

# An Analysis of ANC Power at the 55th National Conference

NALEDI MODISE   
School of Government Studies  
North-West University  
Naledi.modise@nwu.ac.za

## Abstract

In the lead-up to the centenary of the ANC in 2012, Booysen proposed an analytical framework through which to assess the ANC's power and ability to retain that power in future. This was because the ability of the ANC to maintain dominance over the South African political system was diminishing for various reasons, but the future remained uncertain. The analytical framework examines ANC to power in four dimensions: the ANC concerning the people, the state of the ANC organisationally, the ANC electorally and the application of said power. The analytical framework indicates milestones to measure whether the party is strengthening or weakening. This paper adopts Booysen's analytical framework to examine ANC power at the time of the 55<sup>th</sup> National Congress held in 2022. Using the milestones indicated by the framework this paper argues that the ANC has weakened across three of the four indicators namely the ANC in the state, concerning the people and electorally while it has remained stable as an organisation.

**Keywords:** ANC, Factionalism, Power, Elections, Indicators, State, Government

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.36615/4t0j5k81>

## Introduction

The year 2022 marks 110 years since the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) and 32 years since its unbanning when it had to make the transition from a liberation movement to a political party. For 28 out of the 32 years as a political party, the ANC has enjoyed unparalleled dominance of the South African political landscape where it has enjoyed most of the electoral support and general trust from society. In the lead-up to the ANC centenary in 2012, Booysen (2011, p. 303) provided an analysis of the ANC's political power in four dimensions. The ANC in the state and government, the ANC electorally and in competition with other political parties, the ANC in relation to people and the ANC organisationally. She argued that the four faces of ANC power offered an inclusive analytical framework for tracking its consolidation of power and its ability to continuously reinvent and retain that power. In her assessment of the ANC in the state and government, she suggests that a weak ANC would be characterised by policies that fail to meet targets, the inability to decide on alternative policies, combined with a reluctance to change deficient policy and the pretence that policy is changed when instead it is just merely recast. As for the ANC in relation to other people, (Booyesen, 2011) further argued that the ANC would be guaranteed continuous strength as long as social and economic indicators are experienced as delivering a better life in one way or another.

The ANC electorally and in competition with other parties, she argued that the party remains strong for as long as the ANC enjoyed 60% of all electoral support and a sizeable majority of the provinces (*ibid*). Most notably and in relation to the focus of this paper, she contends that at the organisational level, the strength of the party is signalled by relative unity and cooperation. Therefore, when factional politics dominate the flow of ideas and challenges to the mother

body prevail, weaknesses materialise. Consequently, while the internal party contestation for leadership positions may indicate a vibrant ANC when this contestation is rooted in access to state resources, it points to an increasingly fragile organisation.

This paper aims to analyse the state of the ANC power using the above metric at the 55<sup>th</sup> elective conference in 2022 and ten years after the development of this model. The paper argues that the ANC has weakened across three of the four indicators namely the ANC in the state, in relation to the people and electorally while it remains relatively stable organisationally. The paper adopts document analysis as a means of data collection. Document analysis is a qualitative research method in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning to a particular topic. Document analysis was most appropriate for this analysis paper because it is a contemporary analysis of ongoing events. Furthermore, document analysis is an efficient and effective way of gathering data because documents are manageable and practical resources. Documents are common, easily accessible, and reliable sources of data. Also, documents are stable, “non-reactive” data sources, meaning that they can be read and reviewed multiple times and remain unchanged by the researcher’s influence or research process (Bowen, 2009).

This paper is divided into four sections which discuss each metric individually, firstly it examines the state in government, followed by the ANC in relation to the people, the ANC electorally and finally the ANC organisationally.

### **The ANC in state and government**

The assessment of the ANC in the state and government (Booyesen, 2011) suggests that a weak ANC would be characterised by policies that fail to meet targets, the inability to decide on alternative policies, combined with a reluctance to change deficient policy and the pretence that policy is change when instead it is just merely recast. Perhaps the most glaring policy failure is the economic policy of the ANC.

The ANC’s policy direction is determined at the elective conferences that take place every five years. The ANC has maintained a culture of National Conferences. When it was banned in 1960, national conferences were held annually. During its years ‘underground’, the ANC held major conferences sporadically, usually to consider policy shifts required by changing circumstances. After the ANC’s unbanning in 1990, national conferences were held every three years until December 1997. At the 50th National Conference held at Mafikeng, North West in December 1997, it was decided future national conferences would be held every five years (Dhawraj, 2017).

According to the ANC constitution, Rule 11, among other responsibilities, the National Conference:

- Decides on and determines the ANC’s policy, programme, and constitution.

That means that economic and social policy is adopted first at the conference and then brought to parliament to be adopted as national policy. During the peak of ANC electoral dominance between 1999–2009 where the party at its peak enjoyed 66% of the electoral support, it was inevitable that ANC conference policy resolutions would be South African policy. Nonetheless, the ANC enjoys a majority within parliament and still has room to direct national economic policy.

The 2012 ANC conference resolutions begin with the declaration that the ANC’s economic vision rests on the Freedom Charter’s call that the people shall share in South Africa’s wealth. This is reiterated across multiple ANC conference documents in the years that follow. It acknowledges the persistent and stubborn challenges of poverty, inequality, and unemployment.

The resolutions further declare the intention to transfer the structure of the economy through industrialisation and broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) to address the basic needs of the people of South Africa (ANC, 2012, p. 20). In sum, the ANC recognises the structural economic challenges facing the country and their response in 2012 was to address these challenges through the implementation of BBBEE and industrialisation. However, both these goals are not clearly defined and there are no measurable milestones that can be used to reflect on the progress made.

The 2017 ANC conference was convened under the theme “*Remember Tambo: Towards Unity, Renewal and Radical Socio-Economic Transformation*”. The theme itself underscores the failure of ANC’s economic policy after 23 years in office. During this conference, the ANC’s approach to economic revival was through the expropriation of land without compensation. In the resolution documents, the party stated:

---

“The ANC is committed to addressing the historical injustice of land dispossession and we shall pursue land expropriation without compensation as a matter of policy. We shall give effect to this resolution in a manner that strengthens the agricultural sector, improves economic growth, and meaningfully addresses inequality and unemployment”.

---

In the lead-up to the 2022 conference, a discussion document was released which would guide the discussions during the 55<sup>th</sup> National Conference. In the discussion document, the ANC declared that the ANC’s economic policy is to build a new more equal society. The document further suggests that there must be a return to the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) must enter a second phase of the ongoing transition from colonialism and apartheid to a national democratic society. According to the discussion document, during this phase, the ANC will forge ahead with interventions that seek to change the structure, systems, institutions, and patterns of ownership, management, and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans. This is a very ambiguous statement that has no clear meaning or tangible indicators.

Reflecting on the conference resolutions and discussion documents, it becomes clear that there is also a discontinuity in ANC policy and the ANC going with whatever political rhetoric is popular in that period. In 2012, at the height of ANC power and dominance, the keyword was black economic empowerment, targeted at the emerging black middle class. In 2017 it was a radical economic transformation, a response to the rising number of the poor and dislocation in the space of the middle class as the torch bearer of their aspirations. Finally, in 2022 the ANC evokes liberation euphoria and declares a return to the National Democratic Revolution. Arguably this is an indication that the ANC is losing its identity and hopes to be clinging to its historical legacy as a means to stimulate support.

There is also a clear disconnect between policy resolutions and implementation. While the party has grand visions and ideas about what needs to be done the implementation is severely lacking. In addition, due to the fact, there aren’t specific measurable outputs instead there are vague timelines at best, it becomes difficult to determine whether the party has failed to meet targets or not. It becomes additionally challenging to develop new policies in response to either failure or success of a policy. This ambiguity further limits the political imagination to develop newer policies to respond to the context of the day. As per the analytical framework, this indicates the weakness of the ANC in the state and government.

### The ANC in relation to the people

As for the ANC in relation to other people, (Booyesen, 2011) further argued that the ANC would be guaranteed continuous strength if social and economic indicators are experienced as delivering a better life in one way or another. Reflecting on social indicators, particularly inequality, poverty, and unemployment which determine the quality of life of South Africans, the ANC has weakened significantly.

In March 2019, the South African quarterly poverty statistics were released. The statistics aim to characterize the nature of poverty in South Africa. From those statistics, 64.2% of black South Africans lived in poverty, followed by the Coloured population at 41, 3%, then the Indian/Asian population falling to 5.9% and then the white poverty levels at 1%. What these figures indicate is that poverty in South Africa disproportionately affects black people who also make up the majority population. According to these statistics out of the 56 million people living in South Africa, 30.4 million of those people live in poverty. Additionally, 49.2% of this poor population is black African women. Furthermore, poverty in the country is concentrated in previously disadvantaged areas or former homelands. Finally, and most importantly, poverty is on the rise in South Africa.

Poverty is a complex societal issue presenting itself along racial, social, and political lines. Essentially poverty is characterized by a person's inability to meet the basic needs necessary for survival. The definition and measurement of poverty is complex. Poverty presents itself in social, economic and political ways and thus it is challenging to capture all its forms in a single definition. In addition to the problems with the conceptualization of poverty, South Africa does not have an official poverty baseline, however, households whose accumulated income is less than R2000.00 p/m are considered very poor (Naidoo, 2011). Numerous studies have emphasized the role socioeconomic status plays in shaping political attitudes and political participation. These studies essentially argue that income and education are determining factors of an individual's political preference and behaviour.

South Africa is known as one of the most unequal countries in the world if not the most unequal country. StatsSA lists four key indicators of inequality; South Africa's labour market which is heavily racialized, gender biased and the largest contributor to income inequality. Secondly, the reliance on social grants as opposed to wages from employment in the bottom 60% of households in the country. Thirdly, identifies the Eastern Cape as the most unequal province with individuals living in the Eastern Cape having had the lowest annual mean and median expenditures for all four data points and finally the increase in the asset distribution among black people, in which there has been consistent in average asset scores for black Africans led to a decline in asset inequality between groups, in sum intra-race inequality is on the rise in particular among black South Africans (StatsSA, 2020). For the focus of this paper, the focus is on income inequality and distribution of wealth which have a historical underpinning and enjoy much political attention. South Africa has one of the highest income inequalities in the world. Therefore making income disparity is a potentially strong factor driving voter identity and ultimately voter behaviour. According to the 2011 Census, 95% of households earn below R12800 per month with 45% of households earning zero annual income. Income status likely maps into the nature of the association with the formal labour market, union membership, or unemployment status, which can further define the nature of voter interests (Fedderke & Giannaros, 2017).

According to (Francis & Webster, 2019) South Africa, like many developing countries is grappling with a continued decline in its primary economic sector, the mining industry which results in a simultaneous decline in employment. In addition, South Africa has also failed to grow its industrial base and has further seen a decline in manufacturing employment. In the first quarter

of 2023 unemployment in South Africa was 32.9%, the first rise in over a year, from 32.7% in the prior period. The number of unemployed persons is estimated to be 7.9 million people (TradingEconomics, 2023)

Furthermore, South Africa also has a very youthful population. According to the StatsSA midyear population estimates of 2018, 35.66 % of the population is between the ages of 15 to 35. This segment of the population contributes the highest level of unemployed persons into the economy with 54.70% of people within this age group being unemployed. In 2022 South Africa was subsequently declared the capital of unemployment in the world.

Undoubtedly, this high level of poverty, unemployment and inequality in the country is an indictment of the failure of ANC policies and the ANC in government. The Rational Choice Theory of Voter behaviour suggests that voters care about and respond to the economic and political performance of the incumbent party. Voters consider the past performance of the government and their future expectations and then punish or reward parties accordingly.

Arguably, trends in ANC support closely match fluctuations in the evaluation of national economic conditions and satisfaction thereof. It seems reasonable to expect that as time passes voters will increasingly link their plight to government policy and hold government policy and government responsible. With time and as the ANC's track record develops retrospective evaluations should become more relevant as South Africans become better to evaluate the ANC's time in office.

Overall the quality of life of South Africans has deteriorated and as (Booyesen, 2011) the ANC would be guaranteed continuous strength if social and economic indicators are experienced as delivering a better life in one way or another, which from the evidence cited above is on the contrary. Inequality, poverty and unemployment are worsening or have stagnated. Within this context, it is reasonable to argue that the ANC in relation to the people is weakening.

### **The ANC electorally and in competition with other parties**

In the first ten years of South Africa's elections many observers, analysts and academics argued that race and racial rhetoric was the driving factor for South Africa's electoral outcomes (García-Rivero, 2006; Naidu et al., 2006; Schlemmer, 1994). In this school of thought, scholars argued that the legacies of apartheid encouraged enduring and inflexible racial and ethnic cleavages that inform electoral behaviour. As a result, the 1994 elections and subsequent elections thereafter were widely described as the racial or ethnic census. The core assumption of this period was that partisan support was racially aligned; black people will vote for black parties and white people will vote for white parties.

However, Schulz-Herzenberg (2008) presented a study of aggregate behaviour voter activity and voter behaviour between 1994 and 2004 revealing that the South African electorate is less predictable than initially thought. The study made the following assertions: It confirmed that South African voters do not make up their minds anew with every election as partisanship guides electoral outcomes. Furthermore, it indicated that multiple factors drive party identification and that the relationship between race and party images is a key driver of voter behaviour. Finally, the study argues that the sociological context in which they find themselves in ethnicity and race also determines voter behaviour.

The year 2004 election year represented the peak of ANC dominance with the party receiving 69.69% of the national votes, achieving the coveted two-thirds majority (IEC, 2019). However, since 2009 the margin of dominance has slowly been declining. Despite the dominance of the

ANC, South Africa is a vibrant democracy that houses multiple opposition parties. The reduced margins of victory of the ANC are in contrast with the electoral outcomes of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the leading opposition party, and the Economic Freedom Fighters EFF, the third-largest political party in South Africa and as from the 2019 election a resurgence in the support of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Freedom Front Plus (VF+). The following table highlights the ANC's electoral performance in contrast to three leading political parties in South Africa since its centenary when the model was first developed and, in the lead, up to the 55<sup>th</sup> National Conference.

**Table 1:** Electoral Performance of ANC 2014–2021

Year	2014 NPE	2016 LGE	2019 NPE	2021 LGE
Party				
ANC	62.15	53.91	57.50	45.59
DA	22.23	26.9	20.77	21.66
EFF	6.35	8.19	10.80	10.31
IFP	2.40	4.25	3.38	5.64
VF+	0.90	0.77	2.38	2.34

Source: IEC

This paper considers both the Local Government Elections and General and Provincial Elections. This paints a more accurate picture of the electoral performance of the ANC in competition with other parties. The current electoral trends indicate the decline of ANC support and an increase in the support of opposition parties, the IFP and the EFF. The electoral trends also indicate a decline in the support of the DA which over the past few years has lost its image as a multi-cultural alternative and is facing accusations and perceptions of being a “white party. The electoral performance of the ANC is also contrasted against a significant decline in voter turnout. When contrasting registered voters with the voting-age population the findings indicate the ANC returned to power in 2019 with the active consent of 35% of the voting-age population.

When citizens are unhappy with the performance of the ANC they choose to abstain from voting as opposed to voting for opposition parties. Whereas voter theories suggest that when the electorate is unhappy, they seek out other potential representatives, Kotze (2006) underscores that South African voters use their votes as an ANC accountability mechanism and use non-voting to punish the ANC.

With the marginal gains of the EFF, IFP and VF+, the above table further suggests a shift in this mentality and South African voters are beginning to vote for alternative parties. This could also be a result of the generational change that is taking place as most voters are people born after 1994 and those born during the transitional phase in the mid-1980s who the first beneficiaries of the post-democratic South Africa are. The ANC can no longer liberation euphoria as a basis for support. Therefore, as per the model, the ANC has weakened significantly.

### The ANC organisationally

At the organisational level, the strength of the party is signalled by relative unity and cooperation. In this regard, this paper argues that the ANC towards the 55<sup>th</sup> National Policy Conference is relatively stable i.e., not strengthening nor registering significant weakness. In so doing I expand the analytical framework to focus beyond the factional contestations within the organisation

and to reflect on the actions of the party in parliament about the positions taken at the elective conference and directives of the National Executive Committee (NEC). This paper argues that the stability of the ANC lies in its ability to consolidate its position during times of crisis. In this way, the party ensures its survival by not being seen to be fragmented.

This paper reflects specifically on the actions of ANC MPs during the motions of no confidence that were initiated by opposition parties in the years 2010–2022. The first motion against a sitting ANC president was initiated in 2010 against former president Jacob Zuma for being considered unfit to hold office, 2017 former President Jacob Zuma had survived five motions of no confidence against him, three had been voted on, one has been withdrawn and one was amended (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2017) Within the South African Constitution, a Section 102: Motion of No Confidence needs a 51% vote, or at least 201 MPs to vote in favour. The initial motions of confidence were related to issues of an underperforming economy, unemployment, and social cohesion, in the final motion of no confidence in November 2016 the failure to implement the public protector's remedial actions was included in the reasons for the motion (Wilkinson, 2017).

To provide context, in the 2009 general elections, the ANC had won a 65.9% of the overall votes which translated to 264 out of the 400 seats in the National Assembly. In 2014 the party secured a comfortable 62.1% of the votes amounting to 249 seats. In 2019 the party won 57.5% which translated to 230 seats in the National Assembly. Therefore, the ANC enjoys the majority in the NA and no motion in parliament can pass without their support. For a motion of no confidence to succeed, the number of votes needed would be 201 out of 400. In the ten years of Zuma's presidency, the ANC enjoyed a majority which ensured the failure of any motion of no confidence brought against the president.

As a result of the reluctance of the ANC MPs to vote in support of the no-confidence motions and therefore act against the former president, the EFF, UDM, and COPE took the Speaker of the National Assembly to the constitutional court for failure to fulfil their constitutional obligation to hold the president accountable. Therefore, the National Assembly was constitutionally mandated to create rules for the impeachment of a president. This ruling was in response to the reluctance of the majority ANC National Assembly, to hold former president Jacob Zuma accountable for not implementing the remedial action determined by the Public Protector for the security updates to his Nkandla Homestead.

Among the critiques of South Africa's electoral system is the lack of accountability by the representatives elected to office (Matlosa, 2008). In a closed party list system, the electorate votes for the party and the party determines who will be in office. In this way, the party representatives serve at the behest of the party and not the electorate and it is to the party that they must account. It is in this context that the ANC MPs receive directives from the ANC NEC on what action to be taken in parliament. When motions of no confidence against the former president were initiated the ANC MPs "*closed rank*" maintained the "*party line*" and voted against the motions.

Similarly, in 2022, when a preliminary report found that the incumbent president Cyril Ramaphosa may have a case to answer about the theft of money at his Phala Phala farm that occurred in 2020. ANC MPs were given strict instructions by the NEC to vote against the adoption of the report. When the report was tabled in parliament on the 8<sup>th</sup> of November 2022, 214 MPs voted 'no'. There were 148 votes for 'yes', with two abstentions (Cotterrel, 2022). In context, the ANC currently has 230 seats in the national assembly.

Through these actions, I argue that the ANC organisationally is stable. The current MP's tow the party line and take instructions very well. While the organisation faces questions about its

electoral survival due to poor performance in government, a failing economy and dismal social indicators, its ability to take resolutions and follow through suggests that this is a party working towards a common goal. It indicates party discipline which is necessary if it is to continue to enjoy electoral success. Particularly in the wake of an increase in opposition parties who are fragmented, and who have failed to carve an independent image outside of the ANC failures, despite their growing electoral support.

In addition, while the analytical framework focuses on the factions and flow of ideas within the organisation, at the 2022 National Conference the factions were not as pronounced as they had been in previous conferences. Factionalism is not unique to the ANC and is an inherent feature of all political parties. Sarakinsky (2015) cites Sartori's factors that create factionalism. A faction may be created as a response to the organization and may either be motivational or ideological. However, these factors tend to overlap, and it is often unclear what the actual causes of the factions are.

At the 54<sup>th</sup> National Conference held in 2017, there was the *Radical Economic Transformation* faction and its key figure head former president Jacob Zuma. This faction which rallied around the disgraced former president claimed to be "fighting for the economic emancipation" of South Africans although in very vague terms. According to Southall (2022), four broad themes emerge as the core principles guiding the existence of the RET faction. Firstly, it is black empowerment in the form of state machinery as apparatus for said empowerment. Secondly, land reform in the form of expropriation without compensation. Thirdly a revision of the constitutional settlement and the Mandela Compromise and finally a strong support for the existence of state enterprises and an anti-privatisation stance. The RET faction also bodes a strong anti-Ramaphosa sentiment.

By the time of the 2022 conference, the RET faction had weakened considerably as key leaders of the faction, the former secretary general of the ANC Ace Magashule and Carl Niehaus were unable to officially participate in the conference as delegates. The RET faction also had close ties to what was known as the *Premier League* which was a group of Premiers from The North-West Province, Free State, and Mpumalanga who wielded significant influence within their provinces and often determined the provincial and regional conference outcomes. At the 55<sup>th</sup> National Conference the members of the Premier League Ace Magashule were barred from attending, David Mabuza declined nomination from the floor, which left only Supra Mahumapelo to agitate for some change.

In the lead-up to the 55<sup>th</sup> National Conference, the Taliban faction emerged from Kwa Zulu Natal. The Taliban is the name of a fundamentalist Islamist group which is notorious for its disregard for human rights and links to terrorism and it is unclear why a bloc within the governing party would find it suitable to name itself that. Nonetheless, this faction was assumed to be supporters of Jacob Zuma Makhaye (2022), and as arguably shares similar ideological values as the preceding RET faction.

There was also the "Chris Hani" Cabal that is named after the SACP former general secretary of the SACP but represents a cohort of ANC leaders namely Gwede Mantashe, Oscar Mabuyane and Enoch Godongwane who originate from the Eastern Cape and are known supporters of the incumbent president. While the RET values continue to reverberate within the organisation the supporters of the current president are at odds with those values. Therefore, the current factions within the ANC are ideological, which is easier to overcome. This allows the party consolidates its position and present a united form and cooperate during these times of crisis.



## Conclusion

The ANC has weakened across three of the four indicators (the ANC in the state and government, the ANC in relation to the people and the ANC electorally) in the analytical framework and remains stable in the fourth indicator which is the ANC as an organization.

Reflecting on the ANC in the state and government, the paper argues that the ambiguity of ANC policies limits the political imagination to develop newer policies to respond to the context of the day. When contrasting the policy framework to the second indicator the ANC in relation to the people, it becomes evident that the quality of life for most South Africans is on the decline. Inequality has remained stubborn and widened, and so has poverty and unemployment and combined with the decline in the key economic sectors are likely to worsen.

The failure of ANC policy which results in the worsening of the quality of life of most ANC supporters is finally translating into a decline in the electoral performance of the ANC. The ANC electorally and in relation to other parties shows a steady decline in ANC electoral outcomes while opposition parties in particular “black” parties such as the EFF and IFP are gaining momentum as alternatives, meaning there is a shift in the political landscape and the ANC is losing votes to opposition. This marginal shift indicates that the electorate is more willing to vote for alternatives which are different from previous electoral cycles in which voters punished the ANC by abstaining from voting. Nonetheless, despite the weakening of ANC power across three of the four indicators this paper argues that the ANC is at its stable organisationally. The paper focuses on the actions of the ANC MPs in parliament and their ability to take instruction and tow the party line. These actions indicate a more stable the ANC than what is assumed. As a result, the paper argues that the focus should be extended from the internal factions of the organisation to the response to crises that the organisation faces while in government. During these times the ANC has been able to consolidate its position and work in unison to achieve its goals. As An analysis of ANC power, overall the paper concludes that by the 55<sup>th</sup> National Congress, the ANC was at its least powerful.

\*Acknowledgements: The earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2022 NIHSS- ANDC Conference and receive useful comments. The researcher wishes to thank the NIHSS for its generous grant in support of this research.

## References

- ANC, A. N. C. (2012). *African National Congress 53rd National Congress Resolutions*. <https://www.anc1912.org.za/>
- Booyesen, S. (2011). The ANC and the regeneration of political power, 1994–2011. *One Hundred Years of the ANC: debating liberation histories and democracy today*, 20–24.
- Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative research journal*. <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>
- Cotterrel, G. (2022). *Ramaphosa spared as MPs vote against adopting Phala Phala report*. The Citizen. Retrieved 17/01/2023 from <https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/ramaphosa-spared-as-mps-vote-against-adopting-phala-phala-report/>
- Dhawraj, R. (2017). *ANC's high stakes elective conference set for the ultimate showdown*. SABC News Online. Retrieved 20/09/2022 from <https://social.shorthand.com/SABCNewsOnline/3CSMLOBjdj/ancs-high-stakes-elective-conference-set-for-ultimate-showdown.html>
- Fedderke, J. W., & Giannaros, M. (2017). Postliberation politics: Evidence from demographic determinants of South Africa voting behaviour in the 2009 national election. *Economic Research Southern Africa*. Fedderke JW Giannaros M.
- Francis, D., & Webster, E. (2019). Poverty and inequality in South Africa: critical reflections. *Development Southern Africa*, 36(6), 788–802. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2019.1666703>

- García-Rivero, C. (2006). Race, class and underlying trends in party support in South Africa. *Party Politics*, 12(1), 57–75. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068806059344>
- Makhaye, C. (2022). ANC KZN: Jubilant ‘Taliban Faction’ takes control of the troubled province after a stormy weekend. Daily Maverick Retrieved 17/01/2023 from <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-25-anc-kzn-jubilant-taliban-faction-takes-control-of-the-troubled-province-after-a-stormy-weekend/>
- Matlosa, K. (2008). The 2004 General Election in South Africa: Is the country’s democracy consolidating? In K. G. A. A. H. J. Rakumbe (Ed.), *Electoral process and the prospect for democracy consolidation: Contextualising the African multiparty elections of 2004*. African Books Collective.
- Naidoo, K. (2011). Poverty and socio-political transition: Perceptions in four racially demarcated residential sites in Gauteng. *Development Southern Africa*, 28(5), 627–639. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2011.623909>
- Naidu, S., Pillay, U., Roberts, B., & Rule, S. (2006). Voting behaviour and attitudes in a post-apartheid South Africa. *South African social attitudes*, 40.
- Parliamentary Monitoring Group, P. (2017). *Infographic: Motions of No Confidence- The Zuma Years*. Parliamentary Monitoring Group. Retrieved 03/07/2023 from <https://pmg.org.za/blog/infographic-motions-no-confidence-zuma-years>
- Sarakinsky, I. (2015). A brief history of factionalism and new party formation and decline in South Africa—the case of Cope. *Journal of African Elections*, 14(1), 60–84. <https://doi.org/10.20940/JAE/2015/v14i1a4>
- Schlemmer, L. (1994). Birth of democracy. *Indicator South Africa*, 11(3), 17–22.
- Schulz-Herzenberg, C. (2008). A silent revolution: South African voters during the first ten years of democracy, 1994–2004. In: Juta & Co.
- Southall, R. (2022). *What is RET and what does it want? The Radical Economic Transformation faction in South Africa explained*. The Conversation. Retrieved 17/01/2023 from <https://theconversation.com/what-is-ret-and-what-does-it-want-the-radical-economic-transformation-faction-in-south-africa-explained-195949>
- StatsSA, D. o. S. S. A. (2020). *How Unequal is South Africa*. Department of Statistics South Africa. Retrieved 02/07/2023 from <https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12930>
- TradingEconomics. (2023). *South Africa’s Youth Unemployment* Retrieved 04/01/2023 from <https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/youth-unemployment-rate>
- Wilkinson, K. (2017). *Fact Sheet: How many motions of no confidence has Zuma faced* EWN\_Eye Witness News. Retrieved 10/01/2023 from <https://ewn.co.za/2017/06/29/fact-sheet-how-many-motions-of-no-confidence-has-zuma-faced>