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The Thinker

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In This Issue

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

Prof Ronit Frenkel

The University of Johannesburg acquired The Thinker in April 2019 from Dr Essop Pahad. Over the last decade, *The Thinker* has gained a reputation as a journal that explores Pan-African issues across fields and times. Ronit Frenkel, as the incoming editor, plans on maintaining the pan-African scope of the journal while increasing its coverage into fields such as books, art, literature and popular cultures. *The Thinker* is a 'hybrid' journal, publishing both journalistic pieces with more academic articles and contributors can now opt to have their submissions peer reviewed. We welcome Africa-centred articles from diverse perspectives, in order to enrich both knowledge of the continent and of issues impacting the continent.

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The Change Which Remains the Same:

Towards a Decolonisation Which Does Not Recolonise

By Steven Friedman

Abstract

In his celebrated study of colonisation, The Intimate Enemy, Ashis Nandy observes of Indian responses to British colonisation: 'The pressure to be the obverse of the West distorts the traditional priorities in the Indian's total view of the...universe...It in fact binds him (sic) even more irrevocably to the West.' This problem stems, he adds, from a tendency by both coloniser and anti-colonial thinker to 'absolutise the relative difference between cultures'.

This article will argue that Nandy's observation is an essential element in a South African response to colonisation which does not repeat colonialism's assumptions in the name of replacing them. In particular, it argues against an essentialism in which a reified 'Western culture' is replaced by an equally reified 'African culture' which is just as constraining and just as likely to be used as a rationale for domination as the colonial ideology it purports to reject.

It will further argue that we avoid the trap of which Nandy warns if we define intellectual colonisation as an ideology which seeks to suppress or eliminate modes of thought which do not conform to a dominant set of values and its antidote, decolonisation, as the removal of this constraint, not as its replacement by new constraints. This decolonisation does not seek to abolish 'Western culture' but to integrate it into a world view in which it takes its place alongside African, Asian, and Latin American cultures. It therefore recognises the syncretic nature of all cultures and views of the world and seeks to enhance, rather than obstruct, conversations between them.

Introduction

> *'...the popular modern antonyms are not always the true opposites...in every situation of organized oppression the true antonyms are always the exclusive part versus the inclusive whole – not masculinity versus femininity but either of them versus androgyny, not the past versus the present but either of them versus the timelessness in which the past is the present and the present is the past, not the oppressor versus the oppressed but both of them versus the rationality which turns them into co-victims.'* (Nandy, 2005: 99)

Since the Rhodes Must Fall protests, which began at the University of Cape Town in March 2015 (Newsinger, 2016), the decolonisation of knowledge and its dissemination have become central concerns – at least in theory – of South African universities. This has obvious implications beyond the academy, since it is hardly the only South African institution in which the values and assumptions of Europe have been normative in the two decades since the achievement of majority rule. The political commentator Aubrey Matshiqi (2011) has observed that, in South Africa's democracy, the political majority remain a cultural minority. The demand for 'decolonisation' is, therefore, not restricted to universities – it speaks to all intellectual and cultural life.

The defeat of apartheid removed the legal impediments to citizenship for all – but left many of the hierarchies of the past in place: in effect, the cultural and intellectual underpinnings of Afrikaner Nationalism were discredited, only for those which had sustained an earlier British colonialism to take over (Friedman, 2015). Given this, perhaps the only surprise about heightened demands for the decolonisation of thinking, writing, and teaching is that they took so long to appear. There is clearly an urgent need for the intellectual equivalent of the negotiation process which produced the political settlement of 1994 – an exchange on how the society's thinkers, writers, and teachers should begin to free themselves of colonial assumptions and to think about the society and its challenges in ways which do not reflect the view of the coloniser. That this discussion is overdue is underlined by the fact that a paper arguing for a broad negotiation on the nature of the university was written a quarter of a century ago (Badat, Barends, and Wolpe, 1993).

But, while calls for decolonisation have been very loud, they have not been very distinct: clear articulations of a decolonised intellectual framework have been largely drowned out by rhetorical flourishes. Equally important is that a frequent feature of the rhetoric is its essentialism. We are exhorted to adopt African modes of thinking in tones which assume both that the continent's many and varied cultures all see the world in the same way – and that the way in which they see it is so obvious to authentic Africans that they require no explanation. It is assumed – or stated – that those who do not endorse these alternatives are colonial ideologues, a charge levelled against, among others, a prominent Black consciousness intellectual (Mangcu, 2017). This is a manifestation of a deeper problem: 'It is not uncommon to hear testimonies of students positing that they do not feel black enough, given that a singular dominant narrative of what constitutes blackness is rigorously defended often at the cost of free expression' (Nymanjoh, 2017: 264).

Those who take this view are used, no doubt, to hearing from their targets angry protestations of their anti-colonial credentials and criticism from supporters of the dominant view denouncing their demands as excessively radical. They are not used to challenges to their own credentials – to being told that their militant opposition to the colonial world view is a product of precisely that order's way of thinking. This is, however, the view of one of India's most important intellectuals, the psychologist and social critic Ashis Nandy: his seminal study of colonial and anti-colonial thinking, *The Intimate Enemy,* makes precisely this argument. While aspects of Nandy's analysis are specific to Indian conditions, much of it speaks to the current South African debate: it provides a much-needed perspective which is yet to be heard in discussion here.

This paper seeks to fill this gap. It will discuss those aspects of Nandy's diagnosis which are relevant to South African realities and seek to spell out their implications for our current condition. It will conclude by proposing an approach to decolonisation in this country which builds on Nandy's insights. Central to Nandy's critique of militant 'decolonisation' is

a particular understanding of colonialism and its cultural underpinning. An obvious objection to the colonial world view which he analyses is that it is only one way of understanding colonialism, one which South Africans have experienced but which is not necessarily either the only or even the dominant understanding among colonisers past and present. This objection is important because it enables us to relate Nandy's critique directly to South African realities. But the paper will argue that Nandy does indeed offer an adequate critique of the kind of intellectual and cultural colonisation which South Africans currently experience and so points the way to an alternative.

The Essential Colonial

Nandy builds his critique on a discussion of two contrasting figures – the author Rudyard Kipling, who was perhaps the most articulate ideologue of the British Raj, and the Indian nationalist and spiritual leader Sri Aurobindo. His purpose is to contrast Kipling's cultural essentialism with Sri Aurobindo's syncretic and inclusive alternative.

Kipling serves Nandy's purpose well because, like many ideologues of racial or national power, he does not fully belong to the dominant group whose dominance he justifies and which he initially did not feel particularly at home in. Nandy points out that Kipling was 'brought up in India by Indian servants in an Indian environment. He thought, felt and dreamt in Hindustani, mainly communicated with Indians, and even looked like an Indian boy' (Nandy, 2005: 64). At a very young age, he was sent by his parents to England, where his idyllic life in Bombay was replaced by a traumatic period in which he felt deserted by his parents and was reminded repeatedly of his Indianness and thus his strangeness. His response was a body of writing which aimed to prove that he belonged as an Englishman by offering an essentialist cultural defence of British colonialism. Besides his stress on the British right to rule India, Kipling 'absolutise(d) the relative difference between cultures'.

Kipling's defence of colonialism is built on creating a strict and unbridgeable divide between 'British' and 'Indian' culture which denies the possibility that either could be influenced by the other, let alone that they could blend: 'Kipling sought to redefine the Indian as the antonym of the Western man' (Nandy, 2005: 79). He romanticised Indians who, in his view, made no attempt to become British and so, in his view, remained true to their identity. His scorn was reserved for the babus, the clerks and bureaucrats who adopted English ways in an attempt to become part of the dominant group. While Kipling and other British colonial ideologues who thought like him 'liked to see colonialism as a moral statement on the superiority of some cultures and the inferiority of others', they were so wedded to essentialism that they '[e]ven accepted that some had the right to talk of Indian culture as superior to Western. Cultural relativism by itself is not incompatible with imperialism, as long as one culture's categories are backed by political, economic and technological power' (Nandy, 2005: 100). It was not necessary to justify colonialism by claiming cultural superiority, as long as military superiority ensured that the culture of the coloniser dominated that of the colonised.

This implicitly recognised that colonisation rested on violence: 'Kipling correctly sensed that the glorification of the victor's violence was the basis of the doctrine of social evolution and ultimately colonialism, that one could not give up the violence without giving up the concept of colonialism as an instrument of progress' (Nandy, 2005: 69). It was, therefore, perhaps inevitable that Kipling admired but greatly exaggerated the military strain in Indian culture. He thought that 'the ideology of Ksatriyahood' – the warrior caste – 'was true Indianness, apart from being consistent with the world view of colonialism'. He thus 'missed the limited role given to Ksatriyahood in traditional Indian cosmology and the vested interest his kind had in denying these limits in a colonial culture organized around violence and counter-violence, manhood and maximised potency, and a theory of history that saw all civilisations in terms of the high and the low and the justifiably powerful and the deservedly weak' (Nandy, 2005: 78–79).

In this colonial ideology, then, essentialism is at the core. Judith Butler, in her attempt to develop a feminist alternative to essentialism, notes that it enables 'the regulation of attributes along culturally established lines of coherence' (1990: 33). Essentialisms are 'hostile to hybridity in that they promote policing the boundaries of identity and acts of exclusion and domination sanctioned by an appeal to an essential

core of an individual' (Butler, 1990: 8). Not only does essentialism ignore or suppress differences within identity groups and cultures – it denies the reality that all cultures are influenced by other cultures and that the loudest advocates of cultural authenticity are often promoting practices which are borrowed. To name but one example, the black frock coats and fur hats worn by Orthodox Jews as a badge of 'true' Jewishness is in reality the style of dress adopted by the 18th century Polish gentry who adopted it because they were trying to imitate Turks (Freeman, n.d.; *My Jewish Learning*, n.d.) So it is, in reality, a product of hybridity which cultural zealots have turned into a badge of supposed cultural distinctiveness.

It is this world view which underpins Kipling's colonial ideology. It is easy to understand why an essentialist response by Indian nationalists should be a vindication of that ideology rather than its antithesis. Violence is also at its core and so it follows again that a violent response should be understood in the same way. The implicit critique of some 'militant' expressions of Indian 'decolonisation' becomes clear – they mimic the coloniser in their purported resistance. Nandy makes this critique explicit by contrasting to it, and to Kipling, Sri Aurobindo. He is chosen because he is, Nandy points out, almost the perfect counterpoint to Kipling.

He was raised in precisely the sort of Anglophile Indian home which horrified Kipling – one of his given names was Ackroyd, although he later dropped it. He became a nationalist and a spiritual leader, abandoning the Brahmo Samaj, the Hindu reform movement whose monotheism attracted Indians seeking a more 'Western' identity because it was seen to be more compatible with Christianity, for a traditional form of Indian spirituality which, in the context of his life, could also have been seen as an anti-colonial choice. But, Nandy insists, Sri Aurobindo did not fall into Kipling's essentialist trap. He searched for 'a more universal model of emancipation' – 'he never thought the West to be outside the reach of God's grace. Even when he spoke of race and evolution… not once did he use the concepts to divide humankind…While other Indian nationalists sought the help of Germany and Japan to remove the British, he always regarded Nazism as Satanic and abhorred Japanese militarism' (Nandy, 2005: 85–86).

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This response, for Nandy, meant more than an expression of inter-cultural tolerance and goodwill. It was also an acknowledgement that Aurobindo 'did not have to disown the West within him to become his version of an Indian' (Nandy, 2005: 86). Nandy writes that '[w]hile the colonial system saw him as an object, he could not see the colonisers as mere objects… As part of his struggle for survival, the West remained for Indian victims like Aurobindo an internal human reality, in love as well as in hate, in identification as well as in counter-identification' (2005: 87). This required the acknowledgement of two realities. First, that contact with a dominant culture cannot simply be erased – it leaves indelible marks on the psyche of the colonised and to claim otherwise is to harbour a potentially dangerous pretence. Second, that since all cultures are influenced by other cultures, a human shaped only by one culture is extremely rare. A poignant example of the power of cultural influence is offered by anthropologist Maurice Godelier's study of the Baruya of New Guinea who were not subject to 'Western' influence until 1951 but, within a few years, had been catapulted into a Western-inspired modernity. Godelier describes that they 'were transformed into citizens of a new state that was a member of the United Nations, furnishing one further proof of the West's advance in that part of the world' (1991: 387). Being an authentic Indian (or African, or European, or American) inevitably entails acknowledging the influence on your world view of other cultures – this does not in any way diminish the

authenticity of a particular cultural identity.

These insights into Kipling and Sri Aurobindo are the prism through which Nandy develops his diagnosis – that militant Indian nationalism, both before and after independence, is in reality an expression of colonial thought because it repeats its essentialism (and its violence). The real threat to colonisation and its world view, he argues, was not the Indian nationalist movements which colonialism 'bred and domesticated'. It was, rather, the India which refused essentialism: 'This other Orient, the Orient which was the Occident's double, did not fit the needs of colonialism; it carried intimations of an alternative, cosmopolitan, multicultural living which was… beyond the dreary middle-class horizons of Kipling and his English contemporaries' (Nandy, 2005: 72). To construct an essentialised 'authentic indigenous identity' in opposition to an equally essentialised 'colonial identity' is not, in this view, to antagonise the coloniser – it is, rather, to endorse the coloniser's world view. It is not to reject colonialism but to accept it.

Colonialism, Nandy argues, could not be complete unless it 'universalized and enriched its ethnic stereotypes by appropriating the language of defiance of its victims'. It both 'bred and domesticated' anti-colonial movements and so 'the cry of the victims of colonialism was ultimately the cry to be heard in another language – unknown to the colonizer and to the anti-colonial movements' (Nandy, 2005: 72–73). This 'other language' adopts an instrumental view of colonial culture – it takes that which is of use and discards that which is not. And, if this means, at times, pretending to admire the coloniser, that too is valid if it ensures survival – not only in the sense of continuing to live and breathe, but a psychic survival which enables the coloniser better to be who they really are.

To illustrate and expand on this point, Nandy recalls being told of a group of fifteenth century Aztec priests who, on being forced by their conquerors to hear a Christian sermon which proclaimed that the Aztec gods were dead, declared that they would rather die. Their conquerors promptly obliged. Nandy responds: 'I suspect I know how a group of Brahman priests would have behaved under the same circumstances'. They would have embraced Christianity and some would have written eulogies in praise of it. In reality, they would have remained devout Hindus and, after a while, 'their Christianity would have looked … dangerously like a variation on Hinduism' (Nandy, 2005: 107–108). For Nandy, 'the response of the Aztec priests has seemed to the Westernized world the paragon of courage and cultural pride; the hypothetical response of the Brahman priests hypocritical and cowardly'.

All imperialist observers, he argues, have loved India's 'martial races' – who are seen as authentically Indian – and have felt threatened by Indians who are willing to compromise. Why do they valorise the priests and reject the Brahmans? The simple answer is that the Aztec priests oblige their conquerors by dying and leaving the scene – the 'cowardly' remain on the scene and may 'at an opportune moment' assert their presence. The more complicated one is that submission of this sort is itself deeply embedded in Indian culture. (Nandy, 2005: 207–211). It is derived not from some contemporary Western source but from 'non-modern India which rejects most versions of Indian nationalism as bound irrevocably to the West'. Nandy suggests that '[p]robably the uniqueness of Indian culture lies not so much in a unique ideology as in the society's traditional ability to live with cultural ambiguities and to use them to build psychological and even metaphysical defences against cultural invasions' (2005: 107). The 'cowardly' response threatens the coloniser because it expresses the autonomous understanding of the colonised rather than that which is imposed by the coloniser.

It would be easy to misinterpret the response of the hypothetical Brahman priests as a physical survival strategy in the face of power, an expression of what James Scott (1985) has called 'the weapons of the weak'. Scott, who was criticising the notion of 'false consciousness' which holds that the dominated often endorse the legitimacy of their domination, argued that the powerless do not accept the morality of domination. They avoid fighting it head on because they believe the power balance is stacked against them and that open resistance will lead to suffering and loss, not change. And so, they find ways of undermining power – by pilfering or feigning ignorance or illness – while loudly endorsing its pretensions when the powerful are listening.

If this was all the Brahmans were doing they would hardly be a model of decolonisation. For Nandy, however, they are challenging colonialism – in a

manner unavailable to the militant decolonisers – because they are refusing to buy into the myth of the 'noble savage' which insists that they are at their most authentic when they live out the cultural stereotypes of the coloniser. Indians who responded in this way were drawing on cultural wellsprings unknown to the British to relate to colonial power on their own terms, not that imposed by its anthropology. In that sense, they, and not those determined to live out an Indianness framed by the coloniser, are the authentic decolonisers: 'What looks like Westernization is often only a means of domesticating the West, sometimes by reducing the West to the comical and the trivial' (Nandy, 2005: 108). Indians who adopt this strategy refuse 'to fight the victor according to the victor's values, within his model of dissent. Better to be a comical dissenter than to be a powerful, serious but acceptable opponent. Better to be a hated enemy, declared unworthy of any respect whatsoever, than to be a proper opponent, constantly making "primary adjustments" to the system' (Nandy, 2005: 111).

Colonialism, Nandy argues, 'tried to supplant the Indian consciousness to erect an Indian self-image which, in its opposition to the West, would remain in essence a Western construction'. The authentic rebellion against that was not to mimic the Kiplings by 'setting up the East and the West as permanent and natural antipodes'. This endorses and repeats 'the cultural arrogance of post-Enlightenment Europe which sought to define not only the "true" West but also the "true" East' (Nandy, 2005: 73–74). The Indian 'has no reason to see himself as a counterplayer or an antithesis of the Western man. The imposed burden to be perfectly non-Western only constricts his... cultural self, just as the older burden of being perfectly Western once narrowed – and still sometimes narrows – his choices in the matter of his and his society's future. The new responsibility forces him to stress only those parts of his culture which are recessive in the West and to underplay both those which his culture shares with the West and those which remain undefined by (it). The pressure to be the obverse of the West distorts the traditional priorities in the Indian's total view of man and universe and destroys his (sic) culture's unique gestalt. It in fact binds him even more irrevocably to the West' (Nandy, 2005: 73).

Two examples underline this point. First 'a sub-group of Kipling's Indian brain-children have set up the martial India as the genuine India which would one day defeat the West at its own game...(they) are quite willing to alter the whole of Indian culture to bring that victory a little closer, like the American army officer in Vietnam who once destroyed a village to save it from its enemies' (Nandy, 2005: 80). The second is 'Hindutva' or 'Hinduness', the core principle of the currently dominant strand of nationalism in India and of its current governing party, which illustrates the point particularly well since 'Hinduness' was unknown in India until colonialism produced it to make sense of indigenous cultural and religious patterns: 'To use the term Hindu to self-define is to flout the traditional self-definition of the Hindu, and to assert aggressively one's Hinduism is to very nearly deny one's Hinduness' (Nandy, 2005: 103). Nandy's point, that the loudest devotees of decolonisation are products of that which they decry, was poignantly captured by Tagore's early twentieth century fictional masterpiece *Gora*, in which the eponymous character is a militant Hindu essentialist blissfully unaware that he is actually English and was adopted and brought up as Indian by his Indian foster-parents (Tagore, 2002).

For Nandy, the alternative to colonialism is, therefore, not a cultural essentialism which seeks to replace colonial assumptions with an 'authentic Indianness' which claims to have no truck with other cultures. It is, rather, a syncretism that draws both on 'pre-modern' Indian cultural understandings and those aspects of Western thought and practice which enhance it. This might entail using Western values to criticise Western practice. This, he believes, was Gandhi's project: 'Instead of meeting the Western criterion of a true antagonist, he endorsed the non-modern Indian reading of the modern West as one of the many possible life styles which had, unfortunately for both the West and India, become cancerous by virtue of its disproportionate power and spread' (Nandy, 2005: 102). He saw his task, therefore, as recovering and emphasising those aspects of the Western tradition which colonialism ignored. He therefore 'judged colonialism by Christian values and declared it an absolute evil' (Nandy, 2005: 200). In sum, 'one could perhaps say that in the chaos called India the opposite of thesis is not the antithesis because they exclude each other. The true "enemy" of the thesis is seen to be in the synthesis because it includes the thesis and ends the latter's reason for being' (Nandy, 2005: 99). Nor, in Nandy's view, does the synthesis

necessarily need to be created by intellectuals – it is already there. Gandhi's attempt to remind the West of its own moral traditions was deeply embedded in Indian cultural understandings: 'Indian society has held in trusteeship aspects of the West which are lost to the West itself' (Nandy, 2005: 74).

Kipling and other colonisers' dismay at this response reflected '[t]he hostility which the liminal man always arouses as opposed to the proper alien' (Nandy, 2005: note 67, 103). The colonised, for them, is guilty of the ultimate sin – trying to be the coloniser. This destabilisation of the boundaries between the two destroys the safety which the coloniser derives from keeping the colonised at a safe distance. A militant nationalist stressing her or his Indianness by adopting the outward trappings of indigenous culture is an ironic source of comfort because it remains clearly alien. A cultural syncretist who uses Christian ethics to declare colonialism evil refuses to be alien and so erodes the barrier between coloniser and colonised. It is obvious which one breaks more firmly with cultural and mental colonisation.

South African Applications: From Verwoerd to Milner

If Nandy's understanding of colonial ideology is accepted, his critique of a resistance which mirrors that which it purports to reject is obviously of great relevance to current discussions of decolonisation in South Africa. At its broadest level, it challenges the notion that decolonisation should be understood as the replacement of colonial assumptions by an 'authentic' African understanding free of 'Western' influence since this would repeat precisely the essentialism which underpinned colonial thinking. It would argue even more obviously against attempts to distinguish between people who are 'African enough' and those who are not. It would insist that the antidote to colonial thought patterns is the 'hybridity' and syncretism which underpins Nandy's proposed antidote. But it could be argued, convincingly, that the strain of colonial thinking which he discusses is one which once dominated in South Africa but no longer does.

Kipling's cultural essentialism seems to fit far more closely the colonisation imposed by Afrikaner Nationalism through apartheid than the current version against which advocates of decolonisation are rebelling. Apartheid was founded on an essentialism which claimed, spuriously, that it was giving expression to the diversity of cultures. This 'diffuse language of cultural essentialism' was pivotal to apartheid ideology because it enabled it to avoid the 'crude scientific racism drawn from the vocabulary of social Darwinism' while still justifying racial domination (Dubow, 1992: 209). Races and ethnic groups were held to possess a distinctive culture which would be fatally diluted if mixed with others and this was said to be a rationale for strict racial separation. Apartheid ideologues also constructed a rigid and static notion of ethnic identity, extolling those among the colonised who, in their view, fitted the stereotype. According to de Wet Nel, then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development: 'The Zulu is proud to be a Zulu, the Xhosa is proud to be a Xhosa and the Venda is proud to be a Venda, just as proud as they were a hundred years ago'. These ethnic groups, he added, derived the greatest 'fulfilment' from their identity (cited in Moodie, 1980: 266). The obvious antidote to this form of colonisation was not to accept the stereotype. On the contrary, it was surely to embrace a cultural syncretism which apartheid was, its justifiers insisted, designed to prevent.

But apartheid is no longer the dominant form of South African colonialism – it was defeated in 1994. As this paper suggested in passing earlier, it has been replaced, in large measure, by a cultural context which revives the pre-1948 form of cultural domination. Before the victory of Afrikaner Nationalism in 1948, South Africa was a British dominion – its Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, was a loyal servant of Empire who served in the British war cabinet in both the first and second World Wars (Steyn, 2017). The dominant cultural framework was thus British. Since 1994, the dominance would perhaps more accurately be described as white and Western, rather than exclusively British, but the elements are much the same. The dominant framework in the academy, the media, and other sources of cultural influence is that of the liberalism described by Richard Turner more than four decades ago, whose adherents 'believe that "western civilisation" is adequate, and superior to other forms, but also that blacks can, through education, attain (its) level' (Turner, 1972: 20). It is no accident that the student protests which became the catalyst for the current attempts to decolonise the academy

were aimed at the statue not of an apartheid-era government figure, but of Cecil John Rhodes, the key figure in Britain's colonisation of Southern Africa. While Rhodes was certainly not a liberal, he did represent a different form of domination, one which took over when apartheid was ended.

This form of mental and cultural colonisation seems to be the polar opposite of Kipling's essentialism. It does not romanticise African culture to justify the domination of African people. Usually by omission rather than commission, it brands that culture inferior and assumes that Black people attain 'civilised' status only by accepting 'Western' norms and assumptions. It assumes that political and social thought is the work of Westerners and marginalises African societies and their ideas and values. In this view, the African equivalent of the 'Westernised' Indian babus who Kipling despised are showing a desirable interest in thinking and acting out the assumptions of a superior culture. The antidote is then surely not Nandy's hybridity but a clean break with Western culture and the unconditional embrace of an African alternative.

The refutation of this conclusion lies in understanding what the current form of domination is seeking to do. In contrast to Kipling's essentialism and to apartheid ideology, it operates not by imposing a template on society which overtly declares some ways of thinking permitted and demonises or outlaws others. It relies far more in excluding or erasing that which it decrees as contrary to its norms. Colonised education of this sort does not triumphantly declare the superiority of the 'West' and the inferiority of Africa. It simply excludes Africa except for that version of it which is seen from Western eyes. Black political thinkers are not demonised as cowards or renegades to their 'true' cultural self – they are ignored. Western frameworks are not exalted – there is no need, since they are the only ones which are taught. Much the same can be said, in myriad ways, of South African media which, while proudly proclaiming its cultural and political neutrality, assiduously presents the perspectives of a suburbia which mirrors the attitudes and perspectives of southern California (Friedman, 2017). It is also pertinent that, while the dominant way of thinking is in theory open to all who accept its assumptions, the boundaries are very firmly set and there is very little room for pluralism or hybridity within the dominant culture. To cite one topical example: Mmusi Maimane,

"Colonised education of this sort does not triumphantly declare the superiority of the 'West' and the inferiority of Africa. It simply excludes Africa except for that version of it which is seen from Western eyes. Black political thinkers are not demonised as cowards or renegades to their 'true' cultural self – they are ignored. Western frameworks are not exalted – there is no need, since they are the only ones which are taught."

then leader of the official opposition Democratic Alliance, whose white, suburban, 'old guard' is one of the key enforcers of this form of domination, regularly ran afoul of the policers of colonial orthodoxy, most notably when he had the temerity to refer to 'white privilege' and 'black poverty' at a Freedom Day rally (Van Onselen, 2018), a remark which may well have cost him the party leadership. So the vast majority of the colonised are never, in reality, integrated into the 'superior' culture which they are by implication exhorted to join (given the intolerance of the culture's policers, it is open to doubt whether any of the colonised are ever fully accepted).

The dominant form of colonisation, then, dominates through exclusion and imposition. It assumes, rather than asserts, that a particular way of seeing is the only way and withholds acknowledgement to alternatives and those who adhere to them. It is as concerned as Kipling and apartheid to set boundaries – it chooses to use other methods. Its understanding of what is permitted and what is not is as rigid as apartheid's – it too has very little room for hybridity or syncretism. It does not profess or feign admiration for indigenous culture, but it is as committed to imposing a template upon it as the overt essentialists are.

Given this, an essentialised alternative, which seeks to replace the dominant Western culture with an essentialised African rival, meets the same objection as Kipling's essentialism. It liberates no-one – it simply replaces one template with another. The term 'Western culture', used routinely by most participants

in the debate, is itself an imposition because it assumes that, in Western Europe and North America, there is only one way of thinking and seeing, when in reality there are many. Similarly, there is no 'African culture' – there are numerous African cultures and to impose on Africans one cultural understanding as the only one is itself a form of colonisation [1]. In Africa, as in the 'West', culture is inevitably contested – claims by the powerful that particular practices are culturally embedded may be challenged by alternative understandings of what a particular culture expects (Nomboniso Gasa quoted in Breytenbach, 2006).

India is, of course, no different: Nandy argues that an authentic anti-colonial position would need to recognise that 'culturally, it is a choice neither between the East and the West nor between the North and the South. It is a choice – and a battle – between the Apollonian and the Dionysian *within* India and *within* the West' (Nandy, 2005: 74) [2]. To be Indian – or African and European – is not to endorse a particular view of the world since, within each, rivals contend and no particular view can claim authentic indigeneity. Not only is ideological pluralism a constant feature of cultures – it is essential for their survival and growth: 'A plurality of ideologies can always be accommodated within a single lifestyle. Fittingly so; a living culture has to live and it has an obligation to itself, not to its analysts. Even less does it have any obligation to conform to a model' (Nandy, 2005: 82).

And so, opposing to the current dominant culture an essentialised 'African culture' which ignores alternatives or, worse, suppresses them by imposing on (African) doubters and dissenters a mandatory way of thinking does not reject the dominant colonial culture – it replaces it with a home-grown culture every bit as inclined to imposition as the dominant variety. Hybridity and syncretism are equally impossible under both templates. Despite the differences between Kipling's essentialism and the colonial culture which currently dominates South Africa, Nandy's critique applies to both. The core features of both is not that they are Western and so the antidote to both is not to be as 'African' as possible. It is, rather, imposition and exclusion (which is arguably more severe in the current version because indigenous alternatives are not patronised, as they are by apartheid and Kipling – they are removed from consciousness). The alternative cannot be a new form of imposition and exclusion – it must, rather, be a view which is built on inclusion and in opening cultural and intellectual horizons to all influences in an attempt to build an authentic Africanness. It means recovering and validating those strains in indigenous understandings which validate hybrid, syncretic, and inclusive ways of seeing, thinking, and doing which – like Nandy's non-modern Indians – take from the dominant culture what is useful while rejecting that which is not.

Decolonisation, not Recolonisation

By now, the implications of Nandy's argument for current decolonisation debates should be apparent. But it is necessary to expand on them to avoid ambiguity. To state the obvious (which, in the current intellectual climate, needs to be stated), this is not an argument against resisting intellectual and cultural colonisation. On the contrary, it argues that colonisation's grip on our thinking may well be even more insidious than we imagined because many of the loudest current complaints against it may be deeply influenced by the colonial view of the world. It is, if anything, an argument for a more thorough decolonisation than those currently on offer. It insists that far more is needed than the adoption of 'African' ways of thinking and doing which may turn out to be as inauthentic as Kipling's or apartheid's fraudulent vision of the 'real' African, the cultural equivalents of the zealot's Polish frock coat mentioned earlier.

In essence, it argues that the core of intellectual or cultural colonisation is that it imposes and excludes. Its antidote cannot, therefore, be to re-impose and to re-exclude. The problem with the dominant form of South African colonisation is not that it sees value in ideas and cultural production which originate in 'the West'. It is, rather, that it values only the West and robs of legitimacy other ways of seeing and doing (including those within the 'West' which do not justify continued cultural colonisation). It rejects hybridity, syncretism and cultural pluralism because they import 'inferior' strands into the 'only and true' culture. Besides imposing mental and emotional burdens on the colonised, it silences their voices not because it is 'unAfrican' but because, beneath a veneer of tolerance, it insists that there is only one way of thinking about and seeing the world. To colonise is to close down and to suppress, whatever

the identity of the coloniser and the colonised.

Many of the purported antidotes on offer would perpetuate this practice in the name of offering a radical alternative. A 'real African culture' which, as it inevitably must if it makes this claim, suppresses the diversity of actual African cultures, the differences of perspective included within them, and the inevitable influence of Asian and European cultures on them, does not decolonise – it recolonises because it imposes and excludes. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that it prompts the phenomenon noted earlier, in which Black voices can be silenced by the charge that they are not Black enough. As Nandy shows, this 'decolonisation' and its claim that we can be 'truly African' only if we reject all Western thought and deny all difference between us does not decolonise at all – it retains the barriers between the 'West' and the rest while ostensibly choosing to be on the 'right' rather than the 'wrong' side of a ghetto which remains firmly in the heart and mind of the rebel.

The really radical alternative insists on not being part of any ghetto at all. It rejects essentialism, imposition, and exclusion. It seeks not to rid our minds of all that is 'Western' but to open them to all that is African (and Asian and European and Latin American). It seeks not to create a new essentialism but to open our minds to the full range of alternatives and so to allow the emergence of a plural, syncretic, and hybrid understanding which is the real antithesis of colonisation. Fortunately, there are in the current South African debate voices which recognise this. Thus, one advocate of intellectual decolonisation observes that: 'Western modes and forms of knowledge are important, but they are not the only valid or viable kinds; other forms of modern knowledge and thought, just as advanced and even ground-breaking, are available in cultures and civilisations the world over' (Omoyele, 2017). This is clearly a non-essentialist understanding which seeks to broaden, not narrow, horizons and which opens the way to hybrid understandings.

A more systematic account of what may be possible is offered by this description of the Africanisation programme of the Johannesburg alternative education centre, Khanya College. 'In contrast to some proponents of Africanisation today', the authors observe, 'Khanya College did not disregard so-called Western knowledge. Instead it drew the best from critical thinkers worldwide to develop students' own critical insights. Some students were political activists who were accepted on the basis of their community involvement rather than strictly academic results. At Khanya, their political work was linked to more formal modes of critical analysis'. It also 'taught students the curriculum they needed to know how to succeed in a white, elite university. The students were introduced to the dominant discourses and practices within elite universities; they were taught to understand and evaluate these practices. Then they were supported in finding the tools to challenge such practices'. This, they add, 'shows how a curriculum can be Africanised without essentialising what it means to be African and what African knowledge is' (Adriansen, Madsen, and Naidoo, 2017).

It is significant that Khanya sees its approach as one which explicitly 'Africanises' rather than decolonises. For it, intellectual pluralism and hybridity are essentially African and to maintain a curriculum which includes insights from all cultural traditions is a form of Africanisation. Just as Nandy suggests that hybridity is essentially Indian and offers a textured account of Indian cultural themes which demonstrate this, so Khanya insists that it is entirely African. This invites the retrieval of those themes in African cultural understandings which seek to break down walls rather than to erect them. It is equally significant that Khanya's approach highlights two reasons why cultural essentialism imposes new controls over the colonised rather than eliminating control.

The first is the perhaps trite but sometimes forgotten point that alternatives to dominant thinking are impossible without an engagement with that thinking. Anti-colonial thinkers have, of course, developed their alternates through a careful critical reading of colonial writing, a task they would have been unable to undertake had they been persuaded that a truly anti-colonial mode of thinking requires no engagement with 'Western' thought. The second is that one of the many flaws in the essentialist understanding of decolonisation is that it ignores the power which is wielded within cultures. Khanya's commitment to including political activists without the required formal qualifications indicates a desire to challenge the use of power to dominate and to create educational models which allow that challenge. Thorough decolonisation is, as Khanya shows, not

only about rejecting imposition by engaging with all thought. It is also about engaging with power to ensure that new patterns of domination do not replace the old.

In these understandings lies a decolonisation which expands rather than narrows boundaries and which recognises Nandy's warning against a purported alternative which merely mimics the imposition and the essentialism of that which it claims to replace. The task of fleshing out a detailed decolonisation strategy which recognises this is an urgent priority.

Notes

[1] See, for example, the heated debate on whether consensus decision-making is inherent to African political culture (Wiredu, 1997; Hountondji, 2009: 6)

[2] For the distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian cultures see Benedict, 1932

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Alliteration in W. Shasha's Zihlabana nje Ziyalamba



By Zilibele Mtumane and Ruth Nozibele Tabu

Abstract

This paper examines the use of alliteration in Welile Shasha's poetry in Zihlabana nje Ziyalamba. This aspect is chosen as Shasha uses it very intensively in his poetry. Alliteration is discussed as demonstrated by the use of assonance and consonance in the poetry. To be considered then is the repetition of vowel and consonant sounds. The subheadings of this discourse are introduction, theoretical framework, research methodology, assonance and consonance. The concept of alliteration is defined as part of the introductory section of the study. A concluding remark, which provides the summary of the research, evaluation and recommendation for further study, will be included towards the end of the discourse. The theoretical framework that underpins this study is that of literary stylistics. The study uses the qualitative research methodology of data collection and analysis.

Introduction

While Shasha employs alliteration very convincingly in his poetry in *Zihlabana nje Ziyalamba*, very little attempt has, so far, been made to analyse this aspect of his poetry. Tabu (2007), on whose Master's study this research is based, is probably the only scholar who has attended to it. However, the concept of alliteration has been discussed by scholars analysing the works of other poets. For instance, Mtumane (2000) has a section on alliteration in his study of S. M. Burns-Ncamashe's poetry. Bobelo (2008) also includes a discussion on the concept as part of her discussion of isiXhosa poetry on Nelson Rholihlahla Mandela. The discussion is structured according to the following subheadings: theoretical framework, research methodology, assonance, consonance, and conclusion.

According to Milubi, as quoted by Kgobe (1994: 237) and Mtumane (2000: 194), alliteration plays an important role in determining the external form of poetry. It is a literary device whereby a sound (consonant or vowel) is repeated in two or more nearby words in a line. Mc Rae (1998: 149) views alliteration as the repetition of the initial sound of successive words in a line of text. Barnet et al. (1997: 610) also define alliteration as the repetition of initial sounds in adjacent words in a line and sometimes as the prominent repetition of a consonant. Bobelo (2008: 95) views alliteration as 'a literary device, where a consonant or a vowel is repeated more than once in a line. It is a repetition of consonants, vowels and/or syllables in close proximity within a line'. She further cites Myers and Simms who see alliteration as 'deliberately used for the sake of melody and rhythm' (ibid.).

The above scholars seem not to agree about the exact position of the repeated sounds in words. For instance, Milubi (op. cit.) and Mtumane (op cit.) do not mention any specific position while Mc Rae and Barnet et al. (op cit.) emphasise that it is the initial sound that is repeated. This difference might be caused by the fact that alliteration applies differently in the poetry of different languages. For instance, the poetry of disjunctive languages such as English, Sesotho, and Setswana has alliteration that applies differently from that of more conjunctive languages such as isiZulu, isiXhosa, and siSwati. This study only considers the poetic effect of such a repetition in a particular line, irrespective of the exact position, as isiXhosa, the language of the poetry studied, is a conjunctive language with morphemes combined together in a single word.

Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this section is to introduce the theoretical framework of this discourse. As this research is conducted with literary stylistics as the underpinning theory, the discussion in this section will then concentrate on this theory. This section commences with a general comment on literary theory. Thereafter, the theory of literary stylistics will receive more attention under the following subheadings: the concept of stylistics, historical background, assumptions, and stylistics and poetry.

Literary Theory

Literary theory developed in the course of the twentieth century into a branch of literary studies that is studied and taught as a distinct subject. It is, however, not a very new subject, as scholars have always been inclined to speculate about the theoretical implications of literary practice. Most literary theorists of the twentieth century were also conscious of belonging to a tradition that goes back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle (Jefferson and Robey, 1986: 7).

Theories of literature vary greatly with regards to the importance they ascribe to the language component of literature. To the extent that literary theory can be distinguished from aesthetics, it seems obvious that it needs to take some account of the main element which distinguishes literature from other art forms: the linguistic medium. Some of the theories concerned with establishing the distinctiveness of literature as an independent category use language as a central feature in their definition of that distinctiveness, usually by defining literature as a special use of language. Literary theory has benefited from the enormous expansion in linguistic science and certain theorists such as Roman Jakobson and his colleagues in the Prague School, who developed their theories in relation to and alongside their works on linguistics. Other theorists, such as those associated with

Parisian structuralism, actually use linguistic theory as their starting point for literary theory. Saussurean linguistics, in particular, has had enormous influence on the development of a number of different kinds of literary theory (Jefferson and Robey, 1986: 16–17).

Some practitioners of literary stylistics, including Halliday, as cited by Jefferson and Robey (1986: 70), would insist on supplementing the comparative approach that is described with some kind of functional analysis that questions what the language of a text does, and how it contributes to the meaning and the effect of the whole (Jefferson and Robey, 1986: 70).

The Concept of Stylistics

According to Baldick, as quoted by Mabuza (2000: 12–13), stylistics is a branch of modern linguistics devoted to a detailed analysis of literary style or of the linguistic choices made by speakers and writers in non-literary contexts. In the words of Weber (1996: 94), stylistics is an attempt to put criticism on a scientific basis. Jefferson and Robey (1986: 62) view stylistics as a convenient label for the branch of literary studies that concentrate on the linguistic form of texts. Literary stylistics is also viewed as the analysis of the language of literary texts, usually taking its theoretical models from linguistics, in order to undertake this analysis (Simpson as quoted by Mills, 1995: 4). Simpson (op cit.) further states that stylistics uses linguistic analysis to provide a window on the devices which characterise a particular literary work.

Peck and Coyle (1992: 137) state that a much more productive and precise way of talking about language is to concentrate on style. This involves describing how a particular piece of writing functions and discussing what words are used and why. Literary stylistics, then, may be viewed as a theory that deals with the analysis of literary works, putting more emphasis on the use of language in texts. This use of language may be determined by the use of stylistic techniques in literary texts. These stylistic techniques may include figures of speech, imagery, repetitions, and idiomatic expressions, among others. It is on this basis that this contribution examines the use of alliteration, which is a repetitive device, as a stylistic technique in W. Shasha's poetry.

In the twentieth century, stylistics developed into a significant academic discipline, situated on the borderline between the study of language and literature, and concerned to engage in technical analysis of what may be referred to as 'manners of expression'. It is important for students of literature due to its close relation to literary studies, and it has introduced a number of specifically linguistic terms and methods of analysis into literary analysis and theory (Hawthorn, 1994: 284).

Stylistics is also growing as a branch of general linguistics that studies variations in non-literary language use. These are variations connected with the different contexts in which language is used (the style of radio commentaries, journalism, official documents, etc.). Stylistics, as a branch of literary research, can draw on this kind of work. However, its concerns must, in general, be very different because, from a literary point of view, the linguistic form of texts is of importance only in certain respects. Literary stylistics views the language or style of literature as 'embellishment, self-reference, representation and manner'. These four categories correspond to real differences of approach in the study of literary language. They also help to show how stylistic and linguistic studies differ. This takes the form of the assumption that writing is made beautiful through the addition of certain linguistic ornaments, such as poetic figures, metaphor, antithesis, hyperbole, and the like (Jefferson and Robey, 1986: 62).

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Carter and Simpson, as quoted by Mills (1995: 4), distinguish between linguistic stylistics and literary

stylistics. For them, linguistic stylistics is where 'practitioners attempt to derive from the study of style and language, a refinement of models for the analysis of language and thus to contribute to the development of linguistic theory.'

Literary stylistics, on the other hand, is more concerned with providing:

> 'the basis for fuller understanding, appreciation and interpretation of avowedly literary and author-centered texts. The general impulse will be to draw eclectically on linguistic insights and to use them in the service of what is generally claimed to be fuller interpretation of language effects than is possible without the benefit of linguistics.' (ibid.: 4)

Leech and Michael, as quoted by Mills (1995: 5), state that in general, literary stylistics has, one way or the other, the goal of explaining the relation between language and artistic function.

Historical Background

Stylistics enjoyed a certain vogue in the 1960s. That was when it underwent a profound revolution. It is remarkably resilient. It has included some of the findings of literary theory and critical linguistics, although in a more piecemeal fashion. It has now moved into the domain of 'literary linguistics, poetics and linguistics, contextual stylistics and discourse stylistics' (Toolan et al., 1995: 8).

In the late 1970s, stylistics was still wobbling from attacks of Fish and other critics. However, it managed to gather strength and developed in two most promising directions, the first of which is 'pedagogical stylistics.' These stylisticians turn away from theoretical matters and from bold claims of scientificity. They claim that stylistic analysis may not be objective and scientific while they agree that it can be 'rigorous, systematic and replicable' and, hence, 'achieve inter-subjective validity and pedagogical usefulness.' Their aim is simply to demonstrate that stylistic analysis, as a way of reading, can be of direct use to students, both in mother tongue-language learning and in the context of English as a foreign language – something that was already advocated by Henry Widdowson as early as the 1970s. In the 1980s, with the support of the British Council, more and more stylisticians worked towards an integration of language and literature study, and developed what they called pre-literary language-based activities (Weber, 1996: 3).

Another important development, which took place in stylistics at that time, was 'an orientation towards contextualization'. This gathered a new strength under the influence of similar approaches in mainstream linguistics, where the growing importance of context was acknowledged through the rise of sub-disciplines such as 'pragmatics and discourse analysis'. It became more and more clear that style is neither inherent in the text nor totally in the reader's mind but an effect produced in it, by and through the interaction between the text and reader. The movement towards greater 'contextualization' in stylistic criticism could be thought of as a succession of 'concentric circles' representing the gradual widening of the text's contextual orbit (Weber, 1996: 3–4). Stylistics was often used during the early period of its development 'to back up intuitions about the meaning of the text under analysis' (Mills, 1995: 7).

Assumptions

Stylistics was born out of a reaction to the 'subjectivity and imprecision' of literary studies.

> 'For the appreciative raptures of the impressionistic critic, stylisticians purport to substitute precise and rigorous linguistic descriptions to interpretations for which they can claim a measure of objectivity. Stylistics, in short, is an attempt to put criticism on a scientific basis.' (Weber, 1996: 94)

Stylistics largely found its theoretical foundations from 'contemporary literary criticism and linguistics'. As these fields have moved on, stylistics needs to respond to the new ideas which have emerged from both fields. For example, many of the early stylisticians took for granted that it is possible to analyse a text in isolation, as a 'self-contained entity', which has a meaning not dependent on any external considerations (Mills, 1995: 8–9).

It is true that each reader will interpret a text differently from others, due to the fact that people are different from one another, have had different experiences, and so on. However, it should be clear that such a subjectivist opinion of literary understanding runs

against the presuppositions of stylistic analysis, as its proponents assume that a shared knowledge of the process for giving meaning to utterances points to a relatively large degree of common understanding, in spite of variations in individual responses.

Mills (1995: 5) states that:

> 'For the stylisticians, the major fact to be explained is that, although we are all different, we agree to a remarkable extent over the interpretation... the range of interpretations which have been produced for even the most discussed texts is remarkably small compared with the theoretically infinite set of possible recordings.'

In stylistic analysis in general, the type of text and language that is used is rarely explicit. That is:

> 'the text itself is assumed to exist in some self-evident state, whereby it contains meanings, which the critic does not need to explain to the reader because it is taken as common sense knowledge about texts in general, which both the reader and the critic share.' (Mills, 1995: 25)

Stylistic studies which have been undertaken have used 'a text immanent model of meaning', that is, they have taken it that what the analyst finds in the text is discovered in the text itself, rather than being the result of a 'negotiation between the reader and the text' (ibid.).

A question that may arise is what the student of the stylistics text is supposed to do with the knowledge which is produced, since there is, very often, an underlying belief that the reader is supposed to learn the techniques and skills described, in order to be able to perform better readings than he currently does (Mills, 1995: 26).

Sperber and Wilson, who are quoted by Mills (1995: 27), attempt to bring to the surface some of the assumptions. They illustrate that it is assumed that thought comes before the production of words and speech and that it is separate from language and exists outside of it. It is taken for granted that the message that is encoded in language is the same as the message that is decoded. That means that there are no obstructions to communication and there are no misinterpretations. This is an ideal form of communication, where words have meaning in a clear and simple way. It is assumed that the normal manner of language-use is between two role players, speaking face-to-face: the speaker or author, and the listener or reader. Lastly, it is assumed that the speaker or author has perfect control over language and can choose to utter whatever s/he wishes; the language exerts no limitations on what can be expressed. Here, language is seen as an unambiguous medium that is used for the conveyance of thought to information.

New critical stylistics is concerned not only with the identification of linguistic features that make poetry different from other discourses. It is also concerned with poetry as a form of signification which strangely changes the familiar relationship between language and meaning. Bradford (1997: 35–36) insists that, although terminology and frame of reference are founded upon non-literary linguistics, the effects produced by poetry are not easily reducible to predictable and scientific models of language.

Stylistics and Poetry

Poetry uses language in a special way as it uses figurative language and repetitions. Figurative, in this sense, means language used in a non-literal way. Figurative language includes imagery as determined by simile, metaphor, personification, hyperbole, euphemism, and idiomatic expressions. Repetitions include alliteration, linking, parallelism, and refrains (Peck and Coyle, 2002: 40–41; Newmark, 1995: 70). Alliteration is the technique that is studied in this discourse.

As a form of literature, poetry is written in language, using techniques and features of language. That is why, in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of poetry, the reader must have an understanding of language, its function, and its mode of operation (Ngara, 1982: 11). The way in which the poet employs poetic devices determines his style, which then determines the form and standard of his poetry. Stylistics, as a literary theory, then concerns itself with the analysis of the style of the poet as it is determined by the use of literary devices, of which alliteration is part, as later sections of this study will illustrate.

When reading a poem, use is made of linguistic

techniques, the aim being to present the reader with a vocabulary to describe what is going on in the text and in the reader's mind when he reads the text. When a text is read, it is not always done so suspiciously, as the reader is used to certain types of messages, which often strike him as necessarily oppressive or pernicious. Language is viewed as a vehicle for ideas rather than as material. Stylistics is then used to discover what is revealed by linguistic units, as in communication, and how the effects of different conventions reveal themselves in the way messages are structured in the text. All of this is applied with regard to alliteration in this paper.

From the discussion in this section, it is clear that stylistics offers itself as an easily definable activity with specific functions and objectives. It enables the reader to identify the distinguishing features of poetic texts and to specify generic, figurative, and structural subdivisions of the genre. This section has introduced literary stylistics as the underpinning theory for this study. It has done so by commenting briefly on the significance of theory in the analysis of literary texts, and by explaining the concept of stylistics – including its historical background, its assumptions, and how it links to poetry.

Research Methodology

This research is conducted with qualitative research methodology as the relevant approach. This methodology considers people's views about life and the world. It makes an in-depth description and understanding of social actions (Babbie and Mouton, 2015: 269). Malterude (2001: 483) views the qualitative method as involving 'the systematic collection, organization, and interpretation of textual material derived from talk or observation'. This kind of research generally includes 'interviews, observations, surveys, content analysis of visual and written materials and oral history' (Mason, 2002: 49). As compared with the quantitative method, in which data and findings are presented in numbers, qualitative research presents its data and findings in words (Walliman, 2011: 71).

As this discourse analyses how Shasha uses alliteration in his poetry, it involves the collection, organisation, and interpretation of textual material. No interviews will be conducted. Even observations will be based on the reading of the poems. The poems have been studied with the aim of identifying the use of alliteration. Therefore, Shasha's *Zihlabana nje Ziyalamba* is the primary source of the study. Books, journals, and theses have been relied on as secondary sources.

Assonance

Assonance is a form of alliteration that is sometimes referred to as vocalic rhyme and consists of the repetition of similar vowel sounds, usually close together, to achieve a particular effect of euphony (Kgobe, 1994: 237). It is the recurrence, in words of proximity, of identical vowel sounds (Barnet et al., 1997: 610). Poems where Shasha uses assonance very vividly are 'Ihagu', 'Ucango', 'Izinja Namathambo' and 'UNongqawuse'. For instance, in the poem 'Ihagu' the poet uses assonance with the recurrence of the *-i-* vowel within a line or even a word in the line, as the following example illustrates:

> *Kwath**i** ngx**i**ngx**i**l**i**l**i** kwangamants**i**nts**i**nts**i;***
>
> (There was an abrupt standstill and heavy quivering followed;)
> (Shasha, 1992: 2)

The poem from which this example is taken is about a pig that was pursued by dogs. In the above example, the *-i-* vowel is used eight times. The repetition of this vowel in the ideophone *ngxingixilili* (dead stop) emphasises how frustrated the pig was when the dogs arrived in the field to attack it. The re-use of this sound, specifically, emphasises that the pig remained on the same spot. The word *ngxingxilili* (dead stop) is employed to illustrate how the pig came to a standstill, confused as to which direction to take, as it was attacked by the dogs from all directions.

Again, in the word *kwangamantsintsintsi* (there was quivering) the repetition of the *-i-* vowel illustrates how the dogs attack the pig, one tearing the ear, the other one holding the tail and the next one pulling any part it could bite. It also illustrates that this action took place at one spot, as the pig could not run away. The recurrence of the vowel gives the line a musical effect.

In the poem 'Ucango', which is about knocking at

the door, the poet uses assonance in the following line:

***O**nkq**o**nkq**o**za ng**o**bun**o**n**o** ng**o**ntliziy**o** –mhl**o**phe,*

(The one who knocks gently is a good-hearted person,)
(Shasha, 1992: 4)

The vowel sound *-o-* appears nine times in the above line and is repeated in all the members of the line. The repetition of this vowel emphasises that the person who knocks gently is a good-hearted one, who has no bad intentions and does not cause any fear or threat, unlike someone who knocks as if to break the door because of their cruel hearts. This is reflected by the beautiful rhythm that is created by the repetition of this vowel. The repetition of the *-o-* vowel also illustrates the consistency with which a gentle person knocks, as he does not change the rhythm of knocking. Here, the intention is to illustrate that there are different ways of knocking. There is a way of knocking that illustrates love and one that illustrates distress and hatred.

In the poem 'Izinja Namathambo', which is about dogs fighting over bones, the poet uses assonance in the following lines:

*Z**a**xhom**a**n**a** ng**a**m**a**th**a**mbo z**a**d**a** z**a**bul**a**l**a**n**a**;*
*Z**a**ngq**a**vul**a**n**a** z**a**bul**a**l**a**n**a** ngenx**a** y**a**m**a**th**a**mbo;*
*Z**a**nc**a**m' iny**a**m**a** y**a**zo z**a**lib**a**l**a** ng**a**m**a**th**a**mbo!*

(They were fighting heavily because of bones until they killed each other;
They attacked and killed each other because of bones;
They gave up on their meat and concentrated on bones!)
(Shasha, 1992: 28)

Note is taken of the repetition of the words *ngamathambo* (because of bones) and *zabulalana* (they killed each other). This is to emphasise that the dogs fight and kill each other because of bones. The *-a-* vowel appears 12 times in the first line, 12 times in the second line, and 11 times in the third one. By this practice, Shasha draws the reader's attention to the importance of bones to dogs. He illustrates how dogs can even go to the extent of killing each other just for the sake of bones. Among amaXhosa, dogs are normally given bones when there is meat. That is the reason they are depicted as very fond of bones to the extent of killing each other. This fondness of bones is emphasised by the dogs giving up on meat and focusing on bones to the extent of killing each other. This shows how they are not used to eating meat but bones.

By repeating the *-a-* vowel in all the words of the three lines, the poet also draws the attention of the reader to the hidden meaning of these lines. The presence of a hidden meaning becomes apparent in the fact that dogs are presented giving up on meat and concentrating on bones. While dogs are normally given bones to gnaw when there is meat, in reality, they never leave meat for bones when it is available for them to eat. What is not understandable then is that, even though there is meat available for the dogs, they leave it and still rush for the bones and fight over them. This idea is discussed in more detail later in this paper.

It should also be noted that the bones, for the sake of which the dogs kill each other, are from animals that were hunted and caught by them, but taken away by a human being. It is this human being who gives the bones to the dogs while he eats up the meat. Xhosa literary writers often use animals to represent oppressed people, and human beings to represent the oppressors (Tshomela, 2006: 56). This is also found in Siyongwana's novel *Ubulumko Bezinja* (1962), in the poems 'Ukwenziwa Komkhonzi' by Jolobe (1992), and 'Inkabi Kabawo' by Qangule (1970).

Bones are what remains after meat has been cut away from them. In this sense, they are the leftovers of the meat that is taken away. They then represent the leftovers of the wealth that is taken away by the oppressors. In the above lines, then, the poet depicts a situation where the oppressed fight and kill each other for leftovers, while the oppressor consumes the actual wealth which the oppressed worked hard to make available. This is what happened during the apartheid regime in South Africa. Black people (the oppressed) fought and killed one another because of a very small portion of the wealth that they worked hard to create, while the white people (the oppressors) held the bulk of the wealth of the country. Black homeland leaders would be at loggerheads among themselves for the sake of the little wealth they were given by their white bosses in South Africa. A clear example of this

was when the then-President of Ciskei, L. L. Sebe, and that of Transkei, K. D. Matanzima, would have a war of words as Matanzima wanted to include Ciskei under his authority. This became more apparent when the Transkei government attempted a failed *coup d'état* over Ciskei in 1987. In addition, General Bantu Holomisa staged a successful coup against Stella Sigcawu, who was the Premier of Transkei, in 1987, while Brigadier Oupa Gqozo staged a successful overthrow of L. L. Sebe of Ciskei in 1989. At some stage, Mbotoli and his company staged an unsuccessful ousting against Holomisa, where people died. All of this proves that Black people fought each other over the little wealth they were given by the whites who controlled the wealth of greater South Africa. This little wealth can be regarded as the leftovers of the larger wealth of South Africa, as the homelands would receive their budget from South Africa after the latter had completed its own budget. Black people, most of whom resided in the Bantustan homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei) and the self-governing states such as Zululand and KaNgwane, but worked in the mines of South Africa to create the wealth there, should have concentrated on fighting for the real wealth they had created. Instead, they fought over the leftovers.

Note should be taken of the use of the possessive *yazo* (theirs) in the third line of the extract. This refers to the meat as belonging to the dogs. In the same way, the wealth in South Africa belonged to the oppressed people, as they were the aboriginal inhabitants of the land while the oppressors came to it from 1652. The minerals were mined from their land, and they worked to create wealth by labouring in the mines and farms of the country – all of which should have given them ownership of this wealth. It was unfortunate that the oppressors took the real affluence and gave the residue to the oppressed. The idea of ownership is further emphasised by Mtumane and Tshomela (2019) as:

> 'the black people who inhabited Africa (including South Africa) long before the whites came to it, belong to the land. Blacks, who were then called the Bantu, are reported to have been in South Africa already by 300 AD...The minerals and all other forms of wealth produced by the land should be their inheritance. The whites, who only came to the land around the 17th century, were foreigners or newcomers. By taking away the wealth of this country from the indigenous people, whom they found in Africa, they were usurping the latter's inheritance.'

Mqhayi (1974: 73) also depicts this scenario in the poem 'Aa! Zweliyazuza' (Hail! Zweliyazuza) when he views Sir George Grey, who visited South Africa from Great Britain, as *Ndlalifa yelakowethu* (Heir of our own land). With this phrase, Mqhayi emphasises that Sir George Grey was considered as the beneficiary of the land (South Africa) which had its own inhabitants, while he was an external person and a visitor from Great Britain. In this manner, he is presented as seizing the birth right from its legitimate owners, the Africans.

The fact that Black people were given the leftovers of the wealth is also evident when one considers that the more developed towns and farms belonged to 'white' South Africa while the less developed ones belonged to the Bantustan homelands. For instance, the more developed towns of East London and King Williams Town, although they fell within the borders of Ciskei, belonged to white South Africa, while the less developed towns of Peddie, Whittlesea, Alice, including their rural areas, belonged to the Ciskei homeland.

In the poem 'UNongqawuse', the poet uses assonance in the following lines:

> *Indl**a**l**a** y**a**s**a**ndl**a**l**a** s**a**ngc**a**d**a**l**a**zel**a***
> *singcungcuthek**a**,*
> *S**a**yil**a**t**a** s**a**ngcuc**a**l**a**z**a** s**a**yob**a** ngenx**a** yeph**a**ngo*
>
> (Famine degraded us as we emaciated,
> We moved from one place to another and fainted because of hunger)
> (Shasha, 1992: 47)

The poem from which this excerpt is taken is about the cattle killing of 1856 among amaXhosa, which was the plot of the white people who pretended to be ancestors and used Nongqawuse to order people to destroy their livestock and crops as they said there would be wealth thereafter, and that the Britons would be driven away, among other promises.

In the above excerpt, the *-a-* vowel is repeated 12 times

in the first line and 11 times in the second one. The repetition of this vowel emphasises how people fainted because of famine and hunger after the cattle killing brought by Nongqawuse's prophesy. The people who introduced themselves as ancestors, to convey the message to amaXhosa that they should destroy their livestock and field crops, appeared to Nongqawuse, who was Mhlakaza's niece. These people claimed that they (as ancestors) wanted to cleanse the land and destroy witchcraft. They promised that, in turn, there would be great wealth as people would have plenty of food, and that the dead would rise. AmaXhosa obeyed and destroyed their livestock and field crops. After all this, a big famine befell the nation. There was death all around (Brownlee, 1977: 126–159; Soga, 1989: 159–170; Peires, 1989: 78–181).

The repetition of the *-a-* vowel in the above lines then illustrates and emphasises the death caused by famine, which came because of Nongqawuse's prophesy, which later proved to be incorrect. The foregoing discussion has illustrated how assonance is used in Shasha's poetry. Besides emphasising certain actions and situations, the repetition of vowels creates a beautiful rhythm and gives the poetry an aesthetic effect as the reader appreciates reading it. When the poem is read aloud, the beautiful rhythm becomes audible and gives structure to the lines in which it is used.

Consonance

Consonance is a form of alliteration that is the repetition of a sequence of consonants but with a change in the intervening stressed vowel (Kgobe, 1994: 238). It is the repetition of identical consonant sounds (Barnet et al., 1997: 610). This repetition tends to give the poem a definite structure and creates audible rhythm. Poems in which Shasha uses consonance clearly are 'Isiphango', 'Utyhilo Lwelitye kwaNtsebeza eCala', and 'Ukhelekenkce'. For instance, in the poem 'Isiphango', which is about a hailstorm, the following lines reflect the repetition of consonant sounds:

> *Isi**ch**o**th**o si**ch**o**th**oze saco**th**oza,*
> *Sa**ch**ol' i**ch**am lobu**ch**opho begusha;*
>
> (The hailstorm dropped steadily,
> It picked up a sheep's brain at no cost;)
> (Shasha, 1992: 10)

Consonance, in these lines, is formed by the recurrence of the *-ch-* and *-th-* sounds. The *-ch-* sound occurs two times in the first line and three times in the second one. The *-th-* sound occurs three times in the first line only. The repetition of these consonants in the above lines emphasises the manner in which the hailstorm fell and its consequences.

Note should be taken that the *-ch-* and *-th-* sounds form part of the root of the word *isichotho* (hailstorm). The recurrence of these sounds in the first line then points to the action connected to the hailstorm. It also gives the auditory image of the drops of the hailstorm dripping steadily. The frequency of the *-ch-* sound in the second line enhances the idea of the actions associated with the hailstorm. The hailstorm is depicted as having destroyed the sheep and the owners of the sheep lost out, as they got nothing in return, hence the storm is said to have picked up a sheep's brain at no cost.

In the poem 'Utyhilo Lwelitye KwaNtsebeza ECala', which is about the unveiling of a tombstone, the poet uses consonance as follows:

> *Nda**hl**okoma ndi**hl**iki**hl**wa li**hl**ombe!*
>
> (I made noise as I was moved by excitement!)
> (Shasha, 1992: 41)

Consonance in this line is fulfilled by the recurrence of the *-hl-* consonant sound, appearing four times in the line. The recurrence of this sound creates a

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beautiful rhythm. Its repetition illustrates the noise that was made by people at the unveiling of the tombstone because of excitement. This repetition then emphasises the excitement experienced by people at the ceremony, as everyone (including the poet) present, wanted to say something. It is the positive speeches of the speakers about Ntsebeza that excited the audience. The poet, also, could not avoid the exciting feeling, as he reveals in the above line.

In the poem 'Ukhelekenkce', which is about the appreciation of isiXhosa language, consonance is fulfilled with the recurrence of the *-tyh-* sound in the following line:

> *Ba**tyh**il' intyilazwi za**tyh**wa**tyh**wa izi**tyh**akala*
>
> (They opened dictionaries and fools were threatened)
> (Shasha, 1992: 36)

The *-tyh-* sound appears four times in the above line. This consonance mainly serves emphatic and decorative functions. It also promotes the musical sounds effect in the poetry. The repetition of the *-tyh-* sound illustrates fear from those who fail to reason, as they cannot stand in defence of isiXhosa that is undermined by foreigners. Although they are being assisted by the presence of dictionaries, they are still being suppressed, as they are not free to use their language. All this causes concern to those who are proud of isiXhosa.

The above situation was a result of the undermining of the indigenous languages of Africa, in favour of English and Afrikaans, under the apartheid regime in South Africa. The speakers of these languages then felt apologetic and lacked confidence when using their own languages, isiXhosa being one of them.

It should be noted that the repetition of the *-ch-*, *-th-,* and *-tyh-* sounds, as illustrated in the above discussion, is a case of what Bobelo (2008: 98) refers to as the repetition of double consonants. Double consonants are an instance where different 'consonants are grouped at the area of the mouth or nostrils, where they are articulated. This results in the articulation of double consonants at the same time.' For instance, the *-ch-* sound is a double consonant in the sense that it consists of the alveolar click sound *-c-* and the voiceless glottalic *-h-* sound, which are joined together to form the *-ch-* sound. This results in aspiration of the *c* sound with the *-h-* sound.

The *-th-* sound is also a double consonant in that the ejective alveolar *-t-* sound is articulated at the same time with the voiceless glottal *-h-*, which results in the aspiration of the *-t-* sound. The same applies with the *-tyh-* sound where the *-ty-* consonant is articulated simultaneously with the *-h-* glottal sound, resulting in the aspiration on the *-ty-* sound.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the employment of alliteration in Shasha's volume of poetry entitled *Zihlabana nje Ziyalamba*. Alliteration was discussed as it gets revealed through the use of assonance and consonance. Prior to discussing these forms, the theoretical framework, the theory of stylistics that underpins the study and research methodology, were introduced in the study.

Assonance and consonance, as they are used as forms of alliteration in the poetry under study, primarily serve decorative or ornamental and emphatic functions as they make the reading of the poetry more interesting. They also create rhythm, which, in turn, gives the poetry a definite structure, and affords it a musical sound effect or euphony. They further give the reader a clearer view of what the poet is presenting in his poetry.

While this study deals with alliteration in the poetry of W. Shasha, it is recommended that scholars of literature attend to the concept in considerations of the works of other poets. It would be interesting to read how other poets use alliteration to emphasise their messages in their works.

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South Africa's Policy Framework for Higher Education Internationalisation: A Decolonial Perspective

By Samia Chasi

Abstract

This article critically discusses the Policy Framework for Internationalisation of Higher Education in South Africa, as adopted by the South African government in late 2020. Using a decolonial lens, it adds a critical voice to public discourse on the country's first national policy for higher education internationalisation. The article argues that the Policy Framework needs to engage more vigorously with decolonisation as one of the most pertinent issues affecting higher education in South Africa today. It offers perspectives on what shifting the geography and biography of knowledge means in the context of the Policy Framework, thus opening up the possibility of moving South Africa from being primarily a receiver to a creator of internationalisation knowledge and practice.

Introduction

In November 2020, the South African Minister of Higher Education, Science and Innovation formally announced that the *Policy Framework for Internationalisation of Higher Education in South Africa* had been ratified. Up to that point, the country's higher education institutions (HEIs) had dealt with internationalisation mostly in their individual institutional capacities since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Chasi and Quinlan, 2021). The International Education Association of South Africa (IEASA) recognised the need for a national internationalisation policy as early as 2003 (Jooste and Hagenmeier, 2018) and was a major driving force in its development. More recently, Universities South Africa (USAf) identified lobbying the South African government 'to develop and implement an internationalisation policy framework' as a priority area in its *Strategic Framework, 2015–2019,* (USAf, 2014: 11), noting that '[a]lthough South Africa's universities are internationalising to improve their scholarship, research and innovation efforts; the absence of a national macro policy framework limits their growth potential in this regard' (ibid.).

Not surprisingly under these circumstances, the adoption of the first national internationalisation policy represents an important milestone for the advancement of higher education internationalisation in South Africa. As such, it is an opportune moment to reflect on internationalisation from a South African perspective, particularly in the context of other significant issues affecting higher education in the country, key among them decolonisation.

Before discussing decolonisation in more detail, it is important to note that it is inextricably linked to the concepts of *coloniality* and *decoloniality*. On the one hand, coloniality 'refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 13). On the other hand, decoloniality is concerned with the 'dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and the geo-political hierarchies' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 14).

At its core, a decolonial approach is concerned with the 'agenda of shifting the geography and biography of knowledge', addressing the question of 'who generates knowledge and from where' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 15). This involves the idea that rigorous knowledge is not generated by 'adhering to questions, concepts, and standards on the basis of the views or needs of only one region of the world, and even less of a region that has been characterized by either colonizing or ignoring other regions' (Maldonado-Torres, 2011: 10).

Using a decolonial lens, this article adds a critical voice to public discourse on the Policy Framework. It explores what shifting the geography and biography of knowledge could mean in the context of South Africa's Policy Framework on higher education internationalisation. It argues that the Policy missed an opportunity to systematically and overtly address internationalisation in the context of decolonisation and that future iterations need to engage much more vigorously with decolonisation as an opportunity to not only reflect critically on dominant trends of higher education internationalisation in South Africa, but also to imagine internationalisation differently from the perspective of the Global South. Doing so will open up the possibility for South Africa to be an active and self-determined contributor and partner in the global field of internationalisation of higher education.

South Africa's Internationalisation Policy Framework

The objective of the Policy Framework of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) was, fundamentally, to understand why South Africa should internationalise its higher education sector (Stacey, 2020). In this context, internationalisation is defined as 'an intentional or steered process to incorporate intercultural, international and/or global dimensions into higher education in order to advance the goals, functions and delivery of higher education and thus to enhance the quality of education and research' (DHET, 2019: 9). Adopting a comprehensive approach to higher education internationalisation in South Africa, the Policy specifically addresses key internationalisation dimensions such as student and staff mobility, research collaboration, cross-border and collaborative programmes, as well as Internationalisation at Home (IaH) initiatives (DHET, 2019). It notes that rationales for internationalisation include the positioning of South Africa's higher

> “Using a decolonial lens, this article adds a critical voice to public discourse on the Policy Framework. It explores what shifting the geography and biography of knowledge could mean in the context of South Africa’s Policy Framework on higher education internationalisation.”

education sector to be competitive in a globalised world, the advancing of higher education quality as well as the benefiting of society at large and enhancing opportunities for higher education to contribute to the public good (DHET, 2019).

Overall, the DHET’s Policy Framework, which was developed through a process of consultations with local and international stakeholders, has been well received by the South African higher education community. It is generally considered an important milestone for higher education internationalisation in the country (Jooste and Hagenmeier, 2020; Stacey, 2020). As a first of its kind, the Policy provides legitimacy for and guidance on internationalisation of higher education, including for those universities that had been forging ahead with internationalisation activities in the absence of national guidance (Stacey, 2020). It has been noted that ‘the South African system can have a sigh of relief that the Policy is now available’ (Jooste and Hagenmeier, 2020), particularly because more than three years had passed since the Policy Framework was initially published as a draft in April 2017.

In terms of more specific sector responses, the Policy Framework has, on the one hand, been praised as an innovative document that is ‘conceptually on the cutting edge of international discourse and integrates the thinking of several leading experts in the field’ (Jooste and Hagenmeier, 2020). As such, it is also understood as having ‘the potential to elevate South Africa’s higher education system to a leading position when it comes to advancing internationalisation in the developing world’ (ibid.).

On the other hand, the Policy Framework has been criticised for not explicitly linking internationalisation to developments relating to the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), information and communication technology (ICT), and virtualisation in the higher education environment (Rodny-Gumede, 2020). What is missing, for example, are ‘guidelines for ICT in advancing internationalisation and support for the development of new collaborative platforms for research, teaching and learning’ (Rodny-Gumede, 2020). In that sense, the Policy could have done more to highlight opportunities and provide national guidance on ICT-related innovation and virtual internationalisation strategies, which are specifically important in resource constrained environments such as the South African higher education sector (Rodny-Gumede, 2020). The importance of and need for such focus and guidance is arguably even more relevant in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has seen the rise of virtual internationalisation activities, including virtual conferences, virtual student and staff exchanges as well as Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL).

This article addresses another significant shortcoming of the Policy Framework, focusing on if and how it responds to issues of decolonisation of higher education, a question which arises poignantly in the context of the main process of the Policy’s development. While lobbying for a national internationalisation policy began in the early 2000s, the DHET only formally initiated the development process of the Policy in 2015 (Jooste and Hagenmeier, 2020). In the same year, a decolonial student movement was formed in South Africa, petitioning that ‘the statue of Cecil John Rhodes be removed from the campus of the University of Cape Town, as the first step towards decolonisation of the university as a whole’ (The Rhodes Must Fall Movement, n.d.).

In the coming years, decolonisation of higher education gained prominence in academic and public domains. When the DHET published its draft Policy Framework for public comment in 2017, South African HEIs had lived through a period of considerable instability in the wake of national student protests, which peaked in 2015 and 2016. Under the banners

of 'Rhodes Must Fall' and 'Fees Must Fall', students around the country called higher education in South Africa into question, most notably regarding issues of relevance, quality and affordability, framed more broadly in a decolonisation discourse. The student protest movements, which gathered momentum in South Africa and elsewhere, highlighted the complexities of colonial legacies in higher education. In South Africa, they spoke specifically to a variety of dimensions that 'urgently require transformation, including statues, symbols and names but also, more broadly, issues of access, financing and relevance, with a particular focus on institutional racism, white privilege and black pain' (Chasi, 2021: 43). Such issues received increasing attention at the same time as work on the development of the Policy Framework was ongoing. It therefore seems reasonable to ask how decolonisation, which has arguably become one of the most pertinent issues affecting higher education in South Africa today, is being addressed in the Policy.

The Policy Framework and Decolonisation

The DHET's Policy Framework does not appear to make a direct and obvious link between internationalisation and decolonisation of higher education in so far as the term *decolonisation* has not entered its vocabulary. It is neither mentioned in the draft version of 2017 nor in the final version adopted in 2020. This does not mean, however, that the Policy is totally void of issues that are relevant to a discussion of decolonisation. In the sections that follow, two such issues are elaborated in more detail, pertaining to transformation, which provides the broader context in which decolonisation is embedded, and Africanisation, which is at the heart of decolonisation on the African continent.

As far as South Africa's transformation agenda is concerned, the Policy Framework recognises, referring to the country's Education White Paper 3 of 1997, the important role that higher education plays in contributing to national growth and social transformation through human capital development. It acknowledges past legacies of an 'unequally differentiated higher education system' (DHET, 2019: 21), which manifest in an uneven advancement of internationalisation across the sector and translate into the need to focus internationalisation efforts specifically on historically disadvantaged institutions (HDIs). As noted in that regard, more than 20 years after the end of apartheid, HDIs need to be prioritised, as they 'still have very low levels of international relations and are not yet, therefore, benefiting from internationalisation to the degree that they could' (DHET, 2019: 21).

The Policy Framework further recognises that both transformation and internationalisation are key objectives for South African HEIs. Regarding their interconnectedness, it is pointed out, for example, that 'internationalisation of the curriculum must not negate curriculum transformation imperatives that higher education institutions in South Africa have an obligation to fulfil; the two can be carried out together successfully' (DHET, 2019: 45). Generally, transformation and internationalisation goals need to be balanced against each other. To illustrate this, while it is in the country's interest 'to appoint the best possible people in academic positions in its higher education institutions, including talented and qualified scientists and scholars from elsewhere in the world', such recruitment 'must be balanced with addressing race and gender transformation through creating opportunities for black and women South African citizens' (DHET, 2019: 33). In cases of conflict, it is suggested that transformation goals should prevail. For example, recruitment of international talent must not be to the 'detriment of job opportunities for equally qualified and experienced South African citizens' (DHET, 2019: 25). In other words, there can be 'no justification for any South African institution prioritising and preferring foreign nationals to South Africans who qualify equally for the same post' (DHET, 2019: 33). As far as students are concerned, international enrolments must not be 'at the expense of access to higher education for South African citizens' (DHET, 2019: 30).

Apart from such illustration of how internationalisation and transformation intertwine, the Policy Framework embeds internationalisation in South Africa in a broader continental context, with reference to African development, the African Renaissance and intra-Africa collaboration (DHET, 2019). More specifically, it gives expression to 'an Afro-centric preferential approach to the SADC region students and staff' (Stacey, 2020), particularly regarding the SADC Protocol on Education and Training of 1997, which is considered 'an early position on the internationalisation of higher

education by the South African government' (DHET, 2019: 13).

A regional and continental orientation is particularly evident in the Policy's priority focus, which states that South African HEIs must design internationalisation activities relating to all their core functions in such a way that priority is, first and foremost, given to South Africa's interests. Following that, 'where possible and relevant, the following order of priority focus should be observed in terms of interests: the SADC states; the rest of the African continent; BRICS; the global South and emerging economies; and the world beyond' (DHET, 2019: 22).

Putting South Africa's interests first might be considered an implicit way of expressing a core theme of decolonisation, which focuses on centring Africa. For the Policy Framework, this implies moving the *centre*, which is generally understood as a synonym for Euro-America or the West, to South Africa. To illustrate this further, it is worth noting that there is a strong correlation between the DHET's priority focus for higher education internationalisation and the organising principle used for the restructuring of the Literature Department at the University of Nairobi in the late 1960s. As described in his book *Decolonising the Mind*, Wa Thiong'o notes that this new organising principle revolved around moving away from a focus on English literature to 'a study of Kenyan and East African literature, African literature, third world literature and literature from the rest of the world' (1987: 94). In doing so, it expressed a determination to 'establish the centrality of Africa in the department', based on education being 'a means of knowledge about ourselves. Therefore, after we have examined ourselves, we radiate outwards and discover peoples and worlds around us' (ibid.).

The University of Nairobi's organising principle, as described here, cannot be easily and directly compared to the DHET's Policy Framework, as the former is a matter of ideology, while the latter is an example of a national policy. However, it is interesting to note that the two are underpinned by a shared motivation to centre Africa, in so far as both start by bringing attention to the local dimension first, represented by Kenya and South Africa, respectively. From there, they move outwards, starting with the regions that are closest to home, represented by East Africa and Southern Africa, respectively. After that, their spheres of engagement broadly overlap, extending to the African continent, the Global South and, ultimately, the world beyond.

While it is not mentioned as an explicit example, the DHET's priority focus for higher education internationalisation in South Africa gives some expression to the centrality of Africa as a key theme of decolonisation of higher education on the continent. As Wa Thiong'o points out, there is a 'need to move the centre from its assumed location in the West to a multiplicity of spheres in all the cultures of the world' (1993: 16). Moving South Africa to the centre of attention and engagement, highlighting that its interests need to be prioritised, is very meaningful in the context of international higher education, where universities' internationalisation efforts tend to benefit Northern institutions more than their Southern counterparts, particularly regarding such dimensions as student mobility and research partnerships.

What the Policy Framework does not do, however, is to engage with decolonisation more deliberately, openly, systematically and deeply from the perspective of South Africa as a postcolonial, post-apartheid society in transformation. The following sections address this shortcoming and offer some critical reflections on what shifting the geography and biography of reason could mean in the context of South Africa's Policy Framework on higher education internationalisation.

Taking a Deeper Look

As mentioned earlier, a key objective of decolonisation is to shift the 'geography and biography of knowledge' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 15). To illustrate how this relates to South Africa's national internationalisation policy, three key concepts will be briefly referred to: criticality, positionality, and pluriversality.

In the first instance, shifting the geography and biography of knowledge entails criticality. It provides an opportunity to question 'methodologies as well as the present asymmetrical world order' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 11). In that sense, a critical engagement with higher education internationalisation must recognise that current internationalisation practices are predominantly informed by 'hegemonic/neoliberal/capitalist/commercial globalisation' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,

2021: 93). Furthermore, internationalisation is 'a global phenomenon, but one that is dominated by Northern perspectives in terms of its definitions, concepts and practices' (Chasi, 2020: 8). The importance and relevance of such definitions, concepts and practices in a Global South context needs to be deliberately interrogated and contextualised in response to local needs and realities.

Secondly, shifting the geography and biography of knowledge requires a careful positioning of South Africa as an 'ex-colonised epistemic site' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 13), which must entail an explicit acknowledgement of the significance of decolonisation in South African higher education, as it continues to be shaped by colonial legacies. This includes, for example, a critical engagement with the role of colonial languages in Africa, which forms an integral part of the decolonisation project. In that regard, a Policy statement on the 'globalisation of English as the *lingua franca* [original emphasis] of higher education, which has opened up national higher education systems to globally mobile students and academics' (DHET, 2019: 36) cannot be simply accepted as a fact. When adopting a decolonial approach, the dominance of English as a medium of instruction and scholarship in universities across the continent must be critically discussed, and such a discussion must be linked to efforts to counteract the marginalisation of local and indigenous languages and knowledge systems in universities in (South) Africa.

Thirdly, decolonisation allows for a pluriversal approach to internationalisation, as it is premised on the 'recognition of the diverse ways through which different people view and make sense of the world' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2021: 79). To illustrate all this with an example, internationalisation of the curriculum (IoC), a key dimension of higher education internationalisation, is defined in the Policy Framework as 'the incorporation of intercultural, international and/or global dimensions into the content of the curriculum as well as into learning outcomes, assessment tasks, teaching methods and support services of a programme of study' (DHET, 2019: 9). This definition reflects well-known definitions developed by Northern scholars and an understanding of internationalisation that is essentially Euro-American. However, accepting such a definition as universally valid and applying it uncritically to the South African context bears the risk of falling victim to 'externally generated knowledges that are not informed by geo- and biographical contextual understanding of the African condition' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 14).

For a contextual understanding of IoC in South Africa, it is important to recognise that the country's HEIs have colonial origins and that university curricula remain, in the main, Euro-centric in orientation and character (Heleta, 2016). However, when applying a decolonial lens, curriculum internationalisation can be approached differently, from an African perspective. In this regard, an internationalised curriculum can be understood as a curriculum that centres Africa and 'situates the notion of Africanness as a key lever for engaging with the global world in solving its developmental challenges and in seeking to position itself as a competitive entity in the globally competitive higher education context' (Wits, 2014: 11). This meaning of IoC is Afro-centric and highlights the importance of the notion of Africanness. It is rooted in a more nuanced and contextualised understanding of internationalisation, which includes '[p]rocesses which seek to embed and elevate an Afro-Global Scholarship as an authentic global episteme equal and competing with other globally recognised epistemes' (Wits, 2014: 8).

Having highlighted the relevance of criticality, positionality and pluriversality for a decolonial perspective on internationalisation, it is important to note that shifting the geography and biography

"In this regard, an internationalised curriculum can be understood as a curriculum that centres Africa and 'situates the notion of Africanness as a key lever for engaging with the global world in solving its developmental challenges and in seeking to position itself as a competitive entity in the globally competitive higher education context'"

of knowledge also relates to an appreciation for decoloniality 'as a liberatory thought that gestures towards the possibility of another world and knowledge' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 15). In this regard, decolonisation creates opportunities to re-imagine higher education internationalisation from the vantage point of South Africa. Such re-imagining must further elaborate on and give substance to one of the main rationales for internationalisation of higher education included in the Policy Framework, which is 'to benefit society and enhance opportunities for higher education to contribute to the public good' (DHET, 2019: 20). As highlighted by IEASA in the context of lessons learnt from the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, 'internationalisation efforts of universities should be permeated by an agenda that focuses on inclusion and social justice' (IEASA, 2020: 4). In the broader context of higher education internationalisation, this is linked to how international engagements can contribute to the 'creation of a better world by addressing its challenges' (DHET, 2019: 23). Ultimately, internationalisation must be a 'liberatory and rehumanising project engaging with colonialism and dislocating it' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2021: 94). This is relevant for higher education as much as for other spheres, for South Africa as much as for other countries and regions of the world.

Conclusions

With the development and adoption of the *Policy Framework for Internationalisation of Higher Education in South Africa* the South African government has, for the first time, addressed higher education internationalisation formally and substantively at the national level. The first edition of the national internationalisation policy is therefore undoubtedly a landmark for higher education in South Africa and, more specifically, for the advancement of internationalisation in the sector.

While the Policy Framework implicitly speaks to decolonisation, one of the most pertinent issues affecting higher education in South Africa today, it does not engage with decolonisation systematically and deeply. In that sense, the Policy missed an important opportunity to be truly reflective of and responsive to its location in place and time. In the immediate term, this gap can be addressed through robust sector engagement at the institutional level. The flexibility and autonomy provided for in the Policy allows South African HEIs, where internationalisation primarily happens, to take pertinent issues such as decolonisation into account when developing their institutional internationalisation policies and strategies or aligning existing ones to the new national framework. However, as an issue of national importance, decolonisation should also be discussed collectively across the sector. For example, it could be addressed in the form of a national dialogue facilitated by the DHET in collaboration with key national stakeholders such as IEASA and USAf.

A collective engagement should touch on a variety of issues emerging from this reflection on the relevance of decolonisation in the context of higher education internationalisation. It should aim to develop much more explicit guidance on how universities can bring decolonisation and internationalisation agendas into conversation, based on the recognition that using a decolonial lens presents an opportunity to shape a uniquely South African approach to internationalisation. Such an approach must include a critical discussion of currently dominant internationalisation concepts and practices, particularly regarding power and knowledge dependencies, as well as an assessment of their relevance in and value to South African higher education. As a starting point, the very definition of internationalisation, as cited earlier, should be carefully critiqued and adapted to the specific South African context, with consideration for its philosophical underpinnings and lived socio-economic realities.

A contextualised understanding of internationalisation – one that is responsive to local needs, interests, and aspirations – opens up the possibility of re-imagining internationalisation of higher education in South Africa in fundamental ways. It creates spaces for South African HEIs to explore how they can deliberately and confidently participate in and contribute to the global higher education environment from an African base. Ultimately, in this way, decolonisation can help bring about positive change in the dominant internationalisation narrative, focusing on how Southern institutions can be active creators and players in this field rather than being seen primarily as receivers of internationalisation knowledge and practices.

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Heterosexism and Homophobia in the Caribbean Dancehall Context

By Nathan Chapman, Sangeeta Maharaj, Melanie Seeberan, and Emmarica Houlder

Abstract

This paper explores how dancehall lyrics reproduce heterosexist and homophobic discourses in the LGBTQ community within a Caribbean dancehall context. It advances notable scholarship (Chunnu 2021, Hope, 2021) on dancehall lyrics by drawing on standard parallels of the colonial same-sex practices used to denigrate enslaved Africans and the Eurocentric religious ideal that LGBTQ customs contravene Judeo-Christian doctrine. Dancehall music originated in Jamaica within the neo-colonial period (since the 1980s) coming out of reggae. Dancehall is the musical expression of the working-class black masses used to protest the criminogenic continuities of colonial history. Although dancehall acted as a form of protest against the colonially entangled inequalities, heterosexism prevailed and continued to shape the checkered reality of coloniality within Jamaica and T&T societies. As such, this study explores the present-day identities of the LGBTQIA community expressed through the dancehall lyrics created within the 1990-2010 period utilising autobiography, critical discourse analysis by Fairclough and gender performativity theory by Judith Butler. In doing so, the researcher connected dancehall lyrics to heterosexism through an analysis of discourses within religion, sex and sexuality. Such discourses contributed to advancing the understanding of stigmatisation, criminalisation and dehumanisation of the LGBTQ community in a cross-cultural Caribbean context.

“This research does not aim to generalise the distinct identities among all members of the LGBTQ community. Instead, the authors use this acronym as a critical, analytical, and interpretive tool to label dancehall lyrics that reflect heterosexist ideologies. The authors focus specifically on the Caribbean male to argue that dancehall lyrics fixate on non-heterosexual men.”

This paper critically explores how dancehall lyrics, produced during the 1990–2010 period, re-enforce pre-existing heterosexist discourses within Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) and Jamaica. The authors situate the analysis within Hope's (2021: 4) terminology 'femmephobia,' which is 'the patent fear of feminization and male disempowerment that emanates particularly from Jamaica's disempowered lower classes.' The article also advances Chavannes' (1994) understanding of the Delilah complex (cited in Hope, 2021), whereby femininity is seen as a danger as it has the potential to weaken male masculinity. The authors engage this academic discourse and draw on dancehall lyrics, through the translation of Jamaican patois into English, and on the authors' high school experiences in T&T. In this way, the article aims to fulfil the feminist principle of making the personal political.

This research does not aim to generalise the distinct identities among all members of the LGBTQ community. Instead, the authors use this acronym as a critical, analytical, and interpretive tool to label dancehall lyrics that reflect heterosexist ideologies. The authors focus specifically on the Caribbean male to argue that dancehall lyrics fixate on non-heterosexual men. This view supports the argument of Lewis (cited in Brown, 1999: 6), who contends that it is impossible to analyse the Caribbean male without distinguishing between hegemonic masculinity and other 'subordinated forms of masculinity'. Hegemonic masculinity is defined as:

> 'An orientation which is heterosexual and decidedly homophobic. It prides itself on its capacity for sexual conquest and ridicules those men who define their masculinity in different terms. Hegemonic masculinity often embraces misogynist tendencies in which women are considered to be inferior. Departure from this form of masculinity could result in the questioning of one's manhood.' (Brown, 1999: 6)

Gutzmore (2004: 1) argues that ending hatred against LGBTQ people starts with identifying five homophobic imperatives: 'religious fundamentalism, heterosexual naturalism, legalism, cultural nationalism, and child protection, which are held to drive the discriminatory discourses and practices.' Thus, to transform this problem, it is important to disentangle small-level and taken-for-granted discourses that reassert linkages between dancehall lyrics, colonial history, and cross-cultural Caribbean identities in the neo-colonial present. In essence, this study sheds light on the way(s) that dancehall music is expressed within colonially entangled power structures that have shaped identities within the present-day neo-colonial Jamaican and T&T contexts.

This study adopts a transhistorical approach by contextualising heterosexist discourses within a colonial past. However, greater attention is placed on a comparative analysis within the post-independent (post-1990) contemporary era by emphasising how widely held cultural viewpoints and expressions of heteronormativity are rearticulated in Jamaican dancehall lyrics and, uniquely, in their reception in Trinidad and Tobago. In doing so, the authors utilise the theory of gender performativity and explore how dancehall lyrics reproduce culturally embedded heterosexism. According to Butler (1998: 2): 'Gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time, an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts.' Bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self (Butler, 1998: 2). This study shows how the performative acts within dancehall lyrics reproduce the dehumanisation and degradation of LGBTQ identities.

This research, through autobiography and lyrical discourse, discusses popular dancehall lyrics. The

authors are citizens of T&T and do not have a cultural background in the intricacies of Jamaican dancehall music. However, they ground their analysis by reflecting on songs that were popular in their high school days, and which shaped perceptions of LGBTQ individuals within their socialisation. The dancehall music selected for research analysis draws on popular culture familiar to the authors during their high school experiences from 2005–2010 (i.e. the period when the authors attended high school, not necessarily when the songs were created). The origins of the songs span between 1990–2010. The songs selected for analysis include, but are not limited to: 'Batty Boi Fi Dead', which was made by Beenie Man in 2005; 'Batty Boy (Stay Far From We)', created by Dr Evil in 2006; and 'Boom Bye Bye', formed by Buju Banton in 1988, made famous in 1992. These songs were analysed using the Jamaican Patwah dictionary, which translated the patois identified in the dancehall lyrics into English.

Music plays a significant role in shaping socio-cultural discourses. In the 2000s, popular music often supported the ideals of heteronormativity. When the authors initially encountered these tracks, the focus was mainly on the beat. While singing along for entertainment, the authors failed to recognise the violence and heteronormative ideology that was intrinsically engineered into the music. For instance, songs such as 'Batty Boy Fi Dead' depicted gruesome tales which honoured, glorified, and promoted murder, abuse, and hate towards non-heteronormative behaviours. During the authors' high school experiences, any comment or song that mentioned or pointed to a non-heteronormative behaviour was ridiculed, repudiated strongly, or seen as horrendous or hateful. Buju Banton's controversial song 'Boom Bye Bye' was supported by famous singer Red Dragon where he said in the lyrics that non-heterosexual men must die. Such a message has a drastic impact on the broader society and, unfortunately, has been normalised.

Heteronormativity sets an automatic assumption about homosexuality, which may result in social pressures leading individuals to react violently towards people from these minority groups. The authors observed that some of the male students bullied other male students who were not interested in sports and rather expressed interest in music, writing, and poetry. The authors grew up in a space where anything that was not part of God's teaching was seen as an abomination. Thus, lesbians and gays were seen as an abomination in the eyes of God. Due to this, many of the authors' friends, who came from similar religious backgrounds, hid their sexual preferences to prevent being disgraced by their families and community members. So far, the authors have lost two friends to suicide because these friends could no longer live a double life and they feared the society would ostracise them if they were honest about themselves.

Much of dancehall music promoted an ideology of violence towards the LGBTQ community. For instance, at a party, as noted in contemporary vulgarism, as soon as the anti-gay songs came on, the homosexuals in that space were automatically intimidated since the others looked upon them with scorn. When this music was entirely consumed, it had the potential for mind control, which on numerous occasions led to sounds of gunshots, making people fear for their lives. As the authors gazed into the lyrics of these songs, it was disturbing and disappointing that as a younger generation with access to a world of information, we participated and supported such melodies and rhythms without an adequate investigation or a healthy understanding of what we were promoting. In other words, despite the blatant vulgarity and horrifying messages embedded in the music, we failed to see the wrong in it.

Kitzinger (2005: 478) describes heteronormativity as 'the myriad ways in which heterosexuality is produced as a natural, unproblematic, taken-for-granted phenomenon.' The concept assumes that within society, people must conform to the gendered roles, ideals, stereotypes, and expectations. Deviating from these norms can initiate specific, robust sanctions, and repudiation. Dancehall music is a medium to channel and re-enforce this oppression. Interestingly, these songs are so powerful that although the authors were never self-proclaimed homophobes, they sang along to the songs without realising the impact of these lyrics and their subliminal messages. It was not until they reached university that the authors began to explore and reflect on dancehall language.

LGBTQ performers such as the Jamaican actor and

comedian Keith 'Shebada' Ramsey have enjoyed success and overwhelming support, while drawing the ire of the dancehall community. Shebada is embraced through the power of his position as an artist and the talented nature of his craft, similarly to globally revered LGBTQ personalities such as Elton John. This acceptance may not extend to the average, underprivileged LGBTQ individual living in Jamaica. Shebada's charismatic and self-confident personality is reminiscent of Saucy Pow in Trinidad and Tobago, who is known to be unapologetically non-heterosexual and popularly known in T&T for his extravagant dances at parties. Such examples of celebrities who enjoy some level of acceptance does not discount the perilous threats, risk, and brutality that these individuals face. Shebada and Saucy Pow have both spoken publicly about receiving death threats and facing abuse (Souza, 2018).

Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago share a cultural legacy of colonialism that incorporates a long history of discrimination towards gender diversity and same-sex sexualities. These Caribbean territories were not always vehemently homophobic. In the pre-colonial era, there were many examples of indigenous communities that provided a cultural space where gender nonconforming people were accepted, particularly the Two-Spirit people, which was an umbrella term to describe persons who fulfilled the third gender. Colonisers also brought the Eurocentric version of Christianity, which criminalised non-heteronormative behaviours (Stewart, 2017: 1–102). It should be noted, however, that many religious scholars argue that the biblical texts traditionally used to condemn homosexuality, such as the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, have been misunderstood and misrepresented (Gnuse, 2015: 68–87). Atluri (2015: 309) notes that: 'The privileging of heterosexist norms and the patriarchal family by the nation-state has its roots not in any indigenous school of thought, but rather in colonial values.' Before 2018, Trinidad and Tobago had a buggery law, whereby anal sex carried a twenty-five-year sentence and oral sex carried a five-year sentence. Jamaican buggery laws or anti-sodomy laws dated back to the colonial-era 1864 Offenses Against the Person Act (LGBT Issues in Jamaica, 2012: 1–2).

Christianity and colonialism introduced notions of 'respectability' in sexual mores and ideologies that repudiated non-procreative sexual acts (LaFont, 2001; Smith, 1965 (cited in Charles, 2011: 8)). These living legacies of colonialism are present in dancehall lyrics and are reinforced by both the colonially entangled institutions and masses within Jamaica. Cowell (2011: 31–60) responded to Cooper's analysis that dancehall is a 'metaphorical revolt against law and order,' saying rather that it seemed aligned with the 'pious morality and conservative gender ideology of fundamentalist Jamaican society,' at least insofar as it relates to conservative outlooks on same-sexualities. Such homophobic discrimination has been challenged by varying groups. Both the Coalition Advocating for Inclusion of Sexual Orientation (CAISO), which was founded in 2007, and the Jamaica Forum of Lesbians, All-Sexuals and Gays (J-Flag), which was founded in 1998 and forms part of the Caribbean Forum of Lesbians, All-Sexuals and Gays (C-FLAG), are civil society organisations in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica that challenge socio-cultural discrimination by advocating for the rights and freedoms of LGBTQ communities.

Dancehall plays an ambiguous role within Jamaican society because, on the one hand, it reinforces religious values but, on the other, is painted as a genre that promotes vulgarity (Hope, 2006: 1–168). Heterosexism in dancehall lyrics has become a problem globally since the 1990s after songs such as Buju Banton's '*Boom Bye-Bye*' caught international interest and attention. Hope (2021: 4) identifies this song as opening up the early debate of male non-heteronormative sexuality and in response to the 'early movement of the male homosexual body from the hidden corners

"Christianity and colonialism introduced notions of 'respectability' in sexual mores and ideologies that repudiated non-procreative sexual acts (LaFont, 2001; Smith, 1965 (cited in Charles, 2011: 8)). These living legacies of colonialism are present in dancehall lyrics and are reinforced by both the colonially entangled institutions and masses within Jamaica."

and cloaked spaces to the heterosexual public space of Jamaica.' Additionally, dancehall has been rooted in society as its 'fundamentalist brand of Christianity' and 'Rastafarian religion' condemn non-heteronormative behaviours and are inculcated in the values of many dancehall artists. Dancehall also plays a role within the political arena. For instance, in 2001, Tok's song titled 'Chi Chi man' was the theme song of the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP), and the People's National Party (PNP) took on the slogan 'Log on to progress' that referred to a song by Elephant Man, which featured anti-LGBTQ lyrics (Rogers, 2010: 1–161).

Despite the controversy surrounding dancehall, it can be argued that it has ties to other genres of Jamaican music rooted in a form of resistance to colonial oppression. These genres include Mento, Ska, Rocksteady, and Reggae. In particular, we emphasise Jamaican icons like Bob Marley who, through music, stood up against racial injustice and canonised Black revolutionaries such as Marcus Garvey. Nevertheless, non-heteronormative sexualities were largely invisible and, in some instances, marginalised within their music. Queen Ifrica patterned heterosexist lyrics in their songs, which were influenced by biblical scriptures. For instance, Queen Ifrica's song 'Keep it to yourself' was championed as a reggae tune that reinforced heterosexist ideals in society by drawing on religious scripture. The song's lyrics include the following:

> 'Yu fi multiply an replenish di Earth,
> An dats why di woman labor inna child birth,
> Mi nuh want si mi brother dress up inna no skirt'

The first verse draws on biblical scripture that speaks of being fruitful and multiplying, which meant that reproduction was the duty of humankind and ultimately signalled that relationships that deviate from such a purpose are problematic. The reggae artist illustrated this in the following two verses that spoke of women as child-bearers and not wanting to see men or women switch roles where a man wore a 'skirt', which referred to playing a woman's role.

In 2004, Brian Williamson – co-founder of Jamaica's only gay rights organisation (J-Flag) – was murdered at his home. The police concluded that this incident resulted from a robbery that went wrong, but other activists remained doubtful of this assessment. Gareth Henry, the man who replaced Williamson in 2007, was also pursued and had to go into hiding. Heterosexism maintained its space within the dancehall context for a long time, but activists began to emphasise the sheer horror of the verbal violence in dancehall lyrics, also termed 'murder music.' British human rights activist Peter Tatchell coordinated the 'Stop the Murder Music' initiative, which urged sponsors to pull funding and to cancel bookings and venues for artists who produced anti-LGBTQ music. This initiative led to the signing of the Reggae Compassionate Act in 2007, in which numerous dancehall artists promised to no longer produce murder music and to renounce their homophobia. Cooper argued that the invitations found within dancehall lyrics to 'murda', 'bun', or 'step pon' chi-chi man (murder, burn, or step on gay men) were playful and metaphorical lyrical gestures that were not incitements to homophobic attack (cited in Noble, 2008: 4). Noble raised two essential questions: who got to determine what comprises a homophobic attack? Secondly, was verbal abuse acceptable if it does not equate to physical violence? Noble further stated that 'Cooper's position both denies the power of language to shape reality and unremorsefully accepts the accusation of being an apologist for Dancehall's homophobia' (2008: 4).

Dancehall lyrics typically reinforce heterosexist discourses through metaphor or allusion. For instance, in his song titled 'Batty Boy (Stay Far From We)', Dr Evil stated that he had a general dislike for the word 'bottom', an allusion to anal sex. In the contemporary Jamaican dancehall context (2010–present), violent homophobic lyrics are on the decline due to years of 'censorship'. However, 'most dancehall artistes still express their disapproval for this lifestyle in a subtle manner' (MM, 2013). Bounty Killer, for instance, stated the following in reaction to dancehall selector Tony Matterhorn: 'Man, no act so, that's feminine gender; he em fi stop that' [Man don't act so (like how Tony Matterhorn acts), he acts like a female, and he needs to stop that].

Heteronormative discourses such as these are visible in print, social media, and within lyrical discourses. Dancehall lyrics often draw on informal language that resonates with a variety of audiences, giving a creole everyday understanding of religious 'values' in society. Common expressions are used that appeal to multiple audiences. For instance, 'Vagina was made

for penis, not penis for penis, not penis for anus.' Parallels can also be found between biblical scriptures and dancehall lyrics. For example, the dancehall lyrics 'Man to man is so unjust, Man to man just brings disgust' and 'Nah promote no nasty man, dem haffi dead' are reminiscent of certain passages in Leviticus.

The discourse presented within Christian religious texts (as interpreted by some, and contested by others) suggests that Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed because of sexual immorality. This discourse is reflected in dancehall lyrics such as Buju Banton's 'Boom Bye Bye' (1988):

> 'World is in trouble, Anytime Buju Banton comes
> Batty bwoy [homosexual male]
> Get up an run [leave]
> Boom bye bye inna batty boy head [Let me shoot you]'

These lyrics point to how homophobic aspects of Christianity are expressed within dancehall lyrics in vulgar and violent ways. Expressions of homophobia are also evident in the lyrics of Dr Evil's 'Batty Boy (Stay Far From We)':

> 'Batty boy [homosexual male]
> Dem need fi stay far we [They need to stay away or leave]
> 'Cause we nuh inna wha' dem inna (nope!) [We are not promoting that homosexual (penis with penis) sexual behaviour]
> Pussy a wha' buddy fi a go inna [We are promoting heterosexual (vagina with penis) behaviour']

From these lyrics, it is essential to note that on a societal level, sexual orientation is viewed in binary terms: man and woman, and 'penis and vagina'. This binary, therefore, excludes non-heteronormative relationships, but it also extends to a broader understanding of what constitutes 'sexual misconduct'. Some dancehall lyrics suggest that 'sexual misconduct' includes men performing oral sex on women. For instance:

> 'Wha u nuh fi do, fuck bottom' [Men! What are you not to do? Have anal sex.]
> 'Wha u nuh fi do, suck pum pum' [Men! What are you not to do? Have oral sex.]

This points to the concept within hegemonic masculinity that dictates that men must be dominant. The idea of men bending down to women through the medium of performing oral sex is interpreted as emasculating. This is suggested in another song titled 'Do not bend down' by Lovindeer, created pre-1990, which clarifies the idea that men, in particular, should not bend down.

Through the notions of 'sexual misconduct', individuals become socially isolated, stigmatised, and ridiculed for any performance of gender which deviates from the social norm. Therefore, whether one is a member of the LGBTQ community or not, he or she is still made to feel or bear the brunt of the consequences of heterosexism if their gender and sexual identity/practice is not aligned with traditional gendered expectations. These heteronormative notions often derive from religious ideals which, as this article has shown, have their roots in colonial contexts. While this article has drawn on dancehall lyrics as a primary source for understanding heterosexist discourses in Jamaica and T&T, there is a need for further research into how heterosexism is constructed and continues to prevail within these contexts.

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

Coloniality, Legitimacy in Statebuilding, and the Use of Force in Africa

By Samuel Ajogwu Igba and Emmaculate Asige Liaga

Abstract

In Africa, legitimation and claims to the legitimate use of force are often challenged by the problematic nature of ethnic diversity, amongst other things. Although ethnicity and diversity are not the problems in themselves, the politicisation of ethnicity is. In this paper, we link this to a history of colonisation which clustered multiple ethnic groups together within single sovereign entities around the continent, as well as the current realities of coloniality which has prevented states within the continent from imagining and transcending the European artefact and design of the modern state in Africa. We link the exploratory term coloniality in statebuilding to the failure of African states to overcome the politicisation of ethnicity and ethnic diversity in order to mitigate the problematic nature of democracy in modern African states. This failure leads to challenges of legitimacy in any given state, and ultimately the states' claim to the legitimate use of force. The resultant symptoms and indicators of such challenges are manifest in the rise of various insurgencies, separatism, and other forms of insecurity. The cases of Kenya, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia are briefly discussed in this article, highlighting the problematic nature of the claims to the legitimate use of force, legitimacy, and the resultant political ethnicity with all its consequences for these states.

Introduction

Discussions about the use of force and claims to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force became prominent in 16th century political philosophy in Europe (Van Der Lijn, 2017: 1). In discussions about the modern state, the conversation about the role of force and its legitimacy cannot be overlooked. According to Van Der Lijn (2017: 1) the core of a state's monopoly of force is that the state is the guarantor of both internal and external security. Van Der Lijn (2017) further argues that although this concept has functioned in some states, in practice its realisation has generally been more the exception than the rule. It still remains, however, the ideal type of security governance chosen by states around the world. Moreover, scholars such as Tilly (1985), Weber (1919: 1), and Van Der Lijn (2017) have argued that the role of the use of force and the monopoly on the legitimate use of force are central components in statebuilding, as they emphasize the importance of a 'legitimate claim to the use of force.'

In this article, two sources of legitimisation for modern states are discussed: international legitimacy and internal legitimacy. The first connotes a situation whereby a state gets its legitimacy from the international community (Engelbert, 2007); in this sense, recognition by the international community of the state as an entity that governs a designated polity is a form of legitimacy. The second refers to legitimacy given by the governed (Armin, 2005: 593); here, state governments are legitimate because the authority of the elected/appointed governing body is acknowledged and recognised by the polity/constituency it governs. It should be noted that this paper will not provide an analysis of the relations between the two types of legitimacy, nor an analysis of a better one, but provide an analysis of each of them in relation to a state and its legitimate use of force. Challenges to the use of force will emerge if the legitimacy of a state's monopoly on the use of force is in question (Tilly, 1985; Weber, 1919). These challenges can range from individual crimes such as armed robberies or kidnappings, to outright confrontations from militia, secessionist and terrorist groups.

In Africa, challenges to legitimation and claims to the legitimate use of force are further exacerbated by the problematic nature of ethnic diversity. Ake (1993) contends that ethnicity is not the problem, but the politicisation of ethnicity is. At this point, a distinction should be made between ethnicity, political ethnicity, and tribalism. While ethnicity is defined as 'a social group or category of the population, set apart and bound together by common ties of race, language, nationality or culture' (Sanders, 2007: 21), tribalism has a more negative connotation as 'the attitude and practice of harboring such a strong feeling of loyalty or bonds to one's tribe that one excludes or even demonizes those 'others' who do not belong to that group' (Nothwehr, 2008: 5). Political ethnicity is a closer term to tribalism, but is specific to politics, as Ake (1993) describes it as 'the politicization and transformation of ethnic exclusivity into major political cleavages.'

In this paper, we link the phenomenon of political ethnicity to a history of *colonisation* which clustered multiple ethnic groups together within single sovereign entities around the continent, as well as the current realities of *coloniality* which have prevented states within the continent from imagining and transcending the modern state in Africa (Grosfoguel, 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016; Quijano, 1993). We link the exploratory term *coloniality in statebuilding* to the failure of African states to overcome political ethnicity in order to mitigate the problematic nature of democracy, which is a form that connotes legitimacy, in the modern states in Africa. This failure leads to challenges to the state's legitimacy, and ultimately the state's claim to the legitimate use of force. The symptoms of the challenges are manifested in the rise of various insurgencies, separatism, and other forms of insecurity. The cases of Kenya, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia highlight some of the problematic areas in claims of acceptance and legitimacy in a state and consequently in its claims to the legitimate use of force. The paper concludes that although international recognition is important, the nature of internal legitimacy can determine how a modern state will perform in terms of statebuilding (Armin et al., 2005; Englebert, 2009; Leander, 2004: 7).

In countries such as South Sudan and Somalia, both governance and security oversight institutions within the state remain weak to deal with traditional and emergent security threats in the region. These states mostly exercise only tenuous control over the means

of violence. While international recognition of a state (and by extension its government) is important in global governance, domestic acceptance, recognition, acknowledgement of the governed polity, and ultimately 'internal legitimacy' provide more relevance to the authority of governing actors with the liberalisation of peace and conflict resolution efforts in Africa (Englebert, 2009). Most statebuilding efforts on the continent have prioritised capacitating political entities, in turn repairing relations between political actors involved in a warring situation at the expense of the larger political community from which the legitimacy of government is derived. Given that the state's legitimate authority is guaranteed and sustained by positive and mutual relations between the governing and the governed, re-imagining statebuilding processes in Africa requires strengthening domestic relations between state actors and the citizenry (civil-state relations), which has the potential to supersede ethnic orientation. This highlights the need for legitimacy, as a key aspect for establishing democratic societies, to be imagined as an inclusive process that caters for the interests of both the majority and the minority, and not the zero-sum game that it continues to be in many African countries, fuelling tension along political/ethnic lines.

Coloniality in Statebuilding and the Legitimate Use of Force in Africa

Walter Mignolo (2006) provides an encapsulating definition of coloniality as 'long standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, which still continue to define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administration.' These patterns of power control the way individuals all over the world perceive realities and knowledge creation. As Mignolo (2006: 6) writes:

> 'Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.'

There are three essential concepts that explain colonialities. These concepts were initially addressed by Quijano (2000), and further explored by decolonial thinkers such as Grosfoguel (2013), Mignolo (2006), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016), and many others. They include the coloniality of power, the coloniality of knowledge, and the coloniality of being. The coloniality of power describes how the current global political order was constructed and constituted into asymmetrical and modern power structures. The coloniality of knowledge focuses on teasing out epistemological issues, the politics of knowledge generation, as well as questions of who generates which knowledge, and for what purpose. The coloniality of being simply delves into questions of how 'whiteness gained ontological density far above blackness as well as how the notions of 'I think, therefore I am' mutated into 'I conquer, therefore, I am' and its production of 'colonizer and colonized' articulation of subjectivity and being' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016: 10).

In Africa, colonialities can be identified across several aspects of society, from religion, to education, to governance and statebuilding, which forms the discussion in this paper. Mamdani (2015) argues that, for the contemporary African society, the colonial era formed the framework that is used in many policies today. This has led Madlingozi (2015) to point out the transposing of practices that are generally valued by Global North actors through their former colonies, thus pacifying the Global South communities. This has resulted in the re-capturing of Africans into the global matrix of coloniality, which refers to long-standing patterns of power that emanate from the colonial era, which continue to preserve the colonial culture, power relations, and production of knowledge beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations, as described by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013).

Sharp (2014: 179) regards this transfer of Western norms, values, and practices as the modern-day mission civilisatrice that asserts the Global North as the power holders and knowledge producers of concepts and practices in statehood. Coloniality in statebuilding is an exploratory concept born out of decolonial literature and previous findings of peacebuilding and statebuilding research (Grosfoguel, 2013; Mignolo, 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016). We define coloniality in statebuilding as patterns of power embedded in statebuilding theories and practice, which developed as a result of the superiorization of European culture, knowledge production, as well as socio-politico and

economic practices carried over from the colonial past. Having identified coloniality of statebuilding (born out of global coloniality) as a problematic area in the modern state in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a need for a decolonised theorisation of Sub-Saharan Africa's reality that transcends the inherited 'sovereign nation state' concept in Sub-Saharan Africa (Zondi, 2017). Our argument in this paper is in line with decolonial scholars such as Grosfoguel (2011: 19), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016: 38), and Quijano (1993) who propose that decolonisation requires a heterarchical view of social structures, different from that which dominates the legacy of liberalism which sorts to separate the economic, the political, the cultural, and the social as autonomous arenas. The heterarchical view is closely related to 'the colonial matrix of power' where ethnicity and culture cannot be separated from other arenas in society (Quijano, 1993). Ethnicity and culture have in themselves played roles in the colonial and post-colonial history of African states, as ethnic and cultural differences have failed to be overcome in all arenas of African intra-state relations. This point will be discussed further in the sections on internal and external legitimacy as it informs the identification of diversity, in this paper, as a problematic area for claims on the legitimate use of force in Sub-Saharan African modern states.

The problem is not diversity, cultural difference, or ethnicity. The problem stems from what Ake (1993: 2) described as 'political ethnicity', that is, 'the politicization and transformation of ethnic exclusivity into major political cleavages'. We will tease out this term in relation to this paper in the sections that follow. The modern state is theoretically based on a 'social contract between the "people" and the "sovereign"' (Baker, 2005: 2), where sovereignty belongs to the state but originates from the people who make up that state. There are five essential elements present in the modern state today: a centralised government, territory, sovereignty, population, and a claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Mazrui, 1983; Pierson, 1995: 17). This paper particularly focuses on the claims to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in Africa, connecting the failure to legitimately claim a monopoly on the use of force by African states to a history of colonisation, and the reality of coloniality that has led to the proliferation of political ethnicity and, consequently, to insecurity.

States and the Legitimate Use of Force

Armin et al. (2005: 593) describe statebuilding as activities by governments to establish, re-establish and/or strengthen public structures in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. The goal of statebuilding is to provide and deliver public goods such as security, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. In *Politics as a Vocation*, Weber (1919: 1) describes the concept of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in statebuilding, contending that the role of the use of force is central to statebuilding, as states need to claim a monopoly on the use of force in order to be recognised as states. Here, Weber assumes that states are essentially defined as states because they are able to assert that they own (by rights, law, acceptance, as well as other connotations of legitimacy) the right to use and delegate force. State institutions need legitimacy to function effectively and to develop over time. Van Der Lijn (2017: 1) presents a similar argument, noting that the core of a state's monopoly of force is that the state is the guarantor of both internal and external security. He argues that the concept has worked in some states around the world, but remains largely problematic, albeit remaining the ideal type of security governance adopted by most states. Armin et al. (2005) argue that though it is of central importance, the use of physical force is not the main aim of statebuilding, but is ideally a concentration and expression of power without the need to exercise coercion for the fact that state power

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must be widely accepted by the people. The claim on the legitimate use of force is then deployed by states in their efforts to provide public goods such as security to protect their territory. These services are often carried out through the state's security institutions such as the police and the military.

Charles Tilly (1985) expands on Weber's (1919) work on the central importance of the use of force, describing four activities that state agents carry out as organised violence. The first is war making, which entails eliminating or neutralising rivals outside the territories on which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force. The second is state making, which entails eliminating and neutralising their rivals inside their own territories. The third is protection, which involves eliminating or neutralising the enemies of their clients. The fourth is extraction, which is related to acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making, and protection. Tilly (1985) criticises this reality of state making, comparing it to racketeering and piracy, noting that the distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' force makes no difference to the fact that it is violence. What distinguishes a state's use of force from other organisations or individuals is the ability to monopolise violence. Monopolising violence, as mentioned earlier, involves states being able to assert that they own (by rights, law, acceptance, as well as other connotations of legitimacy) the right to use and delegate force (Tilly, 1985; Weber, 1919). Tilly writes that:

> 'If we take legitimacy to depend on conformity to an abstract principle or on the assent of the governed (or both at once), these conditions may serve to justify, perhaps even to explain, the tendency to monopolize force; they do not contradict the fact' (1985: 171).

These broad definitions of state legitimacy are not to be conflated with police legitimacy but are emphasised in this paper to show that state legitimacy is a necessary condition for the justifiable use of force by the police or military in any given state (Bradford and Jackson, 2010: 1). Legitimacy and how it is defined has implications on statebuilding and the use of force, as Tilly (1985) notes. In this paper, two distinct sources of legitimacy are discussed: international legitimacy and internal legitimacy.

International Legitimacy

The post-colonial state in Africa is argued to have been deprived of internal legitimacy because it was not an outcome of the consent of citizens and this led to *de jure* statehood on the continent (Bereketeab, 2020: 52; Englebert, 2009). In *de jure* statehood, sovereignty is a provision of international laws and functions. Englebert (2009) discusses why in Africa, despite the diversity within sovereign entities and differences, there is a shortage of secession around the continent. Englebert cites many examples, including Nigeria and Somalia, where ethnic and clan diversity have led to civil wars in the past but the countries still remain sovereign states. Englebert suggests that this is a result of the nature of sovereignty in Africa; that is, that sovereignty is *de jure,* getting its legitimacy from the international community as opposed to being given by the people. In this sense, recognition from the international community gives states the legal rights to perform statebuilding essentials such as claiming a monopoly on the use of force.

This can be seen in the case of South Sudan in their civil war with Sudan. In 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) after almost half a decade of conflict, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the civil war that lasted from 1955, after their election, with a brief interlude of a peaceful period in 1972, which sparked again in 1983. This was quickly followed by the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) for the southern region of the country and the Government of National Unity was formed in Khartoum, the national capital. As agreed in the CPA, there was a vote for a referendum on the independence of their region, which was overwhelmingly supported, and six months later Southern Sudan seceded (Moro et al., 2017). The CPA, which later led to a referendum and to independence, was a child born of the efforts of international mediation by elections, and the integration of northern and southern troops. The agreement was brokered by several international actors, including the United States, Norway, and Britain; several African mediators

also pressured the parties to resolve the conflict (Moro et al., 2017).

In South Sudan, international developments and pressures beyond the region added the political weight needed to pressure the parties into deal-making mode. Of particular importance was the United States' involvement as part of the troika, alongside the UK and Norway. The United States played a key role in helping to create the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, laying ground to the 2011 referendum on self-determination. Compared to the previous head of state in the US, George W. Bush's administration had a more pragmatic policy on Sudan and a determination to facilitate a settlement (Cockett, 2010). With this as a precursor, the external influence has not relented. In the 2018 ARCSS peace deal, many political parties which did not sign for the deal were strong armed by the external players towards signing, leading to the harsh reality of implementation challenges.

Another similar case is that of Somalia, whose civil war lasted between 1991 and 2013. The civil war began as former dictator, Siyad Barre, was overthrown with none of the competing factions being strong enough to replace him. The country then fell into chaos, gradually forming a stateless society where various clans who had been marginalised during Siyad Barre's regime clashed with each other, led by warlords for over 22 years. Heavily armed factions controlled various parts of the country, with hostilities causing widespread death and destruction around the country, and with civilians needing emergency humanitarian assistance (United Nations, n.d). The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict (United Nations, n.d; Møller, 2009). Peace talks had broken down repeatedly during the course of the fighting as a result of clan members' resistance of the peace processes led by the international community, referring to the processes as unrepresentative and foreign. A Somalia federal government backed by and recognised by the international community was finally established in Somalia in 2013. The above cases represent the power of the international community in the state formation of South Sudan and Somalia's governments, which both had subsequently spent many years in war. Although the international community played a part in relatively fathering a solution in both countries, the danger was in the high-level process which needed the buy in of the communities over time.

Internal Legitimacy

A second source of legitimacy is given by the governed to the government of a state, termed 'internal legitimacy' in this paper. According to Armin (2005), for a modern state to function effectively, it must be accepted widely as legitimate, and legitimacy is given by 'the people' in today's modern state. In sharp contrast to how Somalia's federal government and state was backed by the international community, and established in 2013, Somaliland with little to no international backing has been able to develop state structures since the late 1990s during the Somalia Civil War. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia, and with local legitimacy, through local processes, has been able to establish a more stable state in comparison with greater Somalia. This feat notwithstanding, Somaliland is yet to be recognised as a state by the international community.

The above suggests that legitimacy involves popular acceptance through democracies. It is worth noting at this stage that African societies, states, and legitimacy were configured and conceptualised differently in precolonial times (Mazui, 1983). The plurality of forms of traditional legitimate government and legitimation processes in Africa presents a crisis of legitimacy for modern states created from colonial territories (Cappelen and Sorens, 2018; Mazui, 1983; Poncian and Mgaya, 2015). A discussion of the many forms of legitimate governments that existed in precolonial times, and might still exist parallel to the modern state today, goes beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the current realities of African states and legitimacy is directed at building *modern states* in the post *1648 Westphalia treaty* sense of the term, and this has proven problematic for statebuilding in Africa due to the unsettled issues of internal legitimacy (Bereketeab, 2020: 52; Englebert, 2009). Rosanvallon (2008: 9) argues that, although it is widely accepted as the procedure for legitimate government, majority legitimacy is flawed in that it conflates the majority with the whole, consequently proliferating the

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marginalisation of minority groups. This pegs some unanswered questions in this article: having identified two forms of state legitimacy i.e. international legitimacy and internal legitimacy through assent of the governed, how then can legitimacy be defined so that it incorporates minorities?

In essence, legitimacy is central to statebuilding, but there are complexities in properly defining legitimacy and this presents a challenge for statebuilding in terms of the use of force, a challenge that emanates from the fact that a legitimate claim to the use of force is central to statebuilding in a modern state. African states have clear international legitimacy (Engelbart, 2007). However, most internal legitimacies of African states can be questioned as a result of ethnic and clan diversities and, as one consequence, weak claims on the monopoly on the use of force and the proliferation of insecurity. The following section elaborates on this point, linking it to the continent’s colonial past, colonialities in the present, and political ethnicities.

Political Ethnicity, Legitimacy, and Claims to the Legitimate Use of Force in Africa

For the sake of clarity in this paper, *political ethnicity* significantly differs from *ethnicity* and *tribalism* as has been discussed by many anthropologists and political scientists, including the likes of Archie Mafeje (1971: 254) who argues that in ‘many instances the colonial authorities helped to create the things called ‘tribes’, in the sense of political communities; this process coincided with and was helped along by the anthropologists’ preoccupation with tribes. This provided the material as well as the ideological base of what is now called ‘tribalism’.’ Mafeje (1971: 258), argues that this ‘*transgression*’ comes from the definition of what constitutes a tribe and the inconsistencies with the definition of tribe. He contends that an undifferentiated society, practicing a primitive subsistence economy and enjoying local autonomy can legitimately be designated as a tribe. Such a society striving to maintain its basic structure and local autonomy, even under changed economic and political conditions, exhibits tribalism. It is, however, a transgression to impose the same concept on societies that have been effectively penetrated by European colonialism and that have been successfully drawn into a capitalist money economy and a world market.

Moreover, many social scientists – including Cohen (1978), Jenkins (2008), Mafeje (1971), Sharp (1988), Weber (1921) – have come to acknowledge ethnicity as a socially constructed phenomenon. The reality of ethnic groups cannot be neglected, however, as Ake (1993) argues that ‘ethnic groups are, to be sure, inventions and constructions in some measure, but they are also real, even in the sense that states are said to be. Nonetheless, ethnicity is not a fossilized determination but a living presence produced and driven by material and historical forces. It begins, becomes and passes away.’ This paper focuses on *political ethnicity*, which is described by Ake (1993: 2) as the ‘politicization and transformation of ethnic exclusivity into major political cleavages.’ In this sense, while ethnicity simply emphasises the glorification of one’s ethnic group, and tribalism emphasises the demonization and exclusion of others, political ethnicity specifically talks about the actions of political actors in statebuilding which are influenced by ethnicity and tribalism. Ake (1993: 2) argues that political ethnicity creates a challenge for practically achieving some of the aspired to, and ideal, characteristics of a modern state, such as a sense of a unified national identity within the population. This has an effect on the political stability of any given modern state.

Political ethnicity is a historical as well as a current reality in the modern state in Africa. The effects of clustering significantly different ethnic groups into a single territory as a state is, among other things, what

Ake (1993: 2) describes as political ethnicity. Ethnicity is now popularly conceived as something constructed, invented, or created (Anderson, 1983; Barm, 1969; Cohen, 1978; Saul, 1979; Sharp, 1988). Ake (1993: 1) does not dispute the fact that ethnic groups are constructed, but argues that this view is inextricably linked to reality as it appears within colonial situations. The fact that ethnic groups are constructed does not make them less real than states themselves, according to Ake. Colonial rule, which amalgamated disparate ethnicities into the chaos called the colonial state, largely created the fluid abstract ethnicity which is evident today by dissociating ethnicity from autonomous polity and territoriality. In this article, political ethnicity is linked to the weakness of legitimate claims on the use of force in African states, and the resultant insecurity. This follows the unanswered question: if legitimacy is taken to mean popular acceptance through democracy and majority votes, how does the system cater for minorities?

Gathering from Bereketeab (2020) and Englebert (2009), *de jure* legitimacy – as is it practiced in many African states – gives the state the legal right to use force to uphold the constitutional laws. In these instances, when governments are elected, they are presented with the imperative by the international communities' recognition to forge a state based on democratic principles of majority rules. But in most cases with African states, the views of the minorities remain silenced and oppositions to the elected government are oppressed by the threat of or use of force by government security apparatus. The monopoly on the use of force comes into play here, through various security agencies. The crushing and silencing of dissenting voices fuels division in the country that can push some of the minorities to retaliate and in some instances demand their rights to self-government (drawing authority from their constituency). The case of Biafra, and the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970, as well as secessionist threats from the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), currently presents perfect examples of this phenomenon. In this case, the latter – the IPOB consisting of predominantly Ibo people of Nigeria – cite marginalisation as a reason for secession and request a referendum to vote on whether to stay or secede, a request that has been ignored by the Federal Government of Nigeria (Gaffey, 2015). In September 2017, the Federal High Court of Nigeria labelled IPOB a terrorist organisation, and the group has been met with force ever since (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020: 1; Ojoye, 2018).

How can states build legitimacy that is not only derived from international recognition of the appointed government but is domestically grown? What contribution would this have to sustainable conflict resolution and statebuilding? What does legitimacy even mean, especially at the domestic level? Trust? Recognition? Respect? The link between political ethnicity and the legitimate claims on the use of force also follows the assumption in this paper that political ethnicity in any given system of government results in the marginalisation of minorities. Without a consensus on a definition of legitimacy that takes minorities into consideration, legitimacy is undermined in democratic systems.

Moreover, in terms of claims to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, connotations of legitimacy as democratic legitimacy result in contestations over the use of force, thereby challenging the state's claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Englebert, 2009; Rosanvalon, 2008; Tilly, 1985; Weber, 1965). Without a legitimate claim on the monopoly on the use of force, groups within the state may challenge the state. This phenomenon can be identified throughout the history of the world, and particularly in Africa where states are diverse and often divided along tribal and ethnic lines (Ake, 1993; Englebert, 2009: 62–63). To analyse the implications of an absence of a legitimate claim to the use of force, we briefly discuss Nigeria's civil war, as well as current insecurity. Mazrui (1983) and a handful of other political science scholars contend that ethnic diversity, coupled with the indirect rule of the British, led to a post-colonial modern state that is dysfunctional (Jackson, 1986). Indirect rule aggravated the problems of creating a modern nation state after independence (Mazrui, 1983). The different groups in the country, by being ruled in part through their own native institutions, maintained their own separate ethnic identities. Northern Nigeria became particularly distinctive in its fusion of Islam and Africanity. The missionaries were kept out and missionary education (which had helped to Westernise the South fairly rapidly) was relatively inaccessible to large parts of the territory. Different sections of the population perceived each other as strangers, sometimes as aliens, increasingly as rivals and, ominously, as potential enemies. As it

happens, the stage was being set for the events which ultimately led first to the military coup in Nigeria in January 1966, then to the slaughter of the Ibo in Northern Nigeria in the same year, then ultimately to the outbreak of a civil war from 1967 to 1970.

Traces of the legitimacy question in Nigeria's governance, with regard to the use of force, can be identified from the colonial period where the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated in a union that merged 250 diverse ethnic groups. There is no assumption here that entities within the area currently known as Nigeria lived peacefully before colonisation. With Othman dan Fodio's jihadist movements encroaching from the North, and conquering territory towards the south in the 1800s, and the old Oyo empire, in what is currently South West Nigeria resisting the jihadist's encroachment (Akinjogbin, 1966; Ibiloye, 2012: 107), both entities were engaged in war shortly before colonisation began in the early 1900s, (Otunola, 2021; Akinjogbin, 1966). Perhaps what is left to ponder on is whether or not these separate entities, without the amalgamation, would have fared better as modern states bound by modern international laws that prevent such war.
Moreover, it should be noted that during Nigeria's socio-political development, in the colonial period, the two protectorates were culturally apart: the Northern Protectorate was poor, and the Southern Protectorate had an abundance of exportation of its agricultural products but was in need of revenue to develop its railway lines and improve social infrastructure (Berger, 2009; Home, 1983). The forced union was a convenient way to assist the Northern Protectorate, albeit without funding of proper structure. This has developed into a Nigeria that displays her disunity in tribes, religions, and natural endowments hinging on the politics of resource control.

According to Oyewo (2019), the amalgamation brought about a considerable popular feeling of exclusion and a perceived sense of injustice among the various units of the Nigerian federation, leading to alienation, suspicion, and apprehension among various groups in the country. The first military coup in Nigeria and the subsequent declaration of the state of Biafra can be linked to these events. According to Oyewo (2019), the forceful merger of ethnic groups was not the only problematic aspect of the amalgamation, there was also a clash of religions and political systems which varies from north to south. There was tension between ethnic groups in the form of politicised ethnicity and competition over scarce resources before, during, and shortly after independence in 1960, leading to rampant nepotism and tribalism which undermined nationhood. Oyewo (2019) notes that this peaked eventually in 1966 when the first republic finally collapsed, leading to the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. These phenomena continue to occur today, as is evident in the upspring of insurgencies, separatists, and terrorist organisations with ethnic bases. For example, while the Boko Haram insurgency is predominantly Northern Muslim and Hausa ethnic groups, groups in the South-South are predominantly made up of ethnic groups of that region.

In an article discussing the influence of ethnicity and religion in Nigerian elections, Oboh (2017: 80) argues that the leaders of the international community spend more time addressing conflicts that arise from ethnicity and religion in Africa, Asia and the East European states. He notes that every state in the West African sub-region, including Nigeria, has passed through the tunnel of crisis emanating from ethnic and religious conflicts. Oboh (2017: 81) contends that ethnicity does have an effect on elections and politics in Nigeria, as no politician can win an election without the support of his/her ethnic nationality. As a consequence, politicians elected into office tend to give priority to the needs of their ethnic nations. Another consequence noted by Oboh (2017: 81) is the fact that ethnic minorities are excluded from attaining the highest office (President), because they don't have the numbers to support political aspirations due to political ethnicity.

Furthermore, in countries like Kenya, the country has been divided into various inter-communal groups, with conflict between groups often centred around elections. These conflicts have not yet matured into levels of secessions, as this does not lead to a mutually desired political outcome. With the closest election (inter-communal) violence being in 2017, it remained an election dispute that was arguably political play and theatrics (Oduor, 2019). The structure of elections and the resultant violence has thus been politically structured, leading to division within inter-communal groups due to the political rivalry of principal groups and people. For instance, the 2007 post-election violence was mainly initiated by two key principals

who belonged to two major and different ethnic communities in Kenya. As a consequence, the ethnic groups which were fighting fell largely in these groups ethnically or in support of them. In the Kenyan case, internal legitimacy is mostly contested through inter-ethnic disagreements and arrangements, which are largely influenced by their political principal.

Mati (2019) argues that instrumentalised ethnic identity has played a key role in mobilising and modelling politics in Kenya as a consequence of the British colonial divide and rule policies that imposed ethnic dualism and emphasised differences. These structures were left functional after independence; therefore, ethnic identities remain the bases for mobilisation and the structuring of politics in contemporary Kenya. Mati (2019) argues that this dominance of ethnic-based politics is a product of the conflation of political economy-induced interests where elites instrumentalise ethnicity in political mobilisation to ensure their own survival and reproduction. According to Ogechi (2019), political elites in Kenya mobilise along ethnic lines to solidify their political bases whenever there is competition to either retain or change the status quo. Ogechi (2019: 130) discusses a variety of identities which are negotiated in Kenya's multi-lingual and multi-ethnic politics, demonstrating that identity in Kenya is dynamic and constantly being negotiated by various players in bids to win political office.

Weak claims to the use of force also results in weak security sectors in some cases. This is an apparent trend in the Horn of Africa. It indicates an increasing erosion of states' monopoly on the legitimate use of force, leaving states of the region unable to provide effective security to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. An example can be drawn from Somalia's security sector where, since the official end of the Civil War in 2013, the sector has failed to develop its capacity to secure the country and consequently, today, the legitimacy of the Somali government, and its claims to the monopoly on the use of force, has been questioned by scholars such as Çanci and Medugu (2015) and Graveline (2016). The weakness of the Somali government's claim on the legitimate use of force is also apparent in the fact that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the major security force preventing militia forces from taking over the capital (Graveline, 2016). It is uncertain whether the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) can retain its authority if the Africa Union mission, which provides it with security, should withdraw from the country (Çanci and Medugu, 2015). AMISOM has been in Somalia from February 2007 until the present day in 2021. Conflicts between the various clans, marginalisation, and inequalities that followed independence in the 1960s, as well as the merging of two former colonies of British Somalia (present day Somaliland) and Italian Somalia (present-day South-Central Somalia), culminated in the events that led to the outbreak of the Somalia Civil War that lasted for 22 years, between 1990 and 2013 (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 33; Paul et al., 2014: 154).

Conclusion

In linking the above narrative to legitimacy and the use of force, we argue that separatists, insurgencies, and terrorist organisations spring up to challenge the legitimacy of governments, even democratically elected governments, as a result of the loophole in democratic systems that assumes the majority is the whole (Rosanvallon, 2008: 9). If we take legitimacy to mean popular acceptance by the governed, which is assumed to be attainable in today's modern state only through a democracy where the majority determines legitimacy, how are minorities catered for in this system to avoid marginalisation and conflict-causing injustices?

We conclude that part of the challenge in answering this question, at least in Africa, lies in the existence of colonialities in statebuilding mentioned earlier in this article. Coloniality in statebuilding places European-generated knowledge about statebuilding, such as the definitions of legitimacy and what is legitimate, far above knowledge generated from other places around the world (Grosfoguel, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016; Mignolo, 2006). The coloniality in statebuilding is accompanied by epistemological issues, politics of knowledge generation, as well as questions of who generates which knowledge about statebuilding, and for what purpose. As argued by Grosfoguel (2011: 38), the advent of colonialism did not only result in colonial administration. Colonisers also brought with them a culture, knowledge, and belief systems that were superimposed on colonies, and continue to affect intersubjectivity relations between Europe and the rest of the world today. It is our conclusion

that this coloniality of knowledge generation about statebuilding has resulted in a lack of imagination to present a less problematic system of legitimation that caters for the whole, as opposed to the majority alone. This kind of system *would* address political ethnicity and the resultant insecurity within states around the continent.

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

The Language of Liberation and Perpetual Eternity:

An Analysis of Jacob Zuma's Rhetoric

By Anton M. Pillay

Abstract

The incarceration of the former South African President Jacob Zuma on charges of contempt of court sparked mass looting, destruction, and damage to a staggering economy attempting to navigate through Covid-19-related repercussions. Early estimates reveal that the initial damage report bill is a R50 billion knock on the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The level of orchestration behind the attacks alludes to state-sponsored violence, given Mr Zuma's loyal sympathisers within the intelligence community and in the African National Congress. This research postulates that Mr Zuma's political rhetoric served as the main inciting factor behind the destruction. Indeed, comparative analysis shows how many post-independence/liberation leaders have invoked a language of debt by virtue of their role as independence/liberation heroes to justify dismal governance records. What are the key features of this language of debt?

Introduction

The incarceration of former South African President Jacob Zuma on charges of contempt of court sparked widespread looting and destruction of the South African economy to the tune of R50 billion (Cele & Wilson, 2021). Initial estimates reveal that the chaos put 150,000 jobs at risk in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, and severely affected some 40,000 businesses (Cotterill, 2021; Harper 2021). The orchestrated attacks allegedly supported by Zuma's formidable faction within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), and instigated by Zuma's intelligence operatives and sympathisers, severely impacted an economy badly hit by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. With 113 communications infrastructures destroyed, R120 million rand stolen from some 1440 ATMs, and the disappearance of a protective police force, the plot thickens to suggest state-sponsored violence (McLeod, 2021; Stoddard, 2021).

One contributing factor behind the anarchy was the rhetoric or political language of Mr Jacob Zuma. As a struggle icon, anti-apartheid figure, and Robben Island prisoner, Mr Zuma is the archetypical 'liberation hero'. The term 'liberation hero' commands a lot of respect and affords one political power and prestige. In deploying what this research terms 'the language of liberation', Zuma was able to move the country to the brink of civil war. This powerful language requires analysis not only because of its destructive power, but because there is a need to examine how long the language of liberation should continue to play a role in post-apartheid South Africa. That is, how long is society expected to be grateful for the achievement of political liberation and does our collective gratitude for political freedom give those who govern the reign to do so dismally?

On the notion of dismal governance, Mr Zuma's record speaks for itself, having normalised and instilled a culture of mismanagement in government, para-statals, state-owned enterprises, and institutions of law and order. In the year 2018/2019, national and provincial government wasted R62 billion to wasteful and irregular expenditure (Gerber, 2019). Informed estimates reveal that during Mr Zuma's presidential tenure, R1.5 trillion was wasted through corruption, graft, state owned company bailouts, and corrupt BEE deals (Bisseker, 2018; Merten, 2019; Basson, 2021). Zuma's clientele state was exposed by over 300 witnesses in the Zondo Commission set up to investigate allegations of state capture, corruption, fraud, and other allegations in the public sector including organs of state. The popular political commentator Justice Malala in 2018 described Zuma's legacy as 'exploding inequality, booming unemployment, and grinding poverty'.

Yet, Zuma and his sympathisers remain oblivious to these facts, instead perpetuating a vision of victimisation in part due to his status as a liberation hero. The juxtaposition of liberation hero and poor governing President follows a pattern in Africa where a growing disillusionment with the achievements of political liberation is becoming more prominent (Carrier and Nyamweru, 2016). As noted by Alexander et al. (2020), the liberation hero's struggle is constantly revealed in and remade in attempts to centre the past in today's present political configurations. What are the key elements in Zuma's language of liberation?

The language of liberation

As the preserve of the elites, heroic narratives of past events are reiterated and developed to create an unquestionable legacy which allows for prestige, legitimacy, and ultimately tribute (Werbner, 1998: 99). In South Africa, heroic narratives have been the source of much contestation over the years with accusations of appropriating history being levelled against the ruling ANC by others who fought against apartheid. To the Pan-African Congress (PAC) who organised the 1960 demonstration which would turn into the Sharpeville Massacre, the ANC hijacked the memory of this event. In the run-up to the ANC's centennial celebrations in 2012, veteran journalist Alistair Sparks remarked how the ANC were airbrushing history, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu also claimed the ANC were side-lining other parties' contributions to fighting apartheid (Smith, 2011; Munusamy, 2015).

In creating an unquestionable history, certain historic events are led at the state level and memorialised annually while other events are forgotten – for example, the Marikana massacre is dubbed by the government as a *tragedy*. In some cases, liberation heroes who did not fit the description or had no ties

with the ANC are erased from history, as is the case of Hendrik Verwoerd's assassin Dimitri Tsafendas. Driven by political reasons in his murder of the 'architect of apartheid', no streets, monuments, or statues of Tsafendas exist (Dousemetzis, 2018).

Essentially, the selection and interpretation of history is constructed around a language of liberation which emphasises that society owes a debt for political freedom. The debt owed cements a party's and their icons' uncontested power. In continuously emphasising the contribution of liberation heroes, society is expected to overlook present conundrums in favour of the past. This effectively allows the personal interests of a handful of liberation heroes to override the interests of an entire nation.

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Mr Zuma's ability to override the national interest is due to his mastering of the language of liberation. With his political foundations rooted in intelligence, it is reasonable to argue that Zuma – like any other formidable intelligence agent – was trained in the art of propaganda, persuasion, and manipulation. Former opposition leader Helen Zille once remarked on Zuma's outright charisma, noting how when they met, Zuma could make her blush with his ability to genuinely make out as if she was a long-lost friend (Hamlyn, 2009). After Zuma's release from Robben Island, he was tasked with setting up the ANC and MK underground structures in Kwa-Zulu Natal. During this time Mr Zuma joined the ANC's Department of Intelligence, eventually rising as Head of Intelligence. His excellence in this field allowed him to set up networks in Swaziland, Mozambique, and eventually Zambia, where he was made Chief of the Intelligence Department in 1988.

A shadow in the Mandela administration and early years of the Mbeki presidency, as Zuma grew in stature within the ANC, he began to militarise his political language (Maritz and Van Rooy, 2021). Professor Van Rooy, who has studied Mr Zuma's political rhetoric, has characterised his language as built on warfare; a war against Zuma and a war against his fight against the remnants of apartheid (Van Rooy, 2018). Over the years, we see this language in statements like 'the ANC will rule till the return of Jesus', allegedly code for the ANC not willing to transfer power. As the contest for the ANC presidency heated up around 2007, his followers declared their willingness to die for Zuma. ANC Youth League (ANCYL) President at the time, the flip-flop Julius Malema, vowed at a rally: 'we are prepared to take up arms and kill for Zuma.' According to one hardcore Zuma fan, Sdu Mdululi: 'people were prepared to die for the liberation struggle. Why can't they be prepared to die for Zuma?' (Russel 2011). Indeed, Mr Zuma is a master of politesse, and when in difficult situations, frames them with jokes or songs, such as the struggle song 'Umshini Wami' (Bring me my machine gun), a MK song.

As President between 2009–2018, the Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans' Association (MKMVA), who were relatively outcast during the Mandela and Mbeki years, rose to power. In many ways, they came to resemble the Sturmabteilung (SA). The SA were the Nazi party's original para-military wing who played a significant role in Adolf Hitler's rise to power. The SA were routinely called upon to disrupt opposition meetings, fight opponents, and generally intimidate and bully. Similarly, the MKMVA came to resemble Zuma's bodyguard, always present at his court hearings, media briefings, and the Zondo Commission when a notable opponent was to testify. In February 2021, MKMVA President Kebby Maphatsoe announced 'we will support Zuma until death do us part' (Khoza, 2021). After the announcement that Zuma was to report to police custody, the MKMVA were mobilised to protect Zuma's Nkandla homestead.

While surrounded by a MK guard, and as their spokesperson Carl Niehaus emphasised the debt of liberation, Zuma remarked: 'I'm not scared of jail. I've

been to jail during the struggle.' Zuma would state that South Africa was fast sliding back to apartheid rule and that there are signs that the country is already under apartheid-like conditions. Comparing the current government to the apartheid government, he noted how both were imposing very similar laws. 'Things like detention without trial should never again see the light of day in South Africa. The struggle for a free South Africa was a struggle for justice that everyone was treated equally before the law', he would state (McKenzie, 2021).

Zuma's rent-seekers and sympathisers extraordinaire followed suit in the rhetoric. Phrases like 'prisoner of conscious', 'dedicated liberation fighter' and 'fighter of white monopoly capitalism' were invoked by Zuma's supporters. Zuma's daughter and spokesperson, Dudu Zuma-Sambuldla, used the terms 'Father of Free Education', 'Mayibuye iAfrika!', and 'Radical Economic Transformation' to define Zuma as a progressive leader whose revolutionary tasks remain incomplete. Similarly, the Zuma Foundation referred to their patron as a freedom fighter for peace and someone who struggled for justice. Radio personality and Zuma loyalist Ngizwe Mchunu, later arrested for incitement, spoke of *ayi-khale*, a reference to machine gun fire.

One way the language of liberation enhances its agenda is through paltering. Paltering refers to making statements that are technically true, but are purposely skewed to mislead the other side. Zuma's accusation that he was jailed without trial, incarcerated without criminal proceedings, and jailed unfairly on par with his apartheid-era jailing, are examples of this. Zuma was jailed for contempt of court, a fact not acknowledged by him or his supporters. Indeed, Zuma and his supporters are masters of Orwellian dystopia, for example turning a swimming pool into a fire pool. The outright lying in public platforms and disguising it as truth was brilliantly captured by Wits Professor William Gumede in 2020. Gumede remarked how systemic corruption has infiltrated South Africa's public discourse, discussions, and debates – to the point where they are increasingly irrational, without integrity, or honesty. The manipulation of truths is captured in struggle slogans, rhetoric, and beliefs, appropriated by the dishonest, corrupt, and incompetent to mobilise the masses.

A further element of the language of liberation is viewing the world from a pre-liberation binary perspective of black vs white, freedom vs apartheid, African vs racist, or good vs evil. According to Basson and Du Toit (2017), Zuma has positioned himself as unfairly targeted by a system that is rigged against the common poor black man. In his 2020 open letter to President Ramaphosa, Zuma remarked how African people have limited civil and political rights and there is a need to 'free the African people from the bondage of colonial and white minority rule.' As Zuma's corrupt relationship with the Gupta family became more prominent during his tenure, he and his allies began a narrative of 'White monopoly capital' (WMC). Anyone who criticised Zuma would then be considered in cahoots with WMC. Zuma has on many occasions accused President Ramaphosa as 'seeking white validation' and turning the ANC into a tool for white monopoly capital. Zuma and his language effectively create 'enemies' out of anybody who disagrees with him. Former minister Derek Hanekom, after giving a statement at the Zondo Commission, was identified by Mr Zuma as a 'known enemy agent' (Van Rooy, 2018).

This binarism is extremely vitriolic. Critics of Zuma risk the label of 'uncle tom', 'clever-black', 'counter-revolutionary', or 'apartheid beneficiary'. Bongi Khanyile, a Zuma fanatic later arrested for inciting violence on his bail release, justified the economic destruction and defence of Zuma as a tool to counter racism and the oppression of the elderly and youth. Indeed, all of Zuma's critics face the same fate: Pravin Gordhan, Karima Brown, Ferial Haffajee, Lindiwe Mazibuko, Herman Mashaba, General Johan Booysen, Ivan Pillay, or Dianne Kohler Barnard have all been accused of racism. Institutions also face this label. Before their disbanding, the elite crime fighting unit, the Scorpions, were accused of having a racist agenda. The investigative journalist Jacques Pauw, author of *The President's Keepers: Those Keeping Zuma in Power and Out of Prison* (2017), similarly was accused of being an 'apartheid era operative' following publication of his book. More recently, Zuma and his followers declared the Zondo Commission to be an apartheid-era plot and that the commissioners were aligned with the apartheid government in their

prosecution of Robert Sobukwe.

A perpetual eternity?

African Liberation has been a *cul-de-sac* for the liberators with no future reference to the nature of post-liberation society (Ackah, 1999). This created a dangerous precedent whereby rhetoric and agitation were more important than content and substance in domestic politics. Sixty years after the era of African independence in the 1960s, African states continue to be the poorest in the world; for example, seven of the ten most unequal countries in the world are African. Bankrupt of ideas and lacking strategic vision and direction, it is easier for leaders to continue with the ideology of liberation than to construct new ideals to take their societies forward. Perhaps it is the simplicity of the binarism of liberation, but whatever the case, the suspicions and negativity previously directed towards colonialists have been now re-directed towards the 'other' ethnic groups, tribes, nations, and religions. Paulo Freire in *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* notes how this is 'one of the most serious problems the revolution must confront when it reaches power' (1970: 158). To Freire, this stage demands maximum political wisdom, decision, and courage from the leaders, who for this very reason must have sufficient judgement not to fall into irrationally sectarian positions.

Zuma's language of liberation is not novel; throughout the continent there are many similar patterns where independence/liberation movements have clung to power and/or refused to transfer power due to liberation exploits. Since 1975, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has ruled in Angola. In Mozambique, FRELIMO has taken all the elections since 1994. In Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), later called the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has dominated politics since 1977. Dynasty politics on the basis of liberation are apparent too: the Kenyattas in Kenya, the Mutharikas in Malawi, the Bongos in Gabon, the Obiangs in Equatorial Guinea, the Debys in Chad, and the Nguessos in Brazzaville, to name a few.

In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has heavily revised history so as to re-invent its liberation heroes. Masiya and Maringira found that the party's reference to liberation hero status cannot be relied upon as a measure of one's past participation in the liberation struggle but as a measure of an individual's circumstances within factions. They state that ZANU-PF and former President Mugabe's view of heroes has always been driven by the zeal to fulfil their own political agenda and to remain in power. As such, they have never been tolerant of other liberation war figures who did not belong to ZANU-PF. The same rationale applies to their own party, as seen in the case of Joyce Mujuru. A dedicated liberation hero for three decades, she was recently accused of 'collaborating with white people' and of plotting the assassination of Mugabe. On a separate note but worthy of mentioning here, the ZANU-PF on numerous occasions noted that they would welcome a coup by the country's military if they were to ever lose power in an election.

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, flaunts his liberation credentials as reason for his stranglehold on power. Referring to his role in ousting the dictator Idi Amin and later on Milton Obote, Museveni frames much of his image as a guerrilla fighter for East and Southern Africa. His time spent as President has turned him into an 'expert in governance'. In 2021, he reminded the world that Uganda 'doesn't need lectures in democracy' and that '[w]e designed this system not from the air-conditioned rooms but from the jungles of our country where we lived with the people in their huts for much of the 16 years of the resistance (1971 to 1986).' As the architect of Ugandan democracy, he thus is incapable of destroying it. When faced with opposition that his government is ethnic based, he reminds the nation of

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his rebel army's role in ending the ethnic massacres in the Luwero Triangle. Nigerian novelist and Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka described Museveni's mockery of democracy as 'the very thing he fought against.'

Gratitude to the liberator is not solely an African phenomenon. In Cuba, the state is instrumental in determining history and how it's told. In Venezuela, political leaders have for nearly 200 years evoked the legacy of their liberator, Simon Bolivar, to stir popular support in what Norman (2017) calls a 'vicious cycle of liberation'. The idea of perpetual gratitude is what Snyder (2018) dubbed 'the politics of eternity'. 'Time is no longer a line into the future, but a circle that endlessly returns the same threats from the past,' Snyder writes. In their analysis of this concept, Madubedube and Fakie claim that South Africa's politics of eternity might be:

'collective resignation to a status quo of oppressions, a state of being of pessimism where enemies lurk in every corner, for South Africa has always been thus — whether for the white minority during apartheid or xenophobia now. Here there is no real future, just a denial that the future exists because of the very real and legitimate critique that we aren't getting the benefits of the fruits of liberation… Eternity places South Africa in a cyclical story of perpetual victimhood.'

In order to move beyond the language of liberation, it is necessary to move away from a history defined by the ruling party. It is not to deny in totality the liberation heroes, but to identify new ones in order to inform a country's prestige and trajectory. Going further back in time could allow for new figures, events, and characters to emerge and be given attention to. This is key to African states still tackling disunity and fragmentation. Freire claims that post-liberation societies require a cultural revolution in order to reconstruct society. As the cultural revolution deepens, a level of consciousness and creativity will emerge and people will begin to perceive why mythical remnants of the old society survive in the new (Freire, 1970: 159).

Conclusion

In an interview, the former Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils stated that his own status as a liberation hero is simply not enough to earn one respect. He said: 'I can't say I'm Ronnie Kasrils, from 1960 I joined the MK and I did this and I did that.' He cautioned the ANC against hero worship, living in the past, and continued ties to those who once fought for democracy but had now become anti-revolutionary. South Africa's fixation on yesteryears' liberation heroes is proving divisive. There is a need for the new generation to reassess and reinterpret new state heroes and heroines, in order to produce a common ownership of history which is the basis of nation-building. In doing so, a language of possibility can override the now-defunct language of liberation.

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SOME PITFALLS OF DECOLONIALITY THEORY

By George Hull

Abstract

Decoloniality theory, with its signature concepts coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge, initially emerged in Latin America. It has been developed further in southern Africa, where it now has significant influence in some universities. Decoloniality theory has to be distinguished from the broader endeavour of intellectual decolonization. The latter includes all intellectual efforts to free theory and ideology from distorting bias which is the effect of colonial or neocolonial power relations. Intellectual decolonization in this broader sense (e.g., in the writings of Anthony Appiah and Kwasi Wiredu) is truth-oriented: it aims to expose incorrect claims which are the result of bias, replacing them with correct theoretical conclusions. By contrast, contemporary decoloniality theory (e.g., in the writings of Walter Mignolo and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni) embraces several contentious metaphysical ideas, among which is rejection of the very possibility of universal truth. When decoloniality theory first emerged (in Aníbal Quijano's innovative writings) out of the discipline of political economy, however, it exemplified the broader, truth-oriented sense of intellectual decolonization. Quijano, and later Ramón Grosfoguel, were concerned to expose several false theoretical claims in social science which are a legacy of Eurocentric bias. Here I argue that tracing the steps by which contemporary decoloniality theory developed from this starting point can reveal some of its principal shortcomings. I seek to show that several of the distinctive metaphysical ideas in contemporary decoloniality theory are founded on drastically undermotivated, hyperphilosophising inferences from empirical premises. Even considered purely on its own terms, I argue, contemporary decoloniality theory exhibits a number of weaknesses and contradictions.

The idea that, following political decolonisation (which in Africa took place from the 1950s onwards), a process of ideological or intellectual decolonisation is also necessary, especially in formerly colonised countries, is not a new one [1]. It is plausible to think that Eurocentric bias, when not counteracted, could distort certain academic disciplines. Take, for example, political theory. If theorists seeking historical models of political association repeatedly turned to ancient Athens, while ignoring precolonial African, Asian and American social formations, they might end up with unduly limited notions of what is practicable [2].

In the discipline of philosophy, the Ghanaian thinker Kwasi Wiredu has argued since the 1980s that not only colonial-era political and religious doctrines, but also the European languages in which colonial education was conducted, have bequeathed to contemporary practitioners a certain amount of 'philosophical deadwood' (2007: 76). Translation into an indigenous African language, Wiredu has suggested, can be a useful tool for identifying philosophical problems which are '[t]ongue-dependent' (2004: 49)—which, that is to say, are not genuine philosophical problems at all, but merely artefacts of a particular European language's idiosyncrasies [3]. Similarly, K. Anthony Appiah has argued that an 'archaeology of Pan-Africanism's idea of race' (1992: 28) can help guard against false assumptions of cultural homogeneity, thus furthering 'ideological decolonization' (op. cit.: x).

These examples illustrate *intellectual decolonisation* in a broad sense which encompasses all intellectual efforts to remove or undo the effects of colonial, neo-colonial or other international power relations where, and to the extent that, these have hindered the attainment of knowledge and other worthwhile intellectual goals. Intellectual decolonisation in this broad sense is part of intellectual hygiene: it enables researchers to detect and address distortive effects of bias.

Decoloniality theory, on the other hand, is something narrower and more specific: a distinctive body of work that has grown up since the 1990s, at first in Latin America, later more widely. Its most recognisable claim is that a 'colonial matrix of power' has existed globally for at least four centuries, outlasting political decolonisation (see, for example, Mignolo, 2011: 8). This matrix is constituted by hierarchical forms of domination and exclusion operating worldwide, which include economic exploitation, sex, race and sexual-orientation hierarchies, and, crucially, an epistemic hierarchy—the 'coloniality of knowledge' (see, for example, Mignolo, 2018: 136). Appiah and Wiredu's approaches to *intellectual decolonisation* are truth-oriented, aiming to eliminate errors and maximise correct conclusions in theoretical work; contemporary practitioners of *decoloniality theory*, by contrast, are deeply uncomfortable with the notion that *any* substantial theory or body of cultural assumptions could be outright untrue—untrue no matter where or by whom it is believed. This makes for two features of contemporary decoloniality theorists' writings which are disorientating to the uninitiated. First, any set of beliefs or assumptions, or at least any set large enough to constitute a 'worldview', automatically earns the title 'knowledge'; any two or more are 'knowledges' (see, for example, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 21). Second, when two 'knowledges' are compared, it is not the rational and epistemic relations between them—for example, whether one evidentially supports or contradicts the other—which come under scrutiny, but instead the political relations—for example, whether they are 'non-dominant and equal' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020: 150) or whether one is in a 'dominant' or 'hegemonic' position (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: xi).

Decoloniality theory has become extremely influential in some southern African universities over the past six or seven years. The Zimbabwean professor Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, based until recently at the University of South Africa, is a prominent decoloniality theorist.

"*Decoloniality theory*, on the other hand, is something narrower and more specific: a distinctive body of work that has grown up since the 1990s, at first in Latin America, later more widely. Its most recognisable claim is that a 'colonial matrix of power' has existed globally for at least four centuries, outlasting political decolonisation (see, for example, Mignolo, 2011: 8)."

During the student-led Rhodes Must Fall protests of 2015, mastering decoloniality theory's sometimes abstruse lexicon was a way for students to 'gain currency' and 'influence' in the movement—with one *ancien combattant* describing the Argentinian decoloniality theorist Walter D. Mignolo's writings as an 'opioid' (Chikane, 2018: 222–23). Rather unusually, the University of Cape Town in South Africa has since 2018 had in place a central 'Curriculum Change Framework' applying to all faculties; instead of being inclusive of various intellectual approaches, this document views curriculum change narrowly, often dogmatically, through a 'decolonial lens'—more specifically, 'the Latin-American perspective on coloniality' [4]. Evidently, a critical discussion of decoloniality theory has relevance far beyond its Latin American birthplace.

Decoloniality theory emerged from the discipline of political economy. In the Peruvian theorist Aníbal Quijano's initial writings about coloniality, it is essentially a branch of dependency theory or world-systems analysis [5]. The continuing influence of these intellectual beginnings explains, to a degree, why decoloniality theory has held itself apart from *postcolonial* theory in its various guises. If decoloniality theorists have accused postcolonial theorists such as Dipesh Chakrabarty and Achille Mbembe of operating 'within a Euro-North American-centric modernist discursive [...] terrain' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020: 38) [6], they have also distanced themselves from postcolonial theory's war on 'grand/meta-narratives'. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni's estimation, postcolonialism marks a 'cultural turn', while decoloniality theory 'underscores [...] the transhistoric expansion of colonial domination and the perpetuation of its effects in contemporary times' (op. cit.: 25): while the former is preoccupied with culture, the latter is focused 'on questions of power' (37). Decoloniality theory, with its emphatic exposition of the centuries-long domination wrought worldwide by a 'colonial matrix of power', cannot dispense with grand narratives any more than classic world-systems analysis can.

Here I seek to show that tracing the steps by which contemporary decoloniality theory developed from its starting point in the discipline of political economy can reveal some of its principal shortcomings. My intention is not to provide a full overview of decoloniality theory, or to itemise its flaws comprehensively. Focusing on Quijano, Mignolo, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and the Puerto Rican writer Ramón Grosfoguel's discussions of the coloniality of power and the coloniality of knowledge, I argue that some of the distinctive metaphysical ideas in contemporary decoloniality theory are founded on undermotivated inferences from empirical claims about political economy and human biology. In the final section, I argue that, even considered purely on its own terms, contemporary decoloniality theory exhibits several weaknesses and contradictions.

Latin American exceptions

In their writings in decoloniality theory from the turn of the twenty-first century, Ramón Grosfoguel and Aníbal Quijano start out from the observation that certain general statements about national development, thought in some quarters to be universally true, in fact fail to apply across the board, because there are Latin American countries of which they are not true. Take, first, what I will call the *free trade thesis*:

> **FTT**: Countries increase their national wealth more through free trade policies than through protectionist policies

Already in the nineteenth century, as Grosfoguel relates, Latin American policymakers were voicing a suspicion that while the free trade thesis was true of Great Britain, it was not true of Argentina, Chile or Paraguay. Established large-scale industry, like that in England, could hold its own against imported manufactured goods. Latin America's small-scale fledgling industry, in contrast, needed to be shielded behind import tariffs, at least for a time, if it was not to be strangled in the nest (Grosfoguel, 2000: 351–53).

Just as the German economist Friedrich List had earlier in the nineteenth century [7], in the 1870s Argentinian economic nationalists such as Vicente F. López and Carlos Pellegrini argued that when the free trade thesis is straightforwardly given universal scope—

> **FTTU1**: *All* countries increase their national wealth more through free trade policies than through protectionist policies

—it is false. On the other hand, López and Pellegrini

(again like List) thought that there are facts about the industrial circumstances of different countries which enable one to explain and predict which countries will benefit more from free trade policies, and which more from protectionist policies. López thought that whether the free trade thesis applies 'depends on the particular conditions of each country'; specifically, '[i]n the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition' (Grosfoguel, 2000: 351). The free trade thesis (FTT) is thus not entirely incorrect; it does apply to some countries, and perhaps applies to all countries at some time in their history. But if it is to be worked up into a principle with universal scope, the straightforward universal principle (FTTU1) will not do. What is needed is a universal principle containing conditionals whose antecedent clauses capture relevant variation in countries' industrial circumstances at a given time:

> **FTTU2**: All countries increase their national wealth more through free trade policies than through protectionist policies if they exhibit industrial circumstances *C1*, and more through protectionist policies than through free trade policies if they exhibit industrial circumstances *C2*

(*C1* and *C2* can include comparative circumstances—for example, having larger-scale and/or longer established industry than the global mean.)

The economic nationalists' scepticism of free trade saw a reprise, from the 1960s onwards, in Latin America's so-called dependency school: this included Fernando Henrique Cardoso, André Gunder Frank, Aníbal Quijano and other political economists. But the dependency theorists took aim at a second general statement about national development, which their nineteenth-century precursors would probably have endorsed. Call it the *developmental stages thesis*:

> **DST**: As they develop economically, countries pass through one sequence *S* of successive developmental stages

Orthodox Marxists hold that *S* includes feudalism, capitalism, socialism and finally communism. For modernisation theorists (for example, Bert F. Hoselitz and W. W. Rostow), on the other hand, *S* fundamentally involves a transition from traditionalism to modernity via some intermediate stages (Grosfoguel, 2000: 358–59).

The dependency school believed that both modernisation theorists and orthodox Marxists go wrong by focusing on individual societies in isolation. The global economy, its theorists argued, is an integrated whole complete with an international division of labour. The economic condition of any given country is in large part a function of its position and role within this global system. While it may be true that the core industrialised countries which benefit most from the global economy have passed through a specific sequence of developmental stages, one should not expect countries in the periphery of the global economy, whose imposed role in that economy is very different, to follow the same path (Grosfoguel, 2000: 360).

For example, Quijano has claimed that the existence in Peru until well into the twentieth century of compulsory unpaid labour by *peónes* for a *padrón*, no less than the existence of slavery throughout the Americas into the nineteenth century, 'serve[d] the purposes and needs' of global capitalism (Quijano, 2000a: 550). It would thus be wrong, in Quijano's opinion, to conclude that Peru was passing through the same sequence of developmental stages as European countries, only *lagging behind*—still *bogged down* in feudalism or traditionalism—due to internal problems. On the contrary, Peru, just like West Germany or France, was following the path required of it and imposed upon it by the global economic system as a whole. After the fifteenth century, the world economy employed 'all forms of control and exploitation of labor', including 'slavery, serfdom, petty-commodity production, reciprocity, and wages', to 'produce commodities for the world market' (op. cit.: 535). By the mid-twentieth-century, global capitalism depended on a fully free labour regime in the core industrialised countries, but it equally depended on peripheral countries' labour regimes being a mix of free and compulsory (op. cit.: 538, 575n8).

So, if the developmental stages thesis is straightforwardly given universal scope—

> **DSTU1**: As they develop economically, *all*

> countries pass through one sequence *S* of successive developmental stages

—it is false. But the explanation the dependency school provides for why different countries pass through different sequences of developmental stages indicates that, while this straightforward universal principle (DSTU1) is incorrect, the developmental stages thesis (DST) can be worked up, albeit schematically, into a universal principle which is correct:

> **DSTU2**: As they develop economically, all countries pass through sequence *S1*, *S2*, *S3*, … or *S*n of successive developmental stages, depending on whether they occupy position *P1*, *P2*, *P3*, … or *P*n in the global economic system

This more sophisticated universal principle (DSTU2) can be true, even if we do not yet know all the possible sequences of developmental stages and all the possible positions in the global economic system—or, indeed, all the different shapes that global economic system could take.

Grosfoguel and Quijano argue not only that the free trade thesis and the developmental stages thesis in their straightforwardly universalised versions (FTTU1, DSTU1) are false, but also that they are Eurocentric. Under the heading 'Eurocentrism' they identify three kinds of bias, which are worth separating out. In the first place, the two theses about national development exhibit *sample bias*. They are, in Grosfoguel's words, 'an attempt to produce a universal theory from the experience […] of the core of the world economy' (2000: 359). What was observed in the case of industrialised West European national economies has simply been asserted of all other national economies, regardless of their level of industrialisation or position in the global economy. The problem here is that the theses were arrived at by a faulty inductive inference from a small, unrepresentative sample.

In the second place, they exhibit *prediction bias*. On the basis of the two theses about national development, Grosfoguel and Quijano believe, true predictions can be made about industrialised West European countries, but not about most of the rest of the world. Quijano writes that when people from Latin American societies 'look in our Eurocentric mirror, the image that we see is […] partial and distorted' (2000a: 556). The sample bias active in the process of formulating the two theses has generated an end product which is reliable in its predictions about national economies relevantly similar to those in the sample, but otherwise highly unreliable.

In the third place, the two theses exhibit *interest bias*. Whether they were arrived at through an innocent mistake or not, once they had been formulated it was generally in the interests of industrialised West European societies that people worldwide should believe the free trade thesis and the developmental stages thesis in their straightforwardly universalised versions (FTTU1, DSTU1). Argentina's nineteenth-century economic nationalists recognised that if all countries believed and acted on the free trade thesis, this would make 'a country that does not possess [England's level of] industry a tributary country' (Grosfoguel, 2000: 352). Similarly, a century later the *dependistas* observed that accepting the developmental stages thesis could be disadvantageous to Latin American countries, as it could lead societal actors to think certain events—such as a bourgeois-led revolution—were inevitable, when they were not (Quijano, 2000a: 571).

Aníbal Quijano is best known in the field of world-systems analysis for his articulation of the concept *coloniality*. The phenomenon of 'coloniality', or 'coloniality of power', involves (i) 'the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of "race," a supposedly different biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others' (Quijano, 2000a: 533). Coloniality thus involves pervasive acceptance as common sense of a third general statement, which we can call the *race hierarchy thesis*:

> **RHT**: The human species is biologically divided into races which differ significantly in their abilities and constitute a natural hierarchy of human beings

But coloniality is not only a matter of beliefs or assumptions in people's heads. It also involves (ii) a systematic division of forms of labour, both within nations and internationally, on the basis of this putative race hierarchy (Quijano, 2000a: 536). It was, Quijano argues, widespread acceptance of the race hierarchy thesis as a basis for labour control which made societally possible the co-existence of free

“Coloniality, as Quijano understands this phenomenon, outlasted the formal political relations of colonialism (2007: 171), and provides the explanation for why industrial waged labour was concentrated for so long in predominantly white Europe and North America (2000a: 538). There is thus, in Quijano’s view, no adequate *purely economic* characterisation of the modern world-system (2000a: 540); rather, the modern world-system is constituted by an economic structure and a racialised social order which are ‘mutually reinforcing’ (Quijano, 2000b: 216).”

and compulsory forms of labour throughout most of the modern period: ‘each form of labor control was associated with a particular race’ (2000a: 537). In the Americas, slave labour came to be assigned to ‘the “black” population brought from Africa’, ‘serfdom’ was largely reserved for the indigenous ‘American Indians’, and ‘paid labor was the whites’ privilege’ (op. cit.: 538–39).

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Unlike the free trade thesis and the developmental stages thesis, the race hierarchy thesis (RHT) is true of no one and of nowhere. ‘The idea of race is literally an invention,’ Quijano affirms; ‘[i]t has nothing to do with the biological structure of the human species’ (Quijano, 2000a: 575n6). If Latin America is an exception to RHT, so is every other region of the world. Therefore, RHT cannot be Eurocentric either in the sense that it exhibits sample bias or in the sense that it exhibits prediction bias. It is true of no sample, has no predictive accuracy, can form the basis of no universal principle. Yet RHT can be, and *is*, Eurocentric in the sense that it exhibits interest bias. Pervasive belief in a hierarchy of so-called races which ascribes the greatest abilities to white people evidently could contribute to entrenching Europeans’ power and privilege. According to Quijano, it was one of the key factors which cemented West Europe’s position as the core of the modern world-system (2000a: 541).

What distinguishes Quijano, Grosfoguel and other decoloniality theorists from the mainstream of dependency theory and world-systems analysis is their emphatic insistence that *economic* ‘delinking’ [8]—whether by individual countries or by the Global South *en bloc*—is not sufficient, and is not even the primary thing needful, to overcome a peripheral position in the global economy. What is required is, in Quijano’s words, ‘[f]irst of all, epistemological decolonization, as decoloniality’ (2007: 177). The first step of a country in the global periphery should be to jettison those false ideas about national development which systematically work to the advantage of the countries of the core and to the disadvantage of countries in the Global South.

In the main, the works by Quijano and Grosfoguel discussed in this section, which inaugurated decoloniality theory, exemplify intellectual decolonisation in the broad sense which I specified at the outset. They are chiefly concerned to root out pervasive false beliefs—about trade, industrialisation or human biology—which not only arose due to a bias in favour of Europe and the West, but also contribute to entrenching European and Western wealth and dominance. The task of the next section will be to describe the process whereby decoloniality theory acquired the narrower and more metaphysical character which sets it apart today.

Hyperphilosophism

By *hyperphilosophism* I mean a faulty, unjustified inference from an empirical fact (a contingent truth, discovered by observation, about the world we live in) to a metaphysical theory (a general philosophical view about the fundamental structure of reality). Hyperphilosophism includes, by extension, unjustifiably attributing to somebody belief in a metaphysical theory on the basis that they believe some empirical fact. Let me begin with two examples

to make clear the sort of faulty inference I have in mind.

I am under the impression that, years ago, you and I heard Günter Wand conduct Bruckner in Hamburg. You prove to me that we did not. Now convinced that this never happened, I draw a further conclusion: that the past does not exist. Here, the empirical fact—that we never heard Wand conduct Bruckner in Hamburg—provides no motivation whatsoever for my conclusion about the nature of time. The past could perfectly well exist without this particular event having occurred. After all, other things might have happened, and a real, existent past might be constituted by them.

You assert that there is no such person as Prester John. I infer that you are a solipsist—that you believe you are the only person and centre of consciousness there is. Once again, my conclusion is radically undermotivated. You believe that there is no self which is Prester John's. That does not mean you think there are no selves apart from yourself. You may well think selves exist which are neither you nor Prester John: myself, for instance.

In one respect, the flaw in the inferences above is the same as that in the Eurocentric inferences Grosfoguel and Quijano exposed and critiqued [9]; in each case, the scope of the conclusion is unwarranted by the sample which forms the basis for the inference. But the examples above are more extreme. They are inferences not just to universal-scope principles in an empirical discipline, but to something in a different register: metaphysical claims about the fundamental structure of reality (such as time and consciousness)—claims of a kind which empirical observation and inductive argument alone would normally be insufficient to justify.

In the remainder of this section, I argue that two important components of contemporary decoloniality theory have been arrived at via inferences of this hyperphilosophising form. Hyperphilosophism, I believe, explains (at least in part) how decoloniality theory evolved from being an instance of intellectual decolonisation in the broad, truth-oriented sense I specified at the outset to being the narrower, metaphysically contentious body of theory it is today.

Time

Some versions of the developmental stages thesis (DST) have been invoked as a convenient rationalisation for colonialism, 'trusteeship', or other relations of political domination. If every society, 'race' or people must pass through one fixed sequence of developmental stages—each stage representing an improvement, a broadening and deepening of capacities, including economic capacities—then countries which consider themselves further along in this fixed sequence might claim the right, even the obligation, to step in and help less developed societies, 'races' or peoples progress to the next stage. 'Denial of coevalness' is the label Aníbal Quijano, following the German anthropologist Johannes Fabian, gives to the stance people from Europe or North America adopt when they regard people in Africa, Asia or South America as belonging to societies in an earlier and inferior stage of development, one which their own society passed through centuries ago.

There is an innocent ambiguity in the phrase 'denial of coevalness', which both Fabian and Quijano sometimes exploit, perhaps mainly for rhetorical purposes. When Fabian writes of anthropologists' '*tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse*' [10] (1983: 31), and when Quijano writes that 'the Europeans [...] relocated the colonized population, along with their [...] cultures, in the past of a historical trajectory whose culmination was Europe' (2000a: 541), they do not, of course, mean that anthropologists or Europeans literally viewed the people they were interacting with as living in the distant past, such that no encounter with them was possible except by time travel. They viewed them as belonging to societies *of* a different developmental age, not *in* a different age of the universe. The relevant kind of *denial of coevalness* is similar to a 12-year-old's denial that his 5-year-old brother is the same age as him (and his consequent insistence that he hold his hand when they cross the road).

However, the Argentinian decoloniality theorist Walter Mignolo has seized on this ambiguity and run with it. Mignolo dedicates a chapter of his book *The Darker*

Side of Western Modernity (2011) to the topic of time. After introducing the modernisation theorists' version of DSTU1, and attributing to Fabian the view that time itself is 'a conceptual and colonizing strategy' (2011: 151–52), Mignolo makes several ambitious claims. At his boldest, he is willing to assert that it was not until 'the sixteenth century' that the 'distinction between space and time emerged' (op. cit.: 163), that '"space and time" [...] were inventions of Western imperial modernity' (176–77), and that in the 'Western discourse on time [...], events are ordered one after another' (169). In these passages, not only are the colonisers credited with inventing time, but their denial of coevalness to the colonised is transfigured into an exotic metaphysical thesis: the denial of the very possibility of simultaneity, the view that events occur only ever in single file. Mignolo is clearly tempted by what would be the ultimate hyperphilosophising reading of Fabian's phrase.

In his more cautious moments, Mignolo is willing to concede that indigenous Americans had a concept of time long before the sixteenth century, albeit one different from that of Westerners: he contrasts 'Christian and Andean time' (2011: 169). He claims that 'the Spaniards managed to impose their concept of time' (156), effecting a 'colonization of time' (178). Describing the concept of time that they imposed, he calls it 'the linear concept of time' (154) and specifies that according to this concept, 'there is only one line of time' (162) which has a definite 'point of arrival' (164). If you adopt this concept of time, says Mignolo, 'you may end up believing that you are behind in time' and 'are more likely to want to catch up with modernity' (161). But this concept of time is not the only one. Mignolo contrasts it with 'cyclical time' (159).

Though somewhat less tendentious, this is also a case of hyperphilosophism. The contrast between a vision of human history as inexorably getting better and better until it reaches a final plateau (a 'point of arrival') and a vision of human history as going through cycles of improvement and decay ('cyclical time') is not a contrast between two concepts of time, but rather a contrast between two visions of time's *contents*, which presupposes the concept of time if it is even to be articulated. The former sees the human condition at the present time *t0* as inevitably superior to the human condition at any past time *t-1* and inferior to the human condition at any future time *t1*; whereas the latter sees the human condition at the present time *t0* as inevitably roughly equivalent both to the human condition at some past time *t-1* and to the human condition at some future time *t1*. Here Mignolo's hyperphilosophism about time consists in presenting contrasting empirical views about the contents of time, and the ordering of those contents in time, as though they were two different concepts of time itself.

Universal truth

Considered as a branch of world-systems analysis, decoloniality theory's distinguishing mark is its claim that the primary determinants of peripheralization in the world-system are not economic, but epistemic—meaning, here, in the realm of ideas and beliefs. To overcome peripheralization, according to decoloniality theory, a country or region must in the first place change its ideas.

No southern African scholar has pursued this line of argument more prolifically than Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni. In his recent book *Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa*, he writes that 'Eurocentric epistemology actively worked and continues to work as the primary and active enabler of planetary European hegemony' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020: 2). He goes on to claim that 'what appears on the surface as the problem of political economy and as development challenges in Africa are rooted in the epistemic domain' (op. cit.: 91). In a nutshell, '[t]he predicament of Africa is fundamentally an epistemic one: that of trying to use Eurocentric epistemology [...] and thus failing to liberate itself from classical economic and conventional thinking' (ibid.).

These conclusions chime with those of the writings by Grosfoguel and Quijano examined in the previous section. If false universal-scope principles about national development or human biology come to be prevalent assumptions which guide policymaking in countries of the Global South, belief in those principles could itself become an obstacle to prosperity and a cause of economic dependency. But in the intervening two decades, a shift in the background framework of decoloniality theory has radically altered these conclusions' emphasis and character. Though I will examine this shift mainly as it features in Ndlovu-Gatsheni's writings, the same shift is evident

in the work of Mignolo (a major influence on Ndlovu-Gatsheni) and other contemporary decoloniality theorists.

In the writings by Grosfoguel and Quijano we have already examined, their primary criticism of the general statements about national development which they critique is that they are *false*. The free trade thesis and the developmental stages thesis are not true of all, or even most, countries; the racial hierarchy thesis is not true of anywhere. By contrast, Ndlovu-Gatsheni's primary criticism of ideas such as these is that they occupy a privileged and oppressive position in a hierarchy of knowledge established when 'Euro-American hegemonic knowledge banished alternative epistemologies from Africa and other parts of the Global South to the barbarian margins of society' (2013: 4).

In Ndlovu-Gatsheni's writings, Quijano's model of the 'coloniality of power' features not only as an unjust social ordering of persons, but also as a template for understanding how 'Western epistemology' has interacted with 'African modes of knowing' (2013: 8). 'Coloniality of power,' writes Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'is closely linked with coloniality of knowledge' (op. cit.: 20). The latter 'took the form of repression of existing African beliefs, ideas, images, symbols and forms of knowledge'; '[h]aving done this, Westerners then imposed their own forms of knowledge' (ibid.).

In Ndlovu-Gatsheni's vision, there exist 'knowledges and worldviews' (2013: 21) which correlate more or less with positions in the global hierarchy created by coloniality of power. Just as Quijano holds that the coloniality of power needs to be overcome 'through a radical and global process of the democratization of society' by which all people come to be recognised as equals (2000a: 568), so Ndlovu-Gatsheni advocates 'not a total rejection of Euro-American knowledge but a democratization of this hegemonic knowledge so that it recognizes other knowledges from the ex-colonized world as equally important and relevant' (2013: 60).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni's application of political concepts like equality, domination and democracy, not to persons or groups, but to 'knowledges and worldviews' immediately raises some concerns. First, it is problematic to label as *Euro-American* the ideas about political economy and human biology which, in Ndlovu-Gatsheni's writings as much as in those of Quijano and Grosfoguel, are the paradigm cases of ideas belief in which keeps the Global South dependent. If some Europeans and Americans have thought free trade a universal good, others have advocated protection, and governments have frequently acted on their recommendation [11]. The Marxist theory of history has probably been repudiated more than it has been accepted in Europe and North America. And many fierce critics of the concept of race have been European or North American. Quijano and Grosfoguel's critique of these ideas as *Eurocentric* is precise and reasonably plausible; it makes specific claims about the methodological origins and predictive power of these ideas, and about the effects of pervasive belief in them. By contrast, Ndlovu-Gatsheni's characterisation of these ideas as *Euro-American*, implying that they in some sense belong to or are characteristic of a region, is loose and, given any more precise cast, looks likely to be incorrect.

Second, ideas or beliefs do, in one familiar way, form a hierarchy: they are not all equal. Some are true, or at least supported by the available evidence; others are false, or at least not supported by the available evidence. If I base relevant life decisions on the belief that smoking increases my risk of cancer, because that is what the available evidence indicates, I ought not to be condemned for dismissing the alternative belief, disconfirmed by the available evidence, that smoking decreases my risk of cancer. On the contrary, I am giving these two beliefs just the treatment they deserve. In his writings on the coloniality of power from two decades ago, Quijano adopts exactly this approach to the race hierarchy thesis (RHT), coloniality's ideological strut: it is 'a mental construction' (2000a: 533), 'literally an invention' (575n6), a false belief that needs to be overcome. Likewise, the straightforwardly universalised version of the developmental stages thesis (DSTU1) is, in view of the Latin American exceptions to it, 'wrong' (Quijano, 2000b: 218). Both are beliefs that deserve to be set aside and replaced with others which better reflect the way the world is.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, determined to treat any ranking of beliefs as objectionable in just the same way as an invented race hierarchy, adopts the position that 'all human beings were born into valid and legitimate knowledge systems' (2020: 154). 'The ultimate goal,'

he consequently affirms, 'is to put all onto-epistemic traditions in a non-dominant and equal position' (op. cit.: 150). But if all theoretical approaches or sets of assumptions are to be treated as equals, principles like RHT, FTTU1 and DSTU1 can no longer be dismissed for being false or evidentially unjustified, as they were by Quijano and Grosfoguel. Accordingly, Ndlovu-Gatsheni makes a quite different complaint about them: they are instances of 'universalizing Western particularism' (2013: 38) [12]. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni's eyes, principles like RHT, FTTU1 and DSTU1 are 'Western particularistic ideas' (op. cit.: 12), meaning that their truth or validity is relativized to a particular context or culture—the West. While Quijano and Grosfoguel hold that some particular empirical principles, RHT, FTTU1 and DSTU1, are not true of anywhere, Ndlovu-Gatsheni's line of attack is of a different stripe. He asserts that principles and beliefs are, across the board, not the kinds of thing which can be true everywhere (relative to all contexts or cultures).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni's move is a hyperphilosophising one. Quijano and Grosfoguel argued, using the method of counterexample, that certain empirical theses in political economy and biology are false—false no matter where they are uttered or by whom. However, as we saw in the previous section, their explanations of why these theses are false in two cases provide the basis for a repair: one that delivers revised empirical theses which stand a chance of being true—true no matter where they are uttered or by whom. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, taking the same flaws in the same theses as his starting point, leaps to a conclusion of a quite different order: that there is no universal truth, that the error is to think that *any* thesis could be other than 'particularistic'—true or valid only relative to a particular culture or context of utterance [13]. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's embrace of this metaphysical conclusion, and his celebration of a 'harmonious pluriversal' alternative (2020: 65), are drastically undermotivated by the counterexamples to empirical theses which are his—as they are Grosfoguel and Quijano's—point of departure.

What is the meaning of 'where'?

The transfiguration of central claims in decoloniality theory from empirically grounded criticisms of social-scientific theses into a metaphysical denial of the possibility of universal truth, which we followed in Ndlovu-Gatsheni's writings [14], is by no means unique to him. Grosfoguel's thinking has moved in the same direction. Like Ndlovu-Gatsheni, he now claims that accompanying the coloniality of power is 'an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology' (Grosfoguel, 2007: 217), and criticises the latter for 'hid[ing] its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism' (214). Mignolo, a strong influence on Ndlovu-Gatsheni, also believes decoloniality theory should 'dispel the myth of universality' and embrace the 'pluriversal' alternative (2011: xv–xvi). The slogan 'I am where I think' is Mignolo's label for a 'basic epistemic principle that legitimizes all ways of thinking and de-legitimizes the pretense of a singular and particular epistemology, geo-historical and bio-graphically located, to be universal' (op. cit.: 81). But the slogan 'I am where I think' immediately raises the question of what Mignolo means by 'where'. More to the point, all contemporary decoloniality theorists owe us an answer to the following question: To what sorts of location or context of utterance does decoloniality theory say the truth or validity of propositions is to be relativized?

Two answers to this question can be found in the work of contemporary decoloniality theorists, both of which face difficulties, and neither of which sits easily alongside the other. In closing, I will briefly explore both.

The first answer to be found is that the salient context of utterance is one's 'epistemic location in the

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structures of colonial power/knowledge' (Grosfoguel, 2007: 213). According to this answer, 'where' would mean one's position in the imposed race hierarchy and the corresponding hierarchy of 'worldviews' or 'knowledges' which decoloniality theorists believe structure the contemporary world. Mignolo writes that there is 'a kind of subjectivity emerging from the lived experience of white and Christian males' (2011: 111), which he contrasts with the kinds of subjectivity emerging in those who occupy other positions in the colonial hierarchy. Discussing the work of the Indian political scientist Partha Chatterjee, Mignolo writes that 'what Foucault did not have was the colonial experience and political interest propelled by the colonial wound that allowed Chatterjee to "feel" and "see" beyond both Kant and Foucault' (2011: 133). Similarly, Grosfoguel asserts that 'if we move the locus of enunciation from the European man to an Indigenous women [sic] in the Americas', the result will be 'radical critique' (2007: 215–16).

The idea that people on the receiving end of oppression have the greatest insight into a society's true character is a coherent one. But it sits in some tension with decoloniality theorists' relativism—their repeated assertions that there is no truth except 'particularistic' truth, truth 'in parenthesis' [15], 'pluriversal' truth. For, in the passages quoted above, Grosfoguel and Mignolo's contention appears to be that those on the receiving end of colonial oppression have greater insight into what is true of the world-system *for all of us*.

Quite apart from its tension with relativism, this contention generates some complications of its own. Mignolo, a professor at Duke University, admits that he is writing his book 'at my house in North Carolina' (2011: 93), where presumably he is taken to be racially 'white'. Is Mignolo not, by his own lights, on the wrong end of the relevant hierarchies to have the necessary insight into coloniality? The same question can be asked of other decoloniality theorists. The obverse problem also arises: some people in the right hierarchical position have the wrong views. Or, as Grosfoguel puts it, '[t]he fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location' (2007: 213). Mignolo and Grosfoguel owe us a statement of the conditions under which views of people in the right social position cannot be trusted (and those under which views of people in the wrong social position *can* be trusted). This had better not be: *when they agree with decoloniality theory*!

If there is 'an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies' (Grosfoguel, 2007: 217), then there must be several different identifiable human systems of belief or 'cosmologies'. These systems of belief—what Ndlovu-Gatsheni calls 'knowledges and worldviews' (2013: 21)—provide a second possible answer to the question at the head of this section. This answer says that the context of utterance for assessing the validity of a belief or assertion is the system of belief within which it is situated. Examples of such systems include the 'Western' (Grosfoguel, 2007: 217) or 'Euro-American' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 60), the 'Andean' (Mignolo, 2011: 169), and the 'African' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 20). Theories which relativize truth to cultures or belief systems face many problems. Here I will mention only one central problem, which concerns the status of a relativist's own theory.

If the truth of propositions is to be relativized to regional or cultural contexts of utterance, what does this mean for decoloniality theory itself? Unlike some varieties of postcolonialism and postmodernism [16], decoloniality theory cannot dispense with grand narratives. Its signature claim, after all, is that a 'colonial matrix of power' exists worldwide, has endured for centuries, and affects all our lives. Mignolo is the decoloniality theorist most conscious of this reflexivity problem. In response to it, he restricts the ambition of his theorising with a concession which is perhaps greater than he realises. Mignolo tells his readers he is putting forward his decoloniality theory not as '*the* option', but as 'just an option' (2011: 21). He does not wish to argue for decoloniality theory over other theories, because '[t]o argue for one or the other [...] would be a modern/colonial way of framing the issue' (xxvii). Mignolo cannot consistently allow himself any more ambitious conclusion, given his view that 'there is no reason (other than epistemic racism) to believe that, among all forms of creative thinking [...], one mode of being where one thinks is better or preferable to the other' (101).

I have argued that decoloniality theory took on

the shape it has today via a series of drastically undermotivated inferences from empirical propositions to contentious philosophical conclusions. Quijano and Grosfoguel's initial critique of Eurocentrism in social science advances intellectual decolonisation in the broad, truth-oriented sense: it aims to strip away false theoretical conclusions which are the result of bias. By contrast, contemporary decoloniality theory is wedded to a set of controversial metaphysical claims, including rejection of the very idea of universal truth. In this final section, I have argued that, quite apart from being radically undermotivated, decoloniality theory's relativism is hard to reconcile with its grand narrative about the colonial matrix of power, and tends to undermine decoloniality theorists' ability to claim that their own theory is correct. If, as Mignolo insists, decoloniality theory is 'just an option', I hope I have made the case that it is an option we should decline [17].

Notes

[1] See, for example, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, 1986.
[2] In this paragraph and the two following, I draw on Hull, 2019a. For a fuller discussion of different approaches to the decolonisation of philosophy, see Hull, 2019b: 6–11.
[3] Wiredu's 'conceptual decolonisation' agenda is not uncontested. Sanya Osha (2005) believes it does not go far enough, while Bernhard Weiss (2019: 235–39) doubts that Wiredu's case studies take him as far as he thinks they do.
[4] The 'Curriculum Change Framework' is available at http://www.news.uct.ac.za/images/userfiles/downloads/reports/ccwg/UCT-Curriculum-Change-Framework.pdf. Quotations are from p. 18 and p. 30.
[5] Quijano co-authored an article with the doyen of world-systems analysis, Immanuel Wallerstein (1992), which prefigures some themes of his subsequent writings in decoloniality theory.
[6] See also Mignolo, 2011: 57–58.
[7] See Levi-Faur, 1997.
[8] For a discussion of this concept in the context of political economy, see Amin, 1990.
[9] See previous section.
[10] Emphasis in original.
[11] See Levi-Faur, 1997.
[12] Mignolo likewise deplores 'the universalization of Western nativism/localism' (2011: 330).
[13] See, for example, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020: 94–95, where he slides between endorsement of Samir Amin's view that some putatively universal economic laws are not true of all social and economic systems, and advocacy of the view that the validity of economic statements is relative to cultural structures, without noting the significant difference between the two.
[14] See previous section.
[15] 'Truth in parenthesis' is Mignolo's label for truth or validity which is restricted to a particular context of utterance (see, for example, Mignolo, 2011: 44).
[16] See, for example, Lyotard, 1984.
[17] Most elements of this critique of decoloniality theory were first explored and discussed in meetings of the Beyond Decoloniality Reading Group, Observatory, Cape Town. I am indebted to Kavish Chetty and Gabriele Teale-James for their hospitality and intellectual companionship. I also profited from discussion with participants from Brazil and South Africa in the UCT-Pernambuco joint online workshop entitled 'Intellectual Decolonization: Critical Perspectives' (9 September 2021), at which I presented some of this material. Finally, I am grateful to Veeran Naicker and Anye Nyamnjoh for written comments on a draft.

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Ethnic Propaganda, Hate Speech, and Mass Violence in Igbo-Hausa/ Fulani Relations in Postcolonial Nigeria

By James Olusegun Adeyeri and Jackson A. Aluede

Abstract

Opinions are divided on the conduct and nature of the 1967–70 Nigerian civil war, occasioned partly by the Igbo secession and declaration of the Republic of Biafra. Some believe that the Nigerian government adopted a genocidal war strategy characterised by mass violence against civilians, aggressive blockade of the eastern region, artificial famine, and hateful/threatening utterances by many military commanders, accompanied by about one million civilian casualties. On the other hand, some are of the view that the actions of some Nigerian military officers and men were not in consonant with the position of the Nigerian government during the war, but were influenced by their animosity towards the Igbo. In post-civil war Nigeria, Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations and political discourses are increasingly tense and indicative of a fearful resurgence of mass violence due to prevalent lies, propaganda, and misrepresentations –verbally, on paper, and online/on social media – particularly among the youths on both sides. This paper argues that the historical crisis-ridden relations between the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani, the attendant 1966 mass killings of Igbos in the north, the nature of the war strategies of the federal government during the civil war, and the currently mounting tension are all direct results of contending ethnic propaganda including hate speech, lies, and name-calling in a bid to gain political and strategic advantages over other ethnic groups. Thus, this paper is a historical inquiry into the role of propaganda and hate speech in socio-political interactions, discourses, and incitements of mass violence among the heterogeneous Nigerian population, particularly the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani. The paper proposes legislative, constitutional, and active citizenship advocacies to address the menace. The article utilises primary and secondary sources to analyse and interpret the subject-matter of the paper.

Introduction and Historical Background

Nigeria is a heterogeneous nation of over 250 ethnic nationalities. The dominant ethnic groups consist of the Igbo, the Hausa/Fulani, and the Yoruba. The Igbo, the Yoruba, and other minor ethnic groups (Efik, Ibibio, Edo, Ijo) who dominate the southern part of the country are predominantly Christian. On the other hand, the Hausa/Fulani – along with other ethnic groups (Tiv, Jukun, Kanem, Igala) – occupy the northern part of the country and are predominantly Muslim. The different ethnic nationalities that made up the federation were independent states before they were conquered and incorporated into the British colonial empire. In 1914 they were amalgamated, ushering the birth of the Nigerian state under British colonial rule. During the era of colonial rule, the British colonial masters orchestrated divide and rule colonial policies that divided the northern and southern parts of the country. The era of decolonisation saw regional politics and other sectional divisive tendencies that polarised the ranks of the three main ethnic groups alongside the minorities. The lack of unity and a weak sense of nationhood marked and undermined Nigerian nationalism and the independence struggle so much that, barely three years preceding independence in 1960, the Hausa/Fulani-dominated north declared that the region was not ready for independence, as against the aspiration of the south, which was vigorously pushing for total freedom and Nigerian statehood. It is imperative to note that the Nigerian state was built on a fragile foundation, which made it susceptible to ethnic and regional tensions, schisms, conflicts, and instability right from its infancy. Existing conflict studies literature on Nigeria have extensively explored the Nigerian military coup d'états, the civil War, the insurgency, and inter-communal conflicts from political, economic, and ethnic/tribal perspectives (Kirk-Greene, 1967; Oyeweso, 1992; Adeyeri, 2015), but the specific role of ethnic propaganda and hate speech in violent conflicts in the country is yet to be adequately studied and fully revealed. Therefore, the main thrust of this paper is to investigate the trajectory and role of ethnic propaganda and hate speech in Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations and mass violence during the postcolonial era. The study shall also consider corrective policy and other response measures.

Conceptual Clarification: Ethnic Propaganda and Hate speech

Ethnicity over the years has attracted considerable attention in academia, government cycles, and the public domain – as it has been manipulated by some groups of people to inflict pain, misery, and death on others they conceive as different from them in terms of language, religion, culture, and worldview. Adlparvar and Tadros write that:

> 'Ethnicity is a hotly disputed concept. Since it emerged as an important form of collective identity in the 1960s, it has been appropriated by all kinds of people for all kinds of purposes. From political mobilisation that uses the necessity of ethnic homogeneity as the basis for expelling populations of different racial backgrounds to the conflation of ethnicity with religion (as when people assume Muslims are an ethnic category), and the reduction of complex geostrategic and historic conflicts to 'ethnic strife'' (2016: 123).

Ethnicity, according to Gurr (2009), has to do partly with the primordial interpretation of issues that recognise the differences among humankind and societies based on their race, language, customs, norms, and civilisation. One of the ways some groups of people or ethnic groups have promoted ethnicity negatively is through ethnic propaganda. This is the deliberate act of one ethnic group inciting its people against another ethnic group through the media and other platforms to inflict pain, assault, and – in some cases – mass violence and death (Deng, 1997). History is replete with examples of states and leaders who deployed ethnic propaganda – such as Nazi Germany against the Jews, and several others in other parts of the world. In Africa, there is ample evidence of ethnic propaganda between rival ethnic groups and the resultant consequences in the outbreaks of mass violence and conflicts in the Great Lakes and the Mano River regions, East and Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, as well as in West Africa and other parts of the continent (Aluede, 2019; Wimmer, 2004). In Nigeria, during the civil war, ethnic propaganda played a major role in inciting some ethnic groups against others. For instance, Igbo and Hausa/Fulani relations were heightened negatively through ethnic

propaganda and this influenced the attitudes of some of the combatants and senior military officers during the war to pursue the annihilation of the Igbo. The rivalry between both ethnic groups can be traced back to the colonial period and worsened during the failed January 15 1966 coup (Amadi, 2020). The coup plotters were dominated by Igbo military officers, while the victims of the coup were prominent Hausa/Fulani military officers and civilians, including the Prime Minister of the country, Sir Tafawa Balewa (Amechi, 2016). The Hausa/Fulani civilians, military officers, and soldiers took revenge through a counter-coup on July 15 1966. The victims of the coup were the Igbo civilians, military officers, and soldiers – including the Head of State, General Aguiyi Ironsi, as well as Igbo civilians massacred in northern Nigeria (Ojo and Fagbohun, 2014). Since the end of the civil war, Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations have been underlined by mutual suspicion maintained through subtle ethnic propaganda against one another.

Hate speech, like ethnic propaganda, has equally received attention among academia, government cycles, and the public domain. This is because of the magnitude of the negative consequences that have emanated from hate speech globally. The phenomenon of hate speech dates back centuries but has become a major issue of discourse in recent times due to its scope, conceptual meaning, and definition. The literature on hate speech agrees that it is morally wrong, harmful, and dehumanising to its victims (Brown, 2017; Noorani, 1992). This is because hate speech has generated a negative impact on society and has been exploited by individuals and groups sometimes driven by ethnic and religious sentiments to incite or provoke disunity and disaffection among rival individuals, groups, associations, and ethnic groups (Sorabjee, 1993). However, opinions are divided on what constitutes hate speech? Hate speech is a term in legal and political theory that refers to verbal conduct – and other symbolic, communicative action – which wilfully 'expresses intense antipathy towards a group or towards an individual based on membership group', where the groups in question are usually those distinguished by ethnicity, religion, or sex (Simpson, 2013). Seglow (2016) conceives hate speech as speech that attacks (and is intended to attack) its targets because of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion and so on, and which conveys intense feelings of apathy. Ezeibe (2015: 4) refers to hate speech as any speech, gesture, conduct, writing, or display which could incite people to violence or prejudicial action.

"hate speech manifests in various forms and is not limited to identity-prejudicial abuse and harassment, the use of slurs and epithets, some extremist political speech, and certain displays of 'hate symbols' (for example, swastikas or burning crosses) (Simpson, 2013: 702). Hate speech is an abuse of free speech or freedom of speech."

In other words, hate speech manifests in various forms and is not limited to identity-prejudicial abuse and harassment, the use of slurs and epithets, some extremist political speech, and certain displays of 'hate symbols' (for example, swastikas or burning crosses) (Simpson, 2013: 702). Hate speech is an abuse of free speech or freedom of speech. The negative manifestations of hate speech in different societies across the world have led to litigations as well as the ban or restrictions of comments that can incite violence, and punishment on those responsible for such comments (American Bar Association, 1994). This notwithstanding, however, some are of the view that punishing people based on comment or speech is an infringement on their constitutional rights. This development has continued to generate controversy among scholars based on their varied interpretations and conceptions of hate speech.

In Nigeria, it is believed that hate speech gained momentum during the colonial period among the various ethnic groups, particularly between the north and south, and spread into the fabric of the respective institutions that evolved during the period (Nzemeka, 2021). Similarly, it progressed among the rival political parties during the colonial period, and into the postcolonial era (Bukarti, 2017). Hate speech was at its ascendancy before, during, and after the Nigerian civil war, among the combatants from the

Nigerian side and the Biafra secessionists (Ahmad, 2017). Senior military officers from both camps made provocative hate speech comments against one another – such as 'killing anything in sight,' 'Kaffari', and 'infidel' – and this fuelled the bitterness between the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani (Osuntokun and Nwokike, 2002). Hate speech between the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani has been on the increase after the country's civil war, arising from the fall out that led to the Nigerian civil war, the perceived marginalisation of the Igbos, and other contentious issues in the Nigerian polity. Despite efforts by successive administrations to tackle the spread of hate speech in the political space, the tension between the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani has remained unresolved owing to bitter animosity, mistrust, and perceptions.

Hate Speech, Propaganda, and the Politics of the First Republic

Nigeria attained independence from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960, and entered the global arena as a country with rich potential and a leading voice in promoting African uniqueness to the world. However, domestic challenges arising from rivalry amongst the country's ethnic groups presented a major threat to Nigeria's unity and progress. Before independence was achieved, the political space was already polarised, as demonstrated in the factionalisation of the political parties along ethnic lines during the colonial period (Osuntokun and Nwokike, 2002). Likewise, each party's quest to dominate the others and to secure the highest political office in the land witnessed all manner of political strategies such as propaganda and hate speech. Interestingly, the political elites were at the forefront in promoting hate speech against their rival ethnic groups. This was one of the features of the politics of the First Republic. For instance, leading political figures – namely the premiers of the Northern and Western Regions and Nigeria's Governor General – were guilty of hate speech:

> 'The Igbo are too dominating, if you employ an Igbo man as a labourer, he will like to take over as foreman within a short while – Late Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. The God of Africa has created the Igbo Nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages – Nigeria's first President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. Nnamdi Azikiwe's policy was to corrode the self-respect of the Yoruba people as a group to build up the Igbo as master race – Chief Obafemi Awolowo.' (Ezeibe, 2015)

It is not surprising that ethnic rivalry and the quest for dominance by the three major ethnic groups fuelled hate speech and propaganda during the First Republic and contributed to its extinction in January 1966.

Reminiscence of Igbo-Hausa/Fulani Rivalry Before the Nigerian Civil War

Nigeria faced numerous challenges after the attainment of independence, namely: the 1962 census and Action Group (AG) crisis, the disputed 1963 census result, the 1964 election crisis, the 1965 western region crisis, the rising tide of corruption among politicians and senior military officers, the entrenchment of ethnicity within the political space, and the contestation for power among political elites (Aworawo, 2002). The postcolonial political elites were unable to find lasting solutions to these challenges that were partly a carry-over from colonial rule and a manifestation of a politics of bitterness displaced by the country's founding fathers in their quest to promote their ethnic group and political party above others. Some young military officers were driven by the desire to curb corruption and ethnic rivalry, and to chart the country onto the path of unity and nationhood – but their efforts were truncated by the political elites at independence (Oluwajuyitan, 2003; Oyeweso, 1992; Ladele, 1987). These young officers were led by Majors Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and were primarily from the southern part of the country. They were of Igbo extraction, except for Major Adewale Ademoyega, who is a Yoruba (Oyeweso, 1992). These young officers struck on 15 January 1966, in a bloody military coup d'état. In the course of carrying out their assignment, senior military officers from the northern region were killed, as were Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the northern region, and Sir Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's First Republic Prime Minister (Siollun, 2009).

Unfortunately, the coup failed and the military took power. The most senior officer at the time, Major General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Nigerian Army,

became the country's first military Head of State (Reviewcious, 2018). Major General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi was an Igbo man. The planning and execution of the January military coup were dominated by Igbo officers, coupled with General Aguyi-Ironsi's eventual seizure of power, and the casualties were mainly Hausa/Fulani officers and political leaders. This soon gave rise to the interpretation (at least in the north) that it was an Igbo coup primarily targeted at the northern power elite, or what soon became popularly known as 'Igbo Plot Theory', indicative of a grand agenda to entrench Igbo hegemony over the remaining ethnic nationalities within the fledgling Nigerian state. However, there is a need to point out that rather than a violent seizure of power with its attendant negative potential implications for civil governance and national unity and stability, the plotters ought to have allowed the citizenry to adopt the better option of changing the government through the constitutional method of elections. Also, given the deep ethnic divides and other centrifugal forces prevalent in the country during the colonial period – which gained ascendancy following the attainment of independence – coupled with the ethnic origin lop-sidedness of the coup planners, and the execution and casualties earlier analysed, it is difficult to dismiss the view that the coup was an Igbo tribal plot.

Following the nature by which the January coup was orchestrated and, more especially, the pattern by which the coup was executed, whereby the victims were of Hausa/Fulani extraction, it was only a matter of time before the north retaliated. The northern officers/soldiers retaliated on 29 July 1966 and their targets were the Igbos. Several Igbo military officers were killed as well as civilians in the north. Also, a victim of the July coup was the country's Head of State, Major-General Ironsi, who was on a state visit to the Western Region. He and his host Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi were killed by the coup plotters (Aworawo, 2002). Observers of Nigeria's political development, after the January coup, affirmed that apart from the killings of Hausa/Fulani in the first coup, the actions of Ironsi, particularly the nature of his appointment of people of his extraction and the outlawing of the Hausa language test which was a core requirement for employment in the northern Civil Service, provoked the retaliation of the north against the Igbos.

"The decree replaced the federal structure with a unitary system of government, thereby abolishing the pre-existing regional structure, and unified former regional public services, among other unitary provisions that were upheld by the military government. The decision of Ironsi to replace the unitary system of government with the federal system was vehemently opposed in the northern part of the country."

The promulgation of Decree 34 by the Ironsi-led military government worsened the already tense political atmosphere in the land. The decree replaced the federal structure with a unitary system of government, thereby abolishing the pre-existing regional structure, and unified former regional public services, among other unitary provisions that were upheld by the military government. The decision of Ironsi to replace the unitary system of government with the federal system was vehemently opposed in the northern part of the country. Amidst the chaos, the emirs (northern traditional rulers) openly threatened secession of the north from Nigeria unless the Unification Decree was nullified (Johnson, 1990). The development appeared to have confirmed northern suspicions and fears of Igbo domination, culminating in the July military coup led by northern soldiers against their Igbo colleagues in the military. Following the success of the July coup, there was jubilation in the northern part of the country. In the process, the jubilant crowd – with the battle cry araba ('let us part') – descended on the Igbos residing in the north, and several of them were killed (Meredith, 2005). Likewise, in the military cycle, many Igbo officers – including Lieutenant Colonels Gabriel Okonweze and Israel Okoro, Majors Christian Anuforo, Christopher Emelifonwu, Joseph Ihedigbo, Bernard Nnamani, Theophilus Nzegwu, Peter Obi, John Obienu, Donatus Okafor, Captains R. Agbazue, J. Chukwueke, L. Dilibe, I. Idika, H. Iloputaife, T. Iweanya, and many others including about 200 Non-

Commissioned Officers (NCOs) – were killed during the mutiny and violent change of government (Alao, 1990; Obiozor, 1994). Some Igbo civilians, including those fleeing, were not spared either. In Kano on 1 October 1966, mutinying northern soldiers mobilised local thugs to help them identify Igbo abodes, following which thousands of Igbos were murdered in places such as the airport and railway station.

The January and July military coups opened a new chapter in Nigeria's political history and, more especially, in Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations. They furthered entrenched divisions among ethnic groups and heightened the seeds of discord and animosity that have lasted up to the present day. Likewise, the development fuelled the use of unfriendly words against each other, regarded today as hate speech.

Following the killing of Ironsi, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon was made Head of State through a consensus of some leading senior military officers. The choice of Gowon was rejected by Colonel Ojukwu, the Governor of the Eastern Region (Aworawo, 2002). He affirmed that Gowon was not the most senior officer to take over power following the death of Ironsi. Furthermore, following the killings of Igbos in the north, he pleaded with them to return home. Unfortunately, the failure of the top military hierarchy to resolve their differences, after several reconciliatory moves at home and abroad, culminated in the outbreak of thirty months of civil war between the Biafra secessionists (dominated by the Igbos) and the Nigerian state.

Hate Speech, Ethnic Propaganda, and Mass Violence: Igbo-Hausa/Fulani Relations During the Nigeria/Biafra Civil War

The inability of the political actors in the corridors of powers at the federal and regional levels, in particular in the eastern region, to settle their political differences led to the outbreak of the country's civil war. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the then-Head of State, Major-General Gowon, created 12 states from the four regions' federal structure (Amuwo, 1992). Following the development, the defunct Eastern Region administration and leaders of thought concluded that the interests of their people could no longer be advanced and ensured within the Nigerian state (Akpan, 1971; Lai, 2021). Therefore, under the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu, the former Eastern Region military Governor, the people of the region on 30 May 1967 declared their sovereign state, the Republic of Biafra, thereby dissolving all pre-existing political, economic, and other ties between them and the Nigerian federation. The jurisdiction of the new state covered the entire territory, the continental shelf, and the territorial waters of former south-eastern Nigeria (Kirk-Greene, 1967; Alao, 1990).

The war was marked by mass violence and atrocities against both combatants and civilians. As De St. Jorre (1972) has pointed out, both the federal and Biafran sides committed massacres during military confrontations and the immediate post-combat period. It is imperative to state that the federal military government was controlled by the Hausa/Fulani; likewise, the Nigerian armed forces that engaged the Biafra forces seeking separation from the Nigerian state. During the early period of the war, following Biafra's surprise invasion and capture of the Midwest region, Murtala's hurriedly established Second Division of the Nigerian Army massacred many Biafran prisoners of war (POWs), and Igbo civilians in their hundreds due to their sympathy for the Biafran soldiers, after expelling Biafran troops from the region. Some soldiers of the division also engaged in a looting spree, after the division's multiple failed amphibious attacks on Onitsha and resultant huge casualties. After the division eventually captured Onitsha via ground invasion, some federal troops looted occupied towns, harassed civilians' wives, and even committed armed robbery on an Asaba-based bank (Momoh, 2000).

Although existing evidence indicates that both sides deployed foreign mercenaries in their war efforts, the federal air force Egyptian mercenary fighter pilots were notorious for frequently attacking civilian targets, including many Red Cross shelters, instead of military targets. Also, federal forces launched attacks against Biafran hospitals and health personnel, and French doctors working as volunteers with the French Red Cross. It is worth noting that the international media focus on the worsening humanitarian disaster inside Biafra and the need for an appropriate response to such human tragedies was the basis for the eventual formation of the now globally well-known Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) (New World Encyclopedia, 2021; Bortolloti, 2004).

The aggressive land, naval, and air sieges on the Eastern Region by federal forces from the onset

“On 15 January 1970, the Nigerian Civil War ended and Colonel Ojukwu’s deputy Lieutenant-Colonel Effiong surrendered to Colonel Obasanjo. Colonel Ojukwu had fled to Cote d’Ivoire before Biafra capitulated. Gowon declared after that the war was a ‘no winner, no vanquished.’ Similarly, the Head of State introduced the policy of reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction as part of measures to reintegrate the Igbos back into Nigerian society”

of the war caused deep human trauma and poor living conditions among civilian populations in the various towns and communities. Hate speech and threatening language by some members of the federal military leadership created worries that genocide against Biafra was in the offing. As an illustration, Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (a.k.a Black Scorpion), Commanding Officer of the Lagos Garrison Command-turned 3rd Marine Commandos, reportedly once declared that:

> We shoot at everything that moves and when our troops march into the center of Ibo territory, we shoot at everything even at things that do not move. (Amadi, 2007)

Even the strident criticisms and protests by humanitarian organisations in Europe and the United States of America (USA) did not make the federal side end the blockade (ADST, 1998; Adeoti, 2021). About 10,000 persons reportedly died daily from starvation caused by the blockade-inspired artificial famine due to disruption of agriculture and obstruction of food and other supplies distribution (Wiseberg, 1975). By the time the war ended, in January 1970, a total of over one million persons were estimated to have died from civilian hunger, malnutrition, and diseases (Shapiro, 2011).

Post-Civil War Hate Speech and Ethnic Propaganda in Igbo-Hausa/Fulani Relations

On 15 January 1970, the Nigerian Civil War ended and Colonel Ojukwu’s deputy Lieutenant-Colonel Effiong surrendered to Colonel Obasanjo. Colonel Ojukwu had fled to Cote d’Ivoire before Biafra capitulated. Gowon declared after that the war was a ‘no winner, no vanquished.’ Similarly, the Head of State introduced the policy of reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction as part of measures to reintegrate the Igbos back into Nigerian society, to address the impact of the war in the Eastern Region, and to promote oneness among the Igbos and other ethnic groups in the land. This notwithstanding, development in Nigerian politics reveals that the Igbos have continued to be marginalised, arising from the events that led to the civil war, as well as the acrimony that had characterised Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations since independence. The Hausa/Fulani have held on to political power in Nigeria more than any other ethnic group in the land, and this has enabled them to marginalise other ethnic groups that they are suspicious of. Unfortunately, the development has not only fuelled acrimony between the Igbo-Hausa/Fulani, but also increased hate speech among their leaders and peoples.

For instance, the present Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Federal, Abubakar Malami, was alleged to have posted the following comments concerning the Igbo on Twitter: ‘Igbos are stupid and unruly. They are the problem of this country’ (The Cable, 2011). In the same vein, renowned writer and poet Chinua Achebe made the following statement concerning the uniqueness of Igbos over other ethnic groups in Nigeria: ‘The Igbo culture, being receptive to change, individualistic and highly competitive, gave the Igbo man an unquestionable advantage… Unlike the Hausa/ Fulani, he was unhindered by a wary religion and unlike the Yoruba, he was unhampered by traditional hierarchies’ (2012: 74).

After the civil war, despite the policies of the Gowon-led military government to promote unity among the ethnic groups in Nigeria, events revealed that the opposite was the case concerning the Igbos. In 1971 and 1973 respectively, hundreds of Biafra ex-military, police, and prison officers were dismissed, including Ojukwu’s deputy during the war (Aworawo, 2002). Likewise, Igbos have been marginalised considerably

compared to other ethnic groups in Nigeria. For instance, the southeast is the only region with five states, whereas other regions have six states (Ezeibe, 2015). In the same vein, several administrations at the federal level, except for the civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015), have been deprived of equitable political appointments. The southeast region has continually decried poor revenue allocation from the federal government, absence of infrastructural development in the region, and unjust census results that do not represent the population of the southeast (Nzemeka, 2021). The Igbos have suffered considerably from ethnic and religious conflicts in the north, since the return to democracy in 1999. Hundreds of Igbos were killed in different states of the north and their property destroyed. Many had to flee to their states (Olu-Adeyemi, 2018).

As part of a measure to defend itself from marginalisation and to promote its collective interest from the Nigerian government, Ralph Uwazuruike in 1999 formed the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (Duruji, 2009). In 2015, when it appeared that MASSOB was losing steam, Nnamdi Kanu created the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) to sustain the struggle for the creation of an independent Igbo State out of the current Nigerian federation. Pro-Biafra agitations have repeatedly pitched the Igbo against the Nigerian state and security agencies, and such conflicts have sometimes resulted in the killing of agitators.

Following MASSOB's re-declaration of Biafra in Aba, capital of Abia State on 22 May 2000, government security forces introduced repressive measures against the movement to checkmate it and its activities, which the government considered to be anti-state and illegitimate, leading to the death of many Biafra activists. Between May 2001 and February 2006, state security forces allegedly killed approximately 80 pro-Biafra agitators, arrested and arraigned 66, while more than 200 were arrested and subjected to human rights violations in the form of dehumanising and humiliating treatment. The worst form of state violence against MASSOB agitators occurred afterward in Onitsha during which up to 700 agitators were reportedly killed as a result of the state government's shoot-on-sight order (PARAN, 2006). Due to government crackdown and internal conflict within MASSOB, the group afterward went into decline, a vacuum that was filled by IPOB which intensified agitations for Biafra's statehood and separation from Nigeria. In this quest, IPOB and its supporters, like MASSOB, have come under government repression and violence (Ibeanu et al., 2016). Of particular note was the 12–15 September 2017 military siege on Kanu's (IPOB leader) home in Afara-Okwu, Umuahia, Abia State, with him, his parents, siblings, the elderly, and numerous visitors trapped inside and resulting in the death of about 28 persons and the injury and arrest of many others, as well as serious damage to the home, including gunshot damage to Kanu's bedroom. The IPOB leader's whereabouts became unknown since the military invasion. Significantly, this and similar acts of government violence and repression against IPOB prompted the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) to pronounce the federal government's branding of IPOB as a terrorist organisation and violence against its members a prima facie violation of the African Charter (Sahara Reporters, 2018; The Sun News Online, 2018; This Day Live, 2018).

Conclusion

Despite being fellow citizens and stakeholders of the Nigerian state, Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations in the postcolonial period have been marred by ethnic propaganda and hate speech by both sides, leading to phases of violent conflicts, widespread violations of human rights, and attendant mutual suspicion and hatred since the dawn of independence to the present. The Igbo-dominated military coup of January 1966 targeted and violently claimed the lives of the leading Hausa/Fulani political elite. A Hausa/Fulani retaliatory coup in July of the same year produced a much higher scale of violence and killing of Igbos, especially top military elite and middle-level officers. The pogrom launched by the Hausa/Fulani against Igbo residents in Northern Nigeria sustained the trend of mass violence and human rights infractions and triggered the forced displacement and emigration of huge Igbo populations back to their indigenous homeland in Eastern Nigeria. The 1967–70 Civil War marked the peak of violence-laden relations between the Igbo and Hausa/Fulani during the post-colonial period. The genocidal war strategy of the Hausa/Fulani-dominated Nigerian

government and military caused very high civilian casualties among the Igbo people. At present, Igbo-Hausa/Fulani relations continue to be marked by ethnic propaganda, hate speech and pockets of violence due to the government's opposition to some Igbo groups' campaign for a sovereign State of Biafra. To halt this historical trend of violence-ridden relations and human rights violations, there is a need to consistently implement existing laws that prohibit ethnic or tribal hate speech and related activities that breed inter-ethnic grievances and are capable of instigating violent conflicts. There is also the need to appropriately strengthen these laws and introduce fresh legislations where necessary for more effectiveness. Finally, it is crucial for all stakeholders in the Nigerian project (government, politicians, bureaucrats, traditional rulers, and the entire citizenry) to observe and promote justice, fairness, equity, and fundamental human rights in their activities and relations with fellow Nigerians, regardless of ethnic or tribal affinities, religion, and other primordial considerations.

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Natural Gas Production in Mozambique and the Political Risk of Islamic Militancy

By Theodor Neethling

Abstract

The Cabo Delgado province in the northernmost portion of the long Mozambican seaboard is now home to Africa's three largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects, and these projects have attracted many of the world's major multinational energy companies, accompanied by massive LNG investments. There can be little doubt that the discovery of rich gas reserves is a potential game changer for the Mozambican economy and development agenda. It is potentially an opportunity for the rapid advancement of a country that currently ranks close to the bottom of the United Nation's Human Development Index. However, despite the billions in investments from major multinational energy companies, the people of Cabo Delgado are yet to see the material benefit from these projects. One of the biggest risks to investors in the LNG industry is the many unknowns pertaining to the threat posed by the militant Islamic movement, Ansar al-Sunna, which has especially been active since 2017 in the Cabo Delgado province. In view of this, this article assesses Mozambique's LNG industry and the political risks associated with the insurgent movement's intention to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Cabo Delgado area.

Introduction

In Mozambique, two very different but interacting domains are currently of major importance to the prosperity and future economic development of the country, namely the country's LNG projects and the militant movement, Ansar al-Sunna. The LNG projects in the northern Cabo Delgado area, with major gas reserves attracting an estimated total investment of more than $50 billion, represent a silver lining of hope for this impoverished country in terms of major international investment and revenue generation. Observers often assert that this could pave the way for the country to become Africa's Qatar or even Dubai from 2024 onwards (Dos Santos, 2020: 1–2).

However, this silver lining may vanish and turn into a mirage as a result of the expanding armed activities of Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado, which the Mozambican government and its security forces have not been able to contain since 2017. Combatting the armed activities of the Islamist insurgents, commonly referred to as Ansar al-Sunna or Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama, and locally known as Mozambique's Al Shabaab, has exacted a high toll on both the government and the investors' energy and budgets (Dos Santos, 2020: 1–2). An agreement between the major players in the LNG business and the former Minister of the Interior made the Mozambican government responsible for supplying military and security services for the protection of the LNG workforces. This, however, has proved to be no guarantee to 'discard a scenario which has, at its core, a growing alliance of local armed Islamists with ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and ADF [Allied Democratic Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo]' which is moving towards 'a jihadist war in Cabo Delgado' (Dos Santos, 2020: 9).

The underlying thesis of this article is that the LNG industry in Mozambique could revolutionise the economy of the country. However, if the dynamics relating to the activities of Ansar al-Sunna in Cabo Delgado are escalating and if they are not carefully managed by the Mozambican government and its security forces, liquefied gas production will become a lost opportunity for development and could even turn into a source of conflict. In view of this, the pressing question is: Does the Mozambican government have the political will and institutional capacity to provide a stable and predictable investment climate where the political risks associated with the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado would not jeopardise or threaten the promising LNG projects?

As far as political risk is concerned, it is defined by Chen (2020) as: '[t]he risk that an investment's returns could suffer as a result of political changes or instability in a country.' Such changes or instability affecting returns on investment could stem from a change in government, legislative institutions, foreign policymakers, or a military takeover. This article assesses Mozambique's evolving LNG industry, specifically against the background of Ansar al-Sunna's insurgency in Cabo Delgado and the movement's intention to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Cabo Delgado area. Several political variables will have a crucial bearing on the viability and profitability of the LNG projects, such as key political trends influencing the exploration process, the evolving oil and gas policy regime, and operational and governance challenges confronting project developers (Frühauf, 2014: 2). Most important, however, are the political challenges associated with the activities of Ansar al-Sunna.

Cursory notes on risk analysis

McKellar (2010: 6) states that political risk is relevant for businesses because it is important for businesses to understand the dynamics of the markets in which they function and the policies and legal frameworks that have an impact on them. Barnard and Croucamp (2015: 1) likewise explain that political, social, and economic stability and growth are among the key determinants affecting or determining the political risk profile of a country.

Political risk thus concerns the functioning of two very different but interacting domains, namely business and politics. The *raison d'être* of business is to create profits for itself and its stakeholders, and business leaders or managers share a mind-set around the ideas of market share, growth margins, and return on investment. Business is affected by the laws of the country, and business furthermore takes place in a framework ultimately set by political authority and social relations. In developed states, business can afford to take this framework for granted, but

in developing states, business needs to adapt to changing and often volatile political landscapes (McKellar, 2010: 6–7).

In view of the above, political risk can be defined as a potential harm to a business operation arising from political behaviour. Political actors and their behaviour are concerned with social organisation and the underlying ideals of society. The basis of political actors and their behaviour relates to issues pertaining to authority, ideology, political culture, social identity, social good, and the levers of power to influence these (McKellar, 2010: 6).

Defining and understanding political risk in a scholarly context is largely a case of disciplinary perspective or approach. For students of international business, for example, political risk relates to a concern with the management of those factors that could influence market conditions. For political scientists, definitions of political risk tend to rest with the exercise of power and the harm that could stem from this to individuals, nation states, and even the international system. Generally, scholars in various fields or disciplines – such as politics, political economy, economics, trade, investment, and international business – all grapple with the problem or challenge of political risk in one way or another (Jarvis, 2008: 3–5).

The point of departure in this article is that political risk concerns the interface between business and politics in a particular country as two different but interacting domains in countries across the world (McKellar, 2010: 6). In the case of Mozambique, the government, civil society, and international donors recognise the natural gas discoveries as a potential 'game changer' for Mozambique (Frühauf, 2014: 1). However, a high level of political risk in Mozambique means that investors will fear some form of harm or damage to their (potential) investments and thus be reserved or conservative in their investment decisions and operations – even keeping investments on hold.

At government level, the Mozambican head of state, President Filipe Nyusi, plays a key role in the country's LNG sector. In fact, he was elected 2020 Person of the Year by Africa Oil & Power, the African continent's leading investment platform for the energy sector. This prestigious award is presented

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to individuals who are considered exceptional and who display true leadership and innovative thinking in the steering of their countries or organisations to the forefront of the global energy sector. Thus, a lack of political commitment to the LNG sector does not seem to be an issue or risk in the development of the LNG sector in Mozambique. Leaders in government realise that LNG projects, once fully actualised, will represent more than three times the country's current gross domestic product (GDP) (Hirst, 2020). Moreover, the 20-year Mozambican National Development Strategy, developed by the Ministry of Planning and Development in 2013, regards the exploration of natural gas as 'a starting point to effect a shift away from poverty reduction towards industrialization' (Frühauf, 2014: 16).

Yet, as already suggested, one of the biggest risks to investors in the LNG industry is the many unknowns pertaining to the threat posed by Ansar al-Sunna since 2017 in the Cabo Delgado province. Mozambique is a developing country, and given the country's political dynamics and related turbulence over many years, political risk in Mozambique has always been of relevance to potential investors. Moreover, the Mozambican government has been facing dwindling domestic and international support, as the President and his ruling Frelimo party face major difficulties to deliver on promises to combat widespread corruption, to boost food production, and to consolidate peace, among others. These challenges are exacerbated by the impact of Covid-19 and related measures on the

country (Dos Santos, 2020: 2).

In addition to the above, risk in the Mozambican context is of even greater importance in view of the fact that gigantic multinational LNG projects are now under construction offshore and onshore in the northern parts of the country. In view of the above, The World Bank (2021) rightly pointed out:
'[T]he government is grappling with another so-called Islamic insurgency in parts of the gas-rich province of Cabo-Delgado. Initially circumscribed to one locality, the indiscriminate killing of civilians perpetrated by the insurgents has now spread to other districts and towns in the province. Recently [March 2020] the rebels attacked and occupied successively the transport hub rural town of Mocímboa da Praia and the town of Quissinga. Recent estimates show the conflict has killed more than 1,000 people and forced 100,000 from their homes. The risk that violence can spread to other areas of the country should not be underestimated.'

These dynamics and challenges will be further discussed in the sections below with the discussion focusing on the dynamics relating to the discovery of offshore gas reserves and then turning to the current insurgency dynamics and related political risk.

Discovery of offshore gas reserves, investments, and societal impact

Since 2011, with the discovery of major offshore gas fields, many observers have been driven to suggest that Mozambique, one of the poorest nations in the world, has 'hit the jackpot'. However, Akwagyiram (2013) almost prophetically opined that 'turning those resources into riches is not straightforward' and suggested that the LNG industry in Mozambique might follow one of two diverse experiences or possible pathways: the Norwegian experience or the Nigerian experience. The Norwegian experience was essentially one where the country would manage to export six times more energy than it consumed and thus become one of the richest countries in the world in per capita terms. Nigeria, however, despite its oil wealth, imported energy and it was estimated in 2013 that at least $400 billion of oil revenue had been stolen or misspent since independence in 1960 (Akwagyiram, 2013). Comparing Norway and Nigeria might not be fair in many respects, as the two countries are vastly different in population size and political challenges. Still, the contrasting fortunes of these two countries – like so many other cases of resource abundance internationally – clearly illustrate the fact that a wealth of natural resources does not necessarily translate into economic progression and prosperity.

World Bank data from 2017 ranked Mozambique as the seventh poorest country internationally. The country has recorded an average annual gross national income of $1 200 per person and although positive trends were recorded since 2000 in poverty reduction, the northern regions – especially Zambezia, Nampula, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado – have largely been excluded from the levels of poverty reduction recorded in the central and southern regions. This is clear from data revealing that from 1996 to 2015, poverty rates in the capital Maputo and Maputo province decreased by approximately 70%, as opposed to approximately 20% poverty reduction in most of the northern areas, including Cabo Delgado (Intelyse LLC, 2019).

As the northernmost province, Cabo Delgado has been neglected over many years and thus finds itself in a situation of political marginalisation and underdevelopment. The province has the highest illiteracy rate in Mozambique – at more or less 60% – with approximately 35% of children not attending school. The figure for postsecondary school education stands at 0.3% and in this context, thousands of youths are unemployed. In fact, youth unemployment is estimated to be close to 90%. On the positive side, Cabo Delgado is the province with the country's most important deposits of natural resources. The largest deposits of rubies in the world are located there, as well as large stocks of timber. Most significantly, large gas reserves are located in the Rovuma Basin area, south of the town of Palma (Intelyse LLC, 2019).

After independence in 1975, exploration efforts in Mozambique during the 1970s and 1980s did not deliver substantial results. The first LNG production only came online in Inhambane province at the Temane field within the Mozambique Basin in February 2004 (Frühauf, 2014: 1). At that point, the discovery of gas reserves largely served South African interests. South African petrochemical giant Sasol made a swift entrance into upstream activity in the Mozambique

Basin and dominated production for some time. The discoveries and related projects have been considered lucrative for Sasol and its partners, such as iGas. A price differential between sales prices in Mozambique and South Africa, as well as favourable fiscal terms in Mozambique, left South African stakeholders in a position to benefit considerably from the projects. South African involvement in LNG production was to be but a preamble to massive gas discoveries in the northern Rovuma Basin, which attracted entities ranging from supermajors to emerging-market national oil companies. In this regard, the US energy company, Anadarko, and the Italian multinational oil and gas company, Eni, have spearheaded exploration activities in the northern Rovuma Basin and, since 2009, exploration has yielded major discoveries and sparked much excitement in the international LNG industry. Not only Western supermajors, such as Total, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and BP entered the Mozambique LNG industry, but also Japan's Mitsui, Malaysia's Petronas, and China's CNPC (Frühauf, 2014: 3–4).

In 2012, Anadarko discovered additional gas reserves off the coast of Cabo Delgado in the Rovuma Basin. Many role players inside and outside Mozambique hoped that this would bring much-needed development and prosperity to the region. Shortly after this discovery, Eni also discovered a massive gas field in the area. Currently, Cabo Delgado is the province where several multinational energy giants are at work in Mozambique's promising offshore LNG projects. Eight LNG projects are in the process of development in Mozambique, containing a total liquefaction capacity of 44 million tons. It was accordingly anticipated that by the mid-2020s Mozambique could become one of the top ten LNG producers globally (Goodrich, 2020).

In 2020, offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area was among Africa's three largest LNG projects (Craig, 2020), namely –

- the Mozambique LNG Project (involving Total and previously Anadarko) worth $20 billion;
- the Coral FLNG Project (involving Eni and Exxon Mobil) worth $4.7 billion; and
- the Rovuma LNG Project (involving Exxon Mobil, Eni, and CNPC) worth $30 billion (Rawoot, 2020).

In 2014, a report from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies stated that, with the costs of the LNG projects estimated at US$40 billion, investment in LNG-related projects alone would constitute about 2,7 times the size of Mozambique's 2012 GDP. Whereas it was anticipated that revenue, especially from LNG production, would only start to have an impact on the economy from 2020 onwards, it was also expected that there would additionally be substantial economic benefits from foreign direct investment (FDI) linked to exploration and construction (Frühauf, 2014: 10), including professional training, employment, and contracts for the supply of goods and services. In a more recent report of the African Development Bank Group, it was claimed that the LNG industry could transform the Mozambican economy and that the country could become a global leading LNG-exporting country (African Development Bank Group, 2019).

As suggested above, these projects could indeed be of major importance to poverty alleviation in indebted Mozambique. As a country in 'debt distress', Mozambique would have received $14,9 billion in debt financing from Total. Together, the gas projects are estimated to be worth $60 billion, and this could revolutionise the Mozambican economy of $15 billion (Mackinnon, 2020). It should also be noted that the geographic location of the current LNG projects is well positioned to meet Atlantic and Asia-Pacific market needs. It is further well positioned to tap into the growing energy demands of the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent (Total, 2020). In March 2021, Total suspended all works while Exxon Mobil pushed its final investment decision further into the long grass. Total also declared a force majeure which followed the occupation of the port of Mocímboa da Praia and disruptions to its construction of infrastructure (Louw-Vaudran, 2020; Vreÿ, 2021).

However, the escalation of violence since early 2020 has raised some pressing questions over the future of these investments and even put them at high risk (Craig, 2020). In September 2020, the Chief Executive Officer of Total, Patrick Pouyanné, as the largest investor in Mozambique LNG projects, met with Mozambican President, Filipe Nyusi, to discuss the risks posed by the intensifying radical Islamic insurgency. Although exploration and operations are taking place offshore, facilities in support of the gas industry are onshore and most vulnerable to attacks. Obviously, the foreign companies, with their

considerable investments, feel threatened, especially at the current stage where final investment decisions have to be taken (World Oil, 2020).

It should also be noted that many locals feel deeply aggrieved. Soon after the discovery of gas in the Cabo Delgado area, many locals were evicted and had to relocate to facilitate LNG infrastructure development, especially for onshore facilities to be used by Anadarko-Total and Eni. A report by Anadarko indicated that more than 550 families had to be relocated and close to 1 000 people were estimated to have lost access to their cultivated land. Furthermore, more than 3 000 individuals stood to lose their access to fishing grounds as a result of LNG operations. This resulted in many locals feeling marginalised and aggrieved. Many of them also complained about agreements regarding compensation, as well as the fact that they had been resettled inshore and away from the coastal fishing areas (Rawoot, 2020).

At the time of writing, the insurgency has not directly targeted the project sites, but attacks were coming closer. Total's projects remain in suspension, while Exxon Mobil's final decision on investment is undecided. It is always said that the town of Palma should be kept safe from attacks, as this is supposed to become the manufacturing hub where hundreds of skilled workers will be located. Unfortunately, the bloodshed by the Islamic insurgents extended to Palma on 25 March 2021 when dozens of people were killed during an armed attack after hundreds of militants stormed the town (BBC News, 2021). In view of this, the biggest investor, Total, has apparently lost its faith in the Mozambican authorities (Africa Intelligence, 2021) and (temporarily) withdrew much of its workforce. In brief, a continuation of the insurgency could hamper further investments, with a detrimental effect on the development of the northern parts of Mozambique (Louw-Vaudran, 2020). In other words, what is clear is that after much initial excitement about the massive potential of the LNG industry in Mozambique, the realities of the conflict dynamics relating to Muslim extremism in northern Mozambique have brought a halt to the exploration work undertaken by Total and Exxon Mobil as the major investors.

“At the time of writing, the insurgency has not directly targeted the project sites, but attacks were coming closer. Total's projects remain in suspension, while Exxon Mobil's final decision on investment is undecided. It is always said that the town of Palma should be kept safe from attacks, as this is supposed to become the manufacturing hub where hundreds of skilled workers will be located. Unfortunately, the bloodshed by the Islamic insurgents extended to Palma on 25 March 2021 when dozens of people were killed during an armed attack after hundreds of militants stormed the town”

Towards an Islamist state in Cabo Delgado?

In recent years, Ansar al-Sunna's insurgency campaign has expanded geographically closer to the areas where the LNG projects are located and where ruby deposits are concentrated, as well as towards the provincial capital of Pemba. As major foreign petroleum companies have increased their investment and operations in Cabo Delgado, it is obviously of importance to have a good understanding of the Cabo Delgado insurgency as a significant and growing threat and risk (Intelyse LLC, 2019).

The history and communal life of Cabo Delgado have been crafted by Indian Ocean trade networks developed by Arab traders over many centuries. This led to the spread of Islam along the East African coast, dating as far back as historical knowledge goes (Pavliková-Vilhanová, 2010: 135–136). Today, Cabo Delgado has a population of more or less 2,5 million and is a Muslim-majority province. Overall, Muslims comprise about 18% of the Mozambican population of more than 27 million (The New Humanitarian, 2007; U.S. Embassy in Mozambique, 2018). For centuries, the dominant form of Islam among Muslims in Cabo Delgado has been a form of moderate Sufi Islam, intertwined with local traditions and practices (Intelyse LLC, 2019).

Research based on fieldwork in Mozambique (see Morier-Genoud, 2020: 400) suggests that the roots of

Ansar al-Sunna can be traced to dynamics in 2007, in the district of Balama of Cabo Delgado, although it might have been earlier. In 2007, a young man of Makua ethnicity, Sualehe Rafayel, returned from Tanzania to the village of his birth, Nhacole, after several years on foreign soil. He joined a newly built mosque, which was built by the Africa Muslim Agency, and followed a distinctly different approach to the Islamic faith than other believers in the district. He rejected several existing practices and ideas, which he considered *haram* (forbidden) and tried to convince Muslims of this mosque and others to follow his thinking and ways, while also building his own praying site. This led to tensions between Sheik Sualehe (Sualehe Rafayel) and other Muslims in Nhacole, as well as the Islamic Council of Mozambique after the latter got involved in the intra-Muslim tensions in the district (Morier-Genoud, 2020: 401).

In brief, from this point, the new 'sect' expanded across Cabo Delgado through the 2010s, and in 2016 the National Islamic Conference hosted in Nampula concluded that the new movement was prevalent in four districts of Cabo Delgado, namely Palma, Nangade, Mocímboa da Praia, and Montepuez, while signs were also prevalent in Macomia and Quissanga (Morier-Genoud, 2020: 401).

Until 2015, Ansar al-Sunna maintained and projected itself as a non-violent Islamist organisation, but eventually, they turned more militant and launched their first attack in October 2017. While the Mozambican government has long been grappling with Renamo as the most serious security threat in the country, Ansar al-Sunna now poses the most significant threat to peace and security. Since the October 2017 attacks, the Mozambican authorities, who opted to ignore warning signals for some time, scrambled to regain control of the situation. A series of battles between government security forces and the insurgent groups followed, but the security forces were too weak and could not stop a chronology of carnage from unfolding over the next years (Bukarti and Munasinghe, 2020).

Whereas the militants initially focused on civilian targets, they eventually turned to military targets – a clear indication that the group has been growing in resilience, operational capacity, and confidence. In addition, at first, a few attacks were launched on targets in the town of Mocíimboa de Praia in late 2017. These extended to more than 20 attacks every month in an insurgency that covered nine major towns and districts along the Cabo Delgado coastal areas. At the end of May 2020, a battle for the town of Macomia demonstrated the organisational strength and capacity of the insurgents, but also elicited a renewed effort in the government's counter-offensive efforts. This eventually led to one of the largest counter-terrorism operations to date from the Mozambican security forces, resulting in the deaths of 78 insurgents, including two of the group's leaders (Bukarti and Munasinghe, 2020).

Whereas Ansar al-Sunna initially advocated for the establishment of an Islamist counter-society in contrast to other Muslims, particularly the movements of Salafism and Wahhabism, who were allegedly not following the Prophet's tradition (Habibe, Forquila and Pereira, 2019: 11–12), the movement eventually made it clear that its goal was to impose Sharia law (Islamic law) in Cabo Delgado. They rejected the state's schooling, health, and legal systems – which resulted in political turbulence in the province (Morier-Genoud, 2020: 400; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020). Many members and supporters of the movement are socio-economically marginalised and unemployed young people without a proper education (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019). They have been joined by young immigrants from nearby countries in a similarly marginalised position, and the members of the movement managed to organise themselves in numerous small cells along the coastal areas of northern Mozambique. In this context, Morier-Genoud (2020: 397) indicates that some analysts link the origins of Ansar al-Sunna to local poverty, inequality, and marginalisation. Others, however, believe the origins of the movement should be primarily linked to the outside players or are the result of a foreign influence. This article maintains that both factors might have played a role.

Lastly, it could be argued that Ansar al-Sunna exploits Islam and local grievances to recruit members. There is no doubt that the message of the movement and its hard-line narrative around the idea of puritanical Islam especially resonate with disgruntled youth in the northern parts of Mozambique. All of this is playing out in a political landscape of exclusion, unemployment, and poverty – which are especially prevalent in the

Muslim-majority areas of the northern areas. This makes the jihadi rhetoric of Ansar al-Sunna appealing, as many northern Mozambicans see Sufi leaders as too passive and further believe that government policies are negatively affecting Muslims (Bukarti and Munasinghe, 2020). Against this background, the next section will reflect on the growing threat posed by Islamic militancy to the exploration of natural gas projects.

Growing risks for Mozambique LNG projects

As stated in the introduction, the pressing question guiding this article is: Does the government in Maputo have the political will and institutional capacity to provide a stable and predictable investment climate where the political risks associated with the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado would not jeopardise or threaten the promising LNG projects?

As much as internal factors are key to a proper analysis of this question, one should be mindful that risks to and challenges of the LNG projects in Mozambique are not only posed by the internal dynamics in the country. Externally, the European Union (EU) is actively working on plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and if its new emission standards are implemented, there will be a strong signal to markets across the globe. A carbon border tariff mechanism is likely to be introduced by the EU, and that may pose a challenge or even a threat to further fossil investments everywhere. Major investments in the LNG industry, such as those in Mozambique, are dependent on international petroleum prices, and eventually alternative renewable energy options could become cheaper by comparison.

Internally, apart from risks relating to ongoing tensions between Frelimo and the largest Mozambican opposition party, Renamo, and the centralisation of decision-making power around LNG projects in the presidential office (Frühauf, 2014: 19–21), forced displacement and the loss of livelihoods in the northern-based communities who have faced increasing violence from Ansar al-Sunna in recent times especially pose significant political risks (Rawoot, 2020). Thus far, neither military action by the Mozambican government nor the assistance from foreign mercenaries has stopped the attacks from Ansar al-Sunna (Institute for Security Studies, 2020). In fact, the situation has gone from bad to worse. In November 2020, 'dozens of people' were reportedly beheaded by Islamist militants in northern Mozambique (Schlein, 2020). Amid developments of an increasingly alarming human rights situation, including the killings of civilians by insurgents, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR), Michelle Bachelet, appealed for urgent measures to protect civilians in what she described as a 'desperate' situation and one of 'grave human rights abuses'. She also stated that more than 350 000 people have been displaced since 2018, and pointed out that since 16 October 2020, more than 14 000 people have fled by sea in an effort to get to the provincial capital, Pemba (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020).

Lastly, it should also be noted that some of the big multinational petroleum companies are hiring foreign security firms to mitigate the risk and threat posed by the insurgents. The biggest investor, Total, for instance, decided to hire the services of former French foreign legion officer, Frederic Marbot, to oversee the security arrangements for its project on the Afungi Peninsula in Palma. He is supported by another French foreign legion officer, Charles Stroeng. Otherwise, Total has concluded contracts with three British security companies, namely Blue Mountain, Control Risks and G4S, as well as Arkhe Risk Solutions from South Africa and Mauritius, and GardaWorld from Canada (Hanlon, 2020).

In January 2021, Islamist militants staged attacks increasingly closer to Total's $20 billion LNG projects, which prompted Total to ask some of its staff to vacate their projects. The company explained that this was a case of temporarily reducing 'its workforce on site in response to the prevailing environment' as the situation 'is being reviewed continuously' (Hill and De Beaupuy, 2021). This happened after members of Ansar al-Sunna raided a town less than 5 kilometres from the construction camp of what is Africa's largest private investment. Obviously, this raised concerns about risks, especially with regard to a planned LNG export terminal on the northern coastline of Mozambique. Although the heavily guarded site has not been attacked yet, militants have threatened to carry out attacks (Hill and De Beaupuy, 2021). The worsening security situation has definitely raised the risk level and played a role

in the delayed decision. In the final analysis, Cotterill (2020) strikingly points out that '[a]n escalating Islamist insurgency in Mozambique's far north-east is intensifying the risks facing the country's vast new offshore gas developments at a time when the coronavirus pandemic is decimating demand.'

On the positive side, an agreement was reached in June 2021 by the leaders of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to deploy forces from the regional organisation in Cabo Delgado to assist the government of Mozambique in its fight against the insurgents. Moreover, following an agreement between President Nyusi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, a 1 000-strong Rwandan force has been deployed to Mozambique in August 2021 to join the Mozambican security forces in their operations in the far north of the country. At the time of writing, notable military successes by the joint forces of the two countries have been recorded (DW, 2021). However, as much as this is a positive development, the major challenge in Mozambique remains the issue of marginalisation and exclusion, and thus a need for good governance throughout the country. After all, marginalisation and exclusion coincide with decades of neglect in Cabo Delgado by the central government.

A major factor in Mozambique is the inability of the state to protect and care for the citizenry in all provinces. In such a landscape, extremism can emerge and thrive, and in Mozambique, this is what has been witnessed in relation to Ansar al-Sunna's emergence in recent years. In view of the above, Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) rightly argue:

'A lasting solution to the extremist violence in Cabo Delgado cannot be brought about by hard power and military might. There is a need for soft power whereby the government addresses regional asymmetries which could be part of the complex of motivations for extremism.'

All in all, the problems in Mozambique primarily relate to what Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) describe as 'four decades of half-mast sovereignty' in Mozambique, which is evident from the fact that, since the country's independence in 1975, the central government in Maputo has lacked a monopoly over the means of violence in its territory and its long coastline. In this context, Renamo regularly clashed with the central government in a 16-year civil war that claimed over a million lives. Fast forward into the future, Ansar al-Sunna now poses the main security threat to the Mozambican government.

Conclusion

In Mozambique, the developmental challenges are considerable and the country faces the grim reality that Ansar al-Sunna's activities have until recently followed an upward trajectory of violence across Cabo Delgado. The movement is undoubtedly a threat in the sense that it jeopardises the successful unlocking of the resource wealth of the country. If not properly addressed, Mozambique might not be reaping the fruits of the very promising LNG projects. At the time of writing, the main gas installations and sites have not been targeted, but LNG companies looking to operate in Mozambique certainly face a very high risk.

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Another Bloody Clean-Up: The Experiences of Trauma Cleaners in South Africa

By David Du Toit and Buck Whaley

Abstract

South Africa has one of the highest violent crime rates globally, where physical and emotional trauma is used in homicides and suicides. While this is apparent to the ordinary South African, what is less clear is what happens after the police and forensics have done their job at a crime scene: Who cleans up the bloody mess? In South Africa, as in many other nations, trauma cleaners restore the scenes where homicides and suicides have been committed, and where industrial accidents have taken place. Little to no scholarly research has been conducted on the experiences of the cleaners of trauma scenes. Cleaning up these scenes consists of labour charged with violence that most cannot countenance, but which the cleaner must face. Drawing on 13 qualitative interviews, this article explores the challenges of cleaning up a site where violent and/or traumatic acts have occurred, and how the cleaners develop strategies to cope with their own concomitant trauma. The cleaners are exposed to various health and safety issues, as well as the emotional trauma associated with cleaning up horrific accidents and crimes. Findings show that trauma cleaners emotionally distance themselves from the violence to which they bear witness and use emotional labour, spirituality, humour, and debriefing as coping strategies. In its conclusion, this article suggests a greater acknowledgement of trauma cleaners' responsibilities and recommends that proper physical and emotional training is necessary to ensure their wellbeing.

Introduction

Trauma and cleaning are two distinct and uniquely intertwined concepts relevant to South African life. The interrogation of trauma cleaning – the marriage of these two concepts – is novel. The job of a trauma cleaner involves the clean-up of violent scenes where suicides, homicides, attacks, industrial accidents, or unattended deaths have taken place, as well as other cleaning jobs including biohazard spills, general disinfection, and, more recently, Covid-19 disinfections. Trauma cleaners clean up industrial accidents where sewage pipes have burst, hoarders' homes with years' worth of rubbish, and biohazard spillage. They clean, scrub, and disinfect every surface that needs it. This job is essential to the process of restoring an environment and cleansing its spirit.

Trauma cleaning is a grim job that is traumatic, bloody, risky, and unpredictable. It is a physically and emotionally challenging job that requires careful consideration of trauma and triggers, and one that not many people want to do. Trauma cleaning is particularly relevant in South Africa – a country with one of the world's highest violent crime rates. Recently, the South African Police Service, in collaboration with StatsSA, has published the country's crime statistics for 2019/20. These statistics show an increase in violent contact crimes, including murders, sexual offences, and robbery, with aggravating circumstances. Most notably, murder rates have increased from 21,022 in 2019 to 21,350 in 2020 (SAPS, 2021). In the first few months of the Covid-19 pandemic, almost 1,800 suicides occurred in South Africa (Besent, 2020). These statistics are glaring. We all watch television and are aware of the protocols that follow a crime or trauma scene: the police are called in, the medical team attend to the victims or bodies, and the forensic team details and notes the scene's intricacies. Television, however, does not privy us to the clean-up of that crime scene. From the blood, the maggots, and the stench that follows: who cleans it? While sometimes the victim's family, friends, or acquaintances may clean up the scene, it may be too traumatic for most people, and they may rely on external help from a crime scene clean-up company.

This article aims to demonstrate, through in-depth interviews, the challenges and coping mechanisms of cleaning up trauma. We begin with an overview of how and when data were collected, followed by a discussion of the different types of cleaning duties that trauma cleaners perform. Hereafter, the physical preparation and labour involved in the clean-up of trauma scenes are outlined. Finally, the emotional preparation and the challenges and coping strategies involved in a trauma clean-up are discussed, including emotional labour and dissonance, spirituality, humour, and debriefing.

Methods and Study Participants

Through a Google search, two trauma cleaning companies with franchises across South Africa were selected. Both companies have specialised in a range of trauma cleaning for more than five years. Company A, 'Sunshine Cleaners' (pseudonym), have 10 franchises across South Africa, while Company B, 'The Cleaning Angels' (pseudonym), have 12 franchises. The franchises' owners were contacted and virtual interviews with 13 trauma cleaners were conducted during April and May 2021. Interviews were conducted on Zoom, recorded, transcribed, and thematically analysed.

The conducting of interviews via online platforms was an unexpectedly positive experience. While research on online interviews indicates that they can come with challenges such as technical difficulties, noisy environments, and a lack of privacy, we did not experience any of these challenges. We conducted our interviews more than a year after the start of the

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Covid-19 pandemic. All the participants were stuck at home and were delighted to share their views on working as trauma cleaners. For us, the online setting enabled participants to be more upfront in sharing their stories, as most interviews lasted around an hour. We also did not experience any challenges regarding internet connectivity or problems utilising Zoom. Most participants had flexible schedules and the interviews were conducted at a convenient time.

Regarding ethical protocols, all the participants received a consent form via email before the interview. This consent form included the details of the study: explaining that participation was voluntary and that all data would be treated as confidential. Participants were also informed that pseudonyms would be used to protect their identity, as well as the identity of their company. Given that the sharing of experiences of cleaning up trauma could be sensitive, the details of a counsellor were also provided in the consent form. Once participants connected on Zoom, we reminded them about the aims of the study, as well as the ethical protocols. Participants gave verbal consent to start the interview. A total of 13 interviews were conducted: 11 of the participants were white women, and 2 were white men. Table 1 below provides a summary of the participants' profiles:

Cleaning Job

When the cleaners arrive at a trauma scene, the victim's body has already been removed. All that is left is the evidence of a crime or traumatic event that must be cleaned. The intensity and duration of the cleaning job are linked to the type of crime or trauma. For example, the cleaning up of violent farm attacks was described by Belinda as particularly horrific, given that they are 'done with a lot of anger and violence' and that 'there is usually a lot of blood everywhere'. Patricia also added that the cleaning up of such trauma is challenging as she needs to ensure that there is 'not a drop of blood left behind', adding: 'The scene must be cleaned to perfection.'

Similarly, the cleaning up of violent break-ins is also challenging. Rose described how she was called in to clean up the trauma caused by a violent burglary where the victim was bludgeoned to death:

> 'This old gentleman was in a wheelchair. They broke in and murdered him. It looked like a bloodbath from one point of the house to the other end of the house. They were running through his blood. A job like that is horrific. We had to clean up everywhere.

Table 1: Participants' Profiles

Pseudonym	Geographical Area	Company name (Pseudonym)
Anna	Johannesburg	Sunshine Cleaners
Mary	George	Sunshine Cleaners
Samantha	Mbombela	Sunshine Cleaners
Yolandi	Durban	Sunshine Cleaners
Rose	Gqeberha	Sunshine Cleaners
Belinda	Pretoria	Sunshine Cleaners
Patricia	Cape Town	Sunshine Cleaners
Patrick	Cape Town	The Cleaning Angels
Melissa	Cape Town	The Cleaning Angels
Johan	Pretoria	The Cleaning Angels
Henriette	Pretoria	The Cleaning Angels
Lizette	Johannesburg	The Cleaning Angels
Stella	Centurion	The Cleaning Angels

> We even had to pick up his dentures from the floor that the police left behind.'

This cleaning job was not easy for Rose as she could see the trauma that the victim experienced, a victim she described as 'vulnerable' and 'incapable of defending himself.' These sentiments were shared by other cleaners who had to clean up the trauma of violent burglaries.

Cleaning up suicides is another task that many cleaners experience as difficult and traumatic. All the participants said that the cleaning up of suicides has increased since the Covid-19 pandemic started. While the cleaners do not necessarily know who the victim was, it remains a difficult job to clean up a suicide, given that they often wonder: 'what drove a person to do this to themselves?' Interestingly, it appears that men and women commit suicide differently. Yolandi describes: 'Men go out with a bang. They usually shoot themselves and it is blood and brain matter everywhere. On the ceiling, everywhere. Women mostly slit their wrists in the bath or drink pills. It is easier to clean when a woman did it.' Other cleaners shared similar views on gender and suicide.

Unattended deaths – which refers to deaths in which the body is not found for days, weeks, or months (Aftermath, 2021) – are another challenging part of a trauma cleaner's job. A decomposing body releases bacteria and toxins that can harm humans and cause significant physical damage to the property. Anna explained:

> 'The worst is an unattended death, especially when the body is starting to decay. A few months ago, we did an unattended death. The victim was found after a week. We were sliding in this victim's bodily fluids. The smell was the worst. Flies everywhere. Maggots. You name it.'

While the body had been removed before Anna had to clean the scene, the stench and the remains from the bodily fluids were particularly unpleasant and challenging. Several other cleaners described cleaning up an unattended death scene as 'the worst', 'really gross', and 'requir[ing] a strong stomach'. At these scenes, trauma cleaners need to disinfect, sanitise, and thoroughly clean surfaces, as well as remove infected furniture from the premises.

Cleaning jobs also involve the cleaning up of industrial spillage or dirt. As Mary described: 'There was a burst pipe of sewerage and I had to clean up the sewerage things. It was a *shit* show, you know.' Similarly, Samantha was called in to clean up the toilets of male factory workers, where the 'faeces solidified'. These types of jobs are both physically and olfactorily challenging. Other jobs include helping families clean up, improving properties that hoarders have neglected, and making homes liveable again. Cleaning up hoarder homes can involve unexpected findings. As Patricia recounted: 'I once found a dead cat under piles of rubbish and old magazines. It was dead for months.' In essence, a trauma cleaner's job is unpredictable. It contains a range of cleaning tasks that are violent and non-violent, but that have potentially hazardous consequences to individuals and society if not taken care of. Cleaning up a scene also requires physical preparation, training, and attention to detail.

Physical Preparation

Trauma cleaners need to adhere to specific regulations when they clean up a scene. Personal protective equipment such as a hazmat suit, gloves, gumboots, and respiratory masks are mandatory to protect the trauma cleaners and prevent cross-contamination. Other items include scrubbers, cloths, buckets, mops, brushes, sponges, and other tools such as saws, knives, and ladders to cut away infected areas on carpets and furniture and to reach ceilings. Once the cleaning is done, contaminated items are put into biohazard boxes that are incinerated.

Special cleaning chemicals are required to clean up blood, bodily tissue, and fluids, as these may contain pathogens such as Hepatitis A and B, HIV, and MRSA. The next step is to inspect the type of infected surfaces to determine which chemicals and equipment should be used.

Yolandi explained:

> 'You see what has been infected, and then you decide, okay, the mattress needs to be incinerated, wrap it up, get it out the way. Is the blood dry, is

> the blood still wet, is it gooey? You need to use specific chemicals and techniques for different surfaces. You look at the floor. Is it tiles? Is it carpet? Is it wooden floors? Parquet floors take forever because the blood seeps in there and we have to remove it and get it incinerated.'

Participants described that although they went through some form of training when they bought the franchise, there is no formal training or a training manual for trauma cleaners in South Africa. The training they receive is usually a five-day course where mock scenes are created with pig's blood. The owner of the company then teaches them proper cleaning methods, how to use equipment and chemicals on specific surfaces, and how to use personal protective equipment. The lack of formal training in trauma cleaning is not unique to South Africa. In the US and Europe, trauma cleaners also do not receive formal training. In the US, trauma cleaning firms need to be registered at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA, 2021). They also need to have proper biohazardous waste disposal documentation from licensed medical waste transportation and disposal firms. This is something that the trauma cleaning industry may consider in South Africa. However, beyond the lack of physical training, what is particularly worrying is the lack of emotional training associated with the job.

Emotional Preparation

Emotional Labour and Dissonance

'You are dealing not with something but with somebody.'

Across many sectors, there are behavioural and emotional cues that employees ought to follow. Work that requires a close connection to the dead, death, or to the scene at which a death occurred can be particularly emotionally taxing for some. Doctors and police officers need to speak with compassion and empathy when engaging with victims and their families (Du Toit, 2012; Waters et al., 2020). Trauma cleaners, too, are expected to present particular emotions and to behave in a specific way when at a clean-up, similarly to employees in other service sectors such as healthcare and hospitality (Funk et al., 2020). These employees engage in emotional labour that refers to the management of expressing appropriate emotions while suppressing inappropriate ones while doing a job. The term 'emotional labour' was first applied to air cabin crew who need to suppress negative feelings to create a proper mood in others (Hochschild, 1983). Similarly, trauma cleaners engage in emotional labour by being sympathetic and empathetic to the victim or victims and their families. For example, Anna and Lizette echoed similar views that they don't show 'disgust' or 'repulsion' when cleaning but try to remain 'neutral' and 'professional' at all times.

In this regard, Mary approaches cleaning up trauma as 'just another mess' to clean while she is on-site. Mary consciously employs this position – that cleaning is physical and an ordered process – as she believes that, at her core, she is a sensitive person who 'cries for no reasons at all' in her everyday home life. Therefore, despite being a sensitive person, Mary understands that she must go into an operational mode when she is on the job. The language that Mary uses indicates that she compartmentalises her emotions to 'make it through the scene'. This shows that Mary has the propensity to feel – to be empathetic and sympathetic to the victim – but insists that too much emotionality on the trauma scene would affect her ability to complete the job at hand. Mary notes that 'the trauma scene is personal until I get there and personal after I leave', adding that when she puts on her protective clean-up gear and picks up the chemicals she uses to clean, it becomes 'just another cleaning job'. In this way, Mary emotionally distances herself from the trauma to cope with the job.

Emotional distancing is not unique to trauma cleaners' jobs. Nurses and other health care and service employees also use emotional distancing to protect themselves from emotional arousal, burnout, and exhaustion. In essence, emotional distancing is a self-controlled protective strategy to remain neutral (Kim et al., 2020). In this regard, Patricia confirms that she emotionally distances herself from the trauma of cleaning up by saying: 'it's a willing decision you're making of not getting involved emotionally.' Interestingly, Patricia, who worked as a police officer in the forensics department for 21 years before becoming a trauma cleaner, said that one cannot be trained for emotional distancing, but that it is 'more a thing of

mentality' and that 'one needs to be made for it'.

Henriette echoes Patricia in her notion that her 'personality is not wondering and ruining over [a] situation', by suggesting, instead, that trauma cleaners should put their 'head down and do the job'. Adding to her words, she emphasises that a trauma cleaner must not sit and wonder, 'Why? What's the ... if there's an emotion caught there ...'. She trails off and concludes her point: 'we don't go there'. It appears that trauma cleaners consciously decide to set aside their emotions when cleaning up trauma. Henriette suggests that cleaners should develop, to a point, an ignorance of their emotions to complete the job at hand. Patrick builds on the sentiment described by Henriette and other trauma cleaners that the job of cleaning trauma scenes should be performed while utilising a 'form of desensitization'. However, contrary to Patricia's suggestion that trauma cleaners should have a certain mentality, Patrick states that developing desensitization to trauma comes with 'experience and time'. In this way, while acknowledging the embedded personality of a crime scene, he resonates with the need to desensitise yourself from the job at hand.

Despite trauma cleaners' use of emotional labour to emotionally distance themselves from a scene, emotions are sometimes triggered and carried home with a cleaner. Following a trauma scene, Henriette, for example, notes how she often leaves feeling frustrated and helpless because she cannot change the situation, and that this frustration could be carried home to her family. Luckily, she has a supportive partner who gives her space to debrief. She notes how her partner allows her to cry and let the emotions out. Hence, the emotional toll of having to express and suppress emotions can be difficult. In the emotional labour literature, service employees often engage in either surface acting or deep acting. Surface acting occurs when felt emotions and expressed emotions are not aligned (Ogunsola et al., 2020). It appears that some trauma cleaners use surface acting to cope with trauma cleaning, by hiding felt emotions and expressing emotions that are deemed professional and neutral. Another coping mechanism that trauma cleaners use is spirituality.

"Trauma cleaning, essentially, comprises the cleaning of death, or at least, the gruesome aftermath of a violent one. Across populations of people, death has meaning as it is a time for mourning, for the community, for prayer – not simply for the life or lives lost, but the circumstances that surrounded the death and the scene on which the traumatic event occurred."

Spirituality

Spirituality is often used as a coping mechanism by employees in stressful jobs and to promote workplace well-being (Kutcher et al., 2010). For example, nurses often rely on prayer to cope with the emotional aspects of treating ill patients (Baskar and Indradevi, 2021). Spirituality also appears to be important for trauma cleaners to decrease depression, stress, and burnout. Trauma cleaning is a very intimate and personal experience. While it involves the cleaning up of bodily fluids, the scrubbing of floors, the application of chemicals, and the intense physical and emotional labour of the clean-up crew, a more spiritual, deeply personal face to trauma cleaning exists. Trauma cleaning, essentially, comprises the cleaning of death, or at least, the gruesome aftermath of a violent one. Across populations of people, death has meaning as it is a time for mourning, for the community, for prayer – not simply for the life or lives lost, but the circumstances that surrounded the death and the scene on which the traumatic event occurred. Developing on the latter, Johan notes that when a violent incident occurs at a particular site, 'a lot of things happen in the spirit [of a place]'. When cleaning up a violent crime scene, one can feel that 'something is not right'. Johan adds:

> 'We also clean the places spiritually. On that basis, we are a Christian business. So, we pray, specifically, at these places where there was death. We clean the atmosphere around the ground where it happened. The physical side is just one part of it. Because [the] emotions that the victim has stayed behind. One part is the traumatic event in the

> time, but there can also be something that stays behind in the spirit there, and that harasses people for a long time.'

Thus, spirituality is used not only as a coping mechanism but also metaphorically to cleanse a space of the trauma that occurred. For example, Patrick and his wife Melissa clean up violent crimes by removing all the physical evidence that a crime has occurred, but also spiritually to restore the atmosphere. Patrick notes that spiritual cleansing at trauma clean-ups is especially important when 'blood has been spilled' at the scene of either a horrific, bloodied suicide or a homicide. These instances are particularly traumatic and need spiritual intervention due to the nature in which these scenes are created. Patrick emotively states the following:

> 'To see the brain matter splattered all over the ceiling – if you start thinking how that happened, what the person had to go through to be able to take his own life because it is the most unnatural thing to do is to commit suicide. Everything in us – the animal instinct, the inherited instinct is to survive, so you will do everything to survive. To override that basic instinct in a person must take a lot of influence – be it natural or spiritual – but some hectic instinct has to come through to give up that primal instinct of survival. I wonder what this person has to go through to put a gun to the head and blow their brains all over this place.'

We have all heard the saying: one should leave a place cleaner than how one found it. This line is particularly important in the context of spirituality in trauma cleaning. In this way, just as emotional labour is used to hide emotions, prayer is used to return a sense of dignity and life to the affected place. Furthermore, prayer functions to comfort the victim's kin and the cleaners who labour at the scene. This is an important procedure in the clean-up process as it helps cleanse the aura and the integrity of the space. Mary suggests that, without it, some cleaners have reported having taken 'spirits home with them'.

Henriette also mentions that the clean-up aims to 'bring and restore peace' which involves making sure that the 'atmosphere is clean and calm'. In this way, Henriette alludes to the entirety of what it is exactly that is being cleaned. The spiritual element to trauma cleaning expands the role and the realm of cleaning, begging us to interrogate the act of cleaning as a spiritual practice. Spirituality also connects trauma cleaners from different franchises. When a quotation for cleaning has been approved in one trauma clean-up company and the trauma cleaners get the go-ahead to clean a particular scene, the relevant team sends a message notifying their network of cleaners in South Africa to hold them in prayer as they embark on this new clean-up. They also attempt to 'sensitize people locally to pray and cover us when we go there'. Through this, the cleaners insinuate that the clean-up is a communal effort that requires the spiritual support of all those willing to give it.

While there may be criticism of the intrusion or imposition of an anonymous team of people praying over a scene, Henriette emphasises that her trauma cleaning team do not go into trauma scenes and start 'Bible-bashing'. Instead, Henriette notes that they do not proclaim it publicly, and only include nearby people in the prayer if they ask to be involved. Whether it involves the trauma cleaners in prayer or on-site family and community members, she believes that prayer is healthy for the potential betterment of the affected communities. This sends a message to the affected community that a single death affects everyone in that community. This coping strategy – to rally the community to prayer – is an interesting technique. It places the responsibility for the future health and wellbeing of a space into the hands of the people who, in one way or another, determine the context and circumstances of the space. Another important aspect of trauma cleaning is the usage of humour.

Humour

There are many different coping strategies used by trauma cleaners to deal with what they see, smell, and experience at trauma scenes. While the spiritual side of trauma cleaning is evident and vast in its reach, humour is used by some cleaners during clean-ups as a strategy to cope with stressful work situations (Romero and Cruthirds, 2006). Research on humour in the workplace indicates that it benefits employees by decreasing stressful situations and burnout (Mathew and Vijayalakshmi, 2017). At crime scenes, humour was not expressed concerning trauma scenes 'at the expense of the person that passed [a]way'. Instead,

Mary said light humour was made of a scene where there was a 'burst pipe of sewerage. They had to clean up the sewerage, so they talked about it as a *shit* storm, you know. So, they use humour to get over the seriousness of this'. Thus, one of the benefits of workplace humour could lead to team cohesion and relationships among colleagues during difficult tasks (Sacco et al., 2021).

Humour can be a productive tool to cope with gruesome scenes, but it often can be inappropriate. Stella notes how she knows that 'other people [make] jokes on scenes and stuff but I don't do that'. By stating that others might find humour where she does not, she insinuates an opposition to the use of humour. Stella understands that there is a 'thin line between a well-timed, well-crafted joke and being insensitive'. Similarly, Patrick takes the trauma scene very seriously. On humour, he has this to add:

> 'You also don't want to desensitize yourself or your people to the actuality of what has happened there. You need to be very careful that you don't contribute to the desensitization of horrific perpetrations. It remains a horrific thing for someone, someone, to shoot somebody else. It remains a horrific thing for a father to kill himself or hang himself in front of his children… It is not acceptable for someone to shoot a child with a stray [bullet]. So, no, I will not joke about it.'

In the above statement, Patrick emphasises the severity with which he treats crime scenes and the trauma embedded within them and, in so doing, dismisses the use of humour as a coping strategy. He mentions that most people live in a 'cocoon' and 'do not know what is happening in society, and the violence that goes with that'. Building onto this, he concludes the interview by stating that the greatest disadvantage of his career is seeing the incredible, insane violence about which many never have to think. Finally, debriefing is a much-needed strategy used by trauma cleaners.

Debriefing

Debriefing is fundamental to processing a potentially traumatic event or incident. After completing a clean-up, some trauma cleaners 'come home and write a full report'. Johan explains that debriefing requires trauma cleaners to answer: 'What did they see? What happened? What did they smell? And so forth.' Patrick notes the importance of this process by stating that: 'You don't even know the things you have seen that are affecting you until you start writing about it.' Henriette points out that after around five-to-seven trauma scenes, the team practices breathing sessions to manage its collective mental wellbeing. She continues to say that colleagues who might seem sad or express their sadness about a scene are probed by team leaders and asked if they are okay and coping. These cleaners also offer external counselling with a professional therapist to those affected by the trauma. On the topic of debriefing, Mary notes that she 'talk[s] to God'. Almost as if putting herself back in that car, she recalls herself leaving a crime scene and spending time 'talking to God and thanking him for getting me through it without any emotions.' She mentions that she finds herself speaking about that specific incident days later with God, repeating to Him: 'I need to debrief. I need to debrief.'

Conclusion

This study has investigated the multifaceted ways in which trauma cleaners cope with the physical and emotional challenges of the job. Each cleaner presented uniquely personal views on the circumstances and the contexts that determine their relationship with the trauma cleaning. Trauma cleaners use spirituality to support each other when affected by the trauma incident. In addition, some use prayers to cope with the emotional trauma of cleaning up violence. While there is an acknowledgement of the spirit of trauma carried through people who visit the trauma scene, there is a consensus that trauma cleaners should compartmentalise emotions between their professional and personal worlds. Cleaning up trauma becomes 'just another mess'.

Through the varied ways in which trauma cleaners experience the plethora of factors present within a trauma scene, we can better understand this niche profession. It is a new profession, with potential for growth, particularly in South Africa. This study offers a new window for researchers to produce new research in this field. The emotional experiences of trauma cleaners are vast, spanning from emotional dissonance and compartmentalisation, spirituality, humour, and debriefing. While trauma cleaners are restoring the

scenes, they lack a deep acknowledgement from society. There is no uniform physical and emotional training involved in this profession, which leaves one with a gaping wound that cannot heal. A more profound acknowledgement of this profession is necessary where trauma cleaners undergo training and support to cope with the aftermath of cleaning up trauma in South Africa.

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

Colonialism and Historical Imagination:

How Colonial Designs Shaped Post-apartheid Identities

Tlhabane Mokhine Dan Motaung | Opinion

Abstract

Ethnic identity has continued to undermine national unity and integration across post-colonial Africa, and South Africa seems to be no exception. Post-apartheid South Africa has been bedevilled by the spectre of ethnic politics in a way which shows the durability of toxic ethnicity. Ethnic identities in Africa and South Africa in particular, were forged by colonial powers and apartheid (in the case of the latter) through identity construction and the classic strategy of divide and rule. Fluid pre-colonial social 'identities' were recast and calcified into hide-bound, immutable and toxic ethnicity that was invested with a separatist consciousness underwritten by corresponding differential economic livelihoods. This study argues for the need to dig deeper into history to understand the state of pre-colonial identities and how colonial designs constructed the latter to undermine resistance by indigenous people and therefore to perpetuate its domination.

The scourge of tribalism has dominated Africa's political imagination since the dawn of liberation (la Hausse, 2000; Webster and Pampallis; 2017; Vail, 1989). Ironically, Africans, including the revolutionary forces that contributed to freedom, have quite often uncritically accepted these extraneous ascriptions of tribal identities, to the detriment of the post-colonial national imaginary. As a result, the post-colonial nation-building project has been invariably debilitated by allegiances rooted in toxic, fractious social identities rather than a 'pan-tribal' vision (Cohen and Middleton, 1970). The historical record, however, shows that tribalism was/is a colonial construct designed to give bearing to colonial domination (Vail, 1989). Weighing in on the history of ethnicity, Vail (1989: 5) argues that "...empirical evidence shows clearly that ethnic consciousness is very much a new phenomenon, an ideological construct, usually of the twentieth century, and not an anachronistic cultural artefact from the past." South Africa is no exception to this seemingly iron law of post-colonial African politics. It follows that only a deeper understanding of the historical processes that formed tribal identities can enable post-colonial, post-apartheid society some heuristic insights into how to manage this menace.

In fact, in terms of historiography (Myers, 2008; Cohen and Middleton, 1970; Harries, 1994; Peires, 1981; Vail, 1989) the term 'tribe' may be a misnomer retrofitting forms of identities into pre-colonial African which just did not exist.

Cohen and Middleton (1970: 2) have questioned

> the history of the term 'tribe' and its use by administrators and others in Africa, as well as by anthropologists who have adopted the tribe or ethnic group as a focus of analysis. It would seem that the popular notions of tribes and tribalism only emerged in Europe and America after the development of fairly clear-cut racist stereotypes concerning Africa. Earlier travellers, missionaries and explorers spoke of 'peoples', 'kingdoms', 'sultanates', and 'customs', but only rarely of tribes. However, by the early twentieth century, colonial administrators and those reporting on African territories were using the term to describe what they believed to be clear-cut and stable groups, each having distinct cultural traditions.

In view of the seeming lack of historicity in the terms 'tribe' and 'tribalism' as socio-cultural categories, this study probes the history of the pre-colonial ethnic relations in the territory which would become South Africa, in order to argue that while forms of group identities were a reality, not only did 'tribalism' as understood in post-apartheid society not exist but also--- and more critically--- that tribal consciousness was the function of colonial conquest (Lekgoathi, 2006; Mudimbe, 1994; Mamdani, 2013). It further holds that the spectre of tribalism in contemporary South Africa is primarily attributable to the history of the strategy of divide and rule of the colonial (and apartheid) state. Tribalism became a useful instrument in the hands of the colonial rulers to divide the indigenous populations with the aim of forestalling resistance to external racial conquest and thus sustaining colonial rule (Lekgoathi, 2006). It is also worth noting that even in cases where colonial policies did not seem to have direct effect on the creation of tribalism, tribalism remained an epiphenomenon of colonial rule and policies. This last point is supported by the absence of evidence in the oral tradition pointing to conscious tribal resentment between or among the indigenous people whose chiefdoms were largely geographically contiguous or co-extensive (Ehret, 2016).

On the contrary, historiography points to the heterogeneity of most pre-colonial African societies, such as the Nguni and Sotho components of the Ndzudza Ndebele (Delius, in Bonner at al, 1989). Engendered by necessity, processes of ethnic co-mingling, co-existing, assimilation and absorption continued well into the era of European settlement.

Indeed, where history records conflict, sporadic or chronic, among the indigenous populations prior to the advent of colonialism, such conflicts are largely ascribable to scarcity of resources such as land, and not to any primordial urge to hate 'the other' (Ehret, 2016; Peires, 1981). Wholesale socio-economic transformation of the pre-colonial landscape which saw the abrupt changes in the economic make-up of African societies because of the era of proletarianisation, migration system, land dispossession and the creation of the reserves, created conditions of precariousness where ethnic solidarity in the face of potential competition from other 'outsiders' became a real threat (Marks in Vail, 1989). Invariably, such periods emerged during the colonial presence (Harries, 1994).

The tribalisation process was driven by the missionaries,

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the English colonial authorities, as well as the Afrikaner governments (i.e., ZAR and the apartheid government) all of which constitute the collective historical agency that effectively constructed the modern state in its evolutionary stages culminating in the Union government of 1910, (Mudimbe, 1994; Lekgoathi 2006; Mamdani 2013). It helps to provide this conceptual clarity given that these three agents (i.e., the Christian missionaries as well as the colonial and Afrikaner governments) may have each acted alone but all of them manipulated the notion of ethnicity for their respective interests (i.e., divide and conquer).

Theoretically, it worth reiterating the platitude that ethnicity, like race, is not a ‘natural’ category but a product of complex historical processes (Delius in Bonner at al, 1989). Against this background, ethnicity can be usefully seen as a historically contingent construct. The amaSwati, baVenda, maTsonga, amaZulu and amaNdebele, for instance, are all break away groups that formed into ethnic units as a result of imposed historical conditions. There are therefore both subjective and objective conditions to the formation of ethnicity. Nowhere is this more amply demonstrated than in the history of the amaZulu people. As John Wright shows in the case of group identity formation of the amaZulu people, the notion of ‘Zuluness’ is a result of convergence of interests between the colonial policy of indirect rule in Natal, the colonial frustrations of the emerging African intelligentsia and the reaction of the Natal chiefs to the urbanisation processes that were beginning to undermine their powers (Carton at al, 2009).

Where the creation of ethnic consciousness was neither a direct nor an indirect result of colonial machinations, it most likely resulted from the nascent, novel interests of the African intelligentsia and petty bourgeois as they instrumentalised their relatively privileged social location for both self-preservation and self-affirmation, in the emerging disruptive European modernity (Harries, 1994). However, such ethnically-tainted interests were embedded in and were therefore the social outcomes of the constitutive, incipient ensemble of colonial social relations (ibid). Prior to colonial conquest, African societies evinced isolated and insignificant cases of identity-based animosity towards one another (Peires, 1981; Elphic and Giliomee 1979). Besides the fact that mostly people identified themselves on the clan basis, historiography has shown that the co-mingling and mixing of people (including mass desertions) was par for the course across time and space as dictated by their objective conditions (Ehret, 2016). Therefore, ethnicity was highly fluid (Lekgoathi, 2006). In and of itself, this lack of historicity regarding the systemic and ideologised discrimination of other ethnically different people makes a lie to claims of patterned, hidebound tribally defined group identities.

Natal was one of the first areas to see the insidious hand of ethnic experimentation. It was in Natal that the deliberate strategy that underscored British colonial approach first sputtered to life (Mamdani, 2013).

According to a body of historical literature Sir Theophilus Shepstone was the main exponent of this strategy in Natal (Martens in Carton at al, 2009; Mamdani, 1996; 2013). According to Mamdani (2013: 7) “...a theory of history framed the agency of the native, set into motion by the colonial legal system, and targeted by its administrative practice. Tribalism is reified ethnicity. It is culture pinned to a homeland, culture in fixity, politicised, so that it does not move.” So it was that Shepstone, as Martens says, “found in the Zulu monarchy a model for his system of indirect rule”(Martens in Carton, 2009:). Chiefs came in handy to the colonialists as the colonial system sought to avoid tempering with the customary institutions and, instead, used them to prop up colonial rule. This was undergirded by the ideology of ‘tribalism,’ propounded into popular consciousness through essentialising the glories of a ‘Zulu past’ (ibid). The 1847 Natal Locations Commission report was one of the first documents to outline the principles of Shepstone’s native administration and his assertion that prosperity depended on the “management and efficient control

of the large native population" which guided colonial policy in the twentieth century (Martens in Carton, 2009: 125). So, this policy of tribalisation fanned out from Natal to the rest of the country.

In pre-colonial times, many geographic spaces had a conglomeration of ethnic groups living together or sharing borders (Ngcukaithobi, 2018; Harries, 1994; Peires, 1981). In none of these areas does the historical record report toxic ethnic differentiation leading to pronounced ethnically defined resentment or conflicts. Mass migration was not unusual among many of indigenous populations in cases of serious, factional disaffection with their monarchies. To be sure, some ethnic communities did submit to the authority of others for a variety of reasons but historiography does not record ethnicity as the primary or even secondary reason for these volitional submission. Harries sees the Tsonga ethnic consciousness as "very much a human construct, a social product..." which was fabricated over time (Harries in Vail, 2009: 83).

As Harries shows, "by 1860 four small semi-independent clusters of the East Coast refugees had begun to emerge in the Transvaal" (Harries in Vail, 1989: 84). These are the clans which would later be consolidated into 'a Tsonga tribe'. Harries also states that the Nkuna and the Baloyi clans, who occupied the Haernersberg area, fell under the political authority of the Pedi chiefs (ibid). Once again mutual understanding and deference to the much stronger chiefdoms loom larger as the reasons for this arrangement than identity politics. Interestingly, the preceding inter-ethnic co-existence happened outside the context of a colonial presence, which would invariably prove cause for fractiousness born of self-conscious toxic identities.

While, according to Harries (in Vail, 1989), the people classified under the label 'Tonga' were generally referred to in a negative way, this does not in any way suggest an ethnic motif. For instance, Harries argues that this term was used equally by the Zulu speakers and several chiefdoms of Southern Mozambique. Given the multifarious clans and people of shared cultural affinities that lived in the north and south of the Spelonken hills, it would have been easy to establish if indeed this pejorative term was ethnically motivated.

In addition, Harries (in Vail 1989) puts down the emergence of a unified Tsonga tribe, and thus consciousness, to the agency of Christian missionary anthropologists. Anthropologists played no small role in the formation of what is known as Tsonga-Shangaan people in South Africa. In forging a single Tsonga tribe from the numerous people, the missionaries perceived to be linguistically related, sometimes extraneous reasons took precedence over the realities of the differences among the people. For instance, the European missionary, Henri Berthoud "argued from a pragmatic perspective that a single language with a common grammar and orthography would reduce the mission's printing costs" (Harries in Vail, 1989: 86). It is an indictment that a task of such social and historical implications, as to merge disparate communities into one, could be undertaken for financial reasons. Indeed, centuries after the costs were saved South Africa is saddled with the sticky challenges of 'tribal discrimination'.

What accounts for the tribalisation of the Tsonga people is the fact that missionaries drew on what they wrongly thought to be similarities between the character of European nationalism and that of African people (Harries in Vail, 1989). This is an important point to understand because it shows us how missionary anthropologists universalised European particularity in their approach to the African condition (Serequeberhand, 1991). Insensitive to the variety of the human experience, they blindly imposed their European understanding of 'ethnicity', 'nation' and 'race' on the African world in a way that suggested shared similarities between the two peoples. Aware of this flawed manner of proceeding, Harries contends that "(C)onsequently, when disputes arose between Tsonga and Venda and North Sotho or Venda-speaking chiefdoms, these were interpreted not as clashes between chiefdoms in the way that intra-Tsonga disputes were, but as 'race conflicts'" (Harries in Vail 1989: 90).

Departing from such elementary misconception about different African communities or chiefdoms, missionary anthropologists proceeded to consolidate these different people into one 'tribe', thus laying the grounds for tribal particularity where one never was historically justified. For their side, Africans identified themselves at a clan level 'through the use of a common patronymic', while those they absorbed from outside were assimilated through the

adoption of such patronymic (Harries in Vail, 1989). The cultural force of a patronymic served a cohesive and centripetal purpose, capable of drawing into one common identity disparate people. Once again, we learn that outsiders were volitionally assimilated into their host chiefdoms without their ethnic make-up being the issue for as long as they both adopted and deferred to the prevailing patronymic. At any rate, the illustrative point in this observation is the fact that ethnicity would not have been an issue since both the host community and the in-migrant saw themselves in clan terms and 'belonging to the land of' rather than as a distinctive ethnic entity (ibid).

With the development of mining and agrarian capitalism in South Africa the notion of tribe assumed some practical importance for the interests of both migrant labourers and capital, which has been known to manipulate or occasion social difference to fragment the labour ranks (Chibber, 2013; Myers, 2008). The Native Land Act of 1913 is said to have been meant to undercut the Africans' independent means of living, forcing them to become cheap labour (Magubane, 1979; Wolpe, 1980). This became particularly pointed after the Anglo-Boer War, where wealthy farmers and the emerging mineral revolution agitated for actions against this perceived economic independence of Africans (Harries in Vail, 1989; Terreblanche, 2001). Africans were dispossessed of land in different ways where, "land bought by a combination of more than six Africans had to be purchased on a tribal basis and held by the Minister of Native Affairs for the tribe concerned" (Harries in Vail, 1989: 94). Officialdom was embarking on the strategy of forced tribalisation, while at the same time land dispossession and being pushed into the pre-defined reserves exposed Africans to the insufferable economic hardships, the survival of which called for consolidation of group identities.

With the homogenisation already creating a framework for tribe as a mode of identity, against the background of harsh economic conditions, it was a matter of time before some enterprising individuals exploited these contingent conditions to their advantage. Harries says that '(O)ut of this fluid situation arose a new class of emergent petty bourgeois farmers who, equipped with vernacular literacy, were to lay the basis for the emergence of a Tsonga ethnic consciousness' (in Vail, 1989: 95). With land dispossession beginning to bite and expulsion from 'white areas' swelling the ranks of the reserve population with little or no chiefly power to provide direction or mitigate their hardships, those with the economic means became natural leaders in the face of the sudden power vacuum in people's lives (ibid). This way tribal consciousness found lush conditions for germination and ossification. Harries tells us that 'the War Office was particularly mindful that if the authorities of the chiefs were to collapse it would be replaced by a wider and more unified political consciousness' (in Vail, 1989: 98), so they made sure that chiefs did duties of civil servants, including collection of tax, supply of labour for public works and so on. As in case of Natal, chiefs were used as an instrument for the entrenchment of tribalism (ibid).

It would appear that co-operation among and between chiefdoms of different ethnic make-up was anything but tribal. More than anything, this political engagement was driven by self-interest, common interests and other forms of self-preservation. Delius (in Bonner at al, 1989: 237) reports that "(I)n 1882 the Pedi pretender Mampuru sought refuge amongst the Ndzudza after having murdered his brother Sekhukhune', and that Nyabela, the Southern Ndebele chief, 'refused to hand him over to the ZAR (Zuid Afrikanse Republiek)..." While various reasons could be adduced to explain the consent of the Southern Ndebele chief's agreeing to Mampuru's request for sanctuary, the former's refusal to hand him over to the colonial authorities despite the risks such refusal entailed to himself, points to mutual compassion and fraternal relations between the two chiefdoms. The most striking aspect of this episode is the appearance of inter-ethnic solidarity.

It could be plausibly argued that whatever expediency induced Nyabela to accommodate Mampuru could not override ethnic resentment, had the two chiefdoms had a history of ethnic rancour. In fact, there would have been all the more reason either to rebuff Mampuru's request, or give him away to the colonial authorities when the chips were down. Even at the level of commoners, one finds instances of inter-ethnic solidary. For instance, after being subjected to forced labour on Boer farms following their defeat by ZAR, some of the Ndzudza Ndebele managed to escape and found sanctuary among other African societies, not necessary of Ndebele origin (Delius in

Bonner et al, 1989). Delius states that Zebediela, the Northern Ndebele chief, 'was issued with a stern warning' after two escapee Southern Ndebele women were seen in his jurisdiction (ibid).

While there have been debates among historians as to the reasons for the survival of the Southern Ndebele's cultural distinctiveness into modern day South Africa, Delius attributes this phenomenon to the Southern Ndebele's reaction to conquest (Delius in Bonner at al, 1989). In this regard, Delius (in Bonner at al, 1989: 248) submits that:

> The experience of the Ndzudza serves as a reminder that while ethnic identities and traditions may be moulded or even invented by elites, they can also be crafted from below by men and women working with available elements of culture to fashion ideologies and identities which help to sustain them in a harsh and changing world.

According to Delius (in Bonner at al, 1989), the foregoing leads to the compelling inference that people tend to develop or consolidate group identity because of the unique, harsh conditions they experience collectively. Given their shared ethnic background, the Southern Ndebele people reacted to the destruction of their chiefdom by the ZAR through consolidating group solidarity and identity expressed through material culture. The only way of rebuilding their lives was through cementing common group consciousness which manifested itself in their artistry. Nonetheless, this conclusion in no way implicates a conscious effort on the part of this language community to set themselves apart by reason of exclusionary identity.

Among the Zulu people ethnic consciousness was just as much forged by the hand of the colonial authorities. Shula Marks argues that "...twentieth century ethnic consciousness has been the product of intense ideological labour by the black intelligentsia of Natal and the white ideologues of South Africa, designed to confront new and dangerous social conditions" (in Vail, 1989: 217). Thus, Natal saw the emergence and intensification of ethnic consciousness among the Zulu people following the political calculations of those who saw an existential threat to the status quo as a result of the processes of proletarianization (ibid). Atavistic and primeval appeals to ethnic identity, in order to corral the growing black working class into conservative and backward-looking form of consciousness, become a rallying point that would help maintain and perpetual the prevailing colonial power relations. Alarmed at the high rate of militarisation, especially among the African working class, the colonial authorities saw tribalisation as an efficacious means of stemming the tide of radicalisation and shoring up colonialism (ibid). Marks cites G.N Heaton Nicholls, whom she describes as 'an architect of segregation', as the clearest evidence yet that tribalisation was a blatant official policy. Nicholls intones that "(I)f we do not get back to communalism we will most certainly arrive very soon at communism' (ibid)" Class-based politics and nationalist impulse among Africans in Natal in the 1920s therefore saw 'reactionary' measures against the formation of several black traditionalist organisations.

"The above historical episodes give credence to the contention that tribalism was regarded by the colonial administrators as a useful ideology to bankroll the durability of colonialism. Black working-class militancy was thus seen as an outcrop of the twin phenomena of uncontrollable urbanisation and proletarianisation, which "were acting to transform African 'ancient habits and customs, their beliefs and modes of being'"

Ironically, among such cultural formations was the 'Zulu Cultural Society', formed by no less a nationalist figure than Chief Albert Luthuli in 1937. Luthuli's motif was rather noble in that he had sought to help ordinary people through cultural affirmation (ibid). On the whole, however, the Zulu Cultural Society would be used as a bulwark by the colonial segregationists to blunt the sharpening political consciousness of the Zulu working class.

The above historical episodes give credence to the contention that tribalism was regarded by the colonial administrators as a useful ideology to bankroll the durability of colonialism. Black working-class militancy was thus seen as an outcrop of the

twin phenomena of uncontrollable urbanisation and proletarianisation, which "were acting to transform African 'ancient habits and customs, their beliefs and modes of being'"(Marks in Vail, 1989: 219). Yet if the white rulers feared the shifting sands of time, so did African chiefs, headmen and homestead chiefs (ibid). While it may not be given that urbanisation negates traditional modes of rule, it would seem as if it does carry within it the seeds of such antithetical culture wrought by the inexorable modern, urban conditions. With their grip on power sliding, the Zulu traditional leadership threw in their lot with the colonisers--- or perhaps their interests just happened to converge. Marks says that as a result of these menacing developments the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906-7 heard torrents of such complaints from the Zulu chiefs, headmen and homestead headmen (ibid). In this mix, the black intelligentsia also featured prominently. People like John Langalibalele Dube, leader of the African National Congress Natal faction and intellectuals such as H.I.E and R.R.R Dlomo and many others of modernist cast and upper social crust, sought to restore what they saw as disintegrating Zulu ways (Marks in Vail, 1989). Importantly, formations such as Zulu Society also aimed to push for the recognition of the Zulu monarchy (ibid). Traditionalists could not come to terms with their loss of power as modernisation decomposed fossilised modes of being in which they had been comfortable.

At an objective level, one could argue that even the ordinary (but mostly traditional) Zulu men began to feel the effects of these social changes, especially as poverty and social dislocation took effect, 'undermining patriarchal social relations' (Marks in Vail, 1989: 221). Under these fertile historical conditions, the consolidation of ethnic consciousness was not going to be a hard task. At the same time, it is equally not inconceivable to see how such deeply entrenched processes of Zulu ethnic self-awareness would eventuate in morphing into permanent social forms. With a plethora of related developments, Zulu ethno-nationalism would linger on into the post-apartheid era. Evidence of such discriminatory instances, fuelled by Zulu tribal particularism, were recorded across many areas of Natal. Among these are the experiences of Professor Zeke Mphahlele, who encountered Zulu discrimination in Adams College, and reports of Zulu antagonism towards South Africans of Indian descent (Marks, 1989: 233).

The colonial politics of divide and rule did not stop at the level of creating 'tribalism'. It also racialized society within the same context of divide and rule. According to Ian Golding, "a distinct Coloured identity...is the outcome of the history of divide and rule" (in Vail, 1989: 241). Pre-colonial 'South 'Africa' was never burdened by inter-ethnic strife between the Khoi, the San and the Bantu, contra post-Apartheid claims to that effect (Peires, 1981; Ngcukaithoni, 2018). Ehret (2016) emphasises the peaceful co-existence among the three language communities, while Legassick (in Elphick and Giliomee, 1979) explains that where frictions erupted between any two of the three groups, resources such as grazing and livestock was invariably the cause. Post-apartheid narratives about the history of Bantu domination, usurpation and dispossession of 'the land belonging' the two other communities may very well be the function of post-colonial historical memory (Phillips in Seixas, 2004).

In fact, it would appear that their relations did not differ from those among Africans, who, instead of ethnic loyalties, related to each other as clans and people belonging to chiefs rather than distinctive ethnic groups. For instance, "in 1799 a rising of Khoi and Xhosa under Ndlhambi shattered the complacency of the first British administration (1795-1803)" (Goldin in Vail, 1989: 241). There were several such inter-ethnic co-operation alliances to head off colonial domination. For example, the Khoi and the Tembu collaborated through military alliance against colonial military attacks in 1851 (ibid). One would not expect two antagonistic communities to readily enter into some alliance when it could have suited one of them, especially the weaker one, to exact revenge through aligning with the intruding external forces. This is exactly what happened when the amaMfengu community, which had been at odds with amaXhosa and amaTembu chieftaincies before colonial arrival, readily embraced colonial intrusion as force multiplier to their cause.

This unity in action stung the British into reverting to their time-tested strategy of divide and rule. One result of this political calculation was a move to draw the San and the Khoi into the colonial administration through job incentives, while shutting the doors in the face of the amaXhosa (ibid). In time, this led

to discernible social differentiation among these language groups. The same strategy was extended to the amaXhosa and the amaTembu on the one hand and the Mfengu on the other (ibid).

In the early colonial period, the designation 'coloured' was used interchangeably with the term 'black' or 'negro', throughout the colonial world and especially the British dominated political geography. In South Africa matters changed in 1904. The ethnic distinctions emerged in the 1904 census which included 'White', 'Bantu' and 'Coloured'. White parties serenaded Coloured communities during the introduction of qualified franchise in the Cape, with the object of not only numeric preponderance marginalising Africans (ibid).

A conscious effort was made to sensitise the Coloured communities to the political advantages of dissociating, as well as ethnically differentiating themselves, from Africans (ibid). For good measures, material incentives were introduced to buttress the social differentiation between these two communities. The form these material incentives took included training in artisan skills, to be monopolised by Coloured communities, thereby ensuring that even at the level of working class these racialised differences endured. Tragically, once people are differentiated for material incentives, in a few generations this artificial separation seems 'natural'.

The colonial entrenchment of tribal consciousness sometimes came in both direct and indirect ways, as in the case of the Xhalanga District between 1865 and 1883. Heavily influenced by the colonial ways, including both western style education and religion, the amaMfengu, or 'school people' as they were known, were consciously differentiated from the 'red people' or amaqaba, made up of amaXhosa and abaThembu. Ntsebeza makes the case that 'missionaries were instrumental in the creation of these divisions' (2005: 40). Distinguishing the two ethnic groups was the extent to which each accepted Western influences, while cultural borders proved permeable on each side. The self-perception of the 'school people' was one where they were disposed to bypass the local chiefs in favour of the local commissioners for their disputes. Again, ethnic tensions arose in Qumbu after what the local population saw as the sub-colonisation by the amaMfengu immigrant community, who were distinguished by being 'Christian and literate', and were to some extent 'forged in the process of colonisation' (Beinard and Bundu, 1987: 108). Such had been the historical depth of the colonial inspired divisions between the amaMfengu and all other ethnic groups in the colonial Cape Colony that by the time of Bantustans in the 1970s, hostilities between Lenox Sebe (Xhosa) and Justice Mabandla (Mfengu) assumed an open ethnic barrier. 'Anonymous' explains the historical roots of these durable ethnic divisions by ascribing them to the 1835 influence of the missionaries who persuaded amaMfengu 'to desert their Xhosa patrons and seek Colonial protection' (in Vail, 1989: 396).

It is abundantly clear from the historical record that ethnicity was deliberately introduced in South Africa, and indeed to the whole African continent, as a strategy of divide and rule. Prior to the onset of colonialism there is no cogent evidence of ethnically defined conflicts. Instead, in Southern Africa especially, there is strong evidence of many chiefdoms being receptive to in-migration from people who may or may not be of their same cultural affiliations, as the survival of many chiefdoms depended on their numeric strength. The Basotho under Moshoeshoe thrived as a conglomerate of refugees from following the advent of Difeqane. Essentialising the notion of a tribe, as well as imbuing it with political and economic utility, was the insidious stratagem of colonialism.

It is true that there are instances where there appears to be ethnic consciousness in the absence of the colonial authorities. In such cases, such as that of the Southern Ndebele people, the historical context would still suggest that people were reacting to a specific situation. In any case, the Southern Ndebele people did not so much differentiate themselves from the 'others' or engage in invidious comparison as to draw closer together in the face of overwhelming odds. There were also cases where the African intelligentsia, petty bourgeois, and traditionalists sought to return to pre-colonial 'African mores and customs' as a rear-guard and indeed last-ditch effort to prevent the inevitable - the inexorable hand of modernisation that was sweeping aside all the cultural norms that used to constitute their world. For their part, the

emergent African petty bourgeois sought to seize the moment by playing to the ethnic gallery for their own economic self-interests.

Lastly, it is worth bearing in mind that some social processes take on a life of their own--- once the seed has been planted. Today, most ethnic challenges draw inspiration from these historical roots, where the notion of a 'tribe' is accepted passively as if the concept is part of the natural order of things. Such is Africa's history!

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