

The Thinker

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A PAN - AFRICAN QUARTERLY FOR THOUGHT LEADERS



NEW

NEW CITIES NEW ECONOMIES

FOCUS: NEW CITIES NEW ECONOMIES

WITH GUEST EDITOR DR. TSHILIDZA RATSHITANGA



INTERVIEW: DALE MCKINLEY



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
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


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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

The University of Johannesburg acquired *The Thinker* in April 2019 from Dr Essop Pahad. Over the last decade, *The Thinker* has gained a reputation as a journal that explores Pan-African issues across fields and times. Ronit Frenkel, as the incoming editor, plans on maintaining the pan-African scope of the journal while increasing its coverage into fields such as books, art, literature and popular cultures. *The Thinker* is a 'hybrid' journal, publishing both journalistic pieces with more academic articles and contributors can now opt to have their submissions peer reviewed. We welcome Africa-centred articles from diverse perspectives, in order to enrich both knowledge of the continent and of issues impacting the continent.



Prof Ronit Frenkel

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Tshilidzi is a social activist. He is an active member of South Africa's ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). Previously he served as Secretary General of the Congress of South Africa Students (Cosas) and also Secretary General of the South African Students Congress (Sasco), both of which are ANC aligned Progressive Student Movements. Dr. Ratshitanga also served the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in Gauteng Province and was also a Commissioner of the ANC's 2012 National Congress Elections Commission.

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He was the head of the regional underground structure in Botswana, Head of the Department of Arts and Culture; member of the Regional Political Military committee in Botswana and in Britain. He was the cultural attaché of the ANC, in Britain and Europe. From 1990, he was head of Arts and Culture of the ANC in South Africa. He spearheaded the organization and mobilization of cultural workers through major festivals, symposiums, conferences in Botswana (1982), Amsterdam (1987) London (1990), Johannesburg (1993) which resulted in the formation of National organizations of writers, musicians, theatre workers, dancers, photographers and filmmakers.

He is a writer of a number of novels, poetry collections,

essays and plays, and has been awarded national and international awards in this regard, including the Inkamanga in Silver, by President Thabo Mbeki, the Pablo Neruda award, by the Chilean President, the Ingrid Jonker award for poetry, the Noma award for writing in Africa, the English medal for contributing in writing in Southern Africa, the Presidential award by the Black Management forum, the BBQ statesman award, the Department of Arts and Culture life time achievement award, the International Golden Wreath for poetry in Strugga Macedonia; he was awarded the Alexandra icon award and the Pan South African Language Board Award for contributing to the development and promotion of African languages in South Africa.

He became a member of parliament and chairperson of the arts, culture, languages, science and technology portfolio committee of parliament.. He participated in the arts, culture, heritage sectors of the national negotiations at Codesa. He has a Master of Fine Arts from Columbia University in New York.

He was CEO of the national heritage site and memorial, Freedom Park, and received a long service award. He has been awarded honorary doctorates, by the Universities of Natal, Transkei, and the University of Johannesburg and an honorary Professorship by UNISA and the University of Johannesburg. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Thabo Mbeki Foundation; and the magazine, The Thinker. He is the director of Seolo Sa Serote Institute Pty Ltd; and founding Chairperson of the Bookela Botho IKS Integrated and Complimentary Healing Institute based at the Clinix Private Hospital in Johannesburg and Seolo Se Mpande IKS healing. He is also the founding Chairperson of the Indigenous Knowledge Systems Portal based at the University of Johannesburg.

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Born and raised in Kenya, Dr. Wambui spent part of his early childhood in one of the largest slums in Africa called Kibera Slum where he received part of his earlier education. While growing up in Kibera Slum, Dr. Wambui witnessed not only the challenges but also the opportunities that slum livelihood presents for both the residents of the slums and also for broader metropolitan lifestyles.

Equipped with personal experiences from the slum, Dr. Wambui proceeded to pursue his higher education in the United States where he earned a bachelor's degree in Psychology from Felician University, a masters in Social Work from Ohio University, and both a master's in Public Policy and a doctoral in Urban Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Delaware.

Dr. Wambui's work focuses on analyzing the geographies of urban poverty with an emphasis on the inventiveness of the urban poor. His work examines how similarly disposed marginal urban groups invent themselves through frugal yet radical creativity; where they create identities and lifestyles that enable them to thrive through competing geographies of contemporary metropolitan lifestyles where the realities of the slum and promises of prosperity in the cities intersect. Dr. Wambui believes that the stability of 21st-century cities in the Global South will depend on how well the city development frameworks integrate the collective experiences and innovative ideas emerging from the slums.

Currently, Dr. Wambui works as a Social Worker in the United States while seeking a career in policy development. Dr. Wambui's career goal is to join local and [or] international policy institutions/think tanks to contribute to the theory and knowledge of urban development, especially in the cities of the Global South.

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Professor Ware's research focuses on various aspects of Civil Rights law. He has authored more than 100 publications consisting of books, academic journal articles, book chapters, essays, book reviews, editorials and other publications in academic journals and other publications. Professor Ware has organized a number of academic symposia, professional programs and hosted many distinguished lectures.

Professor Ware is a co-author, with Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond, of *Brown v. Board of Education: Caste, Culture and the Constitution* (2003). He is the editor of *Choosing Equality: Essays and Narratives on the Desegregation Experience* (co-edited with Robert L. Hayman with a Foreword by Vice President Joe Biden) Penn State Press (2009). His most recent book, *A Century of Segregation: Race, Class, and Disadvantage*, (Lexington) was published in November of 2018. He has lectured and made other presentations to numerous audiences in the United States, Europe and Africa. Professor Ware is a graduate of Fisk University and Boston College Law School.

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RETHINK. REINVENT.



New Cities New Economies: South Africa and Africa's Grand Plan, A Pan-African Economic Revolution



By Tshilidzi Ratshitanga | Peer Review

Prolegomena

There is no doubt that the year 2020 will go down in history as a year of major disruption towards humanity. It is critically important to analyse exactly what this disruption is. Such analysis should be rooted in the understanding of the world's balance of power. Indeed, at a national level, the analysis for each country should also be based on the country's balance of power relations. It is easy to sing a common chorus of despair regarding the massive disruptions that have been occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. The reality is that society is made up of different social classes that have been affected differently by this pandemic.

The global elites, that is, those who command the global economy and their immediate beneficiaries, are undoubtedly feeling the greatest pain from this pandemic. The global economy has been hugely impacted upon by the manner in which nations have had to respond to the pandemic. The closure of trade borders across the world has yielded negative consequences for the global economy as a whole. Those who had been at the helm of the global economy, those whom global trade had been exclusively benefitting, have been most affected.

The poorest of the world have not had much to lose, as their lives were already a catastrophe of abject poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment. At most, what the poorest have suffered is the loss of loved ones, who have perished as a result of this pandemic. As such, the vehement attack on humanity by Covid-19 demands of us to see it as the most profound protest against global inequality. The 'new normal', which has been projected post-Covid-19, should not merely be a new normal insofar as the nature of work is concerned, it should also be a new normal against inequality, which had unfortunately become a 'normal' way of life in many countries prior to the pandemic.

The massive shifts that are expected in world power relations post-Covid-19 should arguably turn patterns of prosperity in favour of hitherto marginalised groups of people across the world. The economic eco-system should have been disrupted in such a manner that it becomes balanced. This balancing act is what I believe should be the biggest outcome of the pandemic. This cataclysmic event is what will balance the scales of the global war against inequality. However, only those who are able to interpret and interact with the shift will benefit from its expected dividends. It can be argued that every dominant group in society achieved their position by exploiting opportunities that were brought about by shifts in the global balance of power as a result of disruptions from monumental calamities.

In the context of South Africa, this is equally a moment to capture the opportunities that have arisen as a result

of this pandemic. The catch is that only those who correctly interpret the situation and act in ways that ensure a resultant benefit will be favoured by history. This is the moment that South Africa can galvanise to address its historical ills, which continue to bedevil the nation. There is a danger if the attitude of the ruling class will be to wait for solutions from elsewhere. Another danger is that of committing all available resources to deal only with the immediate challenges posed by the pandemic, instead of making medium to long-term investments that would herald the new economy.

The New Cities New Economies thesis that the book under profile proposes should be seen in light of the above analysis. This period of consternation and calamity should at the same time be seen by the South African government and all other relevant actors as an opportunity to build the united, democratic, and prosperous society of our dreams. Massive urbanisation, modernisation and industrialisation, which can emerge through import substitution industrialisation and the expansion of existing industries, can enable the creation of a totally transformed society.

South Africa is not confronting a huge moment of opportunity for the first time. Huge opportunities existed during the toppling of apartheid. However, history now tells us that the very same people who had been toppled are the ones who were ready and who ultimately enjoyed and continue to enjoy the spoils of the post-apartheid era. We must be afraid, very afraid, should history repeat itself like this.

The end of apartheid resulted in the dislodgement of the captains of apartheid, but that was not for long, as the prevailing new material conditions soon enabled



“ Massive urbanisation, modernisation and industrialisation, which can emerge through import substitution industrialisation and the expansion of existing industries, can enable the creation of a totally transformed society. ”

them to become even more privileged and wealthy. Based on their continued control of the economy, these very same people stand to gain from the current disruption, as much as many currently stand dislodged. The millions of black people who are suffering from this unfortunate turn of events do not have the means to exploit the existing opportunities; hence we look to the state to salvage the situation. We dare not fail, not again.

Below is a profile of the book *New Cities New Economies: South Africa and Africa's Grand Plan, A Pan-African Economic Revolution*. This book sets forth a proposition that can contribute towards the blueprint that can herald the post-Covid-19 New Economy, through the creation of new cities that anchor new economies and redefine power relations across our society. Hopefully the powers that be will have the temerity to act in such a bold manner.

Background

The political atrocities of apartheid ended in 1994, although their psychological, social, and economic consequences remain embedded within both its victims and the soul of the country at large. Racial economic inequality in South Africa is the offspring of these atrocities. This has resulted in a racially divided country or, more precisely, a country of white prosperity and endemic black poverty and mayhem, leading to some calling the country's much-lauded reconciliation a failure. The failure of South Africa's reconciliation stems from the fact that, to begin with, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) only dealt with apartheid's political atrocities; it never attended to economic atrocities, which remain a cancer that will continue to consume the very fabric of our democracy. Until South Africa chooses to confront this ugly truth,

it will continue to slide down a slippery slope. There is a relationship between this ugly reality and the country's pattern of negative economic growth. A country whose majority population is unskilled and unproductive cannot realise sustained levels of high economic growth. As a result of apartheid's economic injustices, too few people are economically active in South Africa today, which has yielded many negative developments in the country.

Racial economic inequality forms the heart of the current social contradictions that should inform the struggle for justice and total emancipation in South Africa. The viruses that have arisen out of this phenomenon include the demons of racism and white supremacy. Racial economic inequality is the bedrock of neo-apartheid, which must be totally dismantled in order for the country to move forward toward a prosperous and glorious future. The above notwithstanding, South Africa is a better country today than during the days of apartheid. Many good things have happened during the African National Congress's 26-year rule as South Africa's democratic government. Millions of people have benefitted from the ANC government's housing policies, with over three million RDP houses having been built for the poor. Healthcare has been provided to many South African citizens, and, recently, free education has been introduced, even at tertiary level, subject to some conditions. Further, road, water, electricity, and sanitation services have all been expanded for the benefit of millions who were previously excluded from these amenities. About 13 million South Africans receive social welfare grants, which include child welfare, disability, and pension grants. Such a lengthy period of governance has not, however, been without its own problems for the ruling ANC, which is currently going through turbulent times.

Spatial Reconstruction

South Africa is a country in transition. From its historical past, the country inherited a fragmented urban geography, a racially segregated society, and high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality (Robinson, 1997). An important phenomenon of development is that of the city. Urbanisation, and cities in particular, are known to be potent instruments of economic and social development and are catalytic to the prosperity of nations. They are spatial expressions of the health of a country insofar as social, cultural, economic, and

“ South Africa is a country in transition. From its historical past, the country inherited a fragmented urban geography, a racially segregated society, and high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality (Robinson, 1997). ”

political phenomena are concerned (Hamann et al, 2015). Since the inception of its democracy, South Africa has been grappling with how to transform its cities into symbols of integration and sustainable development.

Given the fact that the engineering of apartheid society was highly geographic, any serious attempt at dreaming up a new society has to examine the challenges of urbanisation in South Africa. Racial spatial geography is the rock upon which apartheid was engraved; hence, regardless of racial laws having been repealed, this rock still holds strong. The spatial settlement is a concrete phenomenon; it is incorrigible and hard to transform, let alone reform.

The above leads one to argue that the spatial reconstruction of our country has become exigent. To undo apartheid, we have to dream anew; we have to garner the courage to redefine the form and character of our country's geography, which is intertwined with the realisation of prosperity for the majority and the attainment of a non-racial and non-sexist society. Many people regard spatial planning as merely an urban and rural development endeavour, without realising that it is, in fact, the pulse of shaping a nation's economy.

In the final analysis, unless a new vision for the construction of a new South African society is founded upon the total reversal of the racially fractured apartheid inherited national outlook, such a vision promises no stable future for the country. It is already an established understanding that the world, and Africa in particular, is fast urbanising. Of the nine billion people projected to exist in the world by 2050, five billion are projected to live in urban areas, with the majority of this growth set to occur in developing nations (United Nations Human Settlement Program, 2015)

African countries, like other nations in the developing world, need to plan for this massive urbanisation. Although this is a huge challenge, it presents opportunities to rectify current and past injustices. How the migration of people is managed in South Africa and the continent has significant implications for the unfolding engineering of a new society.

The majority of the social, political, and economic ills of urbanity have a greater chance of being addressed through the total spatial re-engineering of society, if such an opportunity exists. Unlike developed nations,

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developing nations have this advantage because their urban development is not saturated. Hence, they have the opportunity to build on lessons learnt from the failures of urbanisation trajectories in other nations, as well as the abhorrent effects of colonial ideologies that bequeathed our nations with the fractured environments we now live within. The result will be a significant paradigm shift from current policy endeavours.

Spatial Justice

Social relations are generally understood to have an impact on power dynamics in society. Massey (1999) promotes the relational dynamic to space in order to elucidate the geography of power relations; specifically, in how spatial form is an important element in the constitution of power. Which actors stand most to gain or get constrained by spatial structuring is at the heart of the relational conceptualisation of space (Massey, 1999).

Based on the role that space plays in informing power dynamics, Soja (2010) contextualises space in terms of its relationship to justice or injustice. According to Soja, 'the "spatiality" of justice is an integral and formative component of justice itself, a vital part of how justice and injustice are socially constructed and evolve over time' (2010). Therefore, seeking justice is a fundamental struggle over geography. Like other like-minded scholars, Soja believes that critical spatial thinking is pivotal to enhancing our understanding of almost any subject, social justice included.

The concept of spatial justice acutely contextualises the South African situation. It provides the justification for why changes to the country's urban structures

should be conceived of in ways that impact upon the manifold injustices present in South African society, given the dialectical link between such injustices and the spatial patterns bequeathed by apartheid. The historical philosophy that guided the construction of South African urban spaces was based on exclusionary intentions (Lemon, 1991); hence, the book scrutinises South African patterns of urban development from the context of how proposed alternatives can impact socio-economic transformation. Spatial consciousness is central to what needs to be done to propel the South African nation forward.

The racial-space-inequality nexus is a central theoretical pillar to the understanding of South Africa's spatial dynamics in order to map a way forward. The nexus makes it possible to understand the link between racial exclusion and spatial formation, since this is the major defining characteristic of the legacy of apartheid colonialism in South Africa. This dialectic informs the South African urban complex, and is key to any development pattern that seeks to change spatial formation for the better.

As Turok has observed, the post-apartheid government recognises the problems of a distorted urban form; however, its policies have been too short-term and sector-specific to chaperone significant settlement restructuring. Regrettably, some of the pro-poor policies have reinforced people's exclusions by subsidising the cost of living in the periphery, rather than locating them nearer to jobs and other amenities (Turok, 2012).

The legacy is so deep, perennial and divisive that, beyond supplanting the old laws, actual change on the ground is hard to come by. Unlike South Africa's apartheid forefathers, the current government may not implement draconian laws to force inclusivity and uproot the monolithic legacy of apartheid. What is vividly clear from the account of apartheid's segregated urbanisation is how it was engineered to crystallise social and economic racism. The legal instrument to foster racial segregation in South Africa was spatial separation. This should lead us to conclude that any project to transform society and level the playing fields of economic opportunities has to be intertwined with restructuring the spatial geography of the country.

Neo-apartheid State

Before delving into the New Cities New Economies proposition, the book highlights some critical factors that impact South Africa's post-apartheid cities. One such reflection is with regard to the neo-apartheid state. To understand how South Africa has become a neo-apartheid state, we have to briefly examine neo-colonialism. As argued above, apartheid and colonialism are two sides of the same coin. Neo-colonialism defines the situation whereby a formerly colonised state appears independent, democratic and sovereign on the outside, but, in reality, its former colonisers control its economic system, which also implies its political power. Hence, neo-colonialism is exercised through economic means (Nkrumah, 1965).

The majority of scientific studies carried out on the state of South African society (Statistics South Africa, 2017), including those on poverty and progress in relation to the transformation of the economy, all report a backward picture of persistent racial inequality akin to the days of apartheid. Such a society is indeed experiencing neo-apartheid. White people remain occupants of the highest rungs of economic prosperity and hold senior management positions in the corporate sectors. In addition, they live in the most affluent of suburbs, have access to quality health care and education, and are on the whole generally well-off.

Many black people, on the other hand, experience abject poverty, play no pivotal role in the economy except as labourers (if they are lucky enough to have a job), live in squalor, scramble for inadequate public healthcare, and generally experience a less than desirable quality of life. Thus, neo-apartheid firmly entrenches white supremacy. The proposals in this book put forward a vision that will help to dismantle neo-apartheid and white supremacy.

It should be highlighted again that, despite neo-apartheid and white supremacy, South Africa is a democratic state. However, as Nkrumah (1965) asserts: 'A state in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny.' Neo-apartheid is powered, on the one hand, by a deliberate and conscious disregard of democratic intentions on the side of the former oppressors, who still control the major levers of the economy while, on the other hand, it continues because the state seems defeated and unable to trace these tendencies and crush them, even as they continue to exist under the pretext of free-market independence.

“ What is required to move away from this conundrum is a radical shift; an entire reconstruction of society. Spatiality should be the core driver of such intent because it was through spatiality that racism became engrained in our society. ”

What is required to move away from this conundrum is a radical shift; an entire reconstruction of society. Spatiality should be the core driver of such intent because it was through spatiality that racism became engrained in our society. In a similar manner to how Nkrumah encouraged the Third World to fight neo-colonialism, the masses of our people are well advised, as the true motive forces of change, to wage a war against neo-apartheid because, ultimately, its demise will be for their immediate benefit.

Land

Another critical factor that impacts post-apartheid South African society is land. Land reform continues to be one of the most contentious issues in the country and has taken centre stage in public discourse over the past few years. The dispossession of land from the native African people is one of the fundamental tools that colonialists used to disempower the development of African people. South Africa also suffered this fate when lands were ceased during the Settler wars, the Anglo-Boer wars and, finally, through the apartheid onslaught (Magubane, 1996).

For far too long, the global elites have orchestrated schemes that render our people useless, hopeless and at war with one another in the scramble for the very few resources left after their dislodgement. At the core of the agenda of the global elites is the dislodgement of mankind and the amassment of wealth. This happens through the displacement of people. The world is filled with people who live in poverty, and, first and foremost, have been displaced from their land. Homelessness, poverty, ill-health, illiteracy, unemployment, inequality and conflicts all stem from the dislodgement of people and the theft of their land, which, in turn, prevents

them from becoming productive citizens of society. No country can claim that it is poor if it has land. Who owns the land, what to do with the land, and how to make people a critical part of such an understanding, defines the difference between the failure and success of nations.

According to the State Land Audit (South African Department of Land and Rural Reform, 2013), the South African government owns 14% of the land, while 79% is owned by private individuals, companies, and trusts. Seven percent of the land is recorded as 'unaccounted extent'. The 1913 Natives' Land Act was the legal instrument that was used to finalise the dispossession of black people from their land, separating them from productive land and confining them to Bantustans, the tribal homelands that were created to spatially separate whites from blacks during the apartheid era.

n recognition of the full impact of this heinous act by the apartheid regime, when Nelson Mandela stood trial after being arrested as a 'terrorist' who had allegedly conducted a treasonous act, he exclaimed: 'I am without land because the white minority has taken a lion's share of my country and forced me to occupy poverty-stricken reserves that are over-populated and over-stocked. We are ravaged by starvation and disease' (South African Department of Land and Rural Reform, 2013: 3).

The most recent Land Audit (South African Department of Land and Rural Reform, 2017), which is Phase II of the audit process, reveals the ownership patterns of land by race, gender, and nationality. It reveals that white people own 72% of the land, followed by coloured people at 15%, Indians at 5%, Africans at 4%, others at 3%, and co-owners at 1%. Black people in South Africa constitute 79% of the population, while white people constitute only 9%. These statistics depict the debilitating reality of our country's affairs, especially insofar as land ownership is concerned.

The peaceful settlement that led to the democratisation of South Africa was facilitated through acquiescence over land and property. This was then engraved in the Constitution as the Property Clause. In effect, this agreement meant that, even if the racial discrimination laws that anchored legislated apartheid could be appealed, that would still not reverse the ownership of land and property away from those who had benefitted from these laws. This is why there will

always be racial tension in South Africa, as the majority of the land remains in the hands of white people, as demonstrated in the statistics above.

The amount of land owned by the government, especially in urban areas, is too miniscule to allow for massive state development. This explains why the tone of government development policies and plans, such as the IUDF, is slanted to influence those who actually own land and property. The government cannot enforce its vision, as it has no rights over the spaces where such developments ought to take place.

The land question has to be addressed in South Africa in a way that totally cuts ties with the past. Hopefully the amendment of the Constitution regarding land and property rights, which is currently underway, may pave way for the restructuring of land ownership patterns in such a way as to boost the establishment of new, liveable, equitable and sustainably prosperous urban and rural spaces for the poor, thus writing an obituary for apartheid and its vestiges.

New Cities New Economies Proposition

The preceding chapters of the book narrate the spatial quagmire that South Africa finds itself in. Policy endeavours that have been implemented by the democratic government are not succeeding in obliterating the vestiges of apartheid; instead, in many instances, they are replicating and reinforcing apartheid's visions. There is a clear need for a paradigm shift in the orientation of South Africa's patterns of urban development. Current patterns require a framework that can assist in redirecting them towards the moulding of a totally new society, one that resonates with the aspirations that are echoed in the country's democratic Constitution.

The current developmental plans of the South African government do not emphasise spatial reconstruction as the overarching foundation for societal transformation and economic development. This is surprising because their aim is to eliminate the apartheid legacies which were primarily envisioned, propelled, and are currently being sustained by racial spatial engineering. Once and for all, the South African government and society as a whole need to elevate the issue of spatial justice as the core of all of South Africa's developmental goals and programmes. This is the only way that these can

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have an enduring effect which will result in destroying the vestiges of apartheid and thus result in the birthing of a new nation.

With the exception of agriculture and a few mining and tourism locations, the centrality of urban economics in the country's economic sectors has been clearly demonstrated. The majority of economic activity in South Africa takes place in urbanised environments. Consequently, given the history of apartheid urbanisation, this is also where the greatest concentration of poverty lies. Urban poverty is a clear and present social ill, which reinforces high levels of crime in urban areas. The concentration of the country's population in urban areas has not happened without a negative impact being felt in rural areas, which also require urgent attention in terms of development.

This proposed policy framework is aimed at influencing the redirection of patterns of urban development in South Africa so that urban development, when partnered with rural development initiatives, can lead the way in guiding the nation towards prosperity and a high quality of life for all South African citizens. This policy framework is anchored in the New Cities New Economies proposal, which acknowledges the dialectical relationship between urbanisation and the economy. This urban development policy framework is believed to be the most appropriate way in which South Africa can totally de-apartheid itself.

The New Cities New Economies thesis sets out a proposal that aims to fuel the long-overdue economic growth and radical transformation of our society. As such, the thesis can be considered as the gestation of an economic revolution, as the plan will not only serve South Africa but also has the potential to reverberate

across the entire African continent. This grand plan is the promise of the South Africa we yearn for – the Africa we want.

New cities herald new economies and, in turn, new economies yield jobs and empowerment, therefore destroying both poverty and apartheid's economic legacy. The new cities should have a symbiotic relationship with the economy. As new cities herald new economies, new economies will then anchor and sustain new cities. The human migration patterns that have been projected to happen in the next few decades open up a window of opportunity for us. However, like many opportunities, that window will not remain open forever. It is projected that by 2030, 71.3% of South Africa's population will live in urban areas; this will reach 80% by 2050. The entire urban population of Africa is expected to reach 60%, or 2.5 billion people, by 2050 (South African Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2016).

These projections suggest a 30-year or so window of opportunity for African countries to respond with concrete plans to manage such large-scale migration. Some critically important questions that African governments need to pose include: where will all these people live? How will they live there? What opportunities does this migration present? What dangers does it pose? Current observations demonstrate that we are failing dismally to answer these serious questions. Instead, there appears to be an obsession with short-term interests based upon our leaders' immediate political terms of office.

If migration patterns are not properly mediated, more and more people will flock to existing and already overstretched cities, creating an archipelago of slums, which will add to those that are already scattered in and around current urban spaces. After a while, or over the next three decades at least, the destructive consequences of such non-action will become even more difficult to reverse than apartheid and colonial legacies. Hence, the result would be a new reality of dehumanisation that arises not out of an abhorrent and deliberately segregationist ideology, but rather out of the lethargic leadership tendencies of democratic governments.

This is the context within which the New Cities New Economies visionary framework is presented; that is, as

a developmental paradigm that is meant to contribute towards possible solutions regarding the challenges of human settlement patterns that are already bewildering humanity at this very juncture.

Broad Features of the New Cities New Economies Policy Framework

As stated earlier, some of the elements of the existing urban development policy, which are geared towards the reform of current cities, should be welcomed into the New Cities vision since they align with some of the progressive global trends for sustainable and smart cities. Although many of them may prove unworkable for the intended reforms of apartheid-planned cities, they can be incorporated into greenfield developments in the new cities. As such, the New Cities framework should embrace the spirit of the Integrated Urban Development Framework vision for South African cities, which is: 'Liveable, safe, resource-efficient cities and towns that are socially integrated, economically inclusive and globally competitive, where residents actively participate in urban life' (South African Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2016).

Human Settlement Patterns

Equitable, Integrated, Compact, Connected and High-Density Human Settlements

The objective remains to offer people quality of life through the creation of equitable living environments, where people cohabitate in a safe, cohesive and socially-uplifting manner. As stated in the IUDF in 2016, the critical features for this include access to transport, safety and security, adequate healthcare, nutrition, housing, water, electricity and sanitation services. The new cities will be compact cities that are anchored by high-density human settlements. Such is the antithesis of segregated residential, social and economic settlement patterns of the old apartheid era, which remain stubbornly firm and have even been replicated by some of the contemporary private sector-led developments.

The typical South African city has a very low-density ratio and, because of apartheid, the majority of the working people, who are black, live far away from employment centres, in conditions of poverty and

“ This situation is unacceptable and must change. Taking advantage of mixed land use innovations, new cities should be built in a way that integrates economic activities with residential settlements and social amenities. ”

underdevelopment. This situation is unacceptable and must change. Taking advantage of mixed land use innovations, new cities should be built in a way that integrates economic activities with residential settlements and social amenities.

Transit Oriented Developments (TOD) can enable the linkages between mass transport systems, residential spaces, and workplaces. Locating residential settlements along transport corridors will alleviate the current burden of travel times between homes and workplaces, what Joel Netshitenzhe (2018) refers to as ‘apartheid tax’ on black people. The IUDF reports that: ‘South Africans spend the longest time in daily commutes to and from work, while more than 50 per cent of poor urban residents spend more than 20 per cent of their declared household income on transport (South African Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2016).

High-density living, as much as it advantages compact city design, can present social challenges. The creation of New Cities demands the inclusion of green and safe communal spaces. There is also the issue of taking account of African cultural practices and the integration of facilities that can accommodate these. This is something that both old and new developers of residential areas do not often consider. From time to time, Africans gather and conduct ceremonies as part of their spirituality. There are no facilities for them to do this in urban areas. In some residential estates, such activities are actually banned through residential association rules. New city spaces cannot fully emancipate people if they are designed in ways that still make them feel constrained in terms of their spirituality. It is worth noting that developers of urban

spaces are typically willing to accommodate Christian and Islamic facilities. It is about time that Africans also enjoy social spaces that will affirm their spirituality by providing relevant amenities for African spiritual practices.

New Cities will also need to be connected in two ways: first, in terms of how they link with other new and old cities through transport networks of different kinds – air, rail, and roads – and second, in terms of telecommunications networks that connect people across the entire world (City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, 2016). In order to become truly functional economic agglomerations, they need this modern connectivity for both institutions and ordinary citizens. The beauty of creating new spaces is that planners have the opportunity to lay out this infrastructure as they build; there will be no need to upset the aesthetics of these cities by having to install these technologies many years after construction has been completed. Such infrastructure can be laid out in a way that accommodates room for further improvements as and when technologies develop.

Economic Growth and Transformation

The earlier sections of the book demonstrate how economically unequal South Africa is, as well as how economic empowerment initiatives are not often linked with urban development initiatives in concrete ways. The construction of new cities provides the foundation to reverse the scourge of racial economic inequality. South Africa’s current economic empowerment policy – Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) – is driven by the philosophy that black people, who were excluded from economic activities during apartheid, should be allowed to buy shares in white companies. These companies then receive BEE points that grant them favourable incentives, including tax incentives and the ability to compete for state contracts. In the same breath, it has been reported how poor the average black person is in South Africa, which contradicts the possibility of masses of people benefiting from this policy. White companies that do not wish to do business with the state naturally do not feel compelled to abide by this policy; therefore, transformation of the ownership of companies is inconsistent across economic sectors. Only a few people have been able to benefit from this policy, while the majority are still

economically excluded from the mainstream economy, the platform that guarantees real wealth creation.

The economic transformation possibilities that the New Cities framework will unlock for South Africa will not be based on retribution or the seizure of assets from those who were unfairly advantaged by apartheid. Black people will be able to be absorbed in the mainstream economy that will emerge from the new space economy of New Cities. They will not unnecessarily have to buy shares from white companies at massive cost in order to participate in the various industries that the construction of the New Cities will herald.

Decentralisation of Economic Activity

Opportunities for economic empowerment and transformation will emerge, first and foremost, from a consciousness of the fact that urban development has to be intertwined with economic growth interventions. These interventions will be consciously aligned with the vision for urban development, which should ultimately define the country's new spatial geography. The book demonstrates how current patterns of urban development are not succeeding in linking human settlement with economic development and, as such, leave people economically vulnerable, even as they appreciate the brand-new houses that the state is building for them. The state must find new ways to approach human settlements in terms of their relationship with economic growth, development, and transformation.

Modern industrial nations have heavily urbanised spatial forms. Rapid urbanisation is projected to take place in developing nations, raising concerns about economic sustainability. In the developed world, economic activity is decentralised. There is a multiplicity of economic activities throughout these countries: some anchored by specific industries, and others following similar patterns across different cities. South Africa, like most developing nations, has not yet reached saturated economic growth potential. There is room for the South African economy to grow in different parts of the country; the state needs to plan for this and lay out infrastructure accordingly. The departments responsible for infrastructure development, however, are not necessarily contemplating new spatial forms. Instead, they are biased toward the idea of improving infrastructure along the lines of what currently exists,

which was laid out to support apartheid's segregated spatial plans. Hence, there is a lack of economic coherence in the overall manner in which the country is investing its resources.

In 2014, then President Jacob Zuma launched the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Council (PICC), which was tasked with implementing Strategic Infrastructure Projects (SIPs). This was after the government made a commitment to recalibrate the economy through investment in infrastructure. How those projects are chosen and implemented is not necessarily consistent with the visions espoused in the Integrated Urban Development Framework, the Rural Development Framework, the Spatial Planning Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA), or the Human Settlements Department's vision: Breaking New Ground. All these plans have their own visions; they may sound similar, but are not necessarily aligned. If the budget allocations of these various plans were to be consolidated, based on the vision of radically altering apartheid's spatial legacy, the vision of building New Cities that are economically viable can be successfully realised.

The country's economic activities are currently tied up in the existing cities that were developed during the days of apartheid. If apartheid had survived, its government would undoubtedly have created even more economic nodes to expand their vision. The current cities were not all created in a once-off swoop after the declaration of apartheid; they evolved over time as the architects of apartheid considered them necessary to entrench their economic domination agenda. The challenge is that the democratic government has not linked its vision of building an inclusive nation with the expansion of the economy in new spaces that would decentralise

“ The challenge is that the democratic government has not linked its vision of building an inclusive nation with the expansion of the economy in new spaces that would decentralise economic activity beyond the existing apartheid towns and cities. This path dependency syndrome is taking the country backward rather than forward. ”

economic activity beyond the existing apartheid towns and cities. This path dependency syndrome is taking the country backward rather than forward.

Some of the New City models that the book explores include:

- New capital city
- New tourism-based cities
- New academic cities (anchored by new universities and colleges)
- New spiritually anchored cities (similar to Mecca, but anchored in African spirituality, religions and cultures)
- New automobile manufacturing city
- New innovation cities
- New cross border cities
- New entertainment cities (similar to Las Vegas-type cities)
- New mineral beneficiation cities (gold, diamonds, platinum anchored cities)
- New mining cities
- New seaport cities

Africa's Grand Plan:

A Pan-African Economic Revolution

Our ultimate objective for Africa must be a continent that is united in both sentiment and prosperity. Africa should become an oasis of development, innovation, construction, and the attainment of human potential. The New Cities New Economies vision should boost massive urbanisation, modernisation, and industrialisation across the continent. This will define South Africa's economic vision of a Pan-African revolution, transforming this vision into an African Grand Plan. The United Continent of Africa (UCA) will emerge when the continent's economy becomes intricately connected. Africa's leaders need to cooperate in terms of economic growth in such a manner that economic borders will vanish, and the African market will benefit all people.

Many external actors vie for the African market, having realised how lucrative it is. South Africa's declining economy can be rejuvenated by focusing investment in the continent. South Africa should study the value chain of goods and products that are consumed by the continent and plan to become the number one provider of such goods and products. This is an

audacious undertaking, as there are already significant foreign agents supplying such goods and products to many parts of the continent. South Africa has a huge advantage to compete successfully with these external actors, as it is a fellow African country that has an added advantage through the Africa Free Trade Agreement.

Success will require the country to take risks. Were South Africa to aim to launch one million companies to do business in various sectors in the African continent, it would then be appropriate to claim that its economic strategy is Pan-African in character. As an example, quadrupling investments in retail, property, and construction across the continent implies that South African products will have a bigger market than is currently the case. Financial services, transportation and telecommunications are ancillary sectors that are required to support the sectors mentioned above; thus, the value chain keeps expanding.

South Africa will need to invest its own resources to lay down the infrastructure needed for such huge economic expansions. This is exactly what China and other countries are doing in Africa; that is, paving the way through the creation of roads, railway lines, air and sea ports, which will also enable South Africa's manufactured products to move across the continent. This is not an act of charity; it is a partnership that will yield huge returns for South Africa's manufacturing sectors and employment possibilities. In the process, it stands to transform the economic infrastructure of the countries that South Africa will target for this economic expansion. The extension of the economic infrastructure will itself boost South African industries so that its raw materials will become hugely sought after for the development of this collective infrastructure grid.

To continue its economic revolution while realising its New Cities New Economies policies within its shores, South Africa should also aim to become a partner for the building of such cities and economies in countries across the continent – in Egypt, Tanzania, Rwanda, Morocco, Nigeria, and others – some of which are already building their own new cities. South Africa should compete heavily in order to deploy its human, capital and productive resources to the rest of the continent in a win-win economic partnership arrangement. It is not an exaggeration to state that as many as 120 000 new cities can be built in Africa as part of Africa's

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urbanising, modernising, and industrialising intent. Once that becomes the plan for the future, it becomes immediately clear why Africa can become the next most successful developing continent. Whoever leads such a revolution will also instantly become the next economic powerhouse of the world.

Once one begins to think about New Cities from the perspective of Pan-African economic growth, fears about economic sustainability should dissipate. Based on the earlier motivation of a decentralisation of economic activities, cities can anchor different kinds of industrial activities for the South African and African infrastructure and consumer market. Africa has a huge network of human capital that is spread across the entire world. Currently, the continent is not doing enough to mobilise this resource for its development. Africans who are in the diaspora have amassed skills and experiences in areas that can be beneficial to the implementation of Africa's Grand Plan. The United Continent of Africa Diaspora (UCA-D) is an untapped treasure that the continent could recruit in order to become heavily embedded in the urbanisation, modernisation, and industrialisation programs of the African Grand Plan.

Future Research

There is still a great deal of detail that needs to be carried out before implementing this new policy framework. Some future research areas include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a. Expansion on the new city models
- b. The location of such new cities, which is directly linked to the decentralisation and expansion of economic activities.
- c. A detailed study of the proposed economic

- d. activities that must anchor new cities.
- d. The financial modelling for the funding of the vision and identification of potential funding sources.
- e. Solutions regarding the impact on old cities and existing townships.
- f. Best design frameworks for different city types in different locations.
- g. The modalities of carrying out such a huge long-term vision; that is, government configuration arrangements.
- h. Legislative requirements for the promulgation of such a vision or certain aspects of it.
- i. A full industrial value chain of products that will be required for the new cities has to be produced so that we can understand the full picture of the impact on economic growth and black economic empowerment.
- j. The exact manner in which this policy framework will impact intergovernmental relations, in other words, the implications for all spheres of government.
- k. The approach towards the expansion of urbanisation in southern Africa and Africa as a whole, in terms of how such is interwoven with the South African vision.
- l. Detailed analysis of the post-apartheid emerging city models (e.g. Waterfall, Midstream, Sandton, Steyn City, Century City and North Coast).

Under the New Cities New Economies Institute, several sectors of society will need to be mobilised behind this vision. Hence the following consultative commissions will be created:

- New Cities New Economies Black Business Chamber of Commerce
- New Cities New Economies Big Business Commission
- New Cities New Economies Small Business Development Commission
- New Cities New Economies Funding Commission
- New Cities New Economies Manufacturing Commission
- New Cities New Economies Construction Commission
- New Cities New Economies Energy Commission
- New Cities New Commission Transport Commission
- New Cities New Economies Water Commission

- New Cities New Economies Pan-African Economic Development Commission
- New Cities New Economies Mining Commission
- New Cities New Economies Education and Skills Training Commission
- New Cities New Economies Health Commission
- New Cities New Economies Innovation and Technology Commission
- New Cities New Economies Spatial Planning, Architects and Designers Commission
- New Cities New Economies Engineering Commission
- New Cities New Economies Inclusive Human Settlement Commission
- New Cities New Economies Legal and Legislative Framework Commission
- New Cities New Economies Indigenous Knowledge, Culture and Heritage Commission
- New Cities New Economies Social Amenities Commission
- New Cities New Economies Governance Framework Commission
- New Cities New Economies Industrial Development Commission
- New Cities New Economies Women Empowerment Commission
- New Cities New Economies Youth Empowerment Commission
- New Cities New Economies Civil Society Commission
- New Cities New Economies Labour Commission
- New Cities New Economies State Owned Enterprises Commission
- New Cities New Economies Government Consultative Commission
- New Cities New Economies Financial Sector Commission
- New Cities New Economies Telecommunications Commission
- New Cities New Economies Land Commission
- New Cities New Economies Community Mobilisation Commission
- New Cities New Economies Environmental Sustainability Commission
- New Cities New Economies International Investors Commission

All these consultative efforts will culminate in the New Cities New Economies Convention which will ultimately become an annual event. The New Cities

New Economies Movement advocates for the Pan-African economic revolution, which will be executed by the Pan-African developmental state and expressed through the Africa Grand Plan, starting in South Africa and spreading throughout the African continent. This oath is the promise of prosperity for all our suffering people in South Africa and the rest of the continent.

Mayibuye! iAfrica!

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A Cosmopolitan Ghetto:

The Shifting Image of Kibera Slum From ‘Flying Toilets’ to a Centre for Metropolitan Innovation

By John M. Wambui | Opinion



Introduction

It has become customary, when conceptualising twenty-first-century urban landscapes, to describe them as existing in two states. The first state is one in which scholars of modern metropolises conceptualise them as new articulations of social, economic, and political identity. Scholarly consensus holds that these geographies and their growth are implicitly and explicitly linked to major social, economic, political, and ecological stability (United Nations, 2016). Their growth is closely connected to the three pillars of sustainable development: economic development, social development, and environmental protection (United Nations, 2014).

The development of cities provides a myriad of socio-economic benefits. Through the agglomeration process – concentration of people, resources, and investments – cities heighten the possibilities for economic development, innovation, and social interaction (UN/DESA, 2013). They concentrate key infrastructure assets which provide opportunities for diversified investments and labour provision, thus improving overall quality of life. The aesthetic values linked to the image of cities have modified the social rhythm through the transformation of social ideals, ties, lifestyles, and aspirations (Harvey, 2008). Cities are also central to political stability. Harvey, for example,

argues that no country has attained stability without experiencing urban growth. The growth of cities not only provides the promise of global social, economic, political, and ecological stability; it also offers the promise for social transformation (Harvey, 2008). This promise is, however, increasingly becoming overshadowed by the second state in which cities exist.

While the growth of cities offers a promissory note for social, economic, political, and ecological redemption, their rapid expansion brings a multitude of challenges. One of the defining elements of twenty-first-century urban development is the movement of rural populations to cities. Urbanisation, 'the gradual shift in the residence of human population from rural to urban areas', has become the most transformative development trend in the twenty-first century, especially in the Global South (United Nations, 2016; United Nations, 2018). Statistics suggest that 55% of the global population resides in urban areas today and this proportion is expected to increase to 68% by 2050 (United Nations, 2018). Approximately 90% of this increase is projected to take place in low and middle-income countries (LMICs), particularly in Africa and Asia. Studies show that the urban population in these regions has been increasing at a rate of almost 70 million persons per year (PSUP, 2016). This shift demonstrates the impact that urban development has on the reorganisation of the global social order. This has resulted in concerns among urban scholars about the sustainability of cities. These scholars view the current uncontrolled and unplanned trend in urban growth as being socially, economically, and environmentally unsustainable.

Concerns about the sustainability of cities are enlarged by the growing research on slums. UN Habitat defines a slum as a 'contiguous settlement that lacks one or more of the following five conditions: access to clean water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living area that is not overcrowded, durable housing and secure tenure' (World Bank Group, 2016). This body of research highlights slums as symbolising the many facets of poverty, inequality, and deprivation in cities, especially in LMICs today (World Bank Group, 2016). Studies indicate that slums have been growing steadily and consistently in the last few decades. For example, in 1990 an estimated 689 million people lived in slums in developing nations. Today, the UN

estimates this population to be around 1 billion people, accounting for 1 in 8 people globally (Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme (PSUP), 2016). Since 2000, the global slum population has been growing by an average of six million people per year. Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounts for 56% of the total growth in the number of slum dwellers among the developing regions (PSUP, 2016; World Bank Group, 2016).

In developing nations, particularly in Africa, slums have become the contemporary image of the metropolitan lifestyle. The presentation of everyday experiences in slums provides accounts of social struggles, disenfranchisement, and disintegrating ecological structures against a backdrop of institutional failures and scarcity of means and resources. Slums have become equated with increased rates of urban crimes, poor health and nutrition outcomes, low literacy achievement, high unemployment rates, poor sanitation, and overall lack of access to reliable and decent human settlements. With more than half of the urban population in African metropolises residing in slums (see Figure 1 below), the image of the slum is a harsh contrast to the glittering illusion of urban promises held out but denied to many. The precariousness of urban slums, as highlighted by the growing body of research on urban poverty, offers the image of slums as a globalised allegory of failed modernisation, especially in the Global South.

Slums are not a new phenomenon in modern cities, having been well documented in the historical literature of Western metropolises predating the Industrial Revolution. Two dominant views of slums have governed this literature. The first is the traditional neoliberal view which conceptualises slums as geographies of urban decay. This articulation

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Almost ½ of Africa's urban population live in slums

Share of urban population living in slums, 2014 (%)




Figure 1: Share of Urban Population living in Slums in Africa (Urban Dynamics: Facts and Figures, 2015) p45)

regards slums as urban human petri dishes where social, economic, political, and environmental misery ferments. Scholars who use this construct perceive slums as interesting only if they affirm the ideas of disenfranchisement, precariousness, and social marginalisation (Dovey, 2012; Gilbert, 2007; Holston & Caldeira, 2008). Both the theoretical and practical

discussions within this view focus attention on slums as symbols corresponding to chaos, disorder, and social and spatial illegitimacy.

Viewed within this framework, slums have been interpreted as decaying urban environments that do not correspond with the mainstream image of a city.

This view of slums has generated what Jane Jacobs calls a paternalistic approach to policy responses (Jacobs, 1992: 271). The urban renewal theories and policies which have emanated from this paternalistic narrative have often focused on eliminating slums through strategies such as forced eviction, clearance, resettlements, and slum upgrading projects (Dupont, Jordhus-Lier, Sutherland & Braathen, 2016; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Shimeles & Yameogo, 2014). These methods have failed or have had limited success (PSUP, 2016). At best, such a method succeeds in shifting 'slums from here to there, adding its own tincture of extra hardship and disruption. At worst, it destroys neighbourhoods where constructive and improving communities exist and where the situation calls for encouragement rather than destruction' (Jacobs, 1992: 270–71).

Parallel to the neoliberal view, an emerging group of scholars has formed what I term the contemporary view of slums. This perspective conceptualises the development of slums as a process of social construction and reconstruction. Through this process, the urban marginalised populations compete for and appropriate resources and opportunities which are otherwise unavailable, inaccessible, or denied to them. Contemporary urban theorists view slums as forms of instant urbanity that highlight alternative ways of self-organisation among marginalised populations (Zappulla, Suau & Fikfak, 2014). They view them as places in which generative possibilities emerge out of desperation and deprivation. Informality, which is a defining characteristic of the identity of slums, is conceived as an 'organising logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself' (Heitzman, 2005). By highlighting the generative dynamism and vibrancy of the social and spatial alchemy of slums, contemporary urban theorists argue that informality offers an alternative structure of urban governance outside the formal structures (AbdouMaliq, 2004; Dovey, 2012; Gilbert, 2007; Holston & Caldeira, 2008; Neuwirth, 2006; Roy, 2011; Tavares & Brosseau, 2013; United Nations, 2014; Whyte, 1981; Yiftachel, 2009). This informal structure highlights the daily informal social experimentations which are marked by incremental adaptation and improvisation in the face of uncertainties (Thieme, 2017).

While these two perspectives differ in the way they theorise slums and ultimately in how they practically

respond to their existence, they nevertheless face the same conceptual and practical dilemma. Modern slums are not only expanding in size parallel to the evolution of cities, they are also growing in their population density. By 2050, the global slum population is projected to reach about 3 billion people. It is worth emphasising that much of this growth has been projected to take place in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The question that has been problematic to both neoliberal and contemporary urban theorists is how states – given the scarcity of means and resources – can successfully manage the threats and challenges that slums present to the sustainability of cities and their social infrastructure.

Neoliberal scholars stick with the grand old ideas that the only logical way of addressing the challenges of slums is by eliminating them. Contemporary scholars, on the other hand, while acknowledging the social, economic, political and ecological challenges which are characteristic of many slums, emphasise the need to embrace slums as new forms of social identity and alternative human settlements in modern metropolises (Harvey, 2008; Neuwirth, 2006; Roy, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2003). This is by no means to say that the precariousness of slums should be condoned or normalised. What contemporary theorists assert is that, given the current trends in both the growth of the city and the persistence of slums, it is imperative to embrace the idea that slums are increasingly becoming part and parcel of the new urban identity, particularly in LMICs. Therefore, there is a need to recognise them as places in which residents use their ingenuity to create connections, adaptations, and survival tactics in modern metropolises where they are disenfranchised (Bayat, 2007; Holston & Caldeira,

“ What contemporary theorists assert is that, given the current trends in both the growth of the city and the persistence of slums, it is imperative to embrace the idea that slums are increasingly becoming part and parcel of the new urban identity, particularly in LMICs. ”

2008; Holston, 2008; Jacobs, 1992; Whyte, 1943). To overcome slums, contemporary theorists postulate that:

'...we must regard slum dwellers as people capable of understanding and acting upon their own self-interests, which they certainly are. We need to discern, respect, and build upon the forces for regeneration that exist in slums themselves, and that demonstrably work in real cities. This is far from trying to patronize people into a better life, and it is far from what is done today' (Jacobs, 1992: 270–71)

This analysis invites the examination of different ways in which the residents of slums creatively and innovatively navigate the contours of urban struggles. Guided by the concept of civic imagination, the goal of this article is to challenge both the theoretical and practical representations of slums which tend to focus on what is lacking, while undermining the very generative possibilities arising from everyday social experimentations and contestations. Building upon the contemporary view of slums, this article undertakes the task of theorising slums as a new form of urban practice that is increasingly becoming part of urban identity. The article examines how day-to-day individual and collective experiences inspire creativity and innovations that have become vital to the sustainability of livelihood in modern slums.

Using evidence gathered from my dissertation work in Kibera Slum in Nairobi, Kenya, the goal of this presentation is to emphasise the cardinal importance of urban informality to contemporary thinking and practice in urban studies. It is important to underscore the fundamental roles that the urban poor play to alleviate their conditions, given the state of their depravity. By highlighting civic imagination in Kibera Slum, I am calling for a radical reconsideration of urban informality. I believe that the assemblage of human enterprise within this informality provides unique opportunities to examine new theoretical and practical approaches when investigating the geographies of urban struggles, particularly in slums.

Defining Civic Imagination

Civic imagination is the 'capacity to imagine

alternatives to current social, political, or economic conditions' (Jenkins, Sangita, Lian & Neta, 2016: 300). It is the 'ways in which people individually and collectively envision better political, social, and civic environment' (Baiocchi, Bennett, Cordner, Klein & Savell, 2014: 54). It is a collection of human processes, activities, adaptations, and innovations which arise as enactments of alternative ways of living in response to existing social realities. Using Kibera Slum as a case study, this article focuses on underscoring a set of human activities that highlight civic imagination in a place otherwise understood by its social, economic, political, and environmental disillusionments. I will utilise my personal accounts, as well as evidence obtained from various documents and field visits, to portray a set of well-crafted activities and frugal innovations that exemplify civic imagination in Kibera. This portfolio of human experimentations will set the ground for reimagining contemporary slum-hood.

'A Cosmopolitan Ghetto'

About two decades ago, in 1997, I was a third-grade pupil at Christ the King Primary School. The school was situated deep in the heart of Kibera Slum, about thirty minutes' walk from the homeless shelter for children where I resided, also located in Kibera. To get to and from school, the other boys from the shelter and I had to wake up at 5 am and start the trek by 5:30 am to be in school no later than 6:15 am. I dreaded these morning treks for so many reasons! First, it was always dark, which made it very difficult to see where and what we were stepping into. The hikes to and from school involved traversing lowly-built shanties, jumping over cesspools, and climbing over garbage hills. We also had to be vigilant of open sewer systems spread across the trails.

The second reason I dreaded these walks was because of the infamous 'flying toilets'. There were very few public and private toilets in Kibera. To compensate for this, people used plastic or polythene bags to relieve themselves before throwing them away into the streets or onto the roofs of nearby shanties. They were dubbed 'flying toilets' because, at any given moment, a plastic bag filled with faecal waste could come flying through the air like a meteorite on a clear blue night sky. We had to be cautious walking to school in the wee hours of the morning, lest we stepped on one of them or,

even worse, one came flying and landed on our heads.

The third reason these morning walks horrified me was for security reasons. It was all too common that, on our way to school, we might encounter a mutilated dead body dumped along the narrow dirt trails meandering through the shanties. I recall many times we had to jump over mutilated bodies stretched across the trails with our eyes closed because we were too frightened to look at them. Most of these corpses were the victims of violent robberies or what we called 'mob justice' – a form of public retaliation towards petty thieves. As a result, we were terrified of travelling in the dark anywhere in the slum and always travelled in groups. The fourth reason I despised the long treks to school was the situation we faced on rainy days. The rain turned the dirt roads into a long stretch of thick stinking nasty sludge. It was a nightmare plodding in this mess to school!

In early 2001, I graduated from Christ the King Primary School, one of the few schools that served Kibera. After my graduation, I was accepted to an all-boys seminary for my high school education. I packed the few belongings I had and left the homeless shelter and Kibera with no intention of returning. Forward 15 years later. In 2015, after spending 10 years in the United States pursuing higher education, I finally returned to Kenya to visit my family. One of my priorities, after reuniting with my family, was to visit Kibera again – partly to see how the place had changed, and partly to explore the state of the 'flying toilets'. I was starting my first year of a doctoral degree at the University of Delaware at the time and was struggling to put my thoughts together on what I wanted to do. While my orientation was towards exploring issues related to urban poverty and collective creativity, I had no sense of direction. So, my visit to Kibera was also to search for ideas worthy of dissertation research.

A few days after my arrival in Kenya, I found myself tucked in between five passengers on the squeaking back seat of a matatu (minibus) headed to Kibera. The bleak memories of my early life there were still fresh in my mind. I had an image of Kibera in which I was expecting to see a protracted line of 'flying toilets' spreading across and along the dirt trails. In preparation for such an occurrence, I was dressed in heavy tall boots. I was not carrying anything of value because I was afraid that I would get mugged, just

like in the old days.

However, when I got to Kibera, instead of a prolonged line of 'flying toilets' along the dirt roads traversing the corroded shanties, I discovered dozens of public and community-sponsored toilets and bathrooms spread across the slum. I found dozens of community-operated multifunctional bio-centres. These are sanitary blocks that use bio-digester systems to treat waste to produce biogas that the community then uses for various purposes. The community had found innovative ways of transforming human waste into gas for energy and fertiliser for various purposes, and liquid waste into treated clean water. These bio-centres also served multiple purposes beyond treating human waste. They created opportunities for economic stability through employment, environmental sustainability through waste management and clearance, and social and political stability by providing venues for various social activities that brought the community together.

In places where I was expecting to be robbed or attacked, I found an established network of digital policing. People had found a way to use the widely available and accessible mobile phone technology to create an online platform of information detailing the security of various locations in Kibera. The community constantly updated this system, thus providing accurate security information to the public. The system also served as a vital virtual information board where residents could post ongoing events and activities which united the community together through similar interests.

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


Figure 2: Circles show the number, date, and types of sports events in Kibera and their specific locations (Kibera News Network)

To address the issues of water hygiene and water deserts, people had found innovative ways of providing clean and accessible water to residents. There was an extensive system of water ATMs supplying clean water to residents at a low cost. These ATMs utilise smart cards where users buy and add points into their cards, then use the points to dispense clean water from an ATM vending machine. The slum had also adopted an extensive aerial water system which comprises of above-the-ground water pipes and tanks hovering across Kibera. These ensure that the community can access clean water, therefore addressing most of the health issues that were common two decades ago when I was a resident there.

I also discovered the existence of an extensive community mapping system. For a long time, Kibera as a community was not recognised in official government maps. This meant that when the government was planning and distributing public goods and services, Kibera was left out of these benefits. As some of the individuals I interviewed noted, Kibera

was considered a blank space in official government maps which only became important during political seasons due to its rich repertoire of young energetic voters. However, in late 2009, a group of youths from Kibera, realising that their community was considered a blank spot on official maps, undertook the task of mapping their community. Utilising freely accessible technology such as the OpenStreet Mapping System, they created MapKibera.org – the first free and open digital map of their community. Using feedback from residents, the group aggregated various resources available in Kibera into one open free interactive system that locals could access. This system has now become a vital information and awareness mobilisation tool for the inhabitants of Kibera and surrounding slums in Nairobi, Kenya.



Image 1: Water ATM Vending Machine in Mathare Slum (left) (UNFCC/Chris McMorrow); Aerial water system in Kibera (top right) (Daniel Wesangula); Water ATM in Mathare Slum (bottom right) (Grundofs)

Additionally, residents have also created a plethora of social organisations that focus on mobilising information. Organisations such as Habari Kibera, Voice of Kibera, Kibera News Network, Humans of Kibera, Pamoja FM and MapKibera, among others, focus on mobilising awareness of local issues that impact the community's social, economic, political and environmental development. The two images below are examples of the efforts of the community to mobilise information. The first image shows the

distribution of schools in Kibera based on their location, type, and sponsorship. The second image shows the impact of recent demolitions of schools in Kibera. It highlights which schools were relocated and where they were relocated to as a result of these demolitions. The information in these images is gathered and aggregated by the community itself to document and share available resources, as well as to indicate how the community is changing.



Figure 3: Schools Map (MapKibera.org)

School Type	Number of Schools
Pre-Primary School	144
Primary School	147
Secondary School	31
Vocational School	13

Primary Operators/Sponsors	%
NGO/CBO	37%
Private	29%
Religious	27%
Government	4%




Figure 4: Impact of Recent Demolitions in Kibera (www.mapkibera.org/blog/)

My return to Kibera was filled with anticipations of the bleak images of struggle and despair that I had witnessed as a child growing up in this slum. Even though I had done some research before travelling back, just to see how the slum I used to know had transformed within a period of two decades, much of the information I had gathered had portrayed Kibera as a labyrinth of social, economic, political, and environmental decay. Therefore, I was not expecting much more than what the YouTube videos, tourist blogs, and newspaper reports I had encountered had painted into my mind: eye-searing misery. Instead, what I found became a source of remarkable inspiration to me. The creative social enterprise emerging and thriving in such a vulnerable environment aroused my curiosity to want to learn more about what has inspired such unique social experimentations and what implications these have to development theory and practice. This became part of the aim of my dissertation: to unearth the untold truth about human resilience in the most broken of places.

The examples of innovative adaptations highlighted above exemplify what this article terms as civic imagination, a set of creative alternatives that

individuals or groups employ to address common threats in the face of precarity. A review of existing documents cataloguing these innovations in Kibera revealed that local grassroots organisations have been at the core of these innovative adaptations and experimentations. For example, an analysis of aggregate data from OpenschoolsKenya.org detailed that there are currently over 364 formal and informal schools in Kibera providing primary, secondary, and vocational education. Compared to early 2000 when I was last in Kibera, this number of academic institutions had more than quadrupled in a period of fewer than two decades.

“ Instead, what I found became a source of remarkable inspiration to me. The creative social enterprise emerging and thriving in such a vulnerable environment aroused my curiosity to want to learn more about what has inspired such unique social experimentations and what implications these have to development theory and practice. ”

Sponsors	Numbers of Schools	Number of Students	Number of Teachers
Religious Institutions	96	12065	579
Community-Based Organisations	99	15374	664
NGOs	17	1685	95
Government	13	14260	328
International NGOs	3	732	22
NGO/CBO	3	762	38
Private	92	8200	394
Unknown	8	9	167

Further analysis of this data exposed even more surprising news. Of the 364 schools in Kibera, 99 of them are sponsored and operated by local community-based organisations (CBOs), 96 of them are run by local religious institutions, and 92 are privately operated. The table below dissects this analysis. What is even more interesting is the level of government involvement in the provision of education in Kibera. Of the 364 schools, only 13 of them are government-sponsored and about 3 are operated by international NGOs, according to reviewed data.

To mainstream society, the housing conditions of slums present an image contrary to what is considered as stable and reliable. In the case of Kibera, however, the data analysed revealed that while housing was a concern, it was not on the top of the list. This finding was corroborated by my interviews with Kibera residents. For example, the photo below shows the home of a resident I visited during my field study. As I was observing the single-room mud shack that the respondent shared with her husband, daughter, and granddaughter, all I saw was dire desperation. There was only one bed for four people, which also served as a place to store clothes. Many of the family's belongings were hanging on the wall to create room for movement. As an outsider, my assumption was that the respondent needed a bigger house and I expected her to acknowledge this as she was discussing some of her challenges. However, after forty minutes of conversation, housing was not mentioned as part of her problems. She had a myriad

of other challenges, ranging from health to economic issues, but not housing.

Strength from Broken Places

It is customary to assume that places like Kibera are breeding environments for social, economic, political, and environmental vices. While there is undeniable evidence of the human struggle for survival, there is also overwhelming proof of alternative adaptations that have surfaced out of human ingenuity and creativity. A closer look at the day-to-day life of Kibera residents reveals a society that is in a constant reconstruction for betterment, as the images below – taken during my field study – pinpoint. In contrast to the image of the slum as the epitome of urban decay, these images highlight the slum as a symbol of urban social reconstruction, where the urban marginalised progressively re-innovate themselves from their subtle creativity.



Image 2: A Kibera resident's home during my field visit (Edwin, O., 2018)



Image 3: Daily Hustles in Kibera (Wambui, J., 2018)

It is easy to dismiss this creative reconstruction when we look at a place like Kibera from afar through the neoliberal telescopes. However, when we zoom in and look at life through the kaleidoscope of those living it, we are 'made all the more aware of how our own ideals have blinded us to the practicality of the slum residents' (Suttles, 1968: 12). We are also made more aware of the captivating beauty and aspirations often concealed from the mainstream narrative of slums, which instead focuses on the contents of their discontents.

Re-Imagining Slums

In the last few decades, scholars of urban studies have been struggling with how to break away from the old paradigms and regulations that have dominated both the theoretical and practical understanding of urbanisation. The reigning neoliberal theories on the urbanisation process have traditionally operated on the idea that cities everywhere follow a similar basic standardised template of development (Murray, 2017). This belief has resulted in global replications of urban development policies and theories that are rooted in the generic caricatured portrait of cities as glittering centres of social, economic, political, and environmental stability and sustainability. This utopian image of cities has dominated the public imagination for the last century, but in recent decades it has come into sharp contrast with the hardened realities that are now defining contemporary metropolitan experiences and lifestyles. This is particularly true in the expanding megalopolises of the Global South that have been

subjected to the twin pressures of uncontrolled population burst and an unprecedented rate of urban inequality.

While the traditional image of the city has often offered a comforting assurance of social, economic and political success, as well as convenience and privilege, the increasing rate of urban marginalisation is now unsettling this promise. This is particularly true in the cities of developing nations where more than half of the urban population resides in slums (Molbrahim Foundation, 2015). Initially seen as a 'transitory phenomenon expected to fade away with economic growth and modernization, slums have not only failed to disappear, but they have grown in size, and density in land occupation, becoming the rule, rather than the exception, for the city growth' (Smolka & Larangeira, 2008). A dense body of urban scholarship demonstrates that as urbanisation increases in low- and middle-income countries, so too does urban inequality and the growth of slums (United Nations, 2016). It is becoming increasingly clear that slums are now part and parcel of the urban development process. In 2003, UN-Habitat called for cities in the Global South to start embracing them as the new forms of human settlements (UN-Habitat, 2003). In this call, the UN-Habitat argued that while slums continued to present many challenges, it was becoming clear that their growth and persistence were inevitable. It was, therefore, necessary not only to re-conceptualise them, but also to find ways of integrating them into the overall urban development framework.

Image 4: The Superheroes of Kibera is an initiative that helps children in Kibera reimagine themselves as local superheroes using simple recycled materials. Images courtesy of Superheroes of Kibera at <https://www.facebook.com/groups/superheroesofkibera/>



Integrating slums into the urban development framework requires that urban scholars adopt a new language, one that is different from the traditional view of slums as petri dishes of human misery that need to be eliminated at whatever cost. The work that this extract from my dissertation research has presented is part of an ongoing search for this new language. It is a continuation of the existing body of contemporary scholarship that views slums as places where residents use frugal innovations to navigate the harsh realities presented by their environment (Jacobs, 1992; Neuwirth, 2006; Gilbert, 2007; Holston and Caldeira, 2008; Roy, 2011; Dovey, 2012; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Shimeles & Yameogo, 2014). Using practical evidence from Kibera, one of the largest slums in the world, I have unpacked and exposed dynamic and creative innovations and transactions that are at the core of the livelihoods of the slum's residents. The ultimate purpose was to further debunk the traditional neoliberal understanding of slums by providing practical evidence of the creative reconstruction that is taking place there. The article has focused on highlighting various ways in which the DIY (do-it-yourself) innovations in Kibera are compensating for the lack of formal service delivery institutions. The set of frugal experimentations captured in this work offer a strong rebuke to the neoliberal conceptualisation of slums as places of 'metropolitan decay'. Contrary to this view, the evidence I present supports the argument that slums are places of metropolitan innovations.

Indeed, Jane Jacobs argues that the inherent resources necessary for 'unslumming' the slum exist within the slum itself (1992). According to Jacobs, 'unslumming' does not mean the demolition or

relocation of slums, as seen with current upgrading mega-projects. Rather, it means improving slums using the resources embedded within them. Successful 'unslumming' hinges on the quality and quantity of the existing regenerative forces often inherent in the social infrastructure (Boo, 2012; Gilbert, 2007; Jacobs, 1992; Neuwirth, 2006; Roy, 2011). This requires an understanding of the structural and relational arrangements of the existing social infrastructure. Attention to its capacity to absorb the present and emerging social, economic, political, and environmental shocks is important. Given the limited scholarly work attempting to analyse the transforming nature of the social infrastructure of slums in the last decade, this work provides a crucial entry point to the new discourse of slums that pays attention to the regenerative forces that emerge out of social desperation for survival. This article provides strong evidence to support the emerging theoretical narrative that the creativity, resilience, ingenuity, and social capacity in slums are potential tools for 'unslumming' the slums (Bayat, 2007; Coleman, 1990; Field, 2003; Holston & Caldeira, 2008; Jacobs, 1992; Putnam, 2000; Whyte, 1943).

Conclusion

This article has focused on providing a twin story of contemporary cities, especially those in emerging economies. First, the article has highlighted the increasing promise that cities in developing nations offer as centres of social and economic development. Second, the extract has illustrated the competing narrative of the city highlighted by the growth of slums, which demonstrates the existence of increasing inequalities. Slums illustrate the uneven development of cities and the unequal distribution of their benefits. It is undeniable that the development of slums parallel to the growth of cities poses considerable concerns to the question of urban sustainability, especially in areas that lack the means and resources to address the undesirable outcomes of slums. By nature, slums do not highlight the best of society. They underscore a caricature of arrested development that often impacts those with little means to compete with and in the rapidly growing metropolises. However, as studies have demonstrated, slums are here to stay as an integral part of the new urban identity. In fact, in emerging

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economies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, slums represent the new urban frontiers. It is therefore imperative, in both theory and practice, to start embracing them as the new forms of metropolitan identities.

While the call to embrace slums as the new urban frontiers can be seen as an overreach or a deviation from the traditional theories and practices that have governed urban development discourses, it is undeniable that unless we embrace them as so, any attempts to address their challenges and threats will continue to be futile. This article has made a case for adopting slums as the new forms of urban identities and frontiers by underscoring creative DIY innovations that are transforming the lives of slum residents for the better, as evidenced in Kibera. These DIY innovations offer new ways of looking at slums and their residents as what Dr. Anil Gupta calls 'hidden hotbeds of inventions' (TED, 2009), or what one resident of Kibera termed a 'cosmopolitan ghetto', where frugal innovations emerge out of collective ingenuity and a desire to create change with little means. To address the problem of slums, and thus the question of urban sustainability in emerging economies, we must look into and work with the resources already embedded in slums themselves. This article provides just an entry point to both the theoretical and practical reconsideration of slums as places of metropolitan innovation, rather than just of metropolitan decay.


I would like to conclude this article by highlighting some lyrics from a song written and produced by a group of artists from Kibera Slum. Using a hybrid genre that mixes Western hip hop and rap with a local Swahili rhythm, the artists not only recognise the challenges that face the residents of slums, but also acknowledge the many ways in which residents unite to create frugal yet effective innovations to address their collective needs. The song sends a message that despite the chaotic nature of slums, there is nonetheless hope and resourcefulness that breeds progress and transformation. More importantly, there are people whose identity is not defined merely by the state of their existence, but more deeply by their character, collectivity, and vision for a better community:

'They say that nothing good never come outta a slum,
But look what we bring out the slum for you to learn,
Artwork and handwork is the talent that we have,
The abilities we have, we strictly preserve,
Why they despise and criticize,
But once you're in the place,
Men and women so nice,
And the children so wise,
Despite the challenges they may face,
Happiness is on their face,
One love is what they embrace.
I call it home they call it a slum,
My motherland I love it most,
Kibera, Kibera...' (Made in Kibera, 2016)

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Johannesburg, Ontario:

Street Naming Strategies and the Decolonised City to Come

By Melissa Levin | Peer Review

South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy was both enabled and burdened by the global political conditions of the late 1980s. The shifting balance of forces at the time meant that the global appetite for authoritarianism was passing as the horizon of possibility suggested by socialism was fading. In other words, democratisation efforts were encouraged by the international community, while radical transformative economic and social projects were not. Tied to this global 'pressure from above' for political transformation was country-wide mobilisation of the masses of people for change. This local organisation put pressure on, but was unable to dismantle the power of the apartheid military and

the white-owned economy. Coupled with that social reality was an ideational perspective articulated by the leading liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), that 'South Africa belonged to all who live in it, black and white'. In other words, the national imaginary accommodated both oppressor and oppressed, albeit in a new relationship of political equality. The navigation of this moment and the compromises that ensued significantly limited the depth of democratisation that would unfold in the polity. Whilst momentous, the project of democracy-building without a twin project of decolonisation of the social, economic and cultural life of the polity has reinforced the power of the already empowered

and naturalised the impoverishment of the formerly, formally oppressed. This neo-apartheid reality (cf. Ratshitanga, 2019) is evident politically in the reproduction of the bifurcated state (cf. Mamdani, 1996), economically in the persistence of massive un- and under-employment of African people in particular, and culturally in the symbolic presence of colonial statuary and monuments throughout the country.

Over two and a half decades after its official demise, apartheid's presence remains ubiquitous in South Africa. It is visible in the gulf between rich and poor, in the spatial geography that still segregates the country, in the statues of Boer generals that still stand tall and proud across the land. Central to the transformative agenda of the new state is the undoing of this legacy and the elimination of persistent social divisions. However, while the reversal of historical injustices discursively informs all statist policy, the reckoning with history as a site of struggle and transformation does not. The end of authoritarian and colonial regimes has generally been accompanied by the spectacle of the demolition of their symbols, or, at least, the removal of their symbols to less prominent spaces. This has not happened in South Africa. The statue of the Boer General Louis Botha proudly stands before the entrance to the parliament in Cape Town. Queen Victoria's statue guards the back of the relatively democratised legislature. To reinforce the normalcy of the memorial presence of colonial leaders are the city monikers and streets whose names commemorate colonial leadership, thus obscuring their atrocities. Modernist theories of the nation suggest that the manner in which the past is constructed is central to building national solidarities and that nationalists build nations through constructing usable pasts. The ANC has chosen a bureaucratised route to accommodating histories in an effort at building national solidarities and legitimising statehood. Nowhere is this ambiguous, administrative, and often denationalised practice of nation-building more evident than in the street and place re/naming processes in South African cities.

But the reproduction of coloniality through public memorialisation on city streets is not a South African issue alone. The title of this essay deliberately yokes together two distant places: Johannesburg and Ontario, in an attempt to make the point that the very

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character of coloniality is its global reach, and that nationalising memory and counter-memory serves to reinforce institutional practices (like the nation-state itself) that derive from European expansion. As illustration, each day I spend countless hours commuting to my place of work at the University of Toronto (or Tkoronto, the Mohawk name for the city) along the Bathurst core to the St. George campus.

Bathurst Street is named for Henry Bathurst, the 3rd Earl Bathurst who ran Britain's colonial office, sent settlers to Canada after the War of 1812 and appointed Lord Somerset as administrator of the Cape Colony. As markers of his colonial reach and success, numerous towns and streets are named for him, such as Bathurst County in New South Wales, Australia; Bathurst Island in Nunavut, Canada; and Bathurst, a small town in the Eastern Cape in South Africa. Bathurst was also once the capital city of Gambia. That city was renamed Banjul after the end of formal colonialism. St. George signifies a multitude of histories. He was obviously not a coloniser himself, but his memory was deployed in the service of imperialism, his cross the symbol of English domination as represented in the flag, and as a call to conquest when Portuguese soldiers captured Africans as chattel in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade:

'The Age of Discovery required a man of arms, and George fit the bill. The conquering knight personified civilization pitted against beastly antagonists and monstrous races. The dragon slayer mounted on his steed antedated the charge: "Exterminate all the brutes." It would be hard to imagine a better representative of the Portuguese errand or a saint more suitable to the task' (Hartman, 2007: 65).

The history of both of these characters is not evident immediately; their roles in the violence of imperialising projects is not apparent. In masking that historical violence, we tend to mask the on-going 'slow violence' of systems of coloniality that are reproduced in the present. To get rid of Bathurst everywhere, to decolonise the city, in symbolism and practice, demands that the city to come must be imagined transnationally.

An analysis of the symbolic import of street and place names as well as processes of renaming in cities alerts us to the multiple articulations of power in the settler colony/neo-colony. It contemplates the ways in which street and place naming practices normalise a settler presence and colonial present; and, in particular, alerts us to the possibilities and challenges that inhere in efforts to transform the city.

Street re/naming too presents a productive avenue for reading the relationship between cities and the colonial present. Street names, according to Maoz Azaryahu (1997: 311) have been understudied by social scientists 'in their studies of the structures of authority and the legitimation of power' since they are 'ostensibly visible, quintessentially mundane, and seemingly obvious'. Duncan Light (2004: 154) suggests that streets have garnered less attention than public place renaming more broadly in political life and the academy since they are seen at first glance as a 'trivial topic of investigation'.

However, Light argues that street names can be 'significant expressions of national identity with a powerful symbolic importance' (2004: 154). Nowhere is this more apparent than in South Africa where, according to Subesh Pillay, member of the Mayoral Committee of the Tshwane municipality, no other issue of state transformation has created

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as much oppositional concern and antagonistic mobilisation of both people and resources (Pillay, Personal Communication, 2009/2010). I argue that the everydayness of the street, or Azaryahu's 'mundaneness' of streets and their names after the event of naming, reinforces and reproduces a sense of cultural belonging and ownership. To change the landscape, through renaming practices and in spatial terms, is a form of unsettling, in the sense of both a feeling of unease and instability, and in the practice of removing settlers (not the people, but the practices of coloniality).

Streets – as signs of mobility, modernity, and freedom – are central objects in the imagining of a 'new' South Africa. The apartheid state tasked itself with significantly curtailing the mobility of black people. The 'tribalisation' of Africans found expression in the 'Bantustan' system that apportioned homelands to different tribal authorities, in an attempt to deny the possibility of unified African nationalism as against primordial segregation. The strategy was classically 'divide and rule' and, in Mamdani's terms, South African apartheid did what colonialism achieved across the continent, which was to erect a 'bifurcated state' – a state that was racialised at the centre and tribalized at the periphery. A significant part of the 'traditionalising' apparatus of the modern apartheid state was to create urban zones of impermanence for Africans who laboured in white South Africa. These transient zones, the urban townships of South Africa, racialised the landscape into segregated living spaces. Movement, for African people, was circumscribed by the advance of settler colonialism, ultimately articulated as apartheid.

As markers of lived space, streets are symbolic and also utilitarian and functional and, as such, are expressions of politics. Colonial city streets are designed to control and assert formal dominance over the colonised. Apartheid spatial geographies maintained segregation in both form and practice. The design of black townships gave expression to the logic of apartheid supremacy. Nowhere was this more evident than in the streets of the township. The usual township had one major arterial route into and out of the township. Rendering residents immobile was imminently available as a mode of control. The web of streets through the townships attest to the impermanence of their residents, at least in apartheid

theory if not in everyday practice. The venous streets that circulate through townships were mostly unnamed, a symbolic injunction towards the transitory position of black people in white South Africa. In apartheid's aftermath, unnamed township streets are not just an issue for symbolic redress, but also a bureaucratic problem for the state. The dispatchment of ambulances or other multiple services of state is hindered in the absence of order, of intransience, of maps. Authoritarian control requires the capacity to close down avenues for mobility. Democratic control demands state access to the individuated mass. The inverse of the restraints on movement for the indigenous populations of colonised countries is the role of streets as technologies of conquest, enabling the colonising forces to expand through indigenous land. This role is explicitly referred to in the context of Canadian colonisation, where streets called 'Colonization Road' can be found throughout the provinces of Ontario and Manitoba. These were the roads that encouraged and enabled European settlement, transported economic goods, and forced indigenous people off their land.

In naming the landscape and streetscapes of South Africa, the 'Afrikanerising bureaucrats' (Alexander, 1989) also sought to limit the ideational mobility of its subjects. In other words, authoritarian control demands a physical and mental component. Control of the ideational domain is about the production of 'common-sense', the construction of the taken-for-granted aspects of daily life (like, in apartheid South Africa, the belief in the normative value of whiteness and the alterity of blackness). Part of the normalising practices of white dominance included the naming of the environment. The white country in general, and the Afrikaner country in particular, were vivified in the names and languages of its streets and places. It is in this regard that the nationalism of the liberation movement needs to be read differently to the democratising impulses of the global third wave. National liberation was historically posited as a drive towards decolonisation and the idea of democracy was one amongst many means towards achieving decolonisation. But the global democratic moment outstripped the exigencies of decolonisation and the response to statist attempts to name and rename the landscape has been dominated by the former imperative. For Amilcar Cabral, national liberation is 'an act of culture', a political act that fundamentally

alters the terrain of the taken-for-granted. Part of altering the terrain is the political act of naming.

Extending on this perspective, even the forgotten named on street signs become part of the language of a place. They become part of the sound and geography of public space, the vocabulary and culture of nationhood, and what is regarded as a community of people. This quiet and implicit memorialisation is what some scholars refer to as 'habit memory' and what Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 82–83) refers to as 'habitus', 'a system of lasting, transposable dispositions' in consistent albeit muted dialogue which 'functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions.' In this sense, street names as part of the vocabulary of a city become devices for what Eviatar Zerubavel (1997: 87–89; 2003: 317) calls 'mnemonic socialization' – the process through which citizens are culturally attuned to the narrative of a place prior to, and outside of, a formal process of education. In a sense, it is the everyday reinforcement of groupness.

I therefore argue that the idea that history will be forgotten or erased if statues of racists, misogynists and colonisers are toppled, or their names on streets, cities and towns are changed, is misplaced. It is less that the nation-builders will be forgotten than the content of the city will become dominated by another vocabulary, that another common-sense will prevail. The extent to which that common sense internalises the changed markers of the city as more than just a name on a street is a question of democratic politics (which is briefly discussed below). This unremembered historical figure is the peculiar legacy of street and place names. On one level, they are memorial plaques that pepper a cityscape. On

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“ The renaming of streets thus becomes historically momentous on two occasions: at the moment that the street is renamed and political conflict or consensus prevail, and as markers of the cultural content of a city that infuse everyday life with a sense of belonging or estrangement. ”

another, they are simply geographical markers with invisible histories and obscure political import. Street names in this second sense are easily disregarded – in the FSU it was possible ‘to walk along Socialist Street without thinking of socialism’ (Kirschenbaum, op cit: 251). Similarly, King George Street in Durban is equally devoid of political significance or meaning. The renaming of streets thus becomes historically momentous on two occasions: at the moment that the street is renamed and political conflict or consensus prevail, and as markers of the cultural content of a city that infuse everyday life with a sense of belonging or estrangement. In other words, we might not think about socialism whilst trekking down Socialist Street, or know of or think about British Imperialism when ambling across King George but, combined with other street names of the revolution or of imperialism, these nonetheless help shape our imaginations and sense of ownership of a city. In Lefebvre’s (1991) terms, place and street naming work to produce space and to produce its ‘essentialized’ characteristics.

Kirschenbaum (2010: 243) regards city streets as ‘palimpsests’ that are expressions of cities of memory. These ghosts, she argues, ‘coexist with the modern state’s tendency to use its control of the city streets as a means of supplanting local associations’ (ibid, 244). Urban geography, particularly manifesting through the street, accordingly inscribes ‘a particular view of the national past’ (Light, 154) by the modern state. But the modern state is neither monolithic nor homogenous. Even if its bureaucratising impulse numbs the political content of those at its helm, it does so differently, conforming to the multiple contexts of the diverse spheres or tiers that institutionalise the state in daily life. The extent to which ‘the national’ can incorporate ‘the local’ and articulate the perspectives of these locals to its own is the extent to which

hegemony is achieved, is the extent to which, in this instance, ‘the national’ is achieved. It is the local that, at once, is steeped in and expresses neo-apartheid and is the site through which democratic practices can tear away from it.

At their most powerful, then, street names are significant as naturalised markers of the cultural content of a city that infuse everyday life with a sense of belonging or estrangement. In other words, we do not think about colonialism whilst walking along Palmerston or down Bathurst Street in Toronto, but combined with other street names of imperialism, these streets help shape our imaginations and our sense of ownership of a city. Familiarity is a forgetting. Part of unsettling the colonial city is about a spatial reorientation that deracialises it, transforms its divisions based on social class, and creates safety for women (among other vulnerable groups). This is eloquently outlined in Ratshitanga’s *New Cities, New Economies*. As he points out, this is not simply a technical exercise, but is deeply political and as such needs to be mobilised and fought for. And that fight is not easily won. Ratshitanga points to the question of ‘path dependence’ of neo-colonial/neo-apartheid cities that acts to reinforce their presence. Most African capital cities, he points out, are inherited from colonial states and these cities, in the settler colonies at least, maintain the spatial divisions devised by colonisers; maintain what Fanon refers to as the Manichaean world of colonialism, the world ‘cut in two’. This path dependence, which is understood as the tendency of institutions to reproduce themselves, even at moments of potential rupture, is evident in street naming and renaming strategies, as the imperatives of struggle give way to the exigent conditions of the moment, to the apparent balance of forces, and to the bureaucratisation mechanisms of statehood.

Within the ANC itself, there were multiple contending perspectives as far as memorialisation was concerned. Pallo Jordan, former Minister of Arts and Culture, argued that ‘history would resolve itself’ and was not worth battling in such an emotional terrain. Joel Netshitenzhe contended that the ANC at the moment of democracy was consumed with what it regarded as the more important domain of political-economy. For Bridget Mabandla, former Deputy Culture Minister, the pursuit of a democratic memory was key. Unlike the collapse of regimes across the

globe, South Africa had a much less certain or more ambiguous response to the question of transforming the discursive environment of apartheid. Alexei Yurchak (14–16) contends that the primary ‘irreversible results’ of perestroika were achieved ‘at the level of discourse’. This was not the case with South Africa. For the FSU, the collapse of communism was symbolically accompanied with the tearing down of walls, statues, and monuments; and with the restoration of historical places and street names where, as early as 1990, name changes were central to the transformative agenda (cf. Azaryahu, Light, Kirschenbaum). This was not the immediate case in South Africa. Daniel Milo segregates street naming in French historical political practice as either honoring heroes or honoring ideas; that is, as ‘honorific’ or ‘ideological’. In South Africa, changes have most often not been ‘honorific’ of the heroes of national liberation, nor ‘ideological’ (as in ‘Liberation Street’, ‘Freedom Street’ etc.). In significant ways, these untransformed name-scapes are an illustration of path dependence.

The South African state begins to democratise within the context of an elaborate domestic and international web of institutionalised and technical naming practices. At the level of the United Nations, its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) saw the need for a group to standardise geographical names at national and international levels. Amongst other things, ECOSOC was of the view that ‘geographical names’ play an important role in ‘economic, social and cultural development, particularly in the developing countries’ (UN, Resolution IX/2). As such, in 1959, it carved the space for the elaboration of what became the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN). The first conference on geographical names standardisation was held eight years later in 1967 and has taken place every five years since. Between 1967 and 2007, Geographical Naming Conferences under the auspices of the UN have adopted 195 resolutions. Some of those resolutions divide Africa into four linguistic/geographical groups in the UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names: Africa, West; Africa, Central; Africa, East and Africa, South (UN, Resolution 111/26).

Drawing from the UN guidelines, South Africa has enacted its own legislative framework for place names during apartheid, which was amended in 1998. The legislation siphons much of its content from the

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UN recommendations on national standardisation (UN, Resolution 1/4), including the establishment of authorities tasked with directing the standardisation of national geographical names (UN, Resolution V/15). The UN standardisation gets complicated when contextually administered. The politics of South Africa are such that some of the international resolutions invariably collide. In particular, the resolutions on the promotion of minority groups and commemorative naming practices make for lively political battles.

In February 2010, the Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulu Xingwana, released the following statement:

‘The standardisation of geographical names in a democratic South Africa is part of the process of redressing the marginalisation of indigenous language, culture, and heritage. It reclaims this wealth for the benefit of all, now and for the future. It is an exciting and dynamic process filled with opportunity for South Africans to enhance their understanding of themselves and their geographical places and in this way, to celebrate our common identity.

Geographic names standardisation is not a uniquely South African phenomenon. In terms of United Nations (UN) Resolution 4 of the first UN Conference on the Standardisation of Geographical Names, each country has, the sovereign right to standardise its geographical names and decide what the name for each feature in that country should be and how that name should be written. In 1998 the South African Geographical Names Council Act (Act No.118 of 1998) was passed by Parliament.

Names standardisation is part of the broad

reconciliation and social cohesion process. The standardisation of geographical names in South Africa is part of the healing and reconciliation process, within the broader context of social transformation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended the re-naming of geographical features as a form of symbolic reparations to address South Africa's unjust past. We all know that many of the existing names of our geographical features are not reflective of our society and our quest for national unity. Names standardisation is not an attempt to obliterate the history of any section of our society. It seeks to contribute towards inclusivity and participatory democracy that acknowledges our common heritage.'

This statement is quoted in its entirety for its careful articulation of the key concerns of the state with regard to history, change, and the rewriting of South Africa's national narrative. The state's considerations of name changes are fundamentally concerned with altering the historical denigration of African life, while not alienating white people from a sense of national belonging. At once, the state presents an argument for redressing the specificity of South Africa's racist past whilst placing South Africa in an international context that generalises its concerns and argues its case in terms of a global technicality. The language used is not language of fundamental and revolutionary change, but the language of aspirant social cohesion and a democratic polity that values and foregrounds the notion of a common heritage.

The statement goes on to list twenty-eight name changes approved by the Minister. This list mainly comprises the names of rivers, mountains and other 'natural' features, 'innocuous' changes such as the

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names of post-offices or other buildings and changes that reflect the correct spelling of African names (such as eNyonini rather than Nyonini). There is a yawning gap between the formal statist naming practices of the 'new' South Africa and the informal conventions of the unofficial living spaces of South Africa's burgeoning squatter communities. The 'informal settlements' that pepper the urban landscape unabashedly name their places for their heroes, dead or alive, such as Ramaphosa, Thabo Mbeki, or Slovo.

The process of the institutional deracialisation of South Africa's towns and cities began in earnest in the early 1990s during negotiations between the apartheid regime and the liberation forces. The product of the negotiations was the Local Government Transitional Act (no. 209 of 1993) which laid the groundwork for the incorporation of segregated neighbourhoods into unified local authorities. The imperative of this round of negotiations underscores the impasse that resulted in apartheid's demise. In political terms, at least, there were no clear victors in the historical battle for and against apartheid. The municipal electoral system, produced alongside the demarcations of the new townscapes, provided for a larger share of the vote for those who became known as 'minorities'. For most of the country, this system skewed votes in favour of whites. By the second local government elections, the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) and the Municipal Demarcation Act (27 of 1998) had secured overall proportionality of the municipalities and produced the context for the first one-person, one-vote municipal elections. The Municipal Demarcation Act (27 of 1998) reduced the number of municipalities from 843 to 284. This included 6 metros (City of Cape Town, City of Johannesburg, City of Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, eThekweni, and Nelson Mandela Bay; Buffalo City and Mangaung were designated as metros after the 2011 local election), 231 local councils, and 47 district councils.

Whereas the previous interim legislation had demarcated wards on the basis of segregated areas rather than voter numbers and given ward 60 percent of council seats, the new legislation demarcated wards on the basis of voter numbers and assigned ward and proportional representation seats on a 50:50 ratio. Cities, towns and townships became amalgamated in form into single administrative units, but remained untransformed in content. In other words, institutional

continuity was more apparent than institutional change. This is revealed in street naming strategies that after 2000 took the form of adherence to a litany of regulatory mechanisms; of international, national and local legislation for it to unfold. What became clear, especially from the experiences in the Tshwane and eThekweni municipalities, is that those with the organised cultural and material capacity to thwart name changes used the regulatory environment to do so. Simply put, the regulatory environment provided opportunity for the reinforcement of already existing power relations, as confrontations in courts played out between the local state and Afrikaner social movements. Absent from these contests were previously disenfranchised peoples.

In contrast to that approach to street name changes was the 2013 Ogimaa Mikana project in Toronto. This project is indigenous-led and insists on reclaiming colonised space through (guerrilla) renaming strategies of streets, lanes, and pathways. This reclamation happens through the restoration of Anishinaabewomin place names inserted over the Canadian name. For instance, the hip Queen Street West in downtown Toronto was renamed Ogimaa Mikana or 'leaders' trail' as a tribute to the women leaders of the resurgent Idle No More anti-colonial movement. Spadina Road, another street that often takes me to work, was recast as Ishpadinaa which corrects the corruption of the Ojibwe name. These naming tactics are an attempt to make visible the attempted erasure of Toronto's indigenous history. Typical of colonialism as an event and ongoing process is the effort to name space since, in naming, a culture appropriates, owns, controls and defines space, in an attempt to negate the violence of conquest. Ogimaa Mikana forces, at least, an acknowledgement that the city we dwell in was not terra nullius. The reception to the name changes has been mixed. Again, in the capacity of institutions to reproduce themselves, Canadian national identity that pivots on the idea of multiculturalism has absorbed and domesticated these new names, and their critique, into that multicultural identity. In other words, instead of indigenous peoples being regarded as a colonised people, they are recast as part of the multicultural edifice of Canadian society, as one group among many. For instance, the Dupont Business Association officially appropriated Ishpidinaa onto street signs, the name sitting above the still operational

Spadina. However, the fight against the colonial city has not ended with street name changes. The Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission has designated land acknowledgements as part of the everyday institutional practice of public institutions, like schools, universities and legislatures. Every day, children in Toronto acknowledge that they live on and are educated on indigenous land. They also still sing the Canadian national anthem. Indigenous gardens are appearing throughout the city, and the city's lakes are sites of cultural and spiritual practices. Protests against police brutality and corporate/state alliances in exploiting indigenous lands mobilise thousands. In other words, naming alone does not transform the colonial city. But it is a necessary part of the process. Representation, after all (according to Stuart Hall), is about refraction – both reflecting and producing normative values and aspirations. It is thus a key site in the battle of ideas and the battle for a changed society. It is on this question – the transformation of society – that the attention of liberation forces in South Africa has been deficient.

Stuart Hall (1988: 7) is instructive here in his analysis of the emergence of Thatcherism as a political project. He posits the important insight by Antonio Gramsci about politics, that it is not:

'an arena which simply reflects already unified collective political identities, already constituted forms of struggle. Politics... is not a dependent sphere. It is where forces and relations, in the economy, in society, in culture, have to be actively worked on to produce particular forms of power, forms of domination. This is the production of politics – politics as a production.'

The Thatcherite project was thus one to transform the state in order to restructure society (Hall: 3). Like early decolonisers, the liberation forces in South Africa sought first the political kingdom in the expectation that all else would follow. But, in the above analysis, the political kingdom does not just exist, but has to be actively built. The political kingdom is not a given and is never homogenous. This is true of both the state and society. A democratising and decolonising project would have to create a new cultural dispensation, one in which the subjection and subjugation of black people and women articulated through the naturalisation of capitalist accumulation would not

longer persist. Put differently, the historic project would be a contest ‘not just for power, but for popular authority, for hegemony’ (Hall: 4). What this refers to is a contest for the transformation of common-sense, taken-for-granted ways of being in the world. This project demands a deepening of democratic life, a democratic proliferation that is usurped in the current moment by the tendency towards bureaucratisation and seizing decision-making from those resident across the country. The significantly untransformed cities of South Africa, both in form and content, reflects that bureaucratising tendency. As Hall (8) posits:

‘That bureaucratic conception of politics has nothing to do with the mobilisation of a variety of popular forces. It doesn’t have any conception of how people become empowered by doing something: first of all about their immediate troubles; then, the power expands their political capacities and ambitions, so that they begin to think again about what it might be like to rule the world ... Their politics has ceased to have a connection with this most modern of all resolutions — the deepening of democratic life.’

‘Without the deepening of popular participation in national-cultural life, ordinary people don’t have any experience of actually running anything. We need to re-acquire the notion that politics is about expanding popular capacities, the capacities of ordinary people.’

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Financing Infrastructure for New Economies in the Context of Dislocated Markets

By Zeph Nhleko | Peer Review

Introduction

One could be forgiven for thinking that given the close to 20 deadly pandemics (LePan, 2020) and over 70 economic crises humanity has seen since the first century, we should by now know how mutation works and what economic outcomes to expect. This view is influenced by the established understanding that irrespective of the type of crisis – natural, financial, economic or otherwise – all crises have some similarities (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). For example, we can anticipate varying impacts from crises on risk appetite in markets, liquidity, productivity, trade, economic activity, standard of living – sometimes even lives and fiscal debt.

The uncertainty in crises mutation begs the question whether certain tools can be set up during normal times to help smooth impacts. Specifically, this question should seek to deal with smoothing impacts on infrastructure finance by development finance institutions (DFIs). Some have criticised DFIs in South Africa for lacking the foresight to deal with and respond to crises in general. This note seeks to add to the DFI arsenal in thinking through possible options.

The proposals in this note are inspired by the New Cities New Economies project in which Ratshitanga (2019) triumphs in relating why the South African

economy finds itself where it is. The project analysis confirms that the economic problems confronting South Africa have not changed since 1994. The assessment further makes a recommendation for a controlled and deliberate economic discrimination to development by introducing the ex nihilo strategy. This strategy discriminates because irrespective of the size and number of developments, specific spatial localities must be chosen to create new economies out of nothing. This is a good thing. The special economic zones concept uses this approach. The critique that this strategy might locate people in the middle of nowhere misses the point that this is precisely how new economies should be forged.

Some of the missing links (Ratshitanga, 2019) to achieving quick progress with the New Cities New Economies project have been the weak collaboration among stakeholders, the lack of widespread programmatic approach to infrastructure development, the dearth of visionary leadership, clinging to the notion of democratic centralisation at the expense of new innovative ways, the inability to identify and successfully nurture local economy initiatives, as well as a lack of innovative funding solutions. The rest of the report assesses the concepts of new economies and dislocated markets to frame the discussion before highlighting the lingering challenges of municipal infrastructure. The last section covers the proposed tools that should be considered by DFIs for infrastructure funding, especially during times of dysfunctional markets.

The concept of new economies

The term 'new economy' can assume different definitions, depending on the context of usage. It could be used to refer to a high-tech driven economy and society (DeLong and Summers, 2001) that emphasises information, ideas and relationships. It can also mean the introduction of new measures of economic progress that encourage new frameworks of economic analysis and policies (OECD, 2019). In this context, the term is used in the spirit of the New Cities New Economies project to mean the development of new spatial settlements that are accompanied by economic activity. Naturally, these are sustainable environments that lean towards being urban in nature. The emphasis is on financing the creation of new infrastructure for these spatial localities, which

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should be situated within municipality boundaries in South Africa. For new economies to make sense, settlements and economic activity must be supported by sound economic and social infrastructure. For example, many of China's cities that started off being labelled as ghost towns eventually found their vibrancy (Shepard, 2015), thus driving the point that if planned properly and supported with the relevant infrastructure, new economies can be developed.

In the case of South Africa, the creation of new economies ex nihilo does not detract from the reality that existing township and rural economies must be improved. The neo-apartheid state of South Africa has ensured that black people who live in these areas, especially in townships, remain crowded with inadequate infrastructure (Evans, 2009).

Dislocated capital markets

Capital market dislocation refers to widespread asset mispricing in the market (Pasquariello, 2012) brought about by a shock internal or external to the market. As a result of the difficulty in measuring market dislocations, it has often been proposed that a market-specific index can be created to assess them. The impact of market dislocations on the ability of DFIs to access funding can be devastating. First, investors pull out of the market, thus rendering DFIs unable to issue new debt instruments. Secondly, the cost of borrowing rises sharply as a risk-off sentiment sets in. Thirdly, those lenders who remain in the market reprice their facilities upwards to compensate for the perceived extra risk. The outcome is that a DFI struggles to service its commitments, let alone extend new credit or create new business. If the market dislocation persists, this means the DFI is unable to invest more to counter the economic downturn.

Municipal infrastructure challenges

Ten years ago, the municipal infrastructure growth rates were robust across all infrastructure types. By 2018, the only growth rate posting a positive return was for transport equipment. This demonstrates both the reversal in infrastructure development and perhaps the inability to maintain infrastructure at the municipal level.

Furthermore, it has been reported recently that it would take an increase in infrastructure investment of 28% per year for the next three years for South Africa to get back to the original growth trends observed half a decade ago (Watermeyer and Phillips, 2020). New economies must be created at the municipal level of the economy and therefore investing in municipalities is critical. One of the investment vehicles is in municipal bonds.

information management systems and sound accounting management, among others.

Funding options that can be elevated during market dislocations episodes

Repurchase agreements (repos)

One of the key tools to deal with the DFI liquidity challenges through municipal bonds is to utilise them as repurchase agreements (repos). Repurchase agreements are a form of short-term market borrowing for traders. In the case of municipal bonds, term repurchase agreements with long tenor would be preferred. Although creditworthiness and interest rates are more likely to fluctuate in a long tenor repo, most DFIs' funding formula are more suited for these types of repos – with maturities of 6 months or longer.

R million

	Construction works		Plant, machinery and equipment		Transport equipment		Land and existing buildings		Other fixed assets		Leased assets and investment property		Total	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
	52 026	50 911	5 037	4 404	1 241	1 669	1 246	1 133	1 451	1 288	1 082	261	62 083	59 666
Y-o-Y growth		-2%		-13%		34%		-9%		-11%		-76%		-4%
10-yr growth	194%	63%	328%	173%	33%	56%	-17%	-66%	371%	168%	100%	433%	187%	58%
	2007	2008	2007	2008	2007	2008	2007	2008	2007	2008	2007	2008	2007	2008
	17 715	31 252	1 177	1 612	936	1 067	1 503	3 356	308	480	0	49	21 639	37 816
Y-o-Y growth		76%		37%		14%		123%		56%		100%		75%

(Source: Statistics South Africa)

In order to support the development of sound primary and secondary municipal bond markets, DFIs might have to increase their role of facilitating the municipal bond market. Balance sheet acquisitions may be utilised where available, or the prudent increase of debt-to-equity ratios might be explored. These municipal bonds can then later be used for repurchase agreements or collateralised instruments. To sustain this approach, a steady flow of municipal bond purchase must be maintained.


One key benefit that will flow from facilitating the municipal primary bond market is enhancing the governance standards at municipal level. This will be achieved as municipalities comply with market listing requirements such as financial information,

Setting longer tenor will probably be difficult initially, but once market players adjust, the process should stabilise. There is enough evidence in the case of South Africa that supports market appetite for this type of instrument. A standard tri-party repo would be preferred for this exercise.

Key risk mitigating processes, such as attending to over-collateralisation, margin calls or under-collateralisation can be utilised to deal with risks from various sources including the terms of the transaction, liquidity, high leveraging and counterparty risk, among others. A steady flow of these instruments must be maintained.

Simple structure of a repo

Earlier date: money flows to seller and bond to buyer



Later date: bond returns to seller and money flows back to buyer

end up being a discussion about nationalisation, then it ends up being a conversation about printing money or about the threat to the central bank’s independence. These are, quite frankly, inconsequential discussions and take a lot of our energy unnecessarily.

Anyone getting involved in the conversation about the central bank supporting economic development indirectly through DFIs should be aware that: (i) only privately-owned assets can be nationalised (Polity, 2011); (ii) as per the guidance of the monetary theory of inflation (Friedman, 1956), increasing the money supply faster than economic output is inflationary; and (iii) the independence of the central bank is guaranteed by the constitution (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2020). Therefore, if it is agreed that historically the key elements of central banking are its independence, inflation targeting and direct/indirect support to economic sectors (Epstein, 2005), then the conversation should be about the central bank’s role in assisting DFIs with infrastructure finance.


Surely in the same manner that the central bank targets sovereign paper in the primary or secondary market, it can target DFI paper or create an infrastructure-specific borrowing facility for DFIs. It has been argued that it should be normal for DFIs to have central bank reserve accounts and even participate in the discount window (Rezende, 2015), especially during times of dysfunctional financial markets. This argument is further justified by the fact that monetary policy liquidity interventions do not go all the way to support DFIs’ borrowing requirements during tough times.

“ Therefore, if it is agreed that historically the key elements of central banking are its independence, inflation targeting and direct/indirect support to economic sectors (Epstein, 2005), then the conversation should be about the central bank’s role in assisting DFIs with infrastructure finance. ”

Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBO)

Municipal bonds of varying credit quality levels could be packaged into tradable Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBO) tranches to deal with liquidity issues. CBOs are structured debt instruments that have different bond grades with varying risk levels as underlying assets. This process facilitates the packaging of high-grade and low-grade municipal paper to be traded in the secondary market. This type of packaging allows high risk investors to participate in the low-grade, high yield segment of the CBO. Since South African municipalities have varying financial strengths and capabilities, the CBO approach would accommodate a wider range of municipalities – beyond just the metros.

Simple structure of a CBO



South African Reserve Bank infrastructure facility

There is a need for the central bank to be an active economic development agent, especially in dysfunctional markets. For some strange reason, the conversation about the involvement of the central bank in supporting economic development directly or indirectly is always taken to extremes. If it does not

The irrational presupposition that DFIs as non-clearing banks (i.e. as banks that do not participate in the exchange of payment instructions) cannot be supported by central banks deprives us of innovative thinking and imagination. It is logical that the framing and deployment of monetary policy should be informed in the main by prevailing domestic economic conditions. While the central bank independence and chosen monetary policy tool must remain mostly rigid, the investment/lending aspect of the policy must adapt and evolve with domestic economic progress. Central banks, by their very nature, are capable of adaptation – note, for example, how Montagu Norman, Benjamin Strong, Hjalmar Schacht and Émile Moreau manoeuvred the early part of the 1900s to reposition the Bank of England, the New York Federal Reserve, the Reichsbank and the Banque de France (Ahamed, 2009).

It is therefore sensible for the South African Reserve Bank to explore and consider getting indirectly involved with infrastructure development through DFIs. This is a long-term solution for a funding problem that repeats itself during every crisis. This liquidity challenge is undesirable if DFIs are expected to be countercyclical and to increase investments during bad economic patches. A standing R15–R20 billion infrastructure facility can ensure a good support platform for DFIs.

Concessional funding

There are a number of global concessional funds that have been established to support sustainable infrastructure development. Funding sustainable new economies using these funds, as part of a broader funding mix, offers an avenue to counter financial market dislocation challenges. Concessional funding, such as the Climate Investment Funds provided by the Sustainable Low Carbon Transport Partnership, gives the opportunity to accelerate the adoption of clean energy technologies, provides investment agility, and enables competitiveness on otherwise very expensive technologies (Climate Investment Funds, 2019; Binsted et al, 2013). Creating new economies will require sustainable approaches that are good for people and the planet. Many concessional funds share and promote the principles of the green economy.

The key sustainable funds available to be explored include:

- Global Environment Facility
- Clean Technology Fund
- Global Climate Change Alliance
- IDB's Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Initiative
- ADB Climate Change Fund
- Fast Start Financing
- German International Climate Initiative
- ADB Clean Energy Fund
- Carbon Market (Clean Development Mechanism and Voluntary Carbon Market)
- Green Climate Fund
- Sectoral Mechanism

It has been found that when financing the transition into new economies, governments require six additional actions (Godfrey and Zhao, 2016) as outlined below:

- Boost local resources and the ability to access capital for investment
- Coordinating public and private finance
- Leveraging international financing
- Strengthening institutional capacity for investment planning at national and local levels
- Reforming wider price distortions
- Strengthening investment in clean technology development and deployment

Urbanisation strategies, such as the Integrated Urban Development Framework and the City Support Programme, are critical to coordinate these actions. However, the focus should not only be on existing urban areas – which tend to entrench the apartheid spatial legacy – but on the creation of new economies as well.

In a study of medium-sized emerging cities in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bonilla-Roth, M. E. and Zapparoli, I., 2017), it was concluded that the process of structuring financing and crowding in private sector participation in financing new economies infrastructure is made easier if accompanied by technical support to strengthen the technical and administrative capacities of municipalities. In

rethinking infrastructure finance and delivery, DFIs must therefore focus on smarter ways that favour sustainable deployment solutions. In this regard, two key aspects become important:

- Creation of platforms to implement infrastructure programmatically in a deliberate process of rowding in the private sector; and
- Focusing on the full infrastructure value chain and designing fit-for-purpose models/solutions through planning, preparation, finance, implementation, as well as operations and maintenance.

In addition, there must be an intentional inclusivity effort across the value chain to ensure that Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), gender and youth participation are at the centre of infrastructure creation.

I am grateful for the invaluable comments received from my colleague, Mohale Rakgate.

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A Bibliometric Analysis and Visual Review of Housing Policy Framework Development Research

By Clinton Aigbavboa and Wellington Thwala | Peer Review

This study reviews housing policy framework development research published mainly in the Scopus database from 1994 – 2020 using a combination of bibliometric analysis and critical review. This study adopted a text mining tool, namely VOSviewer, to examine the bibliometric association in housing policy framework development research in a number of academic disciplines. Bibliometric analysis (publications per year, publications per country, co-author, co-citation, co-occurrence and their clusters) quantitatively visualized and critically reviewed housing policy research status quo and development. There is a wide range of housing policy framework development to solve the complex problem of housing

in all developmental states. However, no studies exist that have scientometrically analysed and visualised the developments of housing policy specifically. While the phenomenon of urban and rural spatial divide is strongly pronounced in the developing economies in respect of access to socio-economic goods and services, the trend of the inadequately housed urban poor is increasing, with many citizens found in urban spaces as rough sleepers and mostly homeless (Tissington, 2010 & 2011).

For instance, rectifying the inherited inequality legacies of the apartheid state has posed a complex and challenging context for the delivery of daily

basic needs in South Africa. Considering the physical, economic, social, and political segregation of the apartheid agenda, meeting the demand for housing post the apartheid dark days has been a central developmental challenge since 1994 (Pottie, 2004; Aigbavboa, 2014). However, apartheid alone cannot be held responsible for the housing conditions in South Africa. Nevertheless, no account of housing policy and conditions can be credible if there is no reference to the apartheid legacy of South Africa and the colonial legacy of the African continent (Goodlad, 1996). Nevertheless, Wilkinson (1998) informed that the key dimensions of the current policy framework cannot be fully understood in isolation from an understanding of the legacy bequeathed by South Africa's peculiar history. In other words, the problems of the past have profoundly shaped the situation to which the present policy seeks to respond.

Housing policy is a guideline comprised of systems of courses of action, regulatory measures, laws and funding priorities provided by government through the negotiation of various bodies in a country as put together by the government. It is intended to meet the housing needs and demands of its citizens through a set of suitable approaches, including fiscal, institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks (Agbola, 1998). Housing policies provide a guide which defines action and sets goals and, in most cases, specifies strategies for achieving the goal (Jiboye, 2011). They further institute guidelines and limits for discretionary actions by individuals liable for implementing the overall plans of action (Olatubara, 2002). According to Duruzoечи (1999), some housing policy decisions (written or implied) prompt the activities of governments, whilst others are goal statements or prescriptions of elemental rules for the conduct of personal or organisational affairs. Housing policies are fundamentally necessary in any country as a guide for or the control of the various actors in the housing sector.

The centrality of debate in respect of the housing policy in South Africa has been hinged on the politico-economic background of the policies developed over time to support adequate housing. The policies have generally been described by some as an extension of World Bank neo-liberalistic frameworks, whilst others have termed these policies as economically conservative, according to Pottie (2004). However, the

South African housing policy mix is rather the result of assorted frameworks of international influences, as well as local and confined ingenuity. This is largely owing to the policy of spatial segregation in the apartheid state, which contributed to a policy which Gilbert (2004) defined as 'scan globally, reinvent locally' principles. It is evident that various World Bank policy elements comprise an integral part of the South African policy, such as the emphasis on incremental housing, economic conservatism, the once-off subsidy scheme, and the instrumental development of formal ownership (Marais and Botes, 2007). However, it should also be acknowledged that two important differences are discernible in the South African policy. Firstly, the South African policy suggests that only housing structures should be subsidised, whilst the World Bank policy suggests that only site and services should be subsidised. Secondly, as the South African policy has developed, an increasing emphasis has been placed on housing size – a factor which is considered as part of the World Bank policy (Marais and Botes, 2007).

It has been contended that the current South African housing policy is founded on the Reconstruction and Development Programme's basic-needs approach, which accentuates a limited offering to the disadvantaged of basic shelter and public services in addressing the socially unequal nature of the apartheid state. It should be noted that the overarching South African housing agenda has objectives that supersede this notion of conservatism that has impacted service adequate housing delivery. For example, the policy is strongly in support of housing stocks' contributing to the development of the national economy – this is a contested space as the availability of land is scarce in most cases. In line with the World Bank's

“ The policies have generally been described by some as an extension of World Bank neo-liberalistic frameworks, whilst others have termed these policies as economically conservative, according to Pottie (2004). ”

framework of the 1990s, the South African housing policy is disposed to enable the housing markets to work; while the housing policy instruments were expected to contribute to the development of urban citizenship with the creation of new cities of home owners who would further develop a democratic and integrated society. It is imperative to note at this point that the details of the current housing policy in South Africa remain somewhat fluid as the overall policy framework has yet to be cast in its final statutory form. Considering the events of the past years and the high level of deprivation, unemployment, and inequality in the country, this on-going fluidity is for the most part indisputably due to the significant political changes that the country has undergone in the past few years, and the initial adoption of developmental policies that were confused with apartheid legacies.

Research Methodology

This study adopts the post-constructivist philosophical ideology, using an inductive approach. Text mining was used to construct meaning and understanding of the research productivity and the footprint of housing policy frameworks from 1994 to 2020. This study reviewed housing policy framework development research through the bibliometric analysis with the critical review of co-occurring keywords. The bibliometric analysis was used to map the housing policy knowledge areas, while the critical review, using the framework of Zhong et al. (2019), was used to categorize the research themes of the keywords clusters. For this study, publications under the subject areas were selected via a rigorous process using the Scopus database. Scopus, an Elsevier database, is one of the largest wide-ranging databases which comprehensively records abstracts and citations of peer-reviewed literature and quality web sources covering a different scientific domain (Guz and Rushchitsky, 2009; Hong et al., 2012). The database summarises the world's research outputs in multidisciplinary fields with built-in intelligent tools to track, analyse and visualise research.

“ The bibliometric analysis was used to map the housing policy knowledge areas, while the critical review, using the framework of a research themes of the keywords clusters. ”




Figure 1: Outline of research framework.

Using the Scopus database, the following retrieval schema were entered into the Scopus catalogue: (TITLE-ABS-KEY) (housing policy) OR ('housing framework'). The 'TITLE-ABS-KEY' indicates either a journal or conference article title, abstract, and keywords. The associated papers were extracted through the specified words in the title, abstracts, and keywords for a complete retrieval of the data. The use of the schema increases the collection of comprehensive data from the database (Zhong et al., 2019). The search was limited to published journal articles and conference proceedings, while articles from books and chapters, including reviews and editorials, were excluded. Figure 1 shows the framework adopted for the study.

The choice for journal and conference proceedings selection was premised on the scholarly views that journals usually provide in-depth and highly quality information (Zheng et al., 2016; Aghimien et al., 2019), while the choice of conference proceedings is based on the view that conference proceedings in the human settlement and policy debate are a valuable source of materials, judging from the robustness of discussion and interest in the subject at conferences. However, other multidisciplinary researchers hold the same view of the importance of conference proceedings in their disciplines (Webster and Watson,

2002; Vuksic et al., 2018; Aghimien et al., 2019). The time span was limited to 1994 to 2020, considering the significant shift in housing policy in South Africa, as this period marked the beginning of a reconstruction process that defined the policy framework for all citizens. The initial search on the Scopus database produced 6 089 publications with the defined search schema. Thereafter, a thorough filtering process was conducted by excluding subject areas, source titles and source types that were not related to the search schema. The language of publication was limited to only English. A total of 1497 articles were finally extracted as a CVS file and used for the analysis.

To explore the trends in housing policy and framework research, this study adopted the VOSviewer text mining tool (Li et al., 2020), to analyse the bibliometric connections in housing policy and framework development, including co-authorship, co-occurring keywords and countries' activeness analysis. VOSviewer, according to Van Eck and Waltman (2014, 2020), is a software tool for creating maps based on network data and is particularly useful for visualising larger bibliometric networks and exploring the maps (Li et al., 2020). Any type of bibliometric network can be visualized using VOSviewer.

Bibliometric Analysis and Discussion
Publication per year

From the extracted 1497 articles, 1479 were journal publications, while 18 were conference proceedings.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 1497 retrievals from 1994 to 2020.

There are multiple peaks in the figure, with the notable period of reference being 2000 (52 publications), the year the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were announced, following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, shortly after the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The other points of references are 2004 (39 publications) when the global Cities Alliance Network was created; 2014 (89 publications); and 2015 (84 publications). 2014 was a year before the expiration of the MDGs, while 2015 was the year in which the MDGs were replaced with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs were set in 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly with the aim of achieving a better and more sustainable future for all by the year 2030. In 2019 (89 publications), five years after the SDGs, there was a rise in the number of publications, with the lowest period of publication being 1995 (24 publications).

The network of publication per country

The analysis of the network of publications per country, set with a minimum of three publications and two citations per country, highlighted 46 countries as meeting the threshold.




Figure 2: Publication per year, 1994–2020




Figure 3: A network visualisation of number of publications per country

Country of publication	Number of articles	Average citation
United States	354	4906
United Kingdom	295	4178
Australia	120	1423
Netherlands	102	1803
Canada	74	1045
Hong Kong	64	1179
China	50	936
South Africa	49	680
Sweden	46	855
Germany	27	305
South Korea	23	175
France	22	117
Italy	21	113
Belgium	17	307
Malaysia	17	214
Singapore	17	272
Ireland	14	99
Norway	14	242
Spain	13	114
Brazil	12	309
Nigeria	12	211
Taiwan	12	55
New Zealand	11	95
Finland	10	84
Israel	10	132
Turkey	10	70

Table 1: Number of publications per country

The set criteria of three publications and two citations per country prevented the possibility of overlap where articles have more than one country affiliation. The analysis of the network is shown in Figure 3. The top twenty-five leading countries for housing policy and framework research are listed in Table 1. The four leading countries on housing policy framework research are the USA (354 papers, 4906 citations), the UK (295 papers, 4178 citations), Australia (120 papers, 1423 citations) and the Netherlands (102 papers, 1803 citations). These figures reveal that these countries have made considerable impacts to housing policy development and housing delivery to their citizens. They are followed by Canada (74 papers, 1045 citations), Hong Kong (64 papers, 1179 citations), China (50 papers, 936 citations), South Africa (49 papers, 680 citations), Sweden (46 papers, 855 citations) and Germany (27 papers, 305 citations).

“ The sizeable amount of the connected articles in these countries shows that the study and conceptualisation of housing policy for the development and delivery of sustainable human settlement spaces and housing in these countries are advanced. ”

The sizeable amount of the connected articles in these countries shows that the study and conceptualisation of housing policy for the development and delivery of sustainable human settlement spaces and housing in these countries are advanced. Also, concerning international collaborations, researchers from South Africa in particular have widely collaborated with researchers from more than 39 of the 46 listed countries in Table 1. Notable countries of South African research collaboration are the USA, the Netherlands, Brazil, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Australia, amongst others.

The publication per document source

Table 2 shows the top twenty-five source journals for housing policy and framework research with at least one article. The Journal of Housing and the Built Environment published 152 articles (1890 citations) and has therefore published more housing policy papers than any other journal. This reveals that the journal has more authority and more popularity in this domain and is recognised by researchers, considering the open access opportunity for the publication of housing policy research. This is followed by Habitat International with 141 publications (3372 citations), Housing, Theory and Society (101 papers; 1925 citations) and the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research with 48 articles and 1629 citations. No South African journals featured on the journal list. The disparity between the total number of articles published and the citation numbers can be attributed to the impact factor measures of the journals, while some of the journals are published via the subscription model with the leverage for the researchers to explore the open access option where possible.

Publication source title	Document records – 1994 to 2020	Citation – 1994 to 2020	Journal Im- pact factor
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment	152	1890	1.481
Habitat International	141	3372	3.846
Housing, Theory and Society	101	1925	1.478
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research	48	1629	2.768
Journal of Urban Affairs	38	567	1.234
Journal of Urban History	26	231	0.416
Ahuri Final Report	25	117	0.167
Journal of the American Planning Association	25	659	2.719
Urban Policy and Research	24	417	1.667
Critical Housing Analysis	23	58	0.337
Critical Social Policy	22	393	2.185
Urban Affairs Review	21	693	2.081
International Development Planning Review	20	136	1.738
Planning Perspectives	16	90	0.356
Urban Geography	15	357	3.567
Built Environment	14	118	1.060
Geoforum	14	129	2.926
Urban Research and Practice	14	91	2.100
Town Planning Review	13	107	0.760
European Planning Studies	12	120	2.690
International Planning Studies	12	152	2.690
Journal of Planning Education and Research	12	195	2.328
Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment	12	50	1.481
Planning Practice and Research	12	136	1.500
Third World Planning Review	12	115	1.738

Table 2: Number of publications per source

Analysis of co-authorship per country

For scientists working in the housing policy and framework space, collaborations with other researchers provide opportunities to strengthen their science by collectively conducting peer-reviewed publications with a greater chance of success with varied perspectives, thus leading to a better problem-solving approach in society. When researchers publish findings of their research projects in peer-reviewed journals and in conference proceedings, the scientific community and society at large is given the opportunity to assess the findings of housing policy thinkers. Likewise, other housing policy scholars are provided with theoretical foundations to repeat the research, build on the findings, and verify the published results. Also, skills, knowledge and techniques are shared, which mutually benefits all collaborators to become better housing policy thinkers.




Figure 4: A network visualisation of co-authorship per country

Using the text mining tool (VOSviewer), the co-authorship of housing policy and framework scholars per country was assessed. The minimum number of publications per country was set at a minimum of two publications per country and 10 citations, highlighting five countries who meet the threshold and who are actively collaborating. Figures 4 and 5 show that the countries with the highest number of collaborations and research productions are the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands. However, the figures further show that South Africa is actively collaborating with these high productivity countries, with a significant collaboration footprint as well as publishing with Brazil, China, Greece and Norway.




Figure 5: A density visualisation of co-authorship per country

Analysis of co-occurrence of keywords

Research keywords in housing policy research represent the emphasis and direction of the domain and likewise assist in tagging vital themes in housing policy thinkers and scholars. The analysis of keyword occurrence in housing policy framework research revealed the hot topics in the knowledge field over a specific timespan. The minimum number of keywords to be extracted was set at five (5), this being the default considering the large data used for the study and in line with previous students (Aghimien et al., 2019). From the 4 000 keywords represented in the data set, 447 met the threshold for further analysis. Further in the analysis, some generic terms and names of countries and geographical regions were removed. Subsequently, 334 keywords were used for the final analysis and grouped into eight clusters. According to Van Eck and Waltman (2014), the closer the keywords are to each other, the higher their occurrence. Also, the large node size in Figure 6 (the network visualisation map for the keywords) indicates a high concentration of the keywords, while a thick association link represents a tight association between two or more keywords (Li et al., 2020).




Figure 6: A network visualisation of keyword occurrence

Figure 6 reveals that the most frequent keywords are 'housing policy', occurring 1048 times; 'housing', occurring 229 times; 'social housing', occurring 211 times; 'urban housing', occurring 183 times; 'housing market', occurring 170 times; 'affordable housing', occurring 154 times; 'housing provision', occurring 135 times; and 'homeownership', occurring 92 times. These keywords and others are grouped into clusters. The findings of the critical review of the network and density visualisation maps were used to categorise the semantic themes hidden in the textual (Chen and Morris, 2003; Zhong et al., 2019) data set of the keywords. According to Olawumi and Chan (2018), the critical review of cluster analysis of keywords enables researchers to categorise a sizeable amount of research data into unique groups for ease of discovery of research themes, trends and their associations. Eight themes were originally discovered from the analysis of the data from the cluster analysis. However,

only seven of the clusters were strongly connected to the intellectual structure (Chen, Ibekwe-Sanjuan and Hou, 2010) of housing policy framework research after a critical review. One cluster contained co-occurring keywords in other clusters and was dropped from further analysis.

Cluster 1

Social Cohesion and Equity:

The first cluster contained 62 keywords that have an occurrence of five keywords and above. The keywords in this cluster were found to have a significant link to the main word of housing policy as shown in Figure 6. The most notable keywords in this cluster are 'policy', 'political systems', 'public policy', 'socioeconomic characteristics', 'demography', 'social class', 'social justices', 'social policy' and 'social support'. The cluster keywords further support the idea that the primary purpose of housing policy is the provision of access to

the cities. Housing policies must be inclusive to cater for the needs of the urban poor, the youth, the ageing population as well as the creation of inclusive cities where all can live in harmony and with equal rights.

Cluster 2

Urban Housing Development:

This cluster contained 59 co-occurring keywords that were also strongly linked to the main keywords in Figure 6. Some of the keywords in this cluster are 'urban planning', 'urban history', 'urban policy', 'urban regeneration', 'zoning policy', 'zoning systems', 'inclusionary housing', 'colonialism', 'gentrification', 'reform process', 'displacement', and 'equity', amongst others. This cluster shows that every housing policy should have concrete rules and legislations for the development of the state. Moreover, the defined national urban housing policies should support urban governances, capacity and institutional development to enable equitable reforms in any national state.

Cluster 3

Homeownership:

This cluster contained 52 co-occurring keywords supporting the housing policy keyword. Some of the co-occurring keywords are 'housing association', 'housing subsidy', 'institutional reforms', 'liberalisation', 'neoliberalism', 'policy reforms', 'welfare', 'welfare economies', 'welfare provision', and 'political economy', amongst others. There is a strong correlation between homeownership ideology and political attitude (Ronald, 2008) as no meaningful discussion on homeownership will be complete without a thorough understanding of state power and social change. There is considerable evidence in literature suggesting that the states and all ethnic and political groups recognise the importance of promoting homeownership as ownership diminishes autonomy in the political (Ronald, 2008). Hence, housing policies must promote homeownership as it is the dream of citizens to own homes and it is often desirable.

Cluster 4

Housing Right:

This cluster contains 51 co-occurring keywords also linked to the housing policy and framework. Some of the keywords are 'urban areas', 'urban housing', 'urban poor', 'urban society', 'urbanization', 'housing conditions', 'housing projects', 'human rights', 'informal

settlement', 'local participation', 'post-apartheid', 'right to the city', 'low-income population', amongst others. The right to housing is a basic human right contained in the Constitution and international human rights instruments (UN-Habitat, 2014). The right to housing ensures that citizens are free from inclement weather and they have a 'roof over their heads'. The right to housing also ensures that citizens have an adequate measure of quality of life and that they live in a safe place in peace and dignity without the fear of eviction. The right to housing is also connected to the broader discussion of economic empowerment. When the right to housing is not realised, citizens' fundamental human rights are violated. Globally, the right to housing is enshrined in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Likewise, the Africa Charter on Human and People's Rights recognises the dignity of all, noting that everyone is equal before the law and has an equal right to the protection of the law. Notable amongst the keywords is 'post-apartheid', a period that marks the transition of the South African state to a redefinition of its approach to housing provision for all its citizens. The post-apartheid state revised the Constitution to enshrine the right to housing. For instance, Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, guarantees everyone's right of access to adequate housing, while Section 26(2) informs that the South African state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to progressively realise this right (Dugard et al., 2016). Connected to the housing right is Section 26(3) which prohibits all indiscriminate evictions and proclaims that no citizen of the new South African state may be 'evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances' (Dugard et al., 2016).

Cluster 5

Housing Policy Reforms:

This cluster contained 33 co-occurring keywords. The associated keywords are 'governance approach', 'planning practice', 'policy change', 'policy implementation', 'decision making', 'devolution', 'disability', 'policy making', 'public service', 'rural area' and 'rural planning', amongst others. By its nature, a housing policy must be progressive with the fundamental tenet and ability being to guide and

direct housing delivery reforms in a state. Significant progress has been made in most national states; however, much is left to be desired as the state of global slum dwelling and homelessness continues to increase. Housing policy must not simply be about the provision of shelter but should be reformed to serve as a tool for the upliftment of citizens and an integrated approach to build human capital and stimulate economic access for the owners (Schill and Wachter, 2001).

Cluster 6

Housing Tenure Systems:

This cluster has 33 co-occurring keywords. The occurring keywords are 'legislation', 'migrants', 'private renting', 'privatization', 'property market', 'property right', 'rental housing', 'renter housing', 'renter sector', 'social exclusion', 'social security', 'tenure system', and 'state role', amongst others. Housing tenure includes all approaches used in a state for use by the citizens to access housing. A housing policy framework must address the issue of tenure to enable various accesses to housing in an incremental manner. The improvement of tenure security is vital as tenure has been linked to community satisfaction and participation (Archer et al., 2012).

Cluster 7

Public Housing/ Residential Segregation:

This cluster has 30 co-occurring keywords that include 'ethnicity', 'ethnic minority', 'housing vouchers', 'immigrants', 'immigrant population', 'public sector', 'civil rights', 'race', 'racism', 'racial segregation', 'social segregation', 'segregation' and 'residential segregation'. Housing segregation has been used over time by white ethnic groups in almost

“ In most nations, housing policies are becoming increasingly integrated with a wide range of social and economic objectives, which means that housing policy is reaching further down than was the case in past decades. ”

every state as a tool of supremacy, thus posing a threat to racial equality in the new world. There is no policy that limits a minority group in terms of housing segregation, which is also the major driver of racial disparity in wealth. While the ownership of a home and the right to housing are not a panacea for eliminating systemic racial inequality, housing policy-makers and researchers must use policy reforms to amend for past and presents harms by proposing and promulgating new housing policies to expand access to housing for all (Danyelle & Maxwell, 2019). For instance, in May 2018, the World Bank informed that South Africa remains the most economically unequal country in the world, due to high poverty levels amongst the black population, owing to the persistence of spatial segregation.

Conclusion

In most nations, housing policies are becoming increasingly integrated with a wide range of social and economic objectives, which means that housing policy is reaching further down than was the case in past decades. Also, the literature informs that a housing policy that has broad goals is much more multifaceted than one that solely emphasises housing for a certain sector of the economy. This study conducted a bibliometric review of housing policy research to visualise and analyse the link in housing policy framework development research in a number of academic disciplines. A total of 1 497 articles published from 1994–2020 were extracted from the Scopus database. On the basis of the mined Scopus database, articles, co-authorship, co-occurrence/co-occurrent keywords, the number of publications and documents per country, and the number of publications per sources were analysed using VOSViewer, to categorise the association in housing policy framework development research. Cluster analyses of the co-occurrence keywords were critically reviewed to define the research themes.

The analysis presented in this study can provide housing studies and policy scholars and practitioners with a robust insight of housing policy research trends between 1994–2020, as the study identified the key areas of focus in the housing policy framework development domain. The scope of the study is limited owing to the use of only the Scopus database. However, Scopus is a database from Elsevier, and is one of the largest wide-ranging databases which

comprehensively records abstracts and citations of peer-reviewed literature and quality web sources covering various scientific domains. Overall, the collected articles reflect the journals of housing policy research framework development since 1994.

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Before and After Segregation and Apartheid:

A Comparative Analysis

By Leland Ware | Peer Review

Introduction

This article compares conditions in South Africa before and after apartheid to the circumstances in America during and after segregation. During the eras of segregation and apartheid, conditions for Black people in America and South Africa were oppressive in the extreme. The two systems had some differences, but the overall impact was the same. Black people were physically separated and treated differently, and less favourably, than their white counterparts. The progress made by African Americans during the 50 years since the end of segregation has been substantial, but significant disparities between Black and white people still linger. In the 25 years since the

elimination of apartheid in South Africa, significant improvements have been made, but most poor Black people still reside in impoverished communities in townships and the countryside.

The broad-based, grass roots, Civil Rights movement started in America in the 1950s. Over the next decade, marches, boycotts, and other forms of nonviolent protests were organised and executed. These activities culminated with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. In the years that followed, African Americans made significant advances in educational

attainment levels, employment opportunities, family income, home ownership, and wealth.

In South Africa, Black people and other non-white groups stepped up their opposition to apartheid in the 1950s. The South African government responded with a campaign of strenuous, and often violent, reactions to those activities. In the 1990s, under international pressure, the apartheid laws were repealed, and Nelson Mandela was elected by a multi-racial electorate. In the 25 years since, substantial changes have been made but more work must be done to reduce the enormous disparities between affluent and impoverished Black African families.

Economic inequality is high and has increased since 1994. The top 1% of South Africans own 70.9% of the country's wealth, while the bottom 60% hold just 7%. South Africa is the world's most unequal society and the split is largely along racial lines. Although a new, Black middle class is slowly emerging, and a small Black elite has accrued tremendous wealth, many Black South Africans have not seen substantial improvements in their lives. This must be addressed. The South African government is in danger of becoming the political stereotype of what is wrong with post-colonial Africa: corrupt African leaders who exercise power through cronyism, bribery, and patronage. 'State capture' refers to practices in which private entities redirect public resources for their own benefit (Gevisser, 2019). This must be ended.

The final section of this article examines the proposals contained in *New Cities New Economies: South Africa and Africa's Grand Plan*. The proposed solution to many of South Africa's problems involves a total spatial reconstruction consisting of the creation of new mega-city regions that will produce new economics for South Africa. The author, Dr. Tshilidzi Ratshitanga, presents a bold, new vision for development and provides a roadmap for achieving prosperity and equality for all South Africans.

Segregation in the U.S.

Plessy v. Ferguson was the historic decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation laws as long as the separate facilities were equal to those reserved for white people. The events leading to *Plessy* began with the

“The South African government is in danger of becoming the political stereotype of what is wrong with post-colonial Africa: corrupt African leaders who exercise power through cronyism, bribery, and patronage.”

enactment of a New Orleans ordinance that required railroad carriers to provide 'equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races.' A group of New Orleans citizens organized a test case to challenge the law.

When the case was tried, *Plessy's* lawyers argued that the ordinance violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. *Plessy* lost. Writing for the majority, Justice Henry Brown dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment claim almost summarily. The Amendment, he wrote, was enacted to abolish slavery. An ordinance that established a distinction between the races did not, in his view, destroy legal equality or re-establish involuntary servitude. Turning to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brown cited a series of earlier decisions as authority for states to enact statutes that made distinctions based on race. Segregation's vision was that Black people would serve white people as domestic servants or as inexpensive laborers. After the Supreme Court's endorsement, racial separation was imposed in virtually all aspects of everyday life. Whites and Blacks were born in separate hospitals, educated in different schools, and buried in segregated graveyards. Schools, restaurants, hotels, theatres, public transportation, and waiting rooms were segregated, as were elevators, parks, public restrooms, hospitals, drinking fountains, prisons, and places of worship. Segregated waiting rooms were required in professional offices, as well as building entrances, cemeteries, and even amusement-park cashier windows.

African Americans could not live in white neighbourhoods. Black people could own property,

but practices in the real estate industry and federal government regulations limited them to shabby and deteriorating ghettos. Segregation was enforced for public pools, phone booths, asylums, jails, and homes for the elderly and disabled. The labour market was segmented. There were white jobs and black jobs; men's work and women's work. African Americans were domestics, janitors, laborers and the like. These were the lowest paying and least desirable occupations.

In Atlanta, Georgia, African Americans testifying in court cases were sworn in using a different Bible to that used by white people. Marriage and cohabitation between white people and Black people was strictly forbidden in most Southern states. In the Midwest, 'Sundown towns' were not uncommon; signs were posted at city limits warning African Americans that they were not welcome after dark (Loewen, 2006).

All branches of the U.S. military were segregated. In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson segregated the federal Civil Service (Yellin, 2013). In 1915, he screened D.W. Griffith's 'Birth of a Nation' in the White House. The movie glorified the Ku Klux Klan and portrayed Black people as ignorant brutes. Wilson said: 'It's like writing history with lightning. And my only regret is that it is all terribly true' (Benbow, 2010).

Segregation was codified in state and local laws and enforced by intimidation and violence. There were, in effect, two criminal justice systems: one for white people and another for Black people. When the colour line was breached, violence was unleashed against offenders by the Ku Klux Klan and local white people; often in concert with local law enforcement officials. In Atlanta, Georgia, Black people could not serve on

juries. The races were indexed separately on tax rolls. Atlanta's banks maintained separate teller windows for white and Black customers.

In some Southern communities, Black people could attend public performances using separate entrances and sitting in the 'colored' section. In public halls, theatres, and movie houses, Black people were required to sit on a balcony. State fairs had a 'colored day' when Black people could attend. Laws separated the races in public transportation. There were segregated waiting rooms in train and bus stations. Black people were required to sit in the rear of streetcars and buses.

Black people could not try on clothes in department stores. In stores, they were expected to wait until white customers were served before they were helped. There was a Jim Crow etiquette that was scrupulously observed in interactions. Black people were expected to address a white person by the title of 'Mr.' 'Mrs.' or 'Miss.' White people addressed Black people by their first names, even if they hardly knew each other, or by the epithets 'boy', 'uncle', 'auntie' or the like. If a Black person entered a white person's home, they were obligated to use the back door. The purpose of these unwritten but well-known rules was to provide a continual demonstration that Black people were inferior to white people and recognised their subordinate status (Myrdal, 1944).

The American Civil Rights Movement

On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks was arrested after refusing to yield her seat to a white passenger (Branch, 1988; 1999; 2006). A few days later, the Montgomery Improvement Association was organised by local Black leaders. Martin Luther King, who was just 26 years old at the time, was elected President. After a tense year, in which carpools were organised and weekly prayer meetings held, in November of 1956 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that segregation on public transportation was unconstitutional.

In 1963, Martin Luther King launched the Birmingham campaign. The effort started with a boycott and switched to marches and sit-ins. Eugene 'Bull' Connor, Birmingham's Commissioner of Public Safety, ordered police officers to use high-pressure water hoses, police dogs and tear gas to control protesters, many of

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whom were children. The extreme brutality inflicted on protestors was featured on nightly newscasts. After weeks of tense negotiations, an agreement was reached that provided for the desegregation of Birmingham's stores, restaurants, and schools.

The historic March on Washington was convened on August 28, 1963. It was the result of the collective efforts of several civil rights groups. The march was the largest civil rights demonstration in American history. It received international media attention. Approximately 250,000 people gathered peacefully on the Mall in Washington, D.C. King captivated the audience with his 'I Have a Dream' speech.

That summer, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. The major provisions of this landmark legislation are Title II, which outlawed discrimination in hotels, motels, restaurants, theatres, and other public accommodations; Title VI, which authorised the withdrawal of federal funds from programs, including public schools, which practiced discrimination; and Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Loevy, 1997).

The 1964 Civil Rights Act did not address voting rights. The Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution guaranteed African Americans the right to vote. However, by the end of the nineteenth century almost all of the Southern states enacted laws that disenfranchised African Americans. The Selma, Alabama, voting rights effort was publicised in January of 1965, when Martin Luther King addressed a mass meeting in that city. The Student, Nonviolent Coordinating Committee workers had been attempting to register voters for several weeks (Lewis and D'Orso, 1999).

During their first march, the protestors were stopped by police officers who savagely attacked them with clubs and tear gas. After a second march was aborted, King led a group of demonstrators on a journey from Selma to Montgomery. They set out on March 21 with approximately 3,000 demonstrators. Four days later, they reached Montgomery with 25,000 marchers. President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6, 1965.

On April 4, 1968, King was fatally shot by an assassin

while standing on a balcony on the Lorraine Motel in Memphis. In the following days, riots erupted in 130 American cities. Twenty thousand people were arrested. Washington, Baltimore, and Chicago were the heaviest hit among the cities that experienced unrest following King's assassination (Risen, 2009). While many of the nation's cities were still smouldering from the riots, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was enacted. This law forbade discrimination in the sale and rental of housing and allowed Black people to move away from the ghettos to which they had been confined. With the passage of the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Movement's legislative agenda was achieved.

Post-Civil Rights Advances

Conditions for African Americans are different and immeasurably better than they were before the enactment of the Civil Rights laws of the 1960s. The black middle class has grown significantly. Levels of educational attainment, employment opportunities, and family incomes are higher. Over the last 20 years, more African American families have moved to suburban communities than those who headed north during the great migration of the 1930s, '40s and '50s. The election of Barack Obama as President in 2008 signalled an unprecedented advance in race relations in America (Ware and Davis, 2012).

Today, an examination of the status of African American families reveals a mixed picture; the best of times for some, the worst of times for others. For those in a position to take advantage of the opportunities created by the Civil Rights revolution, the gains over the last generation have been remarkable. For Black people left behind in America's impoverished communities, the obstacles to advancement are more daunting today than they were a generation ago. Conditions are only marginally better for African Americans residing in all black or racially mixed working or lower middle-class suburbs. For this group, building wealth continues to be a problem, with the 2008 recession having brought many socio-economic gains to a halt.

Educational Attainment Levels

The advances in African Americans' educational attainment levels since the late 1960s are significant.

In 1940, the vast majority of Black people (92.3%) had completed less than 4 years of high school. Only 6.4% completed high school and 1.3% completed 4 or more years of college (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). By 1970, the proportion of Black people 25 years and older with less than 12 years of school had declined to 66.3%. The proportion of Black people aged 25 and above with less than a high school education declined from 66.3% in 1970 to 15.8% in 2010. Black people significantly increased their educational attainment levels during the forty-year period between 1970 and 2010. The proportion of Black people who had attended 12 or more years of school increased from 33.7% in 1970 to 84.2% in 2010.

Occupational Advances

During the first half of the twentieth century, Black people abandoned the fields of the agrarian South and found employment in factories in the industrialising north and Midwest. Over the last 40 years, they moved from factory floors to retail outlets and office suites. In 2010, 29% of employed Black people were employed in management, professional, or related occupations. An additional 25% were employed in sales or office occupations. Another 25% were employed in service occupations (such as food and beverage preparation, lodging, cosmetology, recreation, protection, personal services, etc.) that required modest educational attainment levels and afforded a moderate income (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).

Approximately half of the Black population is now employed in white-collar jobs. In 1972, only 34.8% of Black workers were employed in white-collar occupations. By 2006, this had increased to 49.5%. During the 1970s, the proportion of Black people in white-collar positions only grew by 3.8%; in the 1980s this proportion grew by 7.3%; and in the 1990s by 5.9%. Although Black people have made substantial advances in occupational classifications, they still lag behind white people in the proportion of their population employed in white-collar occupations. In 1972, the difference in the proportion of Black and white people employed in white-collar occupations was 22.5%; by 2006, the difference was down to 12.9%.

Family Income

The average family incomes of African Americans

have increased significantly over the last 40 years. There is ample proof of a growing Black middle-class after the late 1960s. For the purposes of this article, Black families were divided into three income groups. The lower-income group consisted of families with incomes under \$49,999, which was \$10,089 under (or 83%) of the national median. The moderate-income group consisted of families with incomes between \$50,000 and \$99,999 annually. The upper-income group included families with incomes above \$100,000.

Since 1970, the proportion of Black families in the lower-income category has declined by an average of 5.3% per decade, with the exception of the 2000s. In 1970, the proportion of Black families in the lower-income category was 76%; by 2009, this had declined to 61%. However, between 2000 and 2009 the proportion of Black people in the lower-income category increased by 3%. The greatest decline in the proportion of Black people in the lower-income group took place during the 1990s when there was an 8% drop in the proportion of the Black population in this group.

Overall, since 1970, there has been a steady expansion in the proportion of Black families in the upper-income category and a substantial decrease in the proportion of Black families in the lower-income group. Despite a significant decline in the lower-income category, over half of Black families still have annual incomes below \$50,000. Between the mid-1980s and 1990s the proportion of middle-class Black people steadily expanded. However, changes in the percentage of Black families across the three groups levelled off during the 2000s.

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Home Ownership

Home ownership is another indicator of the economic disparities within the Black community. Equally important, it is a gauge that can be used to measure the continuing significance of race for Black people in general and a dilemma in the accumulation of wealth for middle-class Black people. Since 1994, there has been an increase in Black home ownership. Between 1994 and 2003, the percent of Black home owners increased from 42.6% to a record high of 49.4%. From 2003 to 2010, however, the percentage of Black home owners declined to 44.9%. Much Black home ownership in the past was the direct result of white people moving to the suburbs and Black people purchasing older homes in largely Black central city or (in recent years) inner-ring suburban communities (Boustan and Margo, 2011).

The Black middle-class has been the beneficiary of the opportunities created by the Civil Rights laws of the 1960s. Over the last generation, there have been significant advances in the occupational classifications of middle-class Black people. Half of the Black population is employed in white-collar occupations and a third of that group occupies upper-level, white collar jobs. The levels of educational attainment have increased significantly. African Americans have enjoyed a significant rise in family incomes. Families with incomes over \$100,000 per year occupy a socio-economic status that is essentially the same as that of their white counterparts.

Despite its remarkable advances, the Black middle class still lags far behind its white counterpart. Black people have moved to suburban communities in significant numbers. Most Black suburbanites

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reside in majority white neighbourhoods. Some middle-class Black people live in upscale, all-black communities that are not adjacent to low-income neighbourhoods. They live comfortably among people like them and do so as a matter of personal choice. However, many of those earning less than \$100,000 reside in inner-ring suburbs that were formerly white neighbourhoods. These are often contiguous to low-income communities. The proximity means that the middle-class residents are exposed to the deleterious conditions that plague inner-city communities.

Net Worth

Even though more African Americans have been able to enjoy middle-class incomes in the last few decades, this advance has not been necessarily reflected in overall Black wealth. Increases gained in Black net worth were depleted during the 2008 recession. One way of measuring this is by considering net worth. This is calculated by taking household assets and subtracting liabilities. Assets may consist of holdings such as real estate, stocks, interest earning accounts, business equity, vehicles, etc.

In 1989, the median net worth of Black families was \$8,020, which was a far cry from white families, who had a median net worth of \$134,680. By 2001, the median net worth for African American families climbed to \$26,150 as the white median net worth soared to \$198,620 by 2004. As a result of the 2008 recession, by 2013 the Black median net worth dropped to \$13,490, which was lower than it was in 1992 and anytime since. The white median net worth also dropped, but only to \$146,320, making the Black/white gap even wider than it was in the '80s or the '90s. Household net worth is concentrated more in home ownership than other assets. African American home ownership and value was hit hardest in the recession (by -23%). Black people also lost larger percentages in stocks and mutual funds (-71%), retirement accounts (-28%), and business equity (-57%) (Black Demographics, 2020).

South Africa Under Apartheid

In 1910, the Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State united to create the Union of South Africa. In 1913, with the passage of the Natives Land Act, hundreds of thousands of Black Africans

were forced off land they owned or inhabited. The law required Black people to live in African 'reserves'. At about the same time, segregation was introduced in the mining industry. Black Africans were barred from higher-paying, skilled labour jobs. Apartheid laws forced the different racial groups to live and develop separately and prohibited inter-racial marriage and social integration (Dubow, 2014).

Translated from the Afrikaans term meaning 'apartness', apartheid was the ideology supported by the National Party government. In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party won the general election. Their goal was not only to separate South Africa's white minority from its non-white majority, but also to separate non-whites from each other, and to divide black South Africans along tribal lines. Apartheid did not differ significantly from the segregation policies that existed before the Afrikaner Party came to power, but it made segregation legal and enforceable.

With some limited differences, apartheid in South Africa operated in the same way as segregation in America. In both countries, Black people were subjugated and subordinated. Black South Africans could not own property. Black Americans could, but they were limited to ghettos in the least desirable areas of cities. In South Africa, numerous laws were passed to create and maintain the apartheid state. They included the Population Registration Act of 1950, which required people to register according to their racial group. People were required to register as white, coloured, black, Indian, or Asian. The Group Areas Act forced these groups to live in separate areas.

Townships evolved from Land Acts enacted in 1913 and 1936, which defined several scattered areas as 'native reserves' for Black people. By the 1950s, the combined areas of the reserves represented 13% of the total land area of South Africa, while Black people made up at least 75% of the total population. These areas were relabelled as 'homelands' in which specific ethnic groups could reside. Later, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 designated Black people living throughout South Africa as citizens of homelands, thus stripping them of their South African citizenship and political rights.

Between the 1960s and 1980s, the white-dominated South African government removed Black people

living in white areas and forcibly relocated them to 'Bantustans'. Land ownership was limited to white people. Other laws included the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, and the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951. Under the apartheid regime, Black and white people were required to use different beaches and public restrooms. Signs designated facilities that were reserved for white people.

Black people earned meagre wages compared to their white counterparts. Their children attended poorly funded schools. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 stipulated that all Black people over the age of 16 were required to carry passes. The document contained details such as their fingerprints, photograph, the name of their employer, address, length of employment, and other information. No Black person could stay in an urban area for more than 72 hours subject to limited exceptions.

Under apartheid, Black townships were highly controlled communities, often located at some distance from the 'white city'. In a few cases – such as the Alexandra neighbourhood in Johannesburg – some older townships were adjacent to white enclaves, separated only by walls and fences. However, in most places a vast expanse of uninhabited land separated the townships from the city. Getting to work often involved a long and expensive commute to a job that could be three hours away. Transportation was limited to state-owned buses and trains.

Leisure activities were strictly regulated. The only legal beer halls were in government buildings. Schools were poorly maintained, barrack-like structures with barred windows and second-hand desks. Dirt lots served as soccer fields. There were no cultural facilities, except for churches, which provided places of community and belonging. People bought their goods from 'spaza shops' (informal convenience shops usually run from a home). The inadequate supply of official housing was supplemented by informal settlements located either on the periphery of the sprawling townships or integrated within their boundaries as shacks on subdivided lots. These areas remain an integral feature of South Africa's landscape. Cities were designated 'for whites only', and townships became the mechanism for housing the non-white labour force (South African History Online, 2011).

The ANC's 1952 Defiance Campaign prompted thousands of Black Africans to defy the apartheid laws in hopes that their arrests would overwhelm the country's prison system and bring attention and reform. Thousands were arrested, but the ANC ended the campaign after scores of protesters were injured by police (South African History Online, 2012). In 1960, South African police killed 69 protesters gathered outside the Sharpeville police station for a nonviolent protest (South African History Online, 2011). The killings led to an international outcry and calls for armed struggle by the ANC and other groups. By the end of the '80s, political and economic boycotts by foreign governments, bolstered by the activist-pressured exodus of private businesses operating in the region, left South Africa politically isolated and economically devastated. Much of the non-white population ignored the pass requirements, territorial restrictions and segregation policies.

On June 16, 1976 between 3,000 and 10,000 students mobilised by the South African Students Movement's Action Committee marched peacefully to protest apartheid. They were met by heavily armed police who fired tear gas and live ammunition at demonstrating students. This resulted in a widespread revolt that turned into an uprising against the government. The uprising began in Soweto and spread across the country until the following year.

The United Nations General Assembly denounced apartheid in 1973. In 1976, the United Nation's Security Council voted to impose an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. In 1985, the United Kingdom and the United States imposed economic sanctions. Under pressure from the international community, the National Party government of Pieter Botha sought to institute some reforms, including the abolition of the pass laws and the repealing of the ban on interracial sex and marriage. The reforms fell short of any substantive change, however, and by 1989 Botha was pressured to step aside in favour of F.W. De Klerk.

The South African government subsequently repealed the Population Registration Act, as well as most of the other legislation that formed the legal basis for apartheid. De Klerk freed Nelson Mandela on February 11, 1990. A new Constitution, which enfranchised Black people and other racial groups, took effect in 1994, and elections that year led to a coalition government

with a non-white majority, marking the official end of the apartheid system.

Progress After Apartheid

Since the end of white minority rule, South Africa has held six peaceful democratic elections, all free and fair, and all won by Mandela's party – the African National Congress. South Africa is the continent's most industrialised country. Its main industries are manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, financial services, transportation, mining, agriculture, and tourism. Its gross domestic product rose from \$139.8bn in 1994 to \$368.9bn in 2018.

Housing

Apartheid is often seen as a political construct, but architecture and planning were critical to implementing apartheid policies. Design practices became cultural extensions of state power. Eliminating the lingering vestiges of apartheid will be difficult. There was a dramatic growth in construction in the early years of ANC rule. Between 1994 to 2018, the South African government constructed 3.6 million homes. But, after reaching a peak in 1999, the rate of house building has slowed, particularly over the past few years. The South African government estimates a current national shortfall of 2.1 million homes for about 12.5 million people. It has set a target of 2030 to fill that gap (South African Government, 2020; Reuters, 2017; Fihlani and Bailey, 2019).

The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) homes built across the country were provided free of charge to those whose monthly incomes

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were less than 3,500 rand. But these have their own problems. Despite the improvements in individual living conditions, there is a growing realisation that the RDP housing program reinforced apartheid-era segregation, continuing to consign the poor to ghettos at the furthest edges of the city. When many people finally get an RDP house, often after years of waiting, they realise that it makes more economic sense to build a shack in the backyard for themselves and to sell the RDP house illegally for about 40,000 rand (a third of what it costs the state to build them) and to use this cash to set up a business from the shack.

The proportion of households living in formal dwellings increased from 65.1% in 1996 to 77.6% in 2011. The proportion of the population living in informal dwellings (shanties) decreased from 16.2 to 13.6%. Informal settlements are housing areas that are often illegally built on municipal land. These settlements are found in a variety of areas and are home to a large percentage of the country's impoverished population. Many Black South Africans still live in townships and informal housing, work multiple jobs, earn very little money, have little access to quality schools or health care, and have few opportunities to move out of the townships (Baker, 2019; Jones, 2019).

Income

South Africa has made progress in reducing poverty since its transition to democracy; 18.8% of South Africans were poor in 2015, a drop from 33.8% in 1996. According to the 2011 census, the incomes of Black South African households grew by 169% over the preceding decade. White South Africans still earn six times as much as non-whites. The Black middle class more than doubled in size from 2.2 million in 1993 to 5.4 million in 2008 (Mohamed, 2020). The average annual income of Black South African households is R60,613 (about \$5,700), while for white-headed households it is R365,134 (\$34,300). South Africa's wealth inequality is even more striking than its income disparity. Overall, household incomes more than doubled during the 10 years from 2001 to 2011. The top 1% of South Africans own 70.9% of the country's wealth, while the bottom 60% holds only 7% (Reuters, 2017; Zwane, 2019; Statistics South Africa, 2019).

Unemployment

South Africa's official unemployment rate in 1994 was about 20%. A more recent labour force survey reported an unemployment rate of 24.1%. Under an expanded rate of unemployment, which includes people who have stopped actively looking for work, this rate rose from 31.5% in 1994 to 34% in the last quarter of 2013.

Education

Primary school enrolment is 87%. Last year, the government spent about 17% of its budget on basic education. Pre-school enrolment has risen by 270% since 2000. The proportion of people aged 20 or older with no schooling has fallen from 13% in 1995 to 4.8% in 2016. The proportion of candidates receiving Bachelor's degrees has increased from 20.1% in 2008 to 28.7% last year (South African Government, 2020).

Higher education participation rates have risen from 15.4% in 2002 to 18.6% in 2015. University enrolment numbers climbed 289.5% since 1985. Just under half of children who enrolled in Grade 1 will make it to Grade 12. Roughly 20% of Grade 9, 10, and 11 pupils are repeaters. Just 28% of people aged 20 or older have completed high school. Only 3.1% of Black people over the age of 20 have a university degree. Just one in three schools has a library and one in five a science laboratory. The unemployment rate for qualified professionals has increased from 7.7% in 2008 to 13.2% today.

Corruption

South Africa ranked 21 of 42 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 1995. In 2004, it ranked 44 of 145 countries. By last year, South Africa's ranking slid to 72 of 177 countries (Majavu, 2020). The World Bank produces annual worldwide governance indicators. In 2012, South Africa's control of corruption was ranked 113 out of 210 countries (South African Government, 2019). This must stop.

New Cities

In the twenty-five years since the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa has made tremendous strides.

The transfer of power from the white minority to the Black majority has been successful, but there are still many problems. Unemployment is high, and the poverty rate is even higher. In his book, *New Cities New Economies: South Africa and Africa's Grand Plan*, Dr. Tshilidzi Ratshitanga presents a bold, new vision for development and provides a roadmap for achieving prosperity and equality for all South Africans. This book explains the legacy of spatial injustices inherited from apartheid's social, political, and economic engineering as the central cause of the challenges which are inhibiting progress. The ghosts of apartheid still haunt South Africa. Dr. Ratshitanga's proposed solution is a total spatial reconstruction spawned by the creation of new mega city regions that will produce new economics for South Africa and the rest of the continent. The New Cities visionary framework is presented as a developmental paradigm that will contribute to solutions for the challenges of human settlement patterns.

The new cities vision is predicated on a state-led development trajectory. The goal is the creation of a national reconstruction project. Once the question of land ownership is resolved, the state can implement a new master plan. This will entail the identification of unoccupied places to build the new cities. This would offset the cost of relocation and compensation. Most of the land is in the hands of private entities and individuals and is registered as farming or mining land.

Since the new cities will create a construction boom in South Africa, the training of young people to prepare for construction work will be needed. The country will need to implement innovative skills training programs that will create a large number of skilled Black people over a short period of time. The country's educational institutions would be mobilised to produce qualified artisans, engineers and technicians who will become the labour force for the new cities building program.

New cities will also incorporate schools, clinics, hospitals, and other social amenities. These will require teachers, nurses, doctors and other skilled workers to be deployed to work there. The objective is to offer people quality of life, through the creation of equitable living environments, where people cohabitate in a safe, cohesive and socially uplifting manner. The ingredients for this are access to transport, safety

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and security, adequate healthcare, nutrition, housing, water, electricity and sanitation services.

The new cities will be compact communities anchored by high-density human settlements. Transit oriented developments will enable linkages between mass transport systems, residential spaces and work places. The location of residential settlements along transport corridors will alleviate the current burden of travel times between homes and work places. South Africans spend the longest time in daily commutes to and from work, while more than 50% of poor urban residents spend more than 20% of their household income on transport. The government has provided housing for the poor by building free RDP houses. However, these have been constructed in a similar manner to apartheid spatial patterns, located at the outskirts of economic activities and without all the relevant amenities, such as adequate schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities.

Housing for ordinary citizens who will be integrated in these new cities will be a source of wealth creation. Unlike the RDP houses that are not wealth-creating assets, the new subsidy schemes should be structured in ways that can create wealth building for the masses. The involvement of the state in investing heavily in the infrastructure of these new cities will complement this approach. New cities will provide employment opportunities, housing, schools hospital and health care facilities which were non-existent for Black people under apartheid.

Conclusion

Under the segregation and apartheid regimes, conditions for Black people in America and South Africa were extremely oppressive. Segregation and apartheid had some differences, but the overall impact was the same. Both regimes were challenged and eventually ended. The progress made by African Americans during the 50 years since the end of segregation has been substantial, but significant racial disparities linger. In the 25 years since the elimination of apartheid in South Africa, significant improvements have been made, but most poor Black people still reside in impoverished communities in townships and the countryside. If Dr. Ratshitanga's recommendations for the development of new cities are implemented, all South Africans will be the beneficiaries.

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Basic Income Grant, Communities, Indigenous Knowledge Systems

– Imagining the New South African Society



By Mongane Serote | Opinion

Introduction

For Africans to live and thrive as a people we must, as a nation, commit social and cultural suicide, so that parts of our nation come out of merely being the Masses and Grassroots. We must resurrect, reclaim, recreate, reawaken, embrace and nurture the belief and culture which lie deep in our hearts and minds, which we achieved through a fierce and protracted liberation struggle, based on the belief that:

‘...South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity...’

For us to do this we need a program of action to rebuild and develop the nation and the country. That program must have as its anchor the Freedom Charter and our National Constitution, both of which – it seems to me – must be the means to strive to understand and to achieve the cultural principles and expressions which must walk the alleys and streets of our townships, the footpaths of our rural areas, and the highways leading to our suburbs. Integral to those projects must be the means to conscientize and promote anti-corruption principles, the culture of entitlement, and the culture

of dependency and expectation to be saved by a messiah culture.

That program must also have, as its base, what is known by the people, what the people have identified as a problem, and what they have identified and understand as that which will transform their lives for the better. On the basis of consensus, decisions must be reached as to what exists in communities, what has the potential to develop the people so that they can develop things. The basis for that must be that the people themselves must reach consensus, accept and take responsibility for the projects to be implemented, in order to ensure the success of programs which can completely transform the lives of the poor, the unemployed, and the politically and economically discriminated against.

Besides the above, emanating from the iARi and iKSSA conference on food security held in Pretoria in November 2019, it would be essential to create a program of action on food security with the following objectives:

1. How do we turn the tide where 20% of South Africa's commercial farmers contribute 80% of the country's total food production?
2. How do we work with government in addressing the challenge that the majority of the farms bought by government for restitution/redistribution to black farms after 1994 are unproductive and non-functional?
3. How do we encourage households in South Africa to produce vegetables in their backyards, rooftops, or window sills in urban areas? This initiative could address the challenging situations where households use 70% to 80% of their income to purchase food (Hendrick 2014, iKSSA Trust report).

Covid-19 has dramatized the spectres of poverty, unemployment, and discrimination of the masses of people in our society in a most cruel manner. It has exposed that those who are black, poor, and marginalised are forever the most vulnerable. We have no choice as a nation but to fundamentally change and transform that circumstance and trajectory, beginning now and into the long-distant future after the Covid-19 pandemic.

“ The basis for that must be that the people themselves must reach consensus, accept and take responsibility for the projects to be implemented, in order to ensure the success of programs which can completely transform the lives of the poor, the unemployed, and the politically and economically discriminated against. ”

We have, as a people, and as a nation, overcome great adversities, such as when we overcame the colonial and apartheid regime in our country. As suggested above, we have laid the reference basis for the emergence of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South African cultural base and expression. That expression, as if a bonfire, caught up and raged across the continent, and the world, as flames which sought to erase imperialism, colonialism, tribalism, racism, and neo-colonialism.

Then, there was a fresh air blowing, as if a storm, over the continent to fan the energy and spirit for the emergence of the rebirth, recreation, reawakening of Africa, the African diaspora, and humanity. International multilateral institutions listened carefully to that African voice and discourse, but an anti-African Renaissance and Pan African discourse also emerged, targeting the African leaders who pioneered the NEPAD project, which would become the steam engine for the renaissance and Pan African cultural discourse in South Africa, on the continent, and among the African diaspora worldwide.

In that time, the cultural concepts of the African Renaissance and Pan African objectives were not only on our lips, but emanated from within us as a deep cultural belief, conviction, and commitment to the cultural expression of Africans. The question we must pose, using hindsight, about this is: how deep and how broad was this cultural expression among the masses? How should the history of the liberation struggles deepen an African consciousness which would exert that as a cultural expression which would protect and defend the gains of the struggle?

Besides that, let us also not overlook and discard other achievements which we gained in the past fifteen years (1994–2009) or so. The Pan African and African Renaissance cultural expressions, which were part and parcel of the national democratic revolution, would have been linked to revolutionary processes nurtured by the liberation struggle concept among the masses, and on the continent as a whole. 'Motho Ke Motho Ka Batho Ba Bang', as part of this principle, is the expression of our National Constitution.

In the same spirit of the above-mentioned gains and achievements, we must note that we have almost transformed the landscape of our country from the early nineties to the present time. What reminds us of our unfinished business is the spread and sprawl of shanty towns and poverty-stricken rural areas, especially of the former Bantustan and township areas.

It is also that the majority of the people, who are held on the necks by a tight vice grip of poverty, discrimination and unemployment, who scream '...I can't breathe, I can't breathe...' While it is not only black people, black people are in the majority. We must know, as democrats, that negative culture does not and cannot augur well for our non-racial, non-sexist and democratic national culture. It is almost late in the day of the history of non-racialism, non-sexism and democracy to still cite that evidence, which is so glaring under the sky. Whichever direction one takes in our country, one is bound to see the many RDP houses, which sprawl and spread across different myriad landscapes, across flat lands, slope spaces, and steep mountains in both rural and urban areas.

Those are the achievements of our struggle which we must still claim. However, we note also that they are infested with grave challenges. They are there, these RDP houses, people live in them! The question is: how, besides the fact of their having provided and promoted the concept of shelter for all, have they transformed the lives of the poor in the urban centres, especially, and also in the rural areas? This question, while inspired by the potential driven by the democratic government to address the quality of life of those who were impoverished and dehumanised by the apartheid system, raises the question: did we succeed to address those conditions holistically – economically, socially, culturally, through

infrastructure, and even politically? If so, how so? If not, how do we conduct an audit which defines this move by government as noble, but which answers the question, why is this still an unfinished business?

They have changed the lives of some poor people, as has the infrastructure to distribute ARVs, as have the social welfare grants which have intervened in the lives of millions of retired, poor, unemployed, and socially marginalised citizens. There are the lives of single parents, whose children and themselves had to be rescued through the social welfare grants. These programs of grants have shifted the quality of lives of the recipients, from here to there. As also have the RDP houses and the ARV program. Is it from poverty to quality of life? Or: would it be that these were programs which were meant to develop the people who are pinned down under the three scourges of poverty, unemployment and social marginalisation, all of which are apartheid's legacy, so that the people themselves begin to develop things?

Which proximities and which institutions should the masses of the grassroots have developed themselves, after which programs should have been accessible to them? In which way should they have empowered themselves, especially from the basis that they have been a resource which kept them afloat against the greatest and most brutal odds? Which resources would have been twin creations with their organic knowledge creations for the interventions referred to above? In other words, what education systems must be put in place which would complement their own and enhance the organic education and knowledge inherent in the people? Statistics say there are sixty-million South Africans. Certainly, there will be more after the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the nation and on the continent. The issue of the continent is also the issue which we must factor into the thinking and planning in our country. If we do, we will have no space in our consciousness for xenophobia. Migration is a human factor, but also, it is now over five and a half decades since we declared to all to know, that we are uniting Africa.

If from a bird's eye view we scan both the rural and urban areas, the eye being focused among the poor, and the question which we seek to answer being: what is the superstructure which we together with the inhabitants of this space must create here to

“ The best guardian and possibility of this is our constitution and both the superstructure and the myriad of institutions which oversee it. ”

fundamentally transform these spaces to achieve their being habitable and to create possibility for quality of life where it never existed?

What must dominate our collective minds as we scan that view? In other words, given the backdrop of the liberation struggle, what values, what politics, what historical understanding, what cultural reference would have to guide how we scan and how we ponder and what vision emerges as we perceive what is there facing us and what is to be done? There are the masses, there are the grassroots, there are the lives which voluntarily stepped forward and joined the organs of civil society, the liberation army, the labour movements, the liberation movements, youth and women organisations, and entered the struggle without looking backwards.

Even as these are not completed projects, interventions have been made in this way in both the rural and urban areas through sanitation, electricity and water supply – all massive projects indeed, which are a pointer to the possibilities of serious interventions. Again, these are the universities of the developing nation, which is also, our continent. These are possibilities to nurture the foundation and emergence of a cultural expression of patriotism, a humane, progressive and optimistic cultural consciousness for the future of our country and nation. The challenge is how to nurture a common culture which is part and parcel of everyday cultural understanding and practice? Have we, as a people, achieved a common understanding as to what is culture and how it is nurtured?

All these achievements, incomplete as they are, are known by the people, they are the base to learn from and to take off from in order to advance the reconstruction, development and transformation of

the South African nation. In the same manner as these parts of the superstructure in townships and the rural areas of our country are the evidence of an attempt at the transformation of the geopolitical landscape of the nation, they are also a glaring example that the nation is still in the grip of colonial and apartheid division, reflecting the institutional presence of a diabolical past system within the emerging non-racial, non-sexist and democratic nation. The best guardian and possibility of this is our constitution and both the superstructure and the myriad of institutions which oversee it.

We must keep this matter on our national agenda, we must still pose the question: how is a cultural expression and consciousness owned by a people, by a nation? Which superstructures of the nation must drive this urgent and necessary project and understanding which must forever claim and forever rescue the gains of our non-racial, non-sexist, democratic cultural consciousness? The people experience their benefits daily. Put together, the collective people's experiences have inherent in them the potential to transform the lives of what Covid-19 has so painfully exposed and dramatised, in the whole world, within Africa and in the black rural and urban areas of the world.

South Africa, were you witness to the long long queues at the supermarkets; the long long queues for social welfare grants; the long long queues for pensions and at the taxi ranks? Soon, it will be long long queues in hospitals for beds and long long queues at cemeteries too. That is the challenge facing our nation now, as the Covid-19 pandemic rages and peaks across the nation.

What must be done?

To implement the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the rural and township communities through the length and breadth of our country; to implement processes, programs and projects based on the concepts of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS), Vuk'uzenzele, and acquired skills using the Basic Income Grant (BIG) as an incentive and in the process identify relevant and appropriate audited skills in the communities for this purpose.

To kickstart this process, the plan must be to mobilise

a small number of IKS holders and practitioners (for example, two from each province for starters) on the basis of the nine IKS languages of our country for a brainstorm session and conference on the five categories of IKS. This must begin with the food and medicinal plant security project. Besides the fact that the food, herbal and medicinal plants can be projects in both the rural and urban areas, it is also a fact that knowledge about them resides among the people, knowledge about both the indigenous and non-indigenous plants, herbs and foods, their use and their cocktails, which unfortunately, is being harvested because all of it is unprotected, let alone valued, by the departments which should be in partnerships with communities.

The objective of the conference must be to shift the IKS discourse in the country, from being only a theoretical discourse or only related to and defining the IKS Healing System (IKSH), as the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) has done for the past fifteen or so years. As IKS is elevated to theory, it must also be elevated to the level of practice, the basis and push being of and by the people supported by the government. That is so that it can contribute to the economy, to social transformation, to national cultural diversity and the intervention by digitisation and innovation. Beginning with access to cell phones, which is a basic 4IR means of production with the objective to eventually orientate the masses, the grassroots digitally, we must mobilise the youth and elders into a partnership. The youth to introduce the digitisation history and culture, the elders to lead and introduce the history, culture and IKS processes, so that the youth can answer the question: who am I?

The objective, in engaging in IKS thus, must be to at all times ensure contribution to a Vuk'uzenzele consciousness of communities and nation building. As also it must be to promote, protect and innovate IKS so that it must yield positive, humane and progressive historical, cultural, political, social and economic expressions nationally. The history of research into IKS, as initiated and unfolded by the Portfolio Committee of Parliament of Arts, Culture, Languages, Science and Technology (PACLST) has thus far yielded the result that there are five main categories of IKS. These are social, institutional, technological, biodiversity and liberation processes.

The suggested conference must be convened to validate and verify these categories through practice. As also, it must be an intervention to empower the communities to engage the culture of Vuk'uzenzele through food and medicinal security processes, programs and projects from an IKS position. There are diverse and myriad forms of industries which can emanate from this project, which must be initially engaged as pilot projects, as a study is also conducted about those projects in the past which did not work.

Food security, including IKSH

As in other parts of Africa, food insecurity and malnutrition are major problems facing South Africa. While there is a myriad of causes of food insecurity in the country, the key cause can be attributed to the arid and semi-arid conditions that exist within the country. The average annual rainfall is less than 600mm. These arid conditions have adverse effects on food production and expose many households to problems of food and nutritional insecurity. (iIKSSA 2020 conference)

'...However, local communities in South Africa have, over the years, developed different food security strategies and mechanisms for surviving in these conditions. These strategies include various technologies of food production, processing, preservation and storage that have not received much attention from policy makers and extension workers. They tend to be underrated and their potential has not been documented and exploited for sustainable community livelihood...'

(Sibanda, 2004).

Research conducted on what was called the African Primary Institution (API) by iARI, funded by both

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the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) and the National Heritage Council (NHC) has indicated that even as the imperialism, colonialism and the apartheid system focused on the destruction of the API, the so called African extended family, with the objective to destroy African organisation, programs and social foundations and communities, the IKS institution has been most resilient.

Besides indicating resilience, given how the imperialist, colonialist and apartheid systems not only continuously, but also with a focused attention, put in place policies and legislation (e.g. pass laws, group areas acts, etc.) which were intended to and resulted in the near destruction of this API, it continued to sustain its value systems, which are based on the concept and philosophy of 'motho ke motho ka batho ba bang' – a fundamental IKS institution and philosophy (iARI).

Given the understanding that the API is the foundation and base of any nation on the continent, iARI's intention and ambition to contribute to the strengthening of the diversity of the emerging South African nation, which is based on the strategic objective of the liberation struggle, and which is also to let emerge a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous nation, it is understandable to claim that the API is still the basis for anchoring community projects for the transformation of those communities.

This suggestion implies that a juxtaposing of a project of food and medicinal plant security, the API, schools and universities (UNISA and UJ among others) and communities with the Basic Income Grant (BIG) project has a potential to prime interests in community building projects. This must be based on, on the one hand, the BIG as an incentive for skills audits in communities as stated above, and on the other, as a program to kick start and encourage cohesion processes within communities, through both BIG and the stokvels (an urban IKS innovation investment process and culture).

Besides that, it would be the potential to establish a sustainable social locomotive process, which mobilises individuals and communities in the rural areas and townships. If on the one hand there are community food, medicinal plant and herbal gardens in communities, as also there are provincial food, medicinal and herbal plant gardens and nurseries. As

these projects merge and yield gains in communities, the land question and the housing projects must be on the agenda, discussed by all relevant structures from within the Government structures, the private sector, and the communities, including also high schools and universities.

The superstructure for these projects must be perceived as being part and parcel of the infrastructure projects of different government development processes and projects, e.g. Arts and Culture, Science and Innovation, Trade and Industry, Social Development, COGTA, Education and Health. While on the one hand, there must be a concerted program and process of skills audit as an incentive for BIG, and for engaging in self-reliance and self-upliftment processes and programmes by the communities, in a word, Vuk'uzenzele of and in communities and villages, another focused project must be that of the complete eradication of illiteracy.

It must also be an urgent project which is focused on contributing to the development and upgrading of at least two African languages, namely Sesotho and isiZulu. This while not stopping the processes of development of the other remaining African languages. This is an urgent matter which the Pan South African Language Board (PanSALB) must engage with the Department of Education (DoE) on the basis of the new community-orientated education curriculum which I will briefly refer to later. Kiswahili, which is the official AU language, has also been put on the national agenda, as the government has done, through the DoE so far. The government-funded PanSALB and the Kiswahili institute based at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) must be encouraged to enter into partnership with the Kiswahili institute, based in Tanzania, as a deliberate intention and objective to contribute to the unity of our continent on the basis of a promotion of a Pan African and African Renaissance Cultural expression and the emancipation of the African voice and culture.

The IKS curriculum for education must in the near future factor digitisation among the youth and the elders. The youth are steeped in this culture, in its present and future, and the elders are steeped in the history, the present and the future. How will the BIG-Communities-IKS, digitisation, the youth, IKS and the elders transform the culture of the masses and the

culture of the grassroots into and as a contribution to the cultural diversity of our nation?

The youth excel in digitisation, but will also be encouraged if their skills in this regard are formally recognised as they are engaged and related to the Reconstruction and Development Program of the country. On the other hand, formally engaging the elders in the history, culture and social circumstances of the communities and the nation would be a social and cultural investment, to conscientize them to the information and data which is inherent in the digitisation culture, the objective being how to use the data and knowledge acquired to enhance and to innovate IKS where and when it is necessary.

The DoE's new complementary education takes into consideration the fact that indigenous education has existed and continues to have a place in South African communities. This new form of education will focus learning on Self, Community, the Country and the World. The certificate will be an education that encompasses both indigenous and local knowledge and embeds scientific knowledge wherever possible and/or necessary. The initial basis for the take-off of this new form of education will be, at all times, to do a skills audit in communities, to empower the participating individuals, and to use the acquired skills for the further development of communities. As one educator stated:

'...One of the prominent features of this education will be a focus on entrepreneurship from both the indigenous and western systems. This new system certificate will groom learners to participate in the economy, governance and make decisions from informed positions. The education system will also focus on learning how to deal with social issues in their own communities. The education will be largely project based...' (Morongoa Masemola, 2020).

It is this approach which makes it urgent that in the first place, the existing mine, the IKS categories are unpacked, verified and validated so that they are the basis for the release of the incubation and innovation reference of IKS.

Validation and verifying of the 5 IKS categories

The foundation for the IKS is the 5 categories

“ This is a category of Indigenous Knowledge which is pregnant with bounds of possibilities for creativity if it is synergised with digitisation. Culture, spirituality, languages, heritage, and the arts also fall under this category. ”

mentioned above, namely: Social, Technological, Institutional, Biodiversity and Liberation processes. The categories were yielded by the 13 years of a national research program which was conducted by the Portfolio Committee of Arts, Culture, Languages, Science and Technology Committee (PACLST) of the Democratic Parliament (1995–2008), in partnership with historically disadvantaged universities, the Science Councils of the country, named above and relevant Government Departments, IKS Holders and Practitioners, International Organisations like UNESCO, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

The Indigenous Knowledge Systems Categories

Social Issues

Taking digitisation into consideration and harnessing this category, social issues will be explored. How must we create the science of harnessing its content so that it must result in a revolution? A rupture from equating a mono-knowledge, Western knowledge, as civilisation... of recognising that there is as diverse knowledge in the world as there are diverse people, cultures, heritages, histories, languages, beliefs, and so on. All of these are the content of the social issue's category. One of the steam engines which must complement the relationship between social issues and digitisation, is a simultaneous interpretation facility and a language lab which must be anchored in the youth and the elders.

This category can facilitate, create and open up communication among all people, in South Africa, Southern Africa, the continent and even the diaspora and the world at large, especially if Kiswahili is also

factored in. Very quickly, the combined teaching of African languages and technology must be instituted, through a drill and practice method, which can contribute to the minimisation of illiteracy in villages and townships as also it becomes the non-racialisation of Pan Africanism. We must note that research emanating from the African Union Language Academy states that there are seventeen African languages on the continent, rather than 2,000 (Kwesi Prah-Sala Language Seminar, 2018). In as much as we can say, there are two African Languages in South Africa, rather than nine, namely Sesotho and isiNguni. This must not mean that we are doing away with Sesotho, Sepedi, Setswana, isiZulu, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, Tshivenda, Tsonga, Khoi and San. This is a category of Indigenous Knowledge which is pregnant with bounds of possibilities for creativity if it is synergised with digitisation. Culture, spirituality, languages, heritage, and the arts also fall under this category.

Indigenous Knowledge Institutions

The institutions exist, are being utilised, and form the consciousness, emotions, spiritual orientation, and physical being of Africans. Besides their having to be juxtaposed with the 21st century objective reality, it is important to unpack these institutions, with the objective of identifying within them, what must be retained, and what must be discarded. The objective here must not be to integrate them with other knowledge systems as a priority, but to continuously ask: what from them can contribute to empower and fundamentally transform the rural and township areas, moving from what the communities know to creating new ideas? But also, we must ask and answer the question: how will they contribute to the human experience, which is humane? Individuals as institutions, for instance, malome and rakgadi, as well as the family and communities, bongaka, bogosi, bogwera, bojale, letsema, masiela, lobola, etc. are the institutions which must be revisited with the view to promote social engineering for quality of life and progress. If we approach these processes informed by an understanding, conviction and commitment that there are skills, expertise, positive values which inform social processes in these concepts within the communities, we will find the resources for the engagement of the projects.

Indigenous Technology

What is technology? If it is the means to mobilise resources, both human and material, and if it is the knowledge repeated through generations to ensure the quality of all forms of life and their perpetuity, then there are more questions which, if answered, will further create knowledge and enable the human race to access the knowledge of the universe. We therefore cannot talk about technology and not also talk about science. What and which is the science in IKS? How must we identify the technologies within IKS which have the potential to prevent the reinvention of wheels, while also stimulating innovations which will allow for sustainability through a careful, creative and concerted unpacking of social, ecological and economic content, with the objective of ensuring the continuity of the regeneration of resources and their container, the earth?

Before we even think about sputnik science, it is most imperative that we focus on the fact that the Fourth Industrial Revolution is imminent and must be compatible with the survival of life, be couched within progressive culture, and be humane. From a calabash, to a house, to both social and natural sciences, IKS as a science, if contextualised within African perspectives, promises all kinds of possibilities. For instance, a technology exists within IKS to cleanse and heal the institutionalised terrible psychic and spiritual wounds of violence, racism, and sexism inflicted by the apartheid system on all South Africans. Indeed, sooner rather than later, we must, as we already do, verify, validate and examine IKS against the backdrop of sputnik science and technology.

Biodiversity

The 3 Bs – Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Bioprospecting – are a content of this category. Inherent in this category is the preservation, conservation and stimulation of the ecosystem, the universe, and all forms of life. The enhancement of IKS in this category must be with the vision and objective of encompassing the renewal, rebirth, reclamation, and furtherance of Pan Africanism within the whole of the African continent, the African Diaspora, and the global context. The challenge and dialectic facing us as human beings here is: on the one hand, we must understand and be part of the self-perpetuating

cycles of the universe, and, on the other, in line with the IKS African story of creation, we must understand and engage the fact that it does seem, for now, that our consciousness, which produces thought, which produces expression, which must produce organised and planned action, is unique to the human species, and therefore, that it must be trained and disciplined to be in tandem with the cycles of the universe, as also it becomes constructively creative with them, because we came here to be creative beings. If the lid is lifted from Bongaka, Bojale and Bogwera, we will discover millions of men and women who have survived the terror of the Apartheid System, who have been revolutionaries.

Liberation Processes

Except for a few islands around the continent, all of the continent has been liberated politically. Taking into consideration that most of the Liberation Movements which were responsible for this achievement, which have their roots in the 15th century and which also emerged in the 19th century, sought to resolve issues of tribalism, racism, sexism, poverty, as simultaneously their strategic objective was to rid their countries and people of the burden of imperialism, colonialism and the apartheid systems, how must both the successes and failures of the strategies and tactics, programs, processes and projects be within the reach and access of the masses?

How can this category be shared with peoples of the world to, on the one hand, contribute to the creation of a peaceful, secure and free world, as also on the other hand, they contribute to the historical, political, social, cultural, artistic, economic and heritage development of the continent and the world?

It is not only the strategies and tactics which were used to conduct the struggles for liberation which must be studied, but also the various methods used. How, why and what did they achieve? Why were they founded? There are those countries which were liberated on the basis of non-violence and negotiations, and there are also those which were liberated on the basis of armed struggles, negotiations and/or international interventions. There are a mixed bag of strategies and tactics among the African Diaspora, which can contribute immensely to the transformation of the world as we know it now.

The stories for creativity abound in these categories, which can be film, theatre, music, dance, and different writing genres. They are also subjects for history and culture and a contribution, as being part and parcel of the education system, to a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, multilateral and peaceful world.

All of these categories demand that the objective to enrich the diverseness of African experience – through its recreation, reawakening, rebirth, reconstruction and revitalising – after it being buried for centuries, must really liberate the human experience.

Conclusion

(We believe that) ‘...South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity...’

This statement can no longer be just theory. It is urgent that the South African nation emancipate the African voice within the diverse context of our country: historically, politically, culturally, socially and, equally importantly, economically.

While this reality must be buttressed by the diverseness of our nation, through implementation, by legislation and superstructures, Africans must lead those processes of the political, social, economic, heritage and cultural liberation. To do so, in communities supported by the non-racial, non-sexist and democratic national culture as a whole, not as charity, but through material and human resources (without paternalism), with support and by endorsement, will not only be for the nation to experience the reality and evidence of the diversity of the South African experience and culture, but will also be a national paradigm shift.

At this passing long hour of the Covid-19 pandemic, millions of ordinary South Africans, having experienced the drastic, dangerous and cruel impact of poverty on millions of citizens, can become a potential motive force for the fundamental transformation of that circumstance and of our nation. While BIG must be shaped to be an incentive for personal improvement, it must also motivate people to become activists in their own right, in their communities. Vuk’uzenzele, and ‘Motho ke motho ka batho ba bang’ must be the clarion call linked to BIG.



COVID-19

Lockdown Time capsule of South Africa, April 2020

South Africa had one of the strictest Covid lockdowns in the world starting on the 26th of March and lasting for 35 days. With five weeks of quarantine where only essential services were open, all educational institutions, places of worship and workplaces were shut down and people had to shelter in place. Walking on the streets was even prohibited except to buy food. The country was



slowly moved through varying restrictions over the next 5 months as the health risks decreased as the virus was slowed down effectively. The articles in this timecapsule represent the analysis from scholars at The University of Johannesburg of the 5 week lockdown period and appeared on various open access platforms. They are collected here as a small historical archive of that time.

CORONAVIRUS:

The answers lie in the numbers

By Rendani Mbuyha and Tshilidzi Marwala | Archive

This article first appeared in the Daily Maverick on 1 April 2020



The Black Death is the plague that infected people in Europe and Asia in the mid-1300s. It killed more than 20 million European people in five years, which was more than a third of Europe's population then. It is estimated that between 75 and 200 million people died in Eurasia. It took Europe 200 years to recover its population size.

Many, including the king of France, blamed the heavens, but that was irrelevant because the bacteria was transmitted through rats and fleas. Some, in cities such as Barcelona, Strasbourg and in Flanders, accused and massacred the Jewish people "for poisoning the wells", but it turned out that the relatively low mortality in that community was due to the Jewish religion's promotion of cleanliness. The culture of cleanliness was not widespread in Europe at the time. The absence of science in any society is dangerous, and it can lead to superstition and murder. The Spanish influenza of 1918 infected 500 million people in the world and killed between 50 and 100 million. These are scary numbers.

Today we have another pandemic – the coronavirus (Covid-19). The novel coronavirus first manifested in the city of Wuhan in China in December 2019. The disease has subsequently spread around the world, leading to the World Health Organisation (WHO) declaring it a pandemic on 11 March. In South Africa, by Sunday 29 March, it was reported that the coronavirus had infected 1,280 and killed two people. The growth

trajectory of this virus is less than exponential, which means it is significantly slower than the regular 'flu. What is emerging is that modern pandemics are killing fewer people than previous ones. However, it is still too early to tell" how this pandemic will evolve and what havoc it will heave in society.

States around the world have embarked on numerous strict measures to lock down their countries to "flatten" the curve of Covid-19 cases. Governments around are now scrambling to ready their healthcare for surges in systems capacity as the pandemic reaches its peak. However, for governments to plan appropriately, they have to answer some of the following questions: how much of the population will be affected? How many will require hospitalisation? When will the country hit the peak infection level? Is the current lockdown effective?

The Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered Model

Answers to these questions lie in projections of each country's infection trajectory. There are various techniques that epidemiologists, actuaries and data scientists use to generate such predictions. One well established epidemiological model for the projection of infectious diseases is the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model. The SIR models the transition of individuals between three stages of a condition: 1) being susceptible to the condition, 2)

having the condition and being infectious to others 3), and having recovered and built immunity for the disease. In its simplest form, it uses two variables, and these are the basic reproductive number and the infectious period. The infectious number is the number of individuals that a person on average may infect, whereas the infectious period is the time frame in which an individual is contagious.

The SIR model utilises a branch of mathematics called differential equations to simulate transitions of individuals between various stages of a disease over time. Differential equations is a type of mathematics that falls under the field called Calculus. Sir Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibnitz independently invented calculus. Ironically the seeds for the invention of Calculus were germinated when Newton left Cambridge University in 1665 to escape the plague (not too dissimilar to the coronavirus) that was affecting the town.

Specifically, the differential equations in the SIR model govern the rate at which susceptible individuals become infected, how the infected transmit the virus to the susceptibles and finally the rate at which the infected recover. The SIR model is a very influential method, in epidemiology, and in the last two months alone there have been over 20 articles (without peer review) published by researchers in online repositories using the SIR to forecast Covid-19 related infection trajectories.

Many projections reported in the media are actually based on outputs of SIR modelling reports such as the now popular Oxford Study suggesting that 60% of the UK population will be or have been infected by Covid-19.

We have similarly calibrated the SIR model on the current South African data with similar findings to the Oxford study, assuming no state intervention. Considering recent state interventions, our SIR model infection estimates could be lower than 20% at its peak.

Proceed with Caution

As models are mere simplified abstractions of reality, the SIR model does have its pitfalls. First, the SIR model assumes random mixing of individuals – this fundamentally starts to deviate from reality as more

and more countries adopt lockdown and gathering restrictions. One aspect that is proving difficult to model is how the socioeconomic differentials will impact the already nonlinear epidemiological models. Furthermore, how does one tune the model, especially to account for townships where community sharing facilities is widespread? The model also requires the distinction between infected individuals and “confirmed infected cases”.

Thus a percentage of infections like the currently popular 60% includes a large number of latent cases who will not even know that they have been infected by the disease and will exhibit either no or mild symptoms. This distinction becomes critical in healthcare resource planning as the infected population estimates, which includes the latent cases, tend to overestimate the expected healthcare utilisation. In Wuhan, it was found that the actual confirmed cases were only 0.5% of the prediction of the SIR model. Evidence such as this from Wuhan assists greatly in contextualising results that might seem alarming such as the popular 60% estimate. In reality, only around 2% will translate to the utilisation of healthcare facilities – at least based on what we have seen from SIR models around the world.

While there are numerous estimates for the Covid-19 infection trajectory, it is crucial to discern the foundational assumptions of the models used clearly. Importantly, caution must be exercised given the limited data available to establish clear trends of the pandemic and the many dynamics at play from state interventions. Now that President Cyril Ramaphosa has declared a national lockdown, to defeat the coronavirus let us stay in our homes during this time and follow basic hygiene as recommended by the Ministry of Health.

Mbuyha is a Lecturer in actuarial science at the University of the Witwatersrand and a PhD student in artificial intelligence at the University of Johannesburg.



Marwala is a professor and the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg. He deputises President Cyril Ramaphosa on the South African Presidential Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Covid-19:

A multipronged approach to protect ourselves and others.

By Sehaam Khan and Saurabh Sinha | Archive

*This article first appeared in the Daily Maverick on 6 April 2020 as “Covid-19: Droplets and Aerosol transmission: How do we protect others and ourselves?”



The rapid increase in the spread and transmission rate of the virus SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19), has led to a frenzied upsurge in general and social media coverage. This, in turn, has led to many conflicting reports related to the spread and transmission of Covid-19 within various environments.

Hourly, we are bombarded with newspaper articles and social media stories, which relay “factual” information from “reliable” sources. The public is confused! While we are cautioned to only rely on information provided by the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), there have also been many reputable research papers that have recently been published, related to the transmission and spread of the virus.

Furthermore, infectious disease experts working on the frontline of Covid-19 control have released videos and reports. Peer-reviewed journal articles and expert information from infectious disease specialists are thus important resources, which must be considered in our quest to learn as much as we can about this virus currently ravaging our globe. Let us thus attempt to simplify and collate the recent information related

to the transmission and longevity of Covid-19.

To date, Covid-19 is known to spread by short-range respiratory droplets and is hypothesised to spread by longer-range aerosol transmission. When we consider the nature of aerosols versus droplets, we must understand that size and behaviour matter. The virus particle size is approximately 50 to 200 nanometres (nm) in diameter. To put this into perspective, one nm is one-billionth of a metre. The human eye (regular vision), without any assistance (magnifying glasses or microscopes etc.), can see objects of approximately 20 micrometres (µm) in size.

Nanometre-sized objects, like the coronavirus, are thus a thousand times smaller. Droplets are normally larger than 20 micrometres (µm) in diameter and are usually produced when coughing or sneezing. They are heavy enough to succumb to gravity and usually travel no more than one to two metres. When an infected person releases these droplets, each droplet may contain many virus particles. To complicate matters, droplets may travel further distances depending on wind conditions. Airflow thus influences the travel distance of droplets.

However, irrespective of the distance, when these droplets fall onto various surfaces, inanimate objects that now “carry” the infectious virus particles, are called fomites. The infection is then indirectly spread when an uninfected person touches these fomites and proceeds to touch their face (mucous membranes of the eyes, nose and mouth).

We therefore must stress the importance of handwashing and hand hygiene. However, we do not advocate irresponsible wearing of gloves. Just before the nationwide lockdown commenced, I (Sehaam Khan) was at the airport travelling from Johannesburg to Cape Town. Almost every person I encountered, whether airport staff or traveller, was wearing a pair of latex gloves. Now, I have been in the laboratory environment long enough to recognise a pair of gloves that have been worn for an extended period – the glove sticks to your skin because your hands are perspiring. This to me indicated that people were not regularly changing their gloves.

I watched in awe and horror as one young woman put her gloved hand to her mouth to blow a kiss at a colleague. In her mind, I am sure, the gloves were offering a form of protection. I am willing to bet that wearing those gloves may even have been considered as a replacement for hand washing. IT DOES NOT. You need to change your gloves numerous times a day. In fact, it should be noted that almost every time you touch an object, you need to dispose of the worn gloves. This is similar to what one observes when visiting a doctor! For many, this is not possible. Soap, water and proper hand hygiene works.

Direct infection (person to person) may also occur by droplet infection, if we stand within range (one to two metres), from the respiratory tract of an infected individual (cough or sneeze), to the mucous membranes of the uninfected person. Moreover, aerosol particles, which are normally smaller than 10 µm in diameter, can travel for many metres (greater than two meters) in the air before they fall to the ground or onto a surface, and may be inhaled.

As a countermeasure, many Asian countries have strongly advocated for the wearing of facemasks. In contrast, the WHO has indicated that wearing a facemask is not advisable. We encourage wearing a facemask when in public spaces for the following

reasons: a) even with proper and frequent hand hygiene, unless you are washing your hands after touching every single object, there may be a time when you (an uninfected person) could come into contact with a fomite and inadvertently touch your face; b) by wearing a facemask, direct infection can also be curtailed; c) comparing the transmissibility rate of the USA and some European countries (e.g. Italy) to South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, it is evident that wearing a mask in public areas (together with many other factors) has positively contributed to controlling the virus spread; d) a facemask decreases the spread of the virus by an infected person; and e) if it is in fact true that non-symptomatic infected people may transmit the virus, it is definitely advantageous to encourage the public to wear facemasks, to curtail spread and infection.

Recently, the Czech Republic took the radical step of mandating the wearing of nose and mouth coverings in public spaces. In contrast, the US Surgeon General and WHO have stated that wearing a mask is not effective in preventing the public from being infected, yet state that they require these masks for their health professionals.

Ultimately, we are of the opinion that a protective measure like a surgical facemask, in conjunction with social distancing and good hand hygiene, will lower the virus infection rate. We do, however, support the sentiment that should there be a shortage of facemasks, health professionals should take priority.

The University of Johannesburg plays an important role in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). In my (Saurabh Sinha) contact with our campus clinics, we have directly faced the shortage of masks. One of our Chinese partner institutions, Shandong University, has donated 2,000 facemasks for campus clinics and security staff. Supported by an open-source design, we have 3D-printed face shields. In a university environment, one can occasionally find overhead projector transparencies and these have been used for the shield cover. A number of innovations have come about as a result of Covid-19. Like many other measures, post the control of a pandemic, our hope is that innovative thinking will remain and also assist with economic rebound.

We further understand that health professionals are trained in wearing professional protective equipment

like facemasks, thus the likelihood of them constantly fiddling with their masks, and in so doing touching their faces, is substantially lower. Can we thus not teach the public proper “facemask etiquette”, in the same way that we have educated the public on how to wash their hands correctly?

There is a lot to still learn about Covid-19. One peer-reviewed article talks about the spread of Covid-19 at patient lavatories and change-rooms in hospitals. This is due to contamination in change-rooms and through fomites in lavatories. Shared spaces, like lavatories are, however, common given the socioeconomic conditions of informal settlements in South Africa. Focusing on healthcare professionals, a recent peer-reviewed study conducted in Wuhan Province, China, investigated for the presence of Covid-19 within various areas in two hospitals, during the outbreak.

The authors divided the sampling locations into patient areas (where the Covid-19 patients had a physical presence), and medical staff areas (workplaces in the two hospitals exclusively accessed by the medical staff who had direct contact with the patients). Their results showed that the Covid-19 concentrations were high inside the patient mobile bathroom (aerosol; one hospital), excessively high in the rooms where protective apparel of healthcare professionals were removed (aerosol; seven locations – one hospital) and high on the floor of the intensive care units (deposits; two locations – one hospital).

Researchers in Singapore, who also detected high levels of the virus in bathrooms, confirmed this study. In both studies, rigorous sanitation processes (when implemented) and the surface sanitation of protective apparel drastically reduced the virus numbers to undetectable levels.

We think it is evident that in order to slow down the virus transmission rate, a multipronged approach is required. It is also evident that we must be willing to constantly consider new information, and if necessary, adjust our recommendations based on evidence and global successes, that use best practice. Humility to listen and be adaptable is now more important than ever. Cover your nose and mouth, wash your hands regularly, practice physical distancing, implement rigorous sanitation processes in hospitals (where infected numbers may be higher), or shared lavatory

spaces, and surface sanitise personal protective clothing.

Sehaam Khan is Professor (Microbiology & Molecular Virology) and Executive Dean: Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Johannesburg.

Saurabh Sinha is Professor (Electronic Engineering) and Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research and Internationalisation, University of Johannesburg.

Pandemic underscores gross inequalities in South Africa, and the need to fix them

By Lauren Graham | Archive

This article first appeared in The Conversation Africa on 5 April 2020

Now more than ever, South Africans are painfully aware of the inequalities that continue to play out in the country. In people's pre-Covid-19 lives, the realities of living in a country that is among the most unequal in the world were easily overlooked. The pandemic shines a very bright light on this reality. It asks us to fundamentally address them – not just at this time of the pandemic, but as a social justice imperative.

As messaging about preventing the coronavirus ramped up, the consequences of inequalities in the provision of basic service provision in the country have become clear. These disparities between rich and poor are reflected across a range of interventions that have been put in place to manage the pandemic and its social and economic consequences. These include access to water, housing circumstances, as well as people's very high dependence on social grants and the informal sector for income.


Five areas where inequality is starkest

Living circumstances: The preventive measures have highlighted inequalities in living circumstances. Take the case of hand washing. The 1.1 to 1.4 million people

who live in informal settlements in South Africa don't have access to water in their homes or in their yards. An estimated 19% of the nearly 19 million people living in rural areas lack access to reliable supply of clean water; 33% do not have basic sanitation. This makes regular hand washing difficult. And social distancing or quarantining is near impossible when water access and ablutions are communal, and where settlements are overcrowded.

Livelihoods: For many people at the upper end of the wage spectrum, working remotely has been relatively easy, with limited impact on their ability to earn a living. Such workers are in the formal labour market. They are protected by both a legal and social contract as well as a safety net of unemployment benefits.

Small business owners will be under significant pressure in the coming weeks and months. But they will be partially cushioned by the business support measures announced by the government. In contrast, the most vulnerable workers will struggle without support at this time. Casual workers (like many domestic workers), those who are self-employed (such as Uber drivers), and those working in the informal



economy are not protected by legal contracts.

In general these workers, who make up over 20% of South Africa's workforce, cannot access unemployment benefits. They will be under enormous pressure financially, potentially unable to feed themselves and their families.

President Cyril Ramaphosa has made it clear that the government is aware of these challenges and will move to ensure support. But it remains to be seen what that entails.

Education: Inequalities in education were also immediately evident when schools were closed. While private schools and many suburban public schools were able to switch to technology-supported learning relatively easily, most public schools were not. The directive by the Department of Basic Education was to ensure that learning continued by providing workbooks and worksheets online. But, many parents will be facing the very real struggle of supporting their families in a locked down economy. This, and other problems, including limited access to technology and data, means that many parents will struggle to supervise their children's learning.

Equally concerning is how this will affect education outcomes in the longer term. Analysis already shows how learning backlogs in the early years, forged in an unequal education system, are compounded over time. Further backlogs under the current situation are likely to have long-term effects.

Access to the internet: Manuel Castells, a sociologist concerned with the internet age and inequality, notes in his book *The Internet Galaxy*:

The fundamental digital divide is not measured by the number of connections to the Internet, but by the consequences of both connection and lack of connection. At universities and other higher education institutions, wealthier students have been able to switch to online learning quickly, while poorer students battle with high data costs.

Inequalities in access to data further entrench existing inequalities in education and livelihoods during the Covid-19 crisis.

Food security: The effects of panic buying on the food security of people with limited income has received attention. But a less well-known impact of the measures is that over 9 million children will not receive a daily, nutritious meal while schools remain closed.

The National School Nutrition Programme potentially has positive effects on reducing stunting and obesity. In the face of prolonged school closures, these children face increased food insecurity, with potential long-term consequences for their health.

There have been heartwarming responses from the public to ensure that food packs are provided to children. But it is simply not possible to reach the over 9 million children who depend on this meal.

What can be done?

The measures announced by President Ramaphosa to mitigate the problem reflect an understanding of how existing inequalities will affect especially the most vulnerable people, and a willingness to address the problem.

Social protection measures that can quickly provide a safety net are crucial at this time. But, the current social protection system provides a safety net only to those outside of the labour market – children, older people, and people with disabilities. Unemployment benefits accrue to those in formal employment who contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund. This leaves the vast majority of working-age adults without a safety net at this time.

While there have been relatively quick changes to existing mechanisms to provide support to small, medium and micro enterprises there are, as yet, no measures to protect informal and casual workers and ensure cash injections into vulnerable households.

The country needs to devise a social contract to better address the vulnerabilities that low-wage, casual and informal workers face daily.



The country must also move towards having low-cost, reliable internet access that can open up opportunities for learning and work for its most vulnerable citizens. Basic services – such as clean water, electricity and sanitation – must also be of a quality that not only

promotes people's right to dignity, but also help protect people from the effects of such a pandemic as Covid-19.

This pandemic highlights how crucial it is to fundamentally address the inequalities that exist in South African society. If a social justice imperative does not push us to do so, perhaps the realisation of mutual connections, borne of a pandemic that knows no class or race lines, will.

Prof. Lauren Graham is an Associate Professor and the Director of the Centre for Social Development in Africa. She has a Doctorate in Sociology from UJ. Her research interests are in the application and testing of social and development theories in practice with a focus on youth transitions to adulthood and specifically to the labour market. She is an NRF Y-rated scholar and a previous Newton Advanced Fellow.

Prof. Suzy Graham speaks on Covid-19 and its impact on international relations, trade and travel



By Stephan Lehman | Archive

This article first appeared in the Bedfordview and Edenvale News on April 5 2020

With the Covid-19 pandemic sweeping across the globe, the Bedfordview and Edenvale News spoke with Prof. Suzy Graham, Associate Professor and Head of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg (UJ).

Graham spoke about the South African government's reaction and the impact the virus will have on international relations, trade and travel.

She said the measures taken by the South African government were appropriate to try and reduce the spread of the virus: "I think the government took action when the virus started to spread already in the country."

Graham said in hindsight, measures such as the closure of borders and returning citizens to South Africa, could have already been put in place when the virus broke out in the northern hemisphere.

However, if this had been done, she said the economy and other aspects of society would have been impacted earlier too.

While comparing SA's response to Covid-19 to that of other countries, Graham believes the South African government responded fairly quickly to the pandemic as cases rose in the country: "In my opinion, our government instituted measures earlier in the crisis than other governments did in their countries."

Graham said although the measures put in place will have an impact on the economy, tourism, education and other sectors, the health of citizens must take precedence.

Speaking on the international community, Graham said many countries are still cooperating instead of seeking total isolation: "There is regional protection and individual country protection. Countries recognise how globally connected the world is; there are so many intricate networks and multiple layers of interaction. Countries are taking advice from the World Health Organisation (WHO), among other scientific advice."

One example of countries cooperating is the European Union (EU). Graham said the EU is acting to protect all EU citizens.

Despite the cooperation, leaders of countries needed to implement measures like the closure of borders as the number of cases increased: "This 'enemy' is not another country, it [the virus] is attacking any humans regardless of culture, race, creed, class, station in life."

Graham believes if states do isolate themselves completely, they would have to reassess their global supply chains and production industries.

With regards to international trade, Graham described the impact as significant and added that the international community has not seen the full impact on trade yet.

Graham said although she could not predict if the virus would bring a change in the economic superpowers of the world, she highlighted that global events like world wars can dramatically shift economic positions worldwide.

"This is different though as WHO has indicated that this virus could reach every country in the world and therefore all states are likely to suffer losses of many kinds."

On the topic of travel and the ease of migration in regions such as the EU, Graham said new regulations may be put in place to better control travel. However, in the same breath, Graham said things may just return to the way they were before the crisis: "As this is linked to health, new health regulations might be enforced."

In Graham's opinion, the ease of travel in areas like Europe contributed to the spread of the virus: "Despite this, the rapidity of spread and impact on communities of the novel coronavirus could not have been anticipated in my view."

Dr. Suzanne Graham is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations at UJ and HOD of the Department (2018-2020).

Covid-19, cellphone location tracking and SA's contradictory security response



By Jane Duncan | Archive

This article first appeared in the Daily Maverick on 6 April 2020

Ever since the lockdown began in South Africa, I have been tracking the government's evolving positions on using cellphone tracking in the fight against Covid-19. It hasn't been easy obtaining information about exactly what their intentions are.

Initially, it seemed as if the government was intending to use aggregate location data to map trends in the spread of the virus. The Minister of Communications announced this intention at a security cluster briefing on 25 March. In it, she said that the cellphone industry has agreed to provide data analytics to track how many people are affected in a particular area.

However, her statement didn't provide much clarity on exactly what they would be providing. Since then, the government has elaborated on their intentions, notably through revised regulations published by the Ministry of Cooperative Governance on 2 April.

So how has the government's position on cellphone tracking evolved, what do the regulations say, how do government's plans measure up to international best and worst practices, and what do these

intentions tell us about how democratic or autocratic government's response is to the pandemic?

The spectrum of uses for location data in the fight against Covid-19

There is a spectrum of uses for location data in the fight against the virus, ranging from non-intrusive to highly intrusive.

The least non-intrusive is to use aggregated and anonymised location data to model population density in the spread of the Covid-19 virus. For instance, Belgium is tracking the mobility of peoples' movements at a broader level to see if confinement measures are working or not. This data can then be fed into government decisions about whether to relax or tighten measures.

There is always the danger of this data being de-anonymised and people being re-identified. But these dangers recede when densely populated areas are being surveilled, which is most likely where the data will be of most use, and mitigation measures are used.

On the more intrusive end of the scale, governments can obtain location data to track the movements of people infected with Covid-19, to establish who they have been in proximity to, and to isolate those people. People who violate lockdowns can also be traced and people graded according to the public health risks they pose. South Korea, China, and Israel have been using location data in such ways.

Location data can speed up the hugely laborious task of contact-tracing by interviewing Covid-19 carriers in countries that are failing to flatten the curve. People who have been in contact with someone diagnosed with the virus can be informed immediately, without having to wait for contact tracers to get to them.

In these cases, location data can literally save lives. It even be used as an alternative to an economically-damaging lockdown, as economic activities among uninfected individuals could continue.

However, there are unanswered questions about the effectiveness of location data for these more granular uses. According to the digital rights group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, location data may not be sufficiently precise to allow people who have been in close proximity to a Covid-19 carrier to be identified with accuracy.

A more democratic option to involuntary contact tracing involves self-monitoring tracking apps that encourage cellphone users to provide to health authorities their location information and information about symptoms voluntarily. They offer an attempt to strike a balance between public health concerns, on the one hand, and privacy on the other.

This option will be difficult to implement in South Africa, though, where large numbers of South Africans still lack access to data, some don't even carry cellphones and, of those who do, many carry feature phones. Furthermore, these apps are only effective if large numbers of people use them. Zero-rating the apps could be one solution.

South Africa's evolving position on location data

Government's evolving position on this is clear from the changes between an initial set of directions issued on 26 March and new regulations issued on 2 April.

On 26 March, the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services released a direction in terms of the Disaster Management Act, covering communications and media-related issues.

Under the heading "individual track and trace", the cellphone operators, and in fact "the digital sector in general", are required to provide location-based services "to support government departments to assist and combat the spread of Covid-19".

The regulation provided important clues to the government's intentions, in that they appeared to extend beyond obtaining aggregate information and into using location data to track those infected with Covid-19 to see who they had been in the vicinity of.

This intention was confirmed to my colleague, researcher and information rights activist, Murray Hunter, by the Department of Communications. Yet, at that stage, there was no indication of them intending to apply for warrants to obtain this information.

When approached for comment, the largest cellphone operator in South Africa, Vodacom, told me this:

"Current laws in South Africa serve to protect customer information and do not allow us to share any customer information without a court order or without the consent of the customer. In the event that Vodacom is served with a Section 205 subpoena from the court, Vodacom will then be obliged to act accordingly and will abide by applicable South African laws. Having said that, our understanding of the data information request outlined recently by minister Stella Ndabeni-Abrahams is for high-level aggregated data on how people are moving, to help curb the spread of Covid-19. This does not include personal information or information that identifies a specific individual."

This statement suggested that Vodacom and the government were not of one mind about how location data would be used. I was unable to obtain a comment from the second biggest cellphone operator, MTN.

Revised Covid-19 regulations and the new route

Then, on 2 April, the government released revised

regulations, with much more elaborate procedures for location tracking. In important respects, they even exceed the privacy protections for metadata provided in Rica and the Criminal Procedures Act.

According to the regulations, the Department of Health will maintain a Covid-19 database of those infected or reasonably suspected of being infected. The department can direct the cellphone companies to provide location data for the database about the Covid-19 carriers or people who have been in close proximity to them.

Furthermore, the department can only request data between 5 March (when the pandemic really picked up) and when the state of disaster finally lapses, and they can only use the data strictly for the purpose of countering the virus. They and others are not allowed to intercept any other communication content.

The regulations envisage the appointment of a special Covid-19 judge, appointed by the Minister of Justice. The Department of Health, on a weekly basis, needs to provide the judge with a list of people whose details were obtained through the regulation, and these people need to be informed six weeks after the state of disaster has lapsed that their details were intercepted.

The Covid-19 judge can also make recommendations to the relevant Cabinet members regarding the amendment or enforcement of the regulations in order to safeguard privacy, while not compromising the fight against the virus.

There are positives and negatives to these regulations. One huge positive is that these regulations recognise the principle of user notification.

In its constitutional challenge to Rica, the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism has argued that Rica is incorrect in not allowing people whose communications have been intercepted to be notified after investigations have reached a non-sensitive stage. This secrecy prevents interception subjects from contesting abusive government interceptions.

The regulations also incorporate basic data protection principles, such as purpose specification and time limit principles. They require that within six weeks after the

lapsing of the state of disaster, all information in the Covid-19 database should be de-identified, and retained and used for research purposes. The designated judge can give directions if s/he isn't satisfied about these new storage arrangements.

However, I am less convinced about the role of the special judge, as the regulations do not envisage judicial authorisation.

If the judge has any reservations about decisions taken, then s/he only has the powers to recommend remedial action, not review the decisions. This part of the regulations should be reconsidered, as it turns the judge into a rubber stamp for the executive.

Rica does contain similar emergency procedures where the authorities can notify the judge after the fact if they have intercepted communications when life and limb is threatened. While not the subject of the constitutional challenge, that procedure is unsatisfactory, too, as it doesn't spell out what happens if the judge disagrees with the authorities' decisions.

This loophole has seen the intelligence agencies using emergency powers thousands of times, simply because it is easier to use than the conventional procedure involving prior judicial authorisation.

Now, it could be argued that locating people infected and affected by Covid-19 requires urgency, but courts deal with urgent matters all the time. Nothing stops the judge, or a panel of judges, from dealing with applications and making decisions on an urgent basis.

The reporting requirements in the regulations mitigate the potential for abuse, but the absolute baseline for individual cellphone tracking is that the authorities must apply for a warrant, which a judge must issue.

Securocratic or democratic? Untangling the government response

When it comes to government's intentions to use cellphone tracking in the fight against Covid-19, the bottom line is it could be worse. The government has clearly made an effort to come up with a much less autocratic system than countries like China, Israel and South Korea. The fact that the regulations are driven by public health officials and not the police or the spy

agencies is a significant strength.

But, it's impossible not to contrast this (largely) positive development with the conduct of some police and military officers on the streets. Already, violent military and police actions have become a blight on the lockdown, with police officers under investigation for the deaths of three civilians.

Police Minister Bheki Cele's threatening tone in announcing lockdown measures is a stark reminder that the militarised conditions that gave rise to the 2012 Marikana massacre remain deeply embedded in the police.

In other countries, the lockdowns have revealed already-existing problems in policing, and South Africa is no exception to that general rule. However, the government has had a large window of opportunity in the wake of the massacre to deal with these problems, and it hasn't. Yet, it has moved with much more speed on the Jacob Zuma-era abuses in the State Security Agency, give or take a speed bump here and there.

Why this contradictory picture? Most likely, because largely policing abuses don't touch the political elite. They touch the working class: the families crowded into one-roomed houses, shack dwellers, refugees.

The elites, on the other hand, are touched by unaccountable state spying. As is public knowledge, politicians in the highest levels of the state have been targets. Clearly, the amaBhungane challenge to Rica has been a wake-up call for them, to the point where they are even willing to concede the very accountability measures they opposed in the case, such as user notification.

State violence erodes trust in the state's ability to protect people during this crisis, and is likely to inflame an already tough situation at the worst possible moment. The last thing the government needs to deal with is spontaneous protests of angry people raging against state violence and unbearable conditions.

Unless the government is consistent in its commitment to rein in the securocrats during "normal" times – and not just cherry-pick those powers that affect politicians directly – then we are likely to see uneven, classist and selectively violent responses continuing in times of crisis.

Jane Duncan is a professor and Head of Department of Journalism, Film and Television. She is author of 'Stopping the Spies: Constructing and Resisting the Surveillance State in South Africa' (Wits University Press, 2018).

Staring down the securocrats

By Jane Duncan | Archive

This article first appeared in about:intel on 7 April 2020

In a rare encouragement for public oversight, South Africa has indicated to use location data responsibly in the fight against Covid-19.

In light of South Africa's history and its weak metadata controls, concerns were strong that the government's intention to use location data in the fight against Covid-19 would lean authoritarian. Yet, the fairly comprehensive regulations added to the Disaster Management Act on April 2 have been seen as a welcome change and glimmer of hope. Arguably, this is due to the pressure civil society had put on the country's surveillance regime before the crisis.

(Tweet: @DuncanJane (@go2uj): South Africa has issued surprisingly strong regulations for the use of location data against #Covid19, incl. purpose specification, user notification & a sunset clause. This speaks to the unrecognised power of public oversight.)

Last month, the South African government announced its intention to follow other governments around the world and use mobile phone location data in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.

At the time of writing, South Africa had recorded 1462 cases of Covid-19 and 5 deaths: thankfully, below what the government had projected for this stage of the pandemic. Yet, the country is the most affected by the pandemic in Africa. There is the real possibility that infections may rise massively if the virus sets into the country's densely-populated low-income or no-income areas.

Instead of wasting crucial time by fumbling its response, the government moved quickly and decisively to counter the pandemic. South Africa has been in a police- and military-enforced lockdown for a week, and faces at least another two weeks before the lockdown is lifted.

It is in these conditions that South Africa announced its intention to use location data: a move that has triggered privacy concerns. However, significantly, the government has declared a national state of disaster, rather than a national state of emergency. So, rights such as privacy have not been suspended.

How does the government intend to use location data, and what do these intentions tell us about

how autocratic or democratic its response is to the pandemic? This question matters because emergency powers have a nasty tendency of sticking around long after the emergency that necessitated them has passed. In the case of South Africa, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks and as part of its contribution to the 'War on Terror', Parliament passed a basket of anti-terror laws, including the Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA), that has remained largely unrevised in spite of the overbroad powers it gave to the country's security services.

South Africa has a terrible history of a securocracy, in which members of the military and the police helped to govern the country and invoked emergency powers to crush mass opposition to apartheid. More recently, the country has emerged from a decade where the security and intelligence apparatuses of the state were misused to benefit a corrupt political elite. If South Africa is to put this history behind it once and for all, then the government needs to ensure that any emergency measures lapse after the pandemic has abated. Thus, the declaration of the State of Disaster must lapse as soon as possible after the pandemic subsides, as the declaration of a lockdown allows the security services to wield extraordinary powers such as prohibiting gatherings.

Intelligence uses and abuses of metadata

There is a spectrum of uses for location data in the fight against the virus, ranging from non-intrusive to highly-intrusive. The least intrusive way is to use aggregated and anonymised location data to model population density in the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Governments intent on more intrusive measures can obtain location data to track the movements of people infected with Covid-19, to establish who they have been in proximity to, and to isolate those people. People who violate lockdowns can also be traced and graded according to the public health risks they pose. South Korea, China, and Israel have been using location data in such ways.

Even before the pandemic began, South Africa had a cavalier approach towards using metadata in intelligence operations, with the number of requests into the thousands. A new research report

by information rights researcher and activist Murray Hunter shows how useful metadata (and especially location data) is to the police for investigating and solving crimes, but how they also prefer to use the least transparent route for obtaining it.

There are two main routes that state intelligence agencies can use to access metadata: a more stringent procedure set down in RICA and the Criminal Procedures Act.

RICA is used mainly by the Crime Intelligence Division of the South African Police Service. The State Security Agency (the civilian intelligence agency), the Defence Intelligence Division of the South African Defence Force, and the Financial Intelligence Centre are less frequent users.

While RICA is used mainly for accessing communication content, the state agencies can also use it to access metadata in real-time. Both, however, require authorisation by a special judge. The applicants must show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a serious crime has been, is being, or will probably be committed. RICA requires that the cell phone companies store metadata for between three to five years. The Act also sets out procedures for the intelligence agencies to access archived metadata, but these are less stringent than for content or real-time metadata. However, the intelligence agencies prefer to use the Criminal Procedures Act, which merely requires that a judge needs to be satisfied that the metadata is relevant to a case. Its usage is not restricted to serious crimes. Furthermore, even a magistrate can issue a subpoena in terms of the Act; it does not have to be a High Court judge.

While RICA is slightly stronger than the Criminal Procedures Act on controls and oversight, neither Act provides sufficient protections for metadata. These weaknesses are premised on the outdated view that communication metadata is less privacy-sensitive than communication content.

Currently, the South African Constitutional Court is considering whether RICA is even constitutional. An investigative journalism organisation, the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism, challenged the constitutionality of RICA on several grounds, including privacy. The case followed a

revelation that amaBhungane's managing partner, Sam Sole, was spied on by the state, presumably to uncover his sources in a state institution. The Constitutional Court heard the case in February and judgement is reserved.

Some of the key problems that amaBhungane is challenging are the lack of post-surveillance user notification, the lack of independence of the special judge, the lack of procedures for the processing of personal information, and the fact that the State Security Agency's bulk signals intelligence agency, the National Communications Centre, has no founding statute and is, therefore, in its entirety a rogue entity.

While the *amicus curiae* applicants in the case raised the lack of controls over metadata usage, the issue was not central to the case and is unlikely to be ruled on. So in other words, South Africa announced its intention to use location data in the fight against Covid-19 in a context where metadata oversight and controls were already weak. Therefore, it was widely expected (and understandably so) that the government's plans would lean towards the authoritarian end of the spectrum.

South Africa's approach to using location data

The government's evolving position on this is clear from the changes between an initial set of directions issued on 26 March and new regulations issued on 2 April. On 26 March, the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services released a direction in terms of the Disaster Management Act, covering communications and media-related issues. Under the heading 'individual track and trace', the cell phone operators, and in fact 'the digital sector in general', are required to provide location-based services 'to support government departments to assist and combat the spread of Covid-19'. The regulation provided important clues to the government's intentions, in that they appeared to extend beyond obtaining aggregate information and into using location data to track those infected with Covid-19, to see who they had been in the vicinity of. This was in spite of the fact that according to South Africa's largest mobile operator, Vodacom, their understanding was that the government was only after aggregate data.

Then, on 2 April, the government released revised

regulations, with much more elaborate procedures for location tracking. In important respects, they even exceed the privacy protections for metadata provided in RICA and the Criminal Procedures Act. According to the regulations, the Department of Health will maintain a Covid-19 database of those infected or reasonably suspected of being infected. The Department can direct the cellphone companies to provide location data for the database about the Covid-19 carriers or people who have been in close proximity to them. Furthermore, the Department can only request data between 5 March (when the pandemic really picked up) and when the state of disaster finally lapses through a declaration by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, and they can only use the data strictly for the purpose of countering the virus. They, and anyone else for that matter, are not allowed to use these procedures to intercept any other communication content, allaying fears that the state of disaster would be used to spy on what people are saying.

The regulations envisage the appointment of a special Covid-19 judge, appointed by the Minister of Justice. The Department of Health, on a weekly basis, needs to provide the judge with a list of people whose details were obtained, and these people need to be informed six weeks after the state of disaster has lapsed that their location data was obtained. The Covid-19 judge can also make recommendations to the relevant cabinet members regarding the amendment or enforcement of the regulations in order to safeguard privacy, while not compromising the fight against the virus.

The regulations also incorporate basic data protection principles, such as purpose specification and time limit principles. They require that within six weeks after the lapsing of the state of disaster, all information in the Covid-19 database should be de-identified, retained and used for research purposes. The designated judge can give directions if s/he isn't satisfied about these new storage arrangements.

Most surprisingly, the regulations recognise the principle of user notification: surprisingly because the government had opposed user notification in the amaBhungane case. In its constitutional challenge to RICA, amaBhungane argued that RICA is incorrect in not allowing people whose communications have

been intercepted to be notified after investigations have reached a non-sensitive stage. This secrecy prevents interception subjects from contesting abusive government interceptions.

One disappointing aspect of the regulations is that they do not envisage judicial authorisation. If the judge has any reservations about decisions taken, then s/he only has the powers to recommend remedial action, not review the decisions. This part of the regulations should be reconsidered, as it turns the judge into a rubber stamp for the executive. RICA does contain similar emergency procedures where the authorities can notify the judge after the fact if they have intercepted communications when life and limb is threatened. While not the subject of the constitutional challenge, that procedure is unsatisfactory, too, as it doesn't spell out what happens if the judge disagrees with the authorities' decisions. The intelligence agencies have used this emergency power thousands of times, simply because it was easier than the conventional procedure involving prior judicial authorisation.

The reporting requirements in the regulations mitigate the potential for abuse, but the absolute baseline for individual cell phone tracking should be that the authorities must apply for a warrant, which a judge must issue.

Making the securocrats blink

People around the world are scared of the pandemic and the uncertainty it has created. These are times when people are least likely to resist the removal of democratic rights and freedoms. After all, what is the point of having rights when the most important right of all, namely life, is at risk. Autocrats could quickly take advantage of the fact that protests have been shut down and popular counter-power is weak.

The South African government's enforcement of the lockdown has been highly uneven, and has revealed existing cracks in policing. Members of the public have laid scores of complaints against the police and military for violent enforcement of the lockdown, including three deaths, allegedly as a result of police action. The situation is precarious and may lead to reactive protests: the very thing the country can do without at the moment. Therefore, it is of the utmost

importance that the lockdown be enforced using the least intrusive and coercive means possible. It is commendable that the government moved with great speed on clarifying their intentions with location tracking, put their powers in writing, limited their scope (although there is room for improvement), and subjected themselves to a sunset clause restricting the Department of Health to use these powers until the State of Disaster has lapsed or has been terminated through a gazetted official notice.

The fact that the regulations are driven by public health officials and not the police or the spy agencies is a significant strength. They imply that the government has actually conceded deficiencies in its metadata interception practices. It is doubtful that they would have done so had the amaBhungane case not happened. This case demonstrates the power of one of the most unrecognised forms of intelligence oversight, namely public oversight. But, at least it is clear now that it is possible to stare down the securocrats and make them blink.

Jane Duncan is a professor and Head of Department of Journalism, Film and Television. She is author of 'Stopping the Spies: Constructing and Resisting the Surveillance State in South Africa' (Wits University Press, 2018).

From weapons to ventilators: time for Denel to do some socially useful work

By Jane Duncan | Archive

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Earlier this month, South Africa's parastatal arms manufacturer, Denel, announced that it would begin to manufacture ventilators in partnership with other entities, to assist in the fight against Covid-19. Countries are battling with major shortages of medical equipment, and South Africa has the additional challenge of a declining Rand.

So it stands to reason that domestic manufacturing capacity should be put to use in the fight. The parastatal has also floated the idea of turning Casspirs into ambulances and producing sanitisers.

Crises have a remarkable way of focussing the collective mind on what really matters. Denel should have branched out into socially useful work a long time ago. Markets for conventional arms are shrinking around the world, leading to more arms manufacturers focussing on the same market: the Middle East.

Denel has set its sights on marketing its wares to corrupt and repressive Gulf states as its target market, with Saudi Arabia at the helm. It should not be allowed to continue with its plans, as it will be feeding the disastrous instability in the region and beyond.

As its finances flounder and job losses loom, it has become clear that Denel has reached its sell-by date. But what happens to Denel beyond the manufacture of war toys? Its current turnaround strategy is underwhelming.

Major arms manufacturers such as the US and the UK are also facing shrinking markets for conventional arms. Yet, they continue to cling obstinately to old growth paths of militarism, financialisation and automation. They have even been willing to resort to military action if their global supremacy is threatened, irrespective of how unsustainable these measures are.

Many countries have severe shortages of the kinds of scientists and engineers involved in defence manufacturing, South Africa included. Companies in the thrall of the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution' are automating more productive functions, leading to the massive destruction of jobs. At the same time, the globe is experiencing an unprecedented ecological crisis.

Yet, economic production remains doggedly skewed towards market demands rather than broader social needs. If there is one positive thing to come out of

the Covid-19 pandemic, it is that countries are being forced to rethink what forms of production are really needed to sustain life.

Denel's ideas are not new. In fact, for many decades, the anti-war and trade union movements have called for the transformation of arms manufacturing into socially responsible, useful and necessary work.

One of the most inspiring legacies of the labour movement was a plan developed by a group of workers in the UK company Lucas Aerospace, who were facing imminent retrenchment in the 1970s. The company produced technical products for the civilian market, as well as weapons for the defence industry.

As highly skilled scientists and engineers, they used this threat to their livelihoods to reimagine their work and their contributions to society more generally. The workers lamented what they referred to as the 'dehumanisation of science and technology', not necessarily because of the misbehaviour of scientists and technologists, but because society misused their skills.

The Lucas workers also expressed concern about the de-skilling of their jobs, as the increasingly popular principles of scientific management atomised them into separate production units, overseen by managers who left little room for discretion, much less creative problem-solving. As more workers felt completely oppressed by their working environment, they lost interest and disengaged from the world of work.

They also recognised that the shift from human intelligence to machine intelligence was exacerbating the problem. They argued that society has the capacity, and in fact the duty, to shape the trajectory of technological innovation, and governments should not allow people to be lulled into believing that these innovations occurred autonomously of society.

According to the workers:

There is something seriously wrong about a society which can produce a level of technology to design and build [the] Concorde, but cannot provide enough simple urban heating systems to protect the old age pensioners who are dying each year from hypothermia. ...[Further] it is clear that there is

now deep rooted cynicism amongst wide sections of the public about the idea, carefully nurtured by the media, that advanced science and technology will solve all our material problems.

So, the workers began a shopfloor-led discussion to transform their work from military/industrial production into socially useful work. However, they recognised the dangers of planning for their shop floor only, as the hostile environment would most likely impinge on them and scupper their plans. So, they felt it necessary to link their plans to a wider industrial strategy that promoted economic diversification of areas dependent on arms manufacturers.

The workers were decades ahead of their time, and perhaps even foresaw the current ecological crisis, by arguing for the need for a just transition from arms manufacturing into socially useful work, especially renewable energy. In other words, they argued for the need to move from destructive to constructive work.

The Lucas workers assessed their existing product range and workplace skills and drafted an alternative corporate plan, dubbed the Lucas Plan. They did so by collecting ideas from the shopfloor, and came up with 150 alternative products.

These products included scaling back on military submarine production and focussing on producing submersible vehicles for marine agriculture, and braking systems linked to velocity sensing devices to address the inadequacies in braking systems in widespread use in public transportation.

In the medical sector, they proposed producing kidney dialysis machines. In the energy sector, they intended to make heat pumps and wind turbines. They even grappled with alternative energy storage solutions, recognising that batteries of the time placed limits on any ambitions to transition to green energy. They proposed using lessons learnt in building batteries for defence ground support to offer hybrid alternatives to conventional battery production, which could be used in combined rail/ road vehicles.

Although the Lucas plan was never implemented, it has continued to inspire activists to this day. The UK-based Campaign against the Arms Trade (CAAT) has used the plan as a touchstone to develop detailed

proposals for shifting defence manufacturing to green products.

According to CAAT, it is entirely feasible to shift employment in large scale arms manufacturing to the renewable energy sector, and would go some way to freeing up scarce skills in the science, technology, maths and engineering fields.

Focussing specifically on offshore wind energy, they have argued that the UK government could contribute to global security by demilitarising its foreign policy and promoting sustainable, low carbon and planet-saving energy sources.

These proposals could well have application beyond the UK, including in southern Africa, where South Africa dominates the local defence industry.

Denel is beset with financial problems. While some problems relate to the parastatal becoming embroiled in state capture, some are more deep-rooted and include unprofitable sales and loss-making contracts, and rising costs coupled with declining revenues.

Their turnaround strategy for the strategy includes plans to strengthen corporate governance, reduce internal costs, unbundle non-core functions and focus on core functions. It also intends to explore diversification into related areas, find new markets for its niche products, and possibly take on a private equity partner.

However, the parastatal's reported diversification plans appear to be limited to security, cyber-technology and advanced software solutions, and providing more services to the police, suggesting that it was also considering the markets for dual-use technologies.

Many conventional arms manufacturers are, in fact, moving into dual-use production, including spyware, as it allows them to sell not only to defence departments, but to police and intelligence agencies also. This is something that South Africa does not want to do, as it will contribute to a globally destabilising cyber-arms race, and existing export controls remain inadequate.

Weapons-grade spyware can be (and has been)

abused to target dissidents and others who are considered politically inconvenient. So serious is the problem that the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, called for an immediate moratorium on the global sale and transfer of the tools of the private surveillance industry until rigorous human rights safeguards are put in place.

As the parastatal dispenses with what it has identified as non-core parts of the business, job losses remain a looming threat, particularly in aerostructures manufacturing. All of these factors mean that the parastatal is ripe for conversion to a company that provides socially useful goods.

It is necessary and important for an arms manufacturer to repurpose itself to produce socially useful goods during a national crisis. But this commitment to thinking outside the bomb mustn't be abandoned once the crisis subsides.

Jane Duncan is a professor and Head of Department of Journalism, Film and Television. She is author of 'Stopping the Spies: Constructing and Resisting the Surveillance State in South Africa' (Wits University Press, 2018).

Ronit Frenkel in conversation with Dale McKinley

Johannesburg, September 2020. | Books

Ronit Frenkel (RF): We're going to be discussing mostly your last two books today, but before we start, maybe you can tell me a little bit about your background?

Dale McKinley (DM): Sure. I was born and raised in Zimbabwe, with parents who had come from the United States as teachers. I grew up in the 1960s and 70s during the Liberation War in Zimbabwe. I left to go and study in the United States in the 1980s, and eventually received a PhD in International Political Economy through the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. I then returned back home in 1990, arriving in South Africa in early 1991 to do my dissertation.

Eventually, I opened a political left-wing bookshop here called Phambili Books, which I ran for 5 or 6 years, and which was a great thing to do in that time period, the pre-1994 period. It was a sort of clearing house for activists and debates and other things – it was an amazing experience. And during that time, I got heavily involved in the ANC and the Communist Party in particular, in politics, but from the left, and I was elected as a branch and district level leader in the Communist Party and then also became part of the Gauteng Provincial Executive. Long story short, I clashed very heavily with the leadership of the Communist Party over the ideological and political direction that they were taking in the embracing of the ANC's capitalist, neo-liberal policies.

I was expelled in 2000 as a result of those disagreements, and then – for the last 20 years, professionally – I've been an independent researcher, occasional lecturer, writer, and so forth, and I've continued with my activism at



various points, particularly in helping to found and build social movements like the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Right2Know Campaign, so I've remained what I would call an activist-intellectual, in that sense. I've written quite extensively, academically as well as politically, on a range of topics, but particularly on issues of liberation politics, political economy, issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, xenophobia and nationalism, and now particularly around media-related issues and freedom of expression, as a result of my work in social movements. So that, in a nutshell, is my trajectory. And I'm 58 years old now, it's hard to believe!



RF: Your background covers some of the themes in your books. I know you've written four books, and looking at your last two mostly – starting with *South Africa's Corporatised Liberation: A Critical Analysis of the ANC in Power* (2017), which is, as far as I can tell, is sort of a Marxist critique of the ANC's rise to power, and how it became a government/a political party, rather than a liberation movement as such. I would describe it as appealing to a broad audience. What was your aim in writing this book?

DM: This book was a sequel, in many ways, to the first book I wrote on the ANC in 1997, and that book was called *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography*. What I did in that book was to trace the ANC from the time it was formed in 1912, all the way to 1994, just as it came into power. I looked at its strategies and tactics and its trajectory, and basically my thesis – which I then picked up in the new book – was that the ANC had always been a party, at least at the leadership level, not necessarily at the rank and file level, but at the leadership level, of what I call accession and incorporation. In other words, one that was not fundamentally interested in revolutionising power and changing the system, but in accessing the system, for a de-racialised capitalism, basically.

So, capitalism was never something that was off the cards. The socialist side, the Communist Party, a lot of the more radical elements, were products of the times and there were the necessary tactical manoeuvres that had to take place, given the exile, the armed struggle, the support of the Soviet Union, and so forth. But it (the ANC) was never ideologically, I argue, part of that. So, as a result, what happened during the negotiations and the ANC's rise to power should have been quite predictable, which was that the ANC did not agree to any fundamental socio-

“ They essentially bought into the existing system, and then basically said what we're going to do is de-racialise it as much as we can, and particularly from the top, in other words the Black Economic Empowerment programme. ”



economic changes in terms of land, in terms of ownership of capital, in terms of the mining sector and these kinds of things. They essentially bought into the existing system, and then basically said what we're going to do is de-racialise it as much as we can, and particularly from the top, in other words the Black Economic Empowerment programme.

You mentioned the Marxist analysis – this is where it comes in and which is very specific to that particular analytical angle – which was to say that the class politics of the ANC leadership has always been one of what I would call petty bourgeois nationalism. It's never been fundamentally interested in revolutionary politics in the sense of socio-economic transformation. It's been revolutionary in the sense of getting rid of racial oppression, yes, and that cannot be underestimated.

So, what I did in the second book was I took up that story in 1994, once the ANC had accessed power, and I

said okay, let's apply that critique that I made and let's see what's happened over the last 20 years. To see if, first of all, that has played itself out, in the way that I expected it to, in the way that many of us did and argued a long time ago, or is there something else here that is at play? And as I argue in the book, the best way that I could use to analytically describe that process was the corporatisation, not just of the ANC as a political party, but of society itself, of the politics of the ANC and in many cases of South African society as a whole.

And what I mean by corporatisation is basically that having accepted a capitalist system, having taken off the table real fundamental revolutionary or socialist change in any meaningful way, the ANC was basically like a corporation – in the way in which it governed and exercised power; which is to essentially say that the political economy is fundamentally about making money, it's about profit, it's about accumulation. It's not fundamentally about servicing, it's not fundamentally about meeting basic needs and equality and justice and all of these things that are in the Constitution and in the Freedom Charter, these are just sort of props in many ways.

What I then did was to show – in empirical terms, and through a lot of deep research that I've done over the past 25 years into various aspects of the ANC's rule – what that means for basic services such as water, electricity, housing, healthcare. If you look at those, then you also look at what the corporatised model does in terms of governance, and the corruption, and the patronage, and all of the other kinds of things that have come up as a result of that kind of politics. And then also at the way in which dissent is treated, the way in which people who then begin to respond – organisations, the working class, unions, workers, and others – and how then one deals with dissent and opposition, and how that politics then plays itself out, in a very intolerant way, and the increasing use of narrow nationalism in order to justify that, in order to basically try to cover up failures.

That leads to a range of other kinds of politics which is very – I would argue – socially reactionary, which is the other aspect which I don't think has been fundamentally approached in terms of understanding the ANC's rule; i.e., the rise of social conservatism. So, it's not just the politics, it's not just the big question,

it's the ways in which our moral and social values have been turned around, and actually the ANC has begun to champion a very narrow, I would say, social relations in many ways. So that is, in a nutshell, what I did in the book and what I then tried to show, and I would say – with all due humbleness in the context of my argument – that I think it is a strong case that has been made and backed up with empirical facts, it's not just an analytical or ideological argument. I would argue that it gives a large degree of explanation to why what's happened has happened, because people continue to ask: how is it that the ANC ended up here, vs. 25 years ago? And I'm saying there is a trajectory, for the last 100 years, that one can follow, that explains the ANC's strategies and tactics, and how when it accessed power it understood that power.

The fundamental conclusion here is that the ANC never trusted democracy, and democracy – fundamentally – is the people, is the role of the people in governance, in self-organisation, in pushing things, and it's never trusted that. So, it sees the state as the way to access power, and then you see exactly the same things happening as what we've seen in many post-liberation societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the liberation party turns into a very top-down, anti-democratic, intolerant, narrowly nationalist kind of party, which is ridden with corruption and patronage, and which is far from the ideals of what the liberation movement stood for. So, in a nutshell, that's my argument.

RF: So, essentially, you are offering an alternative analysis to the two dominant narratives in terms of the ANC government. The one narrative makes the argument that, due to our negotiated settlement and the sunset clauses, the ANC's hands were tied in terms of how much economic transformation they could enact in the country, and it was part of that sort of so-called peaceful transition. That's on the one hand, and then, on the other hand, people – and a lot of narratives today – position what's happened in the ANC as a result of Jacob Zuma removing more left-wing forces from the party and putting his own people there in order to reinforce the mechanisms of corruption that happened over his tenure. So, you really seem to be offering an alternative critical analysis to both of these dominant understandings?

DM: Absolutely, and let me just deal with both of

those, and I do in the book. The first one – which I call the ‘balance of forces’ argument – is that the balance of forces were so against the ANC, internationally neo-liberalism was so triumphant, all the strictures, there was no way that the ANC could move in a left direction or a radical direction, its hands were tied, plus it was not prepared in any meaningful way for governing an economy such as this, and did not have the capacity to do so, and understood that, so therefore made these particular kind of tactical choices: the government of national unity, the acceptance of the property clause in the Constitution, and so forth. And basically, my argument there is that yes, one has to recognise that there was an unfavourable balance of forces, but that has never – in history, in any kind of situation – ever stopped people from acting in the natural way that they want.

In other words, that is to say that if we fought for a particular kind of goal, which is the transformation of apartheid capitalism, not just apartheid but apartheid capitalism as a socio-economic system, then we’re going to have to find ways, and it doesn’t mean it’s going to happen in the way we thought it would, it’s not about a military victory over the apartheid state, that we’re going to take a revolutionary military victory, no. But here’s the crux of the matter: if one believes in one’s own constituency, if your entire liberation movement is composed of people who – you believe in their agency and the revolutionary possibilities – then that’s what you follow, you don’t turn towards what I call existent power, and the ANC turned towards existent power.

What I mean by that is the institutional power of the state and the power of capital, and they said, ‘this is where power lies, and we’re going to bow to that power’, and then the power of the people gets lost. The power of the people gets completely forgotten and the excuses are, well, it’s not feasible, it’s not possible, we can’t do these things. So, you’re always playing down the agency, you’re always playing down the people, and in the process what you do is you pivot towards where existent power is, and when you do that, well then it’s natural that you’re going to make certain kinds of decisions and compromises.

The analogy that I use in the book is the metaphor of the house, which explains it in much simpler terms. If you conceptualise South Africa as a house: pre-

“instead what they say is, ‘we’re not going to mess with the foundations of the house, what we’re going to do is we’re going to build some new rooms, we’re going to do a new paint job, we’re going to make it look nicer, we’re going to make it look bigger, we’re going to make it look more inclusive, but we’re fundamentally not going to change the structure.’”

1994, the National Party was running the house, the apartheid state had big security walls, the ANC and the people were outside attacking the house, trying to basically engage in a war of liberation. It comes to some degree of a stalemate, nobody’s looking like they’re going to win this war outright, so you have these negotiations. What happens as a result of these negotiations is that the National Party walks out of the house and the ANC walks into the house, and the landlords change. But the house remains the same.

So the ANC, instead of looking at the house and saying, ‘this house is pretty rotten and we need to fundamentally look at the foundations of this house, we need to begin a reconstruction program here’, instead what they say is, ‘we’re not going to mess with the foundations of the house, what we’re going to do is we’re going to build some new rooms, we’re going to do a new paint job, we’re going to make it look nicer, we’re going to make it look bigger, we’re going to make it look more inclusive, but we’re fundamentally not going to change the structure.’ And as a result, over time, what happens is that initially it looks good, of course, there’s more people in the house, now it’s not racialised – legally and otherwise – but over time the landlords basically act as landlords, as the bosses. They begin to start taking the best rooms, they begin to have all-night parties while people get crammed into the rooms below and the outhouses. One can then play with that metaphor, which I do in the book, but I think that captures the sense of what I’m trying to argue, on the first point that you make.

On the second point, which is essentially the argument that you have bad people in the ANC, that Zuma was a bad person, that his crew were really bad, that Mandela and the liberation heroes were the good people, and they got lost along the way. This argument is so weak


that it doesn't hold water, because fundamentally it ignores what I call the DNA of the ANC. So let's look, for example, at what was accepted, even before '94, in terms of what gave rise to all the patronage, all the corruption, all the running away from the people, the treating of individuals as enemies. When it was, for example, poor people who were simply trying to access basic services, there is a mentality and an approach which basically says, again, that we have the power, within the state and within the institutions of power and capital itself, as opposed to the people. So, what you then have is no problem with doing an arms deal. People forget this. The first and fundamental foundation of the corruption of South African society started with Mbeki and Joe Modise and Trevor Manuel and all of the rest of them who completely turned a blind eye, or facilitated, the most corrupt deal ever, in the history of South Africa, at the time not in terms of big numbers and money, but in terms of what it did, and it inculcated a sense of, 'this is the way we're going to do things'.

The adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) network, in 1996, this was not forced onto the ANC, and this was often the argument, that 'it was forced, otherwise we would have had to accept the IMF and a World Bank structural adjustment package'. Nonsense – the choice was a political and ideological choice to turn towards existent power, which was neo-liberal capitalism, and as a result, what do you do? You start cutting off your own constituents because they can't pay for water or electricity. You start corporatising and privatising things, and you basically set the scene for the commodification of politics, or the patronage system, or the corruption, for all of the things that Zuma comes in and basically takes on to another level, sure, but essentially and fundamentally the ANC and all of those who tried to then separate these out, now you have Trevor Manuel coming 30 years later trying to act like some moral saint. I won't use the words that I'm thinking of – but it's so opportunistic and trying to wipe the history out of the role that the ANC itself, and those people who now claim to be sort of taking the moral high ground against state capture and everything else, this was part and parcel of the ANC's politics and those that were running the show. I think Ronnie Kasrils came the closest to admitting this in a more honest and real way when he basically, in the book that he wrote,

was talking about the Faustian pact and the way in which they basically just gave it up, and they turned away from the people. I think that's the much truer, and much more objectively verifiable story.

RF: Thank you. Definitely an alternative critical analysis of how we got to where we are today. Which brings me to your new book – *Tell Our Story: Multiplying voices in the news media* (2020) – which is co-written with Julie Reid. At first glance, the book seems to be a different trajectory, but your essential themes are still there in terms of looking at the agency of ordinary people and where that gets squashed in different scenarios. So, this book, in my mind, is essentially about media justice, to put it simply. Can you tell us a bit more about the book?

DM: So, the impetus for this book was that many of us who have been activists – particularly with the Right2Know Campaign – who have dealt with freedom



of expression issues, with dissent, with communities that were trying to access information, that were trying to basically use media and communications to tell a particular story, their stories, and how that then played itself out in relation to the media landscape in South Africa. And particularly trying to look at this over a longer period of time, so it's not just looking at an incident, for example.

We chose particular communities that have had struggles since 1994, almost similar kinds of struggles, in different ways, so one was an urban community – Thembelihle – which is sort of the epitome of a community that's been struggling against eviction and housing and land issues, where they're being pushed further out, and taken away for development purposes, and they're holding firm, and this is almost a microcosm of post-1994 urban South Africa, of poor communities struggling, so that was the one aspect.

The second one was Glebelands, the largest hostel complex in South Africa, in south Durban, which in some ways gives an urban perspective, but also a mixture – a large number of rural people coming in, the role of hostels in the context of the conflicts of the late 1980s and early 90s, and how that then played itself out in the post-1994 situation. And of course, Glebelands being the classic example, where this kind of violence and murder and dealing with the violence of politics then migrated from pre- to post-1994, when you had hundreds of people being killed, and hit squads. The nature of KZN politics then begins to show itself through a Glebelands perspective, and then that kind of gives you another angle and all sorts of other urban/rural kinds of dynamics, the single-sex hostels, the migratory labour system, everything, so making the connection between how that's played itself out over the last 25 years.

And then a third, deep rural community – Xolobeni, Amadiba, in the Eastern Cape along the Wild Coast – here fighting against development in the form of mining coming in, trying to basically mine the community as well as the construction of the national highway, the N2, coming through, and environmental concerns, land issues, ownership. These go a long way back to the Pondoland revolt, all the way back to the 1960s, so again a historical continuum.

So, the idea was then to say OK, let's take these

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three and see the ways in which their stories and struggles have played themselves out in the media, and how they've been reported on, how they've been conceptualised, how they've been presented, and what impact that has had in the sense of the conflict itself and the community, and so forth. So, what we did was field research and talking to people in the communities to get their stories. The one thing was to prove this form of what we call a listening journalism, a way in which you go and you actually get people to tell you their story – without any preconceived notions of what you're trying to do. You're just trying to say, 'tell us your story', and however that story gets told, then you begin to relate that, as opposed to what the media often does, what we call the dominant media, those owned by capital, not necessarily NGOs and small media outlets and others that are alternative media or community media, but commercialised media, and how they have then responded to that and how they've told the story.

So, we juxtapose these things in the book. We first show that we have this story and here it is, and we do that by doing a content analysis, so we looked at all the major print and television media, and we chose up to 100 articles, or as many as there were, as we could find, articles or broadcasts that dealt with these communities, and then we did a content analysis. Who do they speak to? Who do they quote? What stories are they telling? How is the analysis? Did they go back and follow up on something they reported? So it was a very in-depth content analysis of the media, and then we compare that to the stories being told by the people themselves and how they experience the media, and how they then have felt that their stories have been manipulated or not told or whatever, and that becomes the meat of this book, which is then essentially put into a larger political economy context,

“ And the one thing there that can begin to change and begin to impact positively is for journalists and editors themselves to understand that it is in their best interests – and we would argue even commercially possibly, if one is to look at the bottom line here – to begin to do their actual jobs, which is to tell stories through listening to people ”

which is not to just say that the media is not telling these stories, but that it's constructing a dominant narrative, so that the dominant media and dominant narrative that then derives from that is one that fundamentally shapes the entire approach of the state and of society to these communities.

So, to give an example of Thembelihle, they're predominantly seen as – because the media projects them as – a violent, disgruntled, angry community that is bent on anarchy and this is how people see them: there they are, they're causing shit again, they're out on the streets again, they're burning things. There's no sense of any history there, of why people are doing these things, of the role of the police and institutions, the failures of the state, all of these other kinds of things, that maybe get mentioned very briefly but is not part of the dominant narrative. And therefore, the state then responds to this community as part of that dominant narrative, which is, 'let's crush them, let's control them, let's manage it, let's not listen.' And this has been going on for 30 years.

And then we do the same with Amadiba, we do the same with Glebelands, which is to show how the dominant political economy and the narrative that is constructed is part of a dominance model of capital and the state, in this particular case, which can then explain – even though we don't go into much detail about this in the book – but which can provide a foundational analytical, as well as conceptual, foundation for once again explaining why what's happened in South Africa has happened. In this case, with a focus on the role of the media, the dominant media, how they have constructed that narrative and how we think about what we see in front of us, what we read in the papers, what we see on our screens, everything, and therefore how the response begins to

happen, by the state, by society, to these conflicts and demands from these communities.

RF: So, if we think about this as a sort of textualisation of information, what would you position as being an alternative to that? How do we get to hear those voices?

DM: Sure. In the book Julie deals with this, particularly in the last chapter. There's two parts to answering that question: the one is that we understand that the mainstream commercial media is going to be with us, in whatever form, even if it's in a digitalised form or otherwise, and not necessarily the dominant print media, but it's there. And the one thing there that can begin to change and begin to impact positively is for journalists and editors themselves to understand that it is in their best interests – and we would argue even commercially possibly, if one is to look at the bottom line here – to begin to do their actual jobs, which is to tell stories through listening to people, whoever it is.

The point here is to not come and think 'we're going to tell this story through a particular lens', or 'we're going to please the advertisers by leaving out certain things', and the editor then starts cutting out all sorts of things that are controversial. In other words, for journalists to be true to their profession, which is to tell stories. To tell the truth. And we're not naïve, there's obviously political and economic pressures that fundamentally impact on that, but we want people to try and apply this model, and not to undermine the possibilities of that. So, you know, if a newspaper has got those kinds of principles and values, then it will adopt a model of journalism that begins to do that, while still being able to make a profit and make money in doing so, but where profit and money is not the number one consideration.

In other words, when you cut your staff to such an extent that all you have is junior reporters who have no idea, and have not necessarily been trained properly, and you juniorise your staff to such an extent that there's no investigative journalism, there's no capacity to go and do in-depth reporting, there's nothing. So, essentially what you do is exactly the same as the privatisation of basic services, you run down the public infrastructure to such an extent that you say, 'well, there's only one option now and that's to privatise it and make it commercially viable.' And

then it's a *fait accompli*, and it's the same with the media. And so, what we're arguing is that we need to get back to some of those basics, which were there, even with the mainstream media, to a certain extent, and that kind of formed journalism.

The second part of it is where there's been a massive failure in South Africa – and we would argue in most places – is in the development of alternative media, of community media. We had all of this on paper in 1994 with community radio stations, community newspapers. There was a rich heritage and a huge reservoir of skills and capacity there which has been basically mostly wasted and left to dry out in the desert somewhere. We worked, for example, with community radio stations which have become totally commercialised because they're not supported by the public sector and they're not given the necessary support and capacity building. So, you don't have that media which is non-commercialised, which then actually doesn't have to worry about the bottom line all the time and can tell these stories.

And when we talk to people – for example, in Xolobeni – they were saying to us that the best things they've ever read about themselves came from community media, from the people who were in the area, local journalists, people who understood and who have a much better connection. This is understandable. And so, it's the dearth of community media, of alternative forms of media, and of people's media, which was there in the 1980s to a certain extent, obviously within a particular context, and then which was just fundamentally abandoned.

I mean, if one looks at the MDDA, the Media Development and Diversity Agency, it has been captured itself, it's playing no fundamentally positive role in developing that voice. And in fact, what you have is a situation where when community media exposes corruption, it's attacked by the state, they try to undermine it, to do away with it, this is the response. So again, there's a double-barrelled sort of response here: one is on the ground, community media, the people, and the voice of people being able to find those vehicles; and the other is the commercial media itself and that model of journalism practice.

RF: Thank you. You're a very prolific writer and analyst. What's next in terms of your work?

DM: That's a good question – I'm not quite sure! I've begun to work with the International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG) and part of my work has been turning towards workers and particularly looking at the changing nature of the working class. And I've just finished a research report, which is not going to be a book, but a booklet – a sort of mini-book – called 'Mapping the World of Casualised Work'. So, essentially what we have is a working class that's fundamentally been casualised in various ways – outsourced, part-time labour, labour brokers, and so on. This is where the majority of workers are, so the permanent, industrial proletariat is a minority, and we need to analytically understand that process historically. We also need to begin, as activists and progressives, if we're saying that workers are always part of those social forces that can change society, then we need to understand what's going on, what people are experiencing, how that's playing itself out politically and socially, so I'm beginning to turn my attention towards that. The booklet will come out soon, in the next 3 or 4 months it'll be launched, and maybe that'll turn into a larger project. I think it's an important way of looking at it.

And then, further down the road, I have my eyes on telling a more personal story. For a long time, I've wanted to use my own life story as a sort of metaphor for a range of things, and I've just wanted to do that in a way that I thought might be interesting and accessible to people to read, so that's a possibility. I'm not getting any younger, and so I think it might soon be time for me to turn my attention to doing something like that.