

The Thinker

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F O R T H O U G H T L E A D E R S

Segobye and Sall on Cry the Beloved Child

MULTI-LAYERED VULNERABILITY AND TRAUMA FOR AFRICA'S CHILDREN



SOUTH AFRICA R29.95



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Samuel Oyewole Jeffrey Sehume Lynn McGregor Afzal Moola David Adams**

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
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On the Cover:

There can be no keener revelation of a society's soul than the way in which it treats its children – Nelson Mandela

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A People's Parliament?

In the period before the historic first democratic elections in the history of South Africa, in April 1994, the ANC and its alliance partners, the SACP and COSATU envisaged a democratically elected parliament as a People's Parliament. It would be an institution that would be open and transparent. It would offer easy access to the people and their views would be given serious consideration by Portfolio Committees. It would hold the executive to account for its policies and operations and be accountable to those who elected them.

It was also envisaged that minority parties would be given the opportunity to participate in parliamentary debates and the deliberations of the Portfolio Committees as well as in the running of parliament. Moreover it was understood that the rules, procedures and processes governing the work of that institution had to be followed and respected by the majority party as well as the minority parties. This included complying with the authority, requests and rulings of the presiding officers.

The chaos – and at times anarchy – that prevailed at the last State of the Nation Address (SONA) by president Zuma on 12 February 2015, was an affront to those lofty ideals. Equally the high handed action of the police against DA demonstrators including sitting MPs outside parliament and the unjustifiable and dishonourable act of jamming signals in parliament prior to the arrival of the President deserve condemnation.

It is worth noting that the ANC distanced itself from the jamming fiasco and President Zuma has given an assurance that it will not happen again. Nevertheless a thorough investigation needs to be conducted and the perpetrators brought to book.

The deliberate decision by the EFF to prevent the President from delivering his address and to consciously flout the rulings of the presiding officers brought parliament into disrepute. This

course of conduct was outrageous, unjustifiable and unacceptable. The insistence on using the tactics of questions to the president even after the presiding officers had ruled it out of order was an act of defiance that the presiding officers could not allow. Parliament cannot function unless all MPs abide by the rules and procedures governing its work, including the SONA.

However let us also note that a few ANC MPs, including a Deputy Minister, raised frivolous Points of Order and that the DA members in violation of protocol and respect for the Head of State refused to stand when the President entered the National Assembly. These actions also undermined the work and dignity of parliament.

The presiding officers also need to give consideration to the way they dealt with the unruly EFF representatives. At times they gave the impression that they were not impartial and failed to communicate the reasoning behind their rulings and the progressive steps they were obliged to take, one after another, to address those who defied their requests. These culminated in the decision to invite a group of security personnel including police officers to enter the National Assembly and forcibly remove EFF MPs who had refused to leave the house.

Millions watching the chaos and anarchy in parliament on TV or listening to the radio should have been informed as to why such steps were taken by the presiding officers. Even guests at the SONA were not informed. The sequence of the actions demanded by protocol should have been outlined and it should have been made very clear that these steps were being followed to the letter.

Parliamentary rules and regulations require a presiding officer faced with an MP who refuses to leave to request the Sergeant of Arms to escort the individual (or individuals) out of the



House. If that should fail they can request the parliamentary security forces to give effect to their decision. On this sad occasion it was only after the EFF MPs refused to leave the House when ordered to do so by the parliamentary security officers that outside security forces were called in to give effect to their rulings. If the necessary decisions taken had not been enforced it would have seriously comprised parliamentary procedures and protocol for the future.

The manner in which the rulings made were implemented without adequate explanation did, as it turned out, unfortunately compromise the dignity of parliament and endanger future harmonious working relationships.

Some sections of the media, academics and legal practitioners overreacted, grossly exaggerating the situation, describing it as "teetering on the brink of being a police state" and claiming a "flagrant violation of the separation of powers". Hysterical overreaction does not help us to chart a way forward to ensure that our national legislature is truly a People's Parliament.

Following the fracas in parliament the EFF in Gauteng also tried to undermine the State of the Province Address by Premier David Makhura. However they eventually relented and respected the ruling of the speaker. But the boorish and disruptive behaviour

of the ANC MPLs when Premier Helen Zille attempted to make her State of the Province Address to the Western Cape Legislature was offensive and totally unacceptable. In an unprecedented move that undermines and destabilises all elected institutions Premier Zille was prevented from making her address. She made it in the next day after making good use of the publicity opportunity she was given.

The DA is elected to represent the people of the Western Cape in that legislature as well as in the Cape Town Metropole. At all times people should respect the view and verdict of the voters. As Inkosi Mangosuthu Buthelezi said, the behaviour of the EFF was “disgusting”. The EFF and the ANC and all political parties must understand that, if Parliament and other legislatures are to function, their rules, regulations, proceedings and processes have to be followed, and these infantile outbursts are utterly inappropriate. For parliament to become a People’s Parliament it must command the support and respect of all our people, cutting across race, class, gender, national groups and political parties. It is the most important law-making institution that we have.

It is also important that the President, Deputy President and Ministers are accountable to parliament. They should answer both written and oral questions timeously and honestly and Ministers should appear before Portfolio Committees. The Chief Whips’ Forum should be encouraged to continue with its good work and healthy interactions and the Deputy President should continue to engage the leaders of the opposition parties. But the Opposition parties also have to play by the rules and respect the verdict of the electorate. The ANC was elected to power by an overwhelming majority. It has the mandate of the people to govern the country and pass laws in parliament.

We should also take a leaf out of the dignified, calm and collected manner in which the President responded to the SONA debate. He acknowledged the contribution of opposition parties and asserted very powerfully that neither he nor the ANC would tolerate any form or manifestation of racism.

The President’s address was lost sight of amongst the hype over the chaos which preceded it. Amongst many other important points he made he shared the government’s nine point plan to “ignite growth and create jobs”. This involves:

1. Resolving the energy challenge.
2. Revitalising agriculture and the agro-processing value chain.
3. Advancing beneficiation or adding value to our mineral wealth.
4. More effective implementation of a higher impact Industrial Policy Action Plan.
5. Encouraging private sector

“It is ultimately the responsibility of the people of South Africa to demand and bring about a parliament that is truly a People’s Parliament. The ANC should go back to its original principle of turning parliament into a dignified institution that truly represents and articulates the views and aspirations of the masses.”

- investment.
6. Moderating workplace conflict.
7. Unlocking the potential of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), cooperatives, township and rural enterprises.
8. State reform and boosting the role of state owned companies, information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure or broadband roll-out, water, sanitation and transport infrastructure.
9. Operation Phakisa aimed [at] growing the ocean economy and other sectors.

On March 11, 2015, during the question and answer session in parliament, President Zuma responded with vigour to the “pay back the money” demand of the EFF MPs.

Ignoring the ruling of the speaker that the issue was not on the agenda, Zuma said: “Never have I ever thought about the date when I would pay back the money. Firstly, there is no money that I am going to be paying back without a determination by those who are authorised to do so, as recommended by the public protector”.

In the opinion of the President, that determination has to be made by the Minister of Police Nathi Nhleko. It is a pity that Zuma did not give this direct answer many months ago or during the debate in August 2014 or when he made his SONA in Parliament. Had he done so the ANC could have avoided much of the subsequent chaos and anger; and parliament could have got on with its business over the last year.

It is noteworthy that South Africa is not alone in relation to poor behaviour from MPs. Other parliaments have experienced worse forms of behaviour. In February 2015, MPs from the ruling AK party and the opposition Republican Peoples Party in Turkey engaged in violent scuffles and unseemly brawls twice in one week when debating the homeland security bill. In those scuffles one MP fell down the stairs and five deputies were injured.

In the parliament in the Ukraine the ruling coalition, which includes representatives from pro-fascist groups, inflict violence as well as verbal abuse against opposition MPs especially those from the Communist Party. Representatives of the Communist Party are at times forcibly removed from the rostrum when addressing parliament. Force, violence and intimidation are also visited upon MPs outside parliament. Even in India, which is the largest democracy in the world, parliament has been subject to disruptions, walk-outs and defiance of presiding officers.

Of course this does not excuse our own disgraceful behaviour. It is ultimately the responsibility of the people of South Africa to demand and bring about a parliament that is truly a People’s Parliament. The ANC should go back to its original principle of turning parliament into a dignified institution that truly represents and articulates the views and aspirations of the masses. ■

VALUE IN NATIONAL DEBATE

February saw the annual State of the Nation address being delivered as our country's various political representatives gathered to hear the President's nine point action plan - centred on South Africa's energy challenges as well as a number of other developmental goals.

While this year's address was dominated by the noise of political competition, the robust debate generated in its wake bears testament to the involvement and tenacity of the South African public. Certainly, the State of the Nation address, like the annual budget, is an exercise in transparent governance. It allows citizens to form a more educated opinion about the direction of the country, but also allows both domestic and international investors to assess the state of government and the economy. This is a particularly important exercise for South Africa, which has a savings deficit and is therefore required to attract foreign capital in order to finance our many infrastructure development programmes. More broadly however, it can instil a sense of participation amongst South African citizens, which is also important for a young democracy such as ours. So while we may not always agree on the path to take, South Africans can feel proud of their right to a democratic expression of collective will. And it is up to all citizens to ensure that these principles are upheld in a way that is consistent with the constitution, without fear or favour towards any individual.

A Word on Financial Matters

The month also saw the release of the National Treasury's detailed budget statement, setting out the government's economic outlook for the country, as well as its revenue and expenditure projections over the next five fiscal years. The Minister of Finance delivered his first statement this year amid an important phase in South Africa's growth history. With electricity constraints limiting growth to 1.5% in 2014, the risks to the public budget have increased in the short term. As a result, this year's budget presented the Minister with the challenging task of stabilising government debt while at the same time stimulating future economic growth as far as is possible.

One of the common features of the annual statement is the need for a sustainable long term spending plan. In order to achieve this goal, government needs to implement measures to increase tax revenues as well as control expenses. Whether

this includes an increase in the fuel levy, reigning in social grants or putting a cap on government wage growth, many South Africans will need to make extra provisions for retirement to enjoy a standard of living that they have become accustomed to during their working years. Saving for retirement will not only benefit the saver as an individual, but also adds to the pool of savings available for investment in our country, reducing the vulnerability of the domestic economy to foreign shocks and stabilising the investment, growth, and employment outlook.

In the News

At the 19th Annual Raging Bull Awards in Johannesburg, Oasis received two performance accolades. The company was recognised as the Top-performing Fund Management Company, on a risk-adjusted basis, amongst all the offshore managers with funds approved by the Financial Services Board. In addition to this, the Oasis Crescent Global Property Equity Fund received Best-performing Offshore Global Real Estate fund. This prestigious event celebrates outstanding achievements within the investment management industry and bears testimony to Oasis' commitment to protect and grow the real wealth of our clients. As this award attests to the Oasis investment philosophy, we celebrate the value delivered to our clients over the many years and the positive impact our dedication has had on their lives.



Left: Nazeem Ebrahim, Deputy Chairman - Oasis
 Centre: Adam Ebrahim, CEO - Oasis
 Right: Shaheen Ebrahim, Chairman - Oasis



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All contributing analysts write in their personal capacity



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Adele Lacob studied for a BA Degree in English and Dramatic Art at the University of Jerusalem before returning to SA. Currently, she is part of a fundraising team which seeks donor support to assist with UJ's core projects in establishing five Flagship Research Institutes in select disciplines and a Centre of Excellence.

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CRY THE BELOVED CHILD

Multi-layered vulnerability and trauma for Africa's children



The maxim that history repeats itself will loom over the developmental trajectory of the continent as its broken citizens grow up in a broken world with untold nightmares and a paucity of dreams and hopes about a future beyond their childhood memories. This is a future Africa cannot afford.

By Alinah K Segoby and Alioune Sall

A tragic story featured online by UNICEF has brought closer to home some of the pain and trauma suffered by orphaned children rejected by their relatives and society after the loss of one or both parents in the unfolding Ebola epidemic. It caused us to pause and reflect on the story of Liberia's children, and perhaps all children who have experienced the ravages of war, disease and other crises in Africa's seemingly unending woes.

The crisis of the three countries worst affected by Ebola in many ways mirrors the experiences of childhood across the continent. It is the story of broken promises and shattered dreams. It is a dream deferred perhaps never to be realised.

2014 unfolded with hope for Liberia and Sierra Leone as both were registering impressive growth and recovering from the trauma of civil war. Mineral wealth was steadily contributing

to the growth rate; and the return to stability and good governance ushered in hope for the citizenry of the two countries. Their neighbour, Guinea, which had experienced its fair share of challenges, was also contributing to the positive mood of the continent and hopes for a brighter future. The region had begun the long road to claiming the future with particular attention to children who would be cultivated as leaders of tomorrow. Then along

came Ebola. There is no doubt that the harsh impact of the Ebola epidemic exposed the existing fault lines of the African development model and drew attention to the most vulnerable in African societies, particularly children.

Forgotten, silenced yet in our midst

The story of the West African child affected by Ebola today resonates with the stories of children in southern Africa and most regions of the continent who have endured various struggles and traumas to date. The common thread throughout the continent's experiences, particularly those of children, is one of desperation. The children are victims of a multi-layered systemic failure of public health systems, governance systems and indeed society. The suffering of Africa's children is symptomatic of the collective crises of the African political economy and socio-cultural systems which have rendered children silenced, invisible, rejected and victimised. Despite going through multiple hardships and traumas including witnessing atrocious deaths, children are unjustly treated and sometimes feared. This fear no doubt stems from the knowledge of wrong-doing by society and its institutions where children have been abused though time and space across the continent.

The ending of war and conflicts in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola in the recent historical past and, significantly, the demise of apartheid in South Africa enabled the region's people to start rebuilding their shattered lives. This period of calm was short as they were soon thrown into chaos by the HIV/AIDS epidemic which hit this region hardest compared to the rest of the continent and the world.

In particular, the impacts on children have been severe given the loss of family members and care-givers as well as the burden of disease for those born with the virus. Some children were ostracised by family members and yet others had to endure disinheritance by relatives and other care-givers. The emergence of "child-headed households" became a phenomenon which is commonly encountered in all countries of the region. The region has only just begun to realise the fruits of

a comprehensive and globally assisted response to the epidemic, particularly the successes of the prevention of mother to child transmission of the virus. Despite these successes, children still suffer from multiple challenges affecting their communities including poverty, pervasive violence and insecurity.

Other regions of Africa have not fared any better. Throughout Africa, the exploitation of children has taken many forms. In particular, the girl child has emerged as the most vulnerable of all the human victims of atrocities, including the use of children as soldiers, human trafficking, and the use of sexual violence in conflict situations and also in the genocide experiences of the continent. The conflicts in the DRC, Rwanda, Sudan and more recently Central African Republic have

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
unleashed untold harm on children. The phenomenon of “child soldiers” infamously associated with the Uganda conflict particularly the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has highlighted the plight of children in conflict situations. Over time, many children have been captured and used as soldiers to commit horrifying acts which have left survivors brutalised and traumatised. In the DRC persistent reports of sexual violence against women and girls has brought to light the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.

The intervention of the UN via the Special Envoy Margot Wallstrom leading up to the declaration of Resolution 1960 and ongoing activism by civil society and UN agencies around Resolution 1325 continue to unearth

atrocities associated with the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict situations. Of note in terms of global campaigns is the “bring back our girls” campaign in support of the school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram militants in northern Nigeria in April 2014. The hyper-vulnerability of the girl child was brought to the fore in the AIDS 2014 Melbourne conference where the shocking statistics of mortality among adolescents from the HIV/AIDS epidemic were shared by UNICEF. The “do-nothing” scenario condemns many African girls to a short-lived miserable existence when taken as bounty during conflict and war situations.

Through the last three decades the Horn of Africa has endured some of the worst droughts and famines leading to internal displacement of whole communities. Those who survived will live with lifelong health challenges including stunted growth as a result of nutrition deficiencies during these episodes of extreme hunger. Images of refugee camps in the Darfur region of Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya have brought the lens to focus on the plight of children in times of conflict and famine.

Africa’s environmental crises also have a human-made dimension to them. Africa’s dependence on natural resources extraction including the reservation of large tracts of land for commercial agro-pastoral and tourism has resulted in the mass dislocation and relocation of people to sometimes uninhabitable areas. Interestingly, the emerging picture of the Ebola epidemic is a home-truth to this subject. Communities who relied on foraged resources (which include many of Africa’s indigenous peoples) have found their habitats increasingly under pressure for natural resources such as lumber and minerals. As a result, they have resorted to wild food resources such as “bush meat” to meet their nutrition needs in contexts of food insecurity. Environmental stressors when coupled with other socio-cultural and political economy stressors have thus brought communities whose resilience has already been tested over time to a low point where “survival” becomes more valued than



humane response to the needs of the most vulnerable, particularly children. Further, the alienation of those seen as “bush” by those in urban spaces further exacerbates tensions in societies already marred by fear of the other.

Another challenge faced by communities across the African continent is often dealing or addressing the omnipresence of beliefs. Many societies still believe in and practice occult rituals and beliefs. These include witchcraft practices which draw deeply on superstitions within and between communities. In this regard new or even old diseases and unexplained occurrences can lead to explosions when people blame each other or refuse assistance from other sources in fear. It is in this respect that orphans and vulnerable children whether as a result of Ebola or HIV/AIDS become targets of violence or are ostracised in fear of the unknown. Added to this, people living in densely populated settings often do not have access to reliable information systems so rapidly spread urban legends and stories fuel fear and the young and voiceless become victims of such acts.

Interestingly, such fear can have a rapid and cruel effect on the weak as indicated in witchcraft killings of elderly women across many communities on the continent. Similarly, the predation on children born with albinism in east Africa for witchcraft medicine has brought to light the vulnerability and subjection of those without power to defend themselves. Ebola has clearly tapped into the fear factor for many whether in the rural or African urban landscapes.

Ironically, at an international level it is playing itself out with the return to the paranoia about “Blackness” and the “dark Africa” images of Joseph Conrad are evoked in media reporting of the epidemic. Of particular interest has been the response of some African countries to close their borders and impose travel bans on nationals from the affected countries. Clearly, these overt and somewhat vindictive forms of exclusion and “othering” will not bring lasting solutions to ending the Ebola epidemic or lessen the trauma of Ebola orphans.

Who is standing up to be counted?

The question often begging an answer is how did the children end up in such extreme situation of misery in the first instance? What mechanisms were or could have been in place to prevent the collateral damage in the form of child mortality, suffering and other traumatic experiences to children? As Nelson Mandela has observed, “there can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in which it treats its children”. In this context Africa has been found wanting.

It is likely that an epidemic like Ebola has affected both children and adults alike. However, it is most likely that children in vulnerable situations such as localities without adequate public infrastructure for health, education

“Citizenry are trapped today in what has been termed “choice-less democracies” where the state has been, in its extreme, predatory and in other instances wilfully negligent.”

and food would have been the most vulnerable. Similarly, as children are orphaned, the least likely to be reached by services including psycho-social support would be those already on the margins of society. What then is the fate of the African child in the face of multiple epidemics, civil strife and outright violent conflict?

Interestingly, many African states are signatories to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child and also the African Union Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. June 16th is marked as a day celebrating the African Child on many African state calendars. Despite this, the plight of children in Africa comes up as a consistent red flag. So what lessons can be learnt from the HIV/AIDS and the Ebola epidemics? The first key lesson is that these epidemics bring into sharp relief

weaknesses in African governance institutions in a variety of ways.

First, the epidemics are not simply public health epidemics but are also socio-economic in nature. They draw on the socio-cultural and religious beliefs of communities and in this respect the response to both epidemics have to take into account these aspects. The recent admission by the AU Commissioner and the WHO that more could have been done sooner to stem the Ebola epidemic is worth reflecting upon. The rapid spread of the epidemic, and the high mortality rates, are symptomatic of a broader failure of the state in Africa to provide adequately for its people.

The stigmatisation of Africa’s children within their communities reflects the broader stigma attached to the poor and marginalised within many African countries. It can be argued that this and other crises in the past have made visible the gaps and fissures in the development trajectory of the Africa state in both the colonial and post-colonial state. Citizenry are trapped today in what has been termed “choice-less democracies” where the state has been, in its extreme, predatory and in other instances wilfully negligent. The state’s lack of capacity to protect its weakest is often not a factor of lack of resources but more a lack of accountability. It is telling that the plea for external help and intervention is often at these peak times and the state’s own response is often characterised by overt militarism even where the response needed is of a humanitarian nature. In this case, the “barbarism of the state” further accentuates the fear and loathing meted out to the weakest.

The resorting to “quarantine mode”, perhaps necessary in the case of Ebola, reminds one of the legacy of curfews endured by African citizenry when coup d’état after coup ravage their neighbourhoods and wreak havoc over their livelihoods. It is no wonder that recent images of people taking flight from officers of the state whether police, army or health officials have been a common feature of news reports on the Ebola epidemic. For children, the enduring images of men with guns now people with “space

outfits" taking away their parents will leave an indelible mark and possible hatred of the state which we will have to contend with unless more proactive interventions are initiated.

Second, the epidemics thrive in contexts of poverty and vulnerability where communities' capacity to respond to any form of challenge is weakened. Despite decades of resilience many communities have become frail and fragile in so far as response and coping mechanisms go and as a result many are very susceptible to "opportunistic infections" when calamities hit them. In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone their fragility in the context of post-conflict and recovery was probably a contributing factor to weak state response to the Ebola epidemic. In the case of Guinea, governance challenges have contributed to depleted infrastructure and other resources to enable coping with a decimating epidemic. In all three countries, the effectiveness of public institutions handling health, education and communication was found wanting in the face of a crisis. Even in a country like Liberia which has committed itself to a turnaround strategy and a new vision for the future the weak institutions were no match for the Ebola epidemic.

A third observation one can make is to underscore the need to critique the development paradigm of African states. As noted above, the Ebola affected countries have registered impressive growth in the last few years. This is the case with many other African countries which have been hailed in various quarters in the "Africa rising" narratives. However, as also noted elsewhere, such rapid growth has been, in the main, at the expense of the citizenry. It has not translated into the meaningful improvement of the quality of life of people so that from a human development perspective people's well-being remains poor. This is indicated by weak education and public health systems and under-developed or non-existent communications systems and infrastructure. It is in this respect that the rural-urban divide in terms of transport systems, communication and knowledge resources including

information about basic public health education were visibly absent to stem the tide of the Ebola epidemic. The crippling effect of the epidemic has now exposed people, particularly women and girls, to further dangers such as maternal and child mortality which were gradually being tackled with the assistance of international development partners.

To this end, the African child's future survival relies heavily on the capacity of the state to provide effective infrastructure and institutional support for basics like health, education and nutrition. Public works infrastructure providing for water and sanitation are critical as are basic social services at local and national government levels. For most African countries where poverty is endemic and extreme

“For children, the enduring images of men with guns now people with “space outfits” taking away their parents will leave an indelible mark and possible hatred of the state”

poverty prevalent, the capacity of state institutions to respond in a coordinated and expedited way is lacking. Often challenges with resourcing disaster management departments or units undermine the good intentions of local and global actors.

Beyond infrastructure, the assumption of the existence of a cohesive society or normal social fabric to cushion communities in times of crisis has to be balanced against the realities of communities emerging from conflict and war. The destructive impact of war on most societies erodes the basics of common or shared civic values and practices. Lives have been lost and many families have been displaced and or are struggling to rebuild their lives. In this regard the need to build a shared set of social values, which would already have

been a major task for communities, is now exacerbated by having to content with Ebola. In South Africa, the identification of building social cohesion as a key priority suggests that government takes seriously the need to rebuild the social fabric of society in a post-apartheid state. Research also highlights some of the damage done by years of state supported violence during the apartheid years. These are manifested in high levels of violence in communities including domestic violence (often targeting women and girls) and violent crimes.

Two points emerge as stark reflectors of the paralysis of our current responses to the Ebola epidemic. Firstly, the rush for a quarantine without reasoning, and the militarisation of the response clearly indicates our collective failure to draw on the human values which inform those who have risen to the call to action to date. Invoking a military response only fuels the fear which lives amongst Africa's citizenry, particularly the children. Closing borders out of fear is not the answer.

Secondly, racialisation of the epidemic also heightens the fear of others in the global community. The media frenzy in reporting the epidemic as an African disease feeds the phobias of those, particularly in developed countries, whose image and knowledge of Africa has not matured beyond the 19th century myths fuelled by colonial trophy hunters.

In the same vein, the disjointed response of the international community also plays on colonial dependency with foreign assistance responses in the three most affected West African countries pretty much resorting to the colonial motherland helping hand syndrome.

What solutions going forward?

What are the opportunities for emerging out of the morass? Fundamentally, a new paradigm of development and a people-centred development agenda has to ground the socio-economic and political ethos of African states. Where many countries have been identified as failed or fragile states clearly this is a longer road. However, a few states classified as emerging or lower middle and middle

income countries offer hope in so far as entrenching the basic tenets of a human rights based approach to development for their citizenry. Added to this, enhancing public accountability and service delivery is critical to ensuring that communities are buffered against adverse impacts of crises, whether emanating from public health or natural calamities. State support for a healthy non-governmental civil society activism and participation are also key to ensuring basic resources such as information can reach destinations timeously.

It is urgent for Africa to invest in building capable states which can, among other things, become accountable to their citizenry. The multiple investments in Africa's natural and other resources which are anchored on a global market appetite for Africa's raw materials and other extractive products suggest that there is room for manoeuvre in this regard. An important if not indispensable requirement of capable states will be the calibre of leadership. Clearly, Africa has seen the best and worst of leadership styles over the last five

“This is not a call for spin-doctors and public relations razzmatazz to photoshop Africa's image or the leaders therein”

decades. The deafening silence of leadership at this juncture to act decisively in the interest of the African child is clearly not in the spirit of, for example, Mandela's leadership style.

It is critical that Africa's leaders have the capacity to reintroduce an ethical and accountable dimension to their leadership. This should go beyond the rhetoric of “moral regeneration” but should critically explore the various ways in which a robust and shared set of values can be developed and owned by citizenry. This is not a call for spin-doctors and public relations razzmatazz to photoshop Africa's image or the leaders therein but a call to unpack the various maladies and systematically

and honestly interrogate their causes and ways of building societies beyond them. To do this, leaders must be able to stand the test of public scrutiny. The legitimacy of leaders and public institutions is essential if the citizenry are to believe they are not once more being hoodwinked to support electioneering or other agendas by and for rogue leaders. The clear despondency of many communities on the continent from Cape to Cairo reflects the multiple disappointments, rejections and feelings of frustration when social actions have been hijacked and bastardised by wily leaders.

One challenge recognised in trying to create a shared vision and new ethos for Africa's future is identified as the lingering suspicion and fear of the “other” in respect to Africa's diversity. Although Africa celebrates its cultural and linguistic diversity and is not averse to showering praise on this as the unique asset of the continent, there remains the ugly truth of a deep seated mistrust and fear of the other. This is reflected in the various iterations of ethnophobia and xenophobia and the



unwillingness to meaningfully address the subject of cultural liberties, rights and the protection of the vulnerable. It is in this domain though, that possible solutions reside.

Legislating against witchcraft for example, will not make it disappear; if anything it will boost its vibrancy as one of the growing list of underworld activities. Similarly, not supporting the growth of cultural and linguistic diversity will not result in a “united nation” and “united continent. If anything, supporting the strengthening of cultural and language development will enhance the access to knowledge and innovation through technology so that sustainable solutions to crises like Ebola can be found.

Not surprisingly, non-state actors have also proven their worth in this domain with their innovative pilot or small scale projects which have targeted communities through collective action. Of note are NPOs like Sonke Gender Justice which has mobilised men around a new call to action against gender based violence in South Africa. It is in this regard that African leadership at all levels needs to embrace the extended hand of non-state actors whether in the private or not for profit sectors to ensure the development of common and shared agendas for development.

It is also very important to ensure that African states ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and that they go further to domesticate the conventions via legislation and policy provisions to ensure protection of children at all times. The regional organs of the African Union must prioritise common approaches towards child protection systems including closing legal loopholes and contradictory laws, as often the abuses of children take advantage of porous borders or absent systems in neighbouring states. This particular problem has been highlighted by the growing problem of child trafficking within and between various countries. Incongruent legal systems and policy provisions across the SADC countries often hamper enforcing the law when it comes to prosecuting perpetrators of crimes against children. In this regard

it is important for civil society actors, particularly children’s rights focused NPOs, to receive the support they need to do the work of advocacy, child protection and the lobbying of policy makers to address priority needs of children.

Benchmarking international practice is also an important way of addressing the needs of children in society. Unfortunately the scale of violence and adverse impacts on children globally does not lend itself to easy benchmarking. Children continue to bear the brunt of suffering in conflicts in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. In this regard the work of UNICEF and international development agencies, NPOs and other actors focused on children’s issues can be drawn upon to review good practice for future policy making to address child protection.

“Developing community based surveillance and monitoring systems to protect vulnerable children is an imperative.”

It will also be critical to develop community capacity and resource communities to respond in a humane way to the needs of children. Given that relatives can shut out children out of fear or greed reflects among other things limitations in policing and monitoring systems. Developing community based surveillance and monitoring systems to protect vulnerable children is an imperative. These systems need to be strengthened with resources at local, national and regional levels to ensure that they are robust enough to enable efficient and effective local and international action to protect children.

Frameworks for the future

Perhaps the time is right for a more engaged debate on the subject of children and their treatment, given the lessons learnt from Ebola and HIV/

AIDS. This is particularly important to act now in light of the ongoing discussions around the post-2015 development agenda. Clearly, what has been referred to as the “unfinished business” of the MDGs should, for Africa, be the self-critique to explore how the continent’s development failed the African child... and why?

These conversations, starting from the family level through local community to national, regional and continental platforms should be a systematic and frank introspection of what could have been done differently and what needs to be done with urgency. The ongoing discussions around the new development agenda for the continent needs to be rooted in the key question – is the Agenda 2063 foregrounded in an informed consideration of the African child’s needs? If not, why is this not the case?

The silence and absence of “the child” in the ongoing discourses of the Agenda 2063 suggests that we will once more fail the African child in planning for the next 50 years. We will remain reliant on “disaster relief” approaches to solving local and regional crises where the capacity to respond could have been more coherently architected and engineered. The more than 3000 Ebola orphans in the three worst affected counties now join the groundswell of over 15 million AIDS orphans and countless others orphaned by war and natural calamities. The current legislations and policies within African states which are often based on the assumption that “minors” are incapacitated or invisible are clearly out of sync with reality. In this respect, the maxim that history repeats itself will loom over the developmental trajectory of the continent as its broken citizens grow up in a broken world with untold nightmares and a paucity of dreams and hopes about a future beyond their childhood memories. This is a future Africa cannot afford. The cost of doing nothing to address the needs of the African child today will become a much heavier cost to bear in the medium and long term future.

Daring to let children lead

If Africa and the world are to



overcome the Ebola epidemic, there are several imperatives which must be addressed. First, the penny counting in so far as financing the global response to the epidemic must be addressed. States and non-state actors, particularly private sector actors must heed the call for assistance from the worst affected countries. This has to happen to save not only human lives but to salvage whatever remains of the economies of the region and to safeguard livelihoods of the poor and the vulnerable, especially children. Second, An Africa-informed response system and messaging must emerge from Africa's leadership. At present the conflicting messages sent by different states and leaders are confusing. The not so visible solidarity of leaders of the continent including the "business as usual" approach within and between the regions of the continent is worrisome. If a united and integrated Africa is indeed our common vision then our current reaction to the Ebola crisis belies this aspiration. If we seek African solutions for Africa's problem our deafening silence in the face of the Ebola epidemic has exposed our

“ If a united and integrated Africa is indeed our common vision then our current reaction to the Ebola crisis belies this aspiration”

weaknesses in so far as defining our critical priorities.

The African child should not be waiting to be rescued or salvaged as has been done over the decades by benevolent others. Clearly, Ebola will preclude this option as the world retreats from Africa in fear. The inclusion and embracing of the African child in building a better future should be evident in our current crisis responses to the plight of the Ebola orphans. Their voices should be informing current leadership thinking and deliberations around the subject of "what next?". Their immediate basic needs should be priority for rapid assistance services including shelter, food, love and care. They have been

through enough suffering to date and their emotional as well as physical well-being should top the agenda.

Going forward, perhaps it is time we revisit our templates of development planning to see at how the ecology of futures planning plays out. Perhaps the fears and dreams of children should be our starting point to enable us to appreciate the very basic needs of a small child who is left alone, hungry, fearful and rejected in the face of loss of parents or other loved ones. Perhaps this will force us to draw on a different value system informed by empathy and humanness rather than an obsession with order and might. Perhaps if we reduce our thought leadership to the vulnerability of a child we could allow ourselves to walk with their bare feet and feel the pain.

If we collectively aspire to an African continent which can claim its place in the world and celebrate prosperity the future cannot be left to chance. The lessons of the HIV/AIDS and Ebola epidemics should be sufficient for us to internalise the need to take collective responsibility and accountability for protecting the future of the African child from further harm. ■

Terrorist Insurgencies, Rebels and Militias in Asymmetric Conflicts in Africa



The use of terror, including the slaughtering of infidels and apostates, kidnappings of civilians and mass abductions, forced marriages and gang rapes of girls and women, is an expression of deeply held contempt for the extant social order.

By Ademola Araoye

The new terrorist insurgencies globally, as well as in Africa, are defined by the exclusivity of their highly partisan “sectarian objectives”, as opposed to the “public good” and the deviation of their methodologies from humanistic

underpinnings to the expression of hatred of apostates who do not share their fundamentalist spiritual craze. In essence, these sectarian insurgencies defy all conventional definitions of revolutionary praxis and struggle.

The emergence of the Islamic State

of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) epitomises this state of affairs and represents the clearest challenge to the concept of a harmonic convergence drawn on the limited experience of Euro-America. ISIL claims religious authority over all Muslims across the world and aspires

to bring much of the Muslim-inhabited regions of the world under its political control, beginning with Iraq, Syria and other territories in the Levant region, which includes Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus and part of southern Turkey. The global implications of the horror that such movements as al-Qaeda and its off shoots, the ISIL, whether in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Libya, Mali or Nigeria, has awakened the world to the sheer futility and falsity of denominating the grand narratives of the evolution of human society as an exclusively a Euro-American affair.

The world of the totality of humanity matters. This global society must count in any propagation of any perceived harmonic convergences that must undergird global stability and order. For Africa, the consequences of this have not brought happy news. In Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, this intersection with al-Shabaab has had a worrisome impact. Nigeria, in its debilitating confrontations with Boko Haram, is the poster image of Africa's continuing dangerous rendezvous with global history. It is a nation in double jeopardy emanating from the continuing denial of establishment Euro-America to the reality that although immediate local conditions, as in most of the Islamic world, may have enabled the rise of Boko Haram, its emergence is undeniably a part of the instability of the global landscape.

Danjibo elaborates on fundamentalism in relation to Boko Haram and other extremist insurgencies. He defines fundamentalism as an eclectic concept that can be viewed from three perspectives: (i) from a cognitive understanding where the work is associated with a closed type that expresses exclusivity, particularity, literality and moral rigour; (ii) from a cultural theological framework where the work expresses opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in defence of orthodoxy and religious traditions; and (iii) from a social movement perspective, fundamentalism denotes organisational and ideological uniqueness from other types of religious movements. Religious fundamentalism is a microscopic but also a literal understanding of religious practices and teachings, especially in

its relation to the direct transliteration of the Holy Scriptures and its insistence on the sacred perpetuation of the traditions. In other words, fundamentalists stress "authority of scripture and the necessity of righteous living". They also place great emphasis on "right doctrine and the necessity of organised warfare against the forces of modernism". It is in this context that the Maitatsine and Boko Haram may be understood as fundamentalist reactions to the Nigerian state and the global order that it perceives to be dominantly western and by implication, Christian.

Danjibo stresses the global nexus of Nigerian religious practice and organisation. He is emphatic that Nigerian Muslim organisations and the Christian counterparts are linked to the Middle East and the West respectively. The former look up to the Arab world

“In northern Nigeria some youth were explicitly supportive of Saddam Hussein, while local militias rose from parts of the south as volunteers for the American side.”

for religious alliance while the latter tilt toward the Euro-American pole.¹ This broad polarisation of Nigeria was demonstrated in the sharp divisions that the American invasion of Iraq elicited in the country. In northern Nigeria some youth were explicitly supportive of Saddam Hussein, while local militias rose from parts of the south as volunteers for the American side.

African religious bodies, including fundamentalist Muslim and Christian groups, are tightly linked to global, mainly western and mid-eastern, religious networks and tend to become local extensions of the theological predilections and orientations of their metropolitan guides and allies. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab typify this. They draw much of their inspiration

and adopt and adapt tactics from the fundamentalist directions of such organisations as al-Qaeda and ISIL.

ISIL is a radical Islamist group noted for its extremely brutal tactics - including mass killings and abductions of members of religious and ethnic minorities, as well as the beheadings of soldiers and journalists. It has seized large swathes of territory in eastern Syria and across northern and western Iraq that it has declared an Islamic state. Its brutal methods have sparked fear and outrage across the world and prompted western military intervention.² Boko Haram has deepened its connection to ISIS by forming an information and material-support alliance and have been sharing military strategy. With the same basic ideology and similar objectives as ISIS, Boko Haram has been integrated into the larger global jihadist agenda to impose shariah law everywhere through the creation of caliphates in the Muslim world. They share the same operational philosophy in the use of terror to advance their fundamentalist cause and the more violence they can inflict on the infidels, the better, as far as they're concerned.³

The use of terror, including the slaughtering of infidels and apostates, kidnappings of civilians and mass abductions, forced marriages and gang rapes of girls and women, is an expression of deeply held contempt for the extant social order. These shocking tactics are also aimed at breaking infidel communities and demonstrating their powerlessness in the face of the unimaginable aggression of the Islamic extremists. These horrendous crimes are associated with the asymmetric warfare that they unleash at all levels of their campaigns; against the individual, community, national armies or international coalitions arrayed against their insurgencies. Their wars are not mediated by any rules. It is war unlimited in the middle-east, in Africa, in Asia and across Europe and America.

The charismatic Muslim cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, formed Boko Haram in Maiduguri in 2002. Boko Haram's official Arabic name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in English means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad".

Translated from the Hausa language, that is spoken across northern Nigeria, Cameroun, Niger Republic, Ghana and Tchad, Boko Haram means literally "Western education is forbidden". The organisation draws its fighters mainly from the Kanuri ethnic group, which is the largest in the three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe that are the epicentres of their operations in Nigeria. But the group recruits from and operates in northern Nigeria and Cameroon from where Mohammed Marwa, the leader of Boko Haram's antecedent group, Mai Tatsine, hailed, Niger and Tchad. However, its main theatre of operations has been in north eastern Nigeria which has common borders with Cameroon where the group has declared an Islamic Caliphate. Boko Haram's main political objective is to upend the Nigerian social order, overturn the secular character of the Nigerian state that it has repudiated in favour of the institution of an Islamic fundamentalist society in a theocratic state.

Boko Haram was reincarnated from the ashes of an earlier violent religious sect, Mai Tatsine. Mai Tatsine is translated from Hausa as "people who curse". The group got its name from the notoriety of its preaching that were mainly diatribes and insults to the social, traditional and political establishment as well as the community at large. Indeed, it was reputed for its hatred of the immediate community in which the sect was founded and based. The spiritual leader of the movement was Muhammad Marwa a.k.a. Mai Tatsine.

The origins of the movement are shrouded in some controversy as some claimed that Muhammed Marwa was one of five Christian students sponsored by the Christian Association in the northern Nigeria, in Jos, in 1954 to study Islamic studies in Sudan. Their mission was to come back to Nigeria as Muslim clerics, use their Islamic knowledge to preach violence, distort original Islamic teachings and, if possible, cause riots and chaos in northern Nigeria. Two of the five provocateurs, this version goes, returned to execute the original plan; Muhammad Marwa deployed in Kano, in northern Nigeria, while the second,

simply identified as Birema, settled in Niamey in neighboring Niger Republic.

Mai Tatsine, which began its reign in the late '50s in Kano and some other parts of Northern Nigeria, is the forerunner of Boko Haram. Their ideologies are similar. In their fundamentalist orientation they forbade what Islam allowed, and allowed what Islam made haram. They claimed western education is sin, they rejected anything brought by technology, they were constantly saying things like "wearing a wrist watch is haram, using radios and television is haram"...⁴ Notwithstanding the very tenacious engagement to propagate fundamentalist Islam in Nigeria the loss of lives in radical and militant confrontations with the government, some indeed still believed Mohammed Marwa remained a Christian until his death. In the often strange contortions that Nigeria's political process can take, whatever his true belief, Marwa's influence remains indelible in the character of Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies that has emerged in the country.

Meanwhile, Boko Haram has developed strong global networks that have complemented its fundamentalism with a murderous mindset that has been demonstrated in its genocidal proclivities.

The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin – commonly known as al-Shabaab, is in the same category. Al-Shabaab is a clan-based insurgent and terrorist group and was the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Al Shabaab was co-founded by Adan Hashi Ayrow, its first spiritual leader, and Ahmed Abdi Godane, under whom the hard-line Islamic militant group linked with global jihadist movements. Although most of its fighters are alleged to be predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the Somali Federal Government, al-Shabaab's senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaeida and are believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan. The merger of the two groups was publicly announced in February 2012 by the Emir of al-Shabaab and Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeida.⁵ Its

most recent leader, Abdi Godani, 33, was killed in an American air raid on 1 September, 2014. Personifying the religious extremism of the group, he declared that had been sent "ahead of the hour with the sword so that Allah will be worshipped alone without partners". He became Emir [an Arabic word for leader] of al-Shabaab, a title that conferred him great spiritual clout. He became in effect the chief ideologue, custodian and interpreter of the 'pure' Salafi jihadi doctrine.⁶

Yet, against this background is the irreconcilable lifestyle of the leadership of the fundamentalist groups, whether in the Middle East or Nigeria, with the fundamentalist and anti-western preachments. In Nigeria, it was observed that Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, rode in exotic cars, including expensive jeeps, and enrolled his children in choice private schools and was attended to by private lawyers and doctors. Boko Haram is distinguished by both its objectives of establishing a fundamentalist exclusivist state and by its brutal methods. It is its inhuman methods that qualify it as a terroristic movement even if its objectives are to delegitimise an extant order or status quo.

Unlike Africa's classic revolutions, terrorist insurgencies are inhuman and positively inhumane. A salient conclusion is the dehumanisation and brutalisation of those who are perceived to be infidels or apostates in the terrorist campaigns by extremist Islamic insurgencies. This separates extremists from authentic African revolutionary movements that promote humanistic tenets as core to the integrity of the ultimate transformation of society that they seek to attain. Rebellions often have certain affinities or claims to revolutions but they belong to different classes in the scope and depth of their challenge to the status quo. In fact many rebellions are integral to the status quo, but have specific grouses. A rebellion is often relatively limited in the ends it may seek to attain. The scope of the changes that are sought may not necessarily lead to the birth of a new order. Indeed it may be the search for accommodation by the rebels in the status quo.

A coup d'état may be a rebellion,



PRESIDING OFFICERS FOR THE FIFTH TERM OF THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE

Section 111 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides for the appointment of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker and also allows the Legislature to appoint Presiding Officers to assist them. The Legislature has adopted the Standing Rules that allows for the appointment of the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of Committees. The four office bearers are collectively referred to as Presiding Officers.

THE ROLE OF PRESIDING OFFICERS

Presiding Officers oversee and ensure that the proceedings of the House during the sittings are adhered to.

The Speaker of the Legislature, as the political head and Presiding Officer of the House, is responsible for the running of the Legislature. The primary responsibility of the Speaker is to ensure integrity, independence and impartiality of the institution. The Speaker presides over meetings and debates and ensures that the Members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs) can freely participate in debates while keeping to the Rules of the House.

The Speaker is assisted by a Deputy Speaker who takes these responsibilities whenever the Speaker for any reason is unable to preside. The Deputy Speaker is generally also responsible for the welfare of the Members. Presiding in the House is done in a fair and impartial manner, ensuring fairness of debates in the House.



A Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of Committees support the Presiding Officers by coordinating the effective functioning of the committees in the Legislature. They help to ensure that the programmes of the committees are in line with the legislative business.

The Presiding Officers are also responsible for political management of the Legislature, overseeing adoption and implementation of policies and implementation of decisions of the House and Rules Committee. They put systems to follow up on petitions. They also bring cohesion among various political parties of the Legislature. The administration of the Legislature under the stewardship of the Secretary accounts to the Presiding Officers.

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*Issued by:
Media Unit*

Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature

but a secessionist bid comes closer to a revolution, while a liberation war such as the process led by the South Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA) represents a revolutionary process, particularly if the vision of post liberation society is based on radically different ideational premises.

The goals envisaged by the use of political violence determine the nature of the process, including the intensity of the force that the process may apply. A revolution is thus a rebellion in extreme dedicated to the complete overthrow of a hegemonic order, which may include armed struggle for independence by colonial peoples from a colonising regime or secession by a people who seek to free themselves from an oppressive authority. A coup d'état is often a minimalist rebellion whose limited goals may range from the total disavowal of the extant political, social and economic order to seeking radical restructuring of the order, to even a mild reform of the status quo. These goals may be described as minimalist, since they do not seek to reject the foundational principles underpinning the prevailing systemic order. A revolution is an absolute rejection of the very principles undergirding an existing order and often entails intense violence to overthrow the entrenched order.

Revolutionary and rebel movements sometimes may bring together, at least at the core of the leadership hierarchy, rational actors who have a clear set of political goals that are perceived to be best attainable through the application of force. In the least, therefore, revolutionary and rebel movements must be able to project force. They must also convince the status quo that they possess such capabilities to be credible. Revolutions seek systemic power transitions, social transformation and transformations in economic relations of power. Rebellions may aim for less having failed in the deployment of persuasive means to achieve change or reform.

The legion of rebel movements in West Africa include the Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and its splinter group the Independent National Patriotic

Front of Liberia (INPFL) as well as United Liberia Movement (ULIMO) or the Liberia United Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) as well as the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) in Liberia, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Force Nouvelles in Cote d'Ivoire that transformed itself into Cote d'Ivoire's post conflict national army.

The trajectory of the Forces Nouvelles from a clannish rebel force to becoming the rechristened national army, Force Republicaines du Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI) presents a classic example of the evolution of a contemporary rebel organisation against the state with its international backers; the neo-colonial power deploying the rebellion as a proxy to achieve its strategic objectives. It started as a band of disgruntled non-commissioned

“A rebellion is often relatively limited in the ends it may seek to attain. The scope of the changes that are sought may not necessarily lead to the birth of a new order.”

officers led by I. B. Koulibali, later to be murdered by the pro-France, pro Blaise Compaore Guillaume Soro faction of the rebellion, that acting with the support of the Burkinabe government, mutinied in September 2002 and sought the overthrow of the emerging neo-nationalist Laurent Gbagbo Ivorian state. Pushed out of the capital Abidjan, the group was, with the encouragement of French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villipen, officially transformed into a formal rebellion by the help of French forces 23rd BIMA based in Abidjan, which created a buffer zone to protect the rebels. The French sabotaged sub-regional efforts to negotiate a resolution of the crisis. It put in place a Linas-Marcoussis process designed to advance its planned strategic objective

of installing a French local proxy and overseer of its Ivorian affairs. This came to fruition in the controversial takeover of the country a decade after through elections that were clearly lost by the local patron of the rebellion and the proxy of France, Alhasane Ouattara.

Again in neighbouring Liberia, rebels were on hand to advance France's agenda to the detriment of Africa. Charles Taylor's horrendous NPFL was aided by the collusion of Burkinabe and Ivorian governments to overthrow the brutal regime of Samuel Doe. The role of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire under Houphouet Boigny was partly to derail gains in what was perceived as the Nigeria led regional integration project of ECOWAS. The political objective of the two states was to align the geo strategic interests of France to consolidate its formal hegemonic status in Africa. Toward this goal, it was crucial to keep the Francophone/Anglophone divide in West Africa and strengthen exclusivist Francophone socio/political and economic platforms against the Anglophones. The price of support for Charles Taylor was the deployment of its forces to assassinate Thomas Sankara, the revolutionary and charismatic young leader of Burkina Faso, who was betrayed by his deputy Blaise Compaore. Charles Taylor in turn was on hand as an accomplice to the genocidal war of Foday Sankor's RUF against Sierra Leone. Cote d'Ivoire under Houphouet Boigny and Blaise Compaore's Burkina Faso had been the centres of the strategic destabilisation that tore apart the social fabric of West Africa for two decades.

From the early sixties, political violence has gradually escalated both in its intensity and the frequency of its occurrence across the sub region. In Nigeria, it is estimated that 10,000 people have been killed in political violence in the last three years. Since the last decade, West Africa has been characterised by an unbroken arch of conflicts that stretches for over a thousand miles from the West to the East of the sub region. This arc begins from Senegal through Guinea Bissau across Sierra Leone, Liberia to Cote d'Ivoire. In more recent times, Mali and Nigeria have been linked to this arc of sub-regional instability. The

countries share close proximity and three of them have contiguous borders. Cultural affinities of the various peoples of the sub region also flow across international frontiers. These affinities have had implications for the spread of political violence.

The prominent use of violence to achieve political ends in the region began in 1963 with the assassination of Togolese premier Sylvanus Olympio by ex-soldiers that toppled his government. In neighbouring Ghana in February 1966, President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown by Colonels Afrifa and Kotoka. Massive violence in western Nigeria foreshadowed the military insurrection of majors that overthrew the Tafawa Balewa government in 1966. By 1967, the federal government was embroiled in a civil war to put down the Col Odumegwu Ojukwu led self-declared state of Biafra. That conflict is reputed to have claimed over 1 million lives. The Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC), led by Abbe Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, launched a secessionist bid from Senegal in 1982. Thirty-two years later, a low intensity conflict still simmers in that province.

In 1999, civil conflict in Guinea Bissau, which had fought a historic revolutionary war of liberation for over 12 years, led to the violent overthrow of the General Bernardino Vieira regime by his Chief of Defence Staff, General Ansumane Mane. In a stark deviation from the revolutionary guidelines of Amilcar Cabral, General "Nino" Viera had exploited racial antipathies to overthrow Louis Cabral from office in 1980. Vieira, a Papel, who returned to office through the ballot box in 2005, was killed by renegade Ballanta soldiers on 2 March 2009, apparently in retaliation for a bomb blast that killed Guinea-Bissau's military chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie, a Ballanta. Viera was accused of planting the bombs. The troubled Lusophone country in the sub region shares contiguous borders in the north with the South of the Casamance, and it was admitted that the civil conflict was perceived as directly related to the international politics of the insurgency in the Casamance. In November 2000,

head of the military junta, General Ansumane Mane took up arms against the democratically elected President Kumba Yala. In September 2003, remnants of the old military junta finally deposed the President.

In spiralling violence in the sub region, by November 2003, Liberia had been at war for over 24 years. It began with the Samuel Doe's bloody "revolution" in April 1980 that resulted in the assassination of President William Tolbert at the hand of private Harrison Pennoh.⁷ Within one month of taking over the entire cabinet of President Tolbert had been put to death. Thereafter many others were brutally eliminated including General Thomas Quinwokpa on charges of coup plotting. In December 1989, the Charles Taylor led National Patriotic

“The proliferation of militias in unstable states may lead to the emergence of warlords who delineate their territorial spheres of control and stake their claims as the political sovereigns of those states.”


Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Nimba county of Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire.⁸ Since then, the Liberian state has imploded and had been reconstituted through mainly sub-regional efforts. Doe's death sparked hellish tribal and factional fighting.⁹ As a result of new insurgency from another rebel movement, Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Charles Taylor was forced into exile in Nigeria and the country has imploded again. The intractable crises spawned numerous militias and chaos elements that controlled different parts of the country. The post Taylor transitional administration was protected by the ECOWAS sub regional intervention force and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until a democratically elected government led by President

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf came into office.

In Sierra Leone, from 1991 army corporal Fonday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with the unwavering support of Charles Taylor,¹⁰ took up arms against the government of Major General John Saidu Momoh. This was in retaliation for President Momoh's hosting of Liberia rebels in Sierra Leonian territory. In fact, the United Liberia Movement of Alhani Kromah and later the Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy, both Mandingo aligned rebel movements, were funded and created by Mandingos in Sierra Leone and Guinea, both sharing contiguous borders with Liberia. Two other coups, and continuous bloodletting from Fonday Sankoh's armed elements, preceded the democratic elections that brought John Tejan Kabbah into office. The RUF came to the notice of the international community by unleashing mind-boggling violence against the people of Sierra Leone. In September 2002, in neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire, after a very bloody attempt to unseat President Laurent Gbagbo, the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire retreated to the central town of Bouake where the movement has consolidated its control over 65% of the national territory. Like Charles Taylor before them, the MPCJ set up an embryonic state within Cote d'Ivoire. As a result of the pervasive violence, security became a concern in the sub region,¹¹ as it was awash with rebels, militias and chaos elements.

Yet, it is possible, as witnessed in West Africa, that legitimate revolutionary processes and political rebellions, in the hands of unsophisticated and crude actors, decay. The decay of revolutions may be marked by the gradual retrenchment of the hitherto lofty original humanistic and altruistic goals. In its stead, violence becomes a norm and chaos an end in itself. Was that the case with Charles Taylor and the NPFL that were established to end a monstrous dictatorial regime? Could also his predecessor Sergeant Samuel Doe who, egged on by the progressive movement of Liberia, rose from the margins of society to challenge an illegitimate century and half old internal apartheid social order supervised by the True Whig party,

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lost the will to pursue a constructive revolutionary path?

Further still, it is critical to delineate between rebellions and militias and chaos elements. Rebel movements are characterised by their amorphous structure. While a tightly knit corps of conspirators may serve as the nucleus, the nature of the enterprise cannot sustain a formal and institutionalised organisation in the very beginnings of rebellion. While a hierarchy may exist, it is the exigencies of the struggle that determines the distribution of responsibilities and power within the organisation. The leadership may be constituted by mostly non-commissioned officers taking important decisions, often with only a few commissioned officers.

Rebel armies are risk acceptant, largely because their operations are opportunistically determined and have no distinct political control. The political leadership is fused with military command. There is therefore no superintending higher political authority with oversight. This implies that rebel armies are not accountable. The lack of control and accountability is more acute at the beginning of the campaigns of the movement. One reason for this is that rebel armies, by their very aims, seek to destroy the basis of the social contract and the subsisting social order between the governing elite and the governed. While the goal of the military establishment may be to protect the integrity of the state, the territory and its institutions, the goal of the rebellion is to destroy this.

Generally conflict in Africa is impacted by transnational sociological affinities across the continent. The crisis crossing of cultural affinities across national frontiers implies that while rebellion may have been motivated by both political and economic interests and developments internal to one country, the internal interests may impact on groups that are not direct participants in the process. The conflicts thus invite the attention of ethnic cousins across the borders. In this scenario that may be described as intermestic, transnational interest groups may be motivated to join a rebel movement across the border to protect perceived corporate interests

of the transnational ethnic or religious groups in the political contentions of the conflict. So a significant percentage of combatants in rebel movements operating in any one country in the sub region may come from neighbouring states. This is sometimes with the connivance of the governments of those states. There is thus wide extra territorial catchment area for rebel groups in the West African sub region.

These facts were demonstrated in Cote d'Ivoire where Burkinabes dominated the Ivorian rebel Forces Nouvelles, and the Kru/Krahn group from Liberia, transnational ethnic cousins of Gbagbo Bete group, fought on the side of the Laurent Gbagbo administration. This situation leads to the beginnings of mercenary activities as was amply demonstrated by the rebel movement RUF in Sierra Leone and the incursions of Liberian fighters on different sides in the Ivorian civil war. If the rebel movement manages to discover an internal source of generating revenue, a new political economy of the war may threaten the political focus and may lead to the decay of the rebellion. In this case, the political economy of the war may lead to factionalisation of the rebel movement that further complicates the intervention process and negotiations to bring the conflict to an end. Militias often emerge from such further splintering of rebellions in decay.

Militias are fairly unstructured rabble-raising armed social groups that are often motivated by a very narrow agenda, which may not necessarily be political. They are often the nucleus of military formations in the service of one person or at the command of one person or an ethnic chieftain. The proliferation of militias in unstable states may lead to the emergence of warlords who delineate their territorial spheres of control and stake their claims as the political sovereigns of those states. Somalia presents an extreme example of a failed state carved out among war lords backed by heavily armed militias.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has a surfeit of groups that typify militias in Africa. It has coined the term Mai Mai or Mayi Mayi to refer any kind of community-based militia group formed to defend their

local territory against other armed groups. Many were established to exploit the unending conflicts and war for their own advantage by looting, cattle rustling or banditry. They also extort monies from artisanal miners prospecting for minerals in many areas where state authority is tenuous or non-existent. Small bands of armed forces led by warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads, and politically motivated resistance fighters fall under the term "Mai Mai". Because Mai Mai are loosely structured owing loyalty to the person of the band leader, internal cohesion is fragile.

Importantly though, different Mai Mai groups are allied with a variety of domestic and foreign government and guerrilla groups at different times. The Mai Mai were particularly active in the provinces in the east bordering Rwanda, North Kivu and South Kivu (the "Kivus"), which were under the control of the Rwanda-allied Banyamulenge-dominated rebel faction, the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma). The two most powerful and well-organised Mai Mai groups in the Kivus were led by Generals Padiri and Dunia, but now there is another Mai Mai group which is called Mai-Mai Yakutumba which was organised in 2007 by General Yakutumba. Other less prominent Mai Mai groups, include the Mudundu 40/Front de Résistance et de Défense du Kivu (FRDKI) and Mouvement de Lutte contre l'Agression au Zaïre/Forces Unies de Résistance Nationale contre l'Agression de la République Démocratique du Congo (MLAZ/FURNAC), were reported to be cooperating with the Rwandan military and RCD-Goma.¹²

Meanwhile asymmetric wars have become the hallmark of extremist movements such as the Boko Haram and ISIL. In the last decade, in northern Uganda and South Sudan as well as along the borders of Congo Kinshasa there is the elusive Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). In Nigeria, it is Boko Haram. The defining trait of groups engaged in asymmetric warfare is their operational resilience, their resoluteness and impermeability to sentimental pleadings from their enemies that they only despire. Unlike rebellions and quasi-revolutionary movements that

often decay, especially in Africa, those mobilised on theocratic foundations often fight to the last man standing. It is also of note, even if ironically, that these violent movements, whether in Iraq, Pakistan, Uganda, Somalia or Nigeria, also recruit, abduct and indoctrinate women and girls to do battle. This completes their defiance of orthodoxy in all realms.

Asymmetric warfare is, paradoxically, described as conflicts where opposing protagonists have starkly unequal military resources, and the so-called weaker fluid insurgent uses unconventional weapons and tactics. The unconventional tactics of the extremists integrate every conceivable form of atrocity; as terrorism, rape of men and women alike, abduction and conscription and use of child soldiers who are indoctrinated, as default instruments of conflict. Executions of captured enemies and mass slaughter of innocent civilians, often tagged as unbelievers or apostates, are frequently undertaken.

It appears that abductions, for which the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) first and now Boko Haram have become notorious, are important to replenish the combatant forces and also to build the human infrastructure and logistics of the insurgency. They also hold hostages to extract resources to buy weapons and humiliate their victims as proxies of their enemy population that they despise. Importantly, they are also to express contempt for the target society that they aim to destroy. Given the history of the stout resistance of the Chibok community to the penetration of Islam all around its locale, the humiliation of that target community is a plausible explanation for the unusual cruelty meted to them by Boko Haram. They also exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy, including probing opportunities offered by the spatial distribution of enemy population, exploitation of local affinities, deployment gaps and infrastructural deficiencies in the opposing army. The enemy, the apostate, is then defined as anyone, including women, children and civilians, who does not profess the fundamentalist credo of the mad terrorists. Perceived as the "weaker" combatants, they use strategy to offset

deficiencies relative to the larger conventional army in quantity or quality of military assets.

In a classic scenario, these ferocious small forces have often metamorphosed from modest beginnings, mobilised by fundamentalist religious theology, Islamic or Christian, to which they are passionately committed and which they violently seek to entrench in areas under their control. For these groups, coercion, preferably gruesome death, is the ultimate weapon for the propagation of the faith. In their confrontations with armies, the strategies employed by the terrorist side may not necessarily be military in form. It is terror inflicted on both the uniformed enemy and the civilian population that drives home the seriousness of the mission for which

“Transnational interest groups may be motivated to join a rebel movement across the border to protect perceived corporate interests of the transnational ethnic or religious groups in the political contentions of the conflict.”

they are ready or indoctrinated to die.

It is important to observe that in all cases, the engagements that are elicited are not structured as conventional rebellions. This new kind of unlimited war has become the dominant form of conflict in the last decade or so mostly in third world theatres. In almost all cases, the covert and overt coordination of international effort from interested parties on both sides has been required to advance the cause of and also to contain the non-state armed movements that are involved in asymmetric warfare. This is because every one of these conflicts is also located within a certain sub regional and the larger international

geo-strategic context.

Within the larger context of unmediated and unlimited violence generated by the imperatives of clashing dominant global systems of thought, including incongruent theological orientations internal to the so called hegemonic faiths, the African state, as currently constructed, fractious and factionalised, is archaic and unsuited to survive. The complexities of the internal structure of the African state, the configuration of its states system and the alignment of transnational sociological affinities in this states system leave room for opportunistic interventions of emergent destructive and centrifugal forces; imported forces of darkness. Could then this challenging reality serve as the motif force to drive the formulation of the contours of an agreeable post-Mandela continental order that should begin with a reformed African social ferment undergirded by an Africanist afrocentric thought system? Could these be distilled as the legitimising parameters of a new African age? Could all these renaissance strides be interventions integral to the definition of an inclusive concept of a global harmonic convergence within the framework of an unending grand narrative of the evolution of human society? ■

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A poisoned chalice?

It is now incumbent on African countries to become subjects of history by turning this relationship from an instrumental project into a moral enterprise.

By Garth le Pere

Africa's relationship with Europe has been profoundly shaped and influenced by the legacy of colonialism, especially with regard to its central tenets of accumulation, extraction, and control. This is a *fortiori* the case regarding the extent to which this relationship has become embedded in the European Union's (EU's) neo-colonial trade and development policy architecture. In essence, it has enmeshed the former colonies of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) in deeply entrenched modalities of structural inequality and inequity.

These modalities find expression in a carefully choreographed political economy of domination and dependency. They are rooted in the founding treaty of the European Community and its original six members. Thus the 1957 Treaty of Rome provided the foundational elements for the form and texture of future relations by defining a framework

for European cooperation with 22 colonial dependencies and off-shore territories. This entailed offering them special trade and economic support measures which were followed in 1958 with the setting up of the European Development Fund (EDF) as a special envelope to finance economic and social development projects.

Following the period of independence in the 1960s and presented with something of a Hobson's choice, African countries opted to maintain these pre-independence schemes under the rubric of the EU-Africa Partnership. This took contractual form with the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention in July 1963 between the European Community (EC) and 18 African countries. The Convention institutionalised and formalised the *de facto* colonial regime of trade, development and financial aid on the basis of reciprocal and non-discriminatory arrangements.¹

The second incarnation of Yaoundé signed in July 1969 made the EDF the primary vehicle for funding development projects while prolonging the asymmetric non-discriminatory arrangements. When the Yaoundé Convention was superseded by the first Lomé Convention in February 1975 and the EC's enlargement was strengthened by the accession of the United Kingdom, the stage was set for a more extensive articulation of the dependency and domination syndrome, the promotion of the fiction of partnership, and the marginalisation of ACP countries in global trade.

A unique feature of the Lomé Convention was the abandonment of the reciprocity and non-discriminatory principle in favour of unilateral and discriminatory trade preferences to which only countries in the ACP family would have 'privileged' access. These were complemented by special commodity protocols, price-loss compensation mechanisms for agriculture and mining as well as aid and political dialogue provisions. This basic package was not significantly altered during the four renewal periods of the convention whose currency expired in 2000.

However, the most insidious development was what John Ravenhill has termed "collective clientelism"² which came to underpin the new Lomé framework. Coterminous with the first instalment of the convention was the signing of the Georgetown Agreement in 1975 which established the ACP as a political grouping, then represented by 46 countries, the majority of which were from Africa. (This number would eventually increase to 79, including 48 from Africa (South Africa joined in 1998 although its relationship is governed by a separate bilateral Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement). The rest was made up of 16 from the Caribbean, and 15 from the Pacific.) Hence, despite sanctimonious and rhetorical EC/EU claims of partnership based on a "special relationship" and a larger commitment to enhanced trade and aid, the Lomé Convention provided the clientelist impetus for the increasing impoverishment and underdevelopment of the ACP grouping.

In Africa especially, the encomium of Lomé representing “the most comprehensive North South partnership” confounded some cold realities:

- the continent continued to lag behind other developing countries especially in world trade indicators; levels of poverty and social deprivation rose sharply;
- the unilateral preferences granted hardly registered any positive growth impact let alone being a vector for increasing value-added exports;
- related to this, the composition of Africa’s trade basket showed little evidence of diversification during the life of the convention and its four iterations from 1975-2000;
- the special compensation mechanisms for loss in revenue due to world price fluctuations in agriculture and mining outputs did not live up to the promise of halting the precipitous deterioration in Africa’s terms of trade;
- as an ultimate indictment, under Lomé more African countries came to be officially designated as “least developed”; and
- Lomé IV (1990-2000) introduced a political dimension that stressed human rights, democracy, and gender issues as punitive conditionalities to be used against countries that insufficiently adhered to them, thus enabling the EC to arbitrarily restrict trade and development benefits.

The multiple failures of Lomé to prove its efficacy as a normative framework led to a re-evaluation of the EU’s trade and development regime. This particularly concerned the compatibility of its trade arrangements with WTO rules which meant a return to reciprocity after 25 years where the “enabling clause” that allowed non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment hardly turned out to be an unmitigated blessing for the ACP group. Moreover, full reciprocity in trade arrangements would ensure the EU a level of market access that was increasingly attractive to third parties such as the USA, China, Brazil, and India especially when it came to Africa. Other concerns which informed the change in the EU’s attitude toward

the ACP included a post-Cold War geo-strategic shift in political priorities and resource allocation to Eastern Europe and countries of the Southern Mediterranean. The Lomé experience also accounted for a large measure of donor fatigue which had led to a reduced political appetite among EU members to fund development projects and programmes that were not subject to strict oversight and accountability.

It was, therefore, the logic of a different kind of relationship that informed the Lomé successor, namely the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 which would span two decades. A very critical component of Cotonou was its WTO-compatible and reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) which were to be negotiated with ACP countries from the beginning of 2008 onwards.³ However, notwithstanding the level of ambition enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement, there was nothing to suggest a decisive break from those debilitating and disempowering structural features that had characterised the history of Africa-EU relations. Nevertheless, the Cotonou Agreement represented a much more elaborate carrot-and-stick approach and rested on five pillars:

- there was a much more comprehensive political dimension that included enhanced dialogue with a special emphasis on preventing and resolving conflict but also for promoting democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law;
- an innovative part of the agreement provided for participation by social and economic actors, including civil society and the private sector;
- there was a strong focus on poverty reduction;
- the new framework for trade and economic cooperation placed strong emphasis on regional integration as a key element of the EPAs;⁴ and
- the agreement simplified financial instruments and made them more flexible in order to encourage fiscal cooperation, but also introduced performance criteria as far as the allocation of aid was concerned.

However, what has proven most contentious and controversial, especially for African countries, has

been the impact which the EPAs will have on their growth and development prospects. A primary concern has been the balkanising effects of EPAs which divides the continent into regional blocs for the purpose of negotiations. Based on their regional affiliation, individual countries are then invited to agree and sign onto “interim EPAs” as a first step towards locking all countries into particular configurations for purposes of concluding a final reciprocal arrangement, albeit with an asymmetrical fig leaf in timing and content.

This attempt to rationalise African regionalism could prove antithetical to the African Union’s broader regional and continental integration agenda at a time when important initiatives have been put in place. The most notable is the proposed tripartite free trade agreement between the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East Africa Community (EAC). The divisive effects of EPAs are hardly complementary to these regional bodies’ wider and deeper ambition of enhanced market integration and improved intra-regional trade, infrastructure development, and their industrialisation and trade facilitation agenda. This is so since most crucially the tripartite geographic area knits the markets of 26 African countries together with a population of close to 600 million and a combined GDP of US\$1 trillion. This tripartite arrangement is meant to provide the gravitation pull for a continent-wide free trade agreement by 2017 in an environment where EPAs would constitute a powerful anti-integrationist tendency and adversarial force.

It can thus be argued that EPAs have consequences and implications that could become the albatross around the neck of continental integration imperatives and there are several considerations which are germane in this regard.

Firstly, there is the potential loss of tariff revenue that could reduce the ability of African countries to provide much needed social and welfare services. It has been estimated generally that three-quarters of ACP

countries could lose over 40% of their tariff revenue due to duty and quota free EU imports entering their markets; in Africa the effects would be even more detrimental since tariffs account for 7-10% of fiscal revenue.⁵

Secondly, EPAs entrench the power imbalance between the EU and the ACP countries with even greater intensity. They overwhelmingly represent unabashed EU self-interest with an excessive neo-mercantilist orientation that leans toward dominating market access, on the one hand; and reprobate protectionism on the other, especially where African countries might have some comparative advantage such as in agricultural production and processing. Moreover, the EU Commission represents a bureaucratic juggernaut with a technical and strategic negotiating capacity that heavily burdened African negotiators and regional secretariats can hardly match.

And thirdly, EPAs as currently being implemented are not strategically and operationally aligned with regional and continental programmes to deliver long-term development, economic growth, and poverty reduction because of the EU's aggressive pursuit of its offensive interests. Moreover, the EPA's market liberalisation emphasis does not take account of Africa's lack of economic and trading capacity as well as its multiple supply-side challenges and deficits in infrastructure, development finance, and human capital. Thus EPAs directly undermine the extent to which African countries and regions have the necessary flexibility over the timing, pace, sequencing, and product coverage of liberalising their markets to the EU. In short, the majority of poor country producers would not be able to compete with the muscular ability which EPAs would afford the EU's growing footprint in African markets.

Interestingly however, Africa's geo-political relevance has improved in the recent past. This has been driven mainly by robust global commodity demand, steady economic growth, and improved forms of economic and political governance. As a consequence, the EU has sought improved dialogue on the basis of a redefined strategic partnership that promotes a normative and ethical shift away from doing

things for Africa to doing things with Africa. This shift has been manifested in EU-Africa summitry starting in Cairo in April 2000⁶ which has put in place a range of action plans to provide support in critical areas of peace and security, governance and human rights, regional and continental integration, as well as energy and climate change. These commitments culminated in a renovated and overhauled "EU-Africa Strategic Partnership" in 2005 which was supplemented by an operational Africa-EU Joint Strategy in 2007. Both have provided the general template as well as the cooperation parameters for a new type of partnership between the EU and the African Union.⁷

Of course, the EU's recourse to this new type of partnership which is based on equity and a harmony

“The stage was set for a more extensive articulation of the dependency and domination syndrome, the promotion of the fiction of partnership, and the marginalisation of ACP countries in global trade.”

of interests take into account the growing pluralism in Africa's external political and economic relations and the alternative opportunities that these bring with them. There is, for example, the system of preferences afforded to eligible African countries for duty free access to the United States under the rubric of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. But even more auspicious is the different calculus of choice which the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) jointly and severally provide for African countries in terms of more permissive and supportive trade, investment, and development aid opportunities. These developments will hopefully allow African countries to incrementally break free of the EU's

stifling and obstructive structural yoke but also provide them with an optic to finally see through its hypocrisy and double-talk which masquerade as noble and virtuous intentions. In this regard, we are reminded of EH Carr's pithy dictum which avers that a harmony of interests "thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position."⁸

In the face of new challenges to its historical hegemony, it is all the more likely that the EU will seek to maintain if not strengthen the hard integuments which have given it such a dominant and commanding position in shaping Africa's colonial and post-colonial political economy on the basis of its different trade and development cooperation frameworks. However, it is now incumbent on African countries to become subjects of history by turning this relationship from an instrumental project into a moral enterprise. ■

Footnotes:

- ¹ Reciprocity and non-discrimination are very important trade principles of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which succeeded it. However, a 1979 agreement known as the "enabling clause" made possible permanent "generalised and non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" treatment for developing countries under GATT/WTO rules. It was this "enabling clause" that informed the spirit of the Lomé Convention.
- ² See John Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
- ³ This commencement date set was in anticipation of the phasing out of trade preferences between the EU and ACP countries by December 2007 in terms of a WTO waiver.
- ⁴ An important rider to EPAs is that ACP countries may choose to opt out of participating in them, especially if they are Least Developed Countries (LDC) of which there are 35 in Africa. In such cases, such LDCs may still benefit from duty free access to the EU market through the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative which was adopted in 2001. In April 2007, the EU announced that it was prepared to extend EBA status to non-LDCs in the ACP group but this probably a case of "too little, too late".
- ⁵ "EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: The Effects of Reciprocity," Institute for Development Studies Briefing Paper: Sussex University, UK, May 2005
- ⁶ Subsequent summits took place in Lisbon, Portugal (2007); Sirte, Libya (2010); and Brussels, Belgium (2014). The Lisbon summit which was to take place in 2003 was indefinitely postponed because of an acrimonious dispute and disagreement between the EU and African countries about whether President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe should be allowed to attend because of what the EU viewed as gross human rights violations, poor governance and abuse of the rule of law.
- ⁷ See Garth le Pere, "AU-EU Security and Governance Cooperation," in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman, (eds.), *The EU and Africa: From Euro-Afrique to Afro-Europa*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 257-275.
- ⁸ EH Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave, 2001 (first published in 1939), 74-75.



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The Role of the Judiciary in the Restoration Of Africa's Lost Glory



An urgent and radical paradigm shift of the prevailing mindset of many African Governments is required in relation to the status, independence and original role of the Judiciary.

By Moegeng Moegeng

Restoration of the lost glory of Africa presupposes the existence of a glorious era at some point in history. You cannot restore what never was. Associating Africa with civilisation, good governance and prosperity, which were some of the incidents of Africa's glory centuries ago, is bound to draw scepticism from some quarters. This is so because very little has been done to uncover the exceptionally good side of Africa in years gone by.

Africa's pioneering role in civilisation as well as the great scholastic and entrepreneurial strides it had made, have not enjoyed the prominence they deserve. For there is no denying that Africa includes countries like Egypt which was a leading civilisation centuries ago. As the historian, Will Durant, said:

The effect of what Egypt accomplished at the very dawn of history has influence in every nation and every age. 'It is even possible', as Faure has said, 'that Egypt, through the solidarity, the unity, and the disciplined variety of its artistic products, through the enormous duration and sustained power of its effort, offers the spectacle of the greatest civilization that has yet appeared on this earth.' We shall do well to equal it.

Egypt thrived for thousands of years. It became famous for great cultural advances in every discipline including the arts, science and the superior technology that was employed in the construction of the globally celebrated pyramids. Its monuments reflect the depth and grandeur of the Egyptian success story which had a profound influence on many ancient civilisations like Greece and Rome.

Then, Egypt was well run and very prosperous. A century before the rest of the world began to work out the capability to write and read, Egypt had already done so. And it was to the Egyptian University of Alexandria, not of Athens, that the emperors turned for teachers required at the royal courts of the Roman Empire.

The literary treasures of Timbuktu in Mali, traceable to its tradition of scholarship in the twelfth century, the exploitation of mineral resources which earned Timbuktu its reputation as the

city of gold, the entrepreneurial skills displayed and the prestigious Sankore University, also underscore the central role played by African countries in announcing civilisation and high quality education to the world.

The impressive stone walls of the Great Zimbabwe, then the main regional trading centre, bear testimony to the lost civilisation of the Shona people during the eleventh century. The advanced trading with gold, ivory, iron, fresh water snail, mussel shells, ostrich eggshells and a variety of agricultural produce that took place in the great and wealthy Kingdom of Mapungubwe in Limpopo, South Africa, and the artistic masterpieces of the Khoisan people of Southern Africa also bear testimony to the enormous potential, sophistry, wisdom and

“Sadly, more nuanced and sophisticated ways of exploiting our resources for the benefit of foreigners and the corrupt in our midst are still employed, with total disregard for the best interests of Africa.”

admirable entrepreneurial skills of the African people.

The desire to restore Africa's past glory ought to be fuelled by these observations by Cullingham:

Our great artist God has displayed these and other wonders in Africa... He hid more gold here, more diamonds, platinum, copper than in any other place on earth. Africa has enough arable land to feed a large portion of the earth. The continent has more hydroelectric potential than all the rest of the world put together, as well as abundance of coal and oil.

Wisely used by and for Africans, the continent's resources could contribute significantly to new wealth

and prosperity. Unfortunately, for too long Africa's people have been enslaved, raped, abused, dismissed by prejudice or just ignored. Their rich resources have often been collected and used by others - even stolen - with little if any benefit going to the Africans. Instead their value has attracted foreign exploitation, enriching dictators and warlords, bringing bloodshed, starvation and even modern forms of black-on-black slavery.

Colonisation hurt Africa very deeply. Sadly, more nuanced and sophisticated ways of exploiting our resources for the benefit of foreigners and the corrupt in our midst are still employed, with total disregard for the best interests of Africa. Africa needs to arrest those forces that are hard at work undermining its development, and establish the good governance, peace and stability that are essential for its repositioning.

Our commitment to the African renaissance must be encouraged by the success stories of countries like Singapore which was an appendage of Malaysia until 1965, when it gained independence. Singapore is a small patch of land, barren of any mineral or natural resources. It had nothing but a small population and a purpose-driven leadership of young intellectuals, desperate for Singapore's survival and eventual attainment of national affluence. About fifty years down the line it has, against all odds, realised its vision to rise from the ashes of obscurity and near-nothingness to become a first world country. Its strategic geographic location does not quite explain its achievements. It is rather the vision and the unwavering commitment to its realisation that does.

The economic miracle of the once-colonised South Korea is slightly different but fundamentally comparable. Again, I say all this mindful of the facilitation and generous financial support by some of the world's biggest economies. It will take the collective impact of the efforts of several key role-players to unleash the full potential of Africa.

Some of the challenges that contribute to big business's lack of enthusiasm about investing in Africa, apart from historical prejudice, are

corruption as well as maladministration and instability. Corruption in Africa is more than a mere irritation. Uprooting corruption will certainly strengthen democracy, create investor confidence and pave the way for sustainable economic growth, a booming economy, employment and poverty alleviation for our people. Peace and stability as well as the capacity to protect investments are of prime importance to potential investors.

Until there is an unwavering and demonstrable governmental commitment to eradicate corruption and crime in general, Africa will have to contend with sparse drizzles of investment here and there. These kinds of investments have not contributed much towards the realisation of the African dream of building strong constitutional democracies and globally competitive economies.

The need to eradicate corruption and strengthen corruption fighting institutions is urgent. As former United Nations Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, stated:

Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organised crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish... Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign aid and investment. Corruption is a key element in economic underperformance and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and development.

Given the profundity of corruption's toxicity, a lot of attention must be given to and resources deployed for its eradication. If our commitment to uprooting corruption applies only to those who are not connected to the rich and powerful, peace and stability, the rule of law and sustainable economic development will remain a pipe-dream. The beneficial exploitation of our mineral resources

and consequential value-addition, as well as the preservation and optimum utilisation of our natural resources for the common good of all, will also be virtually impossible.

Corrupt and untouchable Africans by themselves or in collaboration with the historical enemies of Africa's progress, would like to continue to exploit Africa to satisfy their insatiable appetite and unquenchable thirst for wealth and power. This is possible when law enforcement agencies, especially the police and the Judiciary, are compromised and under-resourced as is the case in some African countries. One of the catalysts for the fulfilment of the African dream is the broader justice system - at the functional helm of which are the courts.

“If our commitment to uprooting corruption applies only to those who are not connected to the rich and powerful, peace and stability, the rule of law and sustainable economic development will remain a pipe-dream.”

Not only must the police be properly resourced, but serious scrutinising mechanisms for evaluating the suitability of new entrants are crucial. Capacity-building programmes must be benchmarked against those of countries that are doing well in their crime-fighting endeavours. Merit, a good track record and a solid character must largely determine suitability for promotion. Investigations should not be manipulated and effective measures must be taken to safeguard their integrity.

Job security and security of tenure are necessary to embolden the police to discharge their duties fearlessly and vigorously. The same applies to our corruption-busting entities, the

prosecuting authority, the intelligence community and institutions meant to undergird constitutional democracies like the ombudsman.

A genuine democracy comprises three arms of the State: the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. To breathe life into the African dream, strengthen democracy, grow the economy and therefore recapture our lost glory, an independent, efficient and effective court system must be in place.

Several countries have finally come to terms with the constitutional reality that the Judiciary should never be relegated to the level of an imposter in the effective governance of a country or be regarded as an appendage to the Executive Branch of Government. Genuine separation of powers has been entrenched. The Judiciary has been given the resources necessary to develop the capacities essential for greater effectiveness and efficiency. And those countries have, without exception, been rewarded with peace and stability, good governance, prosperity and low levels of corruption. It is, however, true that some countries are doing well economically, notwithstanding their poor record on human rights, the rule of law and constitutionalism which is the natural consequences of their undisguised disdain for the independent functioning of the courts. But longer term stability is lacking.

Let us not forget, the Judiciary is the conscience of a nation, the guardian of every constitutional democracy. And courts exist to administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice in line with the oath or affirmation administered to Judicial Officers on assumption of office. That role is seriously undermined when the Judiciary cannot guarantee the independence of both its institutions and its Judges. The Judiciary must be left to set its strategic objectives and priorities and develop a concomitant implementation plan without undue interference from the political arms of the State. That is the kind of independence that insulates the Judiciary from manipulation. Judicial independence is also at risk where there is no transparency in the appointment

of Judicial Officers.

In our continent elections are either run by the Judiciary or the Judiciary bears the responsibility of expeditiously resolving or mediating fierce election-borne political contestations. Only a truly independent Judiciary is able to defuse such volatile situations. When the Judiciary has a reputation for impartiality and acts accordingly, even the losing party finds it relatively easy to absorb the pain of losing and accept an unfavourable court decision. Not so when the Judiciary is known to be beholden to a governing party, or some other political formation or allied interest group. A lack of judicial impartiality is a recipe for hopelessness and violent contestations that often culminate in war and instability.

When citizens and would-be criminals know that their country has an effective and efficient justice system and that arrest, prosecution, conviction and sentence for the guilty is predictable, then corruption and crime in general is significantly reduced.

In addition, those who might wish to take over power through unconstitutional means are deterred by the predictable response of an independent Judiciary to their unconstitutional actions. The capacity of courts to dispose of criminal, commercial and civil cases expeditiously is essential for unlocking major investment possibilities. Keeping disputes lingering on endlessly in the court system potentially has disastrous consequences for the public, business community and other litigants. It thus constitutes a damper to the willingness of big business to invest in any country where such incapacities obtain.

The African Judiciary has come to recognise the special role it has to play to contribute to the renaissance of Africa. To this end, the Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa (CCJA), comprising the Heads of the highest courts in our continent, recalls in its Statute that the Constitutive Act of the African Union enshrines the commitment of Heads of State and Government “to promote and protect human and people’s rights, to consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law”. The

CCJA also undertakes to supplement the AU mechanisms to consolidate the rule of law, democracy and human rights. It goes on to recognise that the achievement of these objectives is “closely linked to the independence and impartiality of Judges”. The draft Memorandum of Understanding, soon to be concluded by the AU Commission and the CCJA, also goes a long way towards reaffirming the role of the Judiciary in the realisation of the African renaissance project. When the Judiciary is under unfair attack in any country, it must be a concern of regional bodies like the CCJA. We must be our brothers’ and sisters’ keepers.

A closer examination of the institutional arrangements and the operations of the Judiciaries in successful democracies and leading economies is quite revealing. Adequate resources are availed to the

“Judicial independence is also at risk where there is no transparency in the appointment of Judicial Officers.”

courts. And the capacity of those courts to cope comfortably with the caseload continues to contribute significantly to the stability and vibrancy of the economy and democracy in those countries.

What are the key challenges that inhibit the effective and efficient performance of courts in Africa? Is the process of appointing Judicial Officers transparent and inclusive? Does the Judiciary in each African country enjoy the kind of independence which can insulate it from undue influence and corruption? Do Judicial Officers have real security of tenure or is their tenure short and renewable? Are they paid fairly well in relation to the fiscal muscle of each country? Do they have the essential tools of trade? Is there proper judicial self-governance in the area of court administration with own budget? Even if there is no self-governance, is the Executive or

hybrid court administration system in place compatible with judicial independence and does it provide the support required? Is the court budget adequate for the execution of key court operations? Is there an effective judicial education system in place? Does the Judiciary broadly enjoy the confidence of the populace? If not, why and what should be done to address those perceptions or realities, as the case may be? Affirmative or negative answers to these questions are, respectively, important and reliable pointers to the independence of the Judiciary or lack thereof.

The institutional arrangements must reinforce judicial independence. Ideally the Judiciary must take full responsibility for court administration, particularly in relation to matters that are intimate to court operations, be able to determine the size and competence of its support staff complement, set its strategic objectives and priorities and execute them as determined by the Judiciary itself.

The Executive and Legislative branches of Government in Africa, from the national all the way down to the municipal level, run virtually every important facet of their business. Not so with the Judiciary. There is no defensible reason for not leaving the Judiciary to do what it is best placed and arguably best qualified to do, including the execution of administrative functions that are intimate court operations. Failure to do so is very likely to yield a weak, manipulable and corrupt Judiciary potentially available to the highest bidder. Given Africa’s position of historical disadvantage and marginalisation, we dare not take comfort in the similarity of our wrongs to those of well-developed economies, some of which were aided by imperialism to achieve their wealth.

It bears repetition that the Judiciary must never be made to look like an appendage of the Executive, dependent on it for the resources required to drive even strategic programmes like case management, court modernisation as well as performance monitoring and evaluation. It must claim and be allowed to occupy its rightful place fully as the third arm of the State.

The African Judiciary must

identify and address the challenges that undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of the court system in the continent. That responsibility should be narrowed down to the regions and individual countries. Such an emancipation of all African courts would enable them to rise to an acceptable level of independence and develop the necessary capacities, for greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Peer review mechanisms among national and regional Judiciaries, as well as best practice and effective ways for the delivery of quality service, require urgent attention.

There is also a need to develop effective communication strategies to create greater public awareness about the Judiciary, its critical role and the enormous challenges it faces. Everybody is concerned about the snail's pace at which criminal, civil and commercial cases often move. A disturbing public perception seems to be firming up that Judges and Magistrates either do not care about the plight of litigants, particularly the poor, or are incompetent. Equally concerning are incidents of corruption within the Judiciary that have been exposed.

What appears to be wanting is a strong enough curiosity about the freedom of Judicial Officers to uphold their affirmation or oath of office, the adequacy of their remuneration and of the resources required for the proper execution of their constitutional mandate. This matter needs serious attention. The stark reality is that far less than is needed is often given to African Judiciaries.

A legitimate way must be found for the leadership collective of the Judiciary to influence decisions about changes needed to secure judicial independence in all African countries, without interfering unduly in the affairs of any sovereign State, given the sensitivities attendant thereto. It would of course be very naive and unrealistic to embark on the process of ensuring that Judiciaries in Africa are independent, efficient and effective, in total disregard for the practical and historical peculiarities, the budgetary constraints, the unarticulated sensitivities and realities that obtain in

each African country.

Another avenue to explore is the establishment of a link between regional structures of Presidents and Ministers as well as Parliaments on the one hand and those of the Judiciary on the other. It should not be left to the regional executive structures to take decisions that affect judicial institutions without the meaningful involvement of the leadership of the Judiciary. The Judiciary must also have a voice at AU level about important matters that affect them. Their role should not be limited to the appointment of Judges to regional and continental courts established without any real engagement or consultation. The Judiciary should be involved in the creation and restructuring of all courts.

The dangers of apparent disinterest

“Keeping disputes lingering on endlessly in the court system potentially has disastrous consequences for the public, business community and other litigants.”

are evident in the SADC Tribunal saga. This is a regional court that was initially empowered to adjudicate disputes between citizens and their Government involving, among other things, human rights, rule of law and democracy issues. After some individuals had litigated successfully against Zimbabwe, the Tribunal was virtually denuded of its powers to handle disputes between citizens and the State even if domestic courts have no jurisdiction in those cases. This is a setback and a retreat of this region and by extension the continent's commitment to the rule of law, human rights and respect for judicial authority as set out in our regional and continental instruments and protocols.

I am optimistic, for the sake of

SADC, the image of Africa and the renaissance, that the forum of Heads of State and Government will revisit this retrogressive step they have taken and demonstrate the necessary political will to tolerate and accept judicial authority however uncomfortable it may be.

When the Judiciary of each African country operates with the ever-abiding consciousness of its constitutional responsibility to contribute to peace and stability, the observance of the rule of law, crime-prevention and the eradication of corruption, it will help that country to create a climate conducive to sustainable economic development, entrench good governance and realise the legitimate and constitutional aspirations of the citizens.

One of the major game-changers in this project is the Judiciary. The possibility of addressing these challenges will forever be remote for as long as courts at all levels are not left free to occupy their operational space fully and given the resources and support necessary to fulfil the role they were originally created to play.

All of the above can create an investor-friendly climate. When potential investors know that in Africa, they will get justice – against any fraudster, any law-breaker, government or business partners or any entity that tries to take unfair or unlawful advantage of them – it will become an investment destination of choice, given the labour force, the vast tracts of fertile and productive land, the very rich mineral deposits and abundant natural resources Africa has to offer.

An urgent and radical paradigm shift of the prevailing mindset of many African Governments is required in relation to the status, independence and original role of the Judiciary and the resources and capacities they need to discharge their mandate properly. When the collective voices of the concerned are added to the cry for more resources, capacities and independence in the broader justice system and these critical needs are met, we will have contributed immeasurably to the rebirth of Africa as a democratic and caring economic giant that we can all be proud of. ■



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AL-SHABAB



Beyond the Dominant Terrorist Narrative

The Federal government needs to devise genuine mechanisms and find a negotiated solution – taking into account the interests of all sides – in the interest of Somalia, the region and the continent.

By Osman Abdi Mohamed

Any good follower of the news or current affairs knows that al-Shabab has been causing trepidation for the Somalis for some time. The group is good at *inter alia* suicide bombings. The story of al-Shabab is not an analogy of Mary Shelley's gothic story "Frankenstein" as is the US al-Qaeda case, but it is not entirely unrelated. When did the al-Shabab phenomenon begin and how did it get to where it is now?

Metaphysical theory strongly urges seeking an understanding of not only how something came to the way it happens to be but also considering the many strands of its constituents. To understand al-Shabab's ideological orientation and operations, one really needs to put it within a socio-political

context. Abdullahi Boru Halakhe paints a picture of al-Shabab's worldview vis-à-vis their socio-cultural and political background, which is often over simplified by many analysts.

In understanding Somalis, one has to struggle with the paradox of being at once pastoral democrats – ready to negotiate some issues – and an unflinching republican, some relations like family are non-negotiable. Al-Shabab concentrated on the latter part. While Somalis can trenchantly disagree over their clan politics, however, when it comes to their sovereignty, both personal and collectively, they will never negotiate. They are unrepentant nationalists, and in the absence of a state, rhetorically and symbolically,

*al-Shabab acts as the vanguard and the only reliable guardian of Somali nationalism and identity.*¹

With a diligent hindsight, Halakhe scrupulously articulated the organic base of al-Shabab. A Chatham House briefing paper entitled 'The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts' highlighted that the Shababs "were not men with a religious background, but they were the driving force behind the implementation of [tribal] court jurisdictions."² Peter Greste, reporting for Al-Jazeera, stated that "Somalis themselves are not instinctively radical but they hold tightly to their tradition".³

The story of al-Shabab began in the mid 2000s when ordinary youth reacted to waves of unexplained assassinations and disappearances in Mogadishu. Those operations were carried out by a group of warlords conniving with the CIA, working under the banner 'The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism' (ARPCT). It was later discovered that the assassinations and disappearances were part of a covert anti-terror US government operation. The ARPCT targeted prominent religious leaders known to have no link with any terror organisation as well as individuals and independent clan courts antagonistic to the warlords. The then U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack praised their iniquities and described them as "responsible individuals".⁴

In response, a loose group of moderate youth volunteered to fight back and it is in this context that al-Shabab was born. They regarded it as their communal, tribal and national duty to react to foreign interference and the menaces of dodgy warlords committing heinous crimes against innocent people.

Al-Shabab cast itself as the vanguard of the aggravated innocent Somalis in the fight against the insecurity caused by American-backed criminals. The CIA's collaboration with internationally known warlords was part of US privity to criminality in Somalia. When the 'anti-terror' campaign intensified, a loose formation of tribal courts (which became Union of Islamic Courts, UIC) joined forces with civil and religious organisations and, in a popular uprising, purged the warlords.

Nothing was politically sinister about the parties involved in the uprising. The renowned Somali Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar described the forces behind the uprising as “Islamic practitioners, rather than Islamists. Islamists has the connotation that they are incredibly politicised.”⁵ Nevertheless, speculation from sensationalist international media, hawkish intelligentsia and certain members of the international community linked the UIC to terrorism.

Responding to those concerns, the chairman of UIC, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, stated, “We categorically deny and reject any accusation that we are harbouring any terrorists or supporters of terrorism. We would like to establish a friendly relationship with the international community.”⁶

In an effort to quell suspicions, Sharif began to build relations with the international community in spite of all indications showing that the US was unhappy with the changes in Mogadishu. In fact, the changes worried the US so much that George W Bush expressed determination to make sure “that Somalia does not become an al-Qaida safe haven, that it doesn’t become a place from which terrorists can plot and plan.”⁷ Evidence from Wikileaks shows that the US preferred Somalia to remain anarchic than to have peace and a government brought by Islamic groups, irrespective of their public standing.⁸

Aware of US dissatisfaction, the UIC proceeded to form a government, re-establish peace and security, and for the first time in 16 years, opened Mogadishu International Airport. Al-Shabab was integrated into the UIC, serving as its military wing, until the Ethiopian forces, backed by the US who did not want an Islamist government, invaded, shattering six months of stability brought to the lawless country.

For the ordinary people who yearned for tranquility, the 2006 US-backed Ethiopian disruption brought woe and horror. It returned them to another cycle of vicious conflict and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The invasion killed 20,000 civilians and rendered 2 million others homeless.⁹ During the two years of the Ethiopian occupation, Mogadishu became a ghost city experiencing an unprecedented level of destruction, far

greater than it had seen during the entire period of its lawlessness.

The defeat of the UIC led to a complete split of the nascent establishment. Al-Shabab regrouped and successfully fought the Ethiopian forces. Following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, seeing the security vacuum in Mogadishu, al-Shabab consolidated their power. Upon realising that al-Shabab was in control of large swathes of the country, the US made allegations claiming that al-Shabab had established links with al-Qaeda and that members of its leadership had trained in Afghanistan.

With no credible evidence, the US killed Adan Hashi Ayrow, the leader of the group, along with more than two dozen civilians. The murders outraged the people and sparked large protests across central Somalia. Through its spokesman Mukhtar Robow (known as Abu Mansur), al-Shabab condemned the attack and warned against the

“Al-Shabab cast itself as the vanguard of the aggravated innocent Somalis in the fight against the insecurity caused by American-backed criminals.”

possible consequences of such an action.

*This attack was cowardly and aggressive. We condemn the international Arab and Islamic community’s silence. These bombs are making Somalis more united. These people do not need bombs. They need international humanitarian help. It is good for America to stop. If America continues what it is doing, they will reap the harvest of the crop they have sown.*¹⁰

According to a 2008 WikiLeaks Cable, Ayrow was killed because the Americans thought he was “violently opposed to U.S. and western interests”.¹¹ No evidence linking Ayrow to al-Qaeda or any terror attacks on Western establishments has been

produced to date. The truth is that neither Ayrow nor al-Shabab was at the time affiliated to al-Qaeda; much less did they present any threat to the West as was made evident in a speech made in the British Parliament during a debate discussing the “Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism”. A Labour MP, Dari Taylor, said

*If there is no evidence that this organisation, al-Shabab, exists or is behaving in a way that is causing serious concern, some in our community – with some justice – will be concerned that the Government [is] exaggerating the existence of terrorist threats in this country.*¹²

Ayrow’s death began to transform al-Shabab internally and externally. The group unleashed a powerful media campaign opening news sites and radio stations providing an alternative media. However, the group later became known internationally for its feeds through the social media: Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Al-Shabab used the media to justify its actions and provided updates on its progress.

Apart from the media fraternity, al-Shabab reformed its structure and organisation so that it was able to focus on its military acumen while at the same time managing civilians living in areas under its control. The dexterity to use unparalleled brute force while purveying equal proportion of benignity portrayed bizarre combinations of qualities that could perfectly be explained by state formation theory. Al-Shabab brought a sudden halt to insecurity and filled in the void of municipal government: providing services like collecting garbage and inspecting pharmaceutical stores for expired drugs.¹³ The group banned Western Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) sparking international condemnation but replaced these with building multimillion-dollar canals in Somalia’s breadbasket in a bid to abolish dependence on food aid.¹⁴ Unlike the Taliban and Boko Haram, al-Shabab did not ban girls from going to school and women from working. That, however, did not get due consideration. Neither was the group given a fair chance to negotiate or run a government nor find a solution that could bring a win-win situation. The US saw any fair chance

which could potentially result in any success for an Islamist group as the “worst-case scenario” and “the US would not allow it”.¹⁵ It did not want al-Shabab to play any constructive role in the formation of a future Somali government.

In a bid to promote the US agenda, the Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jandayi Fazer, took a set of steps driving the Transition Federal Government (TFG) and al-Shabab further apart.

First, the US State Department waged an intensive media campaign stigmatising al-Shabab. For a while, the media demonised the group associating it with “terror”, “ruthlessness”, “threat” and “savagery”. Secondly, true to the proverb, give a dog a bad name and kill it; the State Department included the group in its terror list just months before the Ethiopian forces pulled out. This was a calculated pre-emptive move intended to kill the chances for any negotiation between the group and the TFG. Thirdly, the US put bounties on the heads of the al-Shabab leadership.

The endeavour to ostracise and purge the group from the conventional political sphere of Somalia remained subtle until in 2012 the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton ordered the TFG not to negotiate with al-Shabab. She said, “Negotiating with al Shabab would be the wrong path, but the United States will engage with Somalis who denounce al Shabab’s leadership.”¹⁶

Following the US directive, the TFG labeled al-Shabab a terrorist organisation. This was in contrast to the view held by many Somalis. The government openly opted for war over peace, and annihilation over negotiation. Instead of seeking a peaceful solution concentrating on, among other things, *Xeer* (the Somali traditional way of dealing with intractable problems), the government sought a military solution because it was vulnerable to attacks from al-Shabab and susceptible to pressure from powerful external actors. It requested funds and an African Union Mission to fight al-Shabab. The US, the EU and the AU pledged generous amounts of \$40 million, 15 million euros and \$11.6 million respectively.¹⁷ Several

African countries pledged deployment as part of a peacekeeping mission.

The people in Mogadishu held mass demonstrations protesting against the proposed peacekeeping mission burning flags and chanting anti-US and anti-AU slogans, but the protests fell on deaf ears. The political result of the American manoeuvres – linking al-Shabab to terrorism, proposing deployment of foreign troops to bring peace, and closing the doors for negotiations in favour of US support – were predictable. The generally more moderate members of al-Shabab became far more militant and radical. Al-Shabab made a statement: “We were not terrorists. But now that we have been designated, we have been forced to seek out and unite with any Muslims on the list [of terrorist groups]

“Evidence from Wikileaks shows that the US preferred Somalia to remain anarchic than to have peace and a government brought by Islamic groups, irrespective of their public standing.”

against the United States.”¹⁸

Al-Shabab waged a media campaign seeking support for its course. First, the group made an international plea asking for anyone willing to defend the Muslim land and religion against foreign aggression to come and join its ranks. The call was answered by none other than young Somalis in the West, mainly the US and the UK. It is here that al-Shabab got more media savvy English speaking Somali youngsters ready to die for their country and religion. Al-Jazeera featured a 45 minute long documentary entitled *From Minneapolis to Mogadishu* telling the story of more than 20 young Somali American men who went to fight in Somalia for al-Shabab.¹⁹ The group also began to issue a near daily warning to countries willing to send troops to Somalia advising them to avoid risking

the lives of their soldiers and that of their civilians.

Secondly, Al-Shabab intensified attempts to discredit the government and its leadership. The group released an audio recording entitled *Sharif Muslim Sharif Murtad* (Sharif the Muslim, Sharif the Apostate) making a dichotomous critique of Sharif’s theological persuasions.²⁰ The CD became widely circulated among the Somalis and was later uploaded onto YouTube. The message was that Sharif, who was formerly the group’s commander-in-chief and later became the president of the TFG, had chameleonic behaviour and was unreliable and a dangerous political opportunist. Al-Shabab also accused the government of bringing enemy forces into the country. The group went further, and declared the government and its entire employees “apostates” notwithstanding its religious implication. Al-Shabab issued a stern warning to all who worked for, collaborated with, or were suspected of having any links with the government or the African Union Mission (AMISOM).

Regarding the US government’s call not to negotiate with al-Shabab, the group hit back shutting all the doors for any possible negotiation with the TFG and later the Federal Government. Al-Shabab was convinced that nothing good would come of negotiating with a government that was a “puppet” of enemy states – the US and Ethiopia. It also despised the UN and IGAD for endorsing the Ethiopian invasion. A council of neutral *Ulema* attempted to mediate but to no avail.

Al-Shabab took the above retaliatory steps fully aware of the fact that it had limited options left. Surrender was not an option. The group was militarily, financially and organisationally stronger than the government. It controlled most of South-Central Somalia and had an estimated force of more than 7000 compared to the 4000 African Union peacekeeping mission keeping the government – holed in an enclave in Mogadishu – in place.²¹ In reality, the government was no match for al-Shabab, which was indisputably an alternative government given its territorial control and firepower. The government’s sole competitive advantage was recognition from the

international community.

Consistent with its views, “we have been forced to seek out and unite with any Muslims on the list against the United States”, Ahmed Abdi Godane (also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubayr), a poet and an erudite leader of the group, sent an application to Osama Bin Laden to join al-Qaeda as evident in two of the “17 Osama Bin Laden documents” posted onto the website of the National Journal. A letter dated 7 August 2010 from Osama bin Laden responding to one from Mukhtar Abu Zubayr in which Abu Zubayr requested merger with the international network attests that al-Shabab meant what it said.²² Bin Laden’s secret letter politely declining the request inadvertently falsifies US claims against al-Shabab. Al-Shabab joined al-Qaeda in 2012 – a year after Bin Laden died.

Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the successor of Bin Laden, made the announcement; “I have glad tidings for the Muslim ummah (nation), which is the joining of the al-Shabab al-Mujahidin Movement in Somalia to Qaedat al-Jihad to support the jihadi unity against ... the treacherous agent rulers”.²³ Al-Shabab became an affiliate of al-Qaeda. Since its affiliation, al-Shabab executed high profile suicide bombs targeting prominent individuals like MPs, the UN compound, the Presidential Palace (Villa Somalia), the National Theatre and AMISOM, all in Somalia.

They also executed a chain of suicide bombings in Kenya including the Westgate Mall. Prior to joining al-Qaeda, operations carried out by the group were retaliatory and targeted the nations that deployed forces to Somalia. Kenya and Uganda were two such countries.

Notwithstanding its genesis, al-Shabab’s suicide bombing in general and its indiscriminate targeting of crowded areas in particular where innocent civilians fall victims cannot be justified. Whether the group’s belligerence is a synthesis of patriotism and a skewed interpretation of *Sharia*, extreme puritanism, a reactionary ideology, is unimportant. Such acts are neither premised on the Somali ethos nor supported by the Islamic *Sharia* that clearly distinguishes enemies from innocents. The use of extreme

measures as a means to an end is, therefore, intolerable. That said, al-Shabab is a reality and, therefore, has to be treated as one.

The USA’s position towards al-Shabab articulated by the former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, rejecting any negotiation with the group has no place in the pacification and reconstruction of Somalia either. Such a perception is utterly flawed, and is indeed as pernicious as the Bush administration’s backing of the Ethiopian invasion. The earlier it is rectified, the better. In a 2012 issue, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) presented a Global Trend report predicting that Somalia will be among the top three failed states in the world by 2030 for reasons related to, among others, civil strife.²⁴ Usage

“For the ordinary people who yearned for tranquility, the 2006 US-backed Ethiopian disruption brought woe and horror. It returned them to another cycle of vicious conflict and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.”

of conciliatory tones and neutral discourses instead of inflammatory terms is imperative to de-escalate the conflict. The Federal government needs to devise genuine mechanisms and find a negotiated solution – taking into account the interests of all sides – in the interest of Somalia, the region and the continent. ■

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UJ Providing African Solutions to 21st Century Challenges



By Adele Lacob

The ability of South Africa to make the transition from a resource-based to a knowledge-based economy will depend in part on the country's ability to produce ground-breaking research in mineral analysis and conduct innovative research into energy resources including the scientific exploration of alternative energy sources.

In a global environment that makes increasing demands on the earth's resources for energy, water, food, health, sustainability and industrial

mechanisation, the University of Johannesburg aims to influence the international search for intelligent solutions to the grand challenges of our time.

Anchored in Africa, UJ is set to become the Pan-African epicentre of critical intellectual inquiry in the Higher Education sector, and is investing more than R600 million of its own funds over the next six years to establish five Flagship Research Institutes and one Centre of Excellence. Aligned with the South African Government's national

research priorities and aspirations for research excellence, these institutes will target national goals in development, aiming to influence progress and development on the African continent.

The Flagship Research Institutes will serve as leading resources for knowledge and progressive research in response to the growing needs of South African industry and will house cutting-edge programmes with experts representing various fields of interest. The five Flagship Research Institutes and one Centre of Excellence are:

the Institute of Nanotechnology and Water, the Institute of Sustainability Management and Megacities, the Institute of Pan-African Political Thought and Conversation, the Institute of Process Automation, the Institute for Advanced Studies and Innovation in Science and Society and a Centre of Excellence for Mineral and Energy Resource Analysis (CIMERA).

The flagship programmes will have a dedicated focus on postgraduate studies that will support students in the master's, doctoral and postdoctoral fellows' programmes championed by the vision for global academic excellence and stature. The Institutes will embody a cohort of postgraduate students, postdoctoral fellows as well as visiting professors whose role will be to contribute towards mentorship, supervision, research publications and a graduate output plan.

The Institute of Nanotechnology and Water

Nanotechnology can be found in textiles, pharmaceuticals, water purification and cosmetics, among other industries. It is being used to treat water in laboratory settings. Nanotechnology is a fast-developing discipline internationally and in South Africa, which involves managing and manipulating matter at an atomic level. It deals with structures of between one and a hundred nanometres in size (a nanometre is one billionth of a metre).

As a revolutionary empowering technology, nanotechnology has the potential to offer continuing economic benefits for jobs and investment in the materials, energy and health care sectors. Over the past ten years UJ has established internal and external networks that show substantial experience in nanotechnology and water treatment.

The rationale for establishing the Institute for Nanotechnology and Water Research is an important step towards enabling UJ to achieve its vision of becoming a premier university in Southern Africa that excels at nanotechnology research and provides nanotechnology-based water treatment solutions to South Africa.

The establishment of the Institute for Nanotechnology and Water Research

is characterised as a collaborative effort that creates an intellectual environment that focuses on a multidisciplinary approach. World-class research in nanotechnology and water purification reflects on the design and creation of functional materials and structural devices and systems that directly control matter at the nano level.

Research at the Institute will concentrate on solving some of the long-standing and fundamentally important problems of water purification using progressive methods. The aim of the Institute is to make the research available for publication and teaching purposes and applying solutions that are developed through research for practical applications.

The goal of the Institute is to broaden the scientific knowledge base

“The critical role of sustainability in Africa is based on the concept of shared values that implement connections between societal and economic progress. These shared values have the power to unleash the next wave of economic growth on the African continent.”

of this area of research and support the application of nanotechnology into new areas of purpose. The positioning of UJ on the world map of nanotechnology for water will involve contact with international experts.

The Institute of Sustainability Management and Megacities

The critical role of sustainability in Africa is based on the concept of shared values that implement connections between societal and economic progress. These shared values have the power to unleash the next wave of economic growth on the African continent.

The future of Africa can be defined through a framework of sustainability management that initiates opportunities for wealth creation and economic opportunities, thus improving the lives of ordinary people on the continent. In its desire to achieve international standing and distinction through its research, UJ is well-positioned to establish itself as a pan-African centre for critical enquiry that will articulate the vision for wealth creation and well-being for the people of Africa.

The Institute for Sustainability Management and Megacities will lead the way in inventive thinking that creates leaders who are able to initiate new concepts that open up new value spaces for economic development. The Institute aims to integrate various UJ faculties and their global partners in coordinating and implementing sustainability initiatives benefitting Africa's sustainability agenda, specifically in the context of urban development. Research topics range from socio-economic development to architectural, engineering and management applications – all aimed at improving the organisational bottom line by contributing to a greener planet and bettering people's lives.

The Institute will be responsible for conducting internationally recognised, academically excellent and problem-oriented interdisciplinary research and teaching on environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainability. UJ will also be the host for pivotal Global Sustainability Conferences that will determine the face of the future of the continent.

The Institute of Pan-African Political Thought and Conversation

The promotion of strong African voices is the focus of the Institute for Pan-African Political Thought and Conversation.

This Institute is envisioned as creating the platform for academics from across Africa to converge and bring to bear intellectual capabilities and contributions that have been marginalised on the global stage for too long.

The Institute will explore sub-Saharan ethics and worldviews, seek to advance African values in politics



and to debate justifiable beliefs, present sub-Saharan artistic values and investigate how Africa should relate to the East in the next major stage of the continent's independence through a globalised world. This Institute has five focus areas as below:

- **Pan-African Ethics Sub-Saharan Worldviews:** Offer perspectives on moral philosophy that are underexplored in the international literature and merit engagement by those working on ethics anywhere in the globe.
- **Pan-African Politics:** Advance theoretically informed normative debates about how these matters should proceed, particularly in the light of characteristically African values.
- **Pan-African Epistemics:** Advance the debate about which beliefs are justifiably held and promoted, and on what grounds.
- **Pan-African Aesthetics:** Present artistic productions from below the Sahara, complemented by reflection about their significance.
- **Pan-Africanism:** Look to the East and beyond in taking us to the next major stage of independent Africa's journey through a globalised world, and consider how it relates, and should relate, to the East.

The Institute of Process Automation

In the rapidly evolving world of technology, there are countless opportunities to develop cutting-edge products that further advance modern process automation. UJ is making a significant impact in this field of research and application. The University is ready to facilitate focused research and development of sensors, devices and control systems with market-related applications.

Process automation and process instrumentation and measurement has been part of the educational offering of UJ for many years and the University has been recognised as an innovative university partner in this discipline. UJ has industry partners of international stature by names of ABB, Klockner, Endress Hauser and Burkett, who have invested in equipping its students for the workplace. Automation and control form part of the curriculum of both the sciences and technology programmes to postgraduate level and are also subjects for doctoral research.

The field covers vast areas of automation from unmanned aerial vehicles to the more familiar chemical process control. This last interface with chemical engineering and technology is where process automation has found its niche. Many of the production facilities

in our country and internationally are under pressure to design and implement control strategies and algorithms to improve production.

These industries include power generation by third-party vendors and smaller industries such as forestry.

Agricultural applications have increased significantly and include automated processes based on analytical instrumentation for the production of wine and also batch control processes. These industries are becoming more dependent on mathematical modelling and a smaller human machine interface.

There is hardly a field of operation that has not seen an increase in automation, from sorting systems in banks and post offices to image streaming for security purposes.

The UJ Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment looks forward to strengthening its disciplines through a new Institute for Process Automation (IPA). The Institute will offer master's and doctoral research programmes to both full-time and part-time candidates. Candidate students will be drawn from the electrical, mechanical and chemical engineering fields and will contribute to the development and success of South African industry and research in the broad field of process automation.

Process automation is practised in almost every type of manufacturing, assembly and chemical plant. Processes benefitting from control and automation include electrical power generation, oil refining, chemicals, steel mills, plastics, cement plants, fertiliser plants, pulp and paper mills, automobile and truck assembly, aircraft production, glass manufacturing, natural gas separation plants, food and beverage processing, canning and bottling and the manufacture of almost all industrial parts. Multidisciplinary integration, for instance, through control systems and computational intelligence is also seen as an enabler to process automation.

The above processes are part of the expected future for all of our engineering graduates – be they mechanical, electrical, chemical or civil. The University looks forward to setting the strategic direction for the Institute of Process Automation (IPA) which will be anchored in Africa.

The Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study

UJ has made the decision to establish the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study that will provide a creative space where top researchers and leaders in knowledge may find sanctuary to find solutions through discourse and engagement with their peers on issues that concern the world, the country and the continent of Africa.

This Institute is a joint Africa-Asia intellectual project with the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) based in Singapore. It is now widely recognised that the continents of Africa and Asia are set to become the arena in which the most far reaching changes will take place in the 21st century. Located in Johannesburg and Singapore respectively, both UJ and NTU are located in dynamic, multi-cultural societies whose political and economic aspirations and challenges cannot be met without the deployment of science, cutting-edge technological innovation, scholarship and the determined pursuit of new knowledge. Like NTU, UJ is a 'new' university, established only ten years ago, with a concern for innovating sustainable

sciences and societies that focus on the grand challenges such as energy, water, environment, urbanisation, poverty, global governance, ethics and democracy.

The Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study creates a global centre where scholars from all continents but especially from Africa and Asia will find a vibrant intellectual space for genuine inter-disciplinary (and often spontaneous) forms of intellectual exchange, strategic intellectual enquiry and research in the sciences and humanities and possibly other

“The Institute will have the capacity, expertise and ability to mobilise expertise from other parts of the world.”

disciplines too. The Institute will have the capacity, expertise and ability to mobilise expertise from other parts of the world in such a manner that the Institute becomes a centre for scholarship, discovery and dialogue about the challenges facing the world today.

Centre of Excellence for Mineral and Energy Resource Analysis (CIMERA)

The DST-NRF Centre of Excellence for Mineral and Energy Resource Analysis (CIMERA) was launched on the 24th of April 2014 at UJ. It is hosted by UJ and co-hosted by the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), with Professor N.J. Beukes of UJ as the Director and Professor J.A. Kinnaird of Wits as Co-Director.

Integrated mineral and energy resource analysis involves the study of the origin, distribution and characterisation of natural earth mineral and fossil energy resources, with the aim of ensuring their optimum utilisation in the future. As South Africa is richly endowed with a wide variety of mineral commodities that are of critical usage in the modern technology-driven world, the timely foundation of DST-NRF CIMERA will

facilitate research that will ultimately be of great economic benefit to the country and continent.

DST-NRF CIMERA brings together two world class economic geology research units – the Palaeoproterozoic Mineralisation research group (PPM) at UJ and the Economic Geology Research Institute (EGRI) at Wits. In addition, research will also be conducted with six founding collaboration partners, namely, the Universities of Cape Town, Fort Hare, Pretoria, Rhodes, Stellenbosch and Venda. It is anticipated that more local academic institutions will also be participating in collaborative research under the DST-NRF CIMERA umbrella in the future.

Discussion amongst all the research collaborators has identified the following eight research themes as being the strategically most advantageous at present:

1. Development of early earth mineral resource systems (metallogenesis)
2. Answering critical questions concerning South Africa's three superlative mineral resources hosts, mainly the greater Witwatersrand-Mozaan Basin (gold and uranium), the Transvaal Basin (iron, manganese) and the Bushveld Complex (platinum group metals, copper, nickel, chromium, iron, vanadium, titanium)
3. Fossil energy resources of the Karoo-age basins
4. Small scale mining opportunities in South Africa
5. Critical elements and minerals of the future (rare earth elements, niobium, tantalum, tin)
6. New bulk mineral resource developments in Africa (iron, aluminium)
7. Environmental and medical geology
8. Public awareness and education

Future collaborative research with additional local and international partners will add further research themes under the DST-NRF CIMERA umbrella.

These five research institutes, together with CIMERA, will provide opportunities for stimulating, developing and implementing innovative theory and practice across key areas which are of great significance for progress in our continent and the world. ■

Does Innovation Policy Fall Apart?



A step by step process should be considered to start building innovation ecosystems in Africa, responding to its own needs and opportunities and taking the global market context into account.

By Stefan Schepers

Who has not been moved by Chinua Achebe's beautiful novel *Things fall apart*? The arrival of European colonisers brought ruin and tragedy to people in an old civilisation. Yet Africa had not so peaceful a history that village life would never before have been disturbed by invaders, that an entire people was not forced to migrate, that empires did not rise and collapse, that no atrocities were committed. Life was brutal and short for millennia, everywhere in the pre-modern world.

The millennia shift

So what was different this time? European colonisers brought modernity, a complex civilisation shift based on rationalist philosophy and a market economy driven by science and technology, which developed first in Europe only because of a unique historic juncture, and which brought with it the most profound social, cultural and political changes in history.

The arrival of Europeans and Asians at Africa's shores to trade, three centuries earlier, did not have this effect, because it had minimal impact on the traditional political and societal structures and on cultural paradigms. But the shift from trading to outright occupation and direct intervention in the ways of living of the people did. Resistance was overcome brutally. What could have been a gradual evolution was forced upon Africa in a short time, to serve the economic interests of the colonisers.

Africa's civilisation, unique and different from others in the world, and often unknown or misunderstood because of a lack of unbiased historical research, had shown great strengths and weakness. But like civilisations in other continents, the concept of science-based technological progress, economic competition and a societal urge for permanently improving the material conditions of people's lives, was absent. Great inventions had been made earlier in the Aztec, Arab, Chinese and other civilisations, but they did not emerge on the basis of this particularly European historic juncture of systemic scientific development and industrialisation, and the widespread and eager take-up of the outcomes.

European/American modernity has been welcomed because it has so much improved living conditions for so many. But there was, and still is, inevitably a downside.

Achebe and other African writers have their counterparts elsewhere. The literature of other continents, including Europe itself, is full of novels about the effects of modernity on people, whether it was imposed from outside, as in Africa, or by their own ruling elites, as in Europe. They all describe how a millennia old way of life, based on very slowly evolving rural economies, suddenly, in just a generation or two, became disturbed by rapid industrialisation and its multiple effects on cultural paradigms and on political and social structures. The French author Charles Péguy called the disappearance of the farming class in 20th Century Europe

“There is no African country to be found among the highest performing countries in terms of economic innovation capabilities or in global competitiveness.”

the most important historic event ever. For millennia, the vast majority of people had lived of the land, whether as hunter gatherers or, since about 10 000 years ago, as serfs, peasants or farmers. Social beliefs, such as religions or gender roles, and social institutions, such as authoritarian government systems and their organisation of the economy, were all determined by the needs of farming and the turning of the seasons.

Modernity changed this more rapidly and more profoundly than ever before in history; in just a century, people working and earning their living on the land declined from 80-90% of the population to less than 10-5% today in most European countries. But as a result of industrialisation, in 200 years more wealth was created and life

changed more significantly than in the 20 000 years before. Changes included our metaphysical views on life and on the family, our social relations, the emergence of the individual, new functions for government and demand for accountability, the emergence of enterprises as key drivers of scientific, technological and economic development and of trade, our relation to nature and so much more. Nothing could be remotely compared to earlier times.

Of course there had been technological progress elsewhere before, but never so systematically and continuously as in Europe since the late 18th Century. From Europe modernity spread rapidly to North America, making the newly independent USA finally overtaking the old continent. The two together came to be seen by the rest of the world as 'the West', with all their desirable things, and its unwanted ones.

All laments and theorising about colonisation notwithstanding, there is no denying that Africa stood nowhere at that time, in relation to scientific rationality and industrialisation, and nearly all of its once powerful kingdoms were withering away. This was partly due to the short-sightedness of its ruling elites who did not use earlier trade opportunities to set in motion a process of modernisation. (Robinson & Acemoglu 2012)

And there is no turning back from modernity, because people all over the world are aware now of its multiple benefits for them. Does anyone in Africa want to return to the average short life span, to the levels of infant mortality, before the arrival of medicine by the colonisers? Despite critical aspects too, such as the effects of industrialisation on the environment, the balance of modernity is clearly positive for people.

The new great divide

Rapid and sustained economic growth is intertwined with deep societal change, modernity, everywhere in the world, but it remains largely dependent on research and technology developments in North America and Europe, in Japan and a handful of newcomers, such as South Korea. China is investing massively to become

a producer of technological progress itself, while still being for the moment dependent on technology imports.

There is in Africa today remarkable economic growth and diversification, the rise of a middle class, more accountable (democratic) government, changing life styles, all exponents of modernity, but where do African countries really stand in the world? Are they in a fundamentally better position than two centuries ago?

The two tables which follow tell a sobering story.

(2013). The WEF ranking does include all African countries, but it is distressing to find them nearly all at the bottom of their list, with Mauritius placed best in 45th place, followed by South Africa in 53rd place, and Rwanda in 65th place.

Looking at the innovation ranking of INSEAD, produced together with Cornell University and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), a UN body, one understands why the competitiveness ranking is so low. The first to appear is Mauritius, in 53rd place, followed by South Africa in

terms of top research and radical innovations, those which produce economic and societal paradigm shifts, such as ICT or life sciences, they remain dependent on ‘the West’ which is moving rapidly to a post-industrial economy. And they will remain so for decades to come, because they are still building up the multiple and interacting capabilities which the West and some other countries have solidly established over two centuries. While some African politicians still indulge in bashing the former colonial countries, other developing countries cleverly construct a multitude of relations with Europe and America, Japan and other countries dominating in research and innovation, in order to catch up with the Western capabilities. Fortunately for them, research, by its very nature, is an open, networked activity. Only its transformation in tradable products sometimes becomes protected in order to ensure competitive advantage.

The African renaissance may be bringing new economic growth and development, after years of stagnation imposed by the ill-considered policies of the IMF and by kleptocracy in its own governments, but it does not seem to reduce the divide in innovation and competitiveness, which some other countries have achieved. Why is no African country, not even South Africa, in the tables of the most innovative and competitive economies worldwide? In fact, they do not even come near the top 20.

The missing policy drive

Africa’s growth is still largely driven by the global commodities trade, with some agricultural and even less manufacturing trade in addition. Its regional market integration is still highly insufficient, depriving it of one important source of internal trade and development. It is importing technology, rather than focussing on improving its education systems which would allow it to develop its own. It is therefore vulnerable to developments elsewhere, not least to the continuous technological developments in the US, Europe, Japan and a few countries in South-East Asia.

But can one expect countries which are still coping with a multitude

Table 1: Overview of innovation rankings

Rank	INSEAD’s Global Innovation Index World 2014	Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014
1	Switzerland (64.78)	Sweden
2	United Kingdom (62.37)	Denmark
3	Sweden (62.29)	Germany
4	Finland (60.67)	Finland
5	Netherlands (60.59)	Luxembourg
6	United States (60.09)	Netherlands
7	Singapore (59.24)	Belgium
8	Denmark (57.52)	United Kingdom
9	Luxembourg (56.86)	Ireland
10	Hong Kong [China] (56.82)	Austria
11	Ireland (56.67)	France
12	Canada (56.13)	Slovenia
13	Germany (56.02)	Estonia
14	Norway (55.59)	Cyprus
15	Israel (55.46)	Italy
16	Korea, Republic of (55.27)	Czech Republic
17	Australia (55.01)	Spain
18	New Zealand (54.52)	Portugal
19	Iceland (54.05)	Greece
20	Austria (53.41)	Hungary

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There is no African country to be found among the highest performing countries in terms of economic innovation capabilities or in global competitiveness.

The only one even researched by IMD is South Africa which is in 53rd place in its competitiveness ranking

58th place, and Botswana in 91st place.

One may note that also none of the BRIC countries appears among the top in these lists, which says a lot of the real economic significance of this political grouping: they are still predominantly industrial economies, some of them with large market potential, but in

of structural problems to invest in innovation policy, when there are so many other pressing demands on public budgets, not least poverty alleviation? Yes! Can countries with limited government capabilities and a small research infrastructure do it? Yes! And can a comprehensive innovation policy facilitate solving complex structural problems? Yes!

Innovation is not just a matter of public spending on research but of creating the right framework conditions for people and for companies, small

use of new technologies, until creative entrepreneurs started to innovate in relation to its management processes. America's car industry, cash rich but poor in technological progress because of a management focussed on short term profitability, went under and had to be saved by the Obama government. South Korea has established 4 times as many university chairs on system complexity than Europe, so no wonder that Europe cannot keep pace in ICT technology with them. Compared to America and Japan, European

well, owing to policies creating the right framework conditions for innovation.

The key objective of an innovation policy is to create value for society, by enhancing the quality of life of its citizens and the (global) competitiveness of its enterprises, through intelligent inter-action between a variety of stakeholders. These are, principally, economic actors (companies and other entities), public governance systems (African Union, regional market structures, national, provincial and even city governments), universities and other centres of knowledge, often also civic society and consumer organisations.

This requires leadership and an open, collaborative mind-set from governments, not a hierarchical, authoritarian, bureaucratic approach. Africa's surviving communal traditions, its proclaimed Ubuntu, can help to innovate governance to make it appropriate for the 21st century.

Value creation implies a wide concept of demand. This can come from the needs of industry to find solutions to specific problems in their value chain or from the many societal needs in Africa. Indeed, innovation often comes through the involvement of stakeholders, of those directly concerned by the outcomes (co-creation). Africa's development of mobile telecommunications and their increasing uses for all kind of services is a good but unfortunately lonely example. In many cases the sometimes obsolete government and bureaucracy structures in Africa constitute a barrier to change.

For example, South Africa's grassroots movements for improving public services can provide a push not just for their provision but also their innovation, if given the right response and constructive engagement with enterprises and centres of research; and this in turn can lead to new products and management methods in the public and/or private sector and perhaps to building or growing companies which are more competitive in other markets. A virtuous economic circle can be the result of a social demand taken up by an open and strategically oriented mind.

Demand driven value creation requires permanent strategic agility, scanning the global and African context, scouting for opportunities, and attention

Rank	WEF's Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015	IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook 2014
1	Switzerland (5.70)	United States (100.000)
2	Singapore (5.65)	Switzerland (92.423)
3	United States (5.54)	Singapore (90.966)
4	Finland (5.50)	Hong Kong (90.329)
5	Germany (5.49)	Sweden (85.833)
6	Japan (5.47)	Germany (85.782)
7	Hong Kong SAR (5.46)	Canada (85.429)
8	Netherlands (5.45)	United Arab Emirates (84.892)
9	United Kingdom (5.41)	Denmark (84.040)
10	Sweden (5.41)	Norway (83.293)
11	Norway (5.35)	Luxembourg (82.164)
12	United Arab Emirates (5.33)	Malaysia (82.088)
13	Denmark (5.29)	Taiwan (81.233)
14	Taiwan, China (5.25)	Netherlands (81.144)
15	Canada (5.24)	Ireland (80.360)
16	Qatar (5.24)	United Kingdom (79.814)
17	New Zealand (5.20)	Australia (79.559)
18	Belgium (5.18)	Finland (78.159)
19	Luxembourg (5.17)	Qatar (77.116)
20	Malaysia (5.16)	New Zealand (74.943)

and large, to innovate in the market; and it does not concern only high technology sectors, but all sectors of the economy, including the most traditional ones which often offer the greatest scope for innovation.

For example, Europe's textile industry was believed by many observers to have no future, despite the

countries' research and innovation efforts are too fragmented, due to outdated national sovereignty views and short term political interests, while companies, even small ones, focus today on European and global markets. No wonder that Europe loses global market share in some sectors, not in all, and some countries succeed extremely

to economic and technological continuities or discontinuities. The emergence of novel concepts or processes, products or services, is often the result of out-of-the-box thinking, improvisation, repeated trial and error, the emergence of new tacit and explicit knowledge until some form of consolidation takes place.

To achieve an innovative economic and social context, a kind of ecosystem must emerge through careful nurturing and reform. An ecosystem of innovation aims to emulate nature in its organisational complexity and to create the dynamics, interactions and feedbacks that produce desired outcomes, spin-offs and cumulative effects. Paradoxically, it requires an effort of parallel construction and deconstruction and of creation of the right framework conditions, which can only be done through consistent holistic steering. And, in addition, the effects may be at the start uncertain and apparently marginal before developing their full potential.

Natural ecosystems evolve under the pressure of contextual change, or perish. Similarly, the creation of an ecosystem of innovation will be required and stimulated by external challenges which threaten the survival of desired patterns. This brings acceptance for the need for innovativeness, but only if accompanied by clear identification and communication of the potential benefits.

Africa is not lacking so much in capacities but it does have a serious problem of coherence of vision and purpose, of creating cumulative effects, and of political culture, due to organisational fragmentation, persistence of multiple barriers in markets, and the absence of a system approach. It does not have the right culture and governance tools to develop an ecosystem of innovation appropriate to the present challenges because it continues too much on the government trajectories inherited from the colonial age (Mbeki 2009).

A step by step process should be considered to start building innovation ecosystems in Africa, responding to its own needs and opportunities and taking the global market context into account. Clear and consistent

leadership from the top will be needed to create the framework conditions to facilitate other actors, primarily companies and centres of knowledge, to develop and manage the dynamic inter-actions which lead to measurable innovation and added value creation.

This should not be done only on a country by country basis, but ideally there should be an overarching drive from a public body, such as the African Union or the African Development Bank, or an initiative from a private foundation, to harness better the many opportunities from cooperation across borders and sectors, and to stimulate cross-fertilisation. It will require a special dedicated effort, outside

“ The African renaissance may be bringing new economic growth and development, after years of stagnation imposed by the ill-considered policies of the IMF and by kleptocracy in its own governments. ”

normal political procedures, involving business leaders, centres or research and civic society organisations.

Waking the African lion

Correctly assessing contextual change is a difficult task in business and government because of a tendency to compare with the past. It is therefore essential to develop a realistic cognitive map, based on an assessment of interacting developments. This first step must be done with a horizon 2030 and on the basis of foresight studies, through a network of centres of knowledge.

Inspiration and methodological examples can be found in the work of the International Panel on Climate Change, the World Economic Forum on Risk Interconnection and Convergence or the strategic outlook of the World Business Council for Sustainability, and others.

The resulting scan of innovation challenges for Africa should be

formulated solution neutral. This will enable the emergence of creative ideas, which are the embryonic solutions whose potential impact can then be further analysed. It will also avoid determining future innovation efforts by tactical considerations.

The persistent gap with the most dynamic economies outlined above cannot be overcome by incremental but by a radical approach in order to achieve trend mutation. This is not just to catch up in sectors of high innovation and rapid productivity growth, where Africa continues to seriously lag behind, but also in traditional sectors, where there is often competitive advantage; and obviously in public governance, whose policies and accumulation of rules are the main cause of this lack of competitiveness. It requires thinking out-of-the-box, including intangibles such as design, brand development, intellectual property protection (including novelties such as geographic indicators), management, and other elements of successful innovation.

The focus in innovative economies is on collaborative governance, not on the hierarchical bureaucratic governance with its over-reliance on regulation, inherited from colonialism and typical for a bygone industrial economy. Change is necessary to move beyond a culture of regulation and control and towards a culture of mentoring and coaching of all stakeholders.

The relations between different administrative units within government as much as between them, the different interfaces between politicians and civil servants, and finally but not least, the capacity problems in many countries, need urgent addressing in order to facilitate the emergence and functioning of an innovation ecosystem. This requires attention to ensuring equal capabilities throughout governance systems of Africa. The existing Peer Review Mechanism could be updated and widened to take account of the new governance culture and methods for innovation policy development and implementation.

In order to align the contrasting, open and hidden, interests of stakeholders within countries, but also between African countries (perhaps on a regional market basis, such as SACU and others),

it is necessary to develop a learning mind-set. Therefore, cross-disciplinary research and multi-experience inputs, as well as open-mindedness and incentives, and finally tolerant handling of failures, will be necessary also after the assessment phase.

In fact, it can probably only be achieved through consistent and courageous leadership – but one which is sensitive also to the requirements of an innovation ecosystem functioning and to the continuously changing context. Leadership is often assumed in Africa, seldom developed. Yet the complexity of ecosystem steering requires us to focus on this now.

Coherence is a key ingredient for bringing cumulative effects in an innovation ecosystem. It demands an overall perspective, based on long-term foresight, in particular in the early stage of innovation development when inertia and status quo approaches may undermine the need for radical new departures. Therefore coherence cannot be provided through traditional coordination set-ups which usually serve only short-term interests.

In order to ensure a focus on the mega-issues determined during the assessment phase, to avoid their premature absorption in policy-as-usual, and to create serendipity, experimental attitude to reality and risk taking in the face of uncertainty, innovation must be steered centrally. It must be an overarching objective towards which all others must converge.

To assess the possible need for paradigm shifts and to align the various agendas, it is essential to involve economic actors alongside the centres of knowledge, because they often possess an understanding of market needs second to none. This demands a deliberation culture and tools which go beyond mechanistic consultation procedures in order to bring a shared vision, engagement and cooperation during implementation. Research and centuries of experience show that there is a positive correlation between a society's degree of openness and tolerance for the independent, creative and entrepreneurial minded and its economic success.

Finally, regular peer review, scrutiny of process and evaluation

of achievements by independent multi-stakeholder groups of experts is essential to ensure firmness of purpose and agility of methodologies. Experimenting with fundamentally new methods and abandoning or modifying programmes when they appear not to move fast enough towards tangible results must be a full part of an innovation ecosystem. Included in evaluation approaches must be tolerance for failure, provided the right efforts have been made of course, because without some form of controlled gambling there will be not enough innovation. This will be a radical departure from existing bureaucratic culture and requires strong leadership support, transparency and communication with stakeholders.

Evaluation is not only part of

“Research and centuries of experience show that there is a positive correlation between a society's degree of openness and tolerance for the independent, creative and entrepreneurial minded and its economic success.”

constant learning under circumstances of uncertainty. It also helps to develop a more constructive approach to risk management in the broadest sense. Learning capacities and risk acceptance are major characteristics of an innovation ecosystem. They provide the basis for adjustments and often lead to additional innovativeness, hence to better value creation and competitive advantage.

Conclusion

One often has an impression of rhetorical incontinence reading about or listening to the grand goals of the African Renaissance. They are seldom followed up by concrete, feasible proposals involving all stakeholders. Yet adversity offers the greatest opportunity for starting a process of innovation.

Africa can be inspired by innovation policy developments, successes and failures in other countries, and in particular those in the top league for innovation and competitiveness.

The methodology of the tripartite High Level Group on Innovation Policy Management, set up in the EU to provide independent, out-of-the-box advice to the European Council of Heads of State and Government, can be a useful starting point. A comparable African initiative should bring together, in their private capacity, a small group of key officials dealing with economic and innovation policy of the AU Commission, and from a few of its Member States (in order to represent different models), from large innovative corporations in different sectors (only one per sector, from Africa and outside), and a small number of practice oriented academics. The group should be steered by an independent chairperson and have its own temporary secretariat and research team. The work could be financed from private sources (business and foundations) in order to ensure independence and not to burden public budgets at the early stages of its operation. Its final report and recommendations are destined to reach the African Commission and Heads of Government. If a Pan-African initiative would be beyond reach, one can launch one or more regional ones.

But ultimately Africa will have to find its own ways to ensure that the present gap does not widen and that it manages to further diversify its economies and to strengthen its capabilities through coherent and comprehensive innovation policies, at national and regional levels.

As the late President Mandela rightly said 'It is always impossible until it is done'. ■

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MOZAMBIQUE'S PITFALLS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS:

Transitional Politics and its Repercussions on Peace and Stability



FRELIMO's unchallenged position has created an elite-based system, which deviates fundamentally from its revolutionary ideology and allows for abuses of power for private business interests.

By Madalitso Zililo Phiri

The inauguration of Filipe Nyusi as Mozambique's president represents a generational shift, as he is the first candidate to be elected without having fought in the war for independence. This paper asks the following question: to what extent are there continuities and discontinuities in the nationalist narrative of building a democratic and peaceful state, especially after the end of the civil conflict? We argue that the post-conflict political and economic liberalisation had a 'placebo effect' on pluralism and prospects for shared economic opportunities.

Although RENAMO and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) have challenged FRELIMO's electoral dominance, strengthening nascent democratic institutions, FRELIMO has a monopoly of power and force in the Mozambican state, shaping its political economy outlook and choices. We adopt Frantz Fanon's bold word of caution to emerging nationalists against the 'Pitfalls of National Consciousness' and suggest that Mozambique's post-conflict political economy of development should move beyond critical studies rooted in decolonisation to decoloniality.

From Decolonisation to Decoloniality: Mozambique in Africa

In 1975, FRELIMO won the war for independence from Portuguese colonial rule. The new Mozambican government embraced Scientific Socialism under one-party rule led by the charismatic Samora Machel. In 1977, civil conflict – rooted in power grievances and geopolitical rivalries of the Cold War era – ensued between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The collapse of socialist states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a weakened economy and shifting alliances led to FRELIMO's abandonment of its Marxist-Leninist ideology, capitulating to neoliberal recommendations proffered by Western powers and international financial institutions (IFI). Under President Chissano in the late 1980s, the FRELIMO government approved an Economic Rehabilitation Programme spearheaded by the World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), privatising 1200 state companies.

After 16 years of conflict, the FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), the former rebel group funded and sustained by the apartheid regime, turned political party and largest national opposition, signed Mozambique's General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992. The ceasefire ushered in a new era of political and economic liberalisation coinciding with the Third Wave of democratisation in Africa. Mozambique has been hailed by international financial institutions and pertinent multilateral organisations as a "success story" of post-conflict peace and stability and economic recovery. In 1997, Mozambique received the Africa Peace Award in recognition for its efforts towards national reconciliation, peace and stability while upholding fundamental human rights and promoting good governance.

In spite of this accolade progress is offset by regression in other areas. A booming mineral sector and massive inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has spurred rapid economic growth at an average annual rate of 7.1 per cent¹, one of the world's highest. In this political and economic order rent-seeking practices and the manipulation of institutions to benefit the elite are synonymous with Mozambique depiction as a 'successful' post-conflict reconstruction narrative. According to the Human Development Index, Mozambique ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world and continues to be plagued by diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, rising inequality, hunger and inadequate educational resources in both urban and rural areas.² Further, politico-military tensions between the government and the opposition RENAMO have taken a toll on the civilian population in the country's central and northern regions. Youth unemployment is rising as the economy focuses on fiscal and monetary policies like inflation targeting and exchange rate stability to the neglect of job creation.³

As Fanon suggested, "National consciousness, instead of being the

all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilisation of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been." Fanon warned against the rise of a ruling elite that would use force and coercion to manipulate political and economic institutions to the detriment of citizens.

Mozambique and other African countries must deal with the continent's political, economic and social condition rooted in decoloniality. Decoloniality goes beyond the precepts of decolonial "thinking and doing"⁴. It questions or problematises the histories of power, underlying the logic of Western civilisation. Decoloniality is a response to the relation of direct political, social and cultural domination established by Europeans.⁵ The

“Owing to the heavy politicisation of the public sector, civil servants have been coerced to join the ruling party and pledge allegiance to its leadership to secure top level positions in the public service.”

concept refers to analytic approaches – and socioeconomic and political practices – opposed to the pillars of Western civilisation: coloniality and modernity. Thus, it is both a political and epistemic project.⁶ In its more practical applications – such as movements for indigenous autonomy, like the Zapatista uprising for self-government – decoloniality entails a "programmatic"⁷ for de-linking from contemporary legacies of coloniality, a response to needs unmet by modern governments⁸ or, most broadly, a search for a "new humanity"⁹, based on "social liberation from all power organised as inequality, discrimination,

exploitation and domination".¹⁰

Deceptive Political and Economic Liberalisation

Political liberalisation in Africa and Mozambique in the 1990s was primarily characterised by an exponential emergence of democratic institutions – free press, opposition parties, independent unions and civic organisations¹¹ – in line with the Western discourse of human rights and democracy. Mozambique's 1990 Constitution and the 1992 GPA envisioned a pluralist democracy characterised by a commitment to multiparty elections, press freedom and protection for civil society organisations. Mozambique has held five highly-contested elections, which have culminated in FRELIMO's dominance of the executive and legislative branches, while curtailing powers of the judiciary. The 15 October results showed that Nyusi, the candidate of the ruling FRELIMO Party, won 2,803,536 votes (57 per cent). His nearest rival, Afonso Dhakama, leader of the former rebel movement RENAMO, was a million votes behind. Dhlakama won 1,800,448 votes (36.6 per cent). The third candidate, Daviz Simango, mayor of Beira, and leader of the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), won 314,759 votes (6.4 per cent)¹². The RENAMO leader has threatened to form a parallel government as accusations of malpractice and fraud were instigated against the incumbent party FRELIMO.

Nyusi inherits institutional inertia as well as a political and economic gridlock that prevents the radical provision of a new social structure that would undo the existing inequalities of opportunity and address poverty. The ruling party has strengthened its hold on not only the state, but also society and the market, through a system of integration between the state apparatus and the party, as well as the rise of a nomenclatura with interests in politics as well as business.¹³

We have argued elsewhere that Mozambique's post-conflict democracy is a "Managed Democracy", as opposed to an inclusive African democracy rooted in the fight against colonialism¹⁴. The public

sector is deeply politicised and, since independence, the president of the republic and head of government has always simultaneously been the party president. FRELIMO's dominance in parliament and monopoly over the judicial system keep the executive strong and nearly exempt from public scrutiny. FRELIMO's unchallenged position has created an elite-based system, which deviates fundamentally from its revolutionary ideology and allows for abuses of power for private business interests. This has led to an increasingly disgruntled citizenry and mounting tensions between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO armed forces.

Owing to the heavy politicisation of the public sector, civil servants have been coerced to join the ruling party and pledge allegiance to its leadership to secure top level positions in the public service.¹⁵ Public servants who are suspected of being allied to an opposition party like RENAMO or MDM face limited prospects for growth in the public sector. Criticism of the ruling party can lead to suspension from the party and loss of public office, as exemplified by the suspension of Antonio Frangoulis, the former head of the Criminal Investigation Police, from the party due to his criticism of FRELIMO's governance in a televised debate.¹⁶

Currently, civil society institutions, such as the press and unions, are private and independent in name but largely operate in tandem with the ruling party. The main media outlets, television and newspapers, are controlled by the state. Thus, they do not challenge FRELIMO but rather highlight its accomplishments, projecting the image of a party engaged in eradicating absolute poverty, boosting self-esteem and fighting corruption. Despite an increase in pundits from academia and local media offering critical analyses of the state, most analysts in the public domain remain hesitant to challenge the FRELIMO government and its leadership.

Voices in civil society are being shut out, and space for dissent is shrinking. Prominent citizens like hip-hop artist Azagaia and economist Carlos Nunes Castel-Branco were interrogated by the Attorney-General for criticising

“Mozambique ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world and continues to be plagued by diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, rising inequality, hunger and inadequate educational resources in both urban and rural areas.”

the former president Guebuza and his government. Civil society is underfunded, structurally weak and, in many cases, linked to FRELIMO.¹⁷ Despite shortcomings, some civil society members have organised notable protests against food and transport price hikes, politico-military tensions, violence in the country and mining-induced resettlements. Many of these events have culminated in brutal responses from state police forces. The FRELIMO government remains largely uncontested, and political freedom has failed to translate into inclusive democratic institutions.

The move towards economic liberalisation entailed the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. This led to the development of an almost indivisible tripartite alliance comprising the state, the party and business – a marriage between business and politics.

“While charismatic leaders like Samora Machel instilled a progressive vision for a new society, poverty, inequality and social exclusion have become the order of the day.”

Mozambique's formerly socialist political elite became its capitalist elite, as state-owned enterprises were either passed on to FRELIMO ex-combatants and militants or acquired by party officials at very low prices using inexpensive loans from donors eager to promote privatisation.¹⁸ According to Hanlon:

...the formal transition to multi-party democracy in 1994 was not accompanied by other mechanisms normal in democracies. There were no conflict of interest regulation, no asset reporting and other transparency requirements, and no reforms to the justice system. Thus the elite came to understand that “democracy” and “capitalism” meant that they were allowed to use their privileged positions to accumulate wealth unobserved.¹⁹

The transition allowed a capitalist elite to become deeply rooted in FRELIMO party structures. Former president Guebuza, who amassed significant wealth in the 1990s, provides one conspicuous example. Since coming to power in 2005, Guebuza cemented his influence in party structures and maintained an iron grip on power. Already amongst the richest people in Mozambique prior to his election, Guebuza consolidated business interests in telecommunications, transport, fishing, mining, tourism, publishing, consultancy, construction and banking, and extended these interests to family members and allies.²⁰ Under the 1990 Constitution, Guebuza could not run for the presidency in the national elections of 2014. Nonetheless, he has been re-elected party president. Strategically, Guebuza successfully lobbied for the election of one of his loyalists, ex-Defence Minister Filipe Nyussi, to the presidency.²¹

Conflict of interests in the coal mining industry is another clear example of the marriage between business and politics. Many top level public officials involved in regulating the companies in Mozambique's booming coal mining industry are also private executives within the same enterprises.²² For example, Aboobacar Changa, a tax judge serving on a tribunal commissioned to audit state corporations is the director of one of

the companies being audited by the government and a business partner of other public officials who are also subject to his legal review.²³ The confidentiality of mining contracts between the government and the mining companies operating in Mozambique, coupled with poor reporting of revenues and amounts subject to taxation entering state coffers, raises questions with regard to transparency, accountability and the management of natural resource funds.²⁴ Considering the aforementioned lack of transparency and the involvement of state officials in private mining enterprises, analysts have pointed out the potential for diversion of public funds from state coffers in the extractive industries.²⁵

Repercussions for Peace and Stability

The politico-military tensions deeply affecting the security of civilians in the central and northern regions of Mozambique epitomise the weaknesses of the post-GPA political and economic liberalisation process. The system has produced disparities, making the state's position a source of insecurity. In October 2013, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama moved to the Gorongosa bush in southern Mozambique to train and arm soldiers. The mobilisation of RENAMO forces expresses the opposition party's discontent and political grievances, which include political marginalisation from national institutions as well as the overall economic exclusion felt through swelling inequalities at the national level. In response, FRELIMO-led government forces stormed Dhlakama's base, resulting in RENAMO's nullification of the GPA and announced return to violence. RENAMO attacks in central and northern Mozambique have taken the lives of innocent civilians and have forced the displacement of significant amounts of the population from the Sofala and Tete provinces to other regions. By July 2014, there had been over 60 rounds of negotiations between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO concluding with a new peace proviso in August 2014. Subsequent to the 2014 elections

RENAMO resorted to the politics of retribution proposing to divide the country into two regions, north and south, leaving the mineral-rich provinces in the north to RENAMO and the southern provinces to FRELIMO.

Conclusion

Mozambique's post-conflict transition raises two important issues. Firstly the post-conflict state has failed to transform the country towards a more humane politics. This is a result of the manipulation of political and economic institutions, which have not been adequately addressed by decolonisation. Analysts who fail to recognise the connection between the politics of decoloniality and the production of knowledge, i.e., between programmatic and analytics, are likely to reflect "an underlying

“Many top level public officials involved in regulating the companies in Mozambique's booming coal mining industry are also private executives within the same enterprises.”

acceptance of capitalist modernity, liberal democracy, and individualism”²⁶ – values which decoloniality seeks to challenge. New discourses of Mozambique's post-conflict political economy of development should be rooted in decoloniality, which prioritises citizenship in development practice.


Secondly FRELIMO's policies and tactics have become anti-democratic, and the transition to 'democracy' has resulted in higher levels of inequality. FRELIMO under the leadership of Nyusi will continue to solidify political institutions that entrench poverty and inequality in Mozambique. While charismatic leaders like Samora Machel instilled a progressive vision for a new society, poverty, inequality and social

exclusion have become the order of the day. When the wealth of a nation is controlled by an elite few, opportunity and ingenuity are curtailed. Citizens are excluded as political and economic institutions supported by FRELIMO have become illusive. An examination of post-conflict Mozambique reveals that the FRELIMO government under the leadership of Nyusi will continue to entrench extractive political and economic institutions, using coercive political tactics and successive party structures, to the detriment of citizens. ■

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SAB and WWF-SA Introduce Sustainable Barley Farming Programme



By South African Breweries

The South African Breweries (SAB) has launched Better Barley Better Beer, a programme which encourages and supports sustainable farming practices amongst South Africa's barley farmers, focusing on water reduction, improved carbon footprints, soil health and the clearing of alien vegetation, as well as the protection and restoration of

ecosystems.

Better Barley Better Beer, in partnership with the World Wildlife Fund for Nature of South Africa (WWF-SA), is in its pilot phase in the dryland area of the southern Cape and in the irrigated barley areas in the Northern Cape, and will run for approximately 2 years.

The programme involves a total of

26 Barley Producers – 15 in the dryland area and 11 in irrigation, who have either voluntarily opted to participate or hold important conservation assets on their properties. These assets include endangered veld, important water catchment areas and critical species.

Through structured engagement and advisory support, Better Barley Better

Beer is aimed at empowering barley farmers to understand and implement sustainable farming practices. The programme is an important element of SAB's global sustainable development framework called Prosper. Prosper highlights tangible targets to be achieved by SAB over the next five years in the areas of responsible alcohol consumption, securing water resources, reducing waste and carbon emissions, supporting small enterprises, including emerging farmers, and the support of responsible and sustainable land use for brewing crops.

Farmers with critical conservation assets will be supported in engaging on biodiversity stewardship to protect and restore ecosystems. The stewardship concept is a new way of achieving conservation protection by creating positive, proactive partnerships with private landowners and conservation bodies such as WWF-SA.

"The WWF-SA's interest in Better Barley Better Beer is to support farmers as key custodians of our South African natural resource base, with advisory extension support to adopt best practice that ensures farming maintains, protects and restores key natural systems, while minimising the environmental impact of production activities for the benefit of producers, as well as downstream users," says Inge Kotze, WWF Senior Manager: Sustainable Agriculture.

The Better Barley Better Beer Guidelines, developed in collaboration with the WWF-SA and SAB Agriculturists as well as local barley farmers, drives the implementation of the programme by each producer.

The guidelines provide farmers with criteria, indicators and verifiers to measure how sustainably they are farming. Key indicators contained in the guidelines allow farmers to self-assess their performance using a checklist provided. They are also able to identify strengths and weaknesses easily, and develop action plans to correct deficiencies.

"The guidelines are designed to empower the barley farmer to make the right decisions today to ensure the sustainable production of local barley into the future," says Thinus

van Schoor, General Manager SAB Maltings.

The pilot is aimed at reducing the cost and risk of doing business and improving crop production, a 'zero sum game' for the farmer. Using key metrics, farmers will be able to track improvement and progress overtime to support the development of a business case for sustainable production and they will be able to demonstrate the impact and value of changing practices at farm level and elsewhere in the chain.

SAB intends for the Better Barley Better Beer key metrics to be systematised into accepted industry standards, much like the Barley Passport it introduced in 2005.

The Barley Passport contains detailed information on chemicals applied on the produce and only that which is registered will be purchased by SAB.

Better Barley Better Beer allows SAB to build on its strategic business objective to help grow the local barley industry and secure its future growth and sustainability. This is in line with South Africa's strategic plan for sustainable agriculture and the Department of Agriculture's policy for sustainable development.

Through Better Barley Better Beer and other sustainable agriculture initiatives, including the construction of a multi-million rand SAB Maltings plant in Johannesburg and its Go Farming programme, which is geared at establishing and supporting emerging farmers, SAB intends to source more than 90% of its barley requirements from local producers.

"Having a fully-fledged and sustainable local barley sector means SAB can rely on contracts with local producers for approximately 93% of its brewing requirements, enabling us to hedge against volatile global commodity markets and, just as importantly, to keep tighter control of quality and ensure a sustainable barley growing sector," says van Schoor.

Historically, SAB has played a pioneering role in the South African barley industry. It began growing barley locally more than three decades ago, a strategic attempt by the company to become self-sufficient. Since those

early days, SAB's support for the local barley industry has strengthened considerably and the company is today regarded as a critical role player. The strategic industry partnerships it has developed, as well as its close working relationship with producers, is what has helped to yield successes and drive further sustainable growth.


"Our collaborative approach within the agricultural sector has proven to be the most effective method in creating sustainable growth, which is a key objective of any SAB investment. The existing knowledge and skills within the industry is invaluable to success," says van Schoor.

This focused commitment by SAB to investing in the local barley industry extends to developing and supporting a more inclusive environment with equal opportunities. These efforts stretch as far back as the early 1990s when SAB initiated the Taung Barley Farmers Project in the Northern Cape. The programme has helped to encourage local barley production and create a sustainable source of income for smallholder farmers. Today, it supports more than 120 smallholder farmers, each generating a sustainable income with guaranteed access to market as supported by SAB.

About 160 000 tons of barley are currently grown in the southern Cape and a further 94 000 tons are produced in the irrigation areas of the Northern Cape. SAB helped establish South Africa's barley growing sector in the 1970s, a strategic move to become self-sufficient in producing the key brewing ingredient.

The next phase of the Better Barley Better Beer pilot will be the roll out of specific guidelines to small scale and emerging farmers in the Taung area. These guidelines will be tailored to focus on training the farmers rather than auditing them. ■





He doesn't know what to do. If he should stay by the window or if he should go down to his friend. He doesn't know what to say, he doesn't know where the friend will go. He doesn't know why they are being forced away.

By Mats Svensson

He wakes up early. Everything is dark. He is awoken by horse hooves clattering on the paving sandstones. He knows what that means. He has become familiar with the sound. It is repeated more often. A few years ago it may have happened once a month. Now, often.

It is like a snare that slowly tightens. It has become harder to breath, to sleep, to laugh.

So much has happened lately. Last time Gaza was bombed, he was still a child. He used to look at the news, especially BBC and Aljazeera. Around the clock he would run around with his friends and play war; he had a small plastic gun that he could load with firecrackers.

A few years have passed. Gaza has been bombed again. The raids have gone on for 51 days. Ground troops have invaded and the most sophisticated automatic birds are flying over this concentration camp throughout the day. Down there, trapped by the Israeli Navy, Israeli Air Force and Israeli ground troops, surrounded by high walls, he can see people trying to hide, seek shelter in UN schools. There is no shelter. Nothing helps. Nobody helps. Everything has been transformed into a target. Hospitals, clinics and UN-buildings. The world condemns, even the President of the United States is concerned but sends more weapons, bullets, and equipment to the Israeli military.

Now he doesn't play war anymore. Now he doesn't have to, now he can't, now he is instead considering joining the war. What often occupies his thoughts these days is how to take responsibility. How to protect his younger siblings, grandfather and grandmother, relatives, friends.

The horse hooves have broken the silence, awakened him. He carefully looks through the window. His room is on the top floor. They have lived here for generations. The house lies on the top of the hill, facing the valley. He lives in Silwan.

It is a good place. They can see far away. A little higher up to the right he sees the wall surrounding the old city. The house lies close to the centre of events. He would often feel proud of living here. But more often now, that

pride is coupled with fear, despair and hopelessness.

Today, only three horses pass by, but many more soldiers. This time, the soldiers halt very close. He hears shouts and screams. A door is forced down. He knows which door it is, which house it is. He has often played around that house. His best friend lives there, as old as himself. They were born the same year, 17 years ago. Two families that celebrated weddings together, who grieved together when a loved one passed away.

He sees how his friend is forced outside. He sees how he gets to go inside again, how he carries out furniture, books, laundry racks, toys. A soldier stands by the door with a semi lifted automatic weapon. Below the stairs are three additional soldiers. Fifteen meters from the house, below his window, another eighty soldiers create a circle around the house.

“The world condemns, even the President of the United States is concerned but sends more weapons, bullets, and equipment to the Israeli military.”

All roads have been blocked. Now, nobody can get to the house. Whoever is there will stay there.

He sees how his friend's mother comes out with a grandchild on her arm. How the father carries out the red carpet, the carpet which always lay in the little “big” room.

He doesn't know what to do. If he should stay by the window or if he should go down to his friend. He doesn't know what to say, he doesn't know where the friend will go. He doesn't know why they are being forced away.

All he knows is that the house will soon be razed to the ground. He knows that everything will be over in a few hours. Maybe he'll wait till then. His friend will need help to clean up under the shattered walls. Look for memories, books, paintings, table

cloths, toys, letters. All that they didn't have time to save before the machines came and shattered the house.

He looks at the place where a house was torn down in the beginning of last year. He sees that a new house has been built. Sees an Israeli flag. A modern, awful building. The ones who lived there before had long tried to build a second floor. In vain. Now it was different. Someone had taken over. All papers had been arranged quickly and their move had been completed within a year.

He doesn't want to think about everything happening in Silwan, the killing in Gaza, the wall of humiliation being built around Bethlehem, that his uncle in Abu Dis, only a kilometer away, no longer can come and celebrate weddings. He does not want to think about the future, about the next day, about the next hour. He just wants to disappear, wants to do something.

He is seventeen. He has experienced most things, been through more than most. He is filled with fear, anger. Is often sad but never cries. Very rarely does he ever see anyone cry. He sometimes hears his mother crying silently. Never when it is light, but sometimes he can wake to the sounds of sadness in the room next door. When he wakes up a moment later, the sounds are gone. If he hasn't been woken by horse hooves, his mother wakes him.

His mother doesn't laugh, but shows no signs of sadness either. She has already planned the day. Arranged breakfast, set the dough. Mom speaks about what his siblings will do, what his father will do.

This is the time of the day when he feels most at ease. For a short moment, everything feels normal, like he is in control of his life. Everything is shut outside. In here, before he steps out on the streets, he is filled with calm.

But today, he is going to see his friend. He will not have time to go to school. Everyone understands, everyone knows, everyone supports, knowing that tomorrow it could be their own house.

They all tighten their fists in their pockets. A collective decision has been made a long time ago – we're staying. ■

BOKO HARAM

Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism



By Lere Amusan and Samuel Oyewole

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most recent hot spot of a modern wave of terrorism. Violent conflicts, riots, uprisings, genocide, wars, insurgency and even terrorism are not recent phenomena in Africa. However, terrorism has emerged and occupies a dominant position among security concerns of African states more than ever before. Beyond the post-9/11

global mobilisation against terrorism by the USA, this phenomenon has in itself come of age in Africa. There are many extremist groups in Africa that are now queuing into the global trend of terrorist operations and strategies. Africa is witnessing a remarkable shift in terrorist practices, with growing flexibility of organisations, constituencies and support systems that reflect

interconnectivity of global, regional and local theatres. These include a 'glocalised' radicalism, business-like organisation, diversified sources of ammunition, finance and training.

The recently celebrated economic growth and progress toward democracy in many African states have continued to be viewed with caution because of the fragility of many

states, mass poverty, corruption, bad governance, political instability and signs of resource curse among other things. In the age of modern terrorism, Africa is witnessing the modernisation of old strategies, transformation of old struggles, redefinition of old grievances and re-evaluation of old crimes. The effects of modernisation and 'glocalisation' of terrorist operatives, tactics and strategies in Africa vary across countries and sub-regions, as there are also variations in the nature of struggle.

The growth of religious-motivated terrorism in Africa has become identified with special strategic concerns. The praxis of sacred extremism and predominance of terrorists motivated by religious ideas across the world is reflected in some ways in Africa. Political order has been savaged in many African states with the subversive activities of Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in partnership with the former's global network. In a similar way, Boko Haram's campaigns of terror in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region have become a serious concern. In the light of this, politicians, strategists, social researchers and stakeholders within and outside the continent of Africa are confronted with how to counter this expanding frontier of terrorism. Against this backdrop, this article unpacks Boko Haram's theatres of terrorism, Nigeria's counterterrorism measures, its allies' responses and the way forward.

Boko Haram: The Idea and the Struggle

On 14 April 2014, members of the Boko Haram group attacked and abducted 250 girls from the Government Secondary School in Chibok, North Eastern part of Nigeria. This tragic event generated a great deal of attention in Nigeria and the world. Boko Haram has carried out a series of assassinations, bombings, maimings, hostage takings, kidnappings, and uprisings. This group has killed more than 7000 people in over 1000 different attacks in Nigeria and beyond.

Among high profile attacks by Boko Haram are the Nigerian Police Headquarters and the United Nations office bombings in Abuja. The

abduction of the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister of Cameroon, French tourists and expatriates in both Nigeria and Cameroon brought their activities into the limelight at the global level. The predominant targets of attacks include the police and the military, traditional rulers, educational institutions, critical clerics and places of worship, media houses and reporters and politicians.

Beyond Nigeria, members of Boko Haram played an important role in the secession and defence of the defunct Islamic Republic of Azawad in Mali. This group has also carried out transnational acts of terror in Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while the operational presence of its members has also been reported in Somalia, Central Africa Republic, Libya and Mauritania; and it is reported to be connected to, and supported by or

“The predominant targets of attacks include the police and the military, traditional rulers, educational institutions, critical clerics and places of worship, media houses and reporters and politicians.”

benefiting from international terrorist networks that included Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Boko Haram, meaning “western education is a sin”, is the popular name for the group that calls itself Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, meaning “people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad”. Its goals have become a source of debate in recent times. Its leadership has been identified with many declarations and demands that have brought a lot of confusion in relation to the understanding of their struggle. However, the most commonly declared and easiest to identify goal of the group is to establish

a theocratic Islamic state in Nigeria. Other common points of rally for the group include the development of the northern region of the country, enthronement of a Muslim from the northern region as Nigerian President, good governance, transparency, employment opportunities and puritan fellowship among Muslims.

The phraseological relevance of Boko Haram as a name is premised on the idea that Western education disorients people from understanding God's purpose for humanity. Any struggle to uphold the idea of God's sovereignty, and subject fellow human beings under His outlined precepts, cannot avoid a clash with some scientific premises of Western teachings. In line with these ideas Boko Haram launched many attacks on schools, particularly the institutions of higher learning, and killed many teachers. The abduction of 250 school girls scheduled to write Physics at the West Africa Examination Council (WAEC), a terminal examination for senior secondary school students in the region, was consistent with this. The group's target is to reduce, if not to stop enrolments into Western education, which is seen as a rival to Islamic education.

A previous survey has revealed that Boko Haram evolved from the *Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation* founded in 1995.¹ Boko Haram emerged from a series of fractionalisations of this group. Under numerous names and labels between 1999 and 2004, the group was first noticed as the Nigerian Taliban in its December 2003 attack in Yobe state of Nigeria. A series of covert attacks among other operations was also credited this group between 2003 and 2009. In July 2009, Boko Haram led a five days uprising against the Nigerian government in the north-eastern region of the country.² This uprising led to the death of its leader, Yusuf Muhammed, among some 800 people killed.

Ever since 2010, the north-eastern part of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) have witnessed a series of attacks perpetrated by this movement. But Nigeria is not the only victim of the expanding Boko Haram terrorism. Cameroon, Niger, Mali and

Chad also share the burden of their terror attacks. The ideological reason behind the fractionalisation of Boko Haram in January 2012, as stated by the leadership of Boko Haram's breakaway faction, Ansaru, is the fact that the former is timid about the internationalisation of their struggle. Due to this internal tussle among other things, Boko Haram has maintained constant criticism of the United States, Britain, France and Israel among other Western nations. The breakaway faction identified as Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladin Sudan (Ansaru), meaning Supporters of Islam in the Land of Black Africa, has declared a continental Jihad on all governments in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria as its kickoff point.

Ansaru has attracted attention for the series of attacks against international symbolic targets such as the heritage library in Timbuktu and the kidnapping of foreigners in Nigeria. Recent intelligence reports have revealed that Ansaru and Boko Haram have resolved their differences and have resumed consultations and joint operations.

Boko Haram is a typical example of the modernisation of old strategies, transformation of old struggles, redefinition of old grievances and the re-evaluation of old crime in Africa. Sharia advocacy and violence committed by Islamists are not recent in Nigeria. Maitasine preaching and violence in the northern part of Nigeria centred on similar motivations as Boko Haram. The Maitasine uprising in Kano and other parts of the northern region in the early 1980s claimed about 5000 lives.

Beyond this, there have always been different radical youth organisations that believed in using violence to establish an Islamic state in the country³ The Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and Ja'amutu Tajidmul Islam led by Abubakar Mujahid are other radical movements with violent trends. In similar ways, the associated grievances and struggles are not new in the region: underdevelopment, corruption, bad governance, unemployment and sectarian conflict between Christians and Muslims have always been there. Finally, arms trafficking, trans-border

crime, human trafficking, sectarian killings and banditry are not recent phenomena. What makes Boko Haram different? Boko Haram is different because it has been able to modernise these trends and apply a strategy that reflects a certain constituency in the global discourse of terrorism.

Counter-terrorism

In response to this trend, Nigeria and her allies have committed themselves to various counter-terrorism responses. Before 2009/2010 when Boko Haram commenced its acts of terrorism, the development and activities of the group was largely policed. With the rise in the number of attacks by the group, the Nigerian National Assembly passed a law that incriminates acts of terrorism, the Terrorist Prevention Act

“Despite the elaborate responses, resources, time and energy that countering Boko Haram terrorism has received, there has recently been a problem coordinating and politicising responses. Commitment and support seems to be declining at times, and confusion and waywardness are common.”

of 2011 and amended in 2013. Against this background, the government of Nigeria intensified efforts to end Boko Haram terrorism. By late 2011, however, Boko Haram bombed the UN and Police Headquarters in Abuja and threatened the seat of Nigeria's government. As various allies and intergovernmental bodies started to contemplate their responses, Nigeria began the incremental injection of the military in their operational responses against Boko Haram.

The government of Nigeria has thus joined her counterparts in Niger

and Chad within the framework of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to patrol common borders against the growing trans-nationalisation of Boko Haram operations. Within Nigeria, the Nigerian Army, the Navy, the Air force, State Security Service (SSS) and the Police are drawn into the Joint Task Force (JTF). Other agencies such as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Custom and Immigration officials, Port and Aviation Authorities have been allotted one role or the other in the on-going security operations. These measures have been joined by the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a group of volunteers from communities affected by Boko Haram's campaigns of terror. These volunteers help the JTF's operations in gathering intelligence and facilitating the arrests and killings of Boko Haram members, given their familiarity and knowledge of the terrain as well as suspected or known terrorists in their locality. With such arrangements, many Boko Haram members have been arrested and decapitated.

However, Boko Haram has not been deterred by these arrangements. On many occasions, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, has declared the infiltration of his government and security agencies by members of this sect.⁴ This compromises security information and defence equipment. It also explains how insurgents “get important intelligence information on the deployment of the military and movement of troops, information they have used to good effect”⁵ as well as contributing to the insurgents' forceful conscription of about 100 young men in August 2014 from Doron Baga village in Borno State.

The on-going activities of Boko Haram may continue for some time as the commissioned military officers and Defence Ministry have access to large amounts of money to prosecute counter-insurgencies. They would like to see the continuation of this development for financial gains as long as the problem is being politicised and turned into money spinning by the relevant security clusters. Therefore, the government has made efforts to negotiate with the group and has offered amnesty to its members. This

measure was vigorously pursued between mid-2012 and mid-2013, though unsuccessfully. On many occasions, Boko Haram has declared the unconditional release of their imprisoned comrades and the strict implementation of Sharia penal code in the northern region as the only condition for dialogue. But while some factions of the group have proven to be cooperative in dialogue, the leading faction, the Abubarka Shekau group, is least moved. Because of this intransigence, the government of Nigeria has to resort to strategic deterrence or to annihilate the movement in order to end terrorism in the country.

The government of Nigeria moved toward the annihilation of terrorists by proscribing Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist groups. The governments of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and the United States, and intergovernmental bodies, including the European Union and the United Nations Security Council have responded to the two groups with similar proscriptions. In May 2013 the federal government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in the three affected states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states) considered as Boko Haram strongholds. This was followed by the commissioning of these states for counterinsurgency operations under the Defence Headquarters. After the expiration of this emergency rule that lasted six months, the proclamation was further renewed by the National Assembly on the recommendation of the President. However, Boko Haram terrorism has continued undeterred.

The State Department of the US had earlier proscribed Shekau and some other leaders of Boko Haram as International Terrorists, even before the proscription of the group. The Department of State offered to give \$7 million to anyone who could provide information on how to track down Shekau.⁶ Israel, the US and UK have sent technical experts, arms and aid to Nigeria. The UK has even joined Nigeria in carrying out some special operations, such as hostage rescue missions. However, the growing number of countries affected due to

the activities of this sect, including business interests and foreign citizens, has increased Nigeria's allies in countering terrorism. Transnational operations and the connections of this group beyond Nigeria's borders has also created reluctant allies such as Cameroon and France. The Chibok incident has increased the amount of counterterrorism aid that Nigeria attracts, from China, Israel, EU, France, the UK and US. Even with this international line-up against them, Boko Haram has continued.

Conclusion

Boko Haram operations have emerged as one of the growing African constituents and expanding frontiers of terror. This trend has also attracted global attention. Despite the elaborate

“You can never solve any of these problems with military solutions... it is a political issue; it is a social issue; it is an economic issue, and until these issues are addressed, the military can never give you a solution.”

responses, resources, time and energy that countering Boko Haram terrorism has received, there has recently been a problem coordinating and politicising responses. Commitment and support seems to be declining at times, and confusion and waywardness are common. To counter Boko Haram terrorism, however, there is a need for internal rearrangements within the government, political renewal and revitalisation of commitment and support systems in Nigeria. At the international level, there is a need for cooperation, commitment and capacity-building, targeting front line countries.

Earlier this year troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger claimed to have recaptured some areas from Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. In March, 2015 the combined

military forces of Chad and Niger drove the Boko Haram rebels from the towns of Malam Fatouriv and Damasak.

Whilst it is important for military victories to be scored in the long-term the Nigerian government and its allies have to go beyond a military solution. As General Martin Luther Agwai, Nigeria's former Chief of Defence staff said: “You can never solve any of these problems with military solutions... it is a political issue; it is a social issue; it is an economic issue, and until these issues are addressed, the military can never give you a solution.” Buhari, a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections, has dealt with insecurity in Nigeria before. In 1983 he led an army unit that drove out Chadian rebels who had made incursions over the north-eastern Nigerian border. In an ironic reversal of fortunes, the Chadian army is now helping Nigeria to fight Boko Haram insurgents in the same corner of Nigeria. In response, Buhari has called the current Nigerian government's reliance on assistance from a much poorer country like Chad a “big disgrace”.⁷ ■

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- According to the editorial comment of *Tell* magazine (Nigeria) of 19 May, 2014, some northern political elite caused the present insurgency in the northern part of the country. While many of them were in Sudan, Yemen and other Islamic countries for religious indoctrination, very many leaders in the region from 1960, when Nigeria received its political independence, did not put in place any developmental programme to empower the masses. Some were mere gatekeepers. For more information on this, see Professor Ango Abdullahi interview in *The News* (Nigeria) June 2, 2014, pp. 14-20.
- See details in Agbo, Anayochukwu. 2014. "Boko Haram and the Enemies Within." In *Tell* (Nigeria) April 7, pp. 22-27.
- There are various versions of information on Abubakar Shekau, the Nigerian security sector believes that the name is just a title among members of Boko Haram. They maintained that the real Shekau was long ago killed in military exercises in 2013. For more information on this, see Odeh, Nehru. 2014. "The Ghost Called Shekau." In *Tell* 26 May, pp. 26-27. The position of these authors is that Nigeria's government may try to showcase a functional military power by telling the world that war on terror is on-going positively. The argument is defensive and very illogical. The reality is that things are not going well with their operations.
- The Guardian*, UK, 11 March 2015.

GLOBAL POLITICS

Bettering Global Governance



21st century global politics requires cooperation more than competition and interdependence more than independence.

By Jeffrey Sehume

International relations in the 20th century were largely determined by politics of economic hegemonies and military confrontation signified by the two world wars and a cold war. After 1945, the philosophical role and operational functions of multilateral bodies like the United Nations (UN) and World Bank (WB) were influenced by western countries, in particular the United States. However, in the

21st century with complex and interconnected crises, global politics has necessitated a major paradigm shift.

The survival of the planet and its assorted species demands recognition of multipolar power centres that requires the involvement of diverse stakeholders – in government, non-state actors, industry, and academia – to chart sustainable consensual solutions.

Since the 1990s, the world has been transformed from a bipolar world dominated by Cold War superpowers, to a polycentric world with multiple centres of power. Globalisation has broken down the barriers between internal and external national interests, regional and international demands, local and global policies. But while globalisation has enabled economic integration with both positive and

negative effects, the integration of global politics faces serious challenges. Bettering intra- and inter-national governance presents a dilemma in that “we cannot always draw a clear distinction between domestic politics, i.e., politics within the state, and international politics, i.e. politics among states” (Frankel 1964: xi). The debate continues on how to manage national interests without threatening or destabilising world peace and prosperity.

The enduring high rates of poverty and inequality have highlighted how Joseph Stiglitz in his *Globalization and its Discontents* was prescient in warning that the “IMF’s policies... failed to allow for desirable government interventions in the market, measures which can guide economic growth and make everyone better off” (2002: xii-xiii). In this respect, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has offered an example of how direct and active state regulation is necessary to temper and manage the free market rationality.

While progress has been made in the economic sphere, significant problems remain in the global political sphere in terms of bettering inter- and intra-governance. The world remains unsafe and unequal for citizens suffering from internecine conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak), Democratic Republic of Congo and North Africa. What is the solution? Should the world community endorse unilateralism, in the name of American Exceptionalism, which the United States and NATO believed justified their interventions in Libya and Uganda? Or should we rather seek mechanisms to empower multilateral institutions like the Arab League, ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) to address issues that directly affect their member states?

The critique by Russian President Putin in *The New York Times* (11 September 2013) is exemplary. He reminds us that the “United Nations’ founders understood that decisions affecting war and peace should happen only by consensus” and that it is “extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation.”

If 20th century international relations were influenced by the reigning superpower from the West, what is the responsibility of the PRC as the economic hegemon in the 21st century? China has to be mindful of the recommendation from the October 2013 report on *Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture*. This Report specifies “the need for decisions enjoying universal legitimacy, norms setting predictable patterns of behaviour based on reciprocity, and mutually agreed instruments to resolve disputes” (EUISS 2010: 11-13). Global governance “includes all the institutions, regimes, processes, partnerships, and networks that contribute to collective action and problem solving at the international level... Governance differs from government, which implies

“Since the 1990s, the world has been transformed from a bipolar world dominated by Cold War superpowers, to a polycentric world with multiple centres of power. Globalisation has broken down the barriers between internal and external national interests, regional and international demands, local and global policies.”

sovereign prerogatives and hierarchical authority. Global governance does not equate to world government, which would be virtually impossible for the foreseeable future, if ever”.

This matter is raised in view of the prominent role of China in global governance institutions and the demands on its growing humanitarian peacekeeping missions in Africa and the rest of the world.

In a changed and changing world order, geopolitical rivalry should not translate or degenerate into open

conflict but should spur everyone to endeavour to operate within the regulations and rules of the international institutions. After all, there are more benefits for promoting political relations based on a win-win game rather than reducing competition to a zero-sum game where everybody eventually loses out, more especially developing countries.

Win-win situations in political and economic affairs are preferable since they promote shared public goods. Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’¹ approach offers a solution since it emphasises human values and ethical behaviour. The foreign policy analyst Yan Xuetong understands effective soft power as “the battle for people’s hearts and minds” grounded on “the country that displays more humane authority”. Accordingly, bettering institutions for ordering global politics looks beyond military might, economic hegemony, technological or educational superiority and more towards shared humane ideals and materialist standards.

This is said in light of the fact that global governance still operates under unequal norms. “The United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund are all structured hierarchically and are not equal. The United Nations distinguishes among permanent members of the Security Council, nonpermanent members of the Security Council, and ordinary member states. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have voting structures dependent on the contributions of the members” (Bell 2010: 11).

Lessons from and for China

What opportunities exist for China to influence multilateral institutions?

Firstly, the debate on global politics should shift from talking about ‘clash of civilisations’ to ‘clash of cognitions’. The world is no longer easily divided, as some used to imagine, into chaos versus civilisation, cultured and uncivilised, or East and West. Instead the welfare of national, regional and global peace and security is linked to ethical regional and global political leadership. As Yan says, “political leadership is the key to national power and morality is an essential part of political leadership.

Economic and military might matter as components of national power, but they are secondary to political leaders who act, (at least partly) in accordance with moral norms" (Bell 2010: 2).² More importantly, the desired synthesis of leadership and morality is championed in the polycentric 21st century because our collective crises demands combined joint-problem solving frameworks.

Secondly, the interlinked crises in the world are complex. Not being able to master complexity decides the destiny of nations. As Joseph A Tainter argues: "complexity is a primary factor linking problem solving to the success or collapse of societies and institutions... For nearly three millennia scholars and philosophers have sought to understand why societies fail to preserve themselves" (Tainter 200: 6).

Fortunately, serious research has been done on this question of complexity and nation's destiny. For instance, October 2013 saw the release of *The Report of the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations* boasting in its commission luminaries like Michelle Bachelet, Trevor Manuel, Kishore Mabhubani, and Amartya Sen. The prognosis from this Report states that "the increasing short-termism of modern politics and our collective inability to break the gridlock which undermines attempts to address the biggest challenges that will shape the future" has to be confronted head-on. They say this for the simple reason that, in the long run, "This could be our best century ever or our worst" (2013: 6).

What practical recommendations do they propose? The Commission's Agenda for the Long-Term is structured around five practical futures:

1. Creative coalitions requiring multi-stakeholder partnerships.
2. Open and reinvigorated institutions for the modern operating environment.
3. Revaluing the future by reducing bias against future generations.
4. Investing in younger generations to promote a more inclusive and empowered society.
5. Establishing a common platform of understanding to address today's global challenges... through

renewed dialogue on an updated set of shared global values around which a unified and enduring pathway can be built.

21st century global politics requires cooperation more than competition and interdependence more than independence.

Conclusions

As a rising superpower following in the footsteps of global hegemony like the Roman, British and American Empires, China stands at a crossroad. It can either replicate the rise, decline and fall of its antecedents or chart a sensibly different course in order to better compete sustainably in global politics.

“In this respect, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has offered an example of how direct and active state regulation is necessary to temper and manage the free market rationality.”

Firstly, China's peaceful rise provides a promising beginning in not seeking to be messianic and aiming to convert people to its worldview, philosophies and governing values. What it does request of the world about how to interact with its civilisational model is understanding and tolerance. Secondly, China should recognise that military might or economic strength should be utilised prudently in a 21st century of polycentric power centres. Thirdly, ideological fundamentalism is irrelevant in an open bazaar of ideologies that range in values and geographic orientation. Fourthly, Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions (such as the World Trade

Organisation) to promote the country's development of global power status" (Ikenberry 2008: 4). Fifthly, since trappings of a globalised capitalist society have been accompanied by endemic problems, China has to prize Tu Weiming's 'humanistic vision' founded on promotion of 'dialogue among civilisations' which directly aims "to transcend anthropocentrism, instrumental rationality, and aggressive individualism" (2006: 1-2).

The clash of cognitions rather than civilisations characterising our century presents both opportunities and hurdles for the Middle Kingdom as a "great global game-changer" whose impact is already beginning to be experienced around the world in business, politics, financial trade, culture and technological spheres.

The words of the Martiniquan Aimé Césaire in *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal* ring as relevant as ever, "the work of man is only just beginning and it remains to man to conquer all the violence entrenched in the recesses of his passion. And no race possesses the monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of force, and there is a place for all at the rendezvous of victory" (quoted in Said 2012: 589).

At heart of global politics is an urgent need for the harmonisation of international norms and standards in global institutions, applying the kind of communitarian morality and humanistic vision articulated in the innovative comparative study of Confucianism and the normative ethic of uBuntu by Daniel A. Bell and Thaddeus Metz (2012). ■

Footnotes

¹ Nye's soft power is contrasted with Sheng Deng's: "Sheng Deng on the other hand, traces the concept of soft power in ancient Chinese philosophy, arguing that the idea has been embedded in Chinese culture throughout history. The Confucian idea of emphasizing the 'limitation and regulation of power' and Sun Tzu's *Art of War* that advocates 'attack(ing) the enemy's mind rather than attacking his fortified cities' provide further proof of Chinese soft power pre-dating Joseph Nye" (Rosario 2011: 4-5).

² For instance, Yan distinguishes between the foreign policy and moral integrity of two US presidents: "if one compares F.D. Roosevelt as president of the United States during World War II and the recent George W. Bush, we can see what Xunzi (ca. 313-238 BCE) means about the moral power of the leader playing a role in establishing international norms and changing the international system. Roosevelt's belief in world peace was the impetus for the foundation of the United Nations after World War II, whereas Bush Christian fundamentalist beliefs led to the United States continually flouting international norms, which resulted in a decline of the international nonproliferation regime" (Bell, 2010: 6).

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Are State Owned Companies in Africa a lost cause?



The starting point is to transform the quality of personal and collective leadership of these key corporate governance players. The leader's spirit and quality provide the light that motivates others – mere talk will not make a difference.

By Lynn McGregor

The reason for this question is that the majority of SOCs are failing or bankrupt. Why are they failing? Does it matter? If it does matter, can something be done about it?

We all depend on vital infrastructure services – such as electricity, telecommunications, refuse collection, housing, transport and the news – both for the quality of our lives and to grow the economy. Most of these services are provided by State Owned Companies (SOCs), and the very fabric of our lives depends on how successfully they are governed.

African countries are among emerging markets driven to compete for trade and investment in a highly competitive, volatile world economy. Unless they have healthy and reliable infrastructures, they will be left behind.

The problem is that time is running out.

What is the state of SOCs?

Six years ago I ran a series of colloquia for business leaders about corporate governance – organised for the Centre of Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch. The two main issues proved to be similar: lack of competent people to govern and run companies, and the impact of growing corruption.

Two years ago with Nozizwe Madlala Routledge, a former Deputy Minister in South Africa, and I modified a ratings matrix to apply to State Owned Entities. Key SOEs were then rated according to publicly available information, but we discovered that there was not enough information to understand what was really happening. Even some of the companies that scored highly were facing charges for bribery, corruption and inaccurate figures. We also realised that to understand the corporate governance of SOEs and SOCs, we needed to have a better grasp of the relationship between Government and the organisations.

SOCs are different from the private sector because their main shareholder is Government, which has a semi-hands-on relationship with companies in terms of funding, auditing and selection of board members and CEO. SOCs often have an additional political mandate to contribute to the social

development of the country. Boards of SOCs have slightly different roles, as they are not as autonomous but still expected to contribute strategic direction, ensure conformance with regulatory requirements and make sure that the CEO runs the SOC well and delivers financial and other targets on time.

Since these projects, I have run workshops where I met a number of Chairpeople, CEOs and directors from other African countries and found that the patterns are similar: successful companies are in the minority, and failing companies are in the majority.

Some of the common indicators of successful SOCs are:

- Promised targets delivered on time – eg. services/products, financial results etc

“Their boards often lack the sound business judgement or regulatory expertise to monitor them, or to know when to intervene. All this can go hand in hand with endemic corruption.”

- A company in good legal and economic standing, with a sound basis for the future
- Happy stakeholders, and customers with few complaints
- Board, executive and company are well run, well trained and have good reputations
- Clean audits
- External investors prepared to pay up to 30% premium.

Some of the common indicators of failing SOCs are:

- Failure to deliver targets. Often bankrupt. Inaccurate or dishonest reports
- Crisis management. Unpleasant surprises. Short-termism
- Unhappy public. Signs of social unrest
- Scandals, court cases. Company,

board or executives guilty of corruption

- Constant turnover of board members and directors. No continuity
- Lack of external funders, or investors withdrawing, because of lack of confidence

Why are so many SOCs failing?

The same two key reasons continue to be cited: growing corruption and too few people sufficiently competent to govern or run companies. And, because neither of the above have been resolved in the last five to ten years, it is reasonable to assume that: many in power do not really care; and that those on the ground have become accustomed to, and expect, sub-optimal standards.

For those who do care, it might be useful to reflect on the main problems before exploring possible solutions.

Sound corporate governance ensures that all the checks and balances are in place for a company to produce cost-effective services in accordance with the law, to maintain a good strategic future, and to remain financially healthy. Government departments need to be capable of signing off on sound financial plans and feasible budgets, and able to monitor financial performance. They must achieve all this on schedule, so companies can rely on the right funding to go forward.

This sounds obvious, but it only happens with efficient government where the departments work well together. Government committees are expected to nominate board members who can govern, and CEOs who can deliver. They need enough business and technical knowledge to select the right people, or they will foster inadequate boards that cannot make informed, independent and balanced decisions on time.

The degree to which many government officials or boards of companies actually understand the value and practice of corporate governance is, however, questionable. Too many CEOs are not properly monitored or supported to avoid such mistakes as: unreasonable and unpopular price hikes; confusion between bail-outs and profits; and



misjudged financial and company reports. Even while failing to deliver, they continue to receive huge salaries and bonuses. Their boards often lack the sound business judgement or regulatory expertise to monitor them, or to know when to intervene. All this can go hand in hand with endemic corruption.

As Kofi Annan warned us, “we are in danger of leaving a terrible legacy to future generations”.

Lack of moral norms breeds corruption

More than \$148bn (£93bn) is lost to corruption in Africa every year, according to the African Union: much of it through public officials employed by ‘democratically’ elected governments. This was endorsed by Mr Nombembe, former South African Auditor General, who in 2013 said that over ZAR 32 billion were “lost, wasted on unauthorised, irregular and fruitless expenditure...Due to the lack of public outcry and activism, the government was not dealing decisively with guilty parties...We should not have a situation whereby there is no knowledge of where money was spent by any government entity or departments.”

When society colludes with corruption, there is less money to invest in infrastructure and SOCs become cash-cows to line the pockets

of the few. Cronyism, fraud, illegal deals, bribery, blackmail and cover-ups – even death threats – lead to an atmosphere of elitism, distrust, secrecy and fear. Plots are hatched to get rid of directors who insist on honesty and the rule of law, and they are replaced by incompetent puppet directors serving those in power. Former Nigerian President Obasanjo warned that: “when the guard becomes the thief, nothing is safe, secure or protected.”

The symptoms of corruption in SOCs are clear: scandals and court cases outweigh good news; service delivery is poor and unreliable, for an insecure and angry population; corporations are fined for bullying and anti-competitive practices; morale is low with little hope for the future. Eventually services run dry and, in some cases, whole regions become destitute.

Over fifty years after decolonisation

“Boards that act as a powerful, cohesive whole can resolve corporate governance issues through rigorous discussion and collective decision-making.”

started in Africa, the situation is much better for millions, but not for all. Democratic government, social development programmes and better education mean that more enjoy the opportunity to thrive. However, the lack of moral sense that permits widespread corruption is still a serious cause for concern. Hopefully, the plea of our Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa for public servants who are not corrupt will not fall on deaf ears.

Once any country develops a reputation for corruption, sound investors take their money elsewhere, leaving the nation’s public and private institutions up for grabs. On the other hand, in view of the potential in the African market, such investors are prepared to pay up to 30% premium for well-governed companies.

How much hope is there?

There is much scope for pessimism, but also some for cautious optimism, and I still believe it is possible to create successful SOCs. Though less newsworthy, there are a significant number of competent individuals who really do care and are responsible for good progress in their countries and across Africa.

There are at least three main reasons for such optimism:

- Government standards improving in some countries
- Signs of greater competence in government and on boards
- Some African nations seem ready to move to a higher stage of development.

In terms of government, some African countries have improved their corporate governance, company legislation and codes of conduct. Some government departments have become more efficient and enjoy constructive working relationships with boards. Better board appointments are improving board and executive performance. As major shareholders, some government departments have developed successful working models that encourage these improved results.

In terms of greater competence: the more experienced Chairs, CEOs and directors play a mentoring role. Boards that act as a powerful, cohesive whole can resolve corporate governance



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3 Help get people moving by supporting physical activity programs in every country where we do business:

- Enabling 39 500 young South Africans and 1 500 school children to participate in physical activity programs.

4 Market responsibly:

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issues through rigorous discussion and collective decision-making. They are better equipped to inform government before policy or strategic decisions are made. Fewer CEOs are making excuses for poor performance and talking more about improving results.

In addition, there is a growing number of experts and institutions that can provide corporate governance knowledge and skills training to upgrade performance. Some have spent many years developing effective methodologies to improve thinking and effectiveness at board and executive levels.

As some African countries prepare to move to the next stage of development, we should ask: what are the lessons of a post liberation government? How can African companies compete more successfully in a global context? How can accumulated knowledge be best utilised?

As members of the OAU are aware, there is now a considerable body of experience, expertise and learning to answer such questions – and a growing population of competent Ministers, DGs, Chairpersons and CEOs of SOCs, capable of leading the changes needed to accelerate competencies and to create an inspiring and motivating culture of integrity.

Inspired and competent leaders can move mountains

To quote Kofi Annan again, “Crucially, we have to have the confidence to expand much more rapidly in terms of what we have seen and know works.”

Improving the collective and individual quality of leadership is key to providing more successful SOCs. I suggest the first leadership group should comprise:

- The Minister of the Government Department responsible for the SOC
- The Director General or equivalent of the Government Department
- The Chair of the Nomination Committee
- The Company chairperson
- The CEO

These are the key roleplayers who need to overview and supervise the processes that ensure effective

corporate governance. When these five people work in separate silos, however, the process becomes fragmented, and working relationships strained. They can be far more effective working together, in the same direction, with the same basic understanding of corporate governance, and focussed on the same common goals. To create desired results leaders need to change gear.

The starting point is to transform the quality of personal and collective leadership of these key corporate governance players. The leader’s spirit and quality provide the light that motivates others – mere talk will not make a difference. Significantly better results require inspirational and competent leaders, able to give and receive of their best.

It is indeed possible to upgrade leadership by giving it priority and setting aside time and money to develop the basic qualities and skills necessary for effective 21st century leadership.

The secret is to work in a safe, reflective environment as far removed as possible from the bureaucracies of day-to-day business. Best results come from standing back in order to gain perspective, simplicity, clarity, mutual understanding, intelligence, wisdom, creativity and genuine commitment.

Yes, it takes time to learn how to save time.

Collective leadership means much more than boring meetings

This article began with the question: “Are State Owned Companies a lost cause?” The answer is that it is possible to turn underperforming companies around as long as people truly have the will to do it, and are prepared to take the lead to make it happen.

Collective leadership can be so powerful – for good or for evil – that the ground must be prepared, seeds planted and young growth carefully nurtured to ensure real, sustainable success. To make a positive difference in difficult circumstances, it is not enough just to do more of the same.

Only when the questions posed below have been asked and answered, is the group really ready to move forward – calling on the help of high

level, inspirational facilitators to make sure that the process stays right on target.

1. Common understanding of the value and nature of corporate governance

- What is the group’s corporate governance role?
- Does everyone understand the value and nature of corporate governance and how the parts work together?
- Why are key corporate governance principles important?
- What is needed for everyone to commit to them in practice?

2. Tap into deepest desires of what the group really wants to achieve

In May 2002 Nelson Mandela said: “What counts in life is not the mere fact that we have lived. It is what difference we have made to the lives of others that will determine the significance of the life we lead.” The impossible can only be achieved through stretching the realm of possibilities.

- What is our most inspiring vision of corporate governance at its very best?

3. Focus on what most needs to be done to make the biggest difference

- What is really important?
- What takes up a lot of time but achieves very little?

4. Learn from successes and failures and celebrate successes

- Celebrate just how much has already been achieved – and build on it! ■

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
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One Africa, One Voice



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Despite a restrictive mandate as an advisory and consultative body, the PAP is continuing to play a key role in promoting democracy, good governance and the harmonisation of laws on the continent. This will lead to more direct investment, development and prosperity for the peoples of Africa.

The objectives of the PAP are mainly to promote the principles of human rights, democracy, good governance, peace and security. The PAP is also expected to promote collective self-reliance, strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa.

Structure

The highest decision-making organ of the PAP is in the Plenary Session. However, the main work which results in the decisions is performed by the 10 Permanent Committees, which meet to oversee the work of the AU.

The Bureau of the PAP, which is responsible for the management of the Parliament, is composed of the President and four Vice-Presidents, who represent the five regions of Africa. The current President of the PAP is the Hon Bethel Nnaemeka Amadi,

from Nigeria. The First Vice-President is the Hon Roger Nkodo Dang from Cameroon, the Second Vice-President is the Hon Suilma Hay Emhamed Saleh from Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, the Third Vice-President is the Hon Loide Kasingo from Namibia and the Fourth Vice-President is the Hon Dr Ashebir Woldegiorgis Gayo from Ethiopia.

The Bureau is supported by a Secretariat comprising of permanent staff members drawn from all over Africa. The Head of the Secretariat is Adv Zwelethu Madasa from South Africa.

Transformation

The Assembly of Heads of States and Government at the recent June 2014 AU Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, took an epoch making decision regarding the status of the PAP. The Assembly approved the transformation of PAP from an Advisory and Consultative Body to a continental legislative body with competence to make laws subject to the approval of the Assembly. The approval of the revised PAP protocol is, however, subject to the signing and ratification by the requisite number of states before coming into

force. The PAP will henceforth have the ability to contribute meaningfully to the economic integration process of the continent by providing the necessary legislative mechanisms and framework. ■

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THROUGH A CREATIVE LENS

UBUNTU ...

(an isiXhosa/isiZulu concept that espouses "the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity")

By Afzal Moolla

We are here today,
and today we pause to remember those who passed before
us.

We walk along many paths,
crisscrossing myriad strands that bind us as one,
strands of conscience,
painfully forged by the ancestors.
We imbibe the spirit of uBuntu,
giving thanks to those who shed blood and sweat and tears,
selflessly guiding us ever onwards,
onwards, yes,
yet ever conscious,
that we are all,
all of us,
hewn from the winds,
forged in the depths,
our jagged edges far, far more radiant,
than dead flawless diamonds.

We are here today,
and we stand as one,
together braving the thunder rolling across the plains,
soaking in the rejuvenating blessings,
bathing us in the rains,
the heartbeat of Africa,
throbbing within us all,

whispering,
guiding,
comforting us,
that,
whenever we fall,
we need only stretch out our hands,
to be lifted up again,
helped back on our feet,
to stand once again,
together,
always, always together,
tall.
The spirit of uBuntu,
flows through our collective veins,
urging us to see,
to hear,
to share the light of peace and of unity,
for we are all,
all of us,
sculpted from one whole,
one mould,
far, far more priceless,
than dead nuggets of gold.
"I am because we are".
Ngiyabonga, Nkosiyama ...

Afzal Moolla has been writing poetry for many years, but recently he has become more widely recognised as a growing talent, with *The Thinker* and a number of other publications and websites publishing his work.


PEACE IS A TREE

Dr David Adams

“What is peace?”
 We asked the old men.
 They looked down at their parched hands,
 their eyes hidden.
 “For years,” they said.
 “We have known only war.
 Even the chickens and dogs
 had to hide their heads.”
 Outside the heat was silent,
 oppressive.
 Then one raised his heavy eyes,
 Shook his head sadly
 And in a distant voice
 began to speak.:
 “Peace is a tree.
 Its roots are deep in our land
 But its branches are barren of fruit

And its roots are starved for water.
 For years it has suffered the drought of war.
 Now people with foreign tongues
 have come to cut it down,
 To take its wood for whatever reasons.
 We must save the tree.
 We must give it water.
 Let it grow in the sun and rain.
 If we respect it,
 It will bring us the wisdom of our ancestors.
 It will give us fruit again
 and fuel for the fire,
 And our children will play in its shade.
 That is peace.”
 Outside the tears were falling.
 The rains had returned to Mozambique.

Dr David Adams is the coordinator of the *Culture of Peace News Network*. From 1992 to 2001 he worked at UNESCO where he was the Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace. He was Professor of Psychology for 23 years at Wesleyan University, and previously at Yale University, where he was a specialist on the brain mechanisms of aggressive behaviour, the evolution of war, and the psychology of peace activists.





SKA puts South Africa and the continent on the global stage

Dr Bernie Fanaroff, DST Minister Naledi Pandor and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa attending the unveiling of the 2nd of 64 MeerKAT Antennas.

By DST

The world's largest and most sensitive radio telescope, the Square Kilometre Array (SKA), took a major step towards the construction phase, with the SKA Board of Directors unanimously agreeing to move the project forward to its final pre-construction phase.

At a meeting in Manchester, UK, where the SKA Organisation has its headquarters, the Board agreed to the design of the R650 million first phase of the SKA. The design – consisting of two complementary world-class instruments – one in Australia, and one in South Africa, is now defined. Both the locations are expected to deliver exciting and transformational science.

"I was impressed by the strong support from the Board and the momentum to take the project forward," said Prof Philip Diamond, Director General of the SKA Organisation. "The SKA will fundamentally change our understanding of the Universe. We are talking about a facility that will be many times better than anything else out there."

Currently consisting of 11 nations, the SKA Organisation has spent the last 20 months in a rigorous and extremely challenging science-driven engineering process, with teams from around the world working to refine the design of SKA1.

In the first phase of the project,

South Africa will host about 200 parabolic antennas or dishes (similar to, but much larger than a standard domestic satellite dish), and Australia more than 100 000 dipole antennas, which resemble domestic TV aerials.

"This will build on South Africa's considerable investment in science and in particular radio astronomy. It's something we can rightly be very proud of," said Dr Phil Mjwara, Director-General of the South African Department of Science and Technology. "Being involved in this exciting global science project spanning two continents, alongside our colleagues from Australia and around the world, is great for the country and for the African continent."

The SKA will address fundamental unanswered questions about our Universe, including how the first stars and galaxies formed after the Big Bang, how galaxies have evolved since then, the role of magnetism in the cosmos, the nature of gravity, and the possibility of life beyond Earth.

For South Africa, its successful bid to host a large part of the SKA was a huge feather in its cap, as it placed the country's burgeoning radio astronomy sector on the global stage.

Africa has never been considered a global player in the science and technology domain, nor has it been seen as a destination for frontier sciences. However, the SKA project has played a great role in changing this perception, with South Africa showing that it has the acumen, skill and potential to construct a radio telescope that will move the discourse on the birth of the universe forward.

On 28 February 2015, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa visited the site outside Carnarvon (near Kimberley) where the SKA and its 64-dish precursor, the MeerKAT, will be constructed. The MeerKAT radio telescope will be integrated into the SKA during the first phase of construction.

The Deputy President's visit, hosted by Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, took place days before the SKA Organisation announced that it was moving towards the construction phase.

The SKA project will not only benefit South Africa, but also the country's neighbours.

"It is particularly significant that eight other African countries will be involved in hosting the second phase of the project," said the Deputy President. "This promises to establish Africa as a hub for expanding scientific inquiry."

South Africa's SKA African partner countries are Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia. Zambia's High Commissioner and Mozambique's Ambassador accompanied the Deputy President on his visit, as did various ambassadors from Europe and China, the Northern Cape Premier, local mayors, and ministers of the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating



The 2nd MeerKAT Antenna unveiled by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Minister of Science and Technology was named in honour of Dr Bernie Fanaroff.

Committee.

In appreciating the broader benefits of this project to South Africa, government has identified the construction of the SKA as a strategic infrastructure project, which is overseen by the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Committee.

Deputy President Ramaphosa emphasised the benefits that hosting the SKA would bring, and urged South Africans to take full advantage of this huge project.

"The 699 students and postdoctoral fellows that have been supported through the SKA South Africa bursary and fellowship programme are at the forefront of this effort. This project is developing technical and artisanal skills, and producing a new cohort of young scientists", said the Deputy President.

"Scientists are not born," he added. "They are made. They are the products of a society that values knowledge, promotes learning and rewards innovation. They are products of a society that reads, schools that work, and parents that are engaged in the intellectual development of their children."

The Deputy President described the project as significant in government's efforts to alleviate poverty and improve the lives of people, and said that it would transform South Africa's economy through human capital development, innovation, value addition, industrialisation and

entrepreneurship.

He said that it would "create jobs not only during the next decade or so of construction, but also for the next 50 years of operation and maintenance." As he explained, "Science and technology can do much in the fight against poverty, unemployment and inequality."

The Deputy President commended Dr Bernie Fanaroff, Director of SKA South Africa, as well as the Minister and former Ministers of Science and Technology, for their sterling work in the development of the SKA project. The second MeerKAT dish was named in honour of Dr Fanaroff.

Minister Pandor vowed that the SKA project would meet its deadlines. "By the end of 2016, 64 of the MeerKAT dishes will be ready for commissioning, and by 2017 the telescope will be ready to do science."

"We are proud that, even before the MeerKAT has been completed, five years of observing time on it have already been allocated to more than 500 radio astronomers, 85 of them from Africa. This demonstrates massive confidence in South Africa's scientific infrastructure, in which the Department of Science and Technology continues to invest." ■

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
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Our African Ancestors



By Mhlahi Stwayi

It has long been advanced that all life began in Africa, since Africa has the longest record of life activity in comparison to other continents. Furthermore it has been argued that modern day European people who possess Neanderthal DNA and features – brawny, big-browed – and other genes that specifically affect the skin and hair are the offspring of Africans who migrated from Africa over 60 000 years ago. Lastly, the genetically oldest people in the world are considered to be the San people, who also boast the oldest language in the world, and of course the San people also come from Africa. Thus the assumption that all life began in Africa may be justified on biological and other grounds.

The oldest empires in the world include the Egyptian, Roman and Greek empires, all of which were later subdivided according to race. However, all have one unique thing in common, and that is the original dominant race in these empires was the 'black' race which was later overthrown or dethroned by the 'white' race. Ancient tradition states that the first pharaoh (king) of Kemet (also known as 'black land' or Ancient Egypt), was Pharaoh Menes, who was honoured with having unified Upper and Lower Kemet into a single kingdom. This pharaoh would begin a series of

dynasties that ruled Kemet for the next three millennia.

In Pliny's account, Menes was credited with being the inventor of writing in Kemet. In the Ancient Greek Empire the name Pelasgians was used by ancient Greek writers to refer to populations that preceded the white Hellenes in Greece. During the classical period, populations identified as 'Pelasgian' spoke a language that at the time Greeks identified as not Greek.

It is also argued that black people in general were foundational in the demographics of Rome. It is generally known that the kingdom that preceded Rome, Etruria, was basically built by Etruscans, a black and brown people who had migrated to the Roman peninsula via North Africa. Many of the ancient Bishops of the Orthodox Church were from this branch of people, and their iconic images still exist today to bear testimony to their ethnicity. So we can conclude that Africans are the original inhabitants of this world.

Therefore if the original humans were 'black,' where did the other races come from?

The birth of other racial groups was seen by some as the birth of the Gentiles (Ancient Hebrew word, loosely translated as meaning the term

"outsiders"). African people, for various reasons which related to religious beliefs and philosophical ideology, cast the Gentiles out of their communities, because some believed that they had unnatural and counterproductive features that threatened the natural order of creation, in its entirety.

The casting out of these people, combined with a natural desire to explore and look for good places to live when a particular social group or habitat became inhospitable, gave birth to modern day nations.

Ancient homo-sapiens first began to leave Africa at about 60,000 B.C. These Africans had two great migrations east. The first migration saw blacks with straight hair, taking a route along the coast of Asia, and then island-hopping across the Indian Ocean to Australia. The Australian Aboriginals then made their way to South America. Their descendants are called "Luzia" in Brazil.

In the second migration event, blacks from Africa, some with straight hair and 'Mongol features' took an inland route through southern Asia and on up to China (about 50-45,000 B.C.) where they settled. Included with this group, were straight haired Blacks without Mongol features – now called 'Dravidians' who stayed close to Africa, and settled in India and other areas of southern Asia.

Also included with this second group, were albinos (blacks without pigmentation), who were probably motivated by a quest for relief from the heat and burning sunshine of southern Africa - and relief from the torment heaped upon them by other Africans. Even today, superstitious blacks of southern Africa maim and mutilate albinos in the belief that their body parts process magical properties, which they use in rituals. These great migrational events were initiated by both Africans who were unhappy with their societies and African peasants seeking healthier hunting grounds, together with the Africans who had been cast out.

To build and sustain harmonious relations cutting across race, class, religion and ethnicity we should all recognise that we share a common humanity with its roots in the African continent. ■



African Political Ethics and Terrorism

By Percy Makholwa

The view that Africans must impose counter war and violence on terror groups as a reasonable defense against terrorism is wrong. The more reasonable course of action is an acceptance that present challenges are intertwined with accepting a democratic model of insiders and outsiders that can work for Africa.

Furthermore the 'violence to deal with terror' argument is popular only because defense analysts and experts who believe in 'war on terror' are actually trying to impose a 'Pax' Americana – US-led or US-imposed peace.

Dr Ali Mazrui and Adekeye Adebajo have been leading the call for Pax Africana, stating that Africans should

solve their own civil war and general political violence problems. A major part of this call involves a rejection of foreign doctrines like military interventions to create peace and democracy.

With regard to terrorism and conflict, Pax Americana can never be relevant as has been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Pax Americana will not prescribe multi-ethnic power-sharing and co-operation, especially if there are oil and other natural resource interests at stake.

Pax Africana is naturally about power-sharing, and is a significant counter to the single party political system.

Alas, Pax Africana has not worked

owing to tendencies of power sharing arrangements being abused. The lack of trust is because Africans are too familiar with the inappropriate package of democracy from their erstwhile colonising metropolises.

For Pax Africana to work the metropolises should not be able to dictate candidates in national elections and terms for agreement in a conflict situation.

In the west there is a growing tendency to equate Muslims with terrorism: Ali Mazrui said "...Muslims are not unique in resorting to terrorism in a bid to redress wrongs perpetrated against them... But terrorism by Muslims receives far more publicity than terrorism by others... Black Africa is caught up in the crossfire between Middle Eastern Militancy and the American War on terror."

So caught up in this crossfire is Africa. Thousands of Nigerians died at the hands of Boko Haram – a movement that is now using children as suicide bombers – and we are not asking the right questions about who is supporting Boko Haram, and about what they want and why.

We should be guided by the political ethics of great Africans and pioneers of Pax Africana like Mandela and Nyerere who called on belligerents to put down their guns and find negotiated solutions. Any resort to United States and French drones and military advisors is historic ineptitude on our part.

The solution is in our reach as Africans, as it is even for the Nigerians on the Boko Haram crisis. Mazrui says: "Fifty years of Nigeria's independence have created more numerous rich Christians than rich Muslims... Petro wealth has resulted.... in gross economic inequalities between social classes, regions, ethnic groups and religious denominations... but... there is still time for religious, political and educational leaders in Nigeria to seek solutions to... political and sectarian grievances... there is need to restore self-worth and a widening of opportunities for disadvantaged young people in Nigeria... this would be the best antidote to political and religious extremism in the unfolding decades of Nigeria's history...". ■



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