

Evolution of Kenya's Foreign Policy During the Cold War

An Examination of Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine During the Moi Era (1978–1990)

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Abstract

This study critically outlines how Moi's administration in the Middle East during the Cold War shaped Kenya's foreign policy. The study examines the strategies, sources, national and personal interests, objectives, priorities, and the implementation of Kenya's foreign policy. It seeks to elucidate whether Kenya's commitment to regional peace and security served as the cornerstone for formulating and implementing its foreign policy. It posits that any inconsistencies in Kenya's foreign policy can be attributed to rational responses to emerging trends in international affairs, particularly security threats to regional and global peace and stability. The study aims to ascertain the formulation, articulation, and exercise of Kenya's recognition policy toward the Middle East (1978–1990) during Moi's era. The central question guiding this study is: What factors influenced Kenya's recognition policy toward Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine during the Cold War under Moi's administration (1978–1990)?

Keywords: Recognition, Foreign Policy, Ambiguity, Legitimacy, Governments.

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The Historical Evolution of Kenya's Foreign Policy

In 1971, within the hallowed halls of parliament, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, then serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, articulated a defining moment in Kenya's foreign policy. He provided a lucid exposition of Kenya's stance regarding the military junta led by General Idi Amin in neighboring Uganda. This pronouncement laid the groundwork for Kenya's diplomatic philosophy: recognizing effective governments rather than mere regimes. Consequently, Kenya extended recognition to Idi Amin's administration as an effective government, distinct from the leadership of Milton Obote (Munene, 1997).

During the tumultuous era of the Cold War, like numerous other nations, Kenya adopted the Estrada Doctrine concerning the recognition of governments. The Estrada Doctrine posited the automatic distinction of governments under all circumstances (Jessup, 1931). This doctrine sought to establish a stringent benchmark for recognition that ostensibly disregarded political considerations and the exigencies of the state. However, this approach became increasingly untenable, particularly when confronted with situations involving competing governments. Critics contended that it blurred the distinction between the act of recognition and the maintenance of diplomatic relations.

In contrast to the Estrada Doctrine, the Tobar Doctrine, also known as the Doctrine of Legitimacy (Stansifer, 1967, pp. 251–272), advocates a diametrically opposite approach. It argues that governments that assume power through extra-constitutional means should only be recognized once their ascendancy has garnered the populace's acceptance. This principle effectively promotes non-recognition in all revolutionary scenarios yet proves challenging to reconcile with the complexities of real-world politics and considerations (as noted by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations).

A Concise Historical Overview of Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi

Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, the second President of Kenya, ascended to power following the demise of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's inaugural President. Moi held the position of Kenya's Vice President when Kenyatta passed away, and constitutional provisions dictated his succession. He was born on September 2, 1924, in Kuriengwo, which was then a part of Kenya Colony situated in the Sacho region of Baringo district – now a county (McKenna, Feb 10, 2020). Moi hailed from the broader Tugen sub-group of the Kalenjin community residing in the Kenyan Rift Valley. He passed away on February 4, 2020 (East & Richard, June 3, 2014).

Moi's legacy is that of a revered statesman and astute politician who served as Kenya's second and longest-serving President, presiding from 1978 to 2002, following the passing of the nation's founding father, President Jomo Kenyatta, on August 22, 1978. Before assuming the presidency, Moi also served as Kenya's third Vice President from 1967 to 1978, succeeding Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.

A moment of considerable significance in President Moi's tenure unfolded on August 1, 1982, when a group of Air Force personnel, under the leadership of Senior Private Grade-I Hezekiah Ochuka, and with the backing of university students, embarked on an ultimately unsuccessful endeavor to orchestrate a coup d'état with the objective of ousting President Moi from his position of authority. The coup is swiftly quashed by military and police forces under the command of the then Chief of General Staff, Mohamoud Mohamed (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12). The key conspirators behind the coup, including Ochuka, were subsequently sentenced to death, marking the last known judicial executions in Kenya (Ndunda, 2016).

Moi's tenure is characterized by continuing Kenyatta's pro-Western policies, which secured substantial development aid during the Cold War era (1947–1991), elevating Kenya to one of the most prosperous African nations. However, the early 1990s witnessed challenges, including the end of the Cold War, economic stagnation due to rising oil prices, and falling agricultural commodity prices, particularly in Africa. Simultaneously, with the conclusion of the Cold War, Western powers shifted their stance towards Kenya, no longer considering it a strategic regional stronghold against communist influences from Ethiopia and Tanzania.

After maintaining a one-party political system since gaining independence in 1963, Kenya eventually began experiencing calls for political and economic reforms in the late 1990s, notably from Western nations. This pressure prompted Moi to legalize opposition parties in 1991. The pivotal moment came when Moi announced his intention to repeal Section 2(A) of the constitution, thereby permitting multipartyism, during a KANU conference held at Kasarani in December 1991. Despite intense debate and opposition from numerous delegates, the motion passed unanimously (Throup & Hornsby, 1998).

In subsequent years, Moi ran for re-election, winning in 1992 amidst electoral fraud and civil unrest allegations. A similar situation unfolded in the 1997 elections, where numerous Kenyans,

primarily of Kikuyu ethnicity, died. Nevertheless, the people elected Moi to a fifth term as President. However, constitutional limitations prevented him from contesting the 2002 presidential elections. Although some of his supporters floated the idea of amending the constitution to allow a third term, Moi chose to retire, endorsing Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya's inaugural President, as his successor (Lacey, 2002). KANU subsequently splintered, with dissidents joining the National Rainbow Coalition, leading to Mwai Kibaki's presidential election with a two-to-one majority over Kenyatta. His inauguration ceremony in December 2002 attracted one of the largest crowds Nairobi had ever seen, though the crowd exhibited open hostility toward Moi (Lacey, 2002).

Following his departure from office in December 2002, Moi was primarily marginalized by the political establishment, although he retained popularity among the masses. On July 25, 2007, President Kibaki appointed Moi as a special peace envoy to Sudan, citing his "vast experience and knowledge of African affairs" and his standing as an elder statesman, which brought him back into the limelight. In this role, Moi contributed to peace efforts in southern Sudan, where an agreement signed in early 2005 was being implemented (Hull, Reuters. 2007).

In August 2017, Moi was diagnosed with dementia (Kahawatungu. August 29, 2017). In October 2019, he was hospitalized in critical condition at The Nairobi Hospital due to complications arising from pleural effusion (Mphaso, October 29, 2019). Moi passed away at The Nairobi Hospital on February 4, 2020, at 95, although his son, Raymond Moi, disputed this age, claiming his father was at least 105 years old (Standard Digital, February 10, 2020). A state funeral was held at Nyayo Stadium on February 11, 2020, followed by his burial at his Karabak home in Nakuru County on February 12, 2020 (BBC News. February 11, 2020). The funeral proceedings included full military honors, featuring a 19-gun salute and a missing man formation flyby (Moi sent off with a 19-gun salute video, February 2020). They laid him to rest beside his former wife, Lena Bomett (BBC News. February 11, 2020).

Rationale and Objectives of the Research

Limited scholarly attention has been devoted to Kenya's foreign policy during President Moi's tenure, particularly about countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine. During Moi's leadership, foreign policy discourse often found its place in his public addresses, leaving behind a need for more comprehensive documentation. During his reign, this absence of well-defined foreign policy directives has led some scholars to question whether Kenya maintained a coherent foreign policy stance. This research aims to elucidate how Kenya engaged with foreign governments from 1978 to 1990, coinciding with President Moi's presidency. It is a timeframe marked by significant global political shifts, particularly within Africa.

The United States

As early as 1793, U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson articulated a quintessential American perspective on foreign policy, emphasizing the right of every nation to self-governance and the freedom to choose its form of government. This foundational principle allowed nations to conduct their international affairs through channels of their choosing, whether it be a monarchy, a convention, an assembly, a committee, or a president. Diplomatic relations with other nations were not mere compliments but tools to facilitate practical conveniences.

The United States initially stipulated in its recognition policy that a foreign government had to demonstrate a commitment to its international obligations to gain recognition. In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson introduced a novel criterion when dealing with Latin American governments. He insists that a government must have been established through constitutional processes

respecting people's will. He used the withholding of diplomatic recognition as a diplomatic lever against governments that failed to meet these standards, an approach notably applied during the sixteen-year non-recognition of the Soviet Union (Jentleson & Paterson, 1997, pp. 466-467).

Research Scope

This research delves into President Moi's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine during the Cold War era (1978-1990). Kenya's stance on recognizing foreign governments during Moi's tenure must be clarified and more precise. The enigmatic nature of its policy formulation and articulation, coupled with the key personalities involved, has raised doubts regarding the existence of a coherent recognition policy. This study unravels the intricacies of Kenya's recognition policy during President Moi's term, focusing on specific case studies involving Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine. The central inquiry driving this research is: What factors influenced Kenya's recognition policy towards these nations during the Cold War under President Moi's leadership (1978-1990)?

Significance of the Study

This study holds significant relevance for scholars and the general public, providing insight into the evolution and articulation of Kenya's recognition policy concerning Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine in the Middle East during the Moi era. Kenya's strategic location has established it as a consequential player in international affairs. The research findings are valuable for scholars investigating Kenya's recognition policy over time. Furthermore, this study sheds light on a pivotal yet intricate facet of Kenya's foreign and recognition policy. By examining trends and articulation in Kenya's recognition policy towards the specified countries, scholars and students can draw upon this research as a foundational resource to discern consistencies, discontinuities, and continuities in Kenya's foreign policy across subsequent administrations following Moi's presidency.

Conceptual Framework

Recognition is fundamental in international law, influencing the allocation of international rights and obligations to emerging states or governments. It pertains to the responsibilities and privileges of engaging with the international community. The concept of recognition serves as the cornerstone of a state or government's legal identity and involves various subjects of international law. Recognition, in and of itself, is a weighty and intricate matter that can sometimes be susceptible to misuse by various governments (Taylor, 1994, p. 25).

A more profound issue arises concerning states that need more representation within the United Nations Organization as they confront the possibility of non-recognition by significant powers and influential international actors. This predicament stems from the substantial influence these major powers wield, allowing them to determine who enters the organization through their veto power. Thus, "recognition" can be defined as the act of acknowledging the existence of a new entity within the international system and granting it an independent status in the existing international order, complete with the rights and duties outlined in international legal documents (Satyavrata, 1964, p. 45). Top of Form

When a state as an international actor endures, it recognizes a new government. However, a revolution or popular uprising ousts the ruling government, transferring state power to a new entity or rebels (Malcolm, 1997, p. 306). In such situations, the challenge lies in the fact that non-recognition of the government can also imply non-recognition of the state itself, as the

government typically represents it. Therefore, recognized states can achieve the recognition of a new entity (state) through formal declarations, the establishment of legal relations, issuing formal statements, or by the conduct of the concerned state. In essence, the principles of international law adhere to the recognition process (Satyavrata, 1964, p. 45).

Once an international actor (state) secures international acceptance, it becomes challenging to change its status from recognition to non-recognition due to governmental changes or overthrow. The state remains an international legal entity unaffected by changes in government. Recognizing a government, therefore, implies recognition of the state, but not the other way around (Talmon, 1988, p. 309). The complexity arises because the international community cannot readily assume recognition of new governments, whether they assert themselves constitutionally or unconstitutionally in areas previously governed by legitimate authorities. International recognition has significant implications, including the ability to enter into treaties, seek membership in international organizations such as the United Nations, and exercise voting rights within these organizations (Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933) (Dixon & McCorquodale, 1991, p. 127).

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) witnessed an evolution in Kenya's recognition policy, shaped by changing global circumstances. Upon gaining independence, Kenya joined the OAU, aligning itself with the OAU charter's call for member countries to contribute to a fund supporting nations striving for independence through liberation struggles. Initially, the focus of recognition lay with states successfully achieving independence from colonial powers. These states were eligible for OAU membership, allowing them to join the United Nations and gain international recognition (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12),

However, the initial optimism surrounding newly independent African nations was short-lived, as many countries fell into coups and military rule. This posed a challenge for both the OAU and regional governments. In response, the OAU developed strategies to address this emerging trend, creating a conflict management department to tackle the rise of states governed by extra-constitutional means. The proliferation of such regimes overwhelmed the OAU, leading to contentious debates about recognizing such regimes, with concerns that doing so might set a precedent for other states to follow suit. Many countries, including Kenya, chose to limit their recognition to states rather than governments. Nevertheless, this selective approach had its drawbacks. Firstly, unrecognized states faced isolation from the international community. Secondly, non-recognizing states risked missing out on bilateral trade opportunities with these states, which often possessed valuable resources. Finally, decisions on recognition were heavily influenced by considerations of national interest (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12).

Amidst this uncertain backdrop, Daniel Arap Moi assumed leadership in Kenya. Kenya adhered to a policy of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, enabling it to maintain relations with military regimes, including the controversial rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. In 1981, Moi took over as the chairman of the OAU. During his tenure, he grappled with conflicts in various African regions, including Chad, Western Sahara, apartheid-era South Africa, Namibia, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique. Ironically, while Moi worked to resolve conflicts across Africa, internal turmoil erupted in Kenya in 1982 when the Kenya Air Force staged an unsuccessful coup (Nyamora, 1992, p. 12), placing Moi in a challenging position as a peacemaker.

Literature Review: The Evolution of Moi's Foreign Policy (1978-1990)

Following the passing of Kenya's founding father and first President, Jomo Kenyatta, on August 22, 1978, Daniel Arap Moi assumed the role of the second President of the Republic of Kenya. While endeavoring to uphold the principles of the Nyayo philosophy, which his predecessor had championed, Moi exhibited a nuanced approach to Kenya's foreign policy, adapting it to the changing domestic and international landscapes (Mabeya, 2002).

One notable feature of Kenya's foreign policy continuity during the 1980s was its steadfast alliance with socialist Ethiopia, as long as the Somalia threat persisted, providing no compelling reasons for withdrawal from this pact. In contrast to the meticulous and cautious foreign policy-making process under Kenyatta's administration, with final approval resting primarily within the confines of the State House, Moi introduced a distinctive approach. Moi's personal diplomacy and direct involvement in foreign policy management sometimes led to the sidelining of relevant institutions in foreign policy-making (Mabeya, 2002).

Additionally, Kenya's foreign policy was significantly influenced and constrained by its economic performance and internal opposition to the Moi regime. As regional dynamics shifted, particularly with resolving conflicts in Ethiopia, Kenya recognized the necessity of mediating internal conflicts in neighboring regions, such as Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to maintain regional stability (Mabeya, 2002).

Moi as the Principal Architect of Kenya's Foreign Policy

Musambayi (1995) contends that Moi cherished international summits and actively articulated foreign policy statements during political rallies, a departed from his predecessor, President Kenyatta, who delegated foreign policy matters to subordinates. Over time, Moi's leadership resulted in a centralization of foreign policy within the Office of the President at Harambee House, effectively personalizing the nation's foreign policy. The late Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Robert Ouko, acknowledged this transformation by attributing the authorship of Kenya's foreign policy to President Moi (Chelagat, 1991).

However, the concentration of foreign policy authority in one individual or a select group led to shortcomings in Kenya's foreign policy, often prioritizing principles over the best interests of Kenyan citizens. A striking example was Kenya's abrupt shift in foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Fifth Kenyan President: William Samoei Ruto

There are parallels between Moi's foreign policy approach and that of Kenya's fifth President, William Ruto. Like Moi, Ruto has opted for a similar mode of foreign policy communication, using social media platforms, particularly Twitter, to make foreign policy pronouncements. Ruto assumed the presidency after a contested national election on August 9, 2022.

An example of this shift in foreign policy communication occurred when Ruto tweeted on September 14, 2022, indicating that Kenya would no longer recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a territory in Western Sahara ruled by the Polisario Front, exiled in Algeria. Morocco has contested this territory since 1975 despite the SADR and Morocco being African Union members (The East African. September 16, 2022). Kenya's Foreign Ministry later clarified that the country would maintain diplomatic relations with the SADR, retracting Ruto's earlier tweet and expressing support for the SADR's right to self-determination, aligning with the positions of the United Nations and the African Union. Kenya's historical support for the SADR,

including establishing its embassy in Nairobi in 2014, further complicates this matter (Anadolu Agency, September 20, 2022).

Kenya's Role in the Cold War Era (1978-1990)

The Cold War era (1978-1990) significantly influenced Kenya's recognition and non-recognition practices in its foreign policy. Superpower rivalries, geographical considerations, and strategic dynamics shaped Kenya's approach to recognizing governments. The Estrada Doctrine (Jessup, 1931), which generally accepted governments as they emerged, gained prominence in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, allowing greater flexibility in recognition practices.

Moi's ascension to the presidency in 1978 prompted efforts to solidify his domestic and international standing. Frequent international trips were part of this strategy, aiming to secure financial assistance amid economic challenges following a downturn in the coffee industry. His 1980 visit to West Germany aimed at strengthening bilateral relations, coinciding with heightened superpower interest in the Indian Ocean region (Weekly Review, January 11, 1980. p. 6).

Kenya's Role in Global Affairs: Afghanistan and South Africa

At the United Nations in the 1980's, Kenya voted against the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at the general assembly. This led to most African countries boycotting the Olympic games that year, which were held in the Soviet Union. Kenya led the pullout as one of the leading Olympic African country (Weekly Review, January 18 1980. p. 14). After the United Nations meeting in 1981, Moi met with the U.S President Reagan and assured him of Kenya's support for the withdrawal of South African forces out of Angola (Moi was the chairman of the Organization of African Unity by then) (Weekly Review, September 18 1981. pp. 14-16). It was also Moi's stand as the OAU chairman that South African troops be withdrawn from Namibia and that South Africa needed to be isolated from the international community. Moi was however keen in recognizing Israel as a State and its government as a precondition for peace in the Middle East though he also recognized the Palestinian homeland. This policy was made clear when he addressed an Arab League as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (Weekly Review, November 27 1981. pp. 19-20).

Kenya's Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War

"The Iran-Iraq war, which lasted nearly ten years, also had some side effects on Kenya. As the war continued into the late 1980s, Kenya found itself in the middle of an arms scandal involving Iran. Ten counterfeit end-user certificates, bearing Kenya government letterheads and forged signatures of the former chief secretary, Mr. Simeon Nyachae, and former chief of general staff, General Jackson Mulinge, were discovered when the arms were intended to pass through Egypt, destined for Kenya but actually bound for Iran. Egypt, at the time, did not allow arms destined for Iran to pass through the Suez Canal. Iraq was displeased with Kenya over the entire affair. President Moi attempted to mend relations with Baghdad during an official visit to Baghdad in 1987 (Weekly Review, April 3, 1987, p. 5)."

The Israel-Palestine Conflict

In 1988, President Moi made an official trip to Egypt. He held talks with the President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. Moi's stand on the Middle East conflict was clear when he said, "Kenya's position was identical to that of Egypt on the Palestinian issue, and both countries see that there can be

no peace in the region without the Palestinian people having the right to self-determination” (Weekly Review, April 8, 1988, p. 29).

However, unexpectedly, to the Arab League’s surprise, Kenya resumed diplomatic relations with Israel and reopened its Kenyan mission after closure of up to fifteen years. It was a boost to Israel’s diplomatic cycles when it needed Africa’s support most, though to the dismay of the Arabic countries. To Palestine, this was a blow when it was pushing ahead with its plan of seeking international recognition. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was expecting support from Arabic countries that had already recognized the PLO government in exile. However, Kenya argued that it resumed a relationship with Israel because the PLO had formally recognized the existence of the Jewish State and had acceded to the United Nations charter as the Middle East question, which acknowledged the right of the existence of Israel as a State and advocated the creation of a Palestinian State as an independent State. Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at the time, the late Dr. Robert Ouko, said, “Kenya believed that Israel would seize the opportunity to recognize and negotiate with the PLO directly under the auspices of the United Nations” (Weekly Review, January 6, 1989, p. 5).

But the Tunis-based Arab League voiced its disappointment against the Kenyan government’s move. The league expected the Kenyan government to recognize the Palestinian State, which had won the support of most UN member States, rather than amending relations with Israel. On the other hand, Kenya had done its part by supporting the PLO at the UN forums and giving the PLO movement full diplomatic status in Nairobi. On his part, Moi said, “Kenya had moved towards that direction due to the PLO’s recognition of the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 that gave recognition to the existence of the State of Israel and similar status to Palestine. Kenya and 29 other African States had closed their diplomatic missions to Israel following the Yom Kippur war in 1973, in which Israel attacked and occupied Arab land, thus calling for international condemnation as the aggressor” (Weekly Review, January 6, 1989, p. 5). Moi’s foreign policy at this time can be said to be pursuing the principle of strategic ambiguity; that is, a government deliberately remains vague on a policy to help it gain from both sides. This was meant for Kenya to remain neutral in regional conflicts instead of pursuing regional peace in avoiding confrontations from the two countries.

Moi’s Foreign Policy: Strategic Ambiguity

Embracing Strategic Ambiguity Strategic ambiguity defined Moi’s foreign policy during this era. Kenya sought to uphold neutrality in regional conflicts as a means to protect its interests, allowing it to leverage advantages from all parties involved in different matters and foster regional peace, all while steering clear of confrontations.

Methodology

This study of Moi’s foreign policy from 1978 to 1990 primarily utilizes secondary sources, with supplementary inclusion of select personal statements from willing individuals. We obtained research materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reputable newspapers such as The Daily Nation. The analysis in this study employs both descriptive and analytical approaches, examining a wide range of sources, including magazines, newspapers, books, journals, seminar papers, and research papers, with a particular emphasis on case studies.

Limitations

Despite efforts to maintain objectivity, the study acknowledges potential bias in arguments and criticisms. Additionally, time constraints limited the depth of analysis. Some institutions and individuals approached for insights into critical government issues, especially about President Moi, were reluctant to provide information.

This literature review offers a comprehensive overview of Moi's foreign policy evolution, his role as the principal architect, and Kenya's stance on crucial international issues during the late 20th century.

Analysis of this Study: Recognition Policy Rationale

The study under examination sheds light on Kenya's historical recognition policy regarding other states. This policy has undergone several shifts and transformations, with significant implications for the nation's foreign relations.

Historically, much like many other nations, Kenya adhered to a policy of recognizing other states primarily during President Moi's leadership. The rationale behind this approach was to minimize potential conflicts arising from recognizing specific governments. This strategic move allowed Kenya to overtly extend recognition to governments it might otherwise have refrained from acknowledging (Galloway, cited in p. 142).

During the early stages of its foreign policy development, Kenya needed a clear and identifiable tradition or established pattern of interests. However, the research conducted by John Howell in 1968 discerned two distinct strands within Kenya's international relations. The first strand was conservative, primarily guiding Kenya's objectives in the Middle East—this conservative stance aimed to maintain the regional status quo, fostering and enhancing Kenya's regional role.

Conversely, Kenya's international relations had a radical dimension. The country actively embraced non-alignment in international affairs, establishing it as a foundational principle to assert its autonomy and sovereignty as a newly independent state. It's noteworthy that, during this period, Kenya maintained covert relations with the South African regime.

Importantly, Kenya's commitment to the principle of non-alignment also meant a dedication to self-determination. This commitment inherently obliged states to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations, highlighting the significance of respecting the territorial integrity of other states. These principles resonate with the charters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) (Olatunda, 1985, p. 87).

This analysis offers valuable insight into Kenya's historical recognition policy, unveiling a nuanced approach influenced by both conservative and radical elements within its foreign policy. Furthermore, it emphasizes the nation's dedication to international principles such as non-alignment, self-determination, and the respect for the territorial integrity of other states, as enshrined in international charters.

Conclusion: Implications of Kenya's Recognition Policy under Moi's Leadership

This study meticulously examined Kenya's recognition policy during President Moi's regime in the context of international law. It delved into government legitimacy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and Palestine. The rationale for recognition intricately linked specific circumstances, national interests, and the geopolitical context of the Cold War era. The study also elucidated

the transition in recognition policy from recognizing entire states to acknowledging specific governments and explained the reasons for this shift.

In the midst of evolving diplomatic landscapes, this study emphasizes that Kenya must adapt to dynamic regional and international policy realities while avoiding isolation. It underscores the necessity of involving various stakeholders, including the public, parliament, and intellectuals, in formulating a well-defined foreign policy. Furthermore, the study advocates for higher learning institutions to play a pivotal role in educating and fostering rigorous debate and critical examination of foreign policy, drawing comparisons with international counterparts. This inclusive approach aims to reinvigorate Kenya's foreign affairs ministry and ensure that foreign policy aligns with the national interest.

This study has revealed a history of inconsistency and ambiguity in Kenya's foreign policy regarding the recognition of governments over time. It highlights the need for a more collaborative and transparent approach to foreign policy formulation to safeguard the nation's interests and maintain its standing in the global arena.

Recommendations

Kenya's recognition policy has evolved since independence in response to changing global dynamics. To ensure a vibrant and effective contemporary foreign policy, all relevant stakeholders must actively participate in its formulation. This includes the public providing input, the legislature engaging in discussions, and intellectuals contributing their expertise.

Higher education institutions should play a pivotal role in fostering foreign policy knowledge and discourse, enabling comprehensive analysis and debate of Kenya's foreign policy in comparison to other nations. This comprehensive approach will infuse fresh vitality into the foreign affairs ministry, dispelling doubts about whether Kenya had a well-defined foreign policy during President Moi's era.

In conclusion, involving the public and parliament in foreign policy discussions prior to implementation serves the nation's best interests, safeguarding its national concerns and ensuring a more consistent and coherent foreign policy.

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