Power-sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation in Zanzibar, Tanzania

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Abstract

Zanzibar has a lengthy and turbulent political history. One of the main causes of such negative politics has been the cosmopolitan nature of the isles, which has resulted in the long-term presence of numerous races and identities. This circumstance culminated in years of tumultuous politics marked by bloodshed, murder, and enmity. In 2010, Zanzibar began negotiations to resolve a long-standing political issue that has plagued the Island. The Government of National Unity (GNU), which incorporates a power-sharing arrangement between the first and second winners, was agreed upon as the form of Zanzibar's leadership. This process was accomplished by constitutional amendment and referendum. This paper examined the extent to which power-sharing has altered Zanzibar's identity-based politics. The study was informed by both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. The study reveals that power-sharing in Zanzibar has been partially successful in eliminating identity politics. Three explanations have justified this success. First is the significant existence and growth of political trust among the societies of Zanzibar. Second, all identity groups, races, and regions were treated equally by government institutions and society. The final one is that political activities were conducted independently of historical and identity-based political narratives. The conclusion of the study is that power-sharing can be the catalyst for identity change from its worst uses to social recognition. Only if the power-sharing institution is designed to consider the possibility of reciprocal self-recognition and respect for social, cultural, and ideological diversity in society can this occur.

Keywords: Identity transformation, Identity, Identity-politics, Power-sharing, Rational politics, Socio-political transformation

Background of the study

Zanzibar has had a long unstable political history from its colonial era to the radicalized politics of post-colonialism. Rather state, identity politics has dominated Zanzibar and coincided with the political exercises on the Island (Matheson, 2012). The identity imagination has revolved around political competition and socio-economic life (Killian, 2008; Said & Hikmany, 2016). The bone of the identity-based life in Zanzibar originated from the Isles' cosmopolitan nature, which involves several races such as African, Arabs, Asian, Comorians, and Indians (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022; Ingrams, 1967; Sheriff, 2001). This nature generated the diversity of the ownership of the Island and created the nationalist contender groups during the National independence struggle and later in the 1964 Revolution. The fundamental question is which cosmopolitan group has property rights in the country and who should rule.

This identity politics tragedy was not solved by the 1963 independence, 1964 revolution, and 1992 multi-party system, and subsequently accelerated (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022). Some scholars argued that the 1992 multi-party system was the shift of previous pre-independence and post-revolution (Brown, 2010; Nassor & Jose, 2014b). For instance, the then main rival political parties of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF) have been nominated as originating from pre-independent racial and identity divides. The proponents of this argument denote that CCM and CUF are the replicas of the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and Zanzibar and Pemba People Party (ZPPP) block respectively, representing a purely racial and identity manifestation (Killian, 2008; Mukangara,

2000). Such manifestation made the election contestation in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 based on identity. As a result, Pemba Island was suffocating the social and political exclusion due to their political support of the opposition party.

In 2010, the power-sharing Government began to exercise its work after the citizen referendum and changing the constitution. Deriving from those politics of races and region, it was, the then President of Zanzibar-Amani Karume of CCM agreed with the Late Seif Sharif Hamad, The Secretary-general of CUF, and decided to make a political reconciliation through the sharing Government to end the political crises that have marred the Island for a long time (Nassor & Jose, 2010). The power-sharing Government had survived for only five years before its collapse in 2015. During this collapse period, the power-sharing as a leadership style of Zanzibar existed in the constitution even though its implementation was stuck. The power-sharing came back again in 2020 after the elections that resulted in killings and injuries.

Such a power-sharing movement has attracted academic inquiry where scholars argued on the ability of power-sharing to solve electoral problems and enhance democracy. For instance, Nassor & Jose (2010) argued on power-sharing and its ability to enhance democracy in Zanzibar. Minde, Roop, & Tronvoll (2018) and John (2020) talk about the elections under power-sharing. They denote that despite the efforts, the Island continue witnessed electoral violence and mistrust in the region of Unguja and Pemba (John, 2020; Minde et al., 2018; Said & Hikmany, 2016). Consequently, this phenomenon hinders the effort to solve the Island's political problem. The existence of power-sharing still, the electoral problem is not well accommodated. Besides all the above scholars' arguments, the adoption of power-sharing was also expected to transform the identity-politics dynamics and adjust the society's political behaviour and activities to rational politics (Gergen, 1997; Jega, 2000). However, there has been a concern from academicians that power-sharing was not set to solve identity politics. Instead, it is a positional acquisition (Hamad, 2017; Minde et al., 2018; Mmanga, 2015; Nassor & Jose, 2010). Yet, it is not clearly known the extent that power-sharing transforms identity-based politics in Zanzibar. Therefore, this paper examines the extent to which power-sharing has altered Zanzibar's identity-based politics.

The study examines the extent to which power-sharing transforms identity politics in Zanzibar as the main source of the political problem. It needs to learn about citizens' political life after the power-sharing adoption. Therefore, the descriptive design incorporating a mix of the qualitative and quantitative methods of data was useful for getting the data. The design provides a picture of the character and natural setting of the studied phenomenon, such as identity politics and power-sharing (Creswell, 2014). The survey tool was used to get the citizens' views and perceptions on how power-sharing changes identity politics in Zanzibar. The key informant interviews help to get an in-depth explanation of the identity politics situation in Zanzibar. The study covered three districts to represent Zanzibar. These districts are Mjini, Micheweni, and Kusini. Micheweni, known to be strong in political competition identity politics, plays a significant role in political exercises. Micheweni represents a Pemba identity, and Kusini presents an Unguja identity. Mjini district consists of a mixed identity of all races and identity and made to have mixed political characters and affiliations. The three districts are conducive for the study that needs to examine the extent that power-sharing transforms identity politics in Zanzibar.

The study uses 287 respondents for survey data. This cast (73%) respondents out of 393 eligible for the study. The percentage is enough to undergo this study (Bullock & Rader, 2021; John, 2020; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). The study also consists of five key informants from Members of the House of Representatives, Power-sharing initiators and elites, citizens and political activists. The quantitative data were analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), and qualitative

data were analyzed using thematic analysis. The ethical matters that were highly considered included getting permission from the authorities and respondents.

The Politics of Identity: An overview

The concept of identity has been used for a long time by Sociologists and Psychologists, especially in Structuralists' works of literature, including the work of Henri Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel & Turner (1979). Currently, post-modernist schools and political scientists use the concept to define an individual's social and political phenomenon concerning their society. In many use, identity in a socio-political context means "the sense of personality in the group" where its existence affects their political behaviour (Béland, 2017). The tie between an individual and their group becomes higher at the level of social and psychological roles. For instance, the individual commits themselves to obligation, trust, love, and collaboration among the group members and excludes those outside the group. In common uses, identity serves as a principle that guides political action, and they add dynamism to political exercises. In plural societies, identity marks a distinction tool for exclusion and inclusion in society (Gamble, 1994).

Identity is not a new problem in the globe; it switches from one angle to another and adjusts its style and vitality in different shapes. In current societies, identity is a tool the elite uses to acquire a political position. For instance, in African societies, political leaders build their political bases and influence political decisions through their identity of race, ethnicity, religion, or region(Alumona & Azom, 2018). It involves the organization of identity attitudes to create mass support for the ruling classes, opposition, and elites in the power polarization acquisition process. Such a situation accelerates the political competition exercised based on identity. Political activities like elections, referendums, public participation, and even crises will be based on the group identity. As a result, civil, ethnic, and tribal violence occurred, making it not easily solved.

The continuation of identity problems emerged in the societies and made the scholars think and re-think the nature, character, and ways of solving the problem. The issue here is not abandoning the identity but transforming the identity into a national identity. Such transformation is not an easy task. It needs social transformation in many economic, social, and political phenomena (Huddy, 2013). This means that the exercises of politics in society should not mainly depend on the identity of individual or group but should be on rational judgment.

Socio-political transformation in societies with identity-based politics has become a central area of conflict research in recent times. Researchers have been working to find ways of changing the role of identity in politics and adjusting political crises to political harmony (Oyero, Oyeyemi, Usaini, & Omole, 2017). Different approaches and mechanisms have been identified and used, including enhancement of national identity, succession, new State formation, and power-sharing between the identity groups (Alumona & Azom, 2018; Lijphart, 1968, 1977). Identity has been the source of the political base in many societies where political elites organized and mobilized the political parties through the identity of ethnicity, religion, race, and language. Thus, the existing political activities become much of an identity base, where one identity-based party competes with another (Olayode, 2016). Such competition generates internal enmity and hostility, producing political violence and civil wars (Alumona & Azom, 2018). Deriving from that base, the socio-political transformation of that society seems to be much more difficult and needs continuous intervention. Despite many ambiguous and contradictions of socio-political theorists and practitioners concerning identity politics, the concept still defines the community's political behaviour and social relationship. Different empirical studies have been conducted, and the results show that socio-political practices like democracy, justice, freedom, instability, violence, wars, and succession are mainly affected by identity politics (Alumona & Azom, 2018; Béland, 2017; Gergen, 1997; Moss & Tronvoll, 2015;

Oyero et al., 2017; Yunespour, 2011). According to Huddy (2013), identity politics is the identification attributed to politically relevant groups. This group includes political groups, ethnic groups, and pressure groups. Identity politics is also associated with liberal perspectives, which deal with the freedom to demand greater economic, social, and political rights in the political system (Nwanegbo, Odigbo, & Ochanja, 2014).

The concept of identity politics can be studied from different angles and bases. Firstly, from the nature of identity, secondly, causes of political identity, and lastly, recognition or matter in society (Yunespour, 2011). Starting with the nature of the identity, the individual or group can associate with the group and perceive it as subjective. This implies that the group creates an image of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. It is socially constructed, and only the group member understands their group's reality. For instance, a group can distinguish itself from an outsider because of the constructed character of the group. The Maasai tribe in Tanzania can say that the Sukuma tribe is an outside identity group because of characteristics that the Maasai created to exclude others. The objectivity of identity means the group differs from another group due to the perception of an individual or a group's self-image, values, traditions, and sense of belonging to a group (Moya, 2006).

Objective identities are the perception of a group from others' perspectives and often contradict one's self-perception(Bilgrami, 2006). For instance, in Zanzibar as a case study, the Unguja natives perceive Pemba natives as opposing the Revolution of 1964 and regard that they have no right to enjoy the Revolution's fruit. Within this filling, diversity occurs and grows in political parties and community matters, including participation in development projects. This social exclusion creates the identity which describes the social and political reality and life within the society.

The second explanation is the source of identity. Yunespour (2011) stipulates two main sources: material base and nonmaterial. The assumption of material base as the source of identity politics started from the Marxist approach of dialectical materialism. According to the proponent of this base, the core of such a structural problem is the economic relations that advantage the capital class, or more accurately, those who own the means of production, and simultaneously alienate workers and other marginalized groups in a society. Based on such social relations between haves and have-nots, economic power is assumed to be more important than other forms of power which dominate social and political relations. In other words, "economic disparity is the cause of social exploitation and oppression" (Bernstein, 2005a, p. 49). On the side of nonmaterial as a source of identity politics, the culture, social values, traditions, belief systems, language, and technology as sources of identity politics in society. The humanist perspective rejects the idea that economic power is more central in social interactions and argues that social differences such as differences in belief systems can also cause or at least exacerbate identity-based political actions (Bernstein, 2005b). This perspective holds a strong base for understanding identity politics in most of Africa and the developing world because people categorize themselves in terms of social inclusion rather than material needs. In Zanzibar, like other African societies, Pemba Island faces exclusion from socio-political benefits for many years after Independence. This situation stimulates the sense of political organizations to fight for such benefits from the central Government. As a result, the growth of opposition in Pemba becomes so high that regional competition becomes a norm during the elections. This situation accelerates the growth of division between Unguja and Pemba Island within one country of Zanzibar.

The third pick point is the recognition of identity politics in society. Does identity politics matter in society? This question gives us another room to understand identity politics. The way identity politics matters in society depict community relations in society. Brunt (1989) reveals that identity politics matter because it allows members of a society to acknowledge and recognize various social groups. It is a tool for social recognition and respecting social differences (Young, 2011). All scholars'

arguments can be summed up that identity politics can play an inclusion apparatus in society or the exclusion and differences tools.

Again, theorists are divided into two groups concerning recognizing identity politics in a certain community. Some defend it as the politics of recognition (Brunt, 1989) and the politics of differences (Young, 1990) with the potential for mutual recognition of self and others and for respecting social, cultural and ideological differences (Fleming, 2014)who belongs to the third generation of critical theorists associated with the Frankfurt School. The paper examines Honneth's reframing of critical theory based on his theory of recognition. This new connection between an individual pursuit of recognition and motivation of social movements for emancipation offers an opportunity to re-affirm the already existing conviction of transformation theory that learning is based on mutuality. In addition, the often remarked disconnect between individual learning and social learning is re-worked to assert that not only is the personal political but the political is personal. Empirical findings of an EU study of non-traditional learners in higher education support the rethinking of transformative learning as a pursuit of recognition. Introduction The theory of transformative learning has always viewed learning as having individual and social dimensions (Cranton & Taylor, 2012, p. 5. This perspective is mainly brought by Constructive theorists who believe that political identity is created from social identity and used by a few elites for their political interests.

In the same vein, Tambiah (1996) denotes that the group identity is largely constructed and deployed to advance the interests and claims of the collectivity banded and mobilized as a pressure group. For this purpose, identity politics is reconstructed and reinvented to serve as an instrument of mobilization. Identity politics is characterized by a backwards-looking claim of power based on ethnic labels, which can be contrasted with a 'politics of ideas' centred on a forward-looking idea of society (Bilgrami, 2006).

Indeed, identity politics play two sides; it can be the source of the direction of the movement in the direction of civic equality, equal opportunity, and democracy (Guttman, 2009). It is also played as the source of division and exclusion. In many developed nations, identity politics has become a source of justice and development competition. However, in the African continent, many crises that, in one way or another, hinder the development of the continent are due to identity politics. As it is known, in a large part of Africa, people categorize them in terms of the identity they belong to. Alumona and Azom (2017) noted that in most parts of Africa, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Liberia, and Somalia, people have been caught up in and excluded by the powerful currents of identity politics.

Identity politics in Africa for so long have controlled individual and group relations, participation, and cooperation in the community. And its failure led to atrocity situations such as apartheid in South Africa, the genocide of Ruanda, civil war in Nigeria, Liberia, and Somalia, and frequent ethnic violence in Kenya. In another vein, the fallout of identity politics in Africa has also been responsible for several secessionist attempts; Belgian Congo in 1960, Uganda in 1966, Nigeria in 1967, Djibouti in 1991, and Senegal in 1991(Alumona & Azom, 2018).

Identity Formation and Political Identity in Zanzibar

Zanzibar, a part of the United Republic of Tanzania, consists of two major islands (Unguja and Pemba) located about thirty nautical miles from the coast of Tanzania's Mainland. Unguja Island resides 68.8 per cent of Zanzibar total population of 1,303,569 while Pemba resides 31.2 percent (National Bureau of Statistic & Office of Chief Government Statistics of Zanzibar, 2013). Unguja is Zanzibar's Commercial and Capital city, where administrative centers and business activities largely take place. The identity genesis of Zanzibar can be traced back to the 1830s when Zanzibar becomes a segment of the Oman Empire. During that time, the Sayyid Said bin Sultan, the Empire of Sultan, shifted his

emperor from Muscat to Zanzibar, who established kingship rule and controlled the economic and social activities, including the plantation of cloves using slave manpower (Brown, 2016)

Subsequently, the kingship rule of Sayyid bin Sultan generates a social and political divide among the residents of Zanzibar. The residents were socially categorized into Arabs, Indians, Native Africans, and Slaves who in one way or another were connected to the state-building effort of Kingship (McMahon, 2012). Such a social category accelerated the economic and political phenomena where the Arabs were created to be Landowners, Indians to be trade owners, and natives Zanzibarians and slaves were set to be workers. The social division continues during the British Protectorate era in Zanzibar from 1890 to 1963. The British rule consolidated the racial and class status in the society by enhancing the divide-and-rule means of production throughout. In all circumstances, the native Africans benefited the least from the production from their motherland despite being large in population (Bakari, 2001). At that time the Arabs were approximately 15.9 percent, Asians 5.8 percent, and Zanzibar Natives were 56 percent, according to the 1948 census.

This diversity and identity glorification did not end in social and economic life, but also accelerated political life. The identity-based affiliations were created to safeguard the groups' interests in society. In the 1930s, they formed the Africa Association to represent the African and Zanzibar natives' interests. The same applies to Indian National Association and Arab association to safeguard the merchants' and land-owned classes, respectively. These geneses accelerated the formation of political parties which struggled for Independence in the 1950s'. The Afro-Shirazi Party- ASP originated from African and Shirazi natives, mainly from Unguja, while ZPPP and ZNP originated from Arab genesis, mainly from Pemba Island. This cosmopolitan nature leaves the central question of which identity has a right on the Island and who should rule.

The identity politics tragedy was not solved by the 1963 independence, 1964 revolution, and 1992 multi-party system, and subsequently accelerated (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022). Some scholars go further and argued that the 1992 multi-party system was the shift of previous pre-independence and post-revolution. For instance, the main rival political parties of Chama Cha Mapinduzi-CCM and Civic United Front- CUF has been nominated as originating from pre-independent racial and identity divides. The proponents of this argument denote that CCM and CUF are replicas of the ASP and ZPPP-ZNP block, respectively, representing a purely racial and identity manifestation (Matheson, 2012; Mukangara, 2000). They further stipulate that, such identity based politics will not distance from all political exercises in Zanzibar.

The power-sharing of Zanzibar was initiated and geared by the political elite of two contested political parties by that time (CCM and CUF). As such, in 1999, the first reconciliation accord *Muafaka[1]* took place under the leadership of Common-Wealth Nation. This reconciliation accord enabled the Isles to conduct free and fair elections in October 2000. Unfortunately, the agreement was not implemented, and consequently, there were violent incidents in January 2001. Zanzibar experienced a catastrophe of killings, injuries, and displacement (Minde, 2014). The Catastrophe of January 2001 left the social unrest in Zanzibar and fueled the adoption of a power-sharing agreement as the only solution to a political problem. The second reconciliation was signed in October 2001, but this involved local and home initiatives, unlike the first one. The reconciliation also failed due to a lack of political willingness, mistrust, and ideologies (Nassor & Jose, 2010). Nonetheless, the third reconciliation accord, which establishes the Zanzibar Government of National Unity (GNU), was signed in 2010 by homegrown initiatives.

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1   Muafaka is a Swahili term "referring to a 'gentlemen' agreement, i.e., an agreement without specific agreement terms or a formal pact signed by the parties to the dispute" (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022).

The idea of the establishment of a power-sharing government in Zanzibar was the reflection of the long-standing political crises in Zanzibar. Any solution to political problems in Zanzibar will pass one among the two perspectives of sources. The first source is radicalizing nature of politics established since the colonial era (Lofchie, 1965; Mukangara, 2000). Under this perspective, the political crises are structurally predetermined and can be solved through generation time. The short-term effort can be done only to keep society safe and stable. It can be said that all solution is temporary but time is the healer of the problem. The second source is the current socio-political dynamics which are based on social classes and exclusion (Bakari, 2001; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001). The second perspective relies on the current situation of political exclusion after the 1964 revolution. The union government can be the solution to the problem hence the excluded group will be recognized. All two scholars' perspectives on the political genesis of Zanzibar justified having a power-sharing of Zanzibar. Whether playing as a temporary solution to solve the problem in order to heal the structural problem or solving the social class and exclusion in Zanzibar, the power-sharing must aim at solving the identity politics created due to the cosmopolitan nature of Zanzibar and the current social dynamics.

Since 2010, power-sharing operates in Zanzibar with the high expectation that the pro-long political problem will be solved. Such expectation was due to the nature of the power-sharing agreement which consist referendum and constitutional amendment. The 2010 general election was conducted peacefully in such some of the political elites and citizens were satisfied that the problem is solved. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was established to include two giant parties of CCM and CUF. The cooperation of elites in the cabinets and citizens in the society made Zanzibar inter in the good records of internal political mediation success. However, as the GNU continues to pass one term of the general election from 2010 to 2015, the claims start from both ruling and opposition parties. Each party claimed cheating and misconduct to implement the power-sharing. As a result, the GNU collapsed in 2015 after the CUF reject to re-inter in the general election of 2016. The GNU back again in 2020 with violence and some sort of election fraud claiming. The rejection of opposition in 2015 made the contradiction the legitimacy of the Government. Some scholars argued that it was illegitimate because the constitution reveals that the structure of the Government of Zanzibar is GNU (RGoZ, 2010). However, some of them argue that it is legitimate hence the constitution gives power for the GNU to continue when the opposition posts are blank due to the absence (RGoZ, 2010).

The ups and downs and the mismatches of the power-sharing in Zanzibar have attracted an academic inquiry with a contiguous debate. Some of them seem it is institutional weaknesses such as the Electoral process, representatives cabinets, and other political institutions of the GNU (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012; Hamad, 2017; Minde et al., 2018; Nassor & Jose, 2014a; Roop, Tronvoll, & Minde, 2018). Some scholars seem that it is elites' weakness in their leadership. Many scholars have discussed identity politics as a challenge to political reconciliation include (Abdulhalim, 2020; John, 2020; Said & Hikmany, 2016; Sheriff, 2001; Throup, 2016). So far, little is known about the extent to which identity politics is transformed in Zanzibar. This paper, therefore, examines how power-sharing transforms identity-based politics into rational politics in Zanzibar.

Power-sharing and Identity-Politics Transformation: Findings

The result shows that power-sharing, to some extent, tries to create a justice society with equal resource distribution and enhances the natural mixture of the identity groups which cross-cutting the society. The results continue show that the past political narratives, which are the strong base of identity politics, seem to be neutralized in the current situation.

Equal social and economic benefits among the identity groups

According to Killian (1998), one Island of Zanzibar (Pemba) was highly excluded from federal benefits due to its political position. The isolation was noticed in economic benefits, including employment and social services availability (Bakari &Makulilo, 2022). The result from this study shows little changes in the economic benefits to the Island. The respondents from three districts show that in Pemba, still, citizens seem not to benefit much from power-sharing compared to what Mjini and Kusini witnessed. In Micheweni, the data shows that only 33.4 per cent of the respondents seem to think that power-sharing increases economic benefits to them, while in Mjini, 55.9 per cent and in Kusini, 57.4 per cent. This data indicates that still, citizens in Pemba seem to be excluded from economic benefits in relation to Pemba Island.

Table 1: Power-sharing increases citizens' economic among the social groups

Power-sharing increases citizens' economic development among the social groups	District of Residence			Total
	Mjini	Micheweni	Kusini	
Strong Dis-Agreed	21	23	12	56
	17.9%	21.3%	19.7%	19.6%
Dis Agreed	4	20	4	28
	3.4%	18.5%	6.6%	9.8%
Un Decided	27	28	10	65
	23.1%	25.9%	16.4%	22.7%
Agreed	28	22	17	67
	23.9%	20.4%	27.9%	23.4%
Strong Agreed	37	14	18	69
	31.6%	13.0%	29.5%	24.1%
Total	117	108	61	286
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Researchers' field data (2021)

Despite the statistical observation above, economic exclusion in Pemba seems to be better than before power-sharing. The interview with Pemba Adult residents testifies to this argument.

> "…Even though the level of provision of development projects in Pemba Island is not as of Unguja due to the exclusion for a long time, the GNU open the quick economic recovery to the Island. Before the 2010 reconciliation, the political leaders seemed to think Pemba did not deserve the development due to their political affiliation. Still, after power-sharing, the construction of roads, ports and many investments in social services increased…."(R 23, 29/11/2021).

The above respondent's comments indicate at least some consideration of Pemba's economic and social benefits after the power-sharing agreement in Pemba. Because economic exclusion was taken as a tool for the political elites to get political mass in Pemba, the continuation of economic benefits distribution by the power-sharing Government reduces the feeling of exclusion. As a result, the economic benefits seem to be the major political decision. The witnesses from Pemba residents testify to this argument;

"… These days, the residents of Pemba seem to be political opportunists rather than having strong political affiliations as before. People start thinking about taking opportunities from any angle without considering their parties. If our political elites are Ministers and top leaders in the GNU, why not take the opportunity? Pemba youth are now leaving aside their political affiliation and taking the opportunity in the Government and economic projects from any source. Unlike in the previous years, the Pemba residents were ready even to live in poverty but did not take the Government-related projects and post…." (R 23, 29/11/2021).

The comments from the interviewees above indicate that through power-sharing, Pemba Island seems to benefit economically and politically. The increasing economic recovery in Pemba made the natives of Pemba take the economic opportunities apart from their political affiliation stand. This made the neutralization of the source of identity politics, which is political and socio-economic exclusion. As a result, political activities are practised through economic benefits instead of identity and region. As the power-sharing Government continues in Zanzibar, there is a possibility of accommodating identity in political activities.

Trust and cooperation among the identity groups

The core problem of Zanzibar was the mistrust between the two regions' identities and political affiliations (Unguja and Pemba). This situation made cooperation and trust in society low; as a result, political activities such as elections are conducted on an identity base. This study member were asked how they trust their opponents with different identities and affiliations, the respondents' data shows that 48.4 per cent agreed that there is an increase in trust and cooperation among the partisans, while 36.6 Percent disagreed. Again, 44.3 per cent of elites agreed that there is trust and cooperation among themselves, and 35.2 per cent disagreed.

Table 2: Political trust and cooperation among the identity groups

Political trust and cooperation among the identity groups	District of Resident			Total
	Mjini	Micheweni	Kusini	
Strong Dis-Agreed	16	7	8	31
	13.7%	6.5%	12.9%	10.8%
Dis Agreed	26	38	10	74
	22.2%	35.2%	16.1%	25.8%
Undecided	20	12	9	41
	17.1%	11.1%	14.5%	14.3%
Agreed	38	33	24	95
	32.5%	30.6%	38.7%	33.1%
Strong Agreed	17	16	1.1	44
	14.5%	14.8%	17.7%	15.3%
Total	117	108	62	287
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Researchers' field data (2021)

The statistical data above indicates increased trust and cooperation among the partisans and elites after power-sharing. Such trust led to the neutralization of identity-based politics; hence the citizens can cross-cut the society to seek opportunity. The narration from the top GNU political leader justifies the statistical data as he narrates;

"…Things have changed a lot; the political and social narrations of 1995 are not the same as those of 2010. Today 2020, there is total interaction between Unguja and Pemba. In the Zanzibar community now a day, there is no single family that cannot be mixed with either Pemba or Unguja. The mixture is now more than saturated. The GNU made people believe they can cooperate and work together as their cabinet leaders in the cabinets…."R 1, 26/10/2021).

The narration above from the GNU's top leader indicates a cross-cutting of identity brought by trust among the citizens. The power-sharing and reconciliation brought trust. The study found an increase in intermarriage and political activities cross-cut the different identities and genesis. These changes happened due to the opportunity that citizens were observed by their elites. The citizens noticed that the elites from different political parties and identities worked together. The citizens focus on the opportunity without considering the party or identity affiliation. This situation challenges the existence of pure identity politics even though the bases exist. The social interaction between the two identities based on political parties and the opportunity from both parties made the cross-cutting of the party segment. This goes contrary to the many African political parties where in most cases, the identity represents the party affiliations (Cheeseman, 2011; Longman, 2013; Olayode, 2016).

Historic political narrations at present

The current socio-political life in Zanzibar has been exercised through historical narration, which divided society according to those narratives. The pre-independence racial politics and after Independence's identity-based politics decided the society's life on the Island. The results of historic politics are election violence, social unrest, social and political exclusion, and inclusion (Bakari & Makulilo, 2022; Killian, 2008; Mukangara, 2000; Nassor & Jose, 2010; Sheriff, 2001). This study found that past politics still defines the current politics in Zanzibar but at a low level. The politics after the power-sharing of 2010 seems to be much of an opportunity rather than the clear cut of past identity. Currently, elites seem to be shifted from one party to another and region to region. Such shifting reduces identity-based politics as it was justified by one of the members of the political elite.

To be true, Uunguja and Upemba races exist, and that narrative excludes people, but it is very low due to societal change. In politics, Pemba is still the genesis of opposition, but now a day, people are not bothered with party history and genesis rather than benefits. Even that opposition in Pemba, if you guarantee the benefits in the ruling party will go. Power-sharing made citizens ignore their party and look on the opportunity as their leaders have…." (R24, 30/11/2022).

Citizens of Micheweni also testified to this as they said,

"….Pemba is indeed strong in opposition, but currently, the people of Pemba can be CCM if they get a political or Government post. In previous years our elders rejected the offer of collaborating with CCM, but our youth now said that in GNU, all-party governs, so any party is ok…."(R 23, 29/11/2021).

The above narrations from respondents indicate that, to some extent, the political phenomenon has changed in Zanzibar, even though the base of the political parties remains the same. For example, the founder of the CUF, the Late Seif Sharif Hamad, was shifting from the CUF party to ACT Wazalendo in 2019, but his follower base remains at Pemba. The remaining party, CUF, also its base, remained at Pemba. This situation indicates that the base of opposition remains in Pemba

and the ruling party in Unguja despite the freeness of shifting in different parties by their follower, unlike the previous years. Again, the power-sharing reduced the politics of exclusion of citizens on the regional background. Specifically, the incumbent GNU of Hon. President Hussein Ali Mwinyi. His leadership seems to bury the past narratives of exclusion and inclusion based on identity. A member of the House of Representatives says,

> "At least Dr Hussein tries to balance the power and treat the GNU members equally. He appointed some government staff from ACT Wazalendo. Even though his party claims on that issue, my advice are the whole government office should be shared according to the constituent's cast....." (R04, 26/10/2022)

Another member of the House of Representatives testifies to this;

> "....The GNU is good with ACT and the group of CCM under President Mwinyi (The incumbent president). The President Mwinyi of harmonized peace and unity and included all the excluded groups in the government institution. He leaves aside the past narrations...." (PR10, 26/10/2022).

The respondents' comments above indicate that power-sharing reduces political practices based on political history. However, the continuation of those successes depends largely on the willingness of the top elites, as many scholars argue that power-sharing success largely depends on elites' trust and willingness to make the continuation of the power-sharing (Chigora & Guzura, 2011; Mukuhlani, 2014)as a united front between the major political parties enabled the forging of an agreement that laid the foundation for a government of national unity. The unity government has brought hope not only to Zimbabweans but also to the international community for many view it as a purveyor of better moves for the country and its overall standing in the region and beyond. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an overview of the politics of governments of national unity in Zimbabwe from the first post-colonial Government of National Unity (GNU. As a part, the leader can be the source of the power-sharing discontinue and operate under history as what happened in Zimbabwe GNU under the Mugabe regime.

Conclusion

The study was set to examine the extent to which power-sharing transforms identity-based politics into rational politics in Zanzibar. The study looks at how the current political activities are undertaken with or without the influence of identity politics. The study discloses that power-sharing in Zanzibar has been successful to a certain degree in eliminating identity politics. The power-sharing has successfully helped the significant growth of political trust among the societies of Zanzibar. The cooperation and inter-relation between the two sides have increased throughout time. Such a relation creates a free-identity generation which is a fertilizer for the death of the identity politics problem in Zanzibar.

Again, through power-sharing, the equal treatment of all identity groups, races, and regions increases in government institutions. As a result, political activities are conducted independently of historical and identity-based political narratives. As a result, the struggle for resource distribution through political conduct becomes less powerful on the Island. This situation automatically reduces the severity of conducting political activities on an identity base. This situation increased the recovery of the Pemba region in terms of economic and social well-being.

This study recommends restructuring the political institutions in power-sharing to allow the recognition of identities and affiliations. This could be possible if the power-sharing deepens to

a society whereby all citizens are treated and benefited equally. The current structure continues making the power-sharing a single-sided project where the benefits and decisions are centralized to the ruling party. This situation made the citizens, especially Pemba natives, seems excluded in the power-sharing as their representatives' leaders (opposition) were powerless in the GNU. Only if the power-sharing institution is designed to consider the possibility of one society's recognition and ideological diversity can this occur.

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Appendix

List of Respondents in the interview

S.N.	Respondents	Code
	GNU Leader from Opposition party	R1
	Member of House of Representatives Zanzibar	R4
	A top officer from the First Vice President	R10
	Citizen Micheweni	R23
	Citizen Micheweni	R24
	Former GNU leader Ruling party	R11