of the CPA which came to fruition was the proposal for a referendum. However, as it has been argued by Zamabakari (2012), the referendum was only successful on paper as the South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for separation. The actual fruits of the referendum have not matured, and South Sudan continues to be enjoined in the hip with Khartoum, although with scepticism and sometimes with belligerence (Zamabakari, 2012, pp. 515-8). The complexities involved in unravelling the border row in Abyie and Blue Nile point to a case of hostility between the two countries. However, there have also been instances of cooperation, especially regarding oil revenues (Johnson, 2014). Attempts to resolve the border row with Khartoum and internal conflict have been futile and come with serious ramifications that have worked in collaboration with other factors to hamper the peace process leading to the collapse of peace agreements. Some scholars have argued that the border raw has propped up and created newly organised groups whose existence excites exclusionary politics (Roque & Miamingi, 2017, pp. 1–5). This, in turn, has led to the increase of state and non-state actors who further complicate conflict resolution efforts due to their diverse interests and continued distrust.

Currently, there are for key actors from the SPLM side: the first is the SPLM-In-Government (SPLM-IG), led by Salva Kiir; the second is SPLM-In-Opposition, led by Taban Deng (SPLM-IO-Taban), the third is the SPLM-In-Opposition, led by Riek Machar (SPLM-IO-Riek) and the fourth is the SPLM-Former Detainees (SPLM-FD), led by Pagan Amum. Additionally, ethnic-based militias operate on the periphery, but their actions add up to the sum of the main antagonists' atrocities (Ruey, 2017).

The peace agreement signed in 2018, though unpopular, provides an opportunity for serious dialogue that should restructure the country's social, political and economic path. Even though there are proposals on how to share the power amongst the contesting parties, there are still ambiguities regarding power-sharing, protection of the minority rights and distribution of resources. It is on this basis that consociationalism power-sharing, which has within its framework some fundamental prerequisites that could cultivate sustainable peace South Sudanese context, would bring

Consociationalism Theory

Consociationalism is a democratic design that disperses power in states with diverse societies (religious, ethnic, linguistic or national groups) by apportioning collective rights to various groups (Flynn & Rissel, 2005). The concept is associated with the writings of Arend Lijphart, who posits that social peace and democracy can be protected in profoundly divided societies if political elites engage in accommodative actions and abandon centrifugal contests. Lijphart further established four principles of consociationalism, including power sharing, minority veto, segmental autonomy, proportionality in resource allocation, and public sector employment (Lijphart, 1977). However, it is essential to note that in divided societies, fault lines derive from religion, ethnicity, political preference and language, which often serve as the basis for antagonism leading to episodic violence in ordinary times and in extraordinary times, there is a potential for prolonged conflicts or civil war (Horowitz, 2014). These divisions also limit economic exchange, intercultural communication, and interactions across social, economic, and geographical boundaries, hampering cohesion and integration (Barry, 1975).

In the case of South Sudan, ethnic division is not the sole cause of the conflict (Johnson, 2016). Other divisions arise from tapered cleavages of social, economic, and ethnicity. These are palpable in the split between those who took part in the liberation war and those who collaborated with the Khartoum government. In other words, the phenomena of heroes vs Traitors between the herders and the farmers and significantly between the South Sudanese living abroad, regarded as cowards against those who remained behind to fight in the bush (Onditi et al., 2018, p. 43). In short, these dichotomies work best to exclude other groups considered outsiders from the centre of power. Moreover, as such divisions become deeply entrenched, the salience of the consociational framework to resolve the conflict would lie in its ability to contain such complex divisions through institutional reengineering.

Consociational theorists suggest that the threats posed by such divisions-including state paralysis or immobilism- can be alleviated at the elite level through the resolute efforts of leaders who are willing to compromise for peace and stability (Lijphart, 1997). The challenge, however, is always the inability to explore all contentious issues at one go during negotiations, and there's always the propensity that new problems will arise during the implementation of the peace agreements, which, if not well handled, would lead to the collapse of the Agreement (Flynn & Russel, 2005). Nevertheless, for South Sudan, most of the contentious issues are already known, and tackling them would mean success for the consociational approach.

Principles of Consociationalism

Consociationalism is anchored on four mutually reinforcing principles: executive power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy/self a government, and veto rights. The principle of executive power-sharing dictates a significant section of the society should have representatives in the grand-coalition government. Like in Switzerland, where the approach is hailed to have had considerable success, the executive power is distributed among the seven members of the executive through a 2-2-2-1 formula that gives all the linguistic groups a representation relative to their size (Flynn &

Russel, 2005). In South Sudan, the warring factions can share power that includes all the aggrieved ethnic groups other than the Nuer and Dinka. These two ethnic groups have dominated the political scene for a long time, and their rivalry has often resulted in conflict and massacres.

The principle of proportionality aims to enable all the groups to be part of the decision-making organs and have proportional access to the state's social, political, economic, and natural resources (Lijphart, 1981). Scholars have underscored this principle as essential in post-conflict states. For example, Cammett and Malesky (2012) assert that it is not only a prerequisite of good governance but also a precondition of peace and stability. However, checking the excesses of the majority remains a challenge in consolidating an effective democracy, even where the principle of proportionality is upheld. In the South Sudanese case, the regional balance should be adhered to in distributing state resources and allocating development projects. This will aim to develop other regions previously neglected by the Khartoum government and consequently abandoned by Kiir's regime.

The principle of autonomy accords the warring factions some degree of autonomy within territories of the state. In divided societies, where ethnic and cultural identities are more salient relative to national identity, arrangements regarding cultural and ethnic cleavages ought to be put in place to allow for autonomy on such matters (Ganesan, 1997). In South Sudan, ethnic groups have enjoyed significant autonomy regarding maintaining their cultural practices. The conflict has not been a struggle for the expression and practice of ethnic and cultural beliefs.

The last principle is the principle of mutual veto/veto rights, which gives different groups the right to veto specific policies or decisions made by the government. The principle stipulates the need for Agreement amongst all parties represented in the executive whenever critical decisions or policies are formulated (Lijphart, 1975). By advocating for mutual consensus, the principle becomes one the complex principles to implement, especially in environments replete with ethnopolitical antagonism as the one in South Sudan, and it is believed that it is the absence of mutual veto that led to the failure of the CPA (Onditi et al., 2018, p. 48). Therefore, considerations should be made to enable other minority groups – women, youth, and other marginalised ethnic groups to have the right to veto government policies that would be detrimental to the larger society. This should be done through well-established institutions like the parliament, in which representative slots are allocated to the minority groups.

Having elucidated the principles of consociationalism, it will be vital to say something about why the consociationalism power-sharing could not yield many results in the young country despite the colossal political value attached to the approach. In the case of South Sudan, as I will explain in the following subsection, the success of consociationalism as an approach to resolving conflicts can be enhanced by tackling systemic and structural complexities that characterise the country

Structural and Systemic Barriers to Consociationalism in South Sudan

This paper identifies four structural and systemic barriers that should be addressed to enhance the success of consociationalism power-sharing in South Sudan. These include: the prevailing ethnic laden political arena, militarised government and peace process, presence of armed civilians and finally, lack of solid governance institutions and a vibrant civic sphere

The South Sudan political scene is characterised by deeply entrenched ethnic divisions, especially between the Nuer and the Dinka. Such divisions have had an insidious impact on implementing the peace agreements. The intense fighting that erupted in Juba in 2016, in which rival groups accused each other of the attempted assassination of their leaders, attests to the engrained ethnic differences in the political arena since the two leaders are renowned ethnic kingpins. According to Hartzel and

Hoddie (2003) establishment of a consociational model with a broad palate of institutions in an environment replete with ethnicised political rivalry does not serve to the benefits consolidation of peace as simmering ethnic politics serve to erode the salience of established institutions (Hartzel & Hoddie, 2003). Therefore, there is a need to de-ethicise South Sudanese politics as ethnicisation of politics has often reduced the contest between the Nuer and the Dinka. Yet, many ethnic groups should also be included without prejudice in merit and policy-driven political environment.

The second barrier that has detrimental effects on the application of consociationalism power-sharing in South Sudan is the militarisation of the government and the ongoing peace process. To demilitarise the peace process, the peace agreement signed in August 2015 called for the exclusion of military personnel in leadership positions and the maintenance of a proportional number of military personnel from SPLM-IO and SPLM-IG. However, as illustrated by (Onditi et al., 2018, p. 49), both sides reneged on the proposition by appointing military personnel in all arms of the government. The military loaded structures became a catalyst for the violence in Juba, beginning with a heated exchange between the military forces allied to SPLM-IO and SPLM-IG. Their allegiance rested on Dr. Machar and President Kiir respectively. Thus, there should be a distinct role of the military that rests on securing the borders from external attack, and there should be a police force that deals with internal security.

The prevalence of weak institutions is another structural barrier that must be addressed to pave the way for applying consociationalism power-sharing. Weak institutions have devastating outcomes on nations, especially when it comes to accountability, whether regarding violation of human rights or economic crimes (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Moreover, such institutions often provide incentives for the political elites who use them to fuel violence and amass a considerable amount of wealth, thus depriving the nation of much-needed peace and economic resource, not to mention the human cost involved.

Since consociationalism advocates for creating several institutions to accommodate the interests of warring factions, South Sudan should work on building strong independent institutions like the judiciary, legislature, and police that will accommodate the interests of the warring sections but also be accountable and open to the people. Moreover, special commissions like the anti-corruption commission are necessary. However, establishing these institutions and commissions is a daunting task that takes several years to accomplish. This explains why the presence of a vibrant civil society would be significant in the nascent stages of democratisation. In addition, civil societies are vital in keeping the excesses of governments in check through lobbying, advocating for better practices, and initiating court processes.

The presence of arms amongst civilians is another barrier that works against consociationalism by spawning serious negative effects on the government's legitimacy, thus dispersing illegitimate force. The monopolisation of legitimate forces is fundamental for a state's political and economic stability (Walt, 1998). This is corroborated by Weber's conceptualisation of a state based on its ability to monopolise the use of legitimate force. However, monopolisation of the use of force comes with some responsibilities which are often abused in ordinary times and recklessly abandoned in extraordinary times (Krasner, 1999). In South Sudan, two factors have hindered the state from monopolising legitimate force and, by extension, the peace process. First, the failure to disarm civilians after the end of the liberation struggle and second, the intense mistrust as well as the decline of social trust as a result of a failed social contract between the state and citizens.

The CPA had fronted a proposal for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration that required parties to the CPA to institute a National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDC) with the primary mandate of disarming civilians (African Development Bank,

2016). However, this was abandoned due to ethnicised politics and the militarisation of government. But as it appears now, there should be a non-partisan that would rid the civilians of their small arms. This should be conducted by the institution proposed by the CPA so that no individuals or ethnic groups will feel targeted in the disarmament process. Furthermore, apart from disarmament, individuals with ambitions to join the police force or the military should be integrated into these forces merit-based.

These systemic and structural complexities have worked in isolation and sometimes in collaboration to produce a complex web that entangles the peace process, making it almost impossible for the country to enjoy democratic peace. Indeed, the same complexities proffer negative impacts to the consociational power-sharing model as they stand in stark contradiction with the fundamental principles of consociationalism, thus upsetting the effect of institutions established by the consociational model.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper examines whether consociationalism democracy can be fostered in South Sudan after a mass failure of previous peace agreements. We hinged our discussions on the recognition that the predicament in which South Sudan is entrapped is somewhat due to a lack of vibrant civic sphere and weak institutions, the presence of armed civilians, ethnic laden politics and a failure to transform pseudo militarised political parties- SPLM-IO and SPLM-IG to policy-driven democratic political parties. These compiled together work to create a politically hostile environment where peace agreements cannot thrive.

Even though the consociational framework has worked in other countries, South Sudan's scenario is still complicated with the presence of immobile governance structures militarised and ethicised politics, which are excellent recipes for suspicion and conflicts. Furthermore, the signing and the incomplete implementation of the CPA and the ARCSS point to structural and institutional inadequacies resulting from ethnic suspicions. As McCulloch (2014) suggests, ethnicity should be incorporated into the institutions created by the model as this may provide an incentive for inter-ethnic cooperation. An ethnic representation that goes beyond the Nuer and the Dinka should be adhered to when establishing critical policy-making institutions in South Sudan.

We recommend that establishing strong independent institutions is critical to the consolidation of consociational democracy. Vital institutions such as the judiciary and the legislature should be kept off the machinations of the executive, and unique slots should be established for the minority groups to enhance inclusive decision-making processes. Other commissions, such as the public service commission and anti-corruption commissions, are vital for fairness in recruitment and checking on the overzealous ambitions of civil servants to enrich themselves through the pilferage of public coffers. As it is known, South Sudanese leaders have been accused of high-level corruption in which billions of dollars of oil revenues have been misappropriated.

Civil societies have a special place in young democracies. We recommend that in tandem with establishing independent institutions, a favourable environment that allows civil society groups to thrive is essential. These groups should also be involved in the ongoing peace process as representatives of ordinary citizens are often left out in the signed peace agreements. We conclude by recognising the importance of prevailing peace in the consolidation of consociational democracy. However, we caution in broad strokes that over-reliance on a few individuals in fostering peace is dangerous for South Sudan. It sets a bad precedence and acts as a deterrent and incentive for other hardliners to thrive. A citizen-centred approach, which would be long and convoluted, is essential in ensuring that the country does not go back to its dark past.

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
Dynamising Liberation Movements in Southern Africa

Quo Vadis?

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The book grapples with reconciling the ideological, policy and implementation bankruptcy of former liberation movements in Southern Africa especially as it applies to their incumbency of national government in their respective domains. The main thesis of the book is that prior to ascending to national government, these liberation movements seemed to have the relevant ideological muscle that reflected the axiology of their times, especially South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Conversely, these liberation movements plainly failed to translate the same axiological arsenal to relevant policy, implementation and practice once they morphed into national government. It is this dissimulation that raises questions on their seeming un-fit for purpose. Undoubtedly, prior to incumbency these movements identified with the masses; they represented the future and a trajectory that embraced the aspirations of many. Sadly, those aspirations remain just but figments of imagination for many people that supported these movements now that these liberation movements have formed governments. Without recalibrating their objectives, visions, and aspirations these liberation movements risk being relegated to political dustbins as they have proverbially reached an ideological *cul-de-sac.*

It is evident, in the arguments of the book, that these liberation movements did not struggle as much in mobilising their people to rally behind them in their noble cause of attaining freedom for the Africans, as they do now when they have been investiture-d with political power. Political power alone does not translate to transformation of the economic sphere for example, as amply argued in the book. Political power is the first of many series of life stations for any political organisation that ensure transformation and emancipation of the formerly colonised and suppressed masses. Admittedly, as articulated in the book, former liberation movements were insufficiently prepared for governance. This is not a problem in itself. However, the continued failure to skill and train members of the former liberation movements for government is a weakness and thus problematic. This speaks broadly to lack of political will particularly from the leaders of these political outfits to respond to going trends of the day.

More nefariously, corruption has permeated these glorious movements of yesteryears. Corruption is largely responsible for the economic downturn, lack of infrastructural development, fraud and embezzlement of public funds by government officials and lack of accountability as a result. Leaders who preside over such political structures and governments once they have lost their moral authority due to their part in corruption, cannot stand and condemn or call to order their members and followers who are accused of the same offenses as themselves. Put differently, the book identifies

that corruption usually starts off at the very top echelons of political leadership. The state capture of South Africa's government during the Zuma presidency and the gross state-sponsored corruption in the Mugabe era, which continues unabated in the current Mnangagwa era, in Zimbabwe are cases in point.

Interestingly, in Zimbabwe the contention and contestation has always been between ZANU and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Both formations felt entitled to be at the helm of Zimbabwe seeing their undisputed participation in the liberation struggle that culminated in the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations, in Britain, that were to usher Zimbabwe's independence from the latter in 1980. ZANU was to later amalgamate with ZAPU to form the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The failure to reconfigure in the face of new ideas and players in the Zimbabwean political space has resulted in the formation of opposition political parties who desire alternative sets of politics, needless to say that ZANU PF has increasingly become intolerant of antithetical views. This demonstrates the lack of governing ideology and ideas. These liberation movements unless they embrace change and recalibrate their ideologies, policies and practices, their end is nigh.

The major limitation that often accompanies books of this magnitude is that they are limited in unearthing all the nitty gritty dynamics involved owing to publication space. This book too is not spared on that front. While there is minimal mention of Angola's People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Namibia's South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and Mozambique's FRELIMO, the concrete case studies analysed involved liberation movements of only two of Southern African countries, South Africa and Zimbabwe. This is a limitation in that the two liberation movements, the ANC and ZANU-PF cannot be used to authoritatively generalise the trajectory of former liberation movements turned governing political parties. However, the book proffers a lively and robust debate on the way forward for these former liberation movements at an opportune time when the world is trying to reconfigure and recalibrate in imagining a post Covid-19 world. Perhaps too, the former liberation movements should be introspecting?

Book information

Title: Dynamising Liberation Movements in Southern Africa: Quo Vadis?
Editors: Kgothatso B. Shai, Siphamandla Zondi
Publisher: Institute for Preservation and Development, 2020
**ISBN**: 062085121X, 9780620851213
Length: 154 pages

Intra-Africa Student Mobility in Higher Education

Strengths, Prospects and Challenges?

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The editors of this timely volume on internationalization, Chika Trevor Sehoole and Jenny J. Lee, contextualized a burgeoning body of research that examines and distinguishes educational migration from the perspective of non-Western and economically developing nations.

The research that underpins this book examines the phenomenon of intra-Africa student mobility, with a focus on seven African countries: South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Egypt. The research in six other African nations was based on the first study of this issue in South Africa. According to the most recent estimates, there are about 200,000 international students studying on the African continent.

The Pull Factors That Attract International Students to Nigeria Despite Fears by Olaide Agbaje (Chapter 2): Boko Haram, according to a hundred foreign students at both public and private colleges deters future international students from studying in Nigeria. This is the largest push factor. Conversely, there are seven reasons why students are drawn to Nigeria to study: parental influence/religion, scholarship chances, English as a medium of instruction, close proximity and family reasons, greater educational prospects, and love of the nation or institution are among factors that people consider. Noteworthy, the students at the private university felt more secure than those at the public university because they are required to reside on campus.

Academic Student Mobility and Refugee Education in Kenya by Jackline Nyerere (Chapter 3): The persistent danger of al-Shabaab proved shockingly ineffective as a deterrence since the pupils viewed terrorism as a worldwide concern. Kenyatta University has opened a specialized campus in Dadaab, one of the two refugee camps to "provide as an incentive for refugee children to complete school" with the expectation that they will play active roles in reconstructing their countries once peace is restored.

Internationalization has long been associated with the pursuit of higher-quality educational opportunities. Scholars who migrate from one nation to another improve their academic outcomes and research performance. When it comes to refugee populations, the advantages of internationalization are even more obvious. High-quality education is more crucial than ever. There are more than 25.4 million refugees around the world, 19.9 million of them under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate. More than half of the 16.1 million refugees in East Africa are school-aged children. This intra-African movement is due in part to its advantages, which include cheaper travel costs and programs inside the area or continent.

At the global level, only 1 per cent of refugees have access to tertiary education compared to 37 per cent who are enrolled in higher education globally. This is predicted to continue if host countries and partners do not make sufficient investments in refugee education.

Political Stability: A Key Driver of African Student Mobility to Ghana by Christiana Badoo (Chapter 4): The country's level of stability is a draw for students considering academic residency in Ghana. Political stability (peaceful elections, democracy, etc.) and the government's commitment to excellent tertiary education are two essential enabling variables for effective internationalization in Ghana. The insecurity in the Sahel area, which has left 5.1 million people in need, has been a major driving force for migration to Ghana.

Citizens' Hospitality and the Legal-Regulatory and Policy Instruments that Enhance Inbound International Student Mobility: The Case of Uganda by Alfred Kenneth Kiiza (Chapter 5): The availability of a comprehensive set of internationalization policies, mechanisms, and plans demonstrates a country's political commitment to internationalization. Students continue to come to Uganda because of its long-standing reputation as a learning hotspot. The use of online e-visa systems demonstrates the government's commitment to enhancing current learning facilities at higher institutions.

Comparing International Student Dispositions in Egypt: The Influences of Safety, History, and Culture by Mahmoud Marei (Chapter 6): For students from the Global North, Egypt is one of the safest countries in the region, but for regional students, it is a safe haven, says Marei. Mexico in Latin America, South Korea in Asia, and South Africa in Sub-Saharan Africa were studied in a series of interrelated research initiatives recently and were identified to be study hubs. According to Marei, Egypt receives more international students than it sends abroad, which is an uncommon phenomenon.

International Students' Academic Integration Experiences in South Africa by Azwifaneli Justice Ratshilaya (Chapter 7): From 12 557 in 1994 to 69 381 in 2015, the number of overseas students studying in South Africa has grown. The countries that send the most international students to South African public institutions are Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, and Lesotho — Southern African Development Community (SADC). South Africa's involvement in African Union (AU) initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) programs has also improved collaboration and partnership with African countries.

Senegal: A Historic Destination of Mobility for French Speaking African Students by Mamadou Dimé (Chapter 8): Senegal has a long history of hosting international students, most of whom are from French-speaking African nations. The proliferation of private universities aids in the consolidation of such a stance. This allure may be explained by the colonisers' decision to make Dakar the training center for indigenous elites. *"Coming to Dakar was the best solution. Studies are cheaper here than in Europe or America, there is no red tape and their school really provided a high-quality education"*, this statement in support of their decision to study in Senegal, by a Gabonese respondent, resonates with perhaps the core reason why there is inter-Africa mobility.

Academics interested in the complex dynamics of intra-Africa student mobility, refugee and conflict workers, African students interested in intra-Africa higher education, policymakers interested in regional integration, and others interested in social mobility in an uncertain Africa filled with potential would benefit from this book. Invertedly, this is also book for the Global North who want to recognize the accomplishments and promise African higher education institutions hold. African Renaissance ideologists who believe in Africa's human capital being supported and advanced will enjoy this as well.

The book provides a good snapshot of where intra-Africa mobility is now. With the fast-paced world we live in, a follow-up edition to the book will be necessary. More research into peer support from students that share in a collectivist culture would also be beneficial. Stakeholders and those engaging in intra-Africa student mobility would do well to fill these knowledge gaps in future. This is the next frontier.

Book information

Title: Intra-Africa Student Mobility in Higher Education: Strengths, Prospects and Challenges
Series: Palgrave studies in global higher education, ISSN 2662-4222
Editors: Molatlhegi Trevor Chika Sehoole, Jenny J. Lee
Publisher: Springer Nature, 2021
**ISBN**: 3030785173, 9783030785178
Length: 213 pages

The Political Economy of Sino–South African Trade in the Context of Asia–Pacific Regional Competition

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In The Political Economy of Sino-South African Trade in the Context of Asia-Pacific Regional Competition, the author intends to comparatively examine the China-South Africa trade relationship over the twenty-year 1998-2018 period through the prism of four other relationships South Africa has with countries China's contentious neighbours in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific). The different case studies presented in the book (Taiwan, Japan, India, and the United States) highlighted a 'differentiated engagement' between Pretoria and Beijing. Importantly, it reports the countries' relations with China, ranging from ambivalent at best to adversarial at worst. At the same time, these countries also aimed to increase trade relations with post-Apartheid South Africa, sometimes at China's marginal expense, since 1998 (when Pretoria formed diplomatic ties with Beijing to Taiwan's exclusion).

Bhaso Ndzendze's writing style is extensive and delves in-depth into the debates of Asia being regarded as the new economic centre of gravity for the new century in international relations, ranking China above all other countries in terms of trade relations with South Africa. The book further highlights the debates on whether there is any validity to the notion that as Chinese imports to South Africa grew, they displaced the market access of those countries that initially had more significant exports than China's. China has been able to assert itself as an essential economic power in the world and today. Its focus on investing in Africa cannot be overlooked. It seems to be invested in sharing its development model with developing states on the continent and has become an essential partner to many African states. As a result, the relations between China and other African countries remain the subject of interest to scholars and policymakers.

China's current relationship with Africa had intensified in the 1980s and looks to garner more strength today. In the years following Africa's independence from colonialism, African states economies experienced a steady decline due to the various conflicts that plagued the continent during and after the official end of the Cold War. Different economic recovery strategies were introduced, such as the structural adjustment policies, which further plunged African states into austerity. China provided viable alternatives for social, political and economic development formulas to the unipolar world of the 1990s. African governments are already frustrated by complex donor policies and the high overhead costs of multilateral development projects. African governments have been open to the alternatives China have provided over the years. Bhaso's analysis emphasises this competition of Asian states in the continent; even so, most of these states fall short of winning a trade competition against China. This is due to China having had more years of continuous growth, has formulated its niche product portfolio with which the other countries could not compete, and higher exports to South Africa compared with Taiwan, Japan, India, and the US. The book helps the reader to appreciate

the complexities behind South Africa's external relations and China's African presence by explicitly considering the *regional* motivators of China's South Africa policy with data-based quantitative analysis. Methodologically the book benefits from an extensive literature review in which the author complements with survey data and content analysis on the China-South Africa trade relationship.

From the introductory chapter to the conclusion, the book sets the theme on the various formations and ambivalent rivalries observed in the relationships between the countries and China in South Africa. Next, Ndzendze formulated the theoretical framework for policy and theory, reflecting on the collective implications of the findings in the preceding chapters. The theoretical framework is an intellectual challenge demonstrating that while there may be a competition for market access, mutual growth is still possible and the dominant trend for South Africa and its peer economies.

The weakest part of the book is that it falls short on its limitation to South Africa, starting with the introduction. The author could begin analysing the preceding statement made by former President Jacob Zuma in support or opposing the same message. "The emergence of China as a power among others gives or offers an opportunity to African countries to be able to free themselves from the shackles that are colonially designed." Details on the following would be beneficial and may enrich the introduction.

Is there an Africa-specific cost-benefit analysis? When it comes to exploitation, what's the difference between Chinese and European? As a resource guzzler and destroyer of Africa's natural riches, which country gets points for environmental stewardship? In other ways, the author is reminiscent of European colonisation a century earlier. Africa provides a low-cost supply of raw resources, a lucrative export market for Chinese manufactured goods, and a way for China to release its excess cash.

Aligning with comments exemplified by the preceding statements, 'scholars and politicians are keenly aware of China-Africa ties, but international institutions and western governments see malign intentions from Beijing and naiveté from African officials and hence the people'. In my opinion, the honeymoon between China and Africa is because the Chinese fund is unaccountable and suitable for African leaders enjoying impunity.

In terms of the China-South Africa relations, it aims to examine the connection between China and South Africa in terms of competitiveness with other Asian countries. The evaluation should focus on trade volume, the trade balance between imports and exports, and technology transfer. The focus should be on who exports the most and the importance of commerce. Is South Africa a beneficiary country or a contributor to the trade balance? I believe that South Africa is no more special than any other African country in terms of capacity compared to China and other Asian countries. On the contrary, the South is superior to several African countries when compared inside the African continent.

Regarding the theoretical implications, one could argue that economic interconnectedness as a deterrent to conflict is a good idea. Asian countries have to compete peacefully due to their economic dependency on China. The US, Japan, and China are either winning or losing (Taiwan). The results are likely to support Ricardian comparative advantage. The author may have used the competing relationship between the BRICS and other countries such as Asian countries, the United States, Japan, and European competitors to Africa through South Africa and a solo move to illustrate his points. In addition, in terms of the policy implications, one could argue that Africa's needs have unique requirements that not all of these partners are now satisfying. To begin, there is no consensus on how Africa should trade with China, which is a debatable premise. Furthermore, Agenda 2063 is not

a manifesto of policy. As its moniker implies, it is a collective wishful thinking exercise devoid of any meaningful execution mechanism.

In conclusion, despite the insights stated above, the book is one of the few unique contributions highlighting detailed the role of competition, often referred to as the 'new scramble for Africa' in Asian states' presence on the continent. The book is a fascinating work that presents important lessons for a genuine South–South relationship. Therefore, promoting effective communication and understanding around common interests is an intellectual challenge in relationships in the coming decades. The book further relates a vital message to the readers and African states on the need to clearly articulate the long-term interests of the relationship with China and cautiously evaluate the alternative provided by China so that it can make an informed choice for the benefit of its people. In short, the author should be commendable since the book contributes to the scholarship on the limited literature on the role that this perceived competition has had in pushing China's entry towards South Africa's market. Highlighting how the country opens its market to South African exporters and whether this continues to persist in the post–Great Recession period.

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Book information

Title: The political economy of Sino–South African trade and regional competition
Author:Ndzendze, Bhaso
Series: International political economy series
Publisher: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
ISBN: 9783030980757
Length: 193 pages

Principle and Pragmatism in the Liberation Struggle

A Political Biography of Selby Msimang?

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This book zeroes into the life of Selby Msimang a politician and activist of the early 20th century South Africa. Msimang's life is thrust against the social and political backdrop of South Africa beginning in the middle 19th century in colonial Natal. The historical context of conquest and colonialism is an important setting for this life story. It is this background of black oppression and struggles that Msimang navigates as he dedicates his life to the fight against black oppression and his own personal tribulations as a man and political activist. Whilst the author does not overtly express the linkages between the protagonist's life at micro level of social interaction and the macro level historical institutions that structure and shape Msimang's journey, the connectedness is quite glaring.

Accordingly, the political biography is not only a life story of just an individual but an ethnographic reflection on native life in South Africa. Msimang's personal struggles are interwoven with the meso and macro level experiences of the black community as well as the organisations that he became part of. In this sense, the political biography is a frame narrative, "a story within a story", with the context of conquest and native domination being the first and largest frame, followed by the social and political history of the African community as a collective, then the history of the political organisations Msimang was part of including the SANNC, ICWU, Liberal Party, and the Inkatha. Lastly, his own personal and family life forms the smallest frame. This last frame is saturated with thick description of the protagonist's life.

The author organised themes along a timeline in an accessible and lucid language. These broad strokes include, inter alia, African nationalism, community activism, politics of race, class and gender, and African economic emancipation. This ordering does not necessarily suggest that each theme is bound to a particular period, accordingly most of them could have been elicited across the timeline. Moreover, the sequencing is more about the progression in Msimang's life than it is about the themes themselves. The recording of Msimang's life along the timeline and over a long period, with the superimposition of themes, also points to the conjunctural nature of not just life in general but also the activist's political life as he moved across time, traversing space, reacting to events and changing conditions. Thus, this story is also a document on the capricious nature of native life in South Africa under white domination.

The ideological outlook and disposition of Selby Msimang.

In the book Msimang is touted as a moderate and pragmatist. Accordingly, his political career reflected these outlook traits throughout, a moderate, liberal, pragmatist, conservative, and perhaps a realist. A different reading of his disposition could portray him as flexible and adaptable to prevailing circumstances and conditions at a particular juncture. It is also possible that he lacked ideological conviction, or was a product of his time like many of his contemporaries.

Looking at his ever evanescent employment prospects, business efforts, and overly ambitious schemes, he was a man of modest means who always had to devise ways to earn a living, therefore he invariably fought for survival. He was therefore a bona fide product of his material conditions. These circumstances made most of his life inclined towards calculation and survival. Accordingly, he came across as ideologically incoherent or irresolute. One major theme and struggle that he committed his life to is that of economic emancipation of Africans, ironically a prominent issue that troubled his personal life. In page 62 he is described as "a man of political paradoxes, assuming multiple political identities while embracing pragmatic approaches to the problems of South Africa's race relations", p.62 "his narrative suggested that he had always been prepared to modify his stance depending on the circumstances and on the likelihood of achieving a positive outcome from his actions". One could argue that what is implicit here is the African National Congress (ANC) notion or description as a broad-church. In other words, one could justify their conflicting moves and get away with it since the organisation itself comprised of traditional leaders, communists, business people, religious people, and trade unionists. Also, it is highlighted that there was a clash between Pan-Africanism and liberalism within the organisation (p.61). People could oscillate from the left to the right of the political spectrum in the same organisation. Thus, as example Msimang was able to switch sides from a radical Abantu-Batho publication to a rival uMteteli newspaper which was viewed as a "mouthpiece of the whiteman" (p.63/63).

In other issues such as on the issue of the Native Urban Areas Act (no. 21 of 1923), he was initially silent in opposing the legislation but later in his biography sounded more determined against it (p.57).

Msimang was also wedged between internal conflicts within the ANC. For example, he found himself caught up between a leftist Josiah Gumede and his presidency and the conservative Pixley Seme around 1937. His serving on government structures such as the Joint Council Movement, Native Advisory Boards, Native Representation Commission, Local Health Council, amongst others, also demonstrated the complexity of his political beliefs and career, as these structures promoted the policy of segregation (p.72). These organisations were also noted as conduits for white liberalism and were paternalistic towards Africans. With regards to the Hertzog Bills of 1936 and the abolishment of the Cape African franchise, he changed his views within a period of less than nine years.

In other instances, such as in the "Crisis pamphlet" which he authored, he adopted a militant tone. Mkhize (p.85) asserts that Msimang's political views evolved in a curiously hybrid direction in the 1940s from radical discontent and loss of faith in interracial cooperation to advocacy for participation in government created structures. ANC members participated in the Native Representation Commission. After 1946 new ANCYL voices called for the boycott of the NRC. Before his death in 1947 Anton Lembede disagreed with Msimang's motion on the Representation of Natives Act of 1936. Msimang was not in favour of a total boycott.

Pragmatism is accordingly problematic as it operates within the scope of the prevailing paradigm or framework of ideas here this being colonialism and apartheid. The NRC participation and abolishment by the apartheid government brought ushered in a new dawn and this was an inflection point for Msimang, his pragmatism was no match to grand apartheid of the National Party. His

fights with AWG Champion and resignation from the Natal Provincial executive however shows that he was a matured and selfless leader who could put organisational interests before his own.

Again he was also a victim and product of his own time as seen through his resignation from the ANC and cosying up with white liberals of Natal. Msimang was a founding member of the Liberal Party in 1953 until its dissolution in 1968. His final chapter as a founding member of the Inkatha, his last political home is arguably the reason for his erasure in ANC historiography and collective memory of the struggle. This was however exacerbated not by his own doing or mere membership of the Inkatha as an organisation but rather by the period of internecine political violence between Inkatha and the ANC affiliated United Democratic Front a few years after Msimang's death in 1982. Msimang thus remains an underrated but significant figure in South African political history having been a founding member of three political organisations, the African National Congress, the Liberal Party, as well as the Inkatha Freedom Party. He therefore traversed three essential ideological traditions, African nationalism, liberalism, as well as Zulu nationalism over more than seven decades and just one lifetime.

Book information

Title: A Political Biography of Selby Msimang: Principle and Pragmatism in the Liberation Struggle
Author: Sibongiseni M. Mkhize
Publisher: Best Red, an imprint of HSRC Press
ISBN: 978-1-9282-4625-1
Length: 256 pages

About the African Association of Political Science

The African Association of Political Science was launched in Dar es Salam in 1974 as the continental parent body of political scientists in Africa, and as a platform to interrogate the state of the politics, governance, economy and development of African states. Before its collapse, AAPS promoted the systematic study and application of African Political Science scholarships. The Association also interrogated the viability of knowledge conjectured about/for Africa. AAPS became a formidable composition of established and emerging African Political Science scholars, Political Science students, scholars from related disciplines and the corporate membership of foreign scholars and institutions.

AAPS' biennial conferences and annual workshops were platforms for exchange of notes, discussion of on-going research, formation of new research networks, the launch of major publications, and exchanges with research funders and publishing houses. These platforms helped in the formation of schools of thought such as the Dar es Salaam, Ibadan, Cairo and Harare (SAPES Trust) schools in the 1980s through to the 2000s.These helped induct scholars emerging with the arrival of a new South Africa to the broader archive and legacy of African political thought in the 1990s, a crucial moment for the extension of AAPS' reach. The association was central in strengthening the pan-African social science fraternity as one of the biggest and most organized associations participating in the CODESRIA network.

In June 2021, AAPS was revitalised in an international conference and its journal was also rejuvenated. Alongside this, several national associations also re-emerged. AAPS counts on you to support by registering via its website - https://aapsrising.org/ - and partnering with it on matters of shared interests. Look out for next conferences and colloquia.

Notice

AAPS together with South African Association of Political Studies and the Institute for Pan-African Thought & Conversation at University of Johannesburg at holding a colloquium on Southern African Development Community @ 30: Pasts, Present and Future. Papers are welcome that look at regional and national issues in SADC or comparable experiences, which must be no more than 6 000 words long and using APA referencing and citation style by 31 July. Send to Africanpolitics2019@gmail.com with Colloquium as title.