


# The Thinker

Quarter 3 — 2015 / VOLUME 65

A PAN - AFRICAN QUARTERLY FOR THOUGHT LEADERS



Peter Lawrence and Michael Prior on  
**DEVELOPMENT AID,  
DOES IT HELP OR HINDER?**

Ademola Araoye on  
**SOUTH AFRICA, THE GLOBAL  
IMMIGRATION CRISIS  
AND THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICAN SOLIDARITY**

SOUTH AFRICA R29.95



Chris Landsberg Richard Smith Jens Pedersen Jonathan Whittall Mongane Wally Serote Tshilidzi Marwala  
Kennedy Mbekeani Kwesi Prah Minga Negash Seid Hassan Mammo Muchie Abu Girma Moges Adane Ghebremeskel  
Lawrence Sisitka Darkey Africa Mxolisi Notshulwana Ntshembo Mathye Zintle Groepe Afzal Moolla Zama Moyo

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
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## On the Cover:

We are Africans First

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# We are all Africans!

A few months ago South Africa was shaken by acts of violence including attacks on non-South Africans and the looting of their shops in a number of places in our country. This violence and vandalism brought shame to our nation and challenged all who live in our country to intensify the struggle for a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, progressive and prosperous South Africa. Our consciences demand that we correctly interpret exactly what these words mean, and do not simply mouth them mindlessly.

Very many reports, articles and comments in the mass media characterised those attacks as xenophobia, many even arguing that South Africans are xenophobic.

It is the considered view of *The Thinker* that the overwhelming majority of South Africans are not xenophobic and are determined and committed to live in peace and harmony with non-South Africans. Nevertheless it is imperative that we continue to deepen our understanding and sharpen our analytical tools to arrive at a more profound understanding of the root causes of the violence plaguing our country. Furthermore we must pursue with vigour and critical analysis the socio-economic and socio-political challenges confronting our country, our region and our continent.

In a previous issue of *The Thinker*, Volume 44/2012, we published a perceptive and thought-provoking article by Michael Prior "Immigration And Europe: Vague Apprehensions or Outright Antagonism – Why Now?"

He demonstrates the immense contribution immigrants, including slaves, made to the economic growth and development of the USA and Europe. Similarly Wally Serote's article in this issue explains the important contribution made by slave labour to the USA.

Michael Prior also points out that the flow of African immigrants into

Europe has led to the rapid growth of right wing organisations, some of them with pronounced fascist tendencies in that continent. The Europe that colonised, brutalised, exploited and underdeveloped Africa is now doing its utmost to prevent African migrants from entering their countries. Progressive forces in South Africa must learn from that reprehensible European example.

In this issue we carry an insightful and analytical article by Ademola Araoye. It is an article that should be critically appraised and digested by anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the flow of African migrants into South Africa and how we may deal with the consequences. As he points out: "South Africa has been unable to wean itself from some of the most devastating legacies of Apartheid. This includes the delegitimising of a dangerous mind-set that was needed to validate the revolutionary violence that was unleashed to overcome Apartheid..."

"The attacks, which seem to have been interpreted as a product of xenophobia are indeed the other side of the criminal violence that seem to have become a quotidian reality of this land struggling hard to translate its vision of a rainbow nation into actuality."

An area that requires much greater attention and research is the possible role that some local South African traders may have played in instigating and supporting the violence, intimidation and looting of shops by young township dwellers. To be sure we need to deal decisively with the overbearing burden of unemployment and dysfunctional schools in our townships and locations. It is also the responsibility of government authorities, the private sector, trade unions, community based organisations, NGOs and faith based institutions to encourage and help promote business partnerships



between South Africans and non-South Africans plying their trade in the townships, locations and CBDs.

It is to the credit of President Zuma, the government in all three spheres, and people cutting across racial, class, religious and ethnic divides that so many not only condemned those horrible deeds but also offered various types of support to the affected and traumatised. These statements and acts of solidarity represent the true and accurate face of the majority of our people.

## Open Letter

Amongst the many South Africans were a group of young South Africans who wrote an open letter to President Zuma declaring "We are Africans First" and calling on the President to institute an "Urgent Enquiry into all violent attacks on non-South Africans since May 2008".

We publish below extracts from that open letter as we are convinced that it represents the views and opinions of the majority of South Africans.

Dear Mr President,

1. We the undersigned are moved to action as witnesses to the vile and abhorrent acts of tyranny meted out against our non-South African brothers and sisters from the rest of Africa and elsewhere within our borders. We are united in our resolve to end these acts of

barbarism and to declare to the world that this is not done in our name.

2. All within our borders must be afforded the protection of our Constitution. This protection should be afforded to everyone, regardless of their legal status. Thus far, our failure to vigorously exercise the mettle of our Constitution in the protection of the rights of our fellow Africans and other immigrants in our country defiles the tenets on which our free country was built and the ideals of human dignity for which our people fought. It is our view that the perpetrators represent a minority and do not speak to the desires of the majority of our people. We, the signatories, believe we speak for the majority of our people, in accordance with the principals of Ubuntu deeply embedded in our culture, "Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu!"
3. The immediate response must therefore focus on quelling all violent attacks on non-South Africans expeditiously. We support any accelerated initiatives by South African authorities to bring all perpetrators to book; and where security forces are found derelict in their duties we trust that the South African Government will act firmly and promptly to correct matters. We commend the actions already taken by the government, led by the President, political parties, faith-based organisations, trade unions, private sector and other civil society structures to demonstrate support and solidarity with non-South Africans living and working within our country. Decisive action will make it clear to the people, governments and civil society organisations on our continent and the world that these abhorrent acts will not be tolerated.
4. We are acutely aware of the critical role that the African continent has played in helping to liberate South Africa, specifically the front line states, making sacrifices for the benefit of all South Africans. At times when these countries were overwhelmed with their own challenges, they harboured,

trained and educated South African freedom fighters. Their own liberation organisations and many of their citizens were our allies, fighting alongside or supporting us and demonstrating their solidarity through many years of struggle. Angola and Mozambique endured many attacks from the apartheid military machine because of their support for the ANC; Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania also gave us military bases, refuge and support; people died in Botswana and Lesotho.... We should always remind our people that other Africans also fought and sacrificed for our freedom.

5. We South Africans should remember

**“We South Africans should remember that, first of all, we are Africans. Only next are we South Africans. These borders we observe were artificially imposed, so our nationality ranks second. We are Africans First! An attack on an African brother, sister, mother, father, child or grandchild is an attack on all of us.”**

that, first of all, we are Africans. Only next are we South Africans. These borders we observe were artificially imposed, so our nationality ranks second. We are Africans First! An attack on an African brother, sister, mother, father, child or grandchild is an attack on all of us. In this context we call on our brothers and sisters on the continent not to take retaliatory action against South Africa and further inflame the situation; but rather we ask you to help us to work together across the

continent to resolve this situation. Please lend your assistance and support to finding a resolution with the utmost urgency.

6. South Africa can only realise its full socio-economic potential if the rest of the continent also grows and develops its enormous human and natural resources. We should also remember that migrant workers from our neighbouring countries have for decades helped to create and build South Africa's wealth. It is in the best interest of South Africa to seek more trade and investments within Africa and closer and better working relationships with the rest of the continent.
7. It is our government's stated policy and commitment to work towards a comprehensive, united and cohesive SADC region. In the context of working towards the free movement of capital, goods and services in the region, we have to plan without delay for the free movement of people and labour also. Post-apartheid South Africa has a long-standing commitment to African unity, pan-African cohesion, building a strong continent, finding African solutions for African problems... If we are unable to deal with such attacks against non-South Africans no-one on the continent will respect or believe in our commitment. These attacks severely distort the South African voice on the continent.
8. Since the dark days of May 2008 to today, although suppressed for some of the time, South Africa has experienced sporadic unchecked and ongoing violence against non-South Africans. We only have a superficial understanding of the root causes of these crimes. Before we are able to work towards finding a sustainable solution, to ensuring these crimes do not repeat themselves, government, political parties (across all party political positions), civil society structures, trade union movements and businesses require a much deeper understanding of the key drivers and triggers behind these attacks. This can only be gleaned from a diligent and thorough official Enquiry. ■

# DIVERSIFYING YOUR INCOME STREAM

South Africa remains one of the most beautiful, resource rich, optimally located countries in the world, with a friendly climate and world class tourism infrastructure.

It is no wonder then, that we as a country have the highest travel and tourism competitiveness ranking in Sub-Saharan Africa, with international tourist arrivals growing at well above the world average rate. Nevertheless, over the medium term our country faces a number of socio economic challenges and uncertainties. The on-going electricity supply issues serve as a frequent reminder that the quality of our economic infrastructure is not yet where it should be, suppressing potential growth and employment levels. Continued tension between labour, business and government leaders suggests a fundamental distrust amongst key economic stakeholders, stunting progress in the democratic era. A recent flare up in xenophobic violence further highlights anger with the level of social and economic development in the 21 years since 1994.


So while there is good reason to be optimistic about South Africa's long term future, positive progress over the shorter term will clearly require bold leadership from within all sectors of society. This is unlikely to be a smooth, predictable process, and will undoubtedly entail many challenges along the way. And as we progress towards the long term objective of social and economic prosperity, our financial markets are thus likely to face some periods of above average volatility.

At Oasis, our Model for Financial Success centres on providing our clients with a thoroughly diversified portfolio of assets, so that the risks associated with a particular geography, currency, asset class, sector, or instrument are mitigated to a large extent. We view volatile periods not with fear, but as important opportunities for buying fundamentally cheap assets and selling fundamentally expensive ones. Through this approach, we strive to provide our clients with superior real returns and consistent investment income over the long term.

## A Word on Financial Matters

Like this Model for Financial Success, the resilience of your household income from unanticipated shocks can benefit meaningfully from the use of well-established diversification principles. In South Africa, household net savings rates remain below 0%, and many depend fully on the income from employment or government grants in order to sustain their livelihood. However, like investing in one asset class or instrument, relying on one source of income can entail significant risks. For example, should an employer run out of business, many of those employees without

income-generating assets would be vulnerable to a complete loss of income. Likewise, the rent received from a single residential property is often dependant on factors beyond the control of its owner, including the macro-economic environment. Diversifying your income streams, through a consistent and disciplined savings regime, can help to secure your financial future, and elevate your financial status significantly through the mitigation of event risks and the accumulation of wealth.



Source: Oasis research, May 2015

Whether you own a business, receive a monthly salary or rent out an apartment, you can benefit substantially from the inclusion of investment income into your diversified income stream, and it is in this domain where Oasis can play an important role in growing and protecting your real wealth. The inclusion of a fully diversified portfolio of financial assets amidst your existing income streams can thus ultimately give our clients a substantial boost on the road to complete financial independence.

## In the News

During June the annual report of the Oasis Crescent Property Fund and Oasis Crescent Property Fund Managers Ltd. for the period ending 31 March 2015 were released. In the report, we aim to further the Oasis tradition of active and transparent engagement with our investors. In particular, we highlight some of the key developments in the broader economy, the domestic property sector and the fund itself, so as to give all stakeholders a clear sense of the outlook for the Fund and its environment.

The aim of the Fund is to provide the shareholders with stable, long-term growth in their real wealth, and our investment philosophy and property management continues to deliver these results. For a great insight into the property market and the Fund itself, the report is available at [www.oasis.co.za](http://www.oasis.co.za).

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## Saving for a Family Home



## Saving for Retirement

Whatever your savings needs may be, Oasis has a wide range of investment products for every life stage and risk profile. Contact your financial advisor for more information on how these products can help you prepare for important events in your life or call Oasis on 0860 100 786.

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## All contributing analysts write in their personal capacity

**Darkey Africa** was a leading member of the ANC in the North West Province and served as a Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Local Government (1994-2004) and the MEC for Finance and Economic Development in the North West (2004-2009). He is considered an expert in local government matters, having played a critical role in establishing the local government system in his province. He has also participated in policy development at a national level, for example in the development of the Municipal Finance Management Act and the Municipal Systems Act.

**Dr Ademola Araoye** is a former Nigerian diplomat and author of *Cote d'Ivoire, The Conundrum of a Still Wretched of the Earth*. He is an international policy analyst with a special interest in conflict analysis and management. Araoye has significant lived experience of post-conflict societies. He trained at the Claremont Graduate University, CA, United States of America. He teaches part time as the University of Liberia, Monrovia.

**Dr Adane Ghebremeskel** is a Senior Regional Programme Adviser for Governance, Peace and Security at the SADC Council of NGOs. He is writing in his personal capacity.

**Professor Seid Hassan** is Professor of Economics at Murray State University in USA. He lectures on global issues concerning economics, international trade, economic development and monetary economics. He is a keen observer and commentator on issues and challenges confronting his native country Ethiopia.

**Professor Chris Landsberg** is Head of the NRF Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy based at the University of Johannesburg. He holds MPhil and DPhil International Relations Degrees from Oxford University, and is a life-time member of Christ Church College. In 2009, he became the National Higher Education champion

for the India-Brazil-South Africa forum (IBSA). He has written articles and contributed chapters to books dealing with the history and contemporary challenges of governance and foreign policy analysis in South Africa and Africa. He is the author of *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition* (Jacana, 2004).

**Ntshembo Mathye** holds an MA in Diplomacy, Law and Global Change from Coventry University, United Kingdom (2012) and a BA in International Relations and English from the University of Witwatersrand (2002). He has published two policy briefs entitled 'Has South Africa Managed to Coordinate SADC's Response to Zimbabwe?' and 'The negative costs of delaying the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises'.

**Professor Tshilidzi Marwala** is the Deputy Vice-chancellor Research, Innovation, Post-Graduate studies and Library at the University of Johannesburg. He is a fellow of the Mapungubwe Institute of Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) and recipient of the Order of Mapungubwe. He holds a PhD in Engineering from the University of Cambridge and was a post-doctoral fellow at Imperial College (London). His research interests include artificial intelligence in engineering and politics. He has supervised 37 Master's and 6 PhD students, published over 210 refereed papers and 4 books, and has also lodged 3 patents.

**Dr Kennedy K Mbekeani** is currently Officer in Charge at the Southern African Regional Resource Centre of the African Development Bank in South Africa. He has written extensively on trade and regional integration in Africa. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Economics and Statistics from the University of Malawi, a Master of Philosophy Degree in Monetary Economics from the University of Glasgow, and Master of Arts and PhD

in International Economics from the University of California.

**Abu Girma Moges** is Associate Professor of Economics, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Japan. His research interests are political economy, poverty, fiscal policy and economic development. He currently serves as co-editor of the *Ethiopian Journal of Economics*.

**Professor Mammo Muchie** is a fellow of the South African Academy of Sciences and the African Academy of Sciences. He is a Professor at Tshwane University of Technology, adjunct professor at the Adama Science and Technology University in Ethiopia and a senior research associate at the Technology and Management Centre for Development at Oxford University. Since 1985 he has produced 365 publications in the form of books, chapters in books and articles.

**Professor Minga Negash** is Professor of Accounting at the Metropolitan State University of Denver, Colorado and at the University of Witwatersrand. He has published over 40 articles in journals in South Africa, Ethiopia and the USA.

**Jens Pederson** is Humanitarian Policy Adviser for Médecins sans Frontières. Jens is a trained nurse, holding an MSc in Humanitarian Studies from the Liverpool School of Medicine. He worked for MSF in Liberia as hospital manager during the Ebola outbreak, and has also worked in Sudan, South Sudan, India, South Africa and Sierra Leone, providing strategic and analytical support for MSF's operations. He writes in his personal capacity.

**Dr Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Prah** is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Thabo Mbeki Institute, UNISA. He received his BA from Fisk University where he was acting president of the African Students Association (ASA) for

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two and a half years. In addition to that, he was part of the CHANGE program for Oxfam America where he served as a youth leader. He received his MA from Lancaster University and his PhD in History from East China Normal University, Shanghai. His research interests revolve around critical approaches to the science of history, African and Asian History, African, Chinese and Japanese philosophy.

**Dr Mongane Wally Serote** is a South African poet and writer. In 1973 he won the Ingrid Jonker Poetry prize. As a Fulbright Scholar, he obtained a Fine Arts Degree at Columbia University in 1979. In 1993, he won the "Noma" Award for publishing in Africa. He served as Chair of the Parliamentary Select Committee for Arts and Culture and was formerly the CEO of Freedom Park, a national heritage site. His written works include several acclaimed novels, volumes of poetry and a collection of essays. In August 2012, he was awarded the prestigious Golden Wreath Award.

**Lawrence Sisitka** has extensive experience in, and in training for, protected area management. He led the development of a Marine Protected Area Management course for WWF in South Africa, and was the consultant commissioned to develop the WIO-COMPAS certification programme. He is an Associate of the Environmental Learning Research Centre at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. The current focus of his work is capacity building for natural resources management, both with professionals and with rural communities.

**Richard Smith** is a conflict transformation strategist and process facilitator based at the ACTION Support Centre in Johannesburg. He is also a senior associate at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies in Cambodia, and a board member of the Southern African Liaison Office and the Zimbabwe Institute. He has a background in Psychology and Economics from the University of Cape Town and an M Phil in Conflict Transformation and Management from the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

**Dr Jonathan Whittall** is Head of Humanitarian Analysis for Médecins sans Frontières. Jonathan has worked extensively on providing strategic support to MSF operations in Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, Pakistan, Afghanistan and South Sudan, and has been an Emergency Coordinator for MSF in Libya and Bahrain. Jonathan holds a PhD in humanitarian studies from the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and he is currently based in Beirut, Lebanon. ■

## The Journal for Progressive Thought

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### Publisher

Vusizwe Media

### Editor

Dr Essop Pahad  
[egp@thethinker.co.za](mailto:egp@thethinker.co.za)

### Managing Editor

Meg Pahad  
[megpahad@mweb.co.za](mailto:megpahad@mweb.co.za)

### Editorial Assistant & PA to Dr Pahad

Zain Dindar

### Advertising, Distribution & Subscriptions

Zain Dindar

[zain@thethinker.co.za](mailto:zain@thethinker.co.za)

Tel: +27 82 369 7422

### All Correspondence To

Vusizwe Media

3 Kruger Drive

Craighall Park

2196

Tel: +27 11 325 4305

Fax: +27 86 608 4799

[egp@thethinker.co.za](mailto:egp@thethinker.co.za)

### Design & Art Direction

Liesel van der Schyf

[liesel@vdsdesign.co.za](mailto:liesel@vdsdesign.co.za)

Tel: +27 82 336 7537

### Accountants

Karolia Jeena inc.

+27 11 537 3700

[karjeena@iafrica.com](mailto:karjeena@iafrica.com)

## Advisory Council

Ademola Araoye (Nigeria), Professor Puleng Lenka Bula (South Africa), Dr. Faisal Devji (Tanzania), Professor Chris Landsberg (South Africa), Professor Tshilidzi Marwala (South Africa), Professor Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Zimbabwe), Dr. Morley Nkosi (South Africa), Professor Eghosa E. Osaghae (Nigeria), Dr. Garth le Pere (South Africa), Professor Alioune Sall (Senegal), Addai Sebo (Ghana), Dr Wally Serote (South Africa).



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# South Africa, the Global Immigration Crisis and the Challenge of African Solidarity



*People who come because they think that Europe is a prosperous continent... must be escorted back, that's the rule.* Francoise Hollande, President of France, on African and Middle Eastern immigrants to Europe.

By Ademola Araoye

**T**he challenges of immigration and its management are global. It is estimated that migrants that traversed international boundaries more than doubled between 1980 and 2010. They increased from 103 million to 220 million. In 2013, the number of international migrants was put at 232 million and projected to double to over 400 million by 2050.<sup>1</sup> Philip Martin, a professor of the Comparative Immigration and Integration Programme, also notes that about 60 percent of global migrants are in the 30 or more industrialised countries. Some 40 percent of migrants are in the 170 poorer developing

countries. Almost half of the world's migrants are women, 15 percent of migrants are under 20, and less than 7 percent of all international migrants are refugees. In the new millennium, immigration has acquired greater import and has become more complex the world over. Immigration has historically confronted the idea of territoriality, the behaviour of animals or people that try to keep others away from an area that they assert to be theirs or seize control of. Territoriality may also be directly associated with attempts by various animals and groups to protect the integrity of their communities in the long term.

Accordingly mass movements, even if they are undertaken as individuals or in small groups at a time, have been problematic since the beginning of human movements.

The human attitude of instinctive perception of threats posed by increased human movements, interpreted as invasion, encroachment or breaches of territoriality from the outside, has lagged behind historic advances in concepts in global modes of social organisations, political and economic. At the same time, it is clear that profound transformation in the sensibilities of international society has impacted on the new definition and

anticipated responses to this historic conundrum. It may be posited that the transformed or evolving international sensibilities have impacted on the expectations of how immigrants are treated. These emerging new impulses are however at variance with the overall postures of state policy that are still founded on realist principles in a significantly or struggling post-realist international environment. For realists, the most important national interest is the survival of the state, including its people, political system, and territorial integrity. Realists contend that, as long as the world is divided into nation-states in an anarchic setting, national interest will remain the essence of international politics. Accordingly, realists perceive danger posed by mass immigration to the integrity of national interests, including the dominant culture. Post-realists focus less on power and depreciate the centrality of power in relations between states. In fact they challenge the legitimacy of force in the interaction among states. They are less resistant to immigration. This different orientation has led to sharp discourses internal to states and among states on the global immigration crisis.

The interplay of domestic political factors and forces impinge on the policy responses to the challenge of immigration. This is an acute consideration in the African environment, where a pervasive sense of the unlimited solidarity of the earthly wretched across international frontiers in Africa is deeply and conveniently ingrained in society. Borders exist only in reality, but not in any mental recognition of their existence. They are therefore meant to be breached in Africa. It is much more so in relation to continental perceptions of a sense of entitlement to an open black ruled post-Apartheid South Africa given its special place in the tortuous story of African emancipation, its sterling economy and the universality of its ideological motor that drove its liberation struggle.

These expectations are not mediated by a keener appreciation of the excruciating internal configurations that persist merely two decades into black majority rule. These include certain persisting mind-sets that were validated by the liberation

struggle but necessarily requiring due de-legitimation in building a new South Africa. One example is the entrenchment of revolutionary violence, and a second is a problematic conceptual dichotomy of South Africa from the rest of the continent that needs to be transcended as a fundamental prerequisite to transit South Africa from its apartheid era attitude and to integrate it mentally and in actuality into the mainstream of African existential realities.

More importantly on the continental aisle is the undeniable lack of political will in many African states to stem emigration through an un-abating creation and export of mass produced poor and wearied who are primed

**“In a perverse way, Europe in the immigration crisis from Africa is reaping a well-deserved self-induced evidently avoidable problem emanating directly from its reckless and tactless intervention in Libya against the advice of perceptive Africa.”**

to go in search of greener pastures further abroad or in the immediate abroad. Horrendous governance paradigms persist that continue to lead to defection of a disenchanting middle class to the down and out constituencies of the wretched across the continent. Current challenges of human haemorrhage and undesirable cargo from Africa to the world and in particular to South Africa constitute an egregious abuse of African and global solidarity. The state is at the heart of this global crisis.

The grounding of the nation state as a defining autonomous sociological enclave, sovereign political space and basic economic unit is a major culprit in the contemporaneous

problematic of immigration and migrants. The nation-state's clear demarcation of territory under its sole control and the entrenchment of the concept of nationhood that defines identities in nationality and statehoods as the normative institution regulating large scale human communities have ossified the human proclivity to contain movements of those considered outsiders. The management of challenges ensuing from the ascendance of the nation state in relation to basic human freedom of movement have very often been associated with tragic consequences as the world currently witnesses in the carnage of African and Asian migrants at sea in the West Mediterranean straits off the coast of Libya to Italy; or again in the plight of the over eight thousand Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants, 'Myanmar's unwanted people', stranded at sea off the coast of Thailand for weeks unending.

In this connection, Malaysian officials noted that 1,018 Bangladeshi and Rohingya refugees had landed illegally on one of the Langkawi islands. They apparently had been abandoned by people smugglers who were transporting them to Thailand. Meanwhile, dozens have been buried in unmarked graves. This scenario unfolds elsewhere, almost everywhere. Responses in recipient societies have been similarly antagonistic, even if they are nuanced in some and less so in others. The familiar international hypocritical postures have been at play to advance political objectives. In the United States, harsh society engagements and draconian measures by non-governmental militias against migrants from South of the border are carefully packaged to assuage international sensibilities, while in others, such as South Africa, international perceptions of challenges of managing immigration are couched in terms of xenophobia. Messaging has thus been a key factor in international reaction to these responses.

In Europe, there are separate rules for migrants emanating from Europe and others. Huge numbers of European Union citizens freely move from one EU country to another. Even though they are categorised as 'migrants', they

are fully protected by EU law, unless they are fugitive criminals. Their status is quite different from that of non-EU migrants. For migrants from other places, in particular Asia, Middle East and Africa, the Dublin system applies. This system is designed to obfuscate the real intention of keeping undesirables out. In conjunction with the revised Dublin Regulation, three other legal instruments constitute the 'Dublin System': These are Regulation (EU) No. 603/2013 establishing the 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the recast Dublin Regulation and Regulation (EU) No. 118/2014 which amends Regulation (EC) No. 1560/2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of the recast Dublin Regulation. The operation of the Dublin Regulation often acts to the detriment of refugees by causing serious delays in the examination of asylum claims. This can result in the asylum seekers' claims never being heard. The system is characterised by the excessive use of detention to enforce transfers of asylum seekers, the division of families, the denial of an effective opportunity to appeal against transfers and the limited use of the discretionary provisions within the Regulation to alleviate these and other problems. Finally, it impedes integration of refugees by forcing them to have their claims determined in Member States with which they may have no particular connection.<sup>2</sup> It is the concept of fortress Europe in practice.

Territoriality has thus remained a serious anachronistic impediment to contemporaneous social advancements that are represented by globalisation, including free movements of finance and labour, and more profoundly the evolution of the Westphalian statehood to the emergence of the post-modern, post statist and post material era. In Africa, these have been manifest in the challenge of sustaining African solidarity in a system still denominated on the outmoded planks and ethical gaps of a post-colonial statism of the African state. As the major economic destination with the largest aggregation of centripetal economic factors, South Africa has had to bear the brunt of a global phenomenon with the strength of a tsunami that is dividing Europe and

has riven apart consensus on the way forward.

The problems of human territoriality, a global phenomenon, and control of movements have been characterised by paradoxes. In the evolution of the United States, a nation of immigrants that nearly decimated the original inhabitants of the continent and defeated other claimants to territory in its West and South, the surge of immigrants to the country in the 1920s led to the development of large, thriving communities of immigrants and minorities. This wave generated a considerable backlash among so called native-born Americans who feared they were losing their cities to 'undesirable' newcomers. Before the coming of the immigrants, a large majority of the American population – more than 60% – could trace their ancestry back to

“South Africa has had to bear the brunt of a global phenomenon with the strength of a tsunami that is dividing Europe and has riven apart consensus on the way forward.”

either the British Isles or to Germany.

These old-line Americans, mostly fair-skinned and Protestant, the new White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP) of the vast and rich territory, tended to view the darker-complexioned, mostly Catholic or Jewish New Immigrants from Southern Europe as not just different but 'inferior' — members of lesser races, likely lacking the Anglo-Saxon temperament many believed necessary to maintain a free society.<sup>3</sup>

In Australia, a colony of migrants, a federated Australia was created to develop a common immigration policy that reflected the resistance to Chinese immigration. A White Australia policy was articulated to exclude all non-European people from immigrating into Australia, and was the official policy of all governments

and all mainstream political parties in Australia from the 1890s to the 1950s. Elements of the policy survived until the 1970s. Although the expression 'White Australia policy' was never in official use, it was common in political and public debate throughout the period. In South Africa, the Boers, also known as Afrikaners, descendants of the original Dutch settlers of southern Africa, declared a Republic of South Africa that excluded the original inhabitants of the region through its Apartheid policy.

Some scholars believe apartheid was a product of racial prejudices and policies imposed by Dutch and British settlers. Recent scholarship highlights a combination of several factors that paved the way to apartheid, including colonial conquest, dispossession of the inhabitants, deliberate economic impoverishment and racial discrimination and segregation. What emerges from history is that territoriality associated with statehood and nationality remained a bane of the ideas of freedom of movement, to such an extent that today a debilitating global crisis of immigration has emerged from the United States, through Europe, Australia and in South Africa. This article examines the challenge of South Africa in managing immigration against the background of its continued dedication to African solidarity as a critical plank of the African Renaissance project in a Post Mandela World Order; and it puts this into global and historical contexts, as well as locating the challenges in the domestic socio-political and economic ferment.

In the post-modernist dispensation and an increasingly globalised world with transformed humanist sensibilities of international society as distinct from an international community of formal states, immigration has broken down its long confinement to specialist discourses of demography, jurisprudence and public policy analysis and its increasing relation to macro processes of social change and the transformation of nation states as highlighted by many distinguished scholars of immigration, especially in the context of globalisation.<sup>4</sup> Araoye<sup>5</sup> observes that post-modern states have developed transnational networks

of causes, based on shared values that bind civil society across state boundaries and enhance interests in international rules regulating these causes. This drives a new transnational political process that assures the acceptance by the states of the new principles which undermine old notions of sovereignty associated with the modern state. The states accept that international law has emerged as a regular feature of modern political life. Also, the post-modern order is built upon a new type of nation state which 'pools' together its sovereignty with other states and accepts transnational and supranational legal authority above its own national law.<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, post-modern states have repudiated the realist principles that guide interaction among modern states and no longer place emphasis on the use of force as a medium of transactions between them. They are thus in a post-realist era. While some of the main challenges of immigration elicited by the large scale movement of labour internationally across national boundaries, including a potential loss of sovereignty over entry and exit of national borders, seem to have been accentuated by recent developments, immigration has become a complex and multifaceted phenomenon spanning the ideological, economic and developmental, humanitarian and sociological, and even acquired a moral tone. The emerged complexity of mass movement of people across borders globally has rendered policy formulation very demanding and contentious as states and whole continents seek to grapple with the emerged multi-dimensional challenges posed by this international crisis.

The post-modernists, often referred to as transnationalists, have faced a stiff rebuttal from conservative citizens on immigration who have derided them as trendy philosophical internationalists who are advocating the juggling of conflicting national and cultural allegiances, and call for the attenuation of specific national loyalties. The post-modernists on immigration are dismissed as mostly privileged academicians insulated from the realities of the world by tenure, who strenuously oppose the right to

select and emphasise one aspect of the multiple cultural and national identities human beings possess. They are seen as constituting an intellectual advocate for the breakdown of law, for the repudiation of historical notions of what makes nation states and civil society, undermining civic traditions, professing the violation of the sanctity of borders that once commanded unquestioned assent, and using a term like patriotism only jokingly.<sup>7</sup>

The reality however is that some neo-liberals accept the beneficial impact of an open immigration regime. In the United Kingdom, a neo-liberal commentator was clear that high levels of immigration are part and parcel of neoliberalism, because they offer speedy, few-questions-asked economic growth. For some reason, however, both Labour and the Conservatives have shied away from explaining to 'ordinary people' that immigrants provide a steady supply of labour, stopping 'ordinary' wages and expectations from getting out of hand.<sup>8</sup>

For those on the left, international solidarity imposes the imperative of joining forces to liberate workers, irrespective of nationality, race or gender. The division is thus strictly not only ideological but is manifested in differing attitudes and orientations that have impacted on immigration policy in Europe, the USA, Asia, Latin America and Australia.

Meanwhile, all over the world, from the USA, through Ukraine, Austria, France, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, and China immigrants have been made scapegoats. The differences are in the approaches and who is leading the charge against foreigners. In the United States and Europe, where the state leads the charge against foreigners, the assaults are very nuanced and couched in a language that confers legitimacy. Historically, discriminatory immigration policies aimed at southern and eastern Europeans were prominent in the quota-based policies of the 1920s. Through the Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the National Origins Act or Johnson-Reed Act, the U.S. used restrictive immigration policies in the 1920s based on the 1890 proportions of foreign-born European nationalities. It was also held that immigrants from

southern and eastern Europe were unskilled, ignorant, predominantly Catholic or Jewish and not easily assimilated into American culture.<sup>9</sup> A century and half later, to protect the threatened hegemony of the WASP dominant USA, or in Australia, the more sophisticated institutional violence that was unleashed was taken off the streets and rationalised in carefully couched euphemisms in carefully arranged and managed bogus discourse. Violence against foreigners can be very crude when the militias, both from the mainstream as in the USA and Australia, or the margins as in South Africa take it upon themselves to help the government to solve perceived threats of foreign invasion. This real xenophobia is a recurrent phenomenon or a crisis that belies globalisation.

The United States shares a common border of about 2,000 miles (3,200 kms) with Mexico and has a large Latino community. This is the largest minority and fastest growing community in the United States. The US Customs and Border Protection spent \$2.4 billion between 2006 and 2009 to complete 670 miles of border fence that is designed to keep foreigners or their vehicles from crossing into the United States, according to a Government Accountability Office report. When completed the cost of this state-of-the-art border fence has been estimated at between four and eight billion dollars. A poll conducted by a conservative news outlet suggests that the American people favoured a proposal to construct this 2,000 mile security fence by a 51-to-37 percent margin.

Meanwhile, the total illegal alien population was estimated by Secretary of Homeland Security at 8 to 12 million in December 2003, even though to heighten perception of the threat posed to the American way of life, some major news outlets regularly use 20 million as a more realistic number of illegal aliens in the US. The conservatives who are the main backers of fencing off the Mexican border claim that a sea of illegal aliens provides a cover and an environment in which terrorists can hide, and the tide of in-coming aliens provides terrorists with a reliable

means of entry. They also allege that foreigners are drug couriers. Such is the fear of Latino immigrants that private minutemen and anti-immigrant militias have been established in states like Texas and Arizona ‘to do the job their government refuses to do’ and ‘protect America’ from tens of millions plundering ‘our’ nation. They argue that ‘it should be legal to kill illegals.’

In Australia, the government dumps desperate immigrants who have survived perilous sea journeys to escape poverty and discrimination in facilities totally inappropriate and ill-equipped, with people cramped into leaking tents, suffering from physical and mental ailments, creating a climate of anguish, especially during the repressively hot monsoon season. Australia is also known to have refused to rescue boat people caught in storms who died when their boats capsized. The waiting time to be processed in this uninhabitable hell located in Nauru is five years under the Government’s horrendous ‘no advantage’ policy. Offshore processing of the so-called illegals on Nauru and Manus Island is designed to break vulnerable people in these ill-conceived limbo camps.

China’s very stringent monitoring of foreigners is legendary as many Africans are forced into debt and imprisoned for merely overstaying their visa. There have been deadly

riots. Also the perennial conflagration in the outskirts and ghettos of French cities need no recall. The French government is known to have offered monetary incentives to get rid of unwanted foreigners, including ‘gypsies’ or Romans, who were once forcibly ejected from the country.

In Africa, South Africa has been singularly hit by this world-wide phenomenon. This was inevitably a near and popular destination for the poor and wearied of Africa and Asia. Barely two decades into its majority rule, in the context of its internal challenges and the struggle as with most states hit by this global challenge, South Africa has paid the price of sluggish messaging and faced the familiar hypocrisy of a world that has traditionally designed one measure for Africa and another for itself. But it is Africa that has been caught in the beams of the hypocritical international searchlight.

The challenge of immigration into South Africa opens an opportunity to examine our own assumptions in relation to principles and expectations that underpin intra-African relations, develop common understandings and map out strategies for the management of relationships. Whatever compulsions, instinctive, emotional or plain and hard-nosed rational, drive our responses to recent developments

in the country, sight cannot be lost of the ready label of xenophobia that was stuck on the ugly outbreak of violence visited upon non-South African migrants. Yet, the pertinent question is, “Was this really xenophobia?” The issue is framed by columnist Mathatha Tsedu, who put it in the Johannesburg *City Press* as “Why are we failing as Africans?”

Meanwhile, the campaign and activism against xenophobia of African artists resident in South Africa seems to be a simplistic framing of the international crisis that does not get to the real heart of the challenge. The xenophobic type attacks are symptomatic of larger festering challenges that South Africa has been unable to resolve in twenty-one years of post-Apartheid black rule. South Africa has been unable to wean itself from some of the most devastating legacies of Apartheid. This includes the de-legitimising of a dangerous mind-set that was needed to validate the revolutionary violence that was unleashed to overcome Apartheid. The structures of the economy remain skewed and South African society increasingly differentiated between an emerged small black elite and a mass black impoverished. These failures have all impacted on the character of post-Apartheid South African society with serious consequences.

**TABLE 1**  
**Reasons why Africans leave their home countries for South Africa**

Variables	Origin of African immigrants entrepreneurs									
	Nigeria N= 40		Somalia N= 40		Senegal N= 20		Other** N= 20		Total N=120	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Political instability	12	30	40	100	2	10	10	50	64	53
Perception of business opportunities in RSA	15	38	0	0	6	30	2	10	23	19
Economic reasons	8	20	0	0	9	45	3	15	20	17
Visit	2	5	0	0	3	15	2	10	7	6
Other*	3	8	0	0	0	0	3	15	6	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>N: Number of respondents</b>					<b>F: Frequency</b>					

\* The group designated as ‘Other’ comprises family problems, marriage, study, adventure etc.

\*\* The group of countries designated as other comprises of Cameroon (6), Tanzania (5), Angola (4), Zimbabwe (2), Rwanda (2) and Morocco (1).

Source: South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, Volume 13 No 4

Main street South Africa deals with the horror of unimaginable violence practically on a daily basis. But this happens behind the fortified walls of highly secured gated communities. Once in a while, this sanguine reality is expressed along the margins of mainstream of South Africa in the scapegoating of fellow Africans. The pattern of violence suggests a systemic trauma that impacts on both foreigners and South Africans alike. Even the men's hostel, a hold-over idea from the Apartheid era, has not yet been dismantled. Violence witnessed in the past few months seems to manifest a crisis that has engulfed this embattled rainbow nation. All residents of the country, across the social strata, are caught in the throes of violence. Only a very brutal re-evaluation of flailing social and developmental paradigms employed by the South African government can begin to instil a semblance of normalcy in relations among South Africans, between South Africans and the continent. These harsh measures to be adopted are the default approaches that have been adopted in many other African countries. It would require the understanding of other Africans to give South Africa a chance to recalibrate its economic and social blueprint to meet the legitimate aspirations of those in the margins who perceive themselves as being left behind, as South Africa moves into its third decade of majority rule.

The South African situation deviates in many respects from these cases. South Africans often assume that since the end of apartheid and the coming of democracy in 1994, there has been a huge wave of migration into their country from the rest of the continent. But in reality, the figures remain unclear. The country's Human Sciences Research Council once estimated that there are 4 to 8 million undocumented migrants in South Africa, but Statistics South Africa, a government agency, estimates undocumented persons in the country to be somewhere in the range of 500,000 to 1 million. Meanwhile, the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg assesses that the overall foreign population in South Africa ranges from 1.6 to 2 million, or 3 to 4 percent of the total population. They

also report that there are between 1 and 1.5 million legal and illegal Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa. This is in the context of national unemployment that has long been a major preoccupation for the South African Government. Despite its high unemployment rate, South Africa has the highest number of immigrants in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>10</sup>

Whatever the volume of the problem of illegal migrants in South Africa, the problem is that official South Africa is caught on the horns of a dilemma. It must resolve the challenge of accommodating its sprawling and roiling internal constituency of those who are left behind while being, at the

**“South Africa has been unable to wean itself from some of the most devastating legacies of Apartheid. This includes the de-legitimising of a dangerous mind-set that was needed to validate the revolutionary violence that was unleashed to overcome Apartheid.”**

same time, sensitive to the demands of African solidarity in managing the avalanche of fleeing economic migrants from badly managed African countries. And it must achieve this without provoking the kind of backlash that it recently experienced. That is not all. Its balancing act is in the context of a very difficult national process.

Table 1 reveals that more than half of those seeking to leave their homes to settle in South Africa cite political reasons for their decisions. Added to the 17% that may be termed economic migrants, also related to governance issues, it can be proposed that over 70% of potential migrants from Africa do so for political reasons.

The current challenge betrays the turbulent undercurrents of South Africa's politics, in particular the structure of its economy and their impact on national life. The shocking hackings to death of foreigners, now symbolised by the brutal daylight stalking, bludgeoning and stabbing to death of Mozambican Emmanuel Sithole, are strong reminders of the dire consequences of the pervasive disillusionment of the black masses in post-Apartheid South Africa. They can easily turn to criminality as the Sithole case demonstrated. The attacks, which seem to have been interpreted as a product of xenophobia are indeed the other side of the criminal violence that seem to have become a quotidian reality of this land struggling hard to translate its vision of a rainbow nation into actuality. Young uneducated black South Africans have felt strongly disadvantaged in the competition in the retail trade and petty services that have been taken over by fellow Africans from the continent as well as from South Asia. The tension had been palpable for some time with a few well-meaning commentators drawing attention to the keg of gun powder in South Africa's national lounge. Indeed the margins of South Africa would seem to have been given a short shrift and this is at the heart of the internal debate within the ANC.

But the situation has arisen not because of a lack of trying by the ANC. South Africa recognised early that “no economy can grow by excluding any part of its people, and an economy that is not growing cannot integrate all of its citizens in a meaningful way” – from South Africa's black economic empowerment strategy document. The need to build an economy that is anchored on the full potential of all persons and communities across the length and breadth of this country has been central to the thinking on empowering all. Despite the many economic gains made in the country since 1994, the racial divide between rich and poor has persisted. The profound danger of such inequalities on political stability has been long realised. It was highlighted that societies characterised by entrenched gender inequality or racially or ethnically

defined wealth disparities are not likely to be socially and politically stable, particularly as economic growth can exacerbate these inequalities. The ANC's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme was designed, amongst other objectives, to create a black middle strata. South Africa's BEE policy is not simply a moral initiative to redress the wrongs of the past. It is a growth and redistribution strategy that aims to realise the country's full economic potential while helping to bring the black majority into the economic mainstream.<sup>11</sup>

The idea was that this new black middle strata would create avenues for the empowerment to impact on the black community as a whole. Although some remarkable progress has been attained, the expected downward cascading impact of BEE has been slow. The black majority who were denied any education or who were outright victims of the Apartheid policy of deliberately stifling the development of the entrepreneurial capacity of blacks are not a match for the more experienced Somalis, Mozambicans and Zimbabweans. As is often the case with immigrants, the foreigners are more motivated to work extremely hard and to save through self-imposed privations. Often too these communities of foreigners are not integrated.

What all this suggests is that South Africa must resolve its internal contradictions and dilemmas. Pretoria has to bite the bullet and institute an indigenisation policy that must definitively restrict some of the activities of foreigners to more advanced and relatively capitalised ventures and sectors of the economy. South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. Unemployment is a staggering problem especially as the unemployed are often also unemployable. Even by official estimates, which tend to be conservative, the unemployment rate in South Africa decreased to 24.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 from 25.40 percent in the third quarter of 2014. The unemployment rate in South Africa averaged 25.25 percent from 2000 until 2014, reaching an all-time high of 31.20 percent in the

first quarter of 2003 and a record low of 21.50 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. Another source highlights that by 2014 the black African unemployment rate had declined from 43% to 40%. It notes that this is of no comfort to the additional 3.1 million black African workforce unemployed. Since many in this category are unemployable and have no history and culture of working, it would require some measure of affirmative mobilisation to inculcate a new working ethic, create self-employment niches and nurture this category of deprived South Africans into constructive participants in society and economy.

Therefore, an open door policy

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to all of Africa's poor and wearied cannot be an option. As it currently stands, South Africa's kind of selfless solidarity is very unrealistic and can only sharpen current antagonisms between poor black South Africans and other Africans. Solidarity unlimited is a politically defeatist route for the ANC. South Africa must find creative alternatives to pacify its roaring mass of disenchanted. It is an imperative to defuse the ticking time bomb.

Some sacrifices are therefore required. South Africa must limit the participation of non-South Africans in some of its soft sectors. The retail sector, with clearly specified limits that are within the capacity of marginalised

South Africans, should preferably restrict the number of foreign owned shops. Also, at the next level, Africans who so desire should enter into partnerships with South Africans in retail and bigger wholesale outlets to enhance the stakes of South African blacks in these joint enterprises. This would be nothing innovative as it is the practice in many African counties, including Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria. South African Development Community or no SADC, some soft sectors of the economy that have the potential to serve as platforms for the apprenticeship of the most business savvy of the lumpen mass lot should rightfully be reserved for South African nationals.

The South African government should also provide lending facilities that are accompanied or preceded by training in the management of small businesses with economic outreach officers from financial institutions to provide advisory services to this new cadres of Small and Medium young black entrepreneurs.

Also directly relevant is the need to reorient South Africans psychologically to begin to see themselves and their nation as an integral part and parcel of Africa. The entrenched notion of South Africa as an autonomous social universe vis-à-vis the rest of the Continent should be addressed through formal and informal engagements with South African society. In this connection, Africa has the technological infrastructure to begin the cultivation of transnational people-to-people networks in the continent.

As for the rest of Africa, it is high time we learnt that we cannot continue to shirk our responsibilities at home and expect others to clean up after us. We are daily assaulted on our television screens by the consequences of the pervasive irresponsibility of our states and leadership as Africans choose to expose themselves to unimaginable risks of near certain death just to earn a menial living in Europe. It is significant that the regional distribution of the recipients of permanent resident status in South Africa indicates that there were more recipients from Africa (67%) than those from overseas (33%). The leading countries from Africa are Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia,

Swaziland, the DRC, Nigeria, Lesotho, Cameroon, Congo, Zambia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. Recipients from these countries received 85.2% of the Permanent Residence Permits issued. Even if only anecdotally, one could talk of a strong correlation between the nature of domestic political governance of the origins of the African recipients and the fulfilled desire to emigrate.

More tragically recently over 6 000 migrants from Africa and nearby have been pulled out of certain death in the ocean by the Italian navy. The other side is over 1 000 illegal immigrants into Europe just perished in the Mediterranean Sea on the way to Lampedusa on the Central Mediterranean route from Libya. The reasons can be adduced from Table 1. Seventy per cent of all those travelling to South Africa gave reasons that reflect poor governance at home as they chose to vote with their feet to South Africa. Even excluding the so called xenophobic attacks, Africans are dying in horrific circumstances just to escape the fate at home. African governments must empathise with the situation in South Africa and work to ensure that the solidarity of official South Africa is not abused any further. The global immigration crisis partly reflects the consequences of so much official irresponsibility in our national lives. The events unfolding in Burundi today are indicative of the generation of a new wave of African defectors on the way to near certain death abroad, far or near.

Yet, while the appalling normative regimes of governance in the African state significantly motivate the desire of many Africans to emigrate, the spike of poor African potential migrants actually taking the risk, a major feature of the current international immigration crisis, cannot be divorced from the unilateral interventions designed to advance strategic objectives of elite extra-African forces in Africa. The timing of the current wave of immigrants, especially from Africa, resulting in the international immigration crisis, is clearly linked to the implosion of the Libyan state following the intervention of extra-African forces, mainly France and Great Britain, co-opting NATO, to push for a military ouster of Libya leader Muammar Gaddafi. Now,

Europe, notably France, is nervous about receiving immigrants from the current crisis, with the anti-immigration National Front doing so well in the polls, and countries in Eastern and Central Europe, which house very few asylum seekers, do not want to start opening their doors now.

Belatedly, in early May, 2015, European Council President Donald Tusk affirmed that Europe will step up efforts to address conflict and instability as key push factors of migration. Mr. Tusk added that the EU would co-ordinate the resettlement of more people to Europe on a voluntary basis and, in classic double speak, "with an option for emergency relocation". Meanwhile, in the unfolding tragedy, by 21 April the UN refugee agency UNHCR reported that so far in 2015 a total of 36,390 migrants had reached Italy, Greece and Malta by sea. It put the number of dead at 1,750 and missing at 1,776 – including those in the shipwreck on 19 April which claimed an estimated 800 lives.

Europe has thus remained consistent in adopting pragmatic and convenient policies toward Africa. The interest of the West in the Libyan conflict, as with other conflicts in the Third World, was not motivated by the love of Libya or Africans. Their engagements ultimately are only to advance their strategic goals, notwithstanding the potential destructive consequences for the states and societies at the receiving end of this poisonous tough love. In the case of Libya, Europe, pursuing a single minded policy of regime change no matter what the aftermath of this intervention, brushed aside the far-sighted advice of key African states and statespersons to work toward a negotiated resolution of the crisis. A negotiated resolution of the Libyan conflict, as consistently advocated by major and insightful African stakeholders, would have reduced the prospects in the post Gaddafi era of the various nightmares that now confront Africa in the devastating destabilisation of the Sahel and the instability in Libya and its Mediterranean coast. The rise of Islamic militancy in the Sahel is another direct outcome of the disastrous western interventions in Libya.

Vivienne Walt<sup>12</sup> affirms that the

disputed details over what happened the day Muammar Gaddafi was executed still fuels the explosive violence in Libya pitting the vengeful remnants of Gaddafi's loyalists against the patchwork of militias who overthrew Gaddafi. The inability of the numerous Libyan warlords facilitated to power by the West to coerce or negotiate the country back to normal statehood has given rise to criminal gangs who have appropriated power in the various regions of the distressed country. The spike in illegal immigration as far as Africa is concerned is a direct result of the abandonment of the broken humpty dumpty Libya to its own devices by the European powers that were so enthusiastically engaged on the side of the rebels. The lesson is the need for Africa and the African Union to strengthen their capacity to leverage the political clout of the continent to ensure a hegemonic influence on African affairs. In a perverse way, Europe in the immigration crisis from Africa is reaping a well-deserved self-induced evidently avoidable problem emanating directly from its reckless and tactless intervention in Libya against the advice of perceptive Africa. ■

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# Development Aid, Does it help or hinder?



Overall, in 2012, the African continent received about US\$61.1 billion in ODA and US\$42.2 billion in CPA. About two-thirds of this was direct bilateral assistance. This volume of CPA amounted to around 2.2% of gross African national income (GNI) in 2012.

By Peter Lawrence and Michael Prior

The problem with anything written about development aid particularly when it comes from hardened participants in its various guises is that it can descend into a series of anecdotes, each capping the last. (Uganda's rabbit multiplication project? That's nothing, remember the Bangladeshi paper mill...). Alternatively, it can rise into a cloud of generalised statements which only reinforce existing prejudices. In part this problem arises from the sheer diversity of the actions called development aid. In what frame is it possible to bring together, for example, the loan by the World Bank in 2010 to the South African power utility, Eskom, of around US\$3.75 billion as part of a \$10 billion project to build 4800 MW of coal-fired capacity, with the US\$0.3 million spent by the Swedish International Development Agency between 2012-14 in Mozambique supporting a programme to improve institutional capability in areas such as gender-based violence? Let us start with some statistics.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, an international grouping of 34 developed countries, defines official development assistance (ODA) as spending which has the "economic development and welfare of developing countries" as its primary objective. This can include some spending on refugees and students in donor countries, activities to build public support there for overseas development and the costs of administering aid programmes and debt relief, even though no new funds find their way to recipient countries. Approaching 20% of OECD aid is spent this way and the proportion can be much higher in the case of some EU countries.<sup>1</sup> Much ODA is not a gift but a concessional loan, that is one below current market rates, and including a grant element of 25%. There has been some debate as to whether loan or grant aid is preferable. Current consensus, at least within the main agencies, is that concessional loans are to be preferred, repeating the view noted above that loans incentivise "policymakers to use funds wisely and to mobilize taxes or, at least, to maintain current levels of revenue collection. In contrast, grants are viewed as free resources and




Fig.1: Official Development Aid and Country Programme Aid as a proportion of national income in African countries

could therefore substitute for domestic revenues".<sup>2</sup>

However, in the past, excessive loans could not be repaid and led to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, between 2000 and 2012 which resulted in 35 countries having some \$130 billion in pre-2003 debt written off. A recent paper by the Jubilee Debt Campaign argues that because of the very real risk of new debt crises being created in the developing world, urgent measures are needed to make lending more responsible and to create fair and transparent ways of dealing with debt crises if they do arise.<sup>3</sup>

ODA in 2013 by OECD countries amounted to \$134.5 billion, about 0.3% of their Gross National Income, a 5.9% rise on the previous year but well below the 0.7% target recommended by the Pearson Commission in 1971. War-ravaged Afghanistan received by far the largest amount at just

over \$5 billion. Direct bilateral aid only accounts for about 70% of disbursement by OECD countries. The other 30% is filtered through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank group or used inside the donor countries thus obscuring the overall regional and country income. However it is significant that over 36% of allocated aid goes to what are classified as 'middle-income' countries, whilst just 32% is distributed to low income states. The top five recipient countries are all Asian (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Vietnam, India and Indonesia) whilst Kenya, Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire and Ethiopia in that order are the next most important with Kenya receiving \$2 billion and Ethiopia nearly \$1.9 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa is the largest region receiving aid, with 26.9% of the total, south and central Asia receiving 16.9%.

The DAC has made some effort to strip out those elements of ODA which are not passed directly on to recipient

states: debt relief, humanitarian aid, in-donor costs, aid through NGOs, and spending that is not allocated to specific countries. It calls this 'country programmable aid' (CPA) reducing the total of \$134 billion noted above to only US\$56.9 billion. Significantly, Africa as a whole receives only 38% of this CPA, amounting to \$21.7 billion, whilst Asia receives nearly 45.6%, reflecting both the huge volume of 'aid' pumped directly into Afghanistan, largely by the USA, and African countries as the largest recipients of debt relief, the latter allowing for a subtle form of double-counting: aid one year in the form of concessionary loans and aid a few years later when the same debt is written off. As well as Afghanistan, six other Asian countries also rank in the top ten recipients of CPA: the proportion of CPA directed to middle-income countries was 53% against 41% or US\$23.4 billion, going to low-income states.

### ODA/GNI against GNI/capita




Fig 2: Official Development Aid as a proportion of Gross National Income in poorer African countries

Overall, in 2012, the African continent received about US\$61.1 billion in ODA and US\$42.2 billion in CPA. About two-thirds of this was direct bilateral assistance. This volume of CPA amounted to around 2.2% of gross African national income (GNI) in 2012. It is interesting that the volume

Official Development Assisted	38.2%
Personal remittances	24.1%
Foreign Direct Investment	13.2%
Other Securities	12.3%

Fig 3: Sources of external resources into Africa: 2013

of CPA received by Asian countries that year was roughly equal to that of Africa at US\$39.9 billion but only formed 0.3% of the latter's GNI.

The impact relative to national income does vary as can be seen in Fig. 1. For example, Malawi is recorded as receiving US\$1.2 billion of ODA in 2012 amounting to 28% of GNI whilst Liberia received aid amounting to 36% of its GNI. However, these

are exceptional countries; the normal proportion of GNI for most lower-income African countries is below 10%. Fig 2 shows the proportion of ODA to poorer African countries plotted against GNI/capita. (Countries with a GNI/capita greater than \$2500 have been omitted). It shows that, although the very poorest receive a slightly higher proportion of ODA, overall there is no obvious relationship. Overall, ODA forms a very important component of external resource flows into Africa, as shown in Fig. 3, amounting to 38%, with remittances accounting for 24% and comfortably exceeding direct investment at 13%.

Finally, the role of China in aid to Africa has been much debated in recent years. China does not provide any figures to the DAC on its overseas aid programme though it has recently started to provide some of its own statistics. These do not always conform to the definitions of the DAC and so comparable numbers are hard to find. One detailed study<sup>4</sup> suggested that, in 2009, Chinese disbursement in Africa (the DAC measure) amounted to about US\$1.4 billion. The DAC itself

estimates that, worldwide, in 2013, China disbursed bilaterally or through multilateral agencies US\$5.9 billion. Therefore, Chinese direct aid amounted to less than 4% of total OECD direct aid, though the Chinese efforts may be targeted at fewer countries. China has recently been instrumental in setting up the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank which some have seen as a rival to the World Bank and associated institutions and which may offer loans on a concessional basis.

#### The Debate on Foreign Aid: Is it necessary and does it work?

Development aid has always had vocal critics both on the right and the left. From the very beginning in 1971, on the free-market right, Bauer argued that aid was 'plain charity' and really had nothing to do with development.<sup>5</sup> Countries that needed capital because of low savings potential should borrow on capital markets, ensuring loans were productive and repayable. Governments could borrow to build roads or railways or other parts of social and economic infrastructure and repay from the additional tax

revenue following increased economic activity. Even aid for ‘the relief of need’ is rejected as the definition of ‘need’ differs between underdeveloped and developed countries, and could be the consequence of poor decisions by the recipient governments – excessive military spending for example. Aid often served geopolitical purposes but he argued that these might be better served by a ‘military presence in the recipient country’. For Bauer, there are really no circumstances under which aid is justified. Modelling foreign aid on the post-second world war Marshall Plan was an error: this was aid to ‘restore’ ravaged economies, not to develop them.

From the left aid was seen as a neo-colonial project (especially where it was tied to the purchase of inputs from donor country firms) and unnecessary as the quantity of foreign resources that needed to be mobilised could be effected by a reduction in import consumption by the domestic higher income groups thus releasing foreign exchange for importing the equipment necessary to industrialise. Aid’s geopolitical role was powerfully critiqued by Teresa Hayter, whose study<sup>6</sup> of World Bank and other international institutions’ aid to Latin America argued that it was used by these agencies, and the capitalist countries that controlled them, to influence recipient government policies in such a way as to maintain the interests of capitalism and prevent the further spread of communist regimes. Not for nothing at that time was the largest chunk of aid going to South Vietnam. ‘Leverage’, the use of the power to lend to force recipients to pursue specific policies, became better known in the 1980s as ‘conditionality’ and was very publicly written into loan agreements part of ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, the implementation of which was a condition for both development aid and balance of payments support from the World Bank and the IMF respectively.

In between these two views were those who believed aid could be effective, as had been demonstrated in the case of countries that had received large amounts of aid allowing sustained

growth and eventually requiring no aid.<sup>7</sup> The case for development aid was reinforced over two decades by the Commissions headed by Pearson (1969)<sup>8</sup>, Brandt (1981)<sup>9</sup>, and Brundtland (1987)<sup>10</sup> on the basis of mutual interests of developed and developing countries. Pearson addressed the ‘widening gap’ between them: ‘the central issue of our time’, and the growing disenchantment with aid, especially the mistrust as to donors’ motives and recipients’ ability to use aid productively. Aid augmented scarce domestic resources for investment, was necessary, and needed to be substantially increased. The Commission famously recommended that the volume of aid should be raised from the then average of 0.39% of developed country GDP to 0.7% by 1975 and no later than 1980. This target has yet to be reached by

“The important thing was to discover why it worked in some cases and not in others rather than to make blanket statements about aid in general.”

most industrialised countries.

These arguments continued throughout the 1970s but the pro-aid lobby prevailed. Donor country governments expanded their efforts, NGOs expanded and proliferated, and the international institutions became more active and powerful. Debates continued, and studies appeared defending aid,<sup>11</sup> or directly asking whether it worked and if it didn’t, how it could be made to work.<sup>12</sup> The general view was that although there were problems and bad decisions, aid did more good than harm and that the important thing was to discover why it worked in some cases and not in others rather than to make blanket statements about aid in general.

However, critiques of aid also continued. Easterly<sup>13</sup> argued that aid in the form of typically grandiose plans

and projects had done little good and a lot of harm though specific kinds of aid did work. The problem was western intervention, whether from the World Bank, Live Aid, the Gates Foundation and other grand efforts to ‘make poverty history’, or military intervention that has sought regime change. He distinguishes between Planners, who advocate aid and have development plans to make use of it, and Searchers who find and take opportunities in markets. Planners have ‘good intentions, but don’t motivate anyone to carry them out’: for example, after all those billions of aid dollars, neither ‘12 cent medicines’ nor ‘four dollar mosquito nets’ have been provided to the poor to combat malaria. Searchers on the other hand, find out about markets and what is likely to be in demand at affordable prices and produce accordingly: JK Rowling, ‘a single mother on welfare without a plan or an International Financing Facility’, took the chance to write the Harry Potter series which made her fortune.

Aid agencies have failed to deliver their big targets, as with the Millennium Development Goals. The aid that does work is from Searchers: the agency that got bed nets to those with an incentive to use them – pregnant mothers at antenatal clinics, thus reaching the main risk groups for malaria, pregnant mothers and children under five. Costing 50 cents each with the nurse getting nine cents for each net, an incentive to ensure the nets are always in stock. They are also sold to better off Malawians at five dollars each, thus subsidising the cheaper nets for the poor. According to Easterly, this is aid that works in comparison to handing out free nets to everyone when only a small proportion get used. In effect foreign aid that doesn’t use market mechanisms will not work well and will be wasted.

More recently, the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo published *Dead Aid*.<sup>14</sup> A graduate of Oxford and Harvard universities, a World Bank consultant and former employee of Goldman Sachs, she dedicates her book to Bauer and follows much of his reasoning. Aid is always a market distortion, causing a vicious circle of low growth, persistent poverty, corruption,

low savings, and low investment back to low growth, prevents the spread of entrepreneurship, causes civil wars (often about competition among different ethnic groups for food aid). Inflows of aid overvalue exchange rates encouraging imports and reducing incentives to export. Countries which have received aid and done well have done so because aid was very small.

As to why donors continue aid if it is so ineffective, Moyo argues that apart from the political, economic and moral considerations, the livelihoods of thousands of people employed by the donor agencies and development ministries depend on the dispensing of aid, and by implication, the perpetuation of the dependency relationship with the donors.

Moyo's solutions involve African countries establishing stock markets, using bond markets to raise investment funds, spreading the risk to investors by seeking loans collectively through for example, the Pan-Africa Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF), encouraging micro-finance for small agricultural and industrial producers, reducing the transfer costs of remittances, encouraging Foreign Direct Investment, and fostering trade both with developed countries and within Africa. As with the Asian emerging economies, once countries show they are open to business and mean business, their credit scores rise and they can get loans cheaper than before. This is easier to achieve if a country is resource rich, but it is also possible in cases where countries are resource poor, especially if they can pool risk through collective borrowing. As for investment and trade, relations with China are leading the way in infrastructural development, manufacturing investment and commodity trade: China exchanges what Africa can offer with what it can offer Africa.

The issue with all these critics, both from the left and the right, is that they all proceed, ideologically, from idealised worlds, either ones free of capitalism or with some form of free market which are then warped by the intrusion of aid. None, and this is particularly true of Moyo, can cope with the hard facts of reality; that idealised free markets

“The important thing was to discover why it worked in some cases and not in others rather than to make blanket statements about aid in general.”

are just an imaginary construct of economics textbooks. Aid for better or worse has to find its way through the maze of the real world.

Finally, there is an account of aid<sup>15</sup> arguing both sides in the context of Tanzania's economic history. On the one hand, in spite of pursuing socialist policies that did not work, Tanzania continued to receive large amounts of aid from donors to support those very policies: 'toxic aid' that impoverished the country by encouraging 'misguided policies, blunders, [and] growing corruption' and heavily outweighed the benefits from 'socially worthwhile projects', mainly in education and health. In this story, it was only when the donors reversed policy from 'toxic aid' to the 'tough love' of conditionality, that eventually Tanzania reformed, achieved growth rates among the highest in Africa and aid began to work. This view places the responsibility on donors to exert

“As for investment and trade, relations with China are leading the way in infrastructural development, manufacturing investment and commodity trade: China exchanges what Africa can offer with what it can offer Africa.”

leverage on recipients so that aid can be effective with the 'right' domestic policies which are 'owned' by the recipients. This continues to be the strategy of the donors, led by the World Bank, to whose record we now turn.

### The World Bank

The 30% of OECD aid, or \$39 billion annually, that is provided to multilateral agencies plus funds supplied for 'earmarked' projects puts the share of multilateral agencies in gross ODA at around 40%. There are over 200 of these agencies according to the DAC, mostly under the UN umbrella, the most important single agencies being the World Bank Group, the European Union, the UN and, to a lesser extent, the two largest regional development banks of Africa and Asia. The largest of these is the UN group though as a single, multilateral agency the EU leads providing around \$12.5 billion in core funding. (Including earmarked funds, the World Bank Group comes top).<sup>16</sup> In Africa, the EU is comfortably ahead providing 14% of the \$51 billion net disbursement against the 9% provided by its International Development Agency (IDA) wing.<sup>17</sup>

However, in terms of influence, the World Bank is the dominant force in all aspects of development aid. As Sender argues in his critical appraisal of the role of the Bank in Africa, it "together with the IMF, has achieved a great deal of influence on the disbursements made by bilateral and multilateral donors; it has often been the case that non-Washington donors will not disburse aid to a sub-Saharan African country until that country has signed agreements with the Bank and the IMF."<sup>18</sup> Hence the World Bank is the main focus for left-wing critiques of ODA because of its espousal of free-market economic policies.

The Bank has developed into something of a hydra-headed monster with five distinct parts; the IDA, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which together constitute the World Bank as such. Add to this the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment

Disputes (ICSID), all of which have been set up to assist the private sector in developing countries: none meet the DAC criteria for development aid. Neither does the IBRD, as its role in Africa is extremely limited with new loans to sub-Saharan Africa of just \$42 million from a world-wide total of \$15.2 billion in 2013. The IDA is financed largely by donor contributions through loan repayments and a small volume of transfers from the IBRD.

All ODA is political, an intervention by one sovereign state or quasi-sovereign agency in the affairs of another. However, the political role of the World Bank is often rather larger than that of most other development agencies. Set up as the IBRD at the Bretton Woods conference in 1946 as the IMF's partner to aid reconstruction in Europe, its first loan was to France in 1947. It provided \$250 million, the biggest in real terms ever granted, on condition that the loan received primacy in repayment over all other external debts and that Communist ministers in the then government be dismissed. This condition came via the US State Department whose views on other countries have remained crucial to World Bank approval.

Thus after the Egyptian government agreed to Soviet finance for the Aswan Dam project in 1956, Bank loans ceased until 1974. Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s and Iran after 1979 were also frozen out of Bank largesse. In 2000, one of us worked on a Bank project analysing ways to export gas from Turkmenistan to Europe. The obvious route was through Iran to whom Turkmenistan already exported gas. However, even a visit to the country was rejected although Iran was a member of the Bank, apparently in good standing. A further example of US influence on the Bank is that Cuba is not a member and has never received any project aid.

Explicit embargoes on countries in line with US foreign policy was a blunt instrument and relatively rarely used in the years when the Bank's main activity consisted mostly of loans for infrastructure projects. However, in the 1980s there developed an emphasis on wider development projects and a greater level of conditionality associated

with loans, increasingly based upon the neo-liberal economics then coming into favour under Reagan and which crystallised in the form of the so-called 'Washington consensus' associated with policies of opening up markets, free movement of capital, privatisation and 'rolling back' the state. It is rather ironic that the vehement criticism from the right, outlined earlier, largely reduces to claims, noted above, that ODA is inimical to just these aims. Though there has been some shift from its most ideological period in the 1990s into this century, partly following sustained criticism from former Bank Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz, and others of similar eminence and partly because such policies, particularly in Africa, have not had positive results in promoting economic growth, the Washington Consensus still govern the broad outlines of the Bank's work. One significant moment in this shift was the Asian financial crisis of 1997 in which the IMF's role was subsequently sharply criticised and in which countries, especially Malaysia, which refused IMF conditionality, suffered rather less than those which accepted.

The World Bank is more than a lender. In Sender's words, *the Bank has established a hegemonic position as the dominant source of economic and policy analysis for sub-Saharan Africa... Most donors to, and governments in, sub-Saharan Africa must rely on economic and other statistical data collated, processed or collected by the Bank in formulating development policy.*<sup>19</sup> The scale of the Bank's efforts in the area of research and analysis is vast and impossible to summarise. To

take random examples: under 'M' in the country index, one can find 119 publications on Malawi and 55 under Mali whilst under 'S' there are 102 for Senegal, 67 for Sierra Leone and 13 for Sao Tome and Principe. This array of research reports are additional to the regular statistical bulletins used widely as authoritative sources of both macroeconomic and micro data, often unobtainable from the statistical agencies in individual countries.

The quality of this research varies widely from excellent through to bad and just invented. This may not matter much, one way or another, as most users learn discretion. What matters is that this huge volume of information (knowledge services in Bank-speak), creates the impression of an institution whose opinions on country or regional policy have to be accepted as the best there is. Such efforts do not come cheap. Administrative costs of the Group come to about \$3.6 billion including a rather astonishing \$339 million spent on travel in 2013.

Although not directly responsible for ODA, the International Finance Corporation is the part of the World Bank Group that directly finances private sector bodies in developing countries. Created in 1956, the IFC remained dependent upon World Bank funding until 1984 when it achieved financial and legal independence, raising funds through bond issues. Now with a global portfolio of somewhat above \$50 billion, about 15% of which is in sub-Saharan Africa, it invested \$4.7 billion in the region in 2013. In 2000, just 13% of the group's total spending was allocated to the IFC, but by 2013



Katse dam in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

that figure had soared to 35%. The IFC has grown so rapidly that it now forms half of the World Bank Group.

The IFC recently came in for severe criticism from a group of NGOs led by Oxfam:

*The private sector arm of the WBG, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) invested \$36bn in financial intermediaries, which include commercial banks, private equity and hedge funds, in the four years leading up to June 2013. .... investment in the financial sector outstrips WBG lending to important social sectors: totalling 50 percent more than direct lending to health, and three times the amount the WBG lent directly to education in the same period. Meanwhile, criticisms about this model of financing and the human and environmental costs it entails have grown.*

The report provides several examples which demonstrate that

*IFC lending through financial intermediaries has in numerous cases had significant and long-term detrimental impact on already vulnerable communities. At the core, the concerns of affected communities and civil society go beyond just technical fixes, and relate to fundamental questions about the development impact rationale for the IFC's investments in financial intermediaries."*

Natalie Bugalski, legal director of Inclusive Development International and a co-author of the report, recently said: *IFC's lending to third parties is now so huge, its portfolio so shrouded in darkness and riddled with abuse, that it needs to completely overhaul this lending model.*<sup>20</sup>

This criticism could be applied to the entire World Bank Group though the complaints against the IFC are particularly shocking. Sometimes criticism is misplaced. Along with other agencies, the Bank certainly lends to large projects, in particular dams and hydrocarbon pipelines, which damage the environment and may cause social problems.

Two African projects which have been particularly criticised in this respect are the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Chad-Cameroon

Oil Pipeline. Just Phases 1A/B of the former cost around US\$3.5 billion whilst the latter cost some US\$3.7 billion; both required substantial resources from a number of agencies including the World Bank; and in both cases, it seems that significant numbers of local people displaced by development have received little direct benefit. It should be borne in mind, however, that such complaints are nearly always levelled against such projects throughout the world in both rich as well as poor countries and the final decision on them lies with sovereign governments and not financing institutions.

The Lesotho project saw a number of corruption cases before the Lesotho courts and there is no doubt that similar problems arise in countries with less open judiciaries. However financial transactions of many kinds and involving many regimes are

“I see that you have come from Washington with your mouth, Monsieur, but have left your ears behind”


accompanied by corruption, such as Middle East arms sales. The Bank along with other agencies are clearly faced with an acute dilemma. Should they assist projects which will help the poor in a particular country or should they draw back, knowing that however tight the financial control, some of the funds will be diverted into private government pockets?

In the end, the central criticism of the World Bank is that it is too big, has too many functions and has taken over a role both as a dominant 'information bank' as well as a financial bank. Few countries, particularly in Africa, are able to stand up to the Bank and its neo-liberal free-market policies despite overwhelming evidence that they do not aid development. The most conspicuous examples of successful development in Asia are precisely the ones which did not follow the Washington rules. Perhaps

the most succinct commentary against Bank policies came when one of us was part of a World Bank mission to China and attended a small meeting between the French head of the Bank's power division and a senior official in the Chinese energy ministry. After a long introduction from the Bank representative, there was a long silence and the official briefly responded in Chinese. Amidst smothered embarrassed giggles from his staff, the translation came: "I see that you have come from Washington with your mouth, Monsieur, but have left your ears behind". There is indeed still much listening and learning to be done by donors and recipients if aid is to be more successful than it has been. ■

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POLO



# South Africa's Foreign Policy for Sale?

National interest considerations should be there, and need to be recognised upfront. But this should be squared with important values and principles which the ruling party holds dear.

By Chris Landsberg and Richard Smith

Over the past few years we have been concerned about the stock response, both from inside and outside government, to some aspects of the articulated International Relations agenda of South Africa, which is premised on a new utilitarian, crude economic driven response. Some critics go so far as to paint our involvement on the continent as purely part of a sub-imperialist agenda. Both domestically and abroad,

it has been said that South Africa is pursuing a narrow national interest-driven foreign policy. And because of this quest to promote the narrow national interest, decision-makers have made it easy for elements of South African capital, including champions of BEE, to take advantage of the access to opportunities provided by the role South Africa has been playing on the continent. In this aspect, foreign policy has become a tool for elite and

sectarian rather than national and continental interests.

While it has not necessarily been the intention of the South African International Relations department to function solely as a provider of such self-interested opportunities, elites close to the ruling class and others see foreign policy as an instrument to advance their narrow business interests, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African

Republic (CAR) and other countries.

Narrow self-interest is now thinly disguised as “the national interest”. The President and the Minister of Trade and Industry have vowed that “South Africa is open for business...in a big way”. The unintended consequence of the “Open for business” strategy is that our international relations agenda is based on propping up business opportunities at the expense of the citizens in the countries on which it focuses.

To be sure, a twenty year assessment would suggest that there is more to South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy than crude utilitarian, self-interest drivers. We would support a school of thought that suggests that South Africa has made huge gains in relation to the ability of Africa to deal more effectively with the sources of violence and armed conflict that are at the core of poverty and underdevelopment. This must surely be the primary area of concern for all solidarity activists.

There have been many instances in which South Africa has pursued a foreign policy agenda that was fuelled on paper, and in many instances also in practice, by a notion of putting people at the centre, with a specific focus on Africa, on the need for solidarity, for acting multi-laterally, and for seeing peace, stability and security as the key pillars of its policy. South Africa has pushed hard for genuine partnerships with the outside world; not some old, and exploitative paternalism.

Successive ANC led administrations have put the national interest driven idea centre stage and argued for a cognitive shift in which foreign policy is seen as an opportunity, both for engagement and as providing entry points for leveraging the progressive implementation of what is clearly a value driven international relations agenda, at least on the policy level. They went further, to argue that their international agenda was responding well to the key drivers of conflict and under-development on the continent, so it must surely have some merit. There is a contradiction and tension here that government should be mindful of, and seek to reconcile. National interest considerations should be there, and need to be recognised

upfront. But this should be squared with important values and principles which the ruling party holds dear, and which have shaped its global standing for decades.

But is South Africa really as committed to conflict resolution, development, co-operation, governance and stability as it would have us believe? Without attempting to give a comprehensive analysis of all of the forms of conflict currently affecting the African continent, this outline seeks to point to areas where there is an apparent shift in the dynamics of conflict, out of which new forms of conflict and an escalation of tension appear to be emerging. This exacerbates existing areas of ongoing concern.

These shifting forms of conflict raise particular challenges for the regional and continental efforts to build an effective African Peace and

**“In some instances the systems that were designed to divide and rule have been adapted to be used in post-colonial contexts for the purposes of maintaining control.”**

Security Architecture (APSA) initiated by the African Union Commission. The gaps and challenges that have been identified in the responses to these forms of conflict have direct implications for the role of South Africa and other African states in finding a complementary set of strategies and inform the direction of the APSA.

The conflict triggers and the gaps and weaknesses of current approaches outlined here all occur within the context of a continent that is still caught up in an ongoing cycle of protracted social conflict. The mediated outcomes that have sought to bring an end to violence have often not been able to effectively contain the residual forms of tension that accompany political and economic periods of transition.

The effect of change processes on communities inevitably leads to volatile contexts in which local level disputes can quickly spiral into widespread forms of escalated tension and violence. External interventions and destabilising tactics used by external powers have served to render parts of the continent ungovernable in many instances.

Several contexts across Africa continue to be characterised by residual conflicts and tension connected to poorly managed transitional processes, including mismanaged demobilisation and integration programmes for combatants, ineffective reconciliation efforts, inappropriate inherited colonial borders and an insensitive handling of transitional justice issues. Interventions in Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Somalia and others have spread extremism and violence.

While South Africa has been a staunch proponent of mediated and negotiated solutions, the Republic’s foreign policy has not sufficiently recognised the fragility of state institutions and structures, and how central these are to understanding why so many mediated outcomes do not appear to be able to prevent communities and national contexts from slipping back into recurring cycles of violent crisis. Post-colonial states have for the most part been unable to transform weak, ineffective and partisan social, economic, political and judicial systems, inherited from a colonial era of domination. In some instances the systems that were designed to divide and rule have been adapted to be used in post-colonial contexts for the purposes of maintaining control.

With millions of people living in poverty on the continent, growing economic inequality appears to be exacerbated by unequal economic development and high levels of unemployment. The conditions are rife to make people, and youth in particular, vulnerable to external manipulation by stakeholders who benefit from the instability and the lawlessness that often accompanies periods of violence. The devastating effect of war and violence on the webs of social relationships that enable human agency compounds the complexity of this challenge. The impact of violence has also had specific

and different long-term debilitating effects on men, women and children.

Sections of the population are often manipulated by those who seek to take advantage of ethnic differences or to use polarised party political systems to deepen the differences between groups and mobilise people around destructive agendas. Interest groups use these strategies to shift forms of ownership and control or to destabilise the situation in order to take economic advantage.

Within these conditions Africa has also been affected by a rise in other forms of extremism, including those developed around religious, faith based or identity related agendas. In an increasingly polarised world African conflicts are also influenced by the use of large-scale military operations in response to acts of violence, and to the use of fear tactics and terror, which often deepen divisions and fan the flames of conflict.

Conditions are ripe in Africa for increasingly violent forms of conflict and a rise in extremism. This could become part of the strategy and tactics used by those who seek to undermine state institutions and structures. The increased militarisation of Africa and the growing military presence of the United States, through the Africa Command Structure AFRICOM, and direct military intervention by NATO allies in African conflicts, including France, Britain and other former colonial powers, is also a source of major concern that feeds into and fuels violent forms of conflict. The US now has a military presence in some 30 African states.

The accelerated scramble to control and exploit African mineral resources, under the banner of Africa as “the new frontier”, and the “new growth point, indeed the new playground”, has also raised the stakes for affected communities. Seldom accruing much benefit from the resource-related development that takes place, communities are also often vulnerable to being relocated or to having natural resources such as forests and water, which are essential to their forms of livelihood, polluted or destroyed.

The phenomenon of rents and rent seeking in relation to natural resource

exploitation, whereby related activities generate profits that are much higher than the minimum level of costs required to keep activities going, encourages the emergence of corrupt systems that undermine efforts to build stability. The mineral resource sector in particular creates the conditions for dysfunctional politics wherein instability becomes the self-serving paradigm of those who stand to gain economically from loose or non-existent regulatory mechanisms, and these exploiters include and involve both African and non-African external actors.

In addition, natural resources provide an obvious source of financing for rebel groups who become trapped in war economies, and South Africa’s new-found focus on “an open for business” paradigm in foreign policy could fuel this culture of exploitation for the gain of small pockets of elites. Many African states endowed

**“Seldom accruing much benefit from the resource-related development that takes place, communities are also often vulnerable to being relocated or to having natural resources such as forests and water, which are essential to their forms of livelihood, polluted or destroyed.”**

with an abundance of natural and other resources are turned into “war economies”, and instead of a positive asset, the possession of resources become a “curse”. This in turn is used by some to instigate and perpetuate cycles of violence and instability that use illicit resource accumulation to finance armed conflict. This encourages armed groups to secure access to and control over lucrative resource opportunities

that are made more lucrative under unstable conditions.

Shifts in power at the global geopolitical level, and in Africa, have also accelerated the externally-driven scramble for resources. As China and other BRICS countries begin to assert a more aggressive economic presence in Africa, the previous dominance of traditional colonial powers, including France, the United Kingdom and other member states of the European Union, has been challenged. The economic opportunities that accompany political influence and resource control and the incentive this provides to work outside of weak and ineffectual systems cannot be delinked from the forces driving instability, inter-state conflicts and undemocratic or unconstitutional changes in leadership at national and local levels.

Ownership transfers and the accumulation of large-scale land tracts as well as changes in land ownership systems are also a source of conflict and a contributing factor to the conflict landscape. The further economic and social marginalisation of vulnerable communities that often accompanies land transfers exacerbates the conditions for escalated tension. These forms of conflict are becoming increasingly prevalent.

The democratisation agenda, and the rapid introduction of polarising forms of multi-party politics into systems that are not prepared to manage the resulting tensions also raises levels of tension. The heightened politicisation of all spheres of government which accompanies polarised party politics is often compounded when the private sector is weak and the state dominates most forms of economic activity. Escalated tensions and conflicts related to economic control, as well as within the relationship between the state and organised labour, and within the relations between the state, the private sector and industry also appear to be on the rise.

Current electoral models, including those that encourage a winner-takes-all approach and those focused on power politics that build support around personalities and identity or ethnicity linked political parties often become flashpoints for violence.

State failure to effectively deliver on social services also creates the conditions for violent forms of conflict linked to the mobilisation of a frustrated and dissatisfied citizenry. While this is often the result of a lack of capacity within the state, it is also sometimes caused by a deliberate intention to marginalise the needs of specific groups of people. These conflicts are also connected to a lack of transparency over how and why decisions are made, and a breakdown or absence of inclusive and effective dialogue processes.

The resulting tensions and the forms of community organisation that emerge around these structural and systemic failures, and the frustration and anger that accompanies the dominant unequal development trajectories of most African countries, is an important emerging form of conflict that requires urgent attention. The relationship between the state and its citizens is central to this element. The combination of economic migration, prejudice against migrant communities, tight competition for scarce resources and inadequate service delivery systems provide a further example of a rising conflict trend that needs to be more holistically addressed.

A key focus then on building the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the African Peace and Security Architecture of the AUC Peace and Security Department would seem to be essential if, as a solidarity lens suggests, the conflicts across the continent affect not only those directly involved but all of us as Africans.

The role South Africa plays out at an international diplomatic level in Africa should be fuelled by 4 key areas:

- dialogue and quiet diplomacy;
- power sharing rather than a winner takes all system;
- an approach to justice that is restorative rather than retributive or vindictive; and
- building capable, developmental states in Africa.

These four areas would all appear to be useful strategic responses to the above analysis that would also fit well within a longer term conflict transformation agenda.

We are not convinced that a more

robust assertion of a Human Rights agenda and the adoption of a moral high ground would prove any more effective at trying to curtail rights abuses and the exploitative use of power by undemocratic leaders. While we would support a more outspoken and principled stance against the abuse of power where it does occur we think an international relations approach in favour of mediated solutions to conflict may be more effective in the longer term than the megaphone diplomacy and carrying the big stick that some are calling for. But this approach will presupposes that South Africa will continue to commit to peace and security and helping to end deadly conflicts.

**“Instability becomes the self-serving paradigm of those who stand to gain economically from loose or non-existent regulatory mechanisms, and these exploiters include and involve both African and non-African external actors.”**

A potentially powerful strategy, not only for South Africa but for the continent as a whole, would involve connecting the international relations policy drivers to the need for African unity and an integrated African economy. This would enable Africa to challenge and reform a global power structure that continues to marginalise African interests and to exploit the relative vulnerability of the continent, economically, politically and socially. Reform of the UN Security Council, and the building of South-South connections offers opportunities to challenge the historical global balance of power that has certainly not been very supportive of African interests to date.

Finally, while clearly the current global economic trajectory, into which South Africa fits, is designed to benefit a predatory elite and not the majority, it is unlikely that any international relations agenda would enable South Africa to opt out of this system any time soon and choose an alternative economic path. Building alternative forms of power, through a multi-lateral solidarity driven agenda, and strengthening international governance systems which could hold powers to account for their actions would appear to be a sound strategy for slowly shifting power. This could put in place the building blocks for propagating and driving alternative economic systems. These could be designed to achieve a major redistribution of the benefits currently accruing to only a few.


While socio-economic imperatives of foreign policy remain vital and should be supported and welcomed, there is a broader agenda of peace and security, governance and democratisation, development, and international co-operation that should continue to inform South Africa's foreign policy and diplomatic engagements. Civil society organisations and academic and research institutions should move away from a 'holier than thou' attitude, stop promoting the agendas of foreign governments and becoming more engaged as they interact with the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO), the Presidency and other agencies. They should strive to help to inform foreign policy without fearing co-option and loss of independence. They should think through how civic strategies might strengthen a more constructive agenda with short-term and long-term intentions.

As for government, it should guard against the dangers of pursuing elements of a narrow, self-interested, utilitarian foreign policy approach that is bent on serving the motives of small elites and adopt a more robust, thought-through approach.

The government's foreign policy should not be for sale to the highest bidder and for unethical contracts and deals. Values still have a vital role to play in our foreign policy. ■

**BEYOND THE VIRUS**

# Why did the Ebola outbreak spiral out of control?



Patients in the Ebola outbreak were left reliant on pharmaceutical industries favouring their own profit margins, local governments protecting their economic interests and UN mechanisms failing to respond to emergencies.

By Jens Pedersen and Jonathan Whittall

The deadliest outbreak of Ebola the world has ever seen occurred in 2014. The virus spread rapidly throughout Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, leaving more than 11,000 dead and causing countless more deaths by devastating already weak health care systems. Although highly contagious and deadly in its own right, the reasons for so much devastation can in part be found in the broader political and economic context. In analysing and unpacking the contributing factors to the outbreak, narrow debates confined to disease control and the realm of medical and epidemiological practitioners are insufficient. The

ongoing Ebola outbreak illustrates how an emphasis on security and profit framed both the conditions for the outbreak and the response to it.

There is no treatment available for such a deadly disease due to a global economic system that prioritises profit over public good. Nowhere is this more starkly evident than in the pharmaceutical industry. Ebola had never been considered a priority for big pharmaceutical companies, as it was perceived as affecting only a limited number of economically disadvantaged patients in short-lived and remote outbreaks in Africa. The research into finding a treatment

for Ebola was informed through the prism of Ebola posing security risks to the 'developed' world, and seldom considered a disease affecting patients in countries devastated by colonialism and conflict. The combination of profit-driven pharmaceutical companies and security-focused government research resulted in African Ebola patients being viewed as unprofitable and unworthy of sufficient investment.

It was similar neo-liberal economic models that arguably resulted in a weakening of health systems in the affected countries. The Ebola affected countries have all been part of International Monetary Fund programmes, which throughout past decades have favoured decreased public sector spending, user fees for health services, decentralised health care systems and a wage structure that makes it difficult to remunerate skilled medical professionals. This came after years of brutal conflict that had left health systems overstretched and unable to develop adequately. In the countries worst affected by Ebola, the existing health systems were already stretched, understaffed, and struggling to meet the basic needs of their people.

Based on the structural fragility of these health systems, one would assume that the international response at the outset of the outbreak would have matched the urgency that characterised the rapid spread of a virus without a cure. However, this was not the case.

Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) – alongside national health authorities – carried the bulk of the Ebola response. The organisation raised the alarm as early as March 2014, referring to the outbreak as unprecedented and calling for additional support. Nonetheless, in the early days of the outbreak response was marked by the governments of the region downplaying the outbreak and the World Health Organisation (WHO) disputing the seriousness of MSF's attempts to raise the alarm. In April, the WHO questioned whether the outbreak patterns were any different from previous outbreaks. And on 10 May, Guinean media reported the president of Guinea complaining that MSF was spreading panic in order to raise funds. In Sierra Leone, the

government instructed the WHO to report only laboratory-confirmed deaths in June, reducing the death toll count in the country by excluding probable and suspected cases. In some cases, responding was made even more difficult for MSF teams who were refused access to contact lists and had to start from scratch in investigating which villages were affected and where and how to respond. Faced with an explosion of Ebola cases in the summer, the Liberian authorities were transparent about the spread of cases, though few outside the country stepped forward to respond to their urgent requests for help.

The Ebola outbreak proved to be an exceptional event that exposed the reality of how inefficient and slow health and aid systems are to respond to emergencies. In practice, the World Health Organisation as an institution proved inefficient and ill-suited for action. In the initial stages of the outbreak, WHO leadership spent more time talking down the scale of the crisis, than actually reacting to the crisis. This was due to pressure from national governments in the affected countries, who were concerned about the economic implications of an outbreak, as well as due to internal politics and poor capacity within the organisation. It was through this approach that WHO became a critical component in what MSF has referred to as the 'global coalition of inaction.'

It was only when the first patients emerged in the US and Europe that the so called 'international community' took notice of the sheer scale of the crisis. Thousands of dead patients in West Africa were not enough to catalyse action – but a few patients crossing into the 'developed world' caused a mass mobilisation. Ebola became a risk to national security. Thus the approach to Ebola continued to be dictated by a security logic. It was abundantly clear that when it came to Ebola, 'black lives' did not matter enough for those with the capacity to respond.

Meanwhile in Liberia, MSF was facing a catastrophic situation. In spite of having established the biggest Ebola management centre in history and having deployed the full extent of the

organisation's emergency capacity, MSF was still turning away patients at the door of the hospital due to a lack of space. Patients were dying on the doorstep of the organisation's treatment centres. It was due to this catastrophic reality that MSF took the unusual decision to call for the deployment of the bio-security capacities that existed primarily in national armies. The need to make this call of last resort reflected both the overwhelming situation and the reality that prior investment and interest in Ebola had been limited to a security focused framework.

After having sought agreement with the heads of state of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, MSF called for field hospitals with isolation wards to be scaled up, trained personnel to be dispatched, mobile laboratories to be deployed to improve diagnostics, and air bridges established to move people and material to and within West Africa.

When the military from western countries finally deployed in October, the response was a disappointment. The majority of the military effort was limited to support, coordination and logistics for the efforts of international aid organisations and local authorities. The military focused on establishing treatment facilities for both national and international health workers – probably to avoid having to transfer foreign aid workers back to Europe and the US and risk infections. Although very much needed, the medical facilities built to treat local and foreign healthcare workers did not offer direct care to the wider community. The African Union played a positive role in responding to cases in the countries neighbouring the epicentre of the Ebola outbreak – but they did not have the capacity to swiftly deploy at the level required within the three most devastated countries. Once the response took some shape, and means were made available, the AU focused on mobilising human resources among its member states, resulting in a unique deployment of hundreds of African health care workers.


At the same time the UN, under increasing pressure, compensated for its own internal failings by creating a stand-alone structure to deal with

the outbreak. The establishment of a United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), was the first ever UN mission to be established as a response to an outbreak. However, as assistance and support was mobilised, the lack of coordination and leadership that remained even after the establishment of UNMEER meant that the measures put in place to stem the outbreak, remained inflexible and ill-adapted to the reality of an ever changing and dynamic situation.

Since the beginning of May 2015, after 42 days with no recorded cases of Ebola, Liberia was declared Ebola free. However, 200 Liberian health workers died from the virus and the health system has been decimated. In addition to this, the fight against Ebola is not yet over in Sierra Leone and Guinea.

International aid responses are slow and ill-adapted and the economic fallout of declaring emergencies for countries still struggling under the burden of debt often deters these governments from declaring an emergency or making an immediate call for outside help. The most vulnerable patients are therefore left relying on pharmaceutical industries favouring their own profit margins, local governments protecting their economic interests and UN mechanisms failing to respond to emergencies. In the case of the Ebola outbreak, this resulted in a situation whereby those with the willingness to respond were overstretched and those with the capacity to respond were too slow, owing to the considerations of their own self-interest.

To avoid this in the future it is necessary to remove response mechanisms from decision making processes that are reliant on economic interest and national security. Those committed to fighting future epidemics should commit to de-linking their responses from their own security interests. This commitment would be an acknowledgement of the specific context in which disease outbreaks occur and would ensure that patients are put before profit or national donor self-interest. Only then will we ensure the willingness to prevent a future outbreak of this kind. ■



# The Routes of the Thoughts and The Thoughts of the Routes

*“Culture is simultaneously the fruit and a determinant of a people’s history by the positive or negative influence it exerts on the evolution of relationships between (human beings) and their environment and (among human beings) within society as well as among different societies.” Amilcar Cabral*

By Mongane Wally Serote

Wherever there are AFRICANS there are underground routes. They began as routes away from home, and also, they are from somewhere to home. Because all human beings, whether white as clouds, or black as clouds of thunder, bear the instinct for survival. That we seek the routes which lead us home is not instinct only, it is the fact of our being an integral part of the universe, of nature. The need for identity, for all human beings, is the same as the need to eat and the need for belonging and the need to reproduce ourselves. These needs spin within cycles and systems of rebirth and regeneration, as if for eternity, as do all the processes of nature.

It was Arabs, Europeans, Americans and some African collaborators who created the routes and bases for the selection, capturing and consignment of human beings to the Slave Trade. It was Africans who created escape routes from Slavery from everywhere.

*Everywhere that the slave trade evolved into a significant commercial enterprise, it relied on a variety of institutions geared toward the accumulation of captives: coastal settlements where African brokers collected captives for sale to Europeans; and the shore based and floating factories (trade forts and coasting slave ships) where Europeans assembled purchased captives into human cargoes. Various sites of incarceration, therefore, became a regular feature of the African coastal landscape from the second half of the seventeenth century on.* Stephanie E. Smallwood *Saltwater Slavery*

It was either civil rights movements, some of which, working together with others, formed liberation movements throughout the length and breadth of the continent, or fledgling political parties created against the greatest odds, like that of Patrice Lumumba in the sixties in the Congo, or in other parts of the continent, as in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Zimbabwe and in South Africa, which created the underground routes.

These transported fighters, arms and messages which took the cultural, political, economic and social struggles

to the masses of countless countries, to fight against the imperialist, colonialist, neo-colonialist, apartheid and racist enclaves. In America, the African diaspora through the Civil Rights Movement, led by Martin Luther King, created the route to Washington DC.

The strategic objective of all these Movements, we dare not forget as Africans and also, we dare not let humanity forget, was to dislodge oppression, exploitation, violence, discrimination and injustice by all means necessary and therefore let emerge a culture which "is simultaneously the fruit and a determinant of a people's history... by the... positive influence it exerts on the evolution of relationships between human being and their environment... and within society."

The African landscape is traversed by two-way underground highways,

**“We must nurture a reference point among all human beings, which will declare, for all ears of the human race to hear, that a mighty, mighty crime was committed against African people.”**

which need to be walked again in the twenty-first century by Africans from wherever they are, to home and away from home, because a dialogue is desperately needed. We must nurture a reference point among all human beings, which will declare, for all ears of the human race to hear, that a mighty, mighty crime was committed against African people. This was called the Slave Trade, and neither the United Nations, nor any other nation has held any hearing to ask what really happened and what must really be done.

The question is really: what must Africans do? The history, the long, long history of African enslavement, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and racism is an issue for Africans, whether they are on

African soil or not.

It manifests itself spiritually, mentally, psychologically and physically now and in that long distant history, and into the future. The basic question some parts of the world consistently ask of us, in ever so many ways, is: you are not white: what do you want here? I can hear even now as I state this, being asked a question: what do you mean by that? That cannot and must not be the important question.

The history which defines why slavery had to be abolished, is most eloquently articulated by the bones which are deep in the Atlantic ocean, bones of Africans who were thrown in there either because they were sick or they revolted, or rather than be slaves, they threw themselves into the deep waters.

In Mauritius hundreds of men and women, old and young, including children, threw themselves from the top of the mountain, rather than be in the hands of the French or the British. Even now as I say this, many will still ask the question: but why did they do that?

Who must answer that question?

Mauritius has done so in Le Morne, at the foot of the mountain where Africans, rather than be slaves, jumped from the highest point of the mountain there, to fall crushed at its foot. There is a memorial there to the humanity of those who rather than be slaves, chose death. Their humanity has been reclaimed.

There are still many, many Africans, the world over, who perform that last ritual, however grim it is, to tear themselves away from the possibility of being slaves and embrace death. Not so long ago, in South Africa, in 1976, children in Soweto threw their lives against showers of bullets rather than be enslaved like their parents, by the apartheid system. "I did not know that..." another South African voice still says as I say this. The democratic Government in South Africa took the decision to remember, as Nelson Mandela stated: *The day should not be far off, when we have a people's shrine, a freedom park, where we shall honour with all the dignity they deserve, those who endured pain so we should experience the joy of freedom.*

That decision is one among many, many reclamations, which more and more Africans must express, engage and act upon. We have to rebirth ourselves, regenerate our being, and reawaken our consciousness to the fact that what we do, we do as human beings.

The whole world must know that, as Madiba said: *Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which all humanity will be proud.* Madiba was of course referring to the apartheid system, which humanity declared 'a crime against humanity'. It is not until all of humanity, all, accept, recognise and acknowledge that the Slave Trade, 'an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long' happened, and that it is necessary for the human race to get rid of this scourge from the universe, before any human being will know anything about Freedom.

If we are asked then, why are you waiting, why are you not doing something about it? We must reply: we are doing something about it. There are many museums, memorials, heritage sites, on the continent, all over the world – which have been created to speak to this 'extraordinary human disaster which lasted too long'. We must now do the audit of these sites and structures: where are they, what are they saying, are they communicating with those nations where they are, are they communicating with other human beings elsewhere and how more effective can we make that voice to reach all of humanity?

Let us do the audit, and let us join the dots between all of those sites and structures, then also do something else: let us create the routes, the two routes, the slave routes and the liberation routes across the world, where these sites are, where slaves built civilizations, not only with sweat, but with great pain and with blood. And then we must still do something else: once a year, we must walk the routes and visit the sites, us, Africans and ask our fellow human beings to join us. Let us link the slave routes to the liberation routes which the descendants of slaves throughout the world wherever they are can reclaim, and so regenerate, rebirth, recreate, reawaken and reconfirm our

being and our oneness with the human race.

Through these conscious actions we will rekindle that flame which everything had been done to extinguish. As human beings all of us, we must come to accept that there are many civilizations which in their multi expressions, confirm, and will forever reconfirm, that the human race in its variety and diversity, expresses the beauty of creation.

Fortunately, we have shrines, monuments, memorials, statues, graves and even tombstones, which are creations of human beings, from time immemorial, across continents, within all cultures. They emerge as symbols and footprints of the human race, almost to claim immortality, and to immortalise their hopes, wishes and intentions, but also as a means to

**“Human beings, generation after generation, will walk those routes; so that the memory of what happened when humanity founded slavery will never be erased from the annals of human history.”**

declare their story and history to those who will come after them.

A recent entry into the collective of shrines of the world, which reclaims and regenerates the African and human spirituality and being is in South Africa: The Freedom Park, which is situated in the capital of the country, Pretoria, in close proximity to the Voortrekker Monument, which is both a vow and a celebration of and by the Boers, for having defeated AmaZulu at "The Battle of Blood River". The Freedom Park stands on a hill, almost in the centre of the City, prominent for everyone to see, from whatever direction one approaches Pretoria. The Memorial has four main features: Isivivane, S'khumbuto, Wall of Names

and //Hapo.

The Park, as President Mbeki said at its launch, "is one of the most ambitious projects of the democratic dispensation." Before the soil, any stone, grass or tree was touched on that hill where it is built, broad, wide and deep consultations were conducted throughout the length and breadth of our country as the book: "Freedom Park: a place of emancipation", attests. Among many issues which were raised, some for and some against, the ones which were outstanding were those which called for unity, reconciliation, recognition of those who sacrificed for freedom and those who worked tirelessly to build our country. It is also as a result of these consultations that it was decided that the Voortrekker Monument, which is a symbol of a vow and a celebration of the defeat of AmaZulu at blood river, must remain standing, symbolising part of the history of our country. The main reason for the creation of the Freedom Park, was to transform South Africa into a liveable country all of whose people have quality of life.

The Freedom Park stands there today, on the hill, Salvokop, together with the Voortrekker monument, in a precinct speaking to the totality of South African history, both positive and negative. A tombstone which links the two parts of the precinct, states that 'guinea fowls always walk together because they eat together', which is a xiTsonga saying. The search for unity and reconciliation is also expressed on the Wall of Names, which bears the names of those who fought in the eight wars which tempered our nation: Pre-colonial, genocide, slavery, resistance, the South African war, the First and the Second World Wars and the Liberation Struggle.

The wall of names contains the names of 2001 Cuban combatants and internationalist who gave their lives to defend, protect and promote Angola's independence against the apartheid military machine and might. The inclusion of the names of the Cuban combatants is most significant. They fought in the Angolan war without any self-interest. This was a strong and unique statement against the Slave Trade, which was the foundation of

imperialism and racism, but also a forceful negation of imperialism itself. It must not be forgotten that millions of Angolans were captured and transported abroad to the Americas including Cuba.

Although the process for the emergence of the Park has been completed, there still remain many issues of history, culture and heritage, which must be engaged to bring closer, at all times, the unity of South Africans, our reconciliation, and the recognition of those who sacrificed for freedom and those who worked tirelessly to build our country.

The issue here is: what must be done to let a united South African Nation to emerge? Yet also history admonishes us not to seek superficial solutions for now, which in the future will threaten the very ideals we thought we had achieved.

The issues raised here imply that it is most important for the young people of our country to be armed with a deep understanding of the history of our country. They are the leaders of a future South Africa, which comes from a most complex history; all of us South Africans must, in the present and in the future, know that no one can be above our Constitution. So we have no choice but walk to the round table and talk about how to shape the future of our country.

In addition to the Wall of Names in Freedom Park there are three other important sites. Isivivane is a shrine which emerged from the processes and work around Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) which took nearly three years to complete.

The land is soaked in human blood of freedom fighters who fought and laid down their lives for the freedom of all South Africans; and there are many living people, who walk the streets of this land, carrying deep, and at times, un-healing wounds in their bodies and limbs, which were inflicted upon them by the apartheid system. All of that will be acknowledged, recognised, portrayed by this national symbol of freedom. Stakeholders, especially, the Faith Based Organisations, and the guardians and custodians of spirituality in our country, supported the concept of Cleansing, Healing and the Return

of Spirits of freedom fighters, from wherever they had fallen. A symbolic cleansing of the land and people was carried out throughout the country, and in some nearby countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, as well as the United States, and the spirits of the fallen freedom fighters were returned to South Africa.

Isivivane, as an IKS concept and project, is circular, is built of boulders, stone, soil and plants, most of which were brought from the provinces and countries where fighters fell. The architectural design of this element borrowed heavily from IKS concepts and was based on African Belief systems, concepts of spirituality and the harmony between human beings and their environment. It is a Msamo We Sizwe national shrine. It is the final resting place of Freedom Fighters.

S'khumbuto is linked to Isivivane

“Through these conscious actions we will rekindle that flame which everything had been done to extinguish.”

through the wall of names. Within the precinct of the wall, there are other elements like the Sanctuary, a space of rest and discussions which is a garden of remembrance. There is the Eternal Flame, to remind us that many people were murdered and we do not know all their names or burial places. There is the Gallery of Leaders, consisting of outstanding leaders who stood firm in defence of freedom, justice, peace and security in their countries and in the world. There is an amphitheatre for bigger cultural and political events, and there is Moshate, a place for discussions and negotiations to be held in tranquillity.

The fourth feature is //Hapo. There is a Khoisan saying that: a *dream is not a dream until it is a dream of a community*. //Hapo means a dream. This element was inspired by the Sanusi of South Africa, Credo Mutwa.

It is simulated as being built as if it were encircled by massive boulders. The boulders are made of copper, to remind the nation about the miners of our country and the most negative impact of the mining industry against African families, communities, culture, heritage and history. President Mbeki said, in his speech to launch the Freedom Park in 2002, on 16 June, which is youth Day in South Africa:

*Freedom Park should therefore make us walk the entire South African history. When we have done this, we should then appreciate our country, its people, their diversity and their determination to build a united nation with a common vision, aspirations and goals.*

This is a gentle nudge to both organic and conventional African intellectuals, to take history by the scruff of its neck and claim the humanity of Africans and of the human race. Honour those millions of human beings, men and women, young and old, children who were not only forcefully removed forever from their birth place, but also millions perished, as they tried to escape from being enslaved; as they were famished by hunger and the long journeys to where they did not know; as they rebelled against being enslaved; as they were murdered; as they were thrown into the oceans; as they perished in dungeons and the far-flung fields which they had to till.

They built empires through their sweat and blood, from which they earned nothing. They contributed to the building of countries which otherwise would have been some of the poorest in the world. But after they contributed they were dehumanised and despised. They turned the enslaving, imperial countries into power houses, contributing to their becoming so powerful that they conquered and colonised the countries of origin of the enslaved. Moreover other countries all over the world were pillaged with impunity. The natural resources of those countries further enriched and made the mother countries of colonisers into empires which have since dominated the entire world. This has resulted in a most cruel and vicious cycle of death and destruction, of theft and the impoverishment of nations and

continents.

That is one part of the history of our continent. The other part of the history of this most beautiful continent, is that its people, the Africans, are still alive and well; they are still the most valuable resource the continent can ever have; they have rebirthed themselves in the 21st Century to become the youngest continent in the world.

The first question Young Africans ask of elders is: what happened and why? The answer to those two questions is two tongued. It is two tongued because it must outline the key question of history: What is to be done? But also, it must be clearly understood, once and for all, what really happened. The other question which must be answered succinctly is, Why did things happen that way? In other words, where were the people when that happened and why did it happen in their presence, what did they do when it happened? How I wish Nkrumah, Nyerere, Cabral, Lumumba, Sankara, Machel, Modibo Keita, Tambo and Mandela could come back and answer those questions! But they are not here to answer. We have to answer those life and death questions ourselves.

What treasures might now be transported on these highways, on the slave and liberation routes by Africans to humanity? How must the African spirit, mind and body reveal itself as a consciousness of being African in the global village, in the past as slaves, in the present as freedom fighters in an endless search for freedom; and in the near future from the past and the present with gifts for humanity – for all to state as Martin Luther stated: “Free at last, free at last, God almighty, Free at last!”

This ‘freedom’ is, of course, “the determinant of the history” of nations, where Africans live, even in Cuba. I say even in Cuba, because there is a great hope that that almost permanent trauma of the Slave Trade may be made not permanent, if, besides the systems which are put in place to find the meaning of human rights and freedom for all Cubans, there will no longer be an embargo against that Island Nation, by the world power! The Cubans accept, unlike in many other areas, including the US, that Blacks who are

there arrived on slave ships, and that that history must be engaged. We must never ever forget that the Slave Trade, a human cruel irony, a violent paradox, left a legacy for the human race, which resists time.

The content of the networks of the underground of the slave routes, those highways from Africa to wherever; and the content of those underground networks of the liberation Movements on the continent and elsewhere in the world, must converge on the African continent to become the story of the human race once more, once more and forever.

This infrastructure of underground highway networks can be pregnant with both African and human consciousness, expression and actions, which must set the human spirit free. We must engage

**“ What must be done to mobilise the broadest participation of the masses on the continent, to oppose imperialism and neo-colonialism and to execute the renaissance of Africans in their diversity? ”**

the AU and the UN and say so. Let Africa prime the consciousness, expressions and acts of the reconstruction and redevelopment of the human soul, to set the spirit, the mind and the body of the human race free!

Can the human race accept that the protracted and deep processes which eventually express themselves as evidence which the eye cannot see, nor the ear can hear, which are embedded in the human spirit, heavy like lead, need the equal amount of effort, energy, time and experience, to taste, to smell, to touch, to see and to hear – so that that trauma of a life-time can be healed? The heavy laden spirit, human spirit, which absorbed the immeasurable trauma, and its memory

and its nightmare which built resistance against all that was made to cure it, can it be cured? What can cure it? If after that whole ordeal, is this the ordeal of the victim only or is it a human ordeal?

For centuries after that grave ‘crime against humanity’, besides having to prove that there is something called racism, but also that those who express it, and execute it, never knew and may never ever know that they do so? If the human race accepts this, takes this responsibility, what must follow then? If the human race, as it seems, is unable to engage this responsibility what then must happen? Why must this issue be put on the human agenda? As we speak now, what is human about the most wealthy West and the most poverty stricken Africa? Is this an issue of the 21st century? How must it be addressed, to be extricated from the words which describe it currently, to be made naked so that it must be known for what it is by how it articulates itself?

A declaration that it is a crime against humanity to practise slavery, could become, if we are not careful, a manner, not deliberate or conscious perhaps, but still, a manner to ghettoise the issue of slavery. Humanity, it could be assumed, has dealt with the issue once and for all, if the UN declares it to be a crime. How has humanity claimed the humanness of the millions who were dislodged, who were extricated, who were consciously dehumanised, who experienced, through their journey to being nothing, and actually being nothing, that they were nothing because whatever they were after being slaves, until death, was to fight with everything possible to be something? The answers to these questions can be found nowhere else but on the African continent. The answers are an African response to what is being human, if, still, in the 21st Century, to be human is to define oneself by not being African?

It is most possible that all the routes which were used to transport the millions of Africans from the myriad of villages, of Africa to all over the world can be marked. Africans collaborated in creating them. We must now identify them. Two millions of slaves captured from Angola, Gabon, the Congo, including Congo Brazzaville, which became the gateway to an eternal

human blank. Africans collaborated, created institutions to capture their peers and hand them over to slave masters. Those institutions are and must be indelible, in those four or five central African states. Besides creating the sites about us which must heal us and empower us to enter the world space, empowered because now we understand what Culture is. We must now as a continent, ask: what is an African discourse? Must there be an African discourse, must there be multiplicity in the human state? Must that multiplicity, in order not to be mere quantity be quality? What is it that defines the difference and what is that difference made of, what does it consist of, and how do we discern that so that that difference is void of fear within the human experience?

Horror was when some among us betrayed us and turned against us and turned us into human cargo, to be loaded on dungeons of ships, handed over into the hands of absolute strangers, with "our hands, legs, in short or long or both shackles," one after another, to journey to far flung places we had never heard of, left alone seen. We have never really returned to where we came from. How must we remember where we have been, how must we make indelible, as at The Slave Lodge in Cape Town, the routes, the places, the dungeons, the fields we tilled, the graves which embody the different deaths we died in the hands of the most cruel fellow human beings?

How many and where are those dungeons, fields, graves from where we were taken to where we were taken?

How must we link the dots to create the routes, which we must for ever travel, the routes to remind us, generation after generation together with others, our fellow human beings, so that we never ever forget what Madiba once said:

*Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world.*

*Let freedom reign.*

*The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement.*

While it is true that those routes will

seem as if they have scarred the different continents upon which the spirit of the slaves walked in their shackles, like the Wall of China, surely, human beings, generation after generation, will walk those routes; and those routes, again like the Wall of China will be seen even by passengers of spaceships, so that the memory of what happened when humanity founded slavery will never ever be erased from the annals of human history. Where are the designers, where the architects, where are constructors who will volunteer to tackle this noble act?

These routes must also be criss-crossed on the African Continent by the liberation routes. The Liberation Routes must also be constructed so that they can be walked, by Africans and by fellow human beings. These routes complement the slave escape routes,

**“Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world.”**

the maroon slave routes – they are routes of rebellion against other forms of slavery: imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and racism. Are the resources for this not the feet, legs, hips, shoulders and necks of Africans?

While all of these projects must be AU projects, they must be implemented through national, regional and continental processes and programmes. Is this not the challenge of challenges for institutions of higher learning of the continent, to volunteer to initiate the nurturing and the creation of the African discourse, through our understanding of culture, as Cabral has defined it, through African heritage and history, through the probing of indigenous knowledge systems, and the engagement of organic intellectuals?

We must also ask, given that there are a myriad of centres of higher education on the continent and wherever Africans are, how do we create African Centres of Higher Education? I do imply here that they are not there. Is there an African State and an African Government? Where, from where must an African discourse emerge? That discourse resides with the masses of the continent, the real fighters against colonialism, coups, killings of revolutionary leaders, the bearers of unenviable legacies of our continent, the unrelenting fight against neo-colonialism and imperialism. Can the conventional and the organic intellectuals of the continent partner, dialogue, find each other? Can African Governments spearhead these potentials? Can Governments, African Governments, facilitate this possibility, resource these possibilities? Is it not correct to say that all African states are in a developmental stage in terms of finding what is best for their people and learning how to listen to what the people say?

We must not romanticise the people. It is from among the people that collaborators who facilitated this most cruel betrayal of the human spirit emerged; what is the deep bottom reason of this occurrence? Is it greed, fear, envy, ambition, ignorance? The imperialists, and colonialists, including racists, have, throughout the world, used divide and rule tactics to conquer, subjugate, oppress and exploit the far flung countries which they regarded as sources of wealth for their own countries. For this to happen, their weapon has been to exploit tribal differences, language, cultural differences, as well as using fire power. What must be done to mobilise the broadest participation of the masses on the continent, to oppose imperialism and neo-colonialism and to execute the renaissance of Africans in their diversity to emancipate the African continent, contribute to the freedom of the African diaspora and be part of the human experience which sharply contradicts racism, oppression, the exploitation of other human beings and the protection of the ecosystem for the quality of human and other forms of life? ■

# Role of Intellectuals in Driving Social and Economic Change



What is needed in society is for there to be adequate diversity of intellectuals to play roles in transforming society in all its economic, social, technological and political dimensions.

By Tshilidzi Marwala

Intellectuals are broadly defined as thinkers in society. According to Wikipedia, “an intellectual is a person who engages in critical study, thought and reflection about the reality of society”. The term intellectual invokes other concepts such as cognitive intelligence, logic, thinking and rationality. The word intellectual implies active utilisation of one’s cognitive infrastructure to analyse a situation, to decide on the course of

action and to structure an argument. These are high level skills that will not be substituted by machines in the near future.

In his work on bounded rationality, Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon states that the utilisation of the intellect whether to make a rational decision or to analyse a complex situation is never fully rational. The reason why it is not fully rational is because the mind is not perfect and the information is neither

complete nor perfect. So all analyses and decisions that these intellectuals make are deformed one way or another and have limited implications. This is because all the advice, decisions, and analyses that these intellectuals give are bounded rationally. Recently the theory of flexibly bounded rationality which states that machines make better decisions, analyses and give better advice than human beings has been proposed; but this is beyond the scope of this paper (Marwala, 2014 and 2015).

There is a problem with the definition of intellect which tends to restrict it to the social domain. A poll by Foreign Policy on who are the leading thinkers produced only 2 scientists in the top 10, Richard Dawkins and Jared Diamond. The list was dominated by journalists and social scientists. This suggests that intellectualism has been appropriated by the social scientists, especially those social scientists that have close proximity to the mass media. Is this the correct reflection of the state of affairs on who are the leading intellectuals especially in the light of the role technology has played in transforming social and economic change in the last 200 years?

Why is Tim Beners-Lee the discoverer of the internet not in the top 10? (Beners-Lee, 2014) Who has transformed society more for the better: Tim Beners-Lee or Noam Chomsky? Society is a broad term and has many dimensions including economic, social, scientific and technological dimensions and, therefore, intellectualism cannot just be restricted to one of these dimensions.

## A utilitarian perspective

There is a philosophical theory called utilitarianism which basically evaluates objects/ideas by their usefulness in society (Mill, 1998). Using this utilitarian frame of thinking, economists have come up with theories such as the theory of rational expectation which prescribes that a rational being acts to maximise his or her utility. Taking a utilitarian view then the usefulness of intellectuals is based on their ability to transform society. Their ideas must transform the greatest number of people for the greatest

amount of happiness. Using this utilitarian view, has Noam Chomsky transformed more people for the better than Tim Beners-Lee? Have the ideas of Noam Chomsky played a more pivotal role in resolving the contradictions in society than those of Tim Beners-Lee? The internet has liberated society, and has thus played a more pivotal role in resolving contradictions in society such as unequal access to information than Chomsky's generative grammar. Evaluating intellectual projects is a complex process. A utilitarian view is, however, limited and requires caution because we are unable to evaluate the usefulness of concepts into the infinite future of human existence with any degree of certainty.

### Transforming Society

How then do intellectuals transform society? And what is the meaning of the expression transforming society? Is there an end point as far as the project of transforming society is concerned? Again taking the utilitarian view, the trajectory that should guide the transformation of society is the maximisation of the total good in society and minimisation of the total bad in society. What is then this total good? Total good is all good things in society such as extended life expectancy, reduced disease burden, high economic activities and increased levels of happiness. What are then the total bad in society? These are all the bad things in society such as unemployment, inequality, violence, and high preventable death rates. Then the usefulness of intellectuals can be measured by the degree in which they play a role in minimising the total bad in society and/or maximising the total good in society. The question of minimisation and maximisation is a broad field and requires a separate conversation.

### Diversity

Now that we have defined what is to be done in society by intellectuals, it is important to reflect that intellectuals should be diverse in terms of knowledge, discipline and experience. The principle of the indivisibility of the sciences whether natural, life, social or physical is important but this should not mean that society should focus on one discipline at the expense of the other.

What is needed in society is for there to be adequate diversity of intellectuals to play roles in transforming society in all its economic, social, technological and political dimensions.

The African continent has produced its fair share of intellectuals in the social space. The annals of African history are full of role players in fields such as psychology (Fanon, 1961), history (Diop, 1974) and politics (Biko, 1986). It is not an accident of history that there has been an over-emphasis of the social sciences in matters of leadership and education. It was because of the nature of colonialism which was intended to make the colonies consumers and the colonisers the producers that the investment into the intellectual pursuit was limited to the social sciences at the expense of science and technology.

“The consequence of balkanising intellectualism to the social sciences resulted in former colonies not industrialising.”

Even in South Africa, there is no single historically disadvantaged university which offers a degree course in engineering.

The extent of this investment into knowledge systems that did not encourage production was such that even in cases where the colonised had the means and ways of producing they were forbidden to do so. The Salt Satyagraha (1930) was a protest in India led by Mahatma Gandhi against the British, primarily to stop the colonial relation of importing salt from Britain even though Indians were quite capable of manufacturing salt (Gandhi and Dalton, 1996). This strategy by colonisers to undermine or discourage building productive forces in the colonies resulted in education in the colonies being biased towards the humanities and social sciences often at the expense of science and technology. It was only after the independence of India that the Indian Institutes of Technology were created

by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The consequence of balkanising intellectualism to the social sciences resulted in former colonies not industrialising. This remains true of many of them until today.

### Lessons from China

It is only now that countries such as China have realised that a more scientific and technological educational base as well as leadership are needed to transform society economically, technologically and socially. In the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party led by Deng Xiaoping the party actively replaced the elite drawn from the revolutionary generation by a technocratic elite generation who were almost wholly trained in engineering and technology (Jungwon Yoon, 2007). This Deng Xiaoping called Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, which in the final analysis means a technologically infused technocratic China. This strategy has transformed the Chinese intellectual space to be biased towards science and technology.

In his book *The Governance of China*, President Xi Jinping states that “...the Third Industrial Revolution would be a Robot Revolution.....big data, cloud computing and 3D printing...driven by artificial intelligence” (Jinping, 2014). Clearly, Chinese intellectuals and leaders are not leaving anything to chance.

Do we as a continent have intellectuals who can meaningfully understand such vital emerging fields that will drive the economy in the 21st Century, such as big data, 3D printing, cloud computing? Can we claim to be intellectually robust if we have limited expertise in fields that are shaping the 21st Century? There is clearly a need for correction, to move intellectual investment from the social sciences to science and technology.

The African continent lacks critical skills in vital areas such as technological leadership. Of all the 25 universities in South Africa there are no more than three universities with formal qualifications in technology management and none in technological policy. As we reflect on the need to deal with the transformation of society we should not be blind to the scientific

ingredients that are necessary to transform society, and these ingredients are not just in the humanities and social sciences but are most importantly in technology and science.

**Industrialisation**

Why is it important for us to focus on science and technology? It is important because we urgently need to industrialise. There cannot be industrialisation unless there is a strong base in science and technology. It is only through industrialisation that we will be able to liberate the productive forces that are needed to mobilise sufficient capital to transform and resolve contradictions in society. There is an old dictum that states: "Seek ye economic freedom and all else shall follow". It is only when we have mobilised enough capital that we will be able to deal decisively with the problems of underdevelopment, gender discrimination, race inequality and class exploitation.

**What is to be done?**

The league tables of top universities indicate the dominance of science and technology intensive universities. According to the Times Higher Education rankings, the top universities in years 2014-2015 are: 1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 2. Harvard University 3. California Institute of Technology 4. Princeton University 5. University of Cambridge 6. Imperial College 7. University of Oxford 8. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) 9. University of California, Los Angeles 10. University of California, Berkeley. All these universities are in the top 15 in the world in science, engineering and technology. This is an indication of the dominance of science and technology in economic transformation and development and consequently in university rankings.

In South Africa the only universities that offer degrees in engineering are UCT, UKZN, Stellenbosch, Pretoria, UJ, NWU, Wits and to a limited extent NMMU. There are other universities that offer technology programmes but these do not lead to professional registration as professional engineers. Can we execute our industrial strategy

competitively without expanding our engineering training? Can we achieve this without involving previously disadvantaged universities? The answer to both these questions is a resounding no. The National Developmental Plan is silent on capacitating our previously disadvantaged institutions to offer engineering and expand their scientific offerings. This will not be achieved with an internally focused strategy and will require massive importation of skills.

How do we produce intellectuals that are skilled in new areas such as big data, 3d printing and other related areas? We need to create new qualifications and import skills that will teach these areas. Degree courses in areas such as big data and artificial intelligence which currently do not exist should be introduced in our

**“Do we as a continent have intellectuals who can meaningfully understand such vital emerging fields that will drive the economy in the 21st Century, such as big data, 3D printing, cloud computing?”**

institutions. The CSIR has introduced a Division of Digital Modelling and Meraka which deals with this matter and this expertise should be strongly linked to universities using mechanisms such as joint appointments and programmes.

To reconfigure the science, engineering and technology architecture will not only require people who are skilled at the technical level but also at the policy level. We need to introduce degree programmes in technology management, innovation and industrialisation. Again this will require the importation of skills.

This is the overriding factor which will determine if we can succeed in tackling these problems. There are new ways in which skills are imported through the cloud and not physically. This means we can have someone

teaching a course in Johannesburg while being physically in Beijing. This is what is now called Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) which were started at Stanford University and are expected to revolutionise teaching and learning. The University of Johannesburg is developing these with leading universities in Europe, USA and Brazil. This will require the Department of Higher Education and Training to set aside funding for universities to participate in such initiatives in order to enhance teaching and learning.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, we, as a continent, should invest in key areas that are defining the 21st Century and these are in science and technology. Moore’s law states that computer technology doubles every 10 years (Moore, 1965). We now know that it more than doubles and indeed society will in many ways follow Moore’s law and therefore change drastically as a result of rapid advances in technological innovation. What intellectuals need to do is to ensure that the pace of this technological change is constructive and not destructive. Can Africa afford to ignore technology, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, and robotics? The answer is absolutely not! ■

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# Making Regional Integration Supportive of Economic Development



A development-focused approach should be underpinned by expanded development assistance to help address supply capacity constraints in poor countries. This requires identifying needs, prioritising them and providing funds to address them.

By Kennedy K. Mbekeani

Regional integration has been the central vision of African leaders since the early years of independence. It is key for Africa to meet the competitiveness challenges of globalisation and to improve the welfare of its people. In the case of land-locked countries, integration with neighbouring countries can help reduce trade transactions costs and expand the effective size of markets — enhancing the potential attractiveness

for investment.

The gains from regional integration are much larger than the overall losses, but there are losers in the short run. In most cases, the immediate losers are low income countries that may not be able to immediately exploit the benefits of regional integration. And if not provided with the necessary adjustment support, the losers will not have the political domestic support to implement regional agreements.

The critical issue is how to design regional integration agreements so that they are supportive of development in low income countries. From a development perspective, the issue is not whether or not there are benefits, but how to maximise the potential payoffs by minimising potential negative dimensions. There is potential cause for concern in particular with regional integration agreements that involve offering partial access to large

markets for goods in exchange for acceptance of rules that may do little if anything to increase the flow of investment to low income country partners.

It is common knowledge that priority needs in many low income African countries are not related to trade policy but to infrastructure and social services. All these can contribute to an environment that can promote trade. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the fact that trade policy issues are secondary issues in most African countries (especially low income African countries). Consequently, regional integration, if it does not display immediate gains, may also not be a priority issue. How then can it be made a priority issue in most African countries? How can regional integration be made more supportive of development in low income African countries?

Greater attention should be focused on ensuring that regional integration is supportive of economic development especially in low income countries and is seen to be so by stakeholders (including local politicians). This is a vital element of enhancing the development relevance of regional integration. Market access and development 'friendly' regional integration agreements must be complemented by supply-side initiatives to address national trade capacity constraints and improve the investment climate in low income countries. This is arguably the most important dimension of strengthening the regional integration architecture.

The traditional motivation for reciprocal regional integration agreements driven by regional free trade agreements (FTAs) is mercantilist, although in some cases the objective has been deep integration of markets. More recently, a motivation underpinning the continuing expansion of FTAs is that this can help achieve economic development. This article explores what might be done in order to make regional integration agreements more effective instruments to support economic development. A basic premise is that if the objective shifts from market access to development, the modus operandi of

negotiating and implementing regional integration agreements and FTAs will have to change.

### Regional Integration Initiatives

The ability to exploit trade growth potential is a function of the competitiveness of domestic firms, which in turn is determined in part by the level of trade and transaction costs associated with moving goods and services across borders. What matters here is not just the absolute level of such costs but how they compare to 'competing' countries. Major reasons for this include problems on the supply side of the market, governance problems, and institutional weaknesses that inhibit local entrepreneurs

**“The immediate losers are low income countries that may not be able to immediately exploit the benefits of regional integration. And if not provided with the necessary adjustment support, the losers will not have the political domestic support to implement regional agreements.”**

from taking advantage of market opportunities in regional markets.

### *Impact of Regional Integration on Low Income Countries*

Even though the aggregate income and wealth of a nation may be expected to grow when trade distortions are reduced, not everyone will gain. Owners of previously protected inefficient firms will lose, as may their workers, especially if there are doubts regarding the creation of new employment opportunities. Social insurance and adjustment assistance mechanisms may not exist, or may be weak in most low income

African countries. These realities make complementary reforms to increase the likelihood of realising the benefits from trade reforms important.

**Government Revenue:** Another problem could be a failure to address the fiscal consequences of tariff revenue losses. These are far from inevitable, especially if non-tariff barriers are converted into tariffs, exemptions are reduced and collections improved, but they can pose a problem for low income countries in which trade taxes account for large proportions of total revenue. Time may be required to develop alternative sources of revenue. The option has been to introduce new taxes such as value added tax. This only reduces the welfare of the citizen while promoting entry of imports.

**Employment:** Lowering barriers to imports and foreign direct investment increases competition as foreign goods and foreign producers enter the domestic market. The magnitude of the effect tends to be much larger in low income countries, which lag behind the relatively more developed middle income countries in terms of technological sophistication, quality and variety of products and productivity.

While in the short term the loss of market share to foreign goods or firms may prevent local firms from reaping the benefits of scale and thus lower their productivity, in the medium term weaker firms will be forced to exit. Local firms that survive lose their market share to foreign entrants and are forced to spread their fixed costs over smaller production and thus experience an increase in their average cost.

Greater competition at the downstream level also affects suppliers of local companies. As regional multinationals are more likely to rely on imported inputs than domestic producers, an increase in their market share may result in lower demand for locally-produced intermediates and thus may hurt domestic producers in upstream sectors. However, given the right support, the exposure to international competition will force previously shielded local plants to improve their performance. Regional integration may also create new

domestic business opportunities. New foreign entrants as well as domestic firms may be interested in sourcing intermediate inputs locally.

**Technology:** The entry of foreign firms in a regional integration setup is expected to bring new technology. To the extent goods embody technology, such knowledge can be obtained through imports from technologically advanced countries. Open trade policies are critical for low income countries in attracting technology. But openness is not sufficient — there needs to be absorptive capacity and the ability to adapt foreign technology, both of which are related to human capital endowments and investment in research and development intensive industries. In low income countries, technology acquisition often amounts to adapting existing methods to local circumstances. Producers need to learn how to apply the new technology and will often start by applying it to a small part of their output and, if profitable, increase its application gradually over time. The productivity potential of new technology is only realised when companies and institutions reorganise their business and management practices to integrate the new technology. Firms in low income countries naturally move too slowly to adopt new technologies and business practices.

**New Markets:** A basic feature of regional integration is that the lowering of a country's own trade barriers is accompanied by an improvement in access to foreign markets. Market access in turn creates new opportunities for domestic firms willing to make improvements necessary to sell their products abroad or to new customers domestically. Entering foreign markets is costly as potential exporters are initially disadvantaged relative to indigenous firms as they have to bear transport costs and overcome tariffs and are less familiar with the tastes of local customers and local regulations. Thus only firms with above average productivity are able to compensate for this disadvantage and successfully make sales in foreign countries.

### Strategy for Welfare Enhancing Regional Integration

Action outside the regional integration and trade agreements to address key institutional and trade infrastructure constraints in low-income African economies is the most important dimension of strengthening the African regional integration architecture. This has a number of dimensions. One is to accept that non-trade issues or policy areas that have at best a weak relationship with market access may be best dealt with in fora other than trade. Another is to pursue the 'complementary agenda' that revolves around upgrading the trade capacity of low income African countries. This potentially spans a large number of areas. The development and growth prospects of countries and their ability to benefit from expanded trade opportunities depend on the

“Regional integration may also create new domestic business opportunities. New foreign entrants as well as domestic firms may be interested in sourcing intermediate inputs locally.”

quality of infrastructure and related services such as ports, roads and telecoms, as well as a country's own trade and investment policies. All of these impact on the investment climate and are critical to the empowerment of people. Governments and stakeholders should take the lead in identifying priorities; greater financial assistance could significantly improve their ability to deal with them.

Although any single efficiency-enhancing reform will hurt someone, if enough of them are packaged together, negative effects will be netted out and many more people and interests will obtain a net gain. It is of great importance to ensure that potential beneficiaries from trade-related reforms have the capacity to actually exploit new trade opportunities. This

requires attention to the business environment and transactions costs, measures to enhance the productivity of firms and farms, ensuring they are linked to markets and have access to finance, etc. Specific areas for attention may include:

- Infrastructure support. Farmers need to be able to reach major market centres at reasonable cost; firms need access to a reliable and efficient power supply; etc. In low income African countries transportation (logistics) and transaction costs are often a multiple of any tariffs exporters confront. This helps explain the more limited participation of low income African countries in regional and global value chains.
- Labour markets and mobility. The primary vehicle for spreading the benefits of increasing labour demand widely is labour mobility. Middle income African economies are reluctant to allow the free movement of labour. Low income countries find themselves burdened with what to do with displaced factory workers who in a truly integrated region would be allowed to look for work across the borders. If markets are segmented and/or distorted, benefits are reduced.
- Establishing new businesses. Cumbersome regulations for establishing new firms, constraints on access inputs (e.g., utilities), restrictions on physical expansion or labour recruitment and separation, can curtail the willingness of entrepreneurs to start or expand operations.

### Government Policies

Governments' role in supporting the process of regional integration is to ensure that firms face the "right" incentives to adjust, and intervene in areas where market failures are present. Government policies play an important role in the adjustment process. Indeed, a key responsibility of government is not only to ensure that firms confront the "right" incentives to induce investment in activities in which a country has a comparative advantage, but also to assist in facilitating adjustment to technological changes

and policy shocks. Other relevant policies include general interventions that have an economy-wide impact such as a good business environment, infrastructure, education, and the rule of law as well as specific actions to address market failures or attain social objectives.

### Technology

Absorption of technology depends on having an adequate supply of engineering and management skills. In this regard, domestic education and training policies are important. Governments can reduce the 'technological distance' between local and foreign firms by establishing national or regional innovation systems that encourage local research and development, transfer knowledge from universities and public laboratories to domestic firms, and promote use of telecommunications and other cost-saving technologies.

### The behind-the-border agenda

While traditional trade policy reform remains critically important for many low income African countries, much of the agenda is 'behind-the-border'. A supporting legal and regulatory environment is vital for regional integration to serve as an engine of growth. Elements of the associated 'behind the border' trade agenda that affect the investment climate include policies and institutions that support the participation of national firms on international markets and measures to enhance their competitiveness by ensuring access to crucial service inputs, both public and private. Improvements which help local markets to function better are also likely to help trade and foreign investment. For instance, access to a reliable communications network is important to domestic firms, foreign firms, and importers.

- The availability of low cost, high quality services is a critical determinant of the competitiveness of national firms. Telecommunications are both a vital intermediate input and crucial to the dissemination and diffusion of knowledge. Transportation costs are a major determinant of competitiveness, and intra-national

transport costs can be a multiple of international costs.

- Initiatives to strengthen private and public service institutions that support export development and help to reduce the cost of key inputs (transport, telecoms, insurance, finance, etc.) should be pursued in the context of an overall national strategic framework that identifies where the payoff to reform and public investment is largest. Careful policy analysis is needed to identify both priorities and options for reform. In many cases, pro-competitive reforms will be needed, as greater competition (contestability of markets) is a major engine for reducing prices and increasing the variety of goods and services.

**“Initiatives to strengthen private and public service institutions that support export development and help to reduce the cost of key inputs (transport, telecoms, insurance, finance, etc.) should be pursued.”**

### Conclusion

Indeed, a strong case can be made that it is critical that policies focus on helping to distribute the gains from regional integration more equally, in part through pro-active policies that help affected workers help themselves. Voters and citizens (especially in low income countries) are much more likely to support regional integration when it is explicitly linked with assistance aimed at minimising labour-market costs.

If regional integration agreements are to do more to support the welfare of low income African countries, the modus operandi of designing and implementing them should give more weight to development (economic


efficiency and equity) considerations. This could be achieved through a variety of mechanisms.

- Grant-based financing mechanisms to improve trade supply capacity and increase the benefits of trade reforms for poor households, based on a local analysis of needs, should be strengthened, with allocations determined by the country's overall development strategy. A development-focused approach should be underpinned by expanded development assistance to help address supply capacity constraints in poor countries. This requires identifying needs, prioritising them and providing funds to address them.
- Trade-related funding should be allocated within the context of an overall country development programme and an agreed macro-economic policy framework. As a development tool stand-alone specific funds and associated mechanisms are less likely to be effective than integrating the prioritisation and resource allocation process into national poverty reduction and development strategies.
- Supply capacity is a necessary condition for exploiting market access opportunities, which will be determined by the prevailing investment climate and trade/business environment. Much of the associated policy agenda extends beyond trade policies and cannot be addressed through regional agreements narrowly conceived. Measures to facilitate trade are likely to be particularly important in many of the low income African countries — getting goods and services in and out of the country at lower cost. Given that many of the low income African countries are land-locked, cooperation with neighbours to reduce the costs of transit/transport and access to ports may well generate a particularly high payoff. ■

*The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the African Development Bank.*

## THE PRACTICALITIES OF RADICAL THOUGHT AND PROTEST IN AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

# Re-affirming Value in Economy



*“... struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.” Edward Said<sup>1</sup>*

By Kwesi Prah

It is important to note the influence of value in defining history, and how this also defines the sources of information that constitute a history. In today's world, the nature of hegemony is such that it compels the citizen to understand the nature and reality of struggle, and to focus on the necessary steps toward unity (in all its meanings). It places sources of information into context, and gives meaning to the present challenges faced by the majority of the world's population. In African contexts, issues of value are of high importance at formal / informal levels; state-to-state, community-to-community, business-to-business, family-to-family.

These themes of struggle and unity have captured the aspirations and hopes of millions of Africans worldwide, through cultural expression, political affiliation and economic activity. In his appeal to the United Nations regarding the purpose behind the political unity of African peoples in 1984, Thomas Sankara placed these aspirations, forms of struggle and protest into sharp perspective when he argued that

*the new international order for which we fight and will continue to fight can be achieved only if we succeed in destroying the old order that has ignored us; if we impose our rightful place in the political organisation of the world; and if, conscious of our importance in the world, we obtain the right to participate in the discussions and decisions on the mechanisms governing trade, the economy, and currencies on a global scale.<sup>2</sup>*

Today, this call to action still finds relevance. Today, the African world still wrestles with the implementation of this reality. The question then is: where can there be an intervention that will have the necessary impact to catalyse critical change, and delink Africa's progress from imperial design?

### **Imperialism and the Need to Delink**

For John Pilger, a journalist by trade, in less dramatic language than the title of his book suggests (*The New Rulers of the World*), this need to delink is about the fact that the

*economic and political crises in the developing world, largely*

the result of post-colonialism, such as the blood-letting in the Middle East and the destruction of commodity markets in Africa, now serve as retrospective justification for imperialism. Although the word remains unspeakable, the western intelligentsia, conservatives and liberals alike, boldly echo the preferred euphemism, 'civilisation'. From Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, an ally of crypto-fascists, to the former British Liberal editor Harold Evans, the new imperialists share a concept whose true meaning relies on an unexpressed contrast with those who are 'uncivilised', i.e. inferior, and might challenge the 'values' of the West, specifically its God-given right to control and plunder.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, Pilger's observations, one of many critical perspectives from the Western world on North American / British influence in global politics and trade, recognised that the horrors brought on by the varying imperial crusades did not bode well for any development agenda set up by the institutions that were apparently mandated to safeguard the interests of humanity at large (United Nations and its affiliates). This is also highlighted by the fact that, "according to World Bank and Fortune Magazine Data, in 2011, of the 175 largest global economic 'entities', 110 (over 60%) were corporations. The revenues of Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil and Wal-Mart were larger than the GDP of a hundred national economies, more than half the world's countries. In that list Royal Dutch Shell is on par with Norway and dwarfed the GDP of Thailand, Denmark or Venezuela."<sup>4</sup>

This reality thus confirms Herbert Marcuse's observation that indeed, "the growing opposition to the global dominion of corporate capitalism is confronted by the sustained power of this dominion: its economic and military hold in the four continents, its neocolonial empire, and most important, its unshaken capacity to subject the majority of the underlying population to its overwhelming productivity and force."<sup>5</sup> Therefore the value of practical lessons from

revolutionary struggles, and their intellectual analyses on the nature and impact of imperialism cannot be ignored.<sup>6</sup>

Faced with these realities, many proponents and activists of anti-imperial thought and action have argued that re-configuring and adapting modes of production (popularly understood as systems of exchange), into value-systems and social systems indigenous to specific environments was integral to the socio-economic and political progress of human society.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, not only did one have to re-examine the value and place that certain economic institutions had in

“The question then is: where can there be an intervention that will have the necessary impact to catalyse critical change, and delink Africa's progress from imperial design?”

complementing African development and progress (e.g. banks, insurance agencies, investment agencies, in their current structures and functions), but also had to provide alternatives as to how one could build an authentically sustainable form /system of economic exchange.

#### **Remuneration based on Restoration: A Tentative Alternative**

According to Patricia McFadden, her "notion of Sufficiency signifies an ethical... value system that is premised on the fulfilment of all human needs in the most ecologically and environmentally respectful manner, extending beyond a sense of satisfaction often associated with food and bodily reproduction, to encompass notions and practices of wellness and livelihoods that are based on dignity and safety."<sup>8</sup> She also notes, very importantly, that "the expansion of trade and the commodification of products and of humans (through slaving and within the household

through Patriarchy as the power of the male over the female) – and the normalisation of exchange and profit making over the satisfaction of human needs characterises both the feudal and capitalist relations of power and accumulation that define humans in contemporary African and other societies".

This visionary suggestion has considerable implications for the prospect of radical and constructive change within African society at large. This is so because a practical argument can be made to say that ownership / custodianship of resources can be granted, and based on how communities and individuals utilise their capabilities to restore and heal; and any macro / micro-economic benefit goes toward acknowledging and empowering such initiatives. The idea of profit and accumulation of capital from exploitation is thus challenged by the idea that if anyone 'accumulated' anything, it would be based on a community's ability to remunerate itself, or an individual, for their efforts in empowering / restoring / healing. The commodity of exchange (currency) would therefore have to be located within the ecology of the local environment, placing ownership of value-definition directly in the hands of those engaging in the necessary exchanges.

A valuable historical precedent for this in an African context was the Ujamaa initiative undertaken by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere's administration, just after Tanzania gained its independence from 'direct' British, Colonial rule. Despite the Ujamaa initiative's explicit objective of attempting to delink the developmental processes of industrialisation and economic self-sustainability from colonial structures, Issa G. Shivji argued that the "objective effect of the Ujamaa Vijijini policy, like its predecessor, the villagisation programme, was to '... integrate the non-monetarised (or the so-called 'subsistence sector') within the cash economy. Given the overall neo-colonial structures of the territorial economy', this meant '... integration within the world capitalist system.'<sup>9</sup> What perhaps was not fully appreciated was the fact that the Ujamaa

initiative had aroused massive public sentiment, enough to provide stimulus for action by the 'uncaptured' peasantry. But they too were also struggling to meet the demands of capitalism. This more often than not entrenched the hegemonic relationship between state-bureaucracy and the 'uncaptured' peasantry, *perpetuating* dependency.

For example, in order to finance the Ujamaa Vijijini initiatives, the re-enforced dependence on the need to acquire credit was the prescribed approach. 'Simple credit' and 'intensification credit' formed the methods in which capital was distributed. These transactions were managed by parastatals in the banking and insurance sectors.<sup>10</sup>

The picture painted by these sources of information reminds people that focused and direct action is now necessary. The historical significance of these sources explains the need to focus on the direction and impact of struggles to stop the growing monopoly of knowledge and resource distribution, the dignity of livelihood, and natural balance of the environment.

Outlining the steps that need to be taken to empower a value system of this kind, the following points tentatively identify necessary building blocks to ensure such alternatives can take root, by confirming that:

- For productivity to accentuate these forms / systems of exchange and value-definition, the premises for production must lie in the presupposition that most of the human population is in a crisis of economy and political organisation.
- Productive interaction must then move toward region-specific variations of service exchange, under the rubric of resource utilisation and the stabilisation of necessities, given the 'psychosis of consumption' already present; which then enables a globally relevant, conscientious development of technological capabilities.
- Human, intellectual and material mobility (migration) at local, continental, or trans-continental levels must not be burdened by the politics of sovereignty

and nationality; as there is an increasing demand to address the varying degrees of material inter-dependence that are being mapped out locally and regionally.

- A cultural appraisal highlighting 'similarity' and 'familiarity' of family / community must take a global platform and be a global priority; mitigating and eradicating the propensity for media and its social extensions to sensationalise exclusivity and propagandise polemicist agendas.<sup>11</sup>

### Conclusion

It is the sum-total effort of people in social contact and interaction which brings to life the importance of

“Re-configuring and adapting modes of production (popularly understood as systems of exchange), into value-systems and social systems indigenous to specific environments was integral to the socio-economic and political progress of human society.”

understanding time, place and value in history. The ever-evolving need to be vigilant in relation to the value-definition processes over time requires a focused sense of history. Also, the need to take decisive action at a given time changes value.

In African contexts, the gradual militarisation of politics paints a bleak picture for social cohesion, locally and internationally, and therefore requires decisive action. Furthermore, economic prescriptions that morally entrench indebtedness through credit-value, which currently use the 'law' and legal terminology to design 'progressive change', have clearly been misleading the majority of people around the

world regarding the historical injustices orchestrated by the colonial chapters in human history. Imperialism (in all its manifestations) must be understood as one of the few ideas that has fuelled the most violent human tendencies in human history.

It is therefore important to remind the reader that lifestyles of consumption, knowledge production based on monopoly of information and access, and profit from exploitation will all be decisively challenged by their own politics, and certain sectors in society will either need to heed to the pressures of struggle and revolution, or face dangerous consequences. ■

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- <sup>7</sup> See Oruka, H.O. (1997). *Practical philosophy: in search of an ethical minimum*. East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi, Kenya
- <sup>8</sup> McFadden, P. (2014). *Bridging the Divide: Technology, Women and Sufficiency in Africa*. (Unpublished paper, presented at the ICAT Conference, Kenya Nov 2014)
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# An African Story of Collaboration and Innovation



Assessors and Candidates – L105, Toliara, Madagascar, 2013

By Lawrence Sisitka

This article records an example of collaboration between professionals and environmentalists in a group of African countries which eventually produced a

ground-breaking solution to a common problem. It provides a useful example to others across the world, showing how learning through experience in the work environment, even at

professional levels, can be assessed in a practical and reliable way. Not all credible certification has to be based on assessment conducted at the end of training programmes. Knowledge

acquired outside educational institutions should be valued and can be recognised.

### In the Beginning

The story began with a conversation in the late 1990s in Tanzania between two old friends and colleagues, and led to an extraordinary collaborative journey involving partners from across the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), the USA and elsewhere; a journey that led to an innovative breakthrough in strengthening capacity for management of the WIO's marine protected areas (MPAs).

The two friends, Dr Julius Francis, Executive Secretary of the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA – based in Zanzibar), and Dr Nirmal Shah, Chief Executive of Nature Seychelles, were discussing ways to share MPA management expertise across the region. They agreed to establish an exchange programme, whereby MPA professionals could visit other sites, both to learn from and to share their own experiences with their colleagues. Cousin Island in the Seychelles was chosen as the first site for such an exchange.

In 2004, on the other side of the Atlantic in what was at the time an entirely unconnected process, representatives of the Coastal Resources Centre (CRC) at the University of Rhode Island in the USA were in discussion with the US development agency USAID about a proposal to develop a certification programme for MPA professionals. This had never been done before (although similar programmes have been developed for a number of other professions) and USAID were prepared to fund what was seen as an experiment with no guaranteed outcomes; a brave and prescient move on behalf of USAID. Out of these discussions grew the Sustainable Coastal Communities and Ecosystems (SUCCESS) programme which brought together our friends from the Western Indian Ocean, the CRC and USAID. It also involved Nicaragua and Ecuador, representing Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

At the first SUCCESS annual

meeting in 2005 it was decided to roll out the certification concept in both East Africa and the LAC in tandem. The following July, in Miami, Lesley Squillante from the CRC presented a document entitled 'Certified Coastal Manager Overview Manual Apr 7'. This set the scene for the launch of the first certification programme ever for MPA professionals, indeed for any protected area professionals. The East Africa group, including Dr Francis representing WIOMSA, proposed three potential audiences for such certification in the WIO: Certified MPA managers; Certified Coastal Natural Resource Management Officer for local government officers; and Certified Coastal Development Consultants.

“The story began with a conversation in the late 1990s in Tanzania between two old friends and colleagues, and led to an extraordinary collaborative journey involving partners from across the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), the USA and elsewhere.”

It was agreed that MPA managers would be the most appropriate group on which to focus initially. Squillante then developed the first draft of the document 'Certified MPA Manager' in November 2006, which laid the foundation for the stakeholder consultation process in the WIO, which commenced with a workshop held in Mombasa, Kenya in February 2007. This was only the beginning.

### Collaboration across the WIO

The ball was now firmly in Africa's court. Although the CRC and USAID continued to be important players, providing essential conceptual, technical and financial support, it was

up to the partners in the WIO region to make it work. The consultative meeting in Mombasa involved representatives from a wide range of organisations in Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, Seychelles and Mozambique. The CRC sent two representatives; Lesley Squillante and Glenn Ricci. Each representative was a leading professional in their own field, with considerable experience in marine science, MPA management, nature conservation or education and assessment. There were several representatives from regional organisations such as the Regional Programme for the Sustainable Management of the Coastal Zones of the Indian Ocean Countries (RECOMAP), and the World Wildlife Fund East Africa Marine Ecosystem programme (WWF-EAME), and global organisations including the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). The workshop was funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) through its Marine and Coastal Science for Management programme.

Two days of intensive discussions covered a wide range of topics, with the focus on entry requirements, programme curriculum, the framework for certification and an implementation plan to move the certification programme from the conceptual stage to a functioning system. Given the high calibre of the representatives, the discussions were characterised by strong, well-informed opinions and ideas coming from every quarter. There was, also inevitably, considerable divergence of views on some of the crucial issues, not all of which were resolved at the meeting.

One of the critical areas in which agreement was not reached concerned the underlying purpose of and approach to the certification process. The original concept, as developed by the CRC, perceived it as very much a 'capacity building' or training exercise, involving some foundational training, followed by a period back in the workplace, after which the certification, including a 'practicum' based on the training, would take place. Several representatives

thought that this would introduce considerable additional complications into an already complex process, and argued for a more straightforward approach focussing on competence assessment rather than competence development. The assessment would enable the certification process, providing recognition to people in the MPA environment for their skills and achievements; and the identified competences would provide a learning pathway for those who wished to strengthen their skills, knowledge and experience. This debate took a further year to resolve.

However the general mood was extremely positive with a palpable sense of excitement at breaking new ground, and a shared will to 'make it happen'. Some of the critical aspects on which agreement was reached were:

- That the programme should be at three levels - Level 1: slightly above field ranger job title, has some supervisory role; Level 2: able to supervise a park; Level 3: capable of supervising many parks and several managers. Entry requirements for all three levels were also agreed.
- That the competences should be clustered into four 'competence areas': the legal and institutional framework of MPAs; MPA operations; engagement of and communications with MPA stakeholders; and knowledge of marine and coastal ecology.
- That assessment should also include aspects of leadership and ethical conduct.
- That a Certification Board should be established comprising representatives from identified focal institutions from each country in the region.
- That WIOMSA would act as the regional umbrella and serve as the programme manager.

Details regarding the proposed 'practicum' were also discussed. Later this idea was abandoned in favour of a more streamlined and less costly approach. An implementation plan was drafted.

It was also agreed that a consultant should be contracted by WIOMSA to:

- produce a definitive list of MPAs in

the region;

- develop a proposed process for certification;
- conduct a demand survey – including identifying numbers of people who might be eligible for certification at the 3 levels;
- identify the core skills at 3 levels;
- define integrated assessment and applied competences, and propose appropriate assessment tools; and
- produce an evidence and testing options paper.


This consultancy was therefore to provide the framework for the certification programme. Unsurprisingly, little headway had been made at the workshop in relation to the details of the competencies required at each level. It was therefore left to the consultancy to propose at least an initial set of core skills. It was on these that the whole programme would rest.

The consultant (the author) consulted widely across the region with the many government conservation agencies and national and international NGOs with responsibilities related to the management of MPAs and the training of MPA personnel. There was considerable enthusiasm for the certification concept, although it was something of a challenge for people to differentiate between this and more conventional notions of training. A vast amount of information was provided willingly by many people, with no question of immediate benefit to themselves, but rather a keenness to strengthen the field of MPA management.

This enabled the consultant to produce all the required documents within the specified time. From this information it was possible to develop the framework for a certification programme as requested.

The outputs from the consultancy were summarised in a report which provided the basis for the next pivotal meeting in Stone Town, Zanzibar in January 2008. The recommendations made in the consultative report were universally accepted as a sound foundation on which to build the details of the programme, and considerable progress was made in developing the various components. In particular:

- The Certification Programme would be known as the Western Indian Ocean-Certification for Marine Protected Areas Professionals (WIO-COMPAS). Website: [www.wiocompas.org](http://www.wiocompas.org)
- The WIO-COMPAS programme would comprise four key steps: the evaluation of the application forms and accompanying evidence; the certification event; the practicum; and issuance of certificates. The programme would be guided by the Certification Board, comprised of representatives from the WIOMSA Board and the CRC, and its terms of reference were agreed. This body would provide technical oversight and guidance to the programme.
- The Board would be assisted in the coordination and actual implementation of the programme by the assessors and a Secretariat.
- Assessors would be responsible for assessing candidate applications, scoring of applicants' evidence and practicum; conducting the certification event and recommending to the Board candidates to be certified.
- There would two types of assessors, regional and national, with the latter responsible for evaluating practica in their respective countries and the former responsible for their countries as well as the activities taking place at the regional level. A regional workshop would be organised for the assessors prior to the start of the certification programme, to train them on the assessment and evaluation methods that would be applied.
- The general outlines of the business plan and marketing strategy were developed.
- An establishment timeline was developed, including setting up the Board and appointing the assessors. It was expected that the first group of successful candidates' class would be certificated in January 2009.
- Partners present in the meeting made a commitment to support the development and implementation of the programme. Here are some of the commitments made:
  - WWF would support applicants



Checking permits on the beach at Mombasa Marine Park and Reserve, 2010

from their sites, who would be approved based on qualifications. They could also provide technical expertise and venues for practica;

- Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife (South Africa) could endorse the programme within its structures;
- The Regional Programme for the Sustainable Management of the Coastal Zones of the Indian Ocean Countries (RECOMAP) could provide individual funding to applicants, particularly for French speaking countries;
- CRC/USAID committed \$200 000 for the programme over the next 18 months.

At the same time agreement was reached on two critical aspects of the programme. One was that experience in the field would be more essential than educational qualifications for entry to the programme. This meant that the programme was open to the very many MPA professionals who had limited educational background, but a wealth of real on-the-ground experience. However, it is noteworthy that the 'practicum' still featured strongly in the certification concept. The use of education/school related language, such as 'class' also illustrates the continuing pre-occupation with capacity development.

The second was the language policy for the three levels:

- Level 1 – candidates could be assessed in their first language, as this was the language they were most likely to be using in their work. In South Africa this meant that Level 1 candidates could be assessed in isiZulu, isiXhosa (the two African languages spoken in the coastal provinces), English, or Afrikaans. In the region this could mean at least 30 different languages.
- Level 2 – candidates could be assessed in the official (or government) language of their country, as this is the language in which most managers work. In the WIO, this means English, French, or Portuguese.
- Level 3 – assessment in English as this is the international language of marine conservation.

In addition it was agreed both that the focus should initially be on level

2 (site management), and that the number of 'competence areas' would be increased from four to six:

- Policy, Legislation and Compliance Framework
- MPA Management Establishment and Arrangements
- Communication and Stakeholder Engagement
- Financing MPAs
- MPA Management Operations
- Biophysical and Social Environment.

And yes – our friends the good Drs Francis and Shah were centrally involved in all discussions. In the restaurant at the last meal following the 2 days of very intensive and animated discussions they had everyone convulsed with laughter as they swapped sometimes risqué but always wonderfully funny jokes...!

In discussions subsequent to the meeting, with the consolidation of the action plan for implementation, some changes were made. The main components of the revised action plan were:

- It was necessary to identify and appoint assessors.
- There should be just one Event of 8 – 10 days duration.
- The practicum would be replaced by a Case Study (at Level 2).
- Telephonic interviews could be held with applicants.
- The whole process would comprise:
  - o A thorough application screening process – as a first filter. (The idea here was that it was important to accept for the assessment event only those professionals who stood a better than even chance of achieving certification. This was both to avoid raising unrealistic expectations, with the inevitable disappointment that might follow, and also to ensure that the costs of an expensive process were kept within bounds. Once an applicant was accepted, they became known as a 'candidate'.)
  - o Development by the candidates of 'Portfolios of Evidence'.
  - o Development by candidates of Workplace Case Studies.
  - o Attendance at the event, which would involve: assessment of the portfolios; presentation of

the case studies; observation of candidates undertaking a field activity; a written assessment; and finally a face to face question session, or interview. It was agreed that this should be the last assessment instrument, as it would then be possible to tailor the questions to the specific needs (or gaps in evidence) of each candidate after all other instruments had been applied.

- o After the assessment was completed each candidate would receive professional development advice.

The shape of the certification process and of the assessment event was now quite clear. What remained to be done was considerable refinement of the competences, finalisation of the assessment instruments, and development of the means of scoring the evidence provided through the different instruments, and recording the scores: the scoring 'tools'. The target date was January 2009, but by some miracle, everything was in place to be able to hold the very first Certification Event (as it had now become known) in August 2008, some 6 months early.

### **Making it all Happen**

The first certification event for Level 2 (coded as L201) was held in Malindi on the Kenyan coast, adjacent to the Malindi MPA. It involved three assessors; the consultant as lead assessor, from South Africa, a marine scientist from the UK, and a MPA specialist from WWF in Mozambique. WIOMSA provided the secretariat and made all the logistical arrangements, and the event was attended by Glenn Ricci from the CRC in a key technical support role.

Thirty-six MPA personnel applied from 5 countries in the region, of whom fourteen were accepted. (This acceptance rate of less than 40% was largely due to the newness of the process and the corresponding lack of understanding of it by many applicants. In subsequent events the acceptance rate climbed to approximately 50% for a few years, then to 70-80% for the most recent events.) Of these, three dropped out for various reasons and eleven candidates ultimately attended

the event.

No-one really knew how it would all work out. Despite the intensive development process, and months, indeed years, of deep consultation, the reality was that there was no comparable precedent on which to draw. In particular the assessors felt a considerable burden of responsibility in ensuring that their assessments were fair and equitable for all candidates. They met for two days prior to the Event to go through the whole process very carefully, under the guidance of the lead assessor, and become familiar with the instruments and tools. The assessors enjoyed little sleep over the 6 days of the Event, battling in particular with the assessment of the evidence provided in the bulky Portfolios of Evidence. The pressure was considerable.

At about the halfway stage it was decided that the assessors should sit with their candidates individually and give them feedback on how they had scored in the Portfolio and Case Study elements. This was to give them a good sense of where they stood in relation to what was needed for certification. This was the pivotal 'light bulb' moment in the process, when the candidates finally became fully aware of what was required and what they needed to do to provide the necessary evidence. Many candidates provided additional documents with new evidence for their portfolios, and all realised the areas where they had not yet provided sufficient evidence and where the questions in their face-to-face interviews would be focussed. The tension levels rose considerably, but everyone: candidates, assessors and the support team, rose magnificently to the challenge.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the world in Beijing, a then relatively unknown (to many of us at least) athlete from Jamaica, also rose magnificently to the challenges he faced. Purely by chance, in a break one evening at the hotel bar, a group of assessors and candidates watched as this tall muscular figure powered his way past all opponents to win the 100 metres in an Olympic and world record time of 9.69 seconds – inspirational! Usain Bolt, as we now knew he was called,

had made his first mark. Two days later, again by chance, at an internet café in Malindi, we saw him leave the others runners standing in the 200 metre final, winning his second gold medal in another Olympic and world record time of 19.30 seconds, and this on the eve of his 22nd birthday. And not to forget his third gold in the 4x100 metres relay, which the Jamaicans won in yes, another Olympic and world record time of 37.10 seconds. Everything suddenly became possible!

Inspired and energised by the brilliance of the inevitably nicknamed 'Lightning Bolt' the candidates and assessors put everything into the final stages of the event. Ultimately the assessors recommended that nine of the eleven candidates, who had achieved the required score, should become the first ever WIO-COMPAS certified 'MPA-PROs'. The two others were required to submit further evidence to strengthen some of their weaker areas. This was a very encouraging outcome indeed. The candidates themselves (who were not informed of the recommendation at the event as the process required that these be first submitted to the Certification Board for approval), were very positive about the experience.

At the end of the event a rigorous evaluation was held with the candidates, followed by a debriefing with the assessors and support team at which the critical challenges were discussed and suggestions for improvements to the programme made. All candidates rated the experience very highly, with the majority considering the rigour 'just right', and 2 suggesting it was 'too rigorous' (no-one, in the 6 years the programme has been running, has ever said that it is not rigorous enough – indeed one candidate in Tanzania in 2012 said '...this thing can kill you!'). They all said they would recommend the programme to their colleagues. A valuable suggestion that arose out of the evaluation discussions was that Level 2 MPA-PROs would be very suitable as Level 1, and potentially Level 2, assessors in the future.

Out of the debriefing the main suggestions were that a leadership competence area was needed. Some changes to and refinement of

the instruments and tools were also recommended and subsequently implemented.

This pattern of evaluation and debriefing has been followed at every certification event, resulting in constant refinement of the programme. Since this first seminal assessment event there have been many more, including several at both Level 1 and at Level 2, and, so far, just one at Level 3.

### The Roll-out of the Programme

The main programme activities since 2008 have been:

- June 2009 – Training of Assessors in Nairobi, Kenya. This included formalisation for the recruitment, training and appointment of assessors.
- July 2009 – Antananarivo, Madagascar, L202 – with the language of assessment being French.
- November 2009 – a 1 year evaluation following L201 candidates, showing clear evidence of "Significant improvements to Marine Protected Area (MPA) professionals' careers and their organisations' practices as a result of their achieving certification." It also appeared that some organisations had, after an initially slow start, begun to recognise the value of the certification. The certification had led to improved networking between MPA PROs, and to them achieving more within their areas of operation.
- February 2010 – Experts meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Agreement that the programme should make efforts to link with and influence the training being provided for MPA staff in the region. Discussion of Level 3 challenges and how these could be met. Agreement on need for formal assessor training, including theoretical understanding of assessment principles and processes, to ensure credibility of the programme. Detailed discussion on the Leadership competence area to 'unpack' the particular qualities that should be assessed. Six qualities were identified at the time but these were subsequently reduced to four: leading by example; self-motivation;

innovation; ethical challenges. This was a seminal meeting in that it not only made the first substantial moves towards the implementation of Level 3, but also set the tone for the future of the programme.

- July 2010 – L101, Tsitsikamma National Park, South Africa - the first Level 1 event, in both English and Afrikaans, with some isiXhosa.
- September 2010 – L102, Mombasa, Kenya - English with some KiSwahili
- April 2011 – commissioning of assessment experts 'Qalanet' (Meg Pahad and Melissa King) to review the programme, in particular the assessment processes. The reviewers made clear that they were not 'subject matter experts', but that they would focus on the assessment from the perspectives of credibility, rigour and manageability. They were very impressed with the quality of the programme. They recommended:
  - o Greater standardisation of process
  - o Streamlining of documentation and clearer instructions to the candidates on compilation of evidence
  - o Development of 'Assessor Framework' (completed by the reviewers); included the development of new assessors through an apprenticeship model
  - o Need for cross-moderation/a chief moderator, to ensure:
    - that common processes and procedures are followed at different assessment events, and by different assessors, and that these are fair to the candidates;
    - that the assessment instruments are valid; and
    - that the assessment judgements meet the agreed-upon standard.
- June 2011 – L203, Mombasa Kenya - English
- August 2011 – L103, Mafia Island, Tanzania - English and KiSwahili
- February 2012 – Johannesburg, South Africa. Assessor training by Qalanet. Identified the WIO-COMPAS programme as a prime example of 'Recognition of Prior Learning' (RPL), and suggested

that the programme should promote this aspect in 'selling' itself to governments. Reiterated the importance of assessors having 'tacit knowledge' of the field (although this may not be necessary for a moderator whose focus is on the credibility of the assessment process). The trainers commended the programme for having been developed out of the needs of the field of MPA management, rather than from some theoretical position. They reiterated that they found the programme fully credible, with considerable rigour and effective checks and balances. They fully endorsed the programme from an assessment perspective.

- May 2012 – L301, Johannesburg, South Africa – the first Level 3 event, in English. First use of an 'assessment panel', including two assessors without prior experience of the process. Also an external moderator (one of the Qalanet assessment specialists). The candidates' evaluation of the event was extremely positive with 4 out of 6 ranking it at 10 out of 10, with one ranking at 9 and another at 8.
- 2012 – 'First Generation' review – an in-depth review of the entire programme from its inception to the completion of assessments at all 3 levels. This included study of the impact of the programme on individuals, their organisations and marine conservation. As the Level 3 assessment had only just been completed, the study focussed on Levels 1 and 2, with the key findings being:
  - o 90% of Level 1 and 80% of Level 2 PROs said that they have become more confident in the execution of their duties.
  - o 90% of Level 1 and 60% of Level 2 PROs said the process had improved their MPA management capabilities.
  - o 90% of Level 1 and 93% of Level 2 PROs stated that WIO-COMPAS had impacted to some extent or greatly on marine conservation in the region.
- March 2013 – L105, Toliara, Madagascar – languages French and Malagasy. For the first time a

candidate with almost no formal education, and very much self-taught and self-motivated provided more than adequate evidence for certification. This reflected one of the original aims of the programme, and in a sense, it 'closed the circle'. The programme had come of age!

- February 2014 – L106, De Hoop Nature Reserve, South Africa – English, Afrikaans, some isiXhosa. This event included observer assessors (part of the assessor recruitment and training process), and also observers from the CapeNature human resources department who were overwhelmed by the experience and keen to incorporate it into their human resources management systems.
- August 2014 – L204, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – English and French. This event included a trainee assessor conducting assessments under the guidance of the lead assessor/moderator. The trainee assessor was subsequently recommended for appointment as a full assessor.
- June to December 2014 – South Africa – two members of the WIO-COMPAS core team worked with CapeNature management and human resources personnel to integrate the programme into their human resources management systems. A similar process had been led by a Kenyan team member within Kenya Wildlife Service since 2012, and is now almost complete.
- 2013 to 2015 - The WIO-COMPAS team work with the IUCN on a global programme for professionalising protected area management. The WIO-COMPAS programme is cited as an excellent model for adoption in other countries, and is used to help frame the global initiative.

#### Where are we now?

Through all these varied and intense activities over the past 6 years, the WIO-COMPAS 'brand' has become firmly established in the marine conservation community in the Western Indian Ocean, and beyond, where this African innovation is becoming increasingly recognised. Several West African countries are



WIO-COMPAS candidates complete their reports - L102, Mombasa, 2010

showing interest in adopting the programme, and similar initiatives in the Philippines and the Caribbean are being developed. Some 68 MPA PROs have been certified, and many of them have moved into positions of considerable authority. Interest is being shown by conservation agencies such as Madagascar National Parks to

integrate the process of assessment and certification into their human resources management systems. The network developed during the consultation period has remained intact with people across the region collaborating on a number of initiatives, and the MPA PROs themselves are better networked than ever before. Key MPA training

programmes in the region are now closely aligned to the competences required for certification, and a whole 'package' of assessment, training and certification is now available for conservation agencies. So we have come a long way, and there is still plenty of energy and commitment to take things further.



### The Personal Story of a core WIO-COMPAS Team Member

Arthur Tuda works as a regional manager overseeing the coastal protected areas of Kenya that are under the Kenya Wildlife Service. He is in charge of five marine-protected areas (MPAs) and six terrestrial parks, and oversees a staff of more than 350 people who work in these protected

areas. The responsibility that Tuda has is not given lightly. He has earned it, proving his leadership abilities and job capabilities in part through certification as an MPA PRO by WIO-COMPAS.

Arthur credits his MPA PRO experience with building his confidence and competence in his professional field. In 2008, then a site manager, he was the first Kenyan to achieve Level

2 Site Management Certification. He remained an active leader with MPA PRO by becoming a Level 1 and Level 2 assessor. In this role he assesses the capacity of other East African MPA professionals hoping to get certified at Levels 1 and 2. In 2012 he proved his commitment to the value of the programme by attaining Level 3 Strategy, Policy and Planning Certification. In early 2013 he was promoted to the assistant directorship he now holds.

Today, as Arthur Tuda oversees more than 2,500 square kilometres of critical habitat, he uses what he has learned as an MPA PRO to take on the challenges of managing expansive conservation areas with limited resources and personnel. He constantly tries new ideas, improves strategies and works to keep his staff motivated. And he shares his MPA PRO-certified expertise every day by mentoring his staff, which he calls a favourite part of his work. Equally important is the leadership role he has taken in WIO-COMPAS to promote the value of MPA PRO certification.

### Where to from here?

One of the first activities is re-certification of some of the existing MPA PROs. The WIO-COMPAS website has been redesigned to handle this web-based process. The first re-certifications will take place this year (in 2015). A very exciting development is the potential inclusion in the programme of people involved in the community managed MPAs in the region.

The team will continue to work with the IUCN on their global programme, and will seek funding to work with Madagascar National Parks and others to integrate the programme into their systems.

A further development that will emerge in the near future will be the recognition and endorsement of training which is aligned to and meets the requirements for the competences at the different levels. All this is leading, almost inevitably, to the realisation of an idea that has been mooted for many years, namely the certification of MPAs. The IUCN started on this route several years ago, but the programme faltered. We now have all the bricks in place to make this a reality. Watch this space! ■

# Perspectives on the Declaration of Principles regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam



The Nile Basin can only facilitate the much needed African regional integration if all parties know how to share both the costs and benefits from this rich resource.

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By Minga Negash, Seid Hassan, Mammo Muchie and Abu Girma Moges

On March 23, 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan signed a declaration of principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam<sup>1</sup> (GERD). Since then, there has been intense debate regarding the modalities and core principles which were spelled out in the Declaration. Unfortunately, the principles contained in the Declaration have invited unhealthy rhetoric, particularly within Egypt, Ethiopia and among the Ethiopian diaspora.

There are two fundamental reasons for the negative discourses. The first one involves the non-cooperative, zero-sum game strategic behaviour that is inherent within the actions of the parties. Game theorists, political scientists and economists very well know that shared watercourses invite unilateral and self-interest maximising actions – the well-known zero-sum positions being the dominant solution. Added to this is the emotive nature of the Nile River usage that was instigated and imposed upon the peoples of the region by colonialism. Secondly, Egypt has long-held historical ambitions to control the sources of the Nile and maintain the colonial era position that is still reflected in the Declaration. On closer examination, we find that several of the current stipulations of the Declaration include many of the key elements of the 1929 and 1959 “Nile Water Agreements” that Ethiopia was not a party to. Consequently, the Declaration is not framed in a positive-sum game (“win-win”) manner.

Cognisant of the fact that the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam has become a game changer, with its strong potential to lead for cooperation, we attempted to show that Egypt’s policy towards Ethiopia has been unsustainable. We did so in our April 30, 2014 commentary. Even though we did not have the full and official Declaration in hand at the time of writing, we also attempted to raise awareness as well as our concerns using a short commentary that we disseminated on March 23, 2015. In particular, we called for (i) the translation of the actual Agreement into various Ethiopian languages; (ii) the revision of certain clauses; and

(iii) as Egypt’s President was heading to address the Ethiopian Parliament and request for ratification, we called upon the Government of Ethiopia to defer this process to allow time and space for reflection. After the release of that commentary, Aigaforum.com<sup>2</sup>, a website that is close to the Government of Ethiopia, posted a document which purports to be the final and authentic version of the Agreement. Except for the location of the signing, and singular-plural uses of certain terms, see for example “resources” versus “resource” in the preamble and the sequence of the numbering of Principles III and IV of the Agreement, when compared to other versions available in the internet, the document appears to be authentic.<sup>3</sup> Though speculations are rife that the final agreement is still a secret, because of the importance of the matter, for this commentary we have used the version

“Egypt has long-held historical ambitions to control the sources of the Nile and maintain the colonial era position that is still reflected in the Declaration.”

that was made available by Aigaforum.com.

Many have opined and welcomed the recent Egyptian diplomatic overture towards Africa, and its acceptance of the construction of the GERD, in particular. Even though the current tripartite Agreement seemed to have temporarily eased the recent tension among the parties, and despite some of the positive aspects of the Egyptian diplomatic overtures and its intent to cooperate as spelled out in the Declaration, we observe that the Agreement is unsustainable in its current form. In fact, our examination of the Declaration of principles leads to the conclusion that the clauses are designed to re-assert the 1929 and 1959 water sharing agreements and the much criticised Framework for General Co-operation Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia,

July 1993, Cairo, Egypt<sup>4</sup> that was signed by the Presidents of Egypt and Ethiopia.

In this follow up commentary on GERD, we independently examine, in a non-technical manner, the elements of the tripartite Agreement which was signed in Khartoum on March 23, 2015. We do so by identifying omissions, sticky points and mistakes that need attention. Consistent with our April 30, 2014 commentary on this topic, we attempt to decouple political posturing within Ethiopia from the trans-boundary water issues that are facing the country. In doing so, we focus on the substantive issues so that the country avoids the repeat of the mistakes in the Algiers Agreement of 2000 between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the series of diplomatic manoeuvrings that created a landlocked country in 1993.<sup>5</sup> We decided to incorporate the clauses that are contained in the Declaration for the reader’s convenience.

#### Analysis of the Agreement

There are ten principles stated in the current Agreement. Below we provide comments for each of these elements. For convenience, we juxtapose the principles *in italics* and our comments, which follow each of these principles in plain text.

##### 1. Principle of cooperation

- To cooperate based on common understanding, mutual benefit, good faith, win-win, and principles of international law;
- To cooperate in understanding upstream and downstream water needs in its various aspects.

#### Our Brief Assessments

1. This article is not very different in spirit from the framework for cooperation that was signed between Egypt and Ethiopia in 1993. The intent of this principle appears to invoke clauses in the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses that was adopted on 21, May, 1997<sup>6</sup> and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with UN Resolution

2625, (1970).<sup>7</sup> It is however important to note that 17 years after its adoption, other than the United Kingdom no major power had signed the non-navigational use of international waters Convention. By the end of 2014, only 38 countries (out of about 194 Member States) have signed/accepted and ratified it.<sup>8</sup> It is also interesting to note that 11 of the 38 countries are located in the African continent, but these do not include Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, none of whom have signed, accepted or ratified this Convention.

2. The most controversial element of the 1997 UN Convention is Article 7 which deals with “not to cause significant harm” by upstream countries on downstream countries. Concerned by the ramifications of this clause, many upstream countries that have important trans-boundary rivers are either shying away from ratifying the Convention or are openly objecting to it, as the Convention: (a) does not provide for compensation to upstream countries for lost opportunities, and (b) exposes them to indeterminate and an uninsurable risk. As we shall see below, Article 7 features in both the recently signed tripartite Agreement (without recognition of opportunity costs and a damage limitation clause) and in Article 5 of the 1993 agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia.

3. The Phrase “principles of international law” neither implicitly nor explicitly recognises the existence of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement. Hence it fails to guide a comprehensive agreement pertinent to the region.<sup>9</sup>

4. The phrase “in its various aspects” suggests that downstream countries need additional waters or if they decide to develop new habitations, the upstream countries may have to give up their development opportunities. Research shows that downstream countries are usually densely populated and industrialised, have flatter topographies and hence their water needs are higher than upstream countries. Furthermore, even

though the Agreement is about the GERD (see the heading and the preamble of the Agreement), the Article is sweeping and covers the entire river system as we shall see below.

## II. Principle of Development, Regional Integration and Sustainability;

- *The purpose of GERD is for power generation, to contribute to economic development, promotion of trans-boundary cooperation and regional integration through the generation of sustainable and reliable clean energy supply.*

### Our Brief Assessments

The text states that the purpose of the project is to generate “sustainable and reliable clean energy supply”. There are no auxiliary purposes, so this

**“This clause could be interpreted to exclude, for example, the use of the waters for fishing, recreation, education and small scale industrial and irrigation projects around the dam.”**

clause could be interpreted to exclude, for example, the use of the waters for fishing, recreation, education and small scale industrial and irrigation projects around the dam. We do think that there are costs (risks) in agreeing to this clause for the upstream country. There are no provisions for planting trees (timber, coffee, etc.), for example, to mitigate the erosion and evaporation, capture the carbon and/or put the soil into better use. This clause is, therefore, devoid of shared benefits and responsibilities.

## III. Principle Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation

- *The three countries shall utilise their shared water resources in their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable manner*
- *In ensuring their equitable and*

*reasonable utilisation, the three countries will take into account all the relevant guiding factors listed below, but not limited to the following outlined:*

- o *Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;*
- o *The social and economic needs of the Basin States concerned;*
- o *The population dependent on the water resources in each Basin State;*
- o *The effects of the use or uses of the water resources in one Basin State on other Basin States;*
- o *Existing and potential uses of the water resources;*
- o *Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources and the costs of measures taken to that effect;*
- o *The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.*

### Our Brief Assessments

1. Even though this principle appears to be normal, it obligates Ethiopia to continue honouring Article 5 of the 1993 cooperation framework between Egypt and Ethiopia.
2. Sub article III (e), which deals with the existing and potential uses of the water resources is a sticky point. It will continue to be a source of tension as it is the focal point of the relationship between upstream and downstream countries. It needs to be examined in the light of the principles that are enshrined in the Nile basin framework.
3. Sub article III(f) does not sufficiently obligate downstream countries to invest in water conservation and rationalisation. The laxity of this sub article legitimises the increased demand for water by downstream countries.
4. The scope of the Agreement does not include ground water resources available in downstream countries.

## IV. Principle of Not to Cause Significant Harm

- *The Three Countries shall take all appropriate measures to prevent*

*the causing of significant harm in utilising the Blue/Main Nile.*

- *Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to one of the countries, the state whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures in consultations with the affected state to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

As indicated above, this clause is taken from Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 (effective as of April, 2014). The “obligation not to cause significant harm” is related to the age-old economic theory of externality which features in European trans-boundary waters and environmental agreements, in the form of the “polluter pays” principle. The UN Convention states that:

“(a) Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.

(b) Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.”

Article #2 of the 1997 Convention defines the term “watercourse” as follows:-

“‘Watercourse’ means a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”

It is interesting to note that the tripartite Agreement avoids the use of the term “watercourse” and hence excludes the ground water resources in Egypt and Sudan that recent geoscience studies are indicating.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, it

is important to note that “international law” is selectively used here to strengthen the position of the initiator-originator of the current text.

1. The opening paragraph of the tripartite Agreement starts with a rather misleading sentence. It states that “the three countries shall take all appropriate measures....” The article specifically deals with damages and not “causing significant harm in utilising the Blue/Main Nile”. The Blue/Main Nile originates from the highlands of Ethiopia and contributes approximately about 85% of the water to the Nile River system, and hence this clause is about Ethiopia. Downstream countries are not affected by this clause as Ethiopia is. The clause is unambiguous in giving downstream countries the

**“There are no provisions for planting trees (timber, coffee, etc.), for example, to mitigate the erosion and evaporation, capture the carbon and/or put the soil into better use.”**

right to “take appropriate measures to prevent significant damage” by the upstream country. The obvious issue that emerges here is sovereignty over the waters of the Blue/Main Nile, and the issue is more than likely to be a sticky point in that neither sovereign equality nor territorial integrity clauses (see Principle # IX below) are sufficient to protect Ethiopia. In fact there is concern that it can be construed as a voluntary ceding of sovereignty by Ethiopia.

2. The phrase “significant harm” is not defined and there are no thresholds about water sharing, physical damages arising from faulty construction/management of the dam and Act of God. Hence it is subject to various interpretations.
3. The clause refers to the Blue Nile/

Main River. The Blue Nile/Main River has tributaries. In the absence of an exclusion clause for the tributaries, this clause may be used to restrict Ethiopia from developing irrigation projects on any of the tributaries of Blue Nile.

#### *V. Principle to Cooperate on the First Filling and Operation of the Dam*

- *To implement the recommendations of the International Panel of Experts (IPOE), respect the final outcomes of the Technical National Committee (TNC) Final Report on the joint studies recommended in the IPOE Final Report throughout the different phases of the project.*
- *The three countries, in the spirit of cooperation, will utilise the final outcomes of the joint studies, to be conducted as per the recommendations of the IPoE Report and agreed upon by the TNC, to:-*
  - o *Agree on guidelines and rules on the first filling of GERD which shall cover all different scenarios, in parallel with the construction of GERD.*
  - o *Agree on guidelines and rules for the annual operation of GERD, which the owner of the dam may adjust from time to time.*
  - o *Inform the downstream countries of any unforeseen or urgent circumstances requiring adjustments in the operation of GERD.*
  - o *To sustain cooperation and coordination on the annual operation of GERD with downstream reservoirs, the three countries, through the line ministries responsible for water, shall set up an appropriate coordination mechanism among them.*
  - o *The time line for conducting the above mentioned process shall be 15 months from the inception of the two studies recommended by the IPOE.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

1. Implicit in Article V is that the project is going ahead. Only the filling of the reservoir and operational/functional matters of the dam are to be negotiated. The presumption

is that the pace of the filling should be slow enough to supply water to downstream countries but fast enough to satisfy Ethiopia's needs as the NPR's reporter has put it.

2. This article however crucially depends on a report that is yet to be produced. The leaked IPoE report vindicates Ethiopia on many fronts and as we indicated in our April 30 2014 commentary the deficiencies are not insurmountable. It remains to be seen whether the TNC report will be different from the one produced by IPoE. Notwithstanding this, the environmental aspect of the TNC report is expected to echo Egyptian concerns. It is important that the environmental impact assessment of the project be comprehensive and linked to (i) current and potential ground water resources in downstream countries and (ii) the rather wasteful use of the resource in downstream countries and pollution around the delta.
3. Sub article V(b) refers to the "owner" of the dam, in the singular, and resolves the speculation about joint ownership, at least for the moment. As a result of the sensitivity of the project, we encourage the Government of Ethiopia not to allow either equity or linked participation at this time.<sup>11</sup>

#### VI. *Principle of Confidence Building*

- *Priority will be given to downstream countries to purchase power generated from GERD.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

1. Clean energy production and sale reduces the downstream countries' dependency on fossil fuel generated energy. Hence, this is not just a "confidence building" issue. It has direct and measurable economic consequences, and hence needs to be imputed in the pricing of electricity for the proposed sale.
2. In many economies electricity falls within rate regulated industries. Hence, pricing for domestic use will be different from pricing for export. International pricing will be a more complicated issue and may not be easily decoupled from the type of

intergovernmental relationships that emerge in the region.

3. The word "will" is equivocal since it has several meanings in the legal lexicon as in thesaurus, and hence may serve as a point of future contention.

#### VII. *Principle of Exchange of Information and Data; Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan shall provide data and information needed for the conduct of the TNC joint studies in good faith and in a timely manner.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

1. As indicated earlier, the IPoE had already stated that the social and environmental aspects of the project in downstream countries need an additional study. The availability of such information should enable

**“ In the absence of an exclusion clause for the tributaries, this clause may be used to restrict Ethiopia from developing irrigation projects on any of the tributaries of Blue Nile.”**

Ethiopia to complete the study. As indicated above, the study however needs to be comprehensive, and does not have to be confined to the project.

2. Data accuracy, completeness and integrity can be sticky problems.
3. Certain technical (engineering design, formulae, etc.) information might be proprietary and therefore confidential. The parties need to determine the minimum level of disclosure.

#### VIII. *Principle of Dam Safety*

- *The three countries appreciate the efforts undertaken thus far by Ethiopia in implementing the IPoE recommendations pertinent to the GERD safety.*
- *Ethiopia shall in good faith continue the full implementation of the Dam safety recommendations as per the*

*IPoE report.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

1. Dam safety is as important for Ethiopia as it is for downstream countries. Notwithstanding this it is important to ensure that "best practice" is followed so that habitations and civilisations in downstream countries are not threatened by faulty construction and substandard operations.
2. Downstream countries are formally acknowledging Ethiopia's compliance effort, and it is good.

#### IX. *Principle of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity*

- *The three countries shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilisation and adequate protection of the River.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

1. The concept of "sovereign equality" features in many international agreements, conventions and constitutive acts (example the African Union), and is defined in the UN's 1990 Declaration on Principles.<sup>12</sup> It states that "sovereign equality" includes the following elements: (a) States are judicially equal; (b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; (c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; (d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable; (e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems; (f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other States.<sup>13</sup>
2. This article is fairly standard and also features in the 1993 framework. However, it is unlikely to override the articles that dealt with damages and rights that appear to have been voluntarily ceded to downstream countries in connection with the Blue/Main Nile and its tributaries.

#### X. *Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*

- *The Three countries will settle disputes, arising out of the interpretation or implementation of this agreement, amicably through consultation or negotiation in accordance with the principle of good faith. If the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute through consultation or negotiation, they may jointly request for conciliation, mediation or refer the matter for the consideration of the Heads of State.*

#### Our Brief Assessments

This article is also fairly standard. It evolves from the UN 1990 Convention and that of the UN Charter. When this article is read together with Principle 1 of this tripartite Agreement, it brings back the 1997 Convention and the mediation, arbitration and determination role of the International Court of Justice. Ethiopia's experience with arbitration has not been good and the Algiers Agreement and the ruling made by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission<sup>14</sup> are too fresh to be forgotten. Despite this fact, with lopsided clauses stacked against Ethiopia and in the absence of sound rules and principles governing the Nile water allocation and management, a "third party", particularly in the context of the Nile Basin Cooperation Framework Agreement may lead to a better outcome.

#### **Concluding Remarks**

In summary, when the recent tripartite Agreement on the GERD is compared with the 1993 bilateral agreement, though in many respects the spirits of the two agreements appear similar, there are important differences. The current Agreement reaffirms Article 5 of the 1993 agreement which favoured Egypt, includes terms about compensation for damages, restricts the scope of the dam project, recognises "rights" to take action on the Blue/Main Nile, is sloppy on water utilisation in downstream countries, and the non-exclusion of the tributaries from the Agreement cumulatively puts Ethiopia at a disadvantage.

The obvious and fundamental question that arises in the minds of many observers is whether a reasonable government representative

of an independent upstream country, irrespective of his/her political credo, would sign without duress, the tripartite Agreement in its present form. In light of the above analysis and consistent with our initial reaction of March 24, 2015, we reiterate our statement that no free nation should be subjected to be a party to such a lopsided and risky Agreement.

We also think the shared Nile waters represent opportunities for all riparian counties. However, the good fortunes emanating from the Nile can only be leveraged if all riparian countries are able to overcome the seemingly self-interest maximising but counter-productive zero-sum game actions. The Nile Basin can only facilitate the much needed African regional integration if all parties know how to share both the costs and benefits from

**“Trans-boundary water flows, by their nature, are susceptible to the tragedy of the commons – that attempts by individual nations acting independently or in a dominant manner could only damage the common resource, and recognise that only shared responsibilities can guarantee shared benefits.”**

this rich resource. Hence, the central point of departure for making bilateral, tripartite, quadripartite (as the case may be) agreements should be the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement, which includes all the riparian states, and centres around the equitable sharing of the trans-boundary watercourses. Egypt must not be allowed to maintain its supremacy by undermining the regional cooperation framework that is already in motion.

Hence, in the interest of an equitable, fair, sustainable, comprehensive solution that guarantees shared benefits and responsibilities, we, therefore, call upon:

- Policymakers and stakeholders of all riparian counties to understand that trans-boundary water flows, by their nature, are susceptible to the tragedy of the commons – that attempts by individual nations acting independently or in a dominant manner could only damage the common resource, and recognise that only shared responsibilities can guarantee shared benefits;
- The parties to the current Declaration to rectify the unfair, unequitable and unsustainable clauses that are damaging any party, Ethiopia in particular;
- All political parties in the riparian states refrain from using the shared waters of the Nile for their self-preserving interests;
- The Declaration and future negotiations should evolve from the laudable Nile Basin Cooperative Agreement;<sup>15</sup>
- Any signed treaties and declaration of principles be immediately translated into major Ethiopian and other riparian states languages so that the general public is aware of what is going on;
- Hydrologists, economists, lawyers, ecologists, geoscientists, sociologists, water engineers and diplomats etc., in the region to make professional contributions so that the water sharing problem is resolved for the benefit of all in the region. ■

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**ERITREA: A SINKING SHIP?**

# The AU must prevent another Failed State in the Horn of Africa



The security services moved swiftly and arrested 13 top army generals and government officials and journalists on September 18, 2001. Ever since, these officials, all leaders of the liberation struggle, remain in prisons in obscure places.

By Adane Ghebremeskel

In October, 2013, a 24 year-old Eritrean woman, Akberet, one of the survivors, speaking to the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* narrated what had happened on board the 66ft long boat that capsized half a

nautical mile off the Italian island of Lampedusa. The boat was carrying 450 to 500 refugees; the majority of them were Eritreans. She said “There was a panic when a fire broke out on the boat – believed to have been started

when someone lit a blanket to try to attract the attention of authorities as the vessel lay half a mile ashore. There were flames that were destroying the boat. We started to scream and then jumped into the water. Then I swam with all my strength. I saw many people die next to me. I thought I would die too. I’m just glad to be alive – I’ve reached Italy after years of desperation. I’m trying to find a better life and safer place.”

In the recent months the world was shaken and its moral values were questioned when a ship carrying more than 900 refugees sank in the Mediterranean Sea killing all of them but 27. More than 350 of the perished refugees are said to be Eritreans. At that time a video was broadcast showing the so-called ISIS group mercilessly executing young Eritreans and Ethiopians in Lydia, Turkey.

Thousands of Eritrean families across the country and the diaspora are engulfed with sadness and grief not only about the death of their young ones, but also about their helplessness to find closure and bring about lasting change in their hellish conditions.

During his visit to Lampedusa on the eve of the tragedy in October 2013, Pope Francis lamented about “the globalisation of indifference”. The utter silence and indifference exhibited by the Eritrean government all this time is indeed a clear admission of its responsibility for creating the conditions that have driven tens of thousands of young Eritreans to misery and death. Eritreans are under no illusion to expect anything different from the government, given its past record. They have, however, legitimate expectations from their African brothers and sisters, especially their continental body, the African Union, to stand up on their behalf – on the side of justice and human dignity.

The indifference of the African Union (AU) is an indictment of the institution and of African leaders. Their behaviour is in total contradiction of the founding principles of the African Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Union Constitutive Act, the African Charter, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and other declarations by the AU. The silence is

not only a betrayal of the aspirations of the people of Africa to live in dignity in their own continent and be protected everywhere in the world. The silence is also a clear statement which suggests that the African Union, like its predecessor the OAU, and its leaders, continue to hide behind the “principle of territorial integrity and national sovereignty” to avoid the responsibility of upholding the sovereignty, rights and dignity of the people of Africa.

As an African it is painful to see a contrary reaction by the European Union. Soon after the incident was reported the European Union held an emergency summit where it came up with a ten point plan to respond to the escalating humanitarian catastrophe at its gate. The question about the motive for the EU to react to the situation is immaterial at this moment. The fact that it reacted to the continuing tragedy, while the African Union appears to be indifferent to the death of Africans is very worrying.

Indeed, the recent tragedies are not the first and definitely not the last ones. As long as the African Union and African leaders do not take concerted and decisive actions to pressure the dictatorial regime in Asmara, young Eritreans will continue to leave their country in search of safety. Along the way they will continue to perish in their numbers. The accounts of survivors of the events leading to the sinking of the ships they were travelling on indeed resemble the current state of Eritrea. It is critical that the African Union take urgent action to prevent the worst – a failed state in the Horn of Africa.

In order to understand the humanitarian catastrophe, it is important to look into its root causes. This approach is unfortunately ignored by the world’s media.

### **Liberation Struggle – Betrayed Promises**

Eritrea gained its independence in 1991 after a three-decade war of liberation. The national liberation struggle was supported by the entire population. Self-reliance was the fundamental principle that guided the struggle which was highly isolated in the context of the cold war. To cement this principle the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) established

broad-based mass organisations both within the liberated and semi-liberated areas and among Eritrean diaspora communities all over the world. Using mass organisations as vehicles, the EPLF conducted political education that contributed to the deepening of a national revolutionary consciousness among the broad masses of Eritrea.

Though the revolution was led by former students the bulk of the membership of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Army (EPLA) was made up of the peasantry. In true articulation of the Eritrean people’s aspirations the EPLF adopted a series of vision documents. The most remarkable one was the 1987 political programme in which EPLF declared the establishment of an inclusive democratic political system as its core political objective. The programme signified a departure from its radical leftist political ideology declared in 1977. The

Congress, a constitution was drafted through a largely participatory and inclusive process. The constitution was ratified in May 1997. Before it could be ratified by the president for full implementation the border war with Ethiopia suddenly erupted.

There are at least two opposing narrations regarding the circumstances surrounding the eruption of the war. The one narration espoused by a majority of Eritreans focused on Ethiopia, in particular the Tigrayan political elite within the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF). According to this Eritrean narration the latter harboured a long-standing, ill-intentioned ambition to reverse Eritrean independence and create a Greater Tigray by annexing all Tigrigna speaking peoples and other territories of the region. To cement their argument the proponents of the position refer to the 1976 Political Manifesto of TPLF, now the central



Politically sensitive picture:- 13 Members of Executive Committee of EPLF 1977–1987. Eleven of those in the picture either died in obscure circumstances, still languishing in prisons for decades or forced to exile.

shift corresponded with the ensuing global political trends following from rapprochement between the then Soviet Union and the United States. It was more a response to the growing demand from within the rank and files of the liberation movement for reform. The position was once again reiterated by the decision of the 3rd and last congress of the movement in 1994 at which the EPLF transformed itself into a party and renamed itself the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).

Pursuant of the resolution of the 3rd

political force within the coalition party of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, a ruling party in Ethiopia. Both the internal administrative re-arrangement of Ethiopia based on the federal constitutional provision which ironically permits the right to secession, and the incremental encroachment of the local Tigrayan militias into Eritrean territories since the early period of Eritrean independence are mentioned as active moves towards the creation of a legal and political reality on the ground. Such public narrative is a source of a deep-

seated suspicion towards Ethiopia. Of course, Ethiopians also have their own narrative about what the motive could have been for the eruption of the war.

### Border War with Ethiopia – A Smoke Screen?

Whether the above narration is true or not, it greatly reignited Eritrean nationalism and mobilised Eritreans, both inside and outside the country, in support of the war. Whether serious consideration was given to other political options to deal with the border dispute besides going to war is a fundamental question that still begs an answer. Critics suggest that the war was a pretext to derail the democratisation process.

The war consumed more than a hundred thousand lives of young people on both sides; tens of thousands were disabled; and tens of thousands of people have been displaced from their homes. The border war was disastrous for Eritrea. Though the regime in Asmara continues to be in utter denial, the cost of the war for Eritrea was disastrous not only in actual expenditure, but also in missed opportunities.

In the few years of post-independence remarkable progress was achieved. With dedication of Eritreans from all walks of life basic infrastructures and social services, such as health and education, were rehabilitated. Social reintegration programmes were implemented; many refugees and exiled, peasants, workers, business people and professionals alike, returned to the country and their home areas to start a new life in an independent country.

The border war with Ethiopia reversed most of the gains. One of the most serious implications of the war was the attack on the nascent democratisation process. The people and the leadership took the war as a question of survival to which all human and material resources were committed. After decades of protracted war the modest infrastructure and economic fundamentals were practically destroyed. The Eritrean family as a fundamental economic and social unit was highly threatened by migration and constant mobility within the country in search of safety.

The signing of the Algiers Peace Accord (2001) opened the way forward for reconstruction, and the democratisation process resumed. A number of legislative frameworks were promulgated, including the Political Party Act and the Press Law, with the purpose of introducing and regulating political plurality and the opening of private print media, respectively. At the same time, key military generals and government ministers asked for a party congress to be convened for the sole purpose of taking stock of the war. However, the request landed on deaf ears. The president refused to convene the congress. Instead the government-controlled public media waged a smear campaign against the top officials and military commanders accusing them of exhibiting 'defeatist' positions. In an unprecedented manner more and

“Since 2001 the national assembly as well as the party statutory structures, such as the Congress, the Central Committee and the Executive Committee, have not been convened.”

more top officials came out in the private print press to give their own accounts on the governance challenges that country was facing.

As the world was still in the state of shock as the result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the security services moved swiftly and arrested 13 top army generals and government officials and journalists on September 18, 2001. Ever since, these officials, all leaders of the liberation struggle, remain in prisons in obscure places. They were never charged in a court of law. It is rumoured that many of them have since died in prison.

The catastrophe of 18 September was indeed a triumph for the authoritarian tendency that has shaped the political culture of EPLF all along. Violence was always justified as a

means to a political end. This is not only due to the nature of the struggle – armed struggle, but also due to the purpose violence served in the internal power struggle within EPLF. Though there were statutory structures, their functions were closely directed and controlled by a highly secretive political party which was in command of all political direction and decisions of the movement. Shielded by its secrecy the party took no responsibility and accountability for any things that happened in the movement. This gave those in control of the secretive party, especially the then First Secretary Issaias Afewerki, a free hand to abuse the party for his own political ambition. Persecution, disappearance and extra-judicial killings of presumed opponents were common within EPLF. Eventually, the secret party became a personal instrument of the first secretary.

Having accomplished its purpose, the secret party was dissolved at a secret meeting of its central committee held in January 1993. No structure was officially announced to take up the role played by the secret party. However, a new clique around the president evolved, and this increasingly became highly dominant over the body politics of the country. The evident legacy of the secret party was a deep-seated fear among the rank and file of the movement for an 'invisible' hand of those in power. After independence, the fear eventually took root in the whole society as critical voices were brutally silenced. The violent action and human rights abuses were justified through nationalist propaganda. The violent suppression of protest by war-disabled who asked for better living conditions in 1992; the persecution of some Muslims and other Christians as well as journalists attests to this. Banal 'nationalist' justification was given by the government to these serious human rights atrocities that went without serious objection from the people or any other segment of the society.

The constitution-making and other reform processes started to incrementally challenge the established political culture. With a determined outcome, namely a more democratic and relatively open political dispensation, it was quite evident that

the various human rights violations and other mal-governance practices would have to be accounted for. Furthermore, the constitution would have allowed credible and transparent elections to legitimise the holding of state power.

To prevent the emergence of such a political environment in the country, the border war could be seen as a good opportunity to preserve the status quo that is characterised by one-man authoritarian rule. The first targets were nascent state institutions the courts, the statutory structures of the party, the national assembly and the ministries. Establishing Special Military Courts run by military persons with no legal knowledge to examine legal cases was a deliberate move by the President to undermine the courts and obliterate the justice system of the country. Since 2001 the national assembly as well as the party statutory structures, such as the Congress, the Central Committee and the Executive Committee, have not been convened. Decisions and actions taken by the government, rather by the President, have never been a result of deliberation and/or subjected to review by these national and party structures.

This gave the President absolute power over national matters. Furthermore, the absence of a national budget approved by the national assembly is a clear indication of a political system at play which is totally devoid of any form of accountability and transparency in the allocation and utilisation of national resources. Ministries have no budget; they have to request resources from the presidency for every initiative they intend to undertake. The approval is at the discretion of the president.

Moreover, the government has never declared the revenues gained from gold, other mining ventures or general taxes. In fact, under the disguise of the party a number of companies and business ventures were set up; these now operate within the country without paying any taxes or import duties. These companies dominate all sectors of the economy at the expense of Eritrean entrepreneurship. Some companies also have operations outside the country, for example in Uganda and South Sudan, which are fronted by conspicuous individuals.

Neither the party nor the national treasury has control of the income of these 'mafia' type operations.

As recent reports from agencies working in global transparency suggest, hundreds millions of dollars have been deposited in Swiss banks by conspicuous individuals from Eritrea in the last few years. These individuals consist of the president and people close to him.

Some analysts equate the prevailing system in Eritrea to the general phenomenon of post-liberation political developments. Algeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola are often mentioned as comparable cases. Though these cases may share certain similarities with Eritrea, the Eritrean situation is unique. In the Eritrean case the state and party structures were sacrificed for the absolute personal power of the president, whereas in the other post-liberation cases the parties and the state structures are the sources of a legitimate power.

Moreover, militarisation has been employed in Eritrea as a strategy for gaining total control over the society. The national military service literally put every able-bodied citizen under military structures through which the government gains total control, not only on an individual's physical whereabouts, but also his/her physiological and emotional being. Unique to the regime in Eritrea is also its deep-seated hate for economic self-reliance amongst its citizens, for education and for intellectuals. The youth in particular have been the primary victims of this. Kept for years, if not decades, in military service the youth are denied a proper education that would enable them to acquire necessary skills. The only university in the country has remained closed for the last thirteen years for no other reason than the protests by students objecting to the abuse of military service by the regime.

As part of its aggrandisement project in the region, the regime has been harbouring a number of armed rebels whose maintenance – their recruitment, and arming and financing their cross-border operations – do not come cheap to the poor country. According to intelligence information,

it is claimed that the various opposition groups, mainly Ethiopian armed groups, are said to have between 30 000 and 50 000 armed members. This is in addition to the relatively big size of the army – more than a third of Eritreans still living in the country are in one way or another members of the Eritrean army.

The government justifies the high-level militarisation by pointing to the unresolved border conflict with Ethiopia. Ethiopia said that it accepted the verdict of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Commission which handed the symbolic town of Badme to Eritrea. However, Ethiopia refused to implement the Border Commission's decisions arguing that it wants political negotiations on the matter. Ethiopia continues to occupy sovereign Eritrean territory and this situation has contributed to the continuing no-war/no-peace situation for the last 13 years. The situation seems to help the regime in Asmara to continue drumming its pseudo-nationalist rhetoric, using it as a pretext to hold the country and its people to ransom. Indeed so great is the suspicion among some Eritreans about Ethiopia that it makes them unwillingly sympathise with the regime on this point. If Ethiopia were willing to implement the Border Commission's decision it would undermine the regime's spurious nationalist rhetoric, and thereby further isolate it internally.

### **A Clique in Power and a Possible Scenario**

Outside observers often have difficulty in understanding the system in operation in Eritrea. While the official cabinet and a party structure are in place, the actual power of decision making, allocation of resources and taking action are in the hands of a clique with a highly amorphous structure with constant changes of its members. The permanent feature of the clique is President Issaias Afwerki. He is at its centre and steers its highly informal and secretive operations. For the last few years, the head of finance of the party Hagos Gebrihiwet and the head of political affairs of the party Yemane Gebreab have managed to remain members of the clique. Some generals of the army come in and out of the circle

time and again. The head of the secret service Abraha Kassa, around whom there are another bunch of individuals, remains loyal to the president. The clique controls the finance of the country, including the revenues from the gold and other minerals as well as the formal and informal business ventures; it also controls a well-financed secret service operating within the army and the civilian population within and outside the country.

For some time the clique managed to sway the majority of Eritreans under the disguise of nationalism. As its human rights abuses and brutality has surfaced, its major instrument has become brute violence. The culture of impunity created by the clique is such that even lower level army and secret service officials have a free hand to imprison, torture and kill anyone they want. Extra-judicial executions, torture and imprisonment of young national service members is a common practice in the army. Army officials can execute any of their members for any offence. There is a total absence of accountability.

Corruption is deeply imbedded in the system. As long as officials demonstrate loyalty to the President, they have a free hand to plunder state resources and extort money from citizens, especially business people, in exchange for protection. As the report of the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia attested, some top army officials close to the president are said to be masterminding human trafficking and arms trade in the region.

This deliberately created situation serves the clique in power well as it puts senior officials and army officers in a highly compromised position, making it unlikely that they will ask questions on issues of national importance. Consequently, the system is a closely-knit web of personal interests. One's survival in the system is entirely dependent on one's ability to demonstrate total loyalty to the president.

At some point such oppressive systems become unsustainable. Currently, the clique seems to have reached that level. The centre does not hold any longer. Many officials continue to abandon the regime, either because they fall out of grace, or

just listen to their conscience. In fact, intelligence reports say that the clique is increasingly relying on Ethiopian armed opposition groups inside Eritrea for its security. The sentiment and discontent with the majority members of the Eritrean army is quite clear as the army mutiny of January 2013 and many other protests indicated.

Conflict between the Eritrean army and the Ethiopian armed groups whose survival is closely linked to the survival of the clique is inevitable. Such a development would be likely to create a power vacuum rendering Eritrea a failed state. For legitimate and non-legitimate reasons this would invite the intervention of neighbouring states, especially that of Ethiopia and the Sudan. In addition, the likelihood of radical terrorist groups finding a presence in Eritrea is high if the geographical proximity to Yemen is taken into consideration. There are a number of consequences that could emanate from such a scenario:

- Yemen in civil war combined with the absence of a central government in Eritrea would make the Red Sea basin and Bab el Mendeb highly insecure places; this would seriously jeopardise the security of naval transport and international trade;
- The civil war in Somalia and South Sudan combined with internal insecurity in Eritrea would exacerbate the already precarious security situation and instability in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, as the headquarters of the African Union Commission would not be spared from the consequences.
- The humanitarian situation would worsen and put neighbouring states under extreme socio-economic and political pressure, leading to an accelerated exodus of Eritreans, Sudanese, Somalis and Ethiopians to Europe in search of security and a better life.

This scenario would indeed represent a movement in the opposite direction from the 2063 vision of the African Union.

In the words of the SADC Council of NGOs, "It is highly worrying that African leaders and the African Union have not taken any substantial measures to address and respond to

the growing humanitarian crisis in the country, which has spilled over to neighbouring countries and beyond. The UNHRC COI has characterised the crisis in Eritrea constituting crimes against humanity, and that it is the threatening regional and international peace and security."

As a primary agent of continental peace and security, the African Union is duty-bound to seize the momentum and be proactive to prevent the above scenario from occurring. The AU Commission must urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Eritrea to assess the situation at first hand. It is important that the mission demands free and open access to citizens and organisations, including political prisoners, as well as Eritreans in the diaspora. It must impress upon the Eritrean government the need to change and improve the human rights situation in the country by:

- unconditionally releasing political prisoners;
- demobilising members of the national service who have served longer than the legally stipulated period with adequate compensation for the service rendered;
- guarantee the citizens the right to move freely within and outside the country; and
- allow independent media to operate.


At the same time, as the guarantor of the Algiers Peace Accord, the AU should insist that Ethiopia fully accept the Algiers Peace Accord and implement the Border Commission's decision without further delay. The AU has to declare Eritrea as a country in crisis requiring AU intervention; hence, make Eritrea an agenda point of the AU Peace and Security Commission. The AU should put forward an engagement plan with the government of Eritrea and also with organised Eritreans in the diaspora.

Through the implementation of such a process the AU can assist Eritreans to find a common ground for dialogue on the future of their country. The ultimate purpose of the national dialogue process must be the establishment of a constitutional and democratic political dispensation in the country in support of peace and security in Eritrea and the whole region. ■



**THE BRANCH**

# The Base from which to forge Unity in Action



If our branches are drained of moral and political content, they will simply become compliant and symbolic formations with no legitimacy or propriety to be the guardians of the revolution and the architects of a better tomorrow for our communities.

By Darkey Africa

Sometimes, odious circumstances can militate against and pre-empt the realisation of the objectives of an organisation. When such situations arise, a critical appraisal is imperative to assess and harness the collective capabilities, experiences and skills of those who constitute such an organisation to prevent any potential crisis or harm to the organisation or the weakening of its resolve to manage change and efficiency.

In such circumstances, greater weight and emphasis will always be placed on the need for unity. Not unity for its own sake, but unity for organisational efficiency, recognising and affirming the branch as the basic unit for cohesion, solidarity, development, democracy and leadership in a specific

locality. Therefore, the starting point at the current moment is to rethink how we can all positively and openly contribute to the ideal local scenario to achieve our collective objectives, and advance the fulfilment of the demands of the people as articulated in the Freedom Charter 60 years ago.

This, more than anything, requires a commitment to rebuild our common purpose and rejuvenate the spirit of the branch as the oasis for fundamental and sustainable unity and cohesion. As is well-known, unity presupposes forging a common platform and purpose with those with whom you may not see eye to eye within your own organisation. Any exclusion, whether done wittingly or unwittingly, defeats the purpose of unity. In this brief contribution,

with the branch at the centre of our efforts, I will outline the steps we need to undertake to strengthen the process aimed at rebuilding our movement in anticipation of the local government elections 2016 and beyond. I will explain how branches can be strengthened to play their combined roles as centres for political education and repositories for unity, positive politics and engines for local change. In this effort, not only leading comrades but also those designated as minor players all have a significant contribution to make.

Undergirding the Freedom Charter is a deliberate determination to make people the centre, subject and object of development. This understanding cannot be perceived to be external

to the culture and tradition of the movement. Rather, the construction of a people-centred and people-driven government derives precisely from the praxis within the movement, to conceive membership as the key driver and shaper of the movement's policy direction. Hence, institutionally and organisationally, this translated in the appropriation of the Branch as the basic unit and also the base for the movement in the determination of policy.

The ANC must prioritise the need to address and resolve critical organisational issues at all levels. This must be done to ensure that our collective effort is geared towards maximum unity within our structures, and also ensuring that our collective energy is deployed towards positive developments. As cadres, we have correctly done some introspection and came to the inevitable conclusion that we need to collectively contribute to the re-vitalisation of the branch.

This must invoke in all of us, irrespective of the views we hold about the current situation, and each other, a new and definitive urgency for engagement and reconnection broadly for the sake of our movement. Sometimes, when our best and sincere intentions are distorted deliberately or simply misunderstood then our revolutionary resilience must be invoked. And such a time is now.

For too long our energies were dispatched and utilised negatively, creating organisational inefficiencies and weaknesses, and also engendering behaviour and solidifying attitudes inimical to the values, tradition and unwritten norms of the movement. Certain positions taken by many, deriving from this environment, are used to justify demeaning and divisive tendencies devoid of politics. This clash of positions is always used as the carrier of our crisis and disunity. We need to recast positively our politics with the branch as our oasis. A better and long-term political and organisational unity trajectory is imperative. Using our collective energy and organising experience as our compass, we certainly can break the "Berlin Wall", which has cast us as different and hostile sets of ANC members. The

ANC's 53rd National Conference re-affirmed the role of the branch as the basic unit of the movement and instructed all its cadres to carry out and fulfil the following tasks, among others:

- Intensify branch work in each community through the *Imvuselelo* (Tsoseletso) campaign, to ensure sustainable mass work and establish ANC branches as vanguards of communities; and to make branches the focus of political and ideological work of senior leadership and cadreship of the movement, including a nationally driven political education programme.

We may ask the question, to what extent were these tasks carried out? If these tasks had been taken seriously, there would probably have been no space for the pervasive community protests which engulfed the country in the recent past. We need to make sure and always measure our branch work against the following:

- its role in mobilising communities around issues of local transformation and development;
- engagement of members in political programmes and campaigns;
- a high level of political consciousness and ongoing engagement with the important challenges of the movement;
- a united, cohesive (local) leadership which provides strategic political direction;
- establishment of Freedom Charter forums to engage our people around issues of service delivery, as we prepare for the 2016 Local government elections;
- its capacity to recruit and induct new members, and practically engage them in the political life of the branch;
- its ability to effectively mobilise the available resources, including the skills, experiences and creativity of all its members in pursuit of ANC programmes;
- its relationship with other sectors, community groups and influential community leaders and its ability to build local partnerships for transformation;
- its ability to concretise the general programme of action into a local plan of action in line with

local conditions and community concerns;

- its good relationship with, and ability to provide leadership to the Leagues and the Alliance (where such exists); and
- its ability to provide leadership and support (not to manipulate) to councillors and ensure that they are accountable to the ANC and the entire community.

Have our branches fulfilled these ideals? If not, why not? If partly so, what needs to be done to consolidate progress and inspire and support those who strive hard to create functional, viable, united and motivated branches at all times, not only for conferences and elections? If our branches are drained of moral and political content, they will simply become compliant and symbolic formations with no legitimacy or propriety to be the guardians of the revolution and the architects of a better tomorrow for our communities.

We need to and can in our individual capacities and collectively contribute to a branch which can do Good. In diagnosing certain disorders in local politics we need a prognosis which will bring rigour with respect and renewal with magnanimity. We need to use our branches to re-earn ANC support in the community and as a school for political consciousness. Each branch is unique with diverse personalities and varying capacities. They also span a number of generations. We must ensure that the potential of each branch and cadre is unleashed.

Unlike in Gauteng, in the North West we have never conducted any study to help us to evaluate the efficacy of our branches and determine what ANC members really value about belonging to the ANC. Neither have we done a comprehensive survey on the state of branches. Maybe this task is for a different period. For now, our immediate task is to rebuild, reconnect, unite and work sustainably together, to position the ANC as the force for a comprehensive and home-grown phase to work with everybody who is a member of the ANC in good standing to forge unity, restore leadership and legitimacy; and to cease and desist from the politics of "label-marketing". We need to

owe allegiance to the ANC and its alliance partners.

What minimum steps are possible therefore under the circumstances? The following list, whilst not exhaustive, could help to chart a new common political trajectory:

1. Engage respectfully with all branch leaders, as ordinary members, and generate discussions and appropriate political programmes to build and invigorate cohesion.
  2. Under the leadership of constitutional structures, meet with alliance leaders to determine commonality of approach and agree on appropriate and long-term programmes.
  3. Engage all comrades who have designated themselves as belonging to certain definable or undefinable groups or tendencies and share, genuinely, views on the need for unity, renewal and a sense of belonging to one family of revolutionaries despite our varying views and perceived, imagined, or real constructed loyalties.
  4. Acknowledge that something has affected our comradely relationship negatively and that we need to bring back the real ANC. Our contribution should never be motivated by a hidden desire or ambition for any position in the structures of the ANC nor prestige by association to the movement.
  5. Determine clear and manageable time-lines to restore and ensure that ANC members across all branches work together for the common good, growth and functionality of the ANC in our area and beyond, (we must be cosmopolitan).
  6. Positively, ensure that all ANC members assist to rebuild the ANC, improve relations, analyse oppositional forces, improve governance and service delivery so that no space is created to weaken the ANC, both inside and outside government.
  7. Meet as soon as possible with the regional executive to promote discussion about renewal and unity in action under the auspices of a credible and legitimate environment.
- These seven steps, in no order

of priority, constitute the first steps towards claiming and creating the space and necessary inspiration in which the ANC and its collective membership can really do Good to itself and the community it has a historical obligation to serve. To effectively and strategically prepare for 2016, we must reconnect our people with the ideals of the Freedom Charter 60 years on, and remove the flaws from all floors.

Our mission, therefore, executed with commitment and conviction, is to make sure that all sets of members feel at home in the ANC. Maybe then a new trajectory or sustainable unity could evolve and manifest itself amongst us.

### **Communication as a Strategy Instrument**

All revolutions are sustained through ideological hegemonic stories of success and acknowledgements of failures. The recognition of failures is the means by

“ Each branch is unique with diverse personalities and varying capacities. They also span a number of generations. We must ensure that the potential of each branch and cadre is unleashed.”

which leaders of the revolution wish to improve on past performances. The perception of non-delivery among our communities and the emergence of an anti-ANC ideological pathogen are indicative of the communicative weakness of the ANC both inside and outside government. As cadres it must concern us that possibilities exist for counter-revolutionaries to influence and shape the thinking of our people.

One of two conclusions may be drawn from this: first, that we have not done enough to advertise the decisions of the movement regarding

any matter, and that therefore a fertile breeding ground exists for counter-revolutionaries to impregnate the minds of communities with falsehoods and to misrepresent the objectives of the ANC. Or, secondly, that indeed there exists a degree of legitimacy in the protestations about service delivery in the province. As regards the latter, we must scientifically engage with the performance of the ANC in government with a view to enhance the ability of government to meet the delivery needs of our people.

Concerted efforts must be made to strengthen the capacity of government to adequately communicate its achievements and explain its inability to deliver in certain cases and the challenges it faces and the complexities of the situation where necessary. As a liberation movement our communication with the masses should start from the premise that they are entitled to know, that the ANC in government is about them. It is only if we pursue an honest dialogical approach that our people will stay with us, as they did during the dark days of repression. However, where our failures result from bureaucratic inertia, we must communicate how these are to be dealt with to ensure that service delivery is not compromised simply because of lack of capacity, corruption or incompetence.

Similarly, the communication lacuna that exists in between elections between our communities and the ANC does provide the material conditions for the forces of reaction and agent provocateurs who find our people susceptible to infestation with reactionary ideas. We must strive to disseminate the perspective of the ANC on all aspects of our socio-political programmes to ensure that no room for doubt exists among our communities. We must ensure that all our members are imbued with the knowledge and information on the rationale for any policy position and the perspective within which such policies are articulated.

The solution to this challenge may be multi-pronged, but must, of necessity, include an open and honest dialogical engagement with our communities on a continuous basis. ■

**EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

# A Cautionary Tale

The challenge for Europe has been less about the resurgence of national interests than about the absence of a European political narrative that binds Europe's national states together.

By Mxolisi Notshulwana

When the European Union (EU) resolved in 2012 to establish a banking union, it did so because other ideas for deepening integration seemed controversial. Surrendering sovereignty over national banking systems was an easier political sell than ceding national powers to borrow and lend to Brussels. Yet, the continuing Greek crisis shows that the banking union involves more than just a delegation of sovereignty. In May 2015, when Greece was weeks away from running out of cash, talks with its creditors in the EU and in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) deadlocked over reform measures including pension cuts and labour market liberalisation that the socialist government in Greece was told to implement.

The Greek crisis places the most advanced experiment of supranational regional integration in modern history in jeopardy. Significant attempts by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF have been deployed to contain the problem in Greece. Seemingly these interventions have not been able to contain nor capture the problem. If anything, the Greek crisis is increasingly exposing the fragile foundations and structural fault-lines of the European integration process. For a long time, the absence of a European think tank

or collective narrative has catapulted the rise of political and economic nationalism within states. This process has culminated in fierce contestation between national and regional policy making.

The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) ratified in Maastricht in 1993 led to intense and multiple fixations of national narratives. Since then, Europe has been confronted by the political and economic crisis of leadership at both national and continental levels. The Greek crisis has spawned several questions about the process of regional integration:

- How will Europe manage internal political evolution and institutional development?
- What interventions will Europe use to close the gap between the European Monetary architecture and national fiscal consolidation?
- What institutional framework will Europe use to move towards a common European fiscal policy?
- How will the crisis affect the EU's global outlook?
- More importantly, what are the lessons in the European crisis for Africa?

One thing that has emerged prominently in most analyses of the ongoing Greek crisis is that the European experiment of regional

integration cannot be allowed to fail. However, the Greek crisis is showing the limitation and fallacy in privileging the economic, neoliberal and market-oriented factors over national and political factors. Clearly, the EU is not simply a heterogeneous collection of states with conflicting interests nor is it a homogeneous economic and political project. The EU's integration agenda is a complex and dynamic process that has had negative impact "on the traditional workings of ... national democracies" (Schmidt 2008:1).

**Integration or Disintegration?**

The landmark Treaty of Rome in 1958 that established the European Economic Community (EEC) coupled with the ambitious roadmap for European Monetary Union (EMU) were unprecedented in the history of regional integration. Most writings on the current crisis in Europe have identified one of its causes as the "... resurgence of national interests in a time when global issues have become vital" (Bastin 2012:11). The challenge for Europe has been less about the resurgence of national interests than about the absence of a European political narrative that binds Europe's national states together.

For the past two decades, the evolution of multi-level governance in the EU and member states, with executive authority and parliamentary representation occurring at different levels, has had an impact on national decision making within states. In this regard, a great deal has been written about "democratic deficit" with a major focus on EU institutions (Schmidt 2008). The EU is criticised for its complex and non-transparent decision making processes and weak representation. Therefore, the fragility of the European integration project is not so much an economic or money problem as it is a political crisis of the European nation state.

A period of intense scrutiny and evaluation of the EU integration process in respect to structure, institutions, regulations and member states' obligations occurred in the decade of the 1980s. This time saw increasing perception that the United States was steaming ahead and Europe was falling behind in its global competitiveness. The

decade of the 1990s culminated in the consolidation and institutionalisation of the highest stage of regional integration in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty provided for the establishment of the European institutions envisaged in the 1980s: the European Monetary Union – with a Common Currency – the Euro, and the European Central Bank (ECB).

During this period, there was penetrating discourse on the EMU, some of it was very sceptical and some in support of the process. The *Economist Intelligence* (1988:7) predicted: "... this [will] lead to an unpleasant scenario all around. Because Europe's governments have signed away national control of interest rates, fiscal policy is the only tool at hand if the single monetary policy leaves their economies growing more slowly than they might, or faster than they can sustain without pressure on wages and property prices." As if foretelling the present day Euro crisis, the *Economist* further posited that: "... in the longer run, such problems will recede. The euro's effect, indeed one of its purposes, will be to bring the performance of Europe's economies more closely into line. But the process of bringing that convergence about may prove unpleasant. The politicians who wax enthusiastic about Europe's fledgling central bank today are likely to be far less enamoured when that reality hits home."

The *Economist Intelligence* raised the same concerns that were expressed by many economists from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Writing in the *Wall Street Journal*, Kristal (1998), made an equally dire prediction about both the EMU and ECB: "... central bankers have their merits, but they also suffer from professional myopia. Their main concerns are (and will be), keeping inflation down and balancing the budget, which are all right in themselves. But the new European Central Bank, liberated from the concerns of any country will be insulated from politics and those other matters politicians and people care about – like unemployment, or economic growth. This is not a good prospect at all."

Another Harvard University economist, Feldstein (1993), was acerbic in his prediction pointing to two major flaws in the EMU design: "... to

the best of my knowledge, history offers no precedent of one country merging with another as a way of protecting itself from other country's future aggression. Similarly, there is no precedent for a voluntary giving up of sovereignty to prevent itself from acting aggressively in the future. In contrast, history offers many examples of countries that pursue and promote political union in order to increase their power over their neighbours."

Historical precedent is important but it is not the only determining factor in the development of the world. New ideas, innovations and approaches to regional integration do provide a platform for the creation of new historical processes. The European sovereign debt crisis does provide useful historical lessons for other regions of the world, such as Africa, in their endeavour to deepen regional integration. On the opposite side of the rather negative evaluation of the EMU and ECB is the following useful preview and prospect (Mundell 1998): "... monetary union will do much to integrate Europe's commodity factor and capital markets. It will increase Europe wide competition and revolutionise financial markets. It will spur rationalisation, mergers and takeovers in the European banking industry and commercial firms. Perhaps most important of all EMU will change the way Europeans think about themselves and about a multi-regional continental market that has become the largest in the world."

The role of leadership in the process of regional integration has been essential in the formation of the EMU and ECB. Bastasin (2012) provides an extensive account of the then German Chancellor, Kohl and the Former French President Mitterrand's towering leadership in the development of the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, the Franco-German axis has been at the forefront of the European integration project for many years. Ironically, recurrent crisis has come at a time when poor leadership by Germany and France has intersected with bad judgment and institutional inertia. The fight over a useful policy and strategy intervention to the European crisis between former French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel clearly demonstrated

this lack of leadership.

The leadership scuffles between Sarkozy and Merkel notwithstanding, the European crisis has sharply raised the mistake of placing the management of fiscal policy within member states and monetary consolidation in the European Central Bank (ECB). Indeed Article 121 of the EU Treaty reads as follows (Bastasin 2012): "... member states shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council. The Council shall, acting by qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the member States and of the Community and shall report its finding to the European Council."

The coexistence of collective monetary policy alongside national state fiscal policy arrangements was for a long time a recipe for disaster. This policy challenge has pitted Germany and France in an unprecedented fight as captured by one economic advisor to Chancellor Merkel in this way: "When Sarkozy and other EU leaders demand Germany's participation in an economic stimulus and rescue package, one reason is that they expect Germany to again bear the lion's share of the costs" (Bastasin 2012). President Sarkozy was indeed perturbed by the slow, lukewarm and measured intervention and commitments by Germany on the crisis. In a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) convention in Germany which Sarkozy was invited to, the French President lost his cool and expressed his mind in hard-hitting words that resonated in the rest of the world: "... as far as coordination is concerned, we are in agreement. As far as more stimulus is concerned, we are also in agreement" but in reference to further stimulus intervention, Sarkozy said: "... France is working on it, and Germany is thinking about it" (Bastasin 2012).

Indeed, in a very useful book, *European Identity*, Checkel and Katzenstein (2008) put the challenge of leadership facing Europe this way: "... the ship of European identity has entered uncharted waters. Its sails are flapping in a stiff breeze. Beyond the harbor, whitecaps are signaling stormy weather ahead. The crew is fully assembled, but

some members are grumbling – loudly. While food and drink are plentiful, maps and binoculars are missing. Officers are vying for rank and position as no captain is in sight. Sensing a lack of direction and brooding bad weather, some passengers are resting in fading sun on easy chairs thinking of past accomplishments; others are huddling in an openly defiant mood close to the lifeboats, anticipating bad times. With the journey's destination unknown, the trip ahead seems excruciatingly difficult to some, positively dangerous to others. Anxiety and uncertainty, no hope and self-confidence, define the moment."

The Greek crisis shows that whether Europe pools, shares or joins its member states' sovereignties in the process of regional integration is beside the point. It is the collective political narrative in the construction of the European identity grounded in national state policies that is missing. Schmidt (2006) puts the dilemma facing the European Union thus: "... [Nation states] have had certain finality characterized in principle by indivisible sovereignty, fixed boundaries, coherent identity, established government and cohesive democracy. By contrast, the EU has no such finality but rather is better conceptualized as a constant process of becoming. What it is becoming, moreover, is not a nation-state but, rather, a regional state, given shared sovereignty, variable boundaries with composite identity, highly compound governance and fragmented democracy split between government by and of the people at the national level, and governance, for and with the people at the EU level."

The process of regional integration in Europe has for a long time proceeded in strictly economic and technocratic way (Checkel and Katzenstein 2008). This has caused the crisis in the democratic and governance processes within national states. The current sovereign debt crisis is a cumulative national frustration at the supranational economic elites' imposition "of Europe by stealth" (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Indeed, the depoliticisation of regional integration in Europe has produced dangerous national narratives and a backlash that has brought the state back in. The solution to the European

crisis will probably be obtained once the crisis of the nation state is resolved and the resistance to the "... unnatural imposition of rule from Brussels" is addressed appropriately (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009).

### Conclusion

It is easy to blame the Greek government for the mismanagement of its economy. Yet the fact remains that for whatever reasons, politically motivated or otherwise, the EU agreed to expand its border to Greece, resulting in ECB ultimately opening up the Eurozone to Greece as well. Whether the EU knew about miscalculations of the Greek economy, Greek economics have always been unstable at best, creating a cause for re-examining the placement of responsibility for the Greek crisis. As Papaconstantinou (2011: 23) puts it in *Kathimerini*, "if little Greece is capable of causing such contagion throughout Europe, couldn't the problem lie with Europe's immune system? In other words, could the Greece debt crisis be, instead of a cause, the catalyst for revealing a much deeper systemic crisis within the Eurozone?" Moreover, how do Spain, Portugal and Ireland fit into this situation, given that they are not poor southern relations to the EU, but include one of its past stars? This may support the idea of a much deeper systemic crisis within the Eurozone and therefore shed light on challenges posed to smaller and weaker economies in the Eurozone, not just the historically weaker southern states.

The European debt crisis provides significant ground for learning and also re-examining the theoretical tools that were used in the analyses and construction of regional integration framework in Europe. Indeed, power is the major theoretical element in mainstream regional integration theory and international relations. But it is how regional integration theories have explained regional integration in Europe that has contributed to misconceptions about the European identity. "The identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions" argues Hopf (1998) – explaining the logic that it would have been proper to contextualise the highest stage of regional integration in Europe within

and build a continental political narrative that would have been binding to all states.

The gold standard of regional integration in the world cannot be allowed to fail. The process of recovery from the crisis has to happen under a strong leadership that is attentive to the fact that state identities and interests are not natural or given but shaped through discursive and social interactions. Failure to do this will mean that regional integration in Europe with its supranational institutional cloak will continually confront the challenge of the nation state. The lesson for the developing world, Africa in particular, is that the process of monetary integration (union) should be treated cautiously and when adopted it should be complemented with regional fiscal consolidation (McCarthy 2012). Of course, the assumption and question in regard to African integration is whether states in Africa will be prepared to cede fiscal sovereignty to a regional institution. If the current experience of intergovernmental regional integration in Africa is anything to go by, regional and/or continental monetary and fiscal union is either a pipedream or a nightmare - incessantly deferred. ■

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## THE MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE REFORM AGENDA SINCE AUGUST 2013

# Challenges and Opportunities



It is clear that the MDC-T has to reorganise and restructure in the next couple of years in order to make sure that the party does not end up in oblivion.

By Ntshembo Mathye

After the July 2013 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe, the poor showing of the Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai (MDC-T) at the polls came as a shock and surprise to many. This was as a result of Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) under the leadership of President Robert Mugabe emerging from the elections with a 61.09% of the vote against the MDC's 34%. Although the MDC has attributed its electoral loss to ZANU-PF rigging the vote, there were a number of factors within the MDC-T which led to the party losing its lustre and support base. This article seeks to assess the challenges that contributed to the dismal performance of the MDC-T in the last election and

which are threatening to destroy it. It further looks into the opportunities that are available to the MDC-T for rebuilding the party and mounting a serious challenge to ZANU-PF in the 2018 election. The MDC has a perfect opportunity to regroup and strategise on how to take the party forward and push for a stronger challenge to ZANU-PF in the next elections.

The MDC has been an important player in Zimbabwean politics since its formation in 1999. It managed to threaten the stranglehold that President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF have had on the country since its independence in 1980. Over the years, there have been indications that the party was growing in stature as the socio-political and economic situation in Zimbabwe

deteriorated. Expectations before the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe were that the MDC-T would do well and might even replace ZANU-PF as the governing party. Morgan Tsvangirai and many others in the MDC-T firmly believed that these elections provided the opportunity to finally remove President Robert Mugabe from power. By the end of the elections, however, the MDC only managed to secure 46 parliamentary seats out of a total of 210.<sup>1</sup>

The poor performance of the MDC-T in these polls was particularly unexpected since the performance of the party in the Government of National Unity (GNU) had been positive. Although many of the positive developments that emerged during the tenure of the GNU can be credited to all the parties involved, efforts by the MDC's Secretary General Tendai Biti as Finance Minister assisted in bringing some level of economic stability. This was mostly done through the introduction of the multi-currency system in the form of the American dollar and South African rand. Robert Rotberg argues that Biti was successful in banning the Zimbabwe dollar and, in the process, ending several years of dreadful inflation that was crippling the country.<sup>2</sup> For those in the MDC-T, the optimism was that the improvement of the economy under Finance Minister Biti was enough to convince the voters that under the MDC-T government, things would take a turn for the better.

However, as the results from the last elections in Zimbabwe show, this was not enough to convince the electorate to vote for the MDC-T in their majority. This could also be as the result of the MDC-T proving to be its own worst enemy over the years and thus playing into the hands of President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The participation of the MDC-T in the Government of National Unity served to weaken the party slightly and, as Susan Booyesen argues, the MDC-T was a co-architect of its own emasculation.<sup>3</sup> With the outcome of the last harmonised elections in Zimbabwe, it is clear that the MDC-T has to reorganise and restructure in the next couple of years in order to make sure that the party does not end up in oblivion.

### Conceptualising democratic legitimacy in Zimbabwe

The situation in Zimbabwe over the years has made it difficult for the MDC-T to be fully accepted as a genuine national political player in Zimbabwe politics. Since its formation, President Mugabe, senior leaders of ZANU-PF and some sections of the media have accused the MDC-T of being funded by foreign organisations and governments to ensure the removal of ZANU-PF from power as an integral part of the regime change agenda.<sup>4</sup> This regime change agenda has been utilised by the revolutionary party ZANU-PF to dismiss the legitimacy of the MDC-T. Their dismissal was structurally supported by the European Union and the USA who are openly, financially and ideologically supporting the opposition party.

The MDC-T has also raised human rights violations concerns in Zimbabwe, and this has over the years been used to strengthen ZANU-PF's claim of persecution by Britain through sanctions and its support for MDC. Furthermore, this view has been shared and accepted by the former liberation movements in power in the in South African Development Community (SADC).

To make matters worse, the MDC-T has lacked a clear ideology and policies, and this has alienated many Zimbabweans from supporting it. It has been difficult for the MDC-T to shake off the tag of being the political proxy serving the welfare of the west, and to establish itself as a party that has the interests of the people of Zimbabwe at heart. In the run up to elections, the MDC-T launched the Jobs, Upliftment, Investment, Capital and Environment (JUICE) which was largely referred to during the election rallies. However, the party failed to sell JUICE to the people and this failure ultimately resulted in the loss to ZANU-PF in the elections.

It is now important for the MDC-T to prove in practice that it is a national party that is able to appeal to the masses and will service their interests. Recently, following the loss of their financial support from their traditional donors from the West, Tsvangirai has been calling on the party membership

to contribute through subscription fees and donations. This is one way for the people to feel that they are part of an organisation and working towards bringing about change in the country.

It is also very important for the MDC-T to start identifying itself with the problems and challenges that many Zimbabweans are confronted with. Although the MDC-T highlighted issues of land reform and indigenisation in the party's manifesto<sup>5</sup>, this was not clearly articulated to the people. This is one area that ZANU-PF ended up using to its advantage, consolidating the support of people who are desperate

“It has been difficult for the MDC-T to shake off the tag of being the political proxy serving the welfare of the west, and to establish itself as a party that has the interests of the people of Zimbabwe at heart.”

for land. The MDC-T has faced serious challenges concerning its leadership for a while, which has caused damaging divisions in the past. At the moment, the party is in serious need of rebranding, either through renewal from within, or coalitions with other opposition parties and an agreement about the best candidate to lead it.

#### Challenges undermining the MDC-T

The MDC-T faced numerous challenges in the run-up to the 2013 harmonised elections that had a direct impact on how they eventually performed. Among these were:

- Morgan Tsvangirai's personal affairs;
- internal power struggles;
- corruption charges levelled at MDC-T leaders; and
- lack of preparedness for the elections.

#### *Morgan Tsvangirai's personal affairs*

The behaviour of some of the

MDC-T leaders in the run-up to elections contributed to its poor performance in the last elections. Morgan Tsvangirai's private life has long been used as a political tool to undermine his leadership and character as a genuine leader. A number of incidents involving Tsvangirai's private life allowed President Mugabe to undermine and ridicule him among the electorate. Roger Southall argues that “Tsvangirai rendered himself particularly vulnerable to ZANU-PF by his sexual peccadilloes, exciting public ridicule and allowing Mugabe to present himself as an icon of marital faithfulness and stability”.<sup>6</sup> During the rallies leading up to the elections, Mugabe used this issue to raise questions about the suitability of a man with such characteristics to lead the nation. Tsvangirai did not dismiss this criticism as cheap politicking, as he realised the potential damage to his political life; consequently he released a written statement on the week of the 13th July 2014 apologising to his supporters.<sup>7</sup>

#### *Internal power struggles*

Tsvangirai's political opponents in the MDC-T have also cited his personal affairs as a means to undermine his leadership and have him removed as the leader of the party. There have been several calls from different sections in the MDC-T for the removal of Tsvangirai as the leader of the party. He is once again being accused of an autocratic leadership style, just as he was when the party split in 2005, when several high profile MDC members such as Welshman Ncube and Arthur Mutambara accused him of the same thing. Since 2013, senior members of the party such as Roy Bennet and former Harare Mayor Elias Mudzuri have been sending out cryptic messages about the removal of Tsvangirai as the leader of the party.

The seriousness of the situation was evident when members of the national executive committee of the party took a decision to suspend Tsvangirai and other senior members of the party in April 2014. This group was led by Secretary General of the MDC-T, Tendai Biti. The group charged him with bringing the party

into disrepute, misappropriating party funds and violating the constitution of the party. This infighting in the MDC-T is damaging to opposition politics in Zimbabwe, and further strengthens the political hold of Mugabe and ZANU-PF.

#### *Corruption charges levelled at MDC-T leaders*

Tsvangirai has not been solely responsible for tarnishing the name of the MDC-T and presenting ZANU-PF with ammunition to attack and criticise it. Other leaders in the party have also contributed to the negative perceptions surrounding the party which have weakened it. The MDC-T has been consistent in its criticism of corruption by Mugabe and some leaders of ZANU-PF. However, since the GNU, there have been many instances whereby its elected public officials have been accused of the same delinquencies as ZANU-PF. These leaders have been accused of being too comfortable in their role as government officials. There were a number of local councillors in different districts of the country who were fired from their posts for engaging in corrupt activities.<sup>8</sup> The damage done to the party by all these activities has been immense and played a pivotal role in the crushing loss of the MDC-T in the last elections.

#### *Lack of preparedness for the elections*

There have been some criticisms levelled against the MDC for resting on their laurels during the power-sharing arrangements of the GNU. ZANU-PF was able to re-organise since 2008 and managed to outmanoeuvre the MDC-T during the GNU by taking most of the credit for the improvements in socio-political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe. Brian Raftopoulos argues that, “under the GPA, the MDC formations were always at a disadvantage against a party that continued to control the coercive arms of the state and persistently blocked key reforms in the agreement”.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, Mugabe was insistent that the MDC-T is a party that had the interests of the West at heart and thus supporting the continuous sanctions on Zimbabwe. In the duration of the

GNU, the MDC-T was also guilty of lacking the ambition to establish more structures of the party especially in the rural areas of Zimbabwe where the ZANU-PF enjoys much support. By the time the election date was announced, it was too late for it to try to reach the masses in these areas, and this proved to be a serious limitation.

#### **Opportunities for the MDC**

The end of the GNU in 2013 provided the MDC-T with an opportunity to focus its energies on rebuilding the party in order to mount a stronger challenge in the next election. A lot of work needs to be done, despite the current climate of infighting in the ZANU-PF and breakaways. The last national elections were a clear indication that a divided and weak opposition will be incapable of removing President

“A number of incidents involving Tsvangirai’s private life allowed President Mugabe to undermine and ridicule him among the electorate.”

Mugabe and ZANU-PF from power. The smaller faction of the MDC-M under the leadership of Welshman Ncube was unable to win a single seat in parliament. This is a clear message to other breakaway factions that a divided and weak opposition will not be able to mount a serious challenge to the ZANU-PF in 2018. The unification of the party going forward should be its main priority.

Moreover, the fact that the MDC is no longer part of the GNU will enable the party to be more critical and raise important issues of concern to the public. Although the MDC has been persistent in its criticism of the ZANU-PF, this was often challenging during the GNU as they were also part of government structures. Another obstacle was the fact that during the

GNU, it became increasingly difficult to raise issues of corruption by ZANU-PF officials while there were also MDC officers implicated in corrupt activities.

This would also be a perfect opportunity for the MDC-T to work on developing policies that will be beneficial to the people of Zimbabwe. In the past, the party has been accused of lacking a definite ideology, its only fixation being on the idea of unseating President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF from power.<sup>10</sup> A party with a clear ideology and vision stands a better chance to win over more disgruntled Zimbabweans to support it in trying to mount a serious challenge to ZANU-PF in the 2018 elections. During the next few years the leadership of the party must venture out into the rural areas of Zimbabwe, from which ZANU-PF receives most of its support and establish stronger and more effective branches as part of a rebranding of the party. This would provide an opportunity to address issues such as indigenisation, land reform and the creation of jobs with people at grassroots level who are directly affected by these issues.

In the current setting, all the major parties in Zimbabwe are experiencing some internal conflict and infighting that threaten to weaken them. Recently, President Mugabe criticised one of the leaders in the ZANU-PF by branding him as an agent whose mission was to sow division and unsettle the party. This was after the Minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting services, Jonathan Moyo, had appointed editors alleged to be anti-ZANU-PF to head ZimPapers, which is under the control of the government.<sup>11</sup> The outburst by Mugabe clearly shows there are tensions within ZANU-PF and that these tensions are only going to increase as the succession battle heats up.

The news that Mugabe’s wife Grace has accepted a position in the executive council of the women’s league already has everyone interested in whether she is being groomed to take up the post of president sometime in the future.<sup>12</sup> Since the re-election of President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF in the 2013 harmonised elections, there have been several signs that all is not

well within the party. Grace Mugabe has emerged as an important player in Zimbabwe's political landscape. She has launched several personal attacks aimed at senior members of ZANU-PF who she maintains are plotting against her husband. Central to the scathing attacks has been the former Vice President, Joyce Mujuru. Since her appointment as Vice President in 2004 there has been a general popular view that she was the favourite to succeed Mugabe when he eventually steps down as the president. The campaign by Grace Mugabe to get Mujuru expelled from the party was a means to ensure that she does not ascend to the highest office in Zimbabwe.

The attacks on Mujuru by the first lady became more strident towards the end of October 2013. In one of her rallies in Bindura, she strategically used the metaphor of 'baby dumping' to indicate what should happen to Mujuru.<sup>13</sup> On a number of occasions, the Vice President has come out in her own defence to denounce the accusations that were levelled against her. From the onset, it was clear that no matter what the Vice President did or said her future in the leadership of the ZANU-PF was already decided. In December of 2014, her fate was sealed when she along with eight other ministers that were alleged to be her allies were fired from their posts.<sup>14</sup> In April 2015, Mujuru's affiliation with ZANU-PF was cut further when she was officially expelled from the party. In a way, the incidents leading up to the expulsion of Mujuru and other senior officials underline the anxiety that has enveloped ZANU-PF regarding factionalism and the succession battle within the party.<sup>15</sup>

In the coming months and years, these debates will surely gain momentum and the sacking of these former senior members of the party just adds more fuel to the debate. There have been suggestions in the last few months that former Vice President Mujuru and other former members including Didymus Mutasa, the former Presidential Affairs minister are planning to establish a rival faction of ZANU-PF to challenge President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. There are indications that the groundwork for

building the party has already begun albeit in a secretive manner so as to remain undetected from President Mugabe's surveillance.<sup>16</sup> Though there might be a significant number of people who could potentially leave the ZANU-PF to join the new party if indeed it were formed, it might not be enough to seriously destabilise ZANU-PF or significantly weaken it. It might also be a bit difficult for ordinary Zimbabweans to trust the new formation, as many of the people involved have been working with Mugabe for a very long time.

However, for opposition politics in Zimbabwe, the formation of a new opposition party, one that is born as a result of splitting from ZANU-PF, could provide opportunities for opposition alliances to form a formidable challenge to the ruling party. The succession battle in the ZANU-PF is only going to intensify and might lead to the weakening of the party. This is another reason why it is crucial for the MDC-T to regroup and reorganise to prepare for such possibilities in case they arise.

### Conclusion and recommendations

The current state of the MDC-T has to be seriously addressed in order to prevent the party from disintegrating. Tsvangirai and many in the MDC-T still believe and maintain that the heavy loss in the 2013 elections was due to the underhand tactics of the ZANU-PF. However, whatever the cause for the loss, it exposed the delicateness of the party and the need for an evaluation of its effectiveness in Zimbabwe's political arena. The MDC-T has long claimed to have been founded and driven by democratic values from which it has seemingly retreated. Therefore, Tsvangirai and the rest of the leadership should look into the past in order to recreate a new path to turn the MDC-T into a more formidable opponent in its quest to win state political power. There are several steps it should take:

- The MDC-T should call for a national summit in the next 12 months to resolve the issue of leadership for the sake of stability within the party. The summit will determine whether Tsvangirai should make way for another individual to lead.

- The MDC splinter parties should be engaged to be part of the summit in order to form a grand coalition and to also agree on the best candidate to lead the party.
- The summit should also try to reach agreement on a clear ideology and policies for the party instead of being driven by the obsession of removing President Mugabe and ZANU-PF from power.
- The MDC-T neglected most parts of rural areas and there is a clear need for mobilisation in these areas in order to increase the support base of the party.
- The support and donations from the West are drying up and there is an urgent need for the party to find new funding methods such as membership fees in order to sustain the activities of the party leading into the next general elections in 2018. ■

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**SCIENCE AND INNOVATION**

**Driving force for future growth**

By Department of Science and Technology

The South African science and technology sector continues to grow stronger each year.

The 2014 election manifesto of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) proposed a quantum leap in support for science, technology and innovation (STI) through the commitment to increase gross expenditure on research and development to 1.5% of GDP during the current administration period. Furthermore, the blueprint for economic development – the National Development Plan (NDP) – clearly identifies the important role of STI in achieving the country's longer term vision for economic development.

These developments are significant in elevating the importance of STI in South Africa, and putting it on a trajectory that many developed economies embarked on with great success. It has also given impetus to the country's intention of moving

our predominantly resource-based economy to a more knowledge-based economy.

These advances in the STI sector did not come overnight. With the country facing persistent high levels of poverty, inequality and joblessness, departments such as Social Development, Basic Education and Housing have always received the lion's share of the national budget – and rightly so.

The Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, has in earlier Science and Technology Budget Votes motivated strongly for additional funding to be allocated to science, technology and innovation. In the 2010/11 Budget Vote speech, when the Department of Science and Technology (DST) received an allocation of R4,127 billion, Minister Pandor emphasised that "one of the areas that needs to be addressed is increased support for postgraduate

study and for senior researchers, plus a more stable funding model for all our research performing institutions."

The 2010/11 allocation was fractionally down when compared to the previous year's R4,261 billion. Since then, we have seen a steady increase in the allocation to Science and Technology: R4,401 billion in 2011/12; R4,999 billion in 2012/13, with significant increases in the last two financial years to R6,480 billion and R7,482 billion, respectively.

DST budget allocations	
2009/2010	R 4,261 billion
2010/2011	R 4,052 billion
2011/2012	R 4,401 billion
2012/2013	R 4,999 billion
2013/2014	R 6,980 billion
2014/2015	R 6,480 billion
2015/2016	R 7,482 billion

The Department allocates the bulk of these funds to its entities, which in turn carry out the mandate of the DST as captured in the White Paper on Science and Technology.

These entities include the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the National Research Foundation (NRF), the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf), the South African National Space Agency (SANSA) and the Technology Innovation Agency (TIA).

Since 2009, the DST has targeted investment in key priority areas, namely, human capital development, research development and innovation, and socio-economic partnerships. For the 2009/10 budget, the Human Capital and Knowledge Programme received the biggest slice of the pie – R1.6 billion. Since then, the allocation has more than doubled and in the 2014/15 financial year was R3.5 billion. Economic partnerships grew from R1.2 billion in 2009/10 to R1.5 billion in 2014/15. The STI allocation went from R1.1 billion in 2009/10 to 1.7 billion in 2014/15. The DST budget growth between 2009/10 and 2014/15 financial years is 52%.

The purpose of the human capital and knowledge programme may

seem to be self-explanatory, but is aimed at increasing the number of women and people from previously disadvantaged communities in science and, particularly, growing the numbers and quality of postgraduate candidates at honours, master's, doctoral and post-doctoral levels to provide the basis for the knowledge-intensive pursuit of excellence.

The lead entity in this development of postgraduates in the sciences is the NRF, which supports and promotes research through funding human resource development and providing research facilities. During 2009/10 budget, the NRF received an allocation of about R680 million; this amount now seems minimal relative to the allocation three budgets down the line – R1 952.9 billion for the 2014/15 financial year. This is nearly three times the 2009/10 allocation and indicative of how the NRF has deepened and expanded its human capital development programme through initiatives such as the South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI), which was launched in 2006 by the DST and the NRF. It is designed to attract and retain excellence in research and innovation through the establishment of research chairs at universities in South Africa, with a long-term investment trajectory of up to fifteen years.

The main goal of SARChI is to strengthen and improve the research and innovation capacity of public universities by producing high quality postgraduate students and research and innovation outputs.

SARChI, one of the DST's flagship programmes, has a total of 157 awarded chairs, 128 of which have been filled. Since its inception, the number of black postgraduate students has increased by 400%, and the number of female postgraduate students by 450%. In 2014/15 R451 779 was spent on SARChI.

Another key instrument in the promotion of world-class research and development is investment in centres of excellence. Investment in the centres has increased at an average of 20% a year since 2010/11, when the budget allocation was R47 million. The centres were established to promote

interdisciplinary and inter-institutional collaboration in research excellence. For example, the South African Centre of Excellence in Epidemiological Modelling and Analysis (SACEMA) focuses on research in quantitative modelling of disease, with a strong focus on relevance to public health policy. The policy to circumcise men to reduce the HIV infections was a consequence of a SACEMA research project. The Centre of Excellence for Biomedical Tuberculosis Research pioneered the use of molecular methods to characterise *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* strains, and these techniques are now used throughout Africa to gain insight into the mechanisms driving the epidemic.

During last year's Budget Vote, Minister Pandor pointed out that an additional R5.8 billion a year would be needed for South Africa to achieve the NDP targets of 6 000 PhDs per annum, or 100 000 PhDs by 2030. Currently, the country produces just over 1 800 PhDs per year. Besides the quantum leap in funding, the capacity of the higher education system to support this growth in the number of PhDs will need significant attention, and it will be necessary to find ways of sending PhD candidates abroad for the supervision they will require.

Research, development and innovation (RDI) is at the heart of efforts by the DST to drive innovation in scientifically strategic areas. Since 2009, the DST has reorganised its Programmes, with greater emphasis on technology, and the relevant Programme is now called "Technology Innovation". Last year this Programme received an allocation of R991 million, with TIA being the main agency. TIA was established with the objective of stimulating and intensifying the commercialisation of technological innovation in order to improve economic growth and the quality of life.

Since 2010, TIA has disbursed a total of R1.2 billion on project contracts and grants. The agency has supported close to seven thousand small and medium enterprises in accelerating technical innovation through technology development at a cost of R286 million. The services provided by TIA have enabled the

enterprises to be more competitive and productive. The agency has also funded the placement of 501 interns in various sectors, including at offices of technology transfer and in venture capital companies.

Socio-economic partnerships remain key to the Department's endeavours to apply science and technology to improve the circumstances of the most vulnerable. The majority of the money allocated by the Department to this Programme is transferred to its implementation partners, the CSIR and the HSRC. Between 2009/10 and 2014/15 the allocation has increased from R1.2 billion to R1.5 billion. This cannot be considered to be significant, and both of these entities are capable of using increased Parliamentary grants effectively.

The CSIR is the biggest and best-resourced science laboratory complex in the country. It accounts for 15% of government expenditure on research and development. Recently the CSIR adopted water sustainability, health and safety and security as areas of integrated research and innovation. These three integrated research and innovation areas are in addition to the six already established research-impact fields, namely, industry, the built environment, the natural environment, defence and security, and energy.

The HSRC continues to consolidate and extend its reputation as a public entity providing excellent social-science research in a range of fields, from reducing poverty to improving education, and from improving gender relations to fighting HIV and AIDS.

The DST believes that these investments in RDI have made a significant contribution to meeting South Africa's triple challenge of poverty, inequality and joblessness. The ANC's commitment to achieving an investment in research and development equal to 1,5% of gross domestic product will be the foundation for a shift towards a knowledge intensive economy. ■  
[www.dst.gov.za](http://www.dst.gov.za)

# South African Teens Choose Sport Over The Internet



By Coca-Cola South Africa

A new study commissioned by The Coca-Cola Company reveals that South African teens chose playing sport for fun as their second most favourite pastime, ahead of listening to music, hanging out with friends and surfing the internet.

The global study, which included a South African cohort, was carried out by Nielsen, a leading global information and measurement company. Over 11,000 teenagers globally were polled to understand the role of sport and more specifically soccer in youth development. 752 teenagers aged between 13 and 18 in South Africa were surveyed, cutting across urban and rural areas.

For over 10 years, Coca-Cola South Africa has supported physical activity programmes focused on improving the health of over 300,000 young

people and creating awareness on the importance of active healthy living.

Encouragingly, even in this digital age, playing sport for fun with friends is ranked higher than playing computer or video games (58%) and surfing the internet (45%) by South African teenagers.

Out of all the sports played, soccer was the most important for South African teens (48%). And every teen surveyed (100%) referenced soccer as a desired team sport to play, with more than half of those (52%) also revealing they play the sport two to five times a week on average and a quarter (27%) citing they play almost every day.

## Soccer helps teens shine off the pitch?

South African teens who play the

game are also reaping the rewards off the pitch when it comes to learning important life skills such as teamwork, confidence and sociability. Eight out of ten (82%) young South Africans feel playing soccer helps them to develop essential skills in teamwork that can be applied in wider disciplines such as school or work.

Over half (54%) of those surveyed named teamwork as the most important attribute of a fellow teammate, with over two-thirds (66%) revealing that being a part of the game is more important to them than winning.

Important life skills South African teens attribute to learning from soccer include being more talented (37%), hardworking (36%) and responsible (20%). 72% of young South African players consider the discipline learnt on the pitch will help them achieve more

in their lives. Over a third (34%) believe that playing has encouraged them to become more sociable, and 33% said a friendlier person. Furthermore, 43% state that playing soccer has helped boost their confidence.

**Soccer Leads to Healthier and Happier teens**

The research revealed that young South Africans who play soccer are happier than their non-playing peers, with seven out of ten (72%) who regularly play considering themselves happy, compared with 67% of their peers that don't play the game.

Feeling healthy and fit similarly comes high on the agenda for South African teens. Nearly a fifth (18%) refer to it as their reason for playing the game, whilst three-quarters (76%) attribute to feeling fit and healthy to soccer playing.

**Female Participation in Soccer**

While the study saw largely similar responses from South African male and female teenagers, a third of females

(28%) believe that opportunities for girls to play football are limited in their country and over a quarter (27%) find it difficult to play regularly due to the lack of other girls that play. Worryingly 19% of those female teens polled feel that soccer is geared towards boys.

**Coca-Cola and Active Healthy Teens**

Copa Coca-Cola is an international youth football tournament that unites over 1.3 million teens in over 60 countries worldwide, promoting an active lifestyle and promoting sportsmanship. The world's largest brand-supported grassroots football tournament is more than a game, it's an opportunity for teens to pursue their dream and learn the value of team spirit, friendship and respect.

Vukani Magubane, Director of Public Affairs and Communications, Coca-Cola South Africa says: "Copa Coca-Cola champions an active, healthy lifestyle and encourages values such as team spirit, friendship and respect. Therefore it is encouraging to learn from

teens all around the world that they are reaping the benefits of developing new skills and maintaining fitness while they pursue their passion for the beautiful game."

Copa Coca-Cola forms part of The Coca-Cola Company's global commitment to promoting active healthy lifestyles in the countries in which the company operates. Coca-Cola is committed to help get people moving by supporting physical activity programmes both externally and amongst their staff with various sponsorships, challenges and initiatives.

Additionally, Coca-Cola continues to extend their portfolio across all countries including South Africa to offer low- or no- calorie beverage options in every market. Furthermore consumers are provided with transparent nutrition information, featuring calories on the front of all of Coca-Cola's packages. The company has committed to responsible marketing, including no advertising to children under 12 anywhere in the world. ■

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**TEENS WHO PLAY FOOTBALL LEARN IMPORTANT LIFE SKILLS SUCH AS TEAMWORK, CONFIDENCE & SOCIABILITY.**

**WITH SEVEN OUT OF TEN,** WHO REGULARLY PLAY CONSIDER THEMSELVES HAPPY, COMPARED WITH **67%** OF THEIR PEERS THAT DON'T PLAY THE GAME.

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**14% GIRLS**

**PLAYING SPORT FOR FUN WITH FRIENDS** IS THE SECOND MOST POPULAR FREE-TIME ACTIVITY

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PLAYING SPORT FOR FUN	74%
LISTENING TO MUSIC	68%

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# One Africa, One Voice



Hon. Bethel N. Amadi – President



Hon. Roger Nkodo – 1st Vice-President



Hon. Suilama Hay Emhamed –  
2nd Vice-President

Despite a restrictive mandate as an advisory and consultative body, the PAP is continuing to play a key role in promoting democracy, good governance and the harmonisation of laws on the continent. This will lead to more direct investment, development and prosperity for the peoples of Africa.

The objectives of the PAP are mainly to promote the principles of human rights, democracy, good governance, peace and security. The PAP is also expected to promote collective self-reliance, strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa.

**Structure**

The highest decision-making organ of the PAP is in the Plenary Session. However, the main work which results in the decisions is performed by the 10 Permanent Committees, which meet to oversee the work of the AU.

The Bureau of the PAP, which is responsible for the management of the Parliament, is composed of the President and four Vice-Presidents, who represent the five regions of Africa. The current President of the PAP is the Hon Bethel Nnaemeka Amadi,

from Nigeria. The First Vice-President is the Hon Roger Nkodo Dang from Cameroon, the Second Vice-President is the Hon Suilma Hay Emhamed Saleh from Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, the Third Vice-President is the Hon Loide Kasingo from Namibia and the Fourth Vice-President is the Hon Dr Ashebir Woldegiorgis Gayo from Ethiopia.

The Bureau is supported by a Secretariat comprising of permanent staff members drawn from all over Africa. The Head of the Secretariat is Adv Zwelethu Madasa from South Africa.

**Transformation**

The Assembly of Heads of States and Government at the recent June 2014 AU Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, took an epoch making decision regarding the status of the PAP. The Assembly approved the transformation of PAP from an Advisory and Consultative Body to a continental legislative body with competence to make laws subject to the approval of the Assembly. The approval of the revised PAP protocol is, however, subject to the signing and ratification by the requisite number of states before coming into

force. The PAP will henceforth have the ability to contribute meaningfully to the economic integration process of the continent by providing the necessary legislative mechanisms and framework. ■

**Pan African Parliament**

Gallagher Convention Centre  
Private Bag X16 Midrand 1685  
Johannesburg South Africa  
Tel : +27 11 545 5000  
www.pan-africanparliament.org



**One Africa, One Voice**



Hon. Loide Kasingo – 3rd Vice-President



Hon. Ashebir W. Gayo – 4th Vice-President



Adv Zwelethu Madasa – Clerk of PAP

# THROUGH A CREATIVE LENS

This quarter includes women's month, so we are happy to introduce a poem by a thoughtful and politically active young woman who has not previously been published.

Zintle Groepe was born in King William's Town in 1989. Later she moved to Germiston where she achieved sportswoman of the year at her high school three times. In 2006 and 2007 she was selected to play for the South African under 17 and under 19 netball teams respectively. She is currently studying psychological counselling through UNISA and is involved in structures of the ANC and ANCYL. Zintle works as a National Administrator for the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). Writing poetry is her best way of expressing herself - a form of therapy.

## IF

By Zintle Groepe

If being black means suffering,  
then let me not be

If being white means isolation,  
then let me not be

I don't want to be black if it means rebellion  
Let me not be white if it means superiority above others

I choose to be human for that has neither race nor colour  
Please do not categorise me to judge me  
My humanness separates me distinctively

If being black means poverty and being white subjectivity  
I beg to be human in humanity my DNA cannot be defined  
Does black and white choose their pigmentation?

Classification is the fall of a nation  
A fallen nation is a weak consortium  
Vulnerable to a cascade of viruses

Racism Repeatedly Accelerates Condemnation Incorrectly Separating Mankind  
Allow my humanness to be supreme  
**After all I am human**

Our second poem is by our most regular contributor, Afzal Moolla. Afzal was raised in the struggle, and, like Zintle, he also writes poetry as a kind of therapy. In the image he creates here we have a moving reminder that, although countless women throughout the world lack even the most basic human rights, they do not give up, and hope never dies.

## SHE WALKS ALONE

By Afzal Moolla

she walks alone,  
barefoot in the paddies of rice,  
breaking her back for some precious grains.

she walks alone,  
in jo'burg town, with a black eye,  
smacked around by him the previous painful night.

she walks alone,  
in the streets of neon hazed manila,  
along the pristine hedges of rotten london,  
on the crowded pavements of lonesome new delhi,  
across the rolling plains of the vast bounteous pampas,  
over the winding back-ways of the sloping and grimy favelas,  
on the glittering pavements of rich and sweetly-scented jeddah,  
through the blindingly false boulevards of that sad los angeles town.

she walks alone,  
bearing the burden of mother and daughter  
of cook and sweeper and wife and mistress and punching-bag,  
she walks alone,  
through your streets and mine,  
standing up as she is beaten more down,  
loving a little as the bruises on her face turn purple,  
feeding the little ones with morsels of hastily cooked beans.

she walks alone,  
in factories and in mills and in buses,  
in schools and in brothels and in places in-between.

she walks alone,  
staying alive on the alms of the 'charitable',  
violated by those who from the pulpit preach.

she walks alone,  
my sister and yours,  
my mother and yours too,  
my lover and your beloved as well.

she walks alone,  
caged by society in its invisible prison,  
a slave of norms and culture and religion and caste,  
she walks alone,  
but she is the conscience of me and you,  
screaming at us silently in hunger and despair,  
she walks alone,  
and though fearful of you men she may seem,  
be warned that she may not forever be this alone,  
for she too dreams and thinks and believes,  
for she too needs and wants and loves and weeps,  
in the silent night of complacency while impotent mankind sleeps,  
and she too will rise and in rising slay,  
the beasts that in your callous hearts prowl and lay,  
and she too will demand her rightful place,  
for every mother and sister and lover and daughter has a  
real, human face ...




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# Africa must stop rising and start standing

Africa must therefore stop perennially 'rising' and stand on the solid ground of economies that serve their people.

By Zama Moyo

Amidst a whirlwind of optimism about Africa's economic rise in recent decades, President Jacob Zuma led the nation in celebrating Africa Day on Monday 25 May 2015. The day is meant to commemorate the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the AU, on the same day in 1963.

On its official website, the government rightly acknowledges that while there is much to celebrate, we would do well to also reflect "upon the common challenges we face in a global environment". I would argue that such a balanced approach must acknowledge the quantitative evidence for the euphoric shouts of an all-conquering

Africa, and subsequently, carefully consider the policy frameworks that will address the aforementioned 'common challenges' we still face.

## **Africa Rising**

Within and without the continent, the rampant expansion of numerous sub-Saharan economies has not gone

unnoticed. Some believe that this economic rise will even translate into political clout. African development policy expert Caroline Kende-Robb envisioned, for instance, a watershed year for the African continent at global governance platforms: "Africa is poised to receive the global attention it deserves at top-level international meetings," she asserts in an article titled '10 reasons to watch Africa in 2015'.

South African mobile banking pioneer Hannes Van Rensburg boldly declared in a 2012 article for *Forbes* that the continent is rising 'fast'. Later that year *Time*, among the most widely circulated weekly magazines, titled its December issue 'Africa Rising'. Rival publication *The Economist* had had exactly the same title emblazoned across its cover in its December 2011 edition.

All these proclamations are in fact quite justifiable in the light of Africa's impressive growth rates in recent years, with top-performing Sub-Saharan economies such as Mozambique expanding by an annual average of above 7% over the past two decades. Thus the 'Africa Rising' refrains spread throughout the 90s into the new millennium like wildfire, so that even the IMF's high-level conference convened in Maputo last year was given the same thematic title.

For those who agree with Kende-Robb in particular, 2015 will signal Africa's metamorphosis from peripheral charity case to a major growth hub.

We may, however, find ourselves punting 2016 as Africa's big year, then 2017, and so on if the somewhat murky (and at times technocratic) issue of development policy is not systematically addressed. In particular, development policy that seems to lag behind the pervasive imperative of 'growth' is a potential stumbling block in the grand project of getting Africa to stand on its own two feet.

**Development-led policy**

A growth-centred discourse of Africa's fortunes is problematic. Although 'challenges' are invariably referred to, the disproportionate focus on GDP – the most common measure of economic output – together with

Foreign Direct Investment figures ignore the many other ingredients for a healthy economy. Indeed substantial inflows of FDI go a long way in job creation, but that picture is incomplete unless you include, for example, the African Development Bank's 2013 finding that the region has lost up to \$1.4 trillion in "illicit financial outflows" between 1980 and 2009. Obadias Ndaba of the *Huffington Post* puts that figure in perspective, indicating that it is more than triple the foreign aid income received in the same period.

It stands to reason that a celebration of what goes into the pot must be sobered up by knowledge of what leaks out.

Moreover, a healthy economy must not only retain national wealth, but it must allow for the distribution of that wealth so that its constituents' welfare is

“Such a policy framework seeks to appropriate growth-generated wealth towards the welfare of all African citizens. It does not, inversely, exploit its human capital for exclusively vertical growth.”

provided for. One of the most effective ways this can be done at the level of governance is to ensure that the right policy frameworks are in place. To be sure, development policy – especially in developing regions – must have as a guiding objective the conversion of national wealth into measurable development indicators.

If Kende-Robb is correct about unprecedented receptiveness to the African agenda 'at top-level international meetings', then the World Economic Forum 2015 presented some notable opportunities: the continent's representatives could have, for example, explored reforms to monetary policy at the 'New Growth Context' session scheduled for Wednesday 21 January. They could have also considered ways of utilising technological advances to

help bridge the wealth divide in the 'Inclusive Growth in the Digital Age' meeting on the same day, or perhaps leverage Japan's extensive investments (think Mitsubishi, Nissan, Honda) throughout Africa to secure even more infrastructure development funding when delegates coalesced for the 'New Context for Japan' session on Thursday the 22nd. Of course, these are overly simplified suggestions, and for all I know, even bigger strides were taken.

Yet what exactly is 'development-led policy?' Some may find this distinction to be redundant because in theory, even a growth-led paradigm should in the end benefit the person on the street. Such an assumption, however, is fallacious. IMF chief Christine Lagarde, in her keynote address at the 2014 'Africa Rising' conference, put it charmingly: "(T)he tide of growth has not lifted all boats," she observed. "Poverty remains stuck at unacceptably high levels."

A perusal of the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) bears witness to this wealth-welfare divide. The index takes into account education, income, and health as indicators of 'welfare'. In the 2013 Human Development Report, South Africa scored an HDI rank of 127th out of 187, despite being categorised as a 'Middle-Income' economy. In simple terms this means that the country's wealth is not being converted into proportionally improved welfare for its citizens. The same can be said for Nigeria, Namibia, and many others.

In 2015, then, the continent's leadership need to firstly engage with itself and the world well beyond the 'it's our time' mode, and secondly, seek to utilise its growing (pun intended) stature to highlight the urgent need for effective development policy. Such a policy framework seeks to appropriate growth-generated wealth towards the welfare of all African citizens. It does not, inversely, exploit its human capital for exclusively vertical growth.

Failure to do this will, I suspect, see the latest gust of Afro-elation amount to no more than feel-good rhetoric. Africa must therefore stop perennially 'rising' and stand on the solid ground of economies that serve their people.

Every whirlwind must, after all, die down. ■



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