

A Liberal Peace Analysis of the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the DRC

Shifting paradigms and Theoretical Misdiagnosis

CHARLES NYUYKONGE 

Independent Analyst

nyuykonge@gmail.com

Abstract

Since its inception in May 1948, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation has evolved through a series of changes in the international security environment to becoming the world's most formidable multi-national instrument for international security intervention for peace and security. Its operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the largest operations in the history of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Yet, it has been one of the most controversial missions given the fact that the DRC remains mired in relative instability despite decades of the blue-helmet intervention in the country, particularly since the start of MONUC in 1999. UN efforts at ending insecurity and restoring political order in the country have seen a succession of peacekeeping mandates and operational orientations thus informing changing theoretical perspective among scholars. Notable, there is what is perceived as a transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace operational models and the adoption of these as analytical frames. Despite this tendency towards theoretical bifurcation in the body of academic literature purporting transformation in the context and content of the UN DRC operations, the UN systems' operational framing reflects more of a continuum than transformation in the guiding framework of action. This paper is conceived to examine the theoretical and operational frames in the discourse of UN mission in the DRC, and their validity in the analyses of UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC. The paper's adopted qualitative discourse approach finds significant differences in the conceptual parameters for evaluating progress in UN missions and suggests that these gaps be bridged by reconciling theory and practice in contexts such as in the DRC in a changing global security environment.

Keywords: Security, operational framework, Theoretical framework, theory and Practice, UN Peacekeeping.

Introduction


The United Nations peacekeeping mission is the most organized effort at the international level aimed at combating insecurity and restoring political order. It also holds the world's most inclusive and most formidable platform for military operation for security. Following the end of the Cold War, earlier writings on UN peacekeeping missions drew theoretical impetus from Liberal Peace-building,¹ raising high expectations on its prospects to deliver peaceful and prosperous societies. Similarly, attempts at explaining the conflation of factors which have shaped dynamics of peace-building, conditioning the progress of peace missions in conflict prone states of Africa have situated these within the frames of Liberal Peace and Sustaining peace doctrines.²

In the DRC, the operational mandate of UN peacekeeping has evolved over the years, responding to changing dynamics as it is confronted with visible changes in the operational contexts, guiding mandate exigencies. These evolving dynamics have informed changing analytical praxis in policy and academic circles, from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace, in response to metamorphosing contexts and emerging realities.³ As one of the most extensive and extensively funded peacekeeping operations across the globe, the UN's mission in the DRC represents paradoxes and contradictions from its size of deployment, funding, and its inability to end the cyclical conflict in the DRC. This is so given its inability to deliver lasting peace which has remained elusive after more than two decades of peacekeeping operation thereby earning it scholarly verdicts on its performance as a failed operation.⁴

There is a growing tendency in the corpus of academic studies on the UN mission in the DRC to often analyze its mandates and operations using two theoretical lenses: the Liberal Peace-building frame, and the Sustaining peace frames, as analytical prisms for evaluating what the UN mission offers in terms of long-term peace and stability.⁵ Conceptual harmony is essential between theoretical discourse and operational frames in that, policy priorities are framed and evaluated at the theoretical levels. It is therefore important to understand the frames through which these changing operational issues are captured in theoretical terms. Interrogating the operational utility of the Liberal Peace and Sustaining Peace doctrines in the DRC context thus opens a vista through which we may understand how the UN mission and its transformations in the quest for peace is integrated into the body of academic debates. The aim of this paper is to examine the conceptual relationship between theory and practice and this relationship finds expression in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the DRC. The paper proceeds with a discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of the paper.

DRC Current Trends and Imperatives for Conceptual Model

The recent failed coups and the string of accusations and counter-accusations about who is responsible for instability in the DRC has been subject of scholastic debate, populist political agenda and international speculation.⁶ As the speculation looms, and the DRC and its neighbours are on the verge of war, none seems to cede to appreciating the lack of consensus about the causes of continued instability; the missed opportunities for stabilization or what could be done to help the DRC live upto to the promise of its resource prosperity while its neighbours enjoy unhinged peace. As such, the DRC's continued failure to appreciate the extent to which its instability spillover to its neighbours remains the critical stake that its neighbours will continue having in the former's internal affairs. On their own, the ungovernable communities in the DRC remain the harbinger of regional instability and the DRC's neighbors remain concerned about the DRC's capacity to address its internal issues which are a threat to regional peace.⁷



In almost the last three decades, the international community has deployed a strong, well-resourced and adaptable peace mission whose mandate has changed with mutations in the conflict dynamics and emerging threats.⁸ However, given the UN's well-resourced and sophisticated operation with sight further than the government's reach, the UN has not only operated in the DRC as a para-state, but have controlled much of the narrative in the Congo especially as it pertains to news emerging from the problematic ungovernable spaces. To date, despite the extensive UN presence, only the African Union and a few regional bodies have explored these ungovernable spaces and dined with 'rebels' and Congolese defected soldiers to understand why rebellion perpetuates and what issues continue to spur their deference from a permanent ceasefire and re-integration into the Congolese national army.⁹ The findings of the African Union revealed just how misinformed many policy conclusions and peer-reviewed articles were from the reality which told partial truths and speculated why instability perpetuates. But with the UN on the ground as *'chef terre'* and as place holder for international organisations, its reporting continues to be what informs policy discourses even though little is done to promote inclusive national dialogue owing to the pre-emptive demonization of some non-state armed groups because they have committed war crimes.¹⁰ Such pre-emptive demonization and non-inclusion into constructive multi-stakeholder national and regional peace talks are the reasons why peace remains elusive in the DRC.

Scholars who have engaged the UN Peace mission have appraised its role in stabilizing the Congo and in particular credited the UN for the 2006 presidential elections which ushered-in a new era of democratization. However, this electoral process and the expected dividends of stability were shortlived because the winner of the elections, President Kabila invested little effort in uniting the country. He sought to consolidate his power, target those opposed to his leadership and in so doing, de-prioritised security sector reforms which remain a critical ingredient for the DRC's stabilization. And at the end of his first term, sought he (Kabila) without control of the territorial integrity of the state, sought the departure of the UN's mission from the DRC. And these efforts which divided the scholarly and policy community forebore the question – What is conceptually unsound about UN Peace Missions?

Conceptual Issues in UN Peace Missions

The quest for peace and stability particularly in contexts of prolonged conflict across the globe has led to modifications in both the strategic approaches as well as conceptual frames adopted in the UN peace mission. In the DRC, there are ongoing shifting frameworks of engagement in the policy

as in academic circles.¹¹ These shifts are manifest in the implementation of diverse approaches to peace ostensibly, in response to changing security. As such, the political environments not only tends, to obfuscate the distinctions between the forms of engagement, it also confounds the expectations in respect to goals, methods and outcomes that should be anticipated from such engagements. More importantly, it has blurred the lines between the various mandate statements which guide the UN mission in the country.¹²

It was the evident lack of clarity that prompted some actors and analysts to suggest that such structures as the Force Intervention Brigade be separated from the MONUSCO as an independent structure so as to ensure clarity in the tasks being confronted and the methods that is distinctly fit for each task, whether peacekeeping, peace-building or peace enforcement.¹³ This appears to have been necessitated by widespread concerns about conceptual ambiguity in the UN's engagements. For example, while officials in the Democratic Republic of the Congo refer to MONUC operations as stabilisation missions, there has been no clarity about the point at which peace enforcement terminated to commence the phase of stabilisation. Rather, the word 'stabilisation' has been used broadly to describe military measures in place to bring about a situation (or perhaps a country) under control.

Operationally, the UN has given 'stabilisation' some structure and meaning during the last decade; the UN Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping (Capstone doctrine) defines stabilisation as the time during which a UN peacekeeping operation is deployed.¹⁴ What's fascinating is that, in many respects, stabilisation is the polar opposite of what UN peacekeeping missions are supposed to achieve, at least in its more militaristic (and NATO-influenced) forms. Stabilization refers to the use of military forces to stabilise a country, generally using all available means to neutralise possible 'conflict spoilers.' However, as the Brahimi Report points out, one of the main principles of peacekeeping missions is that they should only be deployed when there is a peace to uphold.¹⁵ But in reality, there are several cases of UN peacekeeping operations being sent where there is no sign of peace - Chad, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are all noteworthy examples.

One important source of disconnect between conceptual and operational frames can be situated within the context of mandate specification. In this regard, it is noteworthy that some of the missions above were not granted peace-enforcement mandates (with the exception of MONUSCO's new mandate), which defined the enemy and required the mission to 'neutralise' it; instead, they were given a broad mandate that allowed them to defend civilians by whatever means necessary.¹⁶ It should be emphasised, however, that there is no clear parameter of correlation between the degree to which a UN peacekeeping operation could use force and whether or not it is designated as a 'stabilisation' mission. The UN mission in South Sudan, for example, has a Chapter VII mandate that allows it to "take all necessary means...to carry out its protection mandate," and many other UN peacekeeping missions have Chapter VII mandates that allow them to be 'robust.'¹⁷

Following the UN's failures to protect civilians in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia in the 1990s, doctrinal revisions evolved that allowed the UN to be "robust" and use force to defend people when necessary. However, there is a significant difference between authorizing the FIB's use of force to protect civilians for a short period of time and giving the UN peacekeeping mandate -a general authorization to use all necessary means, whether as brigade or not.¹⁸ Other views look critically as United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) decisions that potentially engage the United Nations in 'peace-enforcement' activities". Pointing out that such a move might jeopardise the neutrality and impartiality that are so important in UN peacekeeping.¹⁹ From this point of view, it is believed that, the organization should always be considered as an 'honest broker,' and while

the rationale behind deployments are evident, it was more desirable to have brigades as a stand-alone entity with distinct responsibilities from MONUSCO's other brigades.²⁰

Changes in mission mandate also has implications on the frames of analysis and changes therein. There has for example, been concerns about whether the transition from MONUC to MONUSCO constituted a fresh start or a continuation of the old order in UN participation in the DRC. The UNSC begins its resolution extending MONUSCO's and its FIB's mandate by stating that it is acting "on an extraordinary basis and without setting a precedent or prejudice to the recognised principles of peacekeeping."²¹ This is particularly intriguing because, since the first mission, the UNSC has been steadily refining the notion of peacekeeping. This raised the question of whether the Security Council considered itself bound by its precedents if nothing else is clearly stated.²²

Synthesizing Theories and Literature in the Context of UN mission in the DRC

Perspectives vary in scholarly attempts at understanding and explaining peace and security operations such as those led at the international level by the United Nations through its peace mission in the DRC. According to Gary Grobman, complexity theory examines uncertainty and non-linearity.²³ Like the incertitude of what systems to put in place to attain and maintain peace, complexity theory suggests that systems are unpredictable and constrained by order.²⁴

Similarly, Johan Galtung's peace theory also appeals to the Sustaining Peace agenda and emphasized on relationship, community bonding, and consensus building within one's conflictual self, community, state, religion or civilisation.²⁵ It argues that humans and society are continually pulling in different directions, and this creates conflict. Peace is therefore not the exclusive preserve or property of one party alone, but the property of the relationships between a collective. Galtung's assertions might be a reasonable explanation for intractability in the DRC. In instances such as the DRC, there is value in stakeholders' introspection about what is more gainful to them: instability or peace.²⁶

Deciding on which theory is important to peace comes down to two categories of thought, those who believe that the creation of liberal democratic states guarantees free markets and the rule of law, and those like Galtung who believe conflict is internal, and peace emerges when cooperation steps- in.²⁷ As earlier indicated, twenty years since the UN deployment, peace remains elusive; and with the new sustainable peace agenda, as examination of the lenses through which scholars and practitioners on the field interrogate the issues are essential to the various interventions towards peace. The next section discussed the underlying theoretical assumptions of Liberal Peace and provides new theoretical insights for understanding the role of peacekeeping in sustainable peace.

Liberal Peace Theory

The Liberal frame of analysis in the international system gained currency in post-Cold War era as an offshoot of widening ideological body of thought in the emerging world order at the time. Liberal Peace contends that active domestic and international collaboration in pursuit of democracy, an open market-based economic agenda, and functional institutions are architects of peace.²⁸ Although its invocation has often been ambiguous as an analytical frame, its application in conflict and peace situations has dispelled the contemplation that, it has a linear set of assumptions and applicable only to post-conflict interventions. This has been more evident particularly following the end of the Cold-War, and with the inking of "An Agenda for Peace."²⁹

In this regard, it is important to understand Liberal Peace's constituent elements and the underlying assumptions upon which is hinged, including its choice as a suitable theorem to understand peacekeepers' role in restoring and Sustaining Peace. Ghali's post-conflict state-building emerged as a critical component of peace-building. In the aftermath of the Cold-War and even more recently with the war on terror and the cocktail of peace and security challenges in Africa broadly and the world at large, Liberal Peace became a household term used to explain conflict challenges and inspire conflict resolution and peace consolidation efforts

According to Richmond, the key components of the Liberal Peace doctrine are its premiums on democratization, rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets and neoliberal development.³⁰ The Liberal Peace framework, Richmond asserts, can be understood to have four strands, namely: victor's peace,' "institutional peace,' 'constitutional peace' and 'civil peace.'³¹ Victors peace is premised on the 'winner takes it all' peace architecture where peace rests on hegemonic power like the military, and its success rests on the dominant hold on the hegemony.

On the other hand, institutional peace is idealistically anchored on consensus. It is based on the normative and legal agreement of states on "how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behavior."³² Institutional peace traces its origin from the Treaty of Westphalia, up until the founding of the United Nations, to the modern-day period of the dominance of liberalism as a political and economic framework promoted by the dominant power in a unipolar world order. Constitutional peace is based on the liberal understanding that peace rests upon democracy and free markets founded on the idea that "individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end."³³ Going further, Richmond notes that constitutional peace gained prominence during the European pre-Medieval times to the end of World War One up until the end of the Cold War.

Civil peace according to Richmond is an anomaly from the three other strands because it shifts power from the state, international actors to the individual.³⁴ Civil peace is based on citizen engagement, individual attainment of rights and the ability to defend them, advocacy and vibrant civil societies. Richmond further notes that the four strands of Liberal Peace, at any one particular time, could 'compliment' or 'contradict' each other.³⁵ The contradictions of the strands have been the basis of the critique of the Liberal Peace agenda.

One important observation, however, is the fact that the four strands of the Liberal Peace by nature of their design and implementation, appoint third parties mostly external actors, as drivers of the peace initiative in conflict-ridden societies. Because of the external drivers of peace Liberal Peace "depends upon intervention, and a balance of consent, conditionality, and coercion."³⁶ Other than the four strands, Liberal Peace can be understood from what Richmond (2006) describes as the 'graduations' of Liberal Peace. Graduations of the Liberal Peace framework are founded upon how the actors enter the conflict, how they interact with the local context, and how those interactions have a bearing on how peace is attained and managed. As such, graduation can be based on the conservative, orthodox and emancipatory models of peace.³⁷

A conservative model is typified by top-down initiatives to peace-building. Most of the time the interventions are coercive, determined by the dominant forces, and in many cases than not, apply violence through "conditionality and dependency creation."³⁸ Because this model is based on unilateral hegemony and dominance mostly by state actors, it can be seen through the prism of the victor's understanding of peace. Due to the application of force through external means, peacekeeping within the conservative model is 'militarised as has been the case in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The orthodox model can be described based on the mantra ‘I will engage you, but you do as I say anyway’. In this model, external actors are aware of the conflict context and because they aim for local ownership of the peace settlements, they are interested in the local culture but still employ their external approaches and norms into the peace framework. Because of how the process is managed, this peace model is based on “consensual negotiation” and which always leads to “balanced and multilateral, and still state-centric peace.”³⁹ This peace model has been advocated by international organisations and has been advanced by UN peacekeeping as a post-cold war model to peace having been implemented in East Timor. This model of peace can be described as bottom-up yet top-down where peace is designed by and with the locals and yet designed and agreed at the state level. Richmond notes that both the conservative and orthodox peace models are hinged on the superiority of the external actors and still modeled on the norms that global values can be applied in local situations to attain and sustain peace.⁴⁰

An emancipatory peace model deviates from conservative and orthodox graduations of peace because it advocates for local ownership and agreements based on consent. When peace negotiations are based on trust and consent, then there is little or no room for coercion, domination, and violence. Emancipatory model is aligned to civil peace as a product of bottom-up approaches and negotiations to peace. The end game of this model is local ownership; hence the process is participatory, consultative, multiple actors with very minimal state engagement. The different graduation model can be applied all through from the beginning of the conflict to the reconstruction phase shifting from one model to the other depending on the nature of the conflict, the intensity of the conflict, parties involved, and the perceived international community mandate at the time.⁴¹

If Liberal Peace is premised on rule of law, democracy, human rights and free markets, it is important to examine if it can be effectively applied in Africa. According to Ian Taylor the nature of Liberal Peace and what it espouses is not a fit for Africa. Taylor argues that strands and graduations of Liberal Peace rest upon hegemony which is lacking in most if not all post-colonial African states.⁴² This has led to a contradiction “that whilst the Liberal Peace might reflect the impulses for a trans-nationalized neo-liberal hegemony, in Africa the very basic foundations of a domestic hegemonic project are mainly absent.”⁴³ The lack of hegemony characterized by weak unstable states with little or no autonomy impairs the attainment of the liberal democracy doctrine upon which Liberal Peace is predicated on. The following section examines the idea of Liberal Peace in the DRC, it also probes into its relevance to explaining the elusiveness of peace, and the adoption by the UN of the Sustaining Peace in the country.

Operationalizing Liberal Peace in the DRC: The influence of Liberal Peace is visible in different levels of UN peacekeeping efforts. Following the publication of former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s “An Agenda for Peace” in 1995, the United Nations began to place a greater emphasis on the promotion of values, norms, and practises which reflect the projection of liberal states, specifically in terms of political (democracy) and socio-economic governance (market economies).⁴⁴

In 2001, the UNSC invoked aspects of Liberal Peace, particularly concerning the link between market economies, natural resource governance, and the attainment of peace. The UN brought this to bear in its engagement with the conflict in the DRC by drawing a link between weak state institutions, illegal resource exploitation of natural resources, and the perpetuation of violent conflict in the country. Through its Resolution (SC/7057), the UNSC condemned “the illegal exploitation of natural resources and wealth by various actors in the conflict, and expressed serious concern at those economic activities fueling the conflict in that country.”

The emphasis in the resolution, on the connection between state capacity, natural resource governance, and the elusiveness of peace in the DRC reinforced the suitability of the UN's standardized notion of Liberal Peace. This notion, in practice, is hinged on the central premise that peace can be attained through strengthened state institutions, a reformed economic model of natural resource governance and trade, as well as a functional political space based on democratic values.⁴⁵ As a result, the UN's involvement was framed as a top-down "remedy" for the causes and effects of armed conflict, in accordance with formulations based on Liberal Peace theorizations.

The impact of Liberal Peace today is evident in the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) post-conflict mandate, and its orientation towards Sustaining Peace. Sustaining Peace attempts to focus greater emphasis on recognizing and reinforcing what is currently working; to accompanying and supporting advocates for peace; and to assure not just a decreased incidence of violent conflict, but to also mobilise resources to abolish it.⁴⁶ As a result, while deciding whether or not to deploy peacekeeping missions, policymakers must consider the best approach for not just ending hostilities but also ensuring that the seeds of peace are sown and peace is maintained.⁴⁷ As a result, this strategy revolves around the concepts of "do no harm" and "do some good."⁴⁸

The "Do no harm" concept is based on the notion that peacekeeping or humanitarian actions in areas of violent conflict or insecure peace should avoid unwittingly increasing the danger or incidence of violence.⁴⁹ While "Do some good" is founded on the idea that, in addition to avoiding worsening violent conflict, humanitarian interventions should also play a role in reducing existing levels of potential violence by carefully studying the environment in which typical development endeavors are implemented.⁵⁰ It can be implied that by extension, this principle requires that peace operations should sustain the peace.

An understanding of these enablers and inhibitors is a critical step towards explaining why peace remains elusive in the DRC, and how changes in analytical and operational frameworks guide UN peacekeeping operations today. The missing link that remains unsolved in the workings of a top-bottom approach is what Stein Sundstøl Eriksen sums up as four encumbrances to the success of Liberal Peace mandate. These include: the inability of foreign drivers of such peace initiatives to ensure the provision of insufficient resources; the application by donors, of a standardized approach to conflict management which often does not adequately take the local context into account; the disconnect between the interest of local power elites and objectives of the pre-designed pattern of state-building; and lastly, the challenge of policy rigidity which arises from the UN's adoption of a standardized and non-negotiable notion of the ideal state.⁵¹

The DRC context of the operationalisation of Liberal Peace, and its inability to deliver lasting peace also highlight the failure of the UN to factors in the array of variables both domestic and external, which exert significant deterministic influences on the mandate deliverables. A brief analytical appraisal of Van der Lijn, (2009), Lise Howard (2008) and Bayo (2012) reveals that there is plethora of such enabling variables which contribute to peacekeeping's success.⁵² Some of these include; local ownership of the peace process; presence of well-equipped peacekeepers providing impartial security to all disputants and stakeholders especially women, children and other minority groups; the willingness and sincerity of disputants and stakeholders to observe and enforce ceasefires; a peacekeeping force that has adequate knowledge and familiar with the conflict drivers; clear timelines in operations' deployment; and broad and long-term vision of the peace operation among other.⁵³

The Limits of the Liberal Peace in the DRC: Following from the foregoing, it is imperative to understand the necessity for the transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace. From an operational level, David Chandler takes issues with Liberal Peace's top-down approach. He argues

that, by its conception, Liberal Peace is externally driven and thus solutions etched-out elsewhere foment the elusiveness of peace and pose a challenge to attaining peace in climes where they are applied.⁵⁴ This view is supported by Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam who opine that in peace-building Liberal Peace suffers a setback because of its lack of inclusivity and its external driven-solution.⁵⁵

Gerard Hagg and Peter Kagwanja argue that the Liberal Peace model, originally designed for the management of inter-state conflicts had gained increased patronage in the attempt to resolve intra-state wars which were driven essentially by identity politics.⁵⁶ The implication of its focus by design is the fact that it often fails to address civilian angles to the injustices including the animosities, memories and images which inflame conflict and perpetuate it. Rather, it produces counterproductive outcomes by downplaying actual peace-building and embracing power sharing initiatives which have come with many hidden costs.⁵⁷ Critical to its inability to deliver sustained peace is the fact that Liberal Peace breeds a cartel-like structure through its process of seeking peace through agreements and negotiations with merchants of war.

The above position echoes Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler who argue that Liberal Peace constitutes an incentive structure which merchants of violence can evaluate in terms of accruable gains from their violence, they may as such become even more motivated to engage in violence in order to secure further concessions from negotiations.⁵⁸ As a consequence, regardless of its potential as a conflict management approach, Liberal Peace option of negotiation with armed groups for power is a potential contributing factor to the “reproduction of insurgent violence” as it accredits armed groups as owners of the state rather than addressing the root causes of the conflict.⁵⁹ As the critique of Liberal Peace has grown, international actors have shifted their operational focus to understanding the local contexts, advancing local-led and locally-owned peace initiatives, and by implication, shifting from top-down to bottom-up approach in what is summed up as the sustaining peace framework. The next section examines Sustaining Peace and its imports using the DRC context.

The Sustaining Peace Framework

Youssef Mahmoud and Delphine Mechoulan describe Sustaining Peace as entailing efforts at revisiting the starting point of the process of building peace by adopting a new approach that recognizes the imperative of a broad-based and proactive peace agenda.⁶⁰ The transition from the Liberal Peace focal priorities to one aimed at Sustaining Peace marks a critical point in UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. This is because it also symbolizes a shift in its underlying ideology. This is possibly according to Sarah Huddleston in recognition of the limits of Liberal Peace which focuses on a top-down approach to peace-building by de-emphasizing the underlying factors and leaving the local population disempowered throughout the peace-building process.⁶¹ A shift in orientation towards Sustaining Peace, it would seem therefore, is an attempt to incorporate the local population as the fulcrum for peace-building within the UN peacekeeping operational framework.

United Nations’ peacekeepers have succeeded in addressing most of the symptoms which manifest as violent conflicts in the country but have not achieved much in addressing the underlying causes such as the control of, and the management of natural resources. As a result of this, conflicts among contending groups remain a source of insecurity, and constitute a threat to peace-building efforts in the country. State capacity for resource management and law enforcement also remains fragile. As Nkongolo-Bakenda, et.al (2016) observed, state institutions are weak, under-resourced, and thus incapable of mitigating these challenges. Preliminary observation of the security climate across the DRC suggest that the some of the failings of the UN peacekeeping

operation may stem from its focus on Liberal Peace which fails to prioritize some of the base issues underlying conflict—a situation which may explain the tenuous nature of peace in the country.

To help maintain peace and stability in the DRC regional and international players have mediated ceasefire agreements that have, at best, been partially respected by the very belligerents who signed them. Consequently, the peace agreements have failed to end violence among the various groups or to re-establish a central government authority throughout the DRC.⁶² Today, amid the rise to power of Félix Tshisekedi in January 2019, the Council on Foreign Relations in its Global Conflict Tracker opines that “poor governance, [an undisciplined military force] and the proliferation of many armed groups have causally subjected Congolese civilians to widespread abuse, sexual harassment, and major abuses of human rights.”⁶³ These factors are responsible for extreme poverty in the country.

In restive areas of the DRC, the African Union (AU), the UN, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have struggled to restore and sustain peace, while insecurity and conflict have continued with major impact on human security and peace prospects. Even with assistance, it seems apparent that the UN has not adequately delivered on its core mission, which is *to re-establish and preserve global peace and security* in the DRC.⁶⁴ As Paul William notes, while peacekeeping is the most visible aspect of the UN in Africa and has been transformed with evolving circumstances, in the case of the DRC, it has failed in its efforts to achieve and sustain peace.⁶⁵ The difficulty in the task of creating lasting peace in the DRC not only questions the Liberal Peace-building approach to UN efforts there, but also raises questions as to why its application has been contrary to the anticipated outcome. Fernando Cavalcante postulates that the UN operational policy, often based on the Liberal Peace-building thesis and defined by the top-down approach, constitutes a part of the limitations to achieving lasting peace.⁶⁶

From Liberal to Sustaining Peace in the DRC

Since the end of the Cold war, the Liberal Peace approach to conflict management has no doubt maintained its dominance on the international conflict management arena. However, despite this dominance, its operationalisation has been marked by problems in terms of its approach to peace and the outcomes in terms of sustainability. Its use as the common operational frame in the management of peacekeeping missions has provided one of the common planks on which the approach is often examined and criticized. To understand the significance of the frames—Liberal and Sustainable Peace principles and their implication for practice, the UN mechanisms of operations in the DRC are instructive. Of particular significance is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as a structure of mission execution in the contexts of the DRC. The contextual peculiarities of the DRC mission and the framing of these in the DPKO are lenses for understanding the linkage between theory and practice within the UN system.

Rationalizing the Transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace

In its broader application, the idea of Liberal Peace, holds as its selling point the globalized assumption that, institution building, political democratization and market liberalisation provide a reliable pathway towards enduring and self-Sustaining Peace are.⁶⁷ Yet it faces significant challenges, not from rival opposing ideas, but from within. According to John Ikenberry, in a critique of the Liberal international order, the author noted that the global liberal order was in crisis, not arising from the contestation of its dominance from among its co-contending approaches or even an attempt to overturn it, but arising from its inability to govern itself.⁶⁸ As a guiding principle in an international institution such as the United Nations however, it has been to even more criticism.⁶⁹

The United Nations peacekeeping mission has evolved over the years, into a complex, global undertaking guided mostly by the exigencies of crisis which inspired it, but leashed little by any rigid rules. Its operations continue to be directed more by a largely non-codified set of principles that are mostly shaped by the perception of the field officers—men and women who constitute its force across different theatres of operations launched around the globe since its inception in 1948.⁷⁰ The predominant tendency in academic analyses on the United Nations' peacekeeping missions is to rely on policy frameworks, statements and declarations made in line with globally accepted ideals of global governance, and weighed against preferred deliverables vis-a-vis the performance of the UN's institutional mandates guiding such interventions.⁷¹

Apostles of sovereignty draw attention to the intrusive strategies of Liberal Peace in highlighting its instrumentality in an unequal international political arena. Pol Bargaés argue that Liberal Peace foists an invasive system of top-down order of peace agenda that is advanced through a forced re-interpretation of established practice that guide the conduct of international interventions in countries affected by conflict.⁷² This is unlike Sustaining Peace approach towards peace-building—an approach which advances a longer-term goal, promotes a bottom-up approach, and assigns secondary roles to external practitioners, and recognizes and accepts risks that may arise from its failure.

When viewed against specific operation contexts over time however, deeper patterns may emerge suggesting that there are more complex undercurrents and more contingency underpinnings between declared ideals and realistic deliverables. While the short term objective of the UN mission in the DRC has oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the evaluation of the mission's long term goals have focused on issues of democratization, institutional development and an enabling environment for unhindered trade and economic development see for example.⁷³

As Richard Gowan noted, the United Nations has peacekeeping mission has been confronted with series of paradigmatic crisis in recent years.⁷⁴ These have stemmed majorly from some of the fundamental assumptions which drive its mandates for conflict management through peace missions, particularly about how best to drive a transitions from the state of war to one of peace. Its experience, from engagements in Afghanistan, to elusive peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo, after over two decades, all combine to cast doubt on its efficiency, and the credibility of its core values and principles of engagement. It is important to examine the changing tenor and temperaments of Liberal Peace principle in the operation context of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Changing Mission Mandate and Sustaining Peace

Debates regarding the successes of the UN mission to the DRC, or the arguable lack of it (often captioned as 'elusive peace' is one that must be situated within the frames of proper understanding of the mandate of the mission to the DRC as well as the operation and institutional contexts of the mission. This is important to ensure that expectations and the associated assessment of performance are weighed against the proper frames of institutional mandates, capacities and possibilities. For one thing, domestic government occupies a strategic position in the execution of UN mandates, particularly through its consent validation requirement.

One important angle is to understand the role of the Congolese government in the drive to ensure sustained peace in the country. One of the structures that had been developed to ensure that the UN operation functions in synergy with the aims of the host government was the STAREC program. This program was also and piloted by Kinshasa, because it was a national program with a view to work in the east and that was necessary. But as the year moved by, we realized that if you

really want peace to be sustainable, you need both the community level and the national level. I don't believe, you know, as some people think that if you have the community engagement only, that peace would be sustainable, because the community engagement is critical but it cannot be sustainable if the people in power in Kinshasa are not also associated with the process, and vice versa.

A lot of progress has been made in that regards, and this stabilization which was initially the ISSSS program, grew into ensuring that the community were being engaged, notably, in peace processes. The ongoing FRPI process in Ituri was the work of two years of engagement with the local population, civil society, and community leadership, in search to find champions of the peace process to sustain. There was also the issue of NGO who were mostly unreliable as tools for Sustaining Peace as they focused on inter-community dialogue and had other more important interest in accessing funding after which they often fizzled out with time for lack of funding. So they proved unreliable as tools for Sustaining Peace-building.

The FRPI was designed to assist community engagement including women leaders, council of wise men, those who can talk to the youth. It sought to work with local associations who had the means and skills. It sought to ensure the national governments acknowledgement of what was happening at the local level and to enable it act promptly towards achieving an end to impunity, ensuring that the demobilized were re-integrated into their communities, and to ensure that national policies took the peculiarities of local processes into account for sustainability. The coordinator of the National Implementation, the regional Agreement for Peace Security and Cooperation for the Great Lake region, with a National oversight mechanism which was led by someone who had the president's ears, Regional oversight mechanism also led by emissaries linking the DDR program. For MONUSCO, Sustaining Peace is all about getting all sectors of the society to accept responsibility for peace.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, attempt has been made to examine the issue of harmony between theory and practice by examining the frames used in academic and operational circles in the United Nations peacekeeping missions, using the DRC as reference case. In order to do this, attempts were made to synthesizing the two key frames through which the two constituencies have explored their analysis in literature—the Liberal Peace and the Sustaining Peace Frameworks. With insight from the mission in the Congo, the transition in the orientation of peacekeeping and the understanding of this in scholarly debate were highlighted as well as the notable changes which define and reflect the dynamism of the mission's mandate.

Instructively, the foregoing highlights the significance of synergy link between theoretical frames and operational doctrines which guide practice. Given the effect that conceptual gaps may have in our understanding and communication of the social world, the importance of clarity at this level of theorizing practice cannot be overemphasized. One important observation in the comparative appraisal of the theoretical frames and operational approaches in UN peacekeeping operations is their ad-hoc, context-defined orientations. The need to define strategies to context often hampers the attempt to create a fixture for the otherwise fluid operational experience of peacekeeping into the neatly framed theoretical fences that conform with the ordered and defined tradition of academic theorizing. This is so, in that while operational frames are designed to be goal specific, theoretical frames are designed for epistemic validity, scientific utility and wider analytical relevance.

The different discursive outlook, despite being saddled with complementary commitments, in these two constituencies underpins the missing link between the theory (academia) and the operations (practice) in the adaptation of frameworks in the UN peacekeeping mission. In most cases, the lack of theoretical harmony might obstruct the much-needed synergy between actors at the policy level and evaluators at theory level.⁷⁵ It is in recognition of the above connection that the need for scholars to reconcile theory with practice is emphasized. At the pinnacle of this reconciliation is the imperative not just to analyse and shed light on the complexity of challenges of dispense recommendations on who should bring about peace in contexts such as the DRC, but by working with other stakeholders to design non-theoretical, but practical and operations solutions to conflict prevention and sustaining peace. This meta-theoretical analysis concurs with this call for an integrated outlook between the academic and policy communities as a way to ensure more coordinated, and therefore more impactful effort in the quest for peace and security. The study goes further to opine that, until this is done, practitioners especially in peacekeeping missions and the DRC more specifically will continually think they are doing a sterling job in a complex environment and academic, scholars and other analysts of such orientations would continue to spell doom on UN efforts. As such, wherever one stands, this theory and practice reconciliation needs to be undertaken much sooner than later as the lack of harmony and the imperative to have a common understanding of how to protect civilians and bring about much needed peace is the sacrificial lamb on the altar of this continued meta-theoretical confusion.

Endnotes

- 1 Hitchcock, N. (2004). Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration: the case of Angola. *Conflict Trends* Issue 1; 36–40.
- 2 Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836>;
- Kabua, I. W. (2019). *Peace Initiatives in Conflict Management: The Case of Eastern Democratic Republic Of Congo, 1996–2016*. Nairobi: United States International University-Africa
- 3 Cavalcante, F. (2014), *The Influence of the Liberal Peace Framework on the United Nations Approach to Peace-building in Guinea-Bissau*; *RCCS Annual Review – Open Edition Journals*. Vol. 6 Issue no. 6, Pp. 141–161. <https://doi.org/10.4000/rccsar.564>;
- Karlsrud, J., & Oksamytna, K. (2019). Norms and Practices in UN Peacekeeping: Evolution and Contestation. *International Peacekeeping*, 253–254. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2019.1600637>
- 4 Clark, J. N. (2011). UN peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Reflections on MONUSCO and its contradictory mandate. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 15(3–4), 363–383. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18754111X572728>;
- Neethling, T. (2011). Toward the End of UN Peacekeeping in the DRC. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 23(2), 191–198. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2011.571608>;
- Bayo, O. A. (2012). The factors behind successes and failures of United Nations peacekeeping missions: A case of the democratic republic of Congo. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3(4), 914–32;
- Zeebroek, Z. (2008). *La mission des Nations unies au Congo : Le laboratoire de la paix introuvable*. Bruxelles: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP).
- 5 Eriksen, S. S. L. (2009). The liberal peace is neither: peacebuilding, state building and the reproduction of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 652–666. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303289>;
- Hansen, C. S. (2012). *Building a liberal peace? A critical analysis of South Africa's engagement in the DRC 2003–2008* (Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University).
- Zambakari, C. (2016). Challenges of liberal peace and statebuilding in divided societies. *conflict trends*, 2016(4), 18–25
- 6 Kumaran, I (2024), Failed pro-imperialist coup targets Democratic Republic of Congo; Available in <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2024/05/23/dkrh-m23.pdf> (accessed on 25 May, 2024)
- 7 Büscher, Karen, Stephanie Perazzone, Jeroen Cuvelier, Stephane Lumbu, Espoir Rwakira, Paul Bulambo, Chrispin Mvano Yabauma, and Godefroid Muzalia. "Contested 'commune rurales': Decentralisation and the (violent) struggle for public authority in the Democratic Republic of Congo." *Global Policy* (2024). <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13309>
- 8 Chen, Eugene, and Katharina Coleman. "Reinvigorating UN Peacekeeping." *Reinvigorating the United Nations* (2024). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032707648-10>
- 9 Takwa, SZ, AU-PCRD Head (2010) in conversation with the author (Charles Nyuykonge); Hazikimana, A; 2011 Interview with Author (Charles Nyuykonge)
- 10 Obuobi, Patrick Peprah. "From 'dirty word' to 'critical enabler': the evolution of peacekeeping-intelligence." *Journal of Intelligence History* (2024): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2024.2345949>
- 11 De Coning, C., & Peter, M. (2019). *United Nations peace operations in a changing global order* (p. 334). Springer Nature;
- Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1>;
- Malone, D. M., & Wermester, K. (2000). Boom and bust? The changing nature of UN peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 7(4), 37–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310008413862>
- 12 Tull, D.M., 2018. The limits and unintended consequences of UN peace enforcement: the Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 25(2), pp.167–190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139>;
- Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016>;
- 13 Cammaert, P. C. (2007). *Learning to Use Force on the Hoof in Peacekeeping: Reflections on the Experience of MONUC's Eastern Division*.
- 14 DPO-DFS (2008) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- 15 Peter, M. (2015). Between doctrine and practice: The UN peacekeeping dilemma. *Global Governance*, 21, 351. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02103002>
- 16 Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016>
- 17 Peter, M. (2015). Between doctrine and practice: The UN peacekeeping dilemma. *Global Governance*, 21, 351. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02103002>
- 18 Wistuba, F., & Cusumano, E. (2017). *Preconditions for Success in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Doctoral dissertation, Leiden University).
- 19 Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016>
- 20 Müller, L., 2015. The Force Intervention Brigade—United Nations forces beyond the fine line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 20(3), pp. 359–380. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krv005>
- 21 Tull, D. M. (2018). The limits and unintended consequences of UN peace enforcement: the Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 25(2), 167–190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139>
- 22 Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016>

- 23 Grobman, G. M. (2005). Complexity theory: A new way to look at organizational change. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 350-382. <https://doi.org/10.1177/073491490502900305>
- 24 Burnes, B. (2005). Complexity theories and organizational change. *International Journal of Management Reviews*. Vol 7 No. 2, 73-90. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2370.2005.00107.x>
- 25 Galtung, J. (1986). The green movement: A socio-historical exploration. *International Sociology*, 1(1), 75-90. <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858098600100106>
- 26 Quinn, M., Mason, D., & Gurses, M. (2007). Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence. *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, 167-193. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620701277673>
- 27 Galtung, J. (1986). The green movement: A socio-historical exploration. *International Sociology*, 1(1), 75-90. <https://doi.org/10.1177/026858098600100106>
- 28 Hegre, H., 2004. *The limits of the liberal peace*. Oslo: University of Oslo.
- 29 Boutros-Ghali, B. B.-G. (1995). *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations;
- Nadarajah, S., & Rampton, D. (2017). A long view of liberal and its crisis. *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 23(2), 441-465. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066116649029>
- 30 Richmond, O. P. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the 'Liberal Peace'. *Conflict, Security & Development* 6.3, 291-314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933480>
- 31 *Ibid*
- 32 *ibid*
- 33 *Ibid pg293*
- 34 Richmond, O.P. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the 'Liberal Peace'. <https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843313816.002>
- 35 *ibid*
- 36 *Ibid pg300*
- 37 Richmond, O. P. (2008). Reconstructing the liberal peace. *Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organizations, States, and Non-State Actors*. Barbara Budrich Publishers: Farmington Hills, 49-75. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdf09tx.5>
- 38 *Ibid pg300*
- 39 *Ibid pg300*
- 40 Richmond, O. P. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the 'Liberal Peace'. *Conflict, Security & Development* 6.3, 291-314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933480>
- 41 *ibid*
- 42 Taylor, I. (2007). What Fit for the Liberal Peace in Africa? *Global Society* 21.4, 553-566. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820701562785>
- 43 *Ibid pg562*
- 44 Richmond, O., & Mac Ginty, R. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. *Third world quarterly*, 763-783. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750>
- 45 Eriksen, S. S. L. (2009). The liberal peace is neither: peacebuilding, state building and the reproduction of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 652-666. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303289>
- 46 Mahmoud, Y.; Connolly, L.; Mechoulam, D. (eds.) (2018). *Sustaining Peace in Practice: Building on What Works*. New York: *International Peace Institute*
- 47 Larsdotter, K. (2019). Military strategy and peacekeeping: An unholy alliance? *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42(2), 191-211. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559156>
- 48 Zartman, I. W. (2019). Challenges of Prevention and Resolution in *William Zartman: A Pioneer in Conflict Management and Area Studies*, Springer, Cham. pp. 257-265. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06079-4_14
- 49 Buhmann, K., Jonsson, J., & Fisker, M. (2019). Do no harm and do more good too: Connecting the SDGs with business and human rights and political CSR theory. *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*. <https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-01-2018-0030>
- 50 Berdal, M. (2019). What are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping? In *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order* (pp. 113-132). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_6
- 51 Eriksen, S. S. L. (2009). The liberal peace is neither: peacebuilding, state building and the reproduction of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 652-666. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303289>
- 52 Van der Lijn, J. (2009). If only there were a blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 13(1-2), pp 45-71. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187541109X402981>; Howard, L. (2019). Peacekeeping is not counterinsurgency. *International Peacekeeping*, 26(5), pp 545-548. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2019.1677288>; and Bayo, O. A. (2012) The factors behind successes and failures of United Nations peacekeeping missions: A case of the democratic republic of Congo. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3(4), 914-932.
- 53 Van der Lijn, J., 2009. If only there were a blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 13(1-2), pp.45-71. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187541109X402981>;
- Howard, L. M. (2008). *UN peacekeeping in civil wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511840593>;
- Ayodeji, O. (2012). The Factors behind successes and failures of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions: A case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* Vol 3, 914-932.
- 54 Chandler, D. (2010), The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'." *Review of international studies* 36, no. S1 137-155. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000823>
- 55 Campbell, S., Chandler, D. and Sabaratnam, M. eds., 2011. *A liberal peace? the problems and practices of peacebuilding*. Bloomsbury Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350218017>
- 56 Hagg, G., & Kagwanja, P. (2007). Identity and peace: reconfiguring conflict resolution in Africa. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7(2), 9-35. <https://doi.org/10.4314/ajcr.v7i2.39409>
- 57 *Ibid pg23*

- 58 Tull, D.M. & Mehler, A. 2005. The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa. *African Affairs* 104 (416), 75–98. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adi034>
- 59 *Ibid* pg375
- 60 Mahmoud, Y.; Connolly, L.; Mechoulam, D. (eds.) (2018). *Sustaining Peace in Practice: Building on What Works*. New York: International Peace Institute
- 61 Huddleston, S. (2018), *Liberal Peace-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of MONUSCO's Security Sector Reform Strategy*. Thesis Seminar: International Institutions and Security Governance, July 9. Available at: <https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2662910/view>
- 62 Akwei, A. (2017, Aug 31). Is the Democratic Republic of the Congo deteriorating into a failed state? *Medium by Amnesty International USA*.
- 63 Center for Preventive Action (2022). *Instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Global Conflict Tracker. 14 May. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo> Accessed on 19 June 2022
- 64 Murithi, T. (2016). 11 The Eastern DRC Conflict and the UN-Mandated Force Intervention Brigade: Insights for Africa's Framework for Responding to Crisis. *African Conflicts and Regional Interventions*, 155.
- 65 Williams, P. D. (2019). The Security Council's peacekeeping trilemma. *International Affairs*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz199>
- 66 Cavalcante, F. (2014), *The Influence of the Liberal Peace Framework on the United Nations Approach to Peace-building in Guinea-Bissau*; *RCCS Annual Review – Open Edition Journals*. Vol. 6 Issue no. 6, Pp. 141–161. <https://doi.org/10.4000/rccsar.564>
- 67 Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836>;
- Richmond, O. P. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the 'Liberal Peace'. *Conflict, Security & Development* 6.3, 291–314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933480>
- 68 Ikenberry, G. J. (2010). The liberal international order and its discontents. *Millennium*, 38(3), 509–521. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810366477>
- 69 Zambakari, C. (2016). Challenges of liberal peace and statebuilding in divided societies. *conflict trends*, 2016(4), 18–25; Eriksen, S. S. L. (2009). The liberal peace is neither: peacebuilding, state building and the reproduction of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 652–666. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303289>;
- Tadjbakhsh, S. (Ed.). (2011). *Rethinking the liberal peace: external models and local alternatives*. Taylor & Francis. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203819050>;
- Chandler, D. (2011). Relational sensibilities: The end of the road for 'Liberal Peace'. *Relational Sensibility and the 'Turn to the Local': Prospects for the Future of Peacebuilding*, 1
- 70 DPO-DFS (2008) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- 71 Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976016>;
- Tull, D.M (2009) *Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War*. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2): 215–230. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685729>
- 72 Bargués, P. (2020). LA ONU Y LA IDEA DE «SOSTENER LA PAZ» EN UN MUNDO MULTIPOLAR. *Revista Española de Derecho Internacional*, 72(2), 341–349. <https://doi.org/10.17103/redi.72.2.2020.2c.03>
- 73 Herbst, J., & Greg, M. (2018, April 26). Why Kinshasa is unable to stop the downward spiral in the Congo crisis. Retrieved from *The Business Day*: <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-04-26-why-kinshasa-is-unable-to-stop-the-downward-spiral-in-the-congo-crisis/>;
- Duursma, A., & Gledhill, J. (2019). Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 25(4), 1157–1185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119830773>
- 74 Gowan, R., 2008. The strategic context: Peacekeeping in crisis, 2006–08. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4), pp.453–469. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802239618>
- 75 Weick, K. E. (2003). Theory and practice in the real world. In *The Oxford handbook of organization theory*. in Christian Knudsen and Haridimos Tsoukas (Eds). <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199275250.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199275250>” *The Oxford Handbook of Organization Theory* OI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199275250.003.0017.